THE SECOND EMPIRE AND THE PRESS

A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED BROCHURES ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN THEIR PROPAGANDA MILIEU

by

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MARTINUS NIJHOFF – THE HAGUE

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To my husband Leonard whose patience and support
made this work possible

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PREFACE

Public opinion had roots in the nineteenth century with the development of industrialization. What is this public? It is the mass of individuals who comprise a society or a nation; this mass in turn is divided into many groups, which have their own interests, prejudices, and beliefs. A government, whether democratic or not, is well aware of the power of public opinion and is anxious to measure and shape it. All three branches of government may direct and educate public thinking, using the instruments of propaganda. *Propaganda is any idea and action designed to influence the views and actions of others.* Today's means of propaganda are books, newspapers, radio, movies, television, public schools, and lastly the rostrum. Molders of opinion believe that words, sounds, and pictures accomplish little unless they are carefully organized and integrated into a well-conceived plan. Once this is accomplished, the ideas conveyed by the words will become part of the people themselves.[1] Special techniques, such as the employment of fear and the play on prejudices, have been used quite succesfully by modern states to impose their own dogmas and policies.

Because the social scientist has been aware of the study of public opinion, he may have concluded that it was a modern innovation; but governments have always been concerned with public opinion, though not always understanding it, and have attempted to influence it. In the diplomatic archives, ministers and ambassadors faithfully recorded their eyewitness reports of public feelings and sent home exhaustive accounts of newspaper editorials and articles and pamphlets; in a preradio age the written word was the important form of communication. Often governments would authorize the bribery of newspaper editors and

[1] E. L. Bernays, "The engineering of consent," *American academy of political and Social science annals,* CCL (March 1947), 118-120.

writers in foreign capitals or would publish pamphlets to influence opinion.

Industrial developments in the nineteenth century affected not only the methods of travel, but also the whole fabric of communications. The extensive use of the telegraph, steamboats, and locomotives made the sending of news much faster. This acceleration was especially needed as the more complex industrial organization necessitated the quick receipt of market prices. As an outgrowth of the increasing use of the telegraph, three new developments occurred. The first was the creation of news agencies, like Reuters and Havas, which became valuable for the transmission of the stock-market readings and summaries of the foreign newspapers. These agencies in turn encouraged the rapid spread of the penny press,[2] in addition to the newly utilized methods of mass news production. Advertising helped to pay for a large part of the cost of printing, and it was soon learned that the over-all cost of publishing greater numbers of papers was not much greater than the printing of a few.[3] The newspaper provided the most important and articulate form of communication; yet it was still not a mass medium: it was geared to appeal to readership with a high degree of literacy – yellow journalism had not yet arrived.

About a thousand and papers circulated in France during the Second Empire, of which three hundred and thirty were printed in Paris and two hundred sixty-seven in the departments. The press was divided into two parts; political and literary. The subject matter of the former papers as a whole tended to be mostly political, although almost all the newspapers had special sections devoted to theatre criticism, art, history, serial stories, humor, and puzzles.[4] The literary press was nonpolitical; a few papers were devoted to literature, art, or philosophy. Some were interested in special topics such as business, agriculture, or crime. These papers were not permitted to discuss politics until after 1868. In 1859 a general amnesty was granted to those political exiles who had left France in 1852, and a few new newspapers were founded in Paris. In 1868 a law was passed lifting all restrictions on the press, which led to the creation of one hundred and forty new journals in Paris alone, of which the greater part was ephemeral.[5]

[2] *History of the London Times* (London, 1935-1952), II 68, 272-273.

[3] E. Dubief, *Le Journalisme* (Paris, 1892), pp. 65-67; Jean Morienval, *Les créateurs de la grande presse en France* (Paris, 1901) gives a very detailed study on this phase of the press through the biographies of Girardin, Villemessant, and Millaud.

[4] Henri Avenel, *Histoire de la presse française depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1900), p. 540.

[5] Georges Weill, *Le journal: origines, évolution, et rôle de la presse périodique* (Paris, 1934), pp. 230-231.

Another form almost as important in the age of the printed word was the pamphlet. Brochures were aimed at the educated, with rational, argumentative and frequently erudite arguments. Louis Jourdain, a newspaperman on the republican *Siècle,* a newspaper of the Second Empire, explained why the pamphlet was used:

> To those who ask why I have to write a brochure, when the *Siècle* is available to me; to those who ask, can a brochure enjoy the publicity and wide circulation of a newspaper I must take a moment to answer.
>
> In spite of the law which forces authors to sign their articles, every newspaper has remained and will remain a collective work. In certain circumstances, when the writer wishes to express his own opinion and to give his opinion more explanation than can the newspaper because of the exigencies of the daily journal, the brochure becomes a supplement, which carries only the responsibility of its author. A brochure is too personal to be placed in the columns of a newspaper. The article can be read in one day; the brochure in two or three.[6]

All governments, but especially that of the Second Empire, utilized this form. Some of the progovernment works were about the Bonapartes and were not issued officially. Some were merely commercial vehicles; others discussed topical interests.

The concern of this study is Napoleon III's attempt during the Second Empire to ascertain and educate public opinion on foreign policy through the use of brochures. Pamphlets on domestic policy have not been included because their effect was shortlived and therefore difficult to ascertain. Moreover, a very large proportion of these propaganda brochures were dull. Generally they eulogized the Bonapartes, or were detailed biographies of the emperor, or were laudatory explanations of Louis Napoleon's good works and policies. They were generally commissioned by the ministers or lesser officials and their effects on public opinion and policy making were generally negligible.

On the other hand, many brochures published on foreign policy were commisioned or written by the emperor himself. This fact gave them a far greater significance than merely progovernment propaganda, and therefore they aroused controversy, suspicion, and debate. Even those which were not debatable in the domestic sphere, created a stir in foreign diplomatic chancellories. The emperor frequently resorted to subterfuge in the commissioning of brochures and research, so far, had not fully uncovered all of his works. The pamphlets selected for this study are those on foreign policy which either emanated from the Tuileries, or

[6] Louis Jourdain, *Les frontières du Rhin* (Paris, 1860), pp. 16-17.

were rumored to have higher inspiration. A few of these brochures were so significant that they actually became political events.

Once this criterion for the selection of pamphlets had been established I found the organization of this work depended on the emperor's journalistic interests, the vagaries of public opinion, and the state of the French press. This study does not reflect all French thinking on all issues, nor is it organized in a logically balanced fashion. Problems such as the Crimean War and the Mexican Question have been ignored because I have found no evidence of inspired pamphlets. But the Italian and Roman questions receive an inordinate amount of space because the brochures involved created divisive controversy, and the whole issue of the Pope's temporal power aroused enormous emotional responses among the clericals which had not been evidenced in any of the other debates on foreign policy.

Napoleon III used newspapers to support and publicize the more important pamphlets. In order to understand and best appreciate French as well as diplomatic reaction, one must grasp the subtleties of press management by the government. These subtleties are discussed throughout to provide the background needed for a full understanding of the brochure milieu. Napoleon III straddled that period of history which portended the economic and political developments of our times; and the study of propaganda and news management by the French government, in many instances sounds a modern note.

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CHAPTER I

THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION OF 1848

Long before Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected President of the Second Republic in December 1848, the Bonapartes had used propaganda. For example, the personal control of the press by Napoleon I enhanced his universal popularity in France prior to the disaster in Russia. Fully aware of the magnetic power of glittering honorifics, he had named his son the King of Rome at his birth; the additional title of Duke of Reichstadt, though politically ineffective, further illustrates the Bonaparte awareness of the power of title. In 1839, Louis Napoleon wrote *Napoleonic Ideas* to celebrate the philosophy and career of his illustrious uncle; and in 1844 he published *The Extinction of Poverty,* which, though vague and groping in its genuine idealism, established him clearly as a liberal thinker.

When early in 1848 the revolution established universal male suffrage, Louis, exiled in England, recognized the problem of affecting mass voting in a largely illiterate society. In addition to the unlettered, another group – the literate, articulate, and economically significant middle class – had to be reached. All who were seeking power, not just Louis, were aware that in the intensely political period of 1848-1849, many forms of propaganda were needed. Therefore, all candidates sought means to influence the unlettered; to sway the middle class, they published newspapers and sought the support of the major journals.

Napoleonic propaganda in the revolution of 1848 was weak. Louis Napoleon had almost no press support before June 1848, and what he had after June was limited. There were few organized clubs, or other propaganda activity. Upon the outbreak of the revolution, the Prince felt he had to make a gesture. He left England for Paris, where he pledged himself to the flag of the republic. The provisional government was neither impressed nor gladdened: instead Louis Napoleon was

ordered to leave French territory within twenty-four hours. He returned to London on 1 March and remained in exile until September 1848.[1]

In Paris some of Louis Napoleon's faithful comrades formed committees. Louis would not agree to run in the elections for the constituent assembly. The committees agreed to abide by the Prince's wishes in the election, but began to spread his name by word of mouth and to suggest that a ballot containing his name be presented at the "voters" urn; but funds remained short.[2] Severall small posters appeared on the walls, frequently patriotic in character and signed by workingmen. These made a direct appeal to the poor and cited Louis' brochure *The Extinction of Poverty.* One poster signed by Victor Hugo, Edgar Ney, Thibaudeau, and Caussidière promised that Louis would support the republican government and "maintain the sovereignty of the people, bring amelioration to the laboring classes, encourage commerce and industry, and finally respect private property." [3] The results proved to be altogether satisfactory. Bonapartes were elected: Napoleon Bonaparte, son of Jerome; Pierre Bonaparte, son of Lucien; and Murat from the department of Lot. A large number of votes for Louis Napoleon had been dropped in the electoral urns in the workers' quarters in Paris; and in the Province of Charente-Inférieure, 5,800 votes had been cast for him without any campaign, publicity, or even ballots.[4]

This limited success in the April elections heartened the committee; and despite Louis Napoleon's reluctance to become a candidate, the committee stole the initiative and began to post placards announcing his candidacy for vacancies in the Assembly in the June by-election.[5] Encouraged by this disobedience, Persigny posed his own candidacy in the departments. Louis now had no choice but to accede very reluctantly to the fait accompli. The vote of the June by-elections confirmed the results of the earlier elections. Despite the absence of press comment, the

[1] Paul Duchon, "Les élections de 1848 d'après les correspondances inéditées du Prince Napoléon et M. de Persigny," *Revue de Paris,* VII (1936), 35.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 40; Aristide Ferrère, *Révélations sur la propagande napoléonienne faite en 1848 et 1849* (Turin, 1862), pp. 72-110. Ferrère reported spending his own money to buy ballots for the elections in Paris before June.

[3] André Jean Tudesq, *Les élections présidentielles de Louis Napoléon Bonaparte 10 décembre 1848* (Paris, 1965), pp. 43, 84, 110.

[4] Odilon Barrot, *Mémoires posthumes* (Paris 1876), II, 227-330; Dr. Veron, *Mémoires d'un bourgeois* (Paris, 1856), V, 147-150.

[5] Henry Izambard, *La presse parisienne* (Paris 1853), pp. 20-203; H. Wallon, *Revue critique des journaux publiés à Paris depuis la révolution de février jusqu'à la fin de décembre* (Paris, 1849), pp. 2-182; Irene Collins, *The government and the newspaper press in France, 1814-1881* (London, 1959), p. 108; London *Times,* 14, 17, 19 June 1848.

placards and ballots seemed sufficient to elect Louis Napoleon deputy in Paris, Yonne, Charente-Inférieure and Corsica.[6]

Bonapartists propaganda took a sudden spurt after the 4 June elections. Funds, difficult to obtain, suddenly became more accessible. Placards, used only for elections before, now became commonplace. Piat's posters begged the workers who had voted for Louis Napoleon not to listen to the seduction of revolution.[7] There were apparently enough funds to start new newspaper: *Le napoléonien, Le petit caporal, Napoléon républicain, Le Bonapartiste, La Redingote grise.* In July there appeared *La gazette nationale,* in August *Le peuple constituant,* in September *Les humanitaires,* and *Journal de Napoléon-Louis Bonaparte,* and in October *La présidence de Napoléon, L'aigle républicain,* and *La liberté.* The majority of these papers were small and usually carried a portrait of Napoleon I or the Prince. Besides the mushrooming of a Bonapartist press, innumerable medals and pictures were given away or sold cheaply. A small biography of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, representative of the people, was widely distributed. The small pamphlet contained details extolling his birthright, education, his first military deeds, his journalistic works, the attempts of Strasbourg and Boulogne, his trial, captivity, escape and his brilliant future. It cost only a sou. The Napoleonic eagle appeared on hats; small flags were accompanied by the words "Vive le Prince Louis!" The largest newspaper, *La liberté,* each day sold five-hundred copies.[8]

Fear of unrest, evidenced by frequent demonstrations and the invasion of the Assembly on 15 May by the radical clubs, alarmed the government, who believed that the Bonapartists were the conspiratorial agents inciting rebellion. Persigny and Laity were arrested by the government, and Louis Napoleon was threatened with arrest if he should come to France. This fear was accentuated by the spontaneous gathering of the crowds crying "Vive Napoléon, Vive Barbes" which gathered in the Place de la Concorde, around the Tuileries, and in the Rue de Rivoli.[9]

Trouble came when the Assembly ended the national workshops and the workers mounted the barricades at the end of June (23-26). The fear of anarchy and disorder created by the social upheaval necessitated the

[6] Robert Pimienta, *La propagande Bonapartiste en 1848* (Paris, 1911), pp. 46-47; André Lebey, *Louis Napoléon Bonaparte et la révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1907), I, 237-288.

[7] London *Times,* 13 June 1848; Lebey, I, 240.

[8] *Gazette de France,* 12, 13 June 1848; *Patrie* 13 June cited in H. Thirria, *Napoléon III avant l'empire* (Paris, 1875), I, 283; London *Times,* 13 June 1848; Pimienta, p. 55.

[9] *Ibid.*

assistance of the army, which cruelly demolished the barricades, and with the support of volunteers from the provinces, restored the peace. On 23 June, eleven newspapers were closed and their editors arrested: included were the socialist *Organisation du travail; Lampion* (a satirical paper which attacked the government with barbed humor); the *Napoléon républicain,* which had appeared only six times; and the large successful *Presse,* because Girardin, the editor, had accused the republic of dictatorship.[10] General Cavaignac took measures to suppress what he considered dangers to the republic, whether from the left or the right. Printers, becoming frightened, began to refuse controversial copy. The repressive attitude was reflected in the Assembly as fear overcame the love of liberty. The law of libel was extended, and caution money, which had been allowed to lapse, was again required, although the amount required was lower than in 1835. Many of the poorer papers were forced out of business entirely. The same policy was enforced in the provinces, but far more slowly.[11]

After June Days, the Assembly, preoccupied with the creation of a constitution, debated the nature of the executive and his election. The Assembly finally agreed on the direct election of the president by universal manhood suffrage. In September the legislators after an exhaustive argument agreed pretenders could be eligible for the presidency, and the law banishing the Bonapartes was repealed.

In September, by-elections were held, and once more the results were gratifying to the Bonapartes. Louis Napoleon was elected in the Seine, Charente-Inférieure, Yonne. He came to Paris on 26 September, and began to prepare for the next step, that of the presidency. Moquard, lawyer, journalist and friend, became his secretary, and the Prince took personal direction of his campaign. The Bonapartes continued the wooing of the masses, but now sought the enlistment of important men to their cause by stressing issues of law and order. Prince Napoleon sought the recruitment of De Broglie, Barrot, Carlier, Emile Thomas, Thiers, all of whom desired stability and security. These men had little hope for the Legitimist or Orleanist candidates and were suspicious of Cavaignac's republicanism. They formed the Party of Order and reluctantly joined

[10] Collins, p. 105; Lebey, I, 295; Alfred Darimon, *A travers une révolution 1847-1855* (Paris, 1884), pp. 66-73; Maréchal de Castellane, *Journal* (Paris, 1896), IV, 93; Emile de Girardin published a pamphlet entitled *Journal of a journalist* which violently attacked General Cavaignac.

[11] Izambard, pp. 27, 59-60, 70-71, 90, 126, 130-131; Collins, pp. 105-106; Castellane, IV, 95; Archives nationales, MSS, Paris, Ministry of Justice, 360, Dijon, 1 July 1848. (Hereafter referred to as AN BB carton no.)

the Bonapartist campaign. They were willing to make a temporary political alliance because they believed in monarchy and in firm support of the church. They were careful to avoid too much precision in their enunciation of their political philosophy.[12] There were many candidates for the presidency (Lamartine, Raspail, Ledru-Rollin), but the two most significant were General Cavaignac and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

Louis Napoleon's alliance with the Party of Order reaped him the support of a large proportion of the important Parisian papers: Girardin's *Presse,* the *Constitutionnel,* Hugo's *Evénement* and the legitimist papers *Gazette de France, Patrie* and *L'assemblée nationale.*[13]

The peasants in the more isolated countryside and the veterans of the wars of the First Empire remained loyal to the memory of the Empire, which the posters and emblems emphasized. Committees published Louis Napoleon's literary and political works and distributed them free of charge. The only press support in the South came from the Paris papers circulating there, notably the *Presse.*[14]

Louis Napoleon used committees of commercial travellers to try to convince departmental newspapers to carry Napoleonic propaganda. They also distributed circulars signed by the Prince himself to the larger landlords and the prosperous farmers.[15] *L'argus Soissonnais* observed that of the three hundred eighty departmental papers, the largest part openly defended Cavaignac; many others divided between Raspail and Ledru-Rollin, and in a few isolated provinces, Lamartine.[16] But the alliance with the Party of Order did bring new press support, more than the Prince had ever enjoyed before.[17] The posters used by the Bonapartes emphasized the belief in republicanism and the prince's loyalty to democracy, stressed the dangers of social conflict, and promised a relief from taxes and a return of prosperity. In many sections of the countryside, the prefects aided Cavaignac's campaign by ordering the Bonapartist posters to be torn down and pamphlets suppressed. In Loire et Cher, Metz, and Côte

[12] Duc de Broglie, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1938), I, 209; De Saint-Arnaud, *Quatrelles de l'épine* (Paris, 1895), I, 33-34; Charles de Remusat, *Mémoires de ma vie, 1852-1875* (Paris, 1867), IV, 368-369, 372; Granier de Cassagnac, *Souvenirs du Second Empire* (Paris, 1879), I, 4; Darimon, p. 64; Cuvillier-Fleury, *Journal et correspondance intime* (Paris, 1903) II, 487; Comte de Falloux, *Mémoires d'un royaliste* (Paris, 1888) I, 84-387.

[13] Pimienta, pp. 8-10, 95-97, 106, 113; Collins, p. 108; Remusat, IV, 372; Granier de Cassagnac, I, 18.

[14] Prosper Rossi, *Mes souvenirs* (Toulon, 1888), I, 110, 114-118.

[15] Lebey, II, 24-26.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 193; Tudesq, *Les élections* gives a detailed press analysis; AN BB 30 327, Paris, 19 November 1848 stated that the departments of Saône and Loire were very devoted to Lamartine.

[17] Lebey, II, 192-95.

d'Or, the prefect's zealous advocacy of the republican candidate led to a campaign of strict police surveillance and an attempt to eradicate the rival's propaganda efforts. In Var the prefect plastered many walls with government posters in the villages and in the city of Toulon, but he was bitterly resented for this official propaganda.[18]

A great profusion and variety of medals were distributed. Usually they bore a picture of Napoleon I or Louis Napoleon and the inscriptions: "Liberty, equality, fraternity. The nation supports its representative Louis Napoleon" or perhaps "No one is more devoted to defense, order or the strengthening of the Republic." [19]

Presidential elections were held 10 December 1848. The results proved an overwhelming success for Louis Napoleon. Almost all of the sections of France granted him huge majorities, except the departments of Var, Bouches-du-Rhône, Finisterre, and Morbihan. The vote in the countryside was overwhelmingly Napoleonic, while the cities split their votes among many candidates. The peasants solidly supported Bonapartism, and this election marked the first attempt of some of the peasants to move away from the influence "of the oligarchy of the departmental notables." [20]

Louis Napoleon won the presidency in December 1848 by exploiting the fears, frustrations, and dissatisfactions engendered by the Second Republic. His emphasis upon Napoleon I and the Empire (Napoleonic Legend) brought the loyalty of millions of peasants and gave a charismatic glow to the new President. His campaign, however, had illustrated certain weakness in the new government. Cavaignac had enjoyed a widespread press, and he had had the aid of the administrative apparatus. Louis' victory came despite these powerful antagonists: it resulted from irritation and anger, from limited support of the Party of Order, and from a romantic yearning for past glory. To consolidate his victory, then, Louis, who had no real party and no real press, would have to build both.

Upon his assumption of power, Napoleon III used the instruments of communication to mold opinion and used his administrative apparatus to measure public reaction. The press was muzzled by direct and indirect pressures until 1868. Journalists were hired, papers secretly subsidized,

[18] Collins, p. 109; Robert Schnerb, "La Côte d'Or et l'élection présidentielle du 10 décembre 1848," *Révolution de 1848,* XXXI (1924), 376; A. Hamelin, "La Seconde République dans le Loir et Cher, *Etudes, société de l'histoire de la révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1953), p. 77.

[19] Ferrère, pp. 167-68; Pimienta, pp. 41, 81, 83.

[20] René Rémond, *The right wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle,* translated by James M. Laux (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 141-144.

brochures published, speeches written – all to influence public opinion. The techniques employed by the Second Empire were not original; they had their roots in the policies of the Orleanist monarchy and the Second Republic.

The press was considered the most important form of communication, and government use of it did not originate with Napoleon III. The July monarchy founded the Bureau de l'esprit public, a primitive propaganda agency, which subsidized some papers in Paris and the provinces – but which was primarily used during elections.[21] The practice continued during the Second Republic, though the subsidies were more in the form of public announcements and judicial notices.[22]

During the Orleans monarchy, restrictions had been placed on the press after 9 September 1835 which stated that political criticism was seditious libel and subject to heavy fines. All those who founded a newspaper had to pay caution money – a deposit paid to the treasury as a guarantee for payment of fines. The founders were required to disclose the address of the publisher or editor responsible for the paper. The revolution of 1848 granted freedom of the press by ignoring the deposit fee (although it remained the law). Immediately Paris was flooded with newspapers (more than 450 in a few months), most of which were small, printed on poor paper, and short-lived. They covered every shade of political opinion.[23] The Second Republic did not hesitate to establish a press in order to "educate the people" and to comment upon current happenings. The newspaper, *Bulletin de la République,* appeared 13 March and continued until 6 May 1848. In addition, the Minister of the Interior, Ledru-Rollin, carefully edited all posters sent to the communes.[24]

Political cartoons were effective, and those of the newspaper *Charivari* were the most noteworthy. Louis also used cartoon posters in the political parades of 1849 to emphasize the belief in republicanism and the prince's loyalty to democracy, to stress the dangers of social conflict, and to promise a relief from taxes and a return of prosperity.

To divide society into two hostile classes can cause new catastrophes, fix your choice on candidates who can serve public reconciliation. There is a name which is a symbol of order, glory, of patriotism, the one which has today gained the confidence and the affection of the people.... He will

[21] Jean Morienval, *Les créateurs de la grande presse en France* (Paris, 1901), p. 15; David Kulstein, *Napoleon III and the working class* (San Jose, 1969), pp. 125-126.

[22] Archives nationales, MSS, Paris, Ministry of Justice, BB 30 318, contains a whole file of such announcements.

[23] Collins, pp. 82-83.

[24] Rémusat, IV, 288; Wallon, p. 39.

obtain amnesty for the unhappy condemned ones of June and the knowledge he has of political and social questions will aid him to save you from unemployment, misery, and anarchy.[25]

Later, Louis would suppress such cartoon posters.[26]

The most auspicious political activity took place in the political clubs. Founded in the revolution of 1789, they managed to survive and flower in the later revolution of 1848. In the 1830's and 1840's the clubs had been democratic, republican, anarchist, and socialist, but all were secret. They provided a forum for political propaganda, especially among the poorer working classes. During the revolution of 1848 the number of clubs mushroomed to include all political opinions, and some embraced social and occupational cliques: clubs of Belgian, Polish, Italian émigrés; those of women's emancipation, school teachers, artists, journalists, cooks, etc.[27] In 1848 some clubs were founded specifically to spread campaign propaganda for the presidential elections: for General Cavaignac, for Louis Napoleon. Dues were collected to be spent on circulars, caricatures, and pamphlets which were widely distributed in Paris and the provinces.[28] Sometimes the republican clubs sent delegates to the provinces to spread republican ideas, sometimes to aid in founding branches.[29] Radicals met in smoky cafes where they harangued, cajoled and swayed their enthusiastic half-drunken members.[30] These organizations were most effective in towns and cities. They were significant in Paris, where there were at least one hundred fifty clubs meeting nightly. If 800 to 1000 belonged to one of these groups, about 90,000 were participating regularly in political discussions or indoctrination.[31] In the regions of Aude and Herault the clubs tended to be left wing.[32] In Normandy, despite the absence of many large cities, the clubs were strong and numerous enough to encourage the appearance of local political candidates before

[25] Lebey, II, 192-195.

[26] Censorship forced the political cartoonist to desist from commentary on any current happenings during the Second Empire. *Charivari* was suspended briefly to re-emerge with an enlarged format, giving its space to drama and literary criticism and social satire. Cartooning avoided political connotations, its emphasis being social criticism. During the Orleans Monarchy and the Second Republic, *Charivari* as well as other papers used the political cartoon to lampoon their political enemies. The most famous of these works were by Daumier, who after 1852 had to turn to social satire.

[27] Alphonse Lucas, *Les clubs et les clubists* (Paris, 1851), pp. 1-4.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-19.

[29] Charles Moulin, "Les clubs et la presse," in *1848, le livre du centenaire* (Paris, 1948), pp. 140-143.

[30] Leo Loubère, "The emergence of the extreme left in Lower Languedoc, 1848-1851," *American historical review,* LXXXIII (April, 1868), 1025-1026.

[31] London *Times,* 17 April 1848.

[32] Loubere, p. 1025.

them.[33] Clubs in Lyons and the surrounding communes attracted dissatisfied workers, and provided an eloquent forum where many then engaged in violent political action: strikes, riots, and the smashing of machinery.[34] In Limoges the clubs provided leadership of an insurrection that had seized the City Hall for a few days.[35] In Marseilles and Toulon and the smaller cantons in the South, legitimist, socialist, and republican clubs often clashed in open fighting after they had left their respective public houses.[36] After the June Days, the Republic recognized the pervasive influences of these clubs and began to suppress them. They did not disappear, but under the guise of being workers' associations or circles (which were legal) continued to propagate their varied political doctrines. The authorities were not fooled: continual surveillance was maintained over these circles. They were generally harried so much during the latter part of the Republic and the Second Empire that they met secretly. The repression continued throughout the entire Second Empire, a recognition of the efficacy of their techniques of indoctrination.[37]

Other influences were effective in molding public opinion: custom and tradition were especially important in the rural isolated provincial area. The local landlord, the local noble, the large entrepreneur could by voicing his opinion and through the respect he commanded be more influential than tons of written propaganda.[38] In some locales the church in the form of the local curate exercised significant persuasive power; in other sections the masonic lodges exercised influence.[39] Frequently the local curate was very effective as the source of legitimist propaganda.[40] Besides the political talks of the local notable, or the priest's sermons,

[33] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Recollections,* translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos (New York, 1949), pp. 93-96.

[34] AN BB 30 361, procureurs généraux reports, Lyons, 11 March, 27 June, 6, 8 July 1848; Archives départementales, MSS, Lyons, Police reports, M 6, 30 March, 17, 21, 28, 29 April, 16, 17, 27 May 1848, 6 June 1848 (hereafter referred to AD M6).

[35] AN BB 30 361, Limoges, 30 April 1848; Cour d'assises de Vienne, Affaire de Limoges.

[36] AN BB 30 358, Aix, 14 March, 27, 29, 31 July, 30 August, 19 September 1848; Agen, 12, 24 May 1848; BB 30 365, Riom, 20, 29 July, Toulouse, 22 April, 11, 20 May, 27 June 1848.

[37] AN BB 30 370, Aix, 10 December 1849; AD M6 (29), Aix, 23 January 1850, AD M6 (355) Marseille, 7 July 1849, 11 November 1849; Howard Payne, *The police state of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte 1850-60* (Seattle, 1966), pp. 11-26; Léon Machu, "Deux aspects de la répression policière dans le Nord à l'époque du Second Empire," *Revue du Nord,* XLVI (July-September, 1964), 386-392.

[38] AN BB 30 358, Aix, 7 April, 31 July, 8 November 1849; AN BB 30 333, Rennes, 7 September 1848; AD M6 (26) Marseille, 25 May 1848; Lord Normanby, *Memoirs of a year of revolution* (London, 1953), I, 344.

[39] André Tudesq, *Les grands notables en France, 1840-1849* (Paris, 1964), II, 1054.

[40] Loubère, p. 1025; AN BB 30 359, Besançon, 13 September 1848.

the demonstration – sometimes highly organized, sometimes spontaneous – could be effective. Crowds gathered shouting slogans, wearing hats, carrying pictures of their candidates. This device was used by the government to ingratiate and sell itself to the masses. During the Second Republic the planting of a liberty tree was an occasion to hold a festival, or a municipal procession, and in general to have a holiday. The local bishop or even Archbishop was called to bless the tree, and the ceremony was followed by speeches of public officials praising the republic or moderate republican candidates. A British contemporary relates:

> Frequently within the last three weeks have I strolled on foot into the populous and distant faubourgs, following ... some of those strange processions carrying bare sickly poplars to plant in some most appropriate spot as trees of liberty; the curé being required to attend with his blessings: apparently to guard against open ridicule of that which was purely absurd.[41]

The ceremonies were certainly effective; political demonstrations took place around trees, and the enemies of the Republic mutilated them.[42] The importance of these trees did not escape the Bonapartes, and in the repression which followed the coup d'état of 1851, a decree was issued ordering the arbors be uprooted and destroyed because, as one official explained, "they are the embarrassing reminders of bad days which have seen order and liberty equally compromised." [43] Long a custom of all regimes, and continued even more lavishly, was that of the government-sponsored holidays or fêtes to honor political occasions. Usually a Te Deum mass was celebrated, many speeches were delivered by the local notables, fireworks and processions were held – all of which served as the vehicle for praising a new constitution, treaty, or election.

Another device to sustain the projected image of the leader was trips and speeches throughout the countryside. Louis Napoleon especially liked this form of propaganda. The local officials, notified of his trips ahead of time, prepared gala celebrations: fireworks, a review of the troops, and an assemblage of loyal followers, who were always enthusiastic and loud in their appreciation. The results were generally gratifying to the administration, because crowds were large and properly effusive.[44]

[41] Normanby, I, 279.

[42] *Ibid.;* Yves Millet, *Un centenaire, la révolution de 1848 dans l'arrondissement d'Avesne* (Paris, n.d.), pp. 54-57; Rossi, I, 46-49.

[43] Decree of prefect, Bouches-du-Rhône, 22 December 1849, *Époque à Marseille* (Marseille, 1948), pp. 97-98; Darimon, p. 76; Castellane, IV, 205.

[44] AN BB 30 327, Paris, n.d., telegrams of sous-préfet to minister of the interior, 9, 19 July 1852; Strasbourg, adjutant to minister of war, marine and justice, 19 July 1852; Archives nationales, MSS, Paris, FIC III 10, Rhone, prefect reports, 3 July 1852 (hereafter cited as AN FIC III carton no. ...).

The song was another popular and succesful form of political indoctrination, used in demonstrations and parades, and was an excellent medium for carrying messages to the unlettered. All groups used songs, especially the left: chants entitled "The Marseillaise of the workers union," the "Liberty of the people," "the Universal vote." After the elections in April 1848 the Bonapartist committees enlarging their propaganda activity also included songs in their arsenal. One was "The French people for Louis Napoleon." Songs that were the most popular stressed the First Empire, and France's grandeur. Memories of the "little corporal" were revived with this refrain which was well known:

Napoléon rentre dans ton palais
Napoléon sois bon républicain
Napoleon return to your palace
Napoleon be a good republican.[45]

Other propaganda devices used to supplement organized demonstrations were posters with pictures as well as proclamations of policy which were nailed in prominent places. Placards were short and their message was simple, making it possible for one person to read aloud for the benefit of many others. During the Second Republic the prefects frequently endorsed candidates at the ceremony of tree planting, and also by using the walls of the city for their own placards. Then they used their position to tear down those of their political rivals.[46] Handing ballots to the voters during an election itself was another method of carrying a political message. This practice was also improved as the prefects became more influential and respected. They learned to influence the peasants, and gradually substituted the prestige of the government for that of the local aristocrat.[47]

It was apparent to the newly elected president that if he wished to create a loyal following, a genuine "party," a public opinion friendly to his policies, he would have to create his own propaganda forces. He needed the press, and he had developed a great respect for the papers and journalists. Besides, he himself frequently wrote for the press. It would be

[45] Pierre Barbier and France Vernillat, *Histoire de France par les chansons,* VII, *La république de 1848 et le Second Empire* (Paris, 1959), 74-75; 82-83; Roger Lévy, "Le culte de Napoléon en Normandie," *La Révolution de 1848,* V (November, December, 1911), 379-391; Jules L. Puech, "Chansons sur les hommes de 1848," *La révolution de 1848,* XXXIII (1936), 82-97; René Arnaud, *The Second Republic and Napoleon III,* translated by E. F. Buckley (New York), p. 20.

[46] AN FIC III, 4 Yonne, Prefect reports, Minister of the interior to prefect, Paris, 31 August 1848; Rossi, *Souvenirs,* I, 114-118.

[47] Rémond, *loc. cit.*

through the brochures, the articles, the daily and weekly political and literary journals that Louis Napoleon would hope to convert the influential, the articulate, the propertied, and the intellectuals to his support. If he were ever to consolidate his gains, if he were ever to challenge the constitution, if he were ever to re-establish the Empire, he would need to create opinions and attitudes favorable to him; and it was the upper and middle classes who would verbalize the necessary consensus.

To achieve these ends, to create a press loyal to him and his policies, the new president had at his disposal many precedents and a governmental structure aptly suited to serve Paris, regardless of its political philosophy.

The prefectoral corps was one such area which proved most useful to the Napoleonic regime. The prefectoral corps and lesser officials had long before the Second Empire managed elections to benefit the existing regime, or repress the existing dissent within their jurisdictions. These practices were continued during the revolution of 1848 and reached their apogee under Napoleon III. In 1852, Persigny, the Minister of the Interior, stated this policy openly:

> The public good can only be assured on condition that the legislative body is in perfect harmony of ideas with the Head of State. Consequently, M. le Préfet, by the intermediacy of the various agents of the Administration and by any and every means you consider to be consistent with the feeling of your area (and if necessary by proclamation in the communes) take all steps necessary to bring to the attention of the electors of your Department those candidates that the Government of Louis Napoleon judges to be the most useful in helping him in his work of reconstruction.[48]

The prefects continued with greater finesse and zeal: not only to select candidates to run for the legislative bodies, but also to use posters, demonstrations, and government money to aid in victory. They were especially successful at this political manipulation until the 1860.'s.[49] In addition to managing elections, the prefects also repressed the newspapers and other forms of dissent. The practice had started in the Restoration and the July Monarchy and had continued in the name of "political education" during the revolution of 1848. During the Second Empire the prefects' powers were greatly increased until they developed arbitrary police power to arrest, deport and threaten those who might be dangerous to the public safety. Their hold was extended to the supervision of the

[48] Brian Chapman, *The prefects and provincial France* (London, 1955), pp. 32-36.
[49] Theodore Zeldin, *The political system of Napoleon III* (London, 1958) is the best account of this.

press also. "Haughty, authoritarian, unscrupulous and ruthless, they dominated the internal life of France for nearly twenty years. They were loaded with honors and prestige by Napoleon III and their social and political eminence was only a little less than that of the general officers of the army staff." [50]

Press laws were administered rigorously, especially after Rouher became Minister of Justice in August 1849. He co-operated closely with Baroche, the minister of the interior, and Carlier, the chief of police, and all three expedited enforcement.[51] Papers in the provinces were very vulnerable to government pressure: the denial of official announcements could be disastrous to their financial income.[52] The prefects carefully supervised these newspapers and did not hesitate to suppress those whose political views were antithetical to the government. The result was that many editors took the easy way out and simply refrained from commenting on political events.[53]

The prefectoral corps also served as an area where loyal, though not always the most brilliant service, could be rewarded. During the Second Empire, journalists were given comfortable niches in the provinces. The most notable examples were Paulin Limayrac and Anselm Petetin. On the whole, however, the prefects proved to be a loyal integral group, provided the political leadership and expedited the desires of the central government.[54]

Other administrative forces which assisted both the prefects and the central government were the police and the district attorneys (*procureurs généraux*). The police reports contained information concerning mendacity, riots, political activities of the "circles" and the press, as well as crime. These accounts formed the basis of reports by the procureurs and the prefects which were sent to Paris. Napoleon III was anxious to measure what the public thought of his projects. His system of ascertainment was not scientific or even wholly satisfactory, but it gave some indication of the pulse of opinion. The prefects and the *procureurs-généraux* were the pollsters of the Second Empire. Both sent reports to the central government at Paris touching on the prevailing state of opinion; but of the two the *procureurs-généraux* were the most important. They were actually the legal agents of the ministry of justice,

[50] Chapman, p. 38.
[51] Collins, p. 111; Robert Schnerb, *Rouher et le Second Empire* (Paris, 1949), p. 32.
[52] Kulstein, p. 55.
[53] Chapman, pp. 42-43.
[54] Payne, pp. 23-28.

very similar to our district attorneys. These officials had contact with many kinds of people and were able to pick up much information. Napoleon III was far more interested in the reports of the procureurs than in those of the prefects. The former were received, examined carefully, underlined; and the margins were filled with comments, lines and checks.[55] The procureur reports, sent every three months, were detailed, regular, and very confidential. However, the difficulty for the historian is that the *procureurs-généraux* were not scientific pollsters and were not too accurate when they attempted to ascertain the feelings of the populace; in the very nature of their work they dealt more with the well educated and the bourgeoisie, and often unconsciously reflected such attitudes rather than those of the whole population. Moreover, this segment of the population was more vocal in its viewpoint than any other. Since the reports were sent to Paris every three months, they gave a rather generalized impression of feelings rather than responses to specific events, such as a pamphlet, speech, etc. Sometimes the suspicion may arise that these reports were slanted, because of the fear of offending the emperor. Anti-administration sentiment was indeed minimized, but a large majority of the reports seemed quite honest about acknowledging the views of the opposition.[56]

The press agency Havas was also used by the government to spread propaganda or to distort unfavorable news. Havas received large-scale subsidies in return for which news was slanted to favor the administration and was ignored if unfavorable.[57] Serving 307 papers, Havas proved especially important because it provided rapid means by which denial, change, or useful information could be circulated. Using the telegraphic form, Havas served all of France.[58]

The press was restricted by direct and indirect pressures until 1868. A newspaper had to have a government permit before it could be published; the editors and publishers had to be sanctioned by bureaucrats. After a monetary deposit was paid, there were high postal rates and special taxes on each paper. Besides these restrictions the government also controlled the sale of papers in the streets and the railroad stations. The government had a system of warnings. If an article appeared that an official deemed "excessive, dangerous or disagreeable," the paper was

[55] L. M. Case, "New sources for the study of French opinion during the Second Empire," *Southwestern social science quarterly,* XVIII (1937), 165.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[57] Archives nationales, MSS, Paris ministry of press, F 18 310 (hereafter cited as AN F 18 carton number).

[58] Note on the organization of the press, 15 April 1869, *Papiers et correspondance de la famille impériale* (Paris, 1871), I, 26.

warned. If the defendant received three warnings, the paper was then subject to a two-month suspension, which was sometimes fatal financially. On the more positive side, the ministry of the interior had various methods of subsidization. One was the outright grant of money to assure the existence of the newspaper; another was the purchase of innumerable subscriptions assuring an income for the paper.[59] Semi-official and friendly journals received exclusive government press releases. Often these favors were extended as bribes for co-operation. Besides this, friendly papers were given official authorization to publish administrative announcements (another form of subvention), and any failure to be conciliatory meant withdrawal of this help, which meant bankruptcy for the weak. In the provinces there was much closer co-operation among the papers. In addition, the administration used the system of the syndicated press. A particularly favorable editorial appearing in a Paris paper often appeared in the various provincial papers signed by different editors.[60]

But the newspaper was not the only channel for inculcation of ideas. In an age in which the only means of indoctrination were the printed word and direct speech, the book and the pamphlet were far more important than today, and again the government utilized these weapons. The pamphlet was a propaganda tool frequently used by all governments. The regime could marshal the forces of its press to give the brochure enormous publicity. By publishing either the whole or excerpts of its inspired brochure, it also could assure a large circulation and increase the size of its reading audience. How could a single newspaper article, except by constant repetition, create this kind of effect? A speech could be given enormous publicity, but its official connection could never be denied. However, if reaction to a pamphlet was strongly antagonistic, the government would immediately withdraw press support and if necessary, deny inspiration or perhaps seize the pamphlet.

The co-operation of the newspapers and the brochures assured the emperor an audience. He desired not only to ascertain what the people thought about various issues but also to create opinion. The minister of the interior, Persigny, in 1852 expressed this government attitude:

The evil doctrines spread through the country by anarchic works, and the moral disorder and crimes which are the consequences, call for an energetic

[59] AN F 18 306.

[60] L. M. Case, *French opinion on war and diplomacy during the Second Empire* (Philadelphia, 1954), pp. 4-11; Henri Avenel, *Histoire de la presse française depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1900), pp. 448-540.

intervention on the part of the administration in favor of good social principles. This intervention can best be accomplished by means of publications and pamphlets encouraged and, if need be financed by the administration . . .[61]

These brochures were often recognized as government sponsored and were "best sellers." French bookstores and publishers quickly spotted an easy way of selling their product. Since a semi-official publication was always significant news, and people bought the brochures, they were frequently imitated. By 1863 the market was flooded with brochures on the question of the day, published anonymously, with the same type of print and binding as used in the government-inspired pamphlets. Often they were introduced in the Belgian or the French papers. The people always seemed to jump at the bait, so that an edition or two might be exhausted before it was apparent that they were faked. No matter how many times this happened, the public continued to buy because they hoped that one among them was government inspired.[62] As we move further along in the history of the Second Empire, it becomes more and more difficult to discern which brochures were emanating from the Tuileries, and they became less significant as propaganda instruments.

The administration also maintained controls over the brochure, though not so tight as those on the press. The publisher had to pay an extra tax in the form of an official stamp before brochures could be sold in the bookstores; the warning system did not apply in this case. If the brochure were offensive, it was seized by the police and the sales stopped. Publishers were unlikely to risk financial losses by printing material that did not conform politically. In 1868 these restrictions were removed. Napoleon III was not averse to having brochures published as trial balloons, followed by a government seizure after a limited sale. The emperor did not hesitate to disavow any brochure if it suited his political needs, just as he did to his semi-official newspapers. His ministers were frequently unaware of many of his specific collaborations. Walewski, when foreign minister, complained to the emperor that "the brochures and newspaper articles supporting your policy were conceived and executed without my knowledge." [63]

Pamphlets were inspired on many levels, some by the lesser civil servants, others by members of the cabinet, and the most important by the

[61] *Circulaires, rapports, notes et instructions confidentielles 1851-1870* (Paris, 1872), 22 December 1852, pp. 96-97.

[62] London *Times*, 30 November 1863.

[63] Walewski to Napoleon III, Paris, 22 August 1859; G. Raindre, "Souvenirs et correspondance du Comte Walewski," *Revue de France*, IV (1925), 316-317.

Emperor himself. Many included in this study were not read by Napoleon III, but they are included because of their effect and importance; while many inspired by the Emperor created no impression.

In this chapter, we have seen that repressive laws eliminated the strident opposition and the existing administrative apparatus manipulated the press; but most of the measures hitherto described were negative. The need to create an atmosphere favorable to the Bonapartes necessitated *strong* progovernment newspapers, and *talented* writers for their columns and for the brochures. We will examine these positive measures in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON III'S METHODS OF CREATING PUBLIC OPINION, 1849–1858

During the Second Empire the government felt the press should be used to mold public opinion, and therefore papers and brochures were regarded as tools. In the introduction of new policy, debate often occurred; hence the government needed authors and journalists to educate the public. Hack writers could be purchased cheaply, but to propagandize effectively, top-flight authors were needed. Since many of these men could not be purchased with money alone, other prizes were dangled before them. In addition to money, these men were offered power and exalted position to enlist their sympathy for imperial goals. High-type journalists were subscribed by these means to the government service: men like La Guéronnière, Boilay, Mirreau, de Bouville, de Montour, Latour-Dumoulin, Collet-Meygret, Petetin, de Cassagnac, and About. By 1867 it became more and more difficult to lure the younger writers to the government fold.[1] The sour Horace de Viel-Castel commented on Louis Napoleon's preoccupation with writers by sneering at "the new peerage" of the press bought by the emperor.[2] Since the new and some of the older journalists were a temperamental and unreliable lot, frequently the emperor enjoyed only a temporary alliance with these men: Edmond About, Emile de Girardin, Clément Duvernois. However, others, such as Cassagnac, Vitu, Gireaudeau, and La Guéronnière remained consistently faithful and were well rewarded.

Between 1849 and the coup d'etat of 1851, the new regime had little genuine press support. Forty-six prefects reported only sixteen papers out of 200 could be described as friendly to the government. Thirty-six could be called "party of order" press, but they were not very enthusiastic in their support. In seventeen departments the government could depend

[1] Note of the Minister of the interior on the administration of the press, 15 September 1867, *Circulaires,* pp. 197-221.

[2] Oliver W. Larkin, *Daumier, man of his time* (Boston, 1968), p. 168.

only on papers which were described as "moderate or colorless" and were not considered very convincing allies. Twenty-five departments had one or more newspapers of the radical left, and fourteen had a Legitimist press which refused to recognize the Bonapartes or support the government.[3] The Bureau of Press issued directives that *all* press, including foreign newspapers, should be kept under surveillance. This included in 1852 about fifty periodicals in Paris and 300 in the departments, including the foreign journals.[4]

Until the end of 1850 the *Moniteur Universel* was the only true friend of the government. *Le journal des débats* supported Louis Napoleon for the presidency grudgingly, but after his victory retreated into political silence. Emile de Girardin's *Presse* deserted Louis Napoleon immediately after his election and moved into the opposition. The *Constitutionnel* occasionally threw a bone to the president, but remained loyal to Thiers and his politics. The Catholic *Univers* attacked the government because it did not support the church strongly enough, while the *Siècle* and the *National* accused the government of being too conservative and too clerical. When the leftist *Réforme* went bankrupt, socialist ideas were carried on by Thoré's *Révolution.* The Legitimist *Union, Gazette de France* and *L'opinion publique* supported conservative policies without any loyalty to the government itself.[5]

Consequently, Louis' first task was to create a press devoted to Bonapartism and to contain all opposition. Repression was continued from 1848 until 1851 when the "warning" system was finalized. The prefects and other governmental officials in the departments were harnessed for this service. Inheriting the *Moniteur universel* (founded in 1789) as the official paper, the administration thoroughly reorganized it. The subscription rate was reduced from 120 francs to 40. This resulted in a sharp rise in its circulation. The paper continued literature, as well as criticism, and employed great writers: Gautier, Champfleury, Feuillet, Houssaye, and Sainte-Beuve. The *Moniteur* was further enhanced in its importance because it was fed news otherwise unavailable to the rest of the papers. The provincial papers often reprinted the *Moniteur's* articles. In 1864 the government founded a smaller edition of the paper called *Le moniteur universel du soir,* known as the *Petit moniteur.* It sold for six centimes, and was aimed both in price and content to appeal to the lower classes. The effort was successful, and the edition was very popular.[6]

[3] AN, F18, 263, Report on the press.
[4] AN, F18, 310.
[5] Collins, p. 113.
[6] Kulstein, pp. 46-47.

However, its official position limited both editions of the *Moniteur* as propaganda weapons. It would be necessary to develop a friendly press which would not be so blatantly official. The three papers that fulfilled this function were the *Constitutionnel,* the *Patrie,* and the *Pays.* Although these papers seemed different in form and style, they all agreed in their uncritical support of the government and its policies, especially in the 1850's. They also shared journalistic personnel.

The *Constitutionnel* had been managed by Doctor Véron and had been financed by Thiers, an Orleanist who had joined the Party of Order. Its support after the 10 December election was lukewarm. The emperor sent for Granier de Cassagnac, a provincial journalist, whose purpose was to bring the *Constitutionnel* into the fold of the Bonapartist cause.[7]

Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac was born in Gers, 1806, into a modest but very old noble family. He went to school in Toulouse and aspired to be a writer, despite the disapproval of his family. To augment his income while writing, he taught school as well as attempting poetry. In 1831 he published his first political mandate, *Aux électeurs de France,* in which he attacked legitimacy and monarchy, and supported democracy, a position he would later disavow. In 1832 he decided to attempt his avocation in Paris. Armed with a letter of recommendation from a hometown lawyer to his deputy of Haute-Garonne, he became a disciple of Victor Hugo, met Guizot and was welcomed into Orleanist circles. He wrote for the *Revue de Paris* and the *Journal des débats.* His support for Hugo was both passionate and fanatical. He won his greatest notoriety after a critical assault on the works of the classical dramatist Racine. All these articles were published in a volume entitled *Oeuvres littéraires* (1852).

Even in academic literary criticism Granier de Cassagnac revealed his flair for polemic and sharp succinct phrases. He lost his job on the *Journal des débats* when he criticized Dumas too sharply. Emile de Girardin, the flamboyant editor of the *Presse,* heeded Hugo's advice and hired Cassagnac in 1836 as one of his editors. A year later he published a brochure entitled *De l'affranchissement des esclaves,* defending the institution of slavery. The planters in the French West Indies were impressed by his work and invited him to visit and become their deputy. He spent a few years in the West Indies, married the daughter of a planter, and served the interests of that class. He came back to Paris in 1841 and took a position on the journal *Globe.* He was being secretly subsidized by the prime minister Guizot, and his attacks on the political opposition became

[7] Granier de Cassagnac, I, 3-10.

so strident that he was involved in duels which he fought successfully. When the *Globe* failed, he founded a new paper, *L'époque,* where he continued his political war, still secretly supported by ministerial subventions. The Revolution of 1848 was a blow to his fortunes, so he became the most vociferous opponent of the Republic. He retired to the provinces and wrote a book, *Histoire des causes de la Révolution française* (1849). He had previously written a *Histoire des classes nobles et des classes anoblies* and a small novel *Danae.*[8] The election of Louis Napoleon supplied a new hero and Cassagnac became his most frenzied, devoted partisan. His columns in the *Courrier de la Gironde* supported the Bonapartes, and Louis Napoleon was so impressed with this support that he sent for Cassagnac in April 1850. In Paris, Cassagnac founded a paper, *Dix décembre,* which became the *Pouvoir.* He also contributed articles to the *Constitutionnel* and devoted himself to bringing Doctor Véron (who disliked Persigny) and his paper to whole-hearted support of the regime. Véron through Cassagnac's help paid his debts of 100,000 francs to Thiers, and as a reward permitted him freedom of his paper's political columns. In the *Pouvoir,* Cassagnac campaigned for a revision of article forty-five of the constitution of 1848, requesting an additional term for the president. The assembly prosecuted him for accusing some of its deputies as revolutionaries. Louis Napoleon secretly paid his fine. The Assembly refused to amend the constitution. Granier de Cassagnac used the *Constitutionnel* to prepare the public for the coming coup. On 24 November 1852 he attacked the deputies, accusing them of plotting dictatorship under Charngarnier or Cavaignac. Louis Napoleon congratulated Granier and asked him to continue the good work, but the coup d'état occurred before he could execute his assignment.[9] He also wrote a brochure called the *Revision de la constitution* (1851).

Véron disliked the inflammatory tone of Cassagnac's columns and thought of dismissing him in June 1852. But the paper received two *avertissements* (warnings) because at that moment they were expedient for diplomatic reasons.[10] Cassagnac had written an article critical of the Belgian liberal party just before the Belgian election. The Belgian minister called at the foreign office to protest, and immediately the *Moniteur universel* issued a stern rebuke to the *Constitutionnel* for publishing such

[8] Edmund Texier, *Histoire des journaux: biographie des journalistes* (Paris, 1850), pp. 219-224, gives an amusing account of his early years; Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle* (Paris, n. d.), VII, 1454-1456.

[9] *Constitutionnel,* 24 November 1852; Granier de Cassagnac, I, 3-10, 30-47, 68-71, 93-102, 188-206; M. de Maupas, *Mémoires sur le Second Empire* (Paris, 1884), I, 277-280.

[10] AN F18, 570.

an indiscreet article. The next day Véron in the latter paper wrote that Cassagnac had been fully authorized to write what had been previously published, as Dr. Véron, the publisher, had seen the original article with the emperor's annotations. Immediately the *Constitutionnel* received the first *avertissement*, to which the paper replied by declaring that Mocquard, the emperor's secretary, had ordered a hundred copies of the paper. The next day the *Constitutionnel* received the second warning. The government found it expedient to disavow all connection with the offending article.[11] Dr. Véron discovered that even progovernment newspapers had innumerable difficulties, and so he took the path of discretion and sold his paper to Mirès (a Bonapartist financier) who had already taken possession of *Pays*. Cassagnac often contributed articles to the journal but its editorship rested with Amédée de Césena, Boniface, and Cauvin for several years. Cassagnac was received frequently at the Tuileries and performed writing chores not only for the emperor, but also for his ministers.[12] He wrote articles for the *Moniteur universel* at the emperor's urging defending the Italian policy.[13] He collaborated on brochures on domestic policy for which he was paid large sums.[14]

In 1859 Cassagnac assumed the post of director and editor-in-chief of *Pays,* together with his son Paul. They became the "enfants terribles" of the imperial press.[15] His loyalty was well rewarded. He became mayor of Plaisance (Gers), conseiller général of Gers, then the official candidate of the government from his department. He was duly elected a deputy in 1852, 1857, 1863, and 1869. As a deputy he was conservative, almost reactionary, convinced that the Empire must be more authoritarian: and in the last years of the regime he bitterly opposed all changes toward liberalism. In spite of his official attachment he did not hesitate to attack Prince Napoleon for his speech before the Senate 1 January 1869. The *Journal officiel* (the old *Moniteur*) reprimanded him for his attack on a member of the imperial family. However, despite his intense antagonism toward Liberal Empire and Ollivier, he supported the plebiscite of 1870. In the years before the war he and Girardin held the most bellicose anti-Prussian views in the Parisian press. After the fall of the Empire, prudence

[11] National archives, Washington, D. C., MSS, State Department correspondence, France, 45, no. 51, Rives to Webster, 10 June 1852 (hereafter cited as Ste depart. corr.); *Constitutionnel,* 5 June 1852; R. Mitchell and Comte Fleury, *Un demi-siècle de mémoires* (Paris, 1911), pp. 11-15.

[12] Emile Ollivier, *Journal* (Paris, 1961), II, 242, an article ordered by Rouher and written by Cassagnac appeared in the Constitutionnel in 1866.

[13] Granier de Cassagnac, II, 154-155.

[14] *Papiers et corr.,* II, 138; AN, F18, 570, Minister of agriculture to minister of interior, Paris, 19 November 1867.

[15] AN, F18, 400 dossier on *Pays;* AN F18, 294, 27 April 1859.

dictated his departure to Belgium. There, he published a Bonapartist newspaper *Le drapeau,* which he sent free of charge to French war prisoners in Germany. He returned to Plaisance and was arrested for a short time. He collaborated with the emperor in writing a pamphlet which discussed the responsibilities of the French defeat of 1870-1871. His son continued activity on the *Pays,* but Cassagnac died in 1880 in relative obscurity.[16]

The second government paper was *Patrie.* It was founded in 1841 as a part of the moderate political left, and during the July monarchy had expressed only a moderate opposition. After the revolution of 1848 the leadership supported the Second Republic, but after 1850 the paper moved to the more politically expedient position of supporting Louis Napoleon's ambitions.[17] The republican journalists claimed that the editor, Delamarre, a former banker, was more concerned with circulation, survival, and influence than with political principles. The *Patrie* became best known for its stories of crime, catastrophe, and scandal rather than its political news.[18]

Pays, the third of the government papers, first appeared in 1849. In 1850, Lamartine, the director of the political news, turned over its editorship to Arthur de la Guéronnière.[19] At the first news of the coup d'état in December 1851 La Guéronnière was opposed, but both the editor and his paper were won over to the Empire, and the journal itself sold to Mirès, a firm supporter of the imperialist cause. On 1 December 1852 *Pays* added "journal de l'Empire" to its title. Vitu, L'heritier, Esparbie, and Guinot were its most frequent contributors until the Cassagnacs assumed its editorship. The government often interfered in the affairs of these papers. For example, articles were often inserted by the Tuileries.[20] *Avertissements* were issued to these papers if the authorities deemed the effect of their columns were bad.[21] The minister of the interior and other officials made personnel decisions through their choices of writers and editors.[22] They encouraged circulation by ordering the lowering of sub-

[16] Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire,* VII, 1455.

[17] Texier, pp. 211-212; AN F18, 294, "journal politique."

[18] Taxile Delord, *Histoire du Second Empire* (Paris, 1869-1876), II, 194-195; Bellanger, Godechot, Guiral, and Terrow, editors, *Histoire générale de la presse française* (Paris, 1969), II, 266-267; AN, F18, 399 dossier on *Patrie.*

[19] Bellanger, II, 243-244.

[20] *Papiers et corr.,* I, 385-388; Kulstein, p. 92; AN, F18, 400, dossier on *Pays,* 13 July 1861.

[21] AN, F18, 570, Paris, report on the press, 7 August 1854. The report stated that by 27 January 1853 the Paris papers had received eight warnings, of which the government papers had three: *Constitutionnel* had one, *Patrie* two; AN, F18, 400, *Pays* had received warnings on 11 May 1852 and 21 August 1854.

[22] AN, F18, 327 dossier on the *Constitutionnel.*

scription rates and by giving authorizations to hawk papers in the railway stations, theatres, etc. Special government and judicial notices were inserted in these papers, and subsidies were granted as needed.[23]

In the early years all three papers followed the same political line: full approval and praise for the government and its policies; but their styles and contents differed despite the fact that their personnel was interchangeable. Paulin Limayrac was one of these writers. He had begun his career on a literary review called *L'essor,* founded by students during the reign of Louis-Philippe. In 1843-1845 he moved to Paris and the *Revue de Paris.* When that job ended he went back to the province Montauban. He contributed articles to the *Revue des deux mondes.* After the Revolution of 1848 he became a candidate for the office of deputy to the Assembly, but he was defeated. He came back to Paris and was employed by the *Presse.* In 1856 he became a regular contributor to the *Constitutionnel* as well as the *Patrie* and the *Pays.* In 1861 he was appointed editor-in-chief of the *Constitutionnel* (13 October 1862 Chevalier became the general director of the *Constitutionnel* and the *Pays*).[24] He served the government so spiritedly and loyally that he was rewarded by appointment to the post of prefect of the department of Lot.[25]

Auguste Vitu was another who moved easily from one paper to another. He began his journalistic career on various provincial papers during the reign of Louis Philippe. After the victory of Louis Napoleon he collaborated on the *Dix décembre, Pouvoir, Pays,* and *Constitutionnel,* and finally in 1870 he became the editor-in-chief of *Le peuple français* replacing Clément Duvernois. After the fall of the Second Empire he became the drama critic for *Le Figaro* until his death in August 1891.[26]

Amédée de Césena was not only an important figure on the government press, but like Granier de Cassagnac he was also part of the coterie of ghost writers who participated in the pamphlet propaganda. He was born in 1810 in Sardinia of a French father and Italian mother. He began his writing career at twenty years by dedicating a poem to the conquest of Algeria in 1830, after which he traveled for a while. He wrote a five-act drama, *Agnès de Méranie* (1842), which was not very successful. He then became a journalist on the newspaper, *Journal de Maine-et. Loire* (an Orleanist sheet). In March 1848, after the February revolution, he changed his views, and contributed to Proudhon's *Représentant du peuple.* He moved from this left-wing political stance to become an

[23] AN, F18, 400, 11 September 1852, November 1857, 6, 7 October, 1861.
[24] AN, F18, 294, *Constitutionnel.*
[25] Texier, pp. 114-115.
[26] *Grande encyclopédie,* XXI (Paris, n. d.), 1074-1075.

enthusiastic defender of the coup d'état and moved to the *Patrie*. As a reward for his devoted efforts, his fortunes improved after 1850. He became the editor-in-chief of the *Patrie* and then the *Constitutionnel*.[27] In 1856 he published the laudatory pamphlet *César et les Napoléons*, and in 1859 he published *Campagne de Piémont et de Lombardie* for which the emperor himself wrote the outline.[28] He also wrote *L'Italie confédérée* (1859-1860) and *La Papauté et l'adresse* (1862). In May 1857 he left the *Constitutionnel* to become the editor of what became the *Courrier du Dimanche*. In 1869, when he became an anonymous editor of the *Figaro*, his services became less useful to the regime.[29]

Napoleon's luring of such writers as Césena and Cassagnac, and his manipulation of the publishers, led inexorably to a Bonapartist press in Paris. However, Napoleon wished to create more than devoted journalism. He wished to create diversity of opinion within a general consensus of approval of his goals. His measures to accomplish this diversity within consensus, which are discussed in the following paragraphs, made the brochures on foreign policy meaningful.

The pro-Bonapartist *Constitutionnel* during the early years was one of the three largest papers in circulation. The other two, the so-called "opposition" papers *Siècle* and *Presse*,[30] presented a more sophisticated challenge in managing the desired consensus. Both in the provinces and in Paris the government wished to preserve the illusion of diversity within the press. Thus an opposition press was actively sought, provided that the differences expressed by the journals were neither too strident nor too radical. The *Presse* was originally founded by Emile de Girardin, who pioneered in the cheap newspaper with wide circulation. He abandoned the total political format in favor of the serialized novels, gossip, and fashion articles. Other papers followed. During the revolution of 1848 Girardin had supported the republic but later insulted General Cavaignac and was fined.[31] Piqued by Cavaignac's treatment, Girardin supported Louis Napoleon in the election of December 1848, but after the election Girardin resumed his independent political viewpoint.

The left-wing press in the period of 1849-1851 suffered from harrying surveillance and petty warnings. During the coup d'état the *Presse* was

[27] Texier, pp. 77-78; AN, F18, 329.
[28] London *Times*, 15 December 1859.
[29] Gustav Vapereau, *Dictionnaire universel des contemporains* (Paris, 1870, fourth edition), pp. 358-359.
[30] AN, F18, 295, Report on the press 1857 gives the following circulation figures: *Siècle*, 36,000; *Presse*, 30,000; *Constitutionnel*, 24,800; *Patrie*, 23,000.
[31] Collins, p. 105.

suspended temporarily, but as soon as the new press law was promulgated, that paper was again printing news. Prince Napoleon, the emperor's cousin, invested in the *Presse*. Both that paper and the *Siècle* were heavily financed and their ownership was distributed among the shareholders. The Duc de Morny (half brother of the emperor), friend of many of the stockholders, persuaded Louis Napoleon to permit these papers' existence.[32] But the same dispersal of ownership also vitiated the violence of the political opposition. Caution was essential if the investments were to pay dividends, because suspensions were uneconomical; so the directors of papers were always circumspect in their opposition.

Emile de Girardin chafed at these restrictions and resigned from the *Presse* editorial staff. He then sold his shares to a businessman, Millaud, who in turn later sold out to others.[33] By the end of the Empire the *Presse* had become a purely business enterprise. The editorship passed to an Alsatian named Auguste Nefftzer. He attempted more overt opposition to the government in 1857 by joining with the *Siècle* in supporting republican candidates to the Corps Législatif. The *Siècle* was given an *avertissement,* and the *Presse,* receiving its third, was suspended for two months. Nefftzer also antagonized Prince Napoleon, who felt that Nefftzer was really Orleanist in his political leanings, and who used his influence to oust the Alsatian.[34] Peyrat succeeded Nefftzer and was joined by Adolphe Guéroult. Nefftzer came back on the staff in an advisory capacity, but from then on the *Presse* gradually lost ground. Its circulation fell from 36,000 in November 1857 to 23,000 in February 1858 to 10,000 in April 1859.[35] In contrast, *L'estafette,* in existence for twenty-five years, was suppressed in April 1858 because it was small, independent and less amenable to pressure.

The major opposition paper was the *Siècle.* It had the largest circulation and was the most significant paper during the Second Empire. Its director was Joseph Havin, a bright republican Norman who was able to adjust to political changes. He enjoyed protection at court through the influence of Vieillard, Bonapartist of the left and an old friend of Queen Hortense. The tone of the opposition under his leadership was very moderate, constitutional, and avoided all direct attacks. The sentiments he expressed were inoffensive: praise of the revolution of 1789, denial of aristocratic pretensions, occasional voicing of the needs of the poor, and

[32] George Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain en France, 1814-1870* (Paris, 1928), p. 313.
[33] AN, F18, 295, Rapport de journaux politiques de Paris; Collins, p. 137.
[34] Bellanger, II, 272.
[35] Weill, *Parti républicain,* pp. 313-314; Delord, II, 195-200.

emphasis on anticlericalism (particularly after 1859).[36] The result was that the government came to regard *Siècle* as its own republican voice. However, the relationship between the two was not always felicitous. The paper was subject to many *avertissements,* but despite the frequency of the warnings, the *Siècle* was never suspended nor suppressed. The central government had no desire to eradicate such worthy opposition.[37] The provincial officials, however, were far less sanguine about the *Siècle,* which enjoyed a wide circulation in the provinces. The prefect of Nièvre warned Paris that the *Siècle* was having a bad effect on the working classes. Calvados reported the paper exercised a "pernicious influence." [38] Nevertheless, after 1859 and the inauguration of the Italian policy, the *Siècle* more than ever enjoyed the benefits of government protection.[39]

The so-called opposition, barely tolerated during the early years, became more widespread and important later. The Bonapartist party itself had no firm ideological base. Existing as a compromise between the "two Frances" it had within its administration conservatives, clericals, Saint-Simonians, and liberals. The followers and ministers agreed only on their allegiance to the emperor, and, obviously, political differences would, during the course of time, slowly be manifested in the press. One of the most important figures who assumed a maverick role in the Second Empire was Prince Napoleon.

Prince Napoleon, cousin of the emperor, represented the "official" left or liberal Bonapartism. After the revolution of 1848 the Prince came back to Paris where he was friendly with Pierre Leroux, Jean Reynaud, and Lamennais. He was elected a deputy from Corsica to the Constituent Assembly, and the deputy from Sarthe in the Legislative Assembly. His views coincided with those of the Mountain: nationality for Poland and Italy, reduction of the salt tax, and clemency for the workers arrested after June Days. This stand earned him the name "The Red Prince" or "Prince of the Mountain." [40] Although he criticized the coup d'état, he became reconciled to the empire; and in spite of his "tactless" criticism of the regime, he held a number of responsible positions: senator, minister of Algeria and the colonies, and member of the Council of State. He remained close with the left-wing leaders: Darimon, Havin, Guéroult,

[36] Collins, p. 137; Pierre de la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire* (Paris, 1894-1905), II, 82-83.

[37] AN, F18, 417, *dossier on Siècle,* 29 March, 11 August, 17 September 1853; 13 April, 8 December 1854.

[38] *Ibid.,* 13 April 1856, 13 August 1858.

[39] Payne, pp. 198-205.

[40] Docteur Flammarion, *Un neveu de Napoléon Ier le Prince Jérôme Napoléon* (Paris, 1939), pp. 33-34, 37.

Proudhon. So notorious did the Prince become for his opinions that the republican Jules Favre was supposed to have said "He is more republican than I." [41] He maintained a close relationship with Emile de Girardin and was a staunch defender of the freedom of the press. He invited Proudhon to the Palais-royal, and he maintained an active correspondence with George Sand.[42] In these years he was a sponsor of the *Presse*; later he would become involved with the *Opinion nationale*. He tried to persuade Louis Napoleon to inaugurate liberal policies, and urged him to permit greater freedom of the press. He also became the liaison between the emperor and the opposition. It was through his connections and friendships that many writers of the left were inveigled into preparing pamphlets for the government.

In such an environment of repression, strict supervision of the press and limited opposition, all brochures published seemed to the innumerable observers of the French political scene to be progovernment or even government inspired. If they were not, the publications would have been seized as indeed many works had been. Thus even innocuous brochures acquired far greater importance in the early years than they deserved. Such a brochure was one entitled *Les limites de la France*.

When *Les limites de la France* appeared in December 1852, all Europe snapped to attention. Europe had viewed the new monarch with mingled feelings of suspicion, fear, and distrust. The long Napoleonic wars left Europe with bitter memories of the Bonapartes. To the established monarchies Louis Napoleon represented the opportunist and parvenu. Memories of the First Empire haunted European rulers despite the fact that Napoleon III was entirely different from his predecessor and that time had wrought changes in domestic policy and in the power balance abroad. This brochure inspired or not, broadcast French aspirations that fanned smouldering European suspicions into flames.

The author, Alexandre Le Masson, a former general under Napoleon I, was not an important political figure. He declared: despite changes in the regime affecting internal policies, certain goals in foreign relationships would remain the same, no matter who directed them, because foreign policy was shaped by tradition, history, and geographical considerations. These goals appeared under various names, but they were always the same: the acquisitions of France's natural frontiers. The losses of the Rhenish provinces Nice, Savoy, and Belgium in 1815 exposed France to attack on her northern, eastern, and southern boundaries. She would have

[41] Weill, *Parti républicain,* p. 326.
[42] Maupas, *Mémoires,* II, 122-123; Ollivier, *Journal,* I, 422; II, 42-43.

to recover these territories in order to acquire security. Belgium would be the most vital acquisition because Paris, the capital and heart of France, lies near the northern frontier. France needed her natural frontiers because their acquisition would add to her population and bring her greater wealth and natural resources.

Le Masson declared that the best way for France to recover her former conquests without incurring the risks of 1815 would be the dream of Napoleon I: a Latin Union – an alliance of Italy, Spain, and France. Spain would annex Gibraltar and Portugal, Italy would unite, and France would acquire the Rhine provinces. It would be a powerful confederacy separated from the rest of Europe by natural barriers and would include Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria. This policy would be almost impossible to realize fully; to attempt to achieve it partially, the following steps would have to be taken: a close alliance of France and Italy, a real neutrality of Holland and Switzerland, and an alliance with Russia. The brochure ended by remarking that France turned to Louis Napoleon to lead her because he understood her "needs and tempers." But he would not lead France in a series of conquests. His goal would be France's – to rectify the losses suffered in the wars of 1814-1815.[43]

It is difficult to ascertain just how high was the source of inspiration for this pamphlet. That it had some approval is certain, for it was permitted to circulate a few days before it was disavowed. The government then issued an emphatic denial of inspiration in the *Moniteur universel:* "The government rejects all connection with the author of this work, whose spirit is opposed to the intentions of the emperor and to his openly declared policy." [44] Immediately, all the Paris papers with the exception of the *Patrie* reproduced the announcement without further comment. The *Patrie* published an article from the Belgian press which expressed alarm at French intentions.[45] Whether or not the emperor inspired the brochure, it remained unimportant as long as diplomatic Europe thought that he had.[46] Many of the ideas certainly reflected Napoleonic sentiments, but there is no evidence of his collaboration.

The French press tended to favor the pamphlet, because its idea – the restoration of natural frontiers – was popular. Other than a limited friendly press reception, it created small reaction in France. The Orleanist *Revue des deux mondes* felt that "this small work has points of merit."

[43] A. Le Masson, *Les limites de la France* (Paris, 1852).
[44] *Moniteur universel,* 3 January 1853.
[45] London *Times,* 7 January 1853.
[46] Cavour to Nigra, Turin; 25 May 1860, *Il Carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861* (Bologna, 1926), III, 316 (hereafter cited as CCN).

However, the *Revue* added, it was far easier to dream of France's true frontiers than to acquire and retain them, as the history of France so clearly illustrated.[47] A discordant note was sounded by the opposition journal *Assemblée nationale,* a fusionist viewpoint of the Legitimists and Orleanists. The editor declared that France's position was very precarious, "so much so that this brochure signed by an almost unknown name has become an event." "Newspapers, perhaps by their enthusiasms and overzealousness spur the fear that France has aggressive designs, but the 'Empire means peace' and the great majority of Frenchmen wish for nothing but peace, stability, and order." [48] The strong denial of inspiration by the French official press caused the excitement over the pamphlet to subside quickly.

But in some foreign capitals smouldering suspicions were intensified. The Belgian press and government were highly suspicious of the new French regime and viewed with great alarm any manifestation of French desires for her natural frontiers. Indeed all during the Second Empire any pamphlet or book which hinted at these aims raised Belgium's blood pressure, whether the publication emanated from high sources or not.[49]

The pamphlet was also viewed with anxiety across the English channel. England and France had been engaged in negotiations over a question of refugees. After the insurrection of June 1848 and the coup d'état of 1851 many liberals and radicals had fled their homelands to seek political asylum in England, Belgium, and Switzerland, where they propagandized for their cause. Upon his assumption of power as prince-president, Louis-Napoleon peremptorily demanded that all refugees, "planning insurrections in their sanctuaries, close to their own home frontiers, should be deported." [50] Although England felt little sympathy for the refugees, she feared that Louis Napoleon might be using these demands as an excuse to extend French influence into his neighboring states and refused to make concessions.[51] This controversy continued throughout 1852. In the midst

[47] *Revue des deux mondes,* Ser. I (1 January 1853), 185-188 (hereafter cited as RDM).

[48] *Assemblée nationale* as cited in the London *Times,* 7 January 1853.

[49] R. Grenu, *La question belge dans la politique européenne de 1866 à 1870* (Paris, 1931), pp. 11-12; P. Hymans, *Frère Orban, la Belgique et le Second Empire* (Brussels, 1905), II, 88-89.

[50] F. C. Palm, *England and Napoleon III* (Durham, North Carolina, 1948), p. 83, citing a memorandum of Granville on a conversation with Flahaut concerning the prince president's policy toward Belgium, 3 January 1852 (Public Record Office, London, MSS, Gifts and Deposits, 29/18 – hereafter cited PRO, GD, FO); Van de Meyer to the king of Belgium in conversation with Morny the president, and Turgot, 13 January 1852, 29/30, *Ibid.*

[51] Flahaut to Morny, London, 3 January 1851, *The secret of the coup d'état,* edited and translated by the Earl of Kerry (London, 1924), pp. 169-180.

of such complicated negotiations the appearance of this pamphlet merely added more bitterness. The English, already suspicious of the emperor's desires, were upset by Le Masson's work. Immediately questions concerning its true intent and inspirations were brought to the Quai d'Orsay. The French government denied any connection with the publication and issued a statement saying that the ideas were in opposition to Napoleon III's.[52]

English newspapers viewed the pamphlet with distaste. The London *Times* characterized the brochure as "vulgar trash" and declared that the only reason it deserved comment was because of its wide circulation and its supposed reflection of the viewpoint of Persigny, the minister of the interior. The pamphlet, it thought, was probably no more than an experiment in public opinion.[53] The *Daily News* noticed that it was common practice for the French government to publish "feelers" to prepare the public mind for a contemplated action. It was long been known, the editor continued, that the emperor had previously, before his declaration of peace, entertained such notions as are contained in the pamphlet. Although the French government repudiated it, she has not repressed this production. ". . . Such writings, tending as they do to disturb the peace of the world . . . are infinitely more mischievous than the socialist speculations which are every day seized in the hawker's pack." [54] An editorial in the *Economist* said that France was a disturbing element in Europe. "Her military tastes, passions for glory, her ambition for paramount influence in the councils of the European Commonwealth . . . her constant and inexplicable hunger for a frontier which nature seems to have intended for her . . . all justify the jealousy, suspicion, and vigilance with which she is regarded by Continental Powers." [55]

The emperor allowed the refugee question to remain dormant because he was anxious to gain European diplomatic recognition of the Second Empire. Moreover, a new threat appeared in the East – Russia. This menace caused France to postpone settlement of the refugee problem because the need for an English alliance was more urgent.

The Crimean War crisis arose in 1853 as the result of a quarrel between the Latin and Greek clergy for possession of the Christian shrines in the Turkish Empire. Opportunity had come for the Russians, in their perpetual drive to the sea, to assert again their influence in the East. The

[52] Palm, p. 95 quoting Cowley to Russell, 2 January 1853, PRO, FO, France, 27/961.
[53] London *Times*, 4 January 1853.
[54] *Daily News*, 4 January 1853.
[55] *Economist*, 1 January 1853.

Russians demanded the protectorate over the whole Greek Church under Turkish jurisdiction. Great Britain, suspicious of Russian motives, advised the sultan to yield on the issue of the Holy Places, but to stand firm against any other concessions. England would never permit Russia in Constantinople as a possible threat to her commerce with her newly growing empire in India, while France saw an opportunity to recoup her lost prestige in Europe, perhaps destroy the treaties of 1815, and disrupt the Holy Alliance. Russia occupied the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1853 to force the Porte into meeting her demands. At the same time the powers headed by neutral Austria, attempted to preserve peace through long, complicated and unsuccessful negotiations. In spite of these negotiations the sultan declared war on Russia.

Then on 30 November 1853 Russia attacked the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea in the harbor of the town of Sinope. The massacre of Sinope angered the Western powers; in protest they sent a combined Franco-British fleet into the Black Sea to maintain peace. Three months of complicated negotiations followed in which the czar emphatically rejected the allied demands for the neutralization of the Black Sea area by reciprocal withdrawal of forces. Hostilities flared in the month of March 1854.

In the midst of these protracted diplomatic hagglings a pamphlet entitled *La revision de la carte d'Europe* was prepared and sent to the printers. Binkley, in his account, declares that the emperor himself edited the work.[56] A contemporary, O'Meagher, the Paris correspondent of the London *Times,* believed that Granier de Cassagnac was its author. He added that the brochure had no political importance, however, because it was seized and suppressed. O'Meagher reported that a government official vigorously asserted that both the contents and the existence of the pamphlet had been unknown, but it did cause a slight furor in the embassies.[57] Sturdza included the brochure in his collection of documents and declared that it was inspired by the French government.[58] Therefore, it must have had a limited circulation. The pamphlet was written in a concise style and gave a list of the desirable revisions of the European map with very little justification for these changes. This differed from other imperial brochures and may have reflected haste – if it was, indeed, imperially inspired.

La revision de la carte d'Europe stated: Russia had great resources,

[56] R. C. Binkley, *Realism and nationalism 1852-1871* (New York, London, 1935), p. 179.

[57] London *Times,* 21 March 1854.

[58] D. A. Sturdza, *Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei romanieri* (Bucharest, 1900-1901, II, 461.

but it was her non-Russian provinces which gave her real power. Since Russia did not bring civilization to her conquered provinces, but spoliation and tyranny, she should not hold them. Finland should be returned to Sweden. If it were possible, the recreation of the kingdom of Poland would be the ideal, but innumerable political difficulties have prevented this solution. Instead Russian Poland should be reunited to the Duchy of Posen and should go to Prussia. Austria should add Moldavia and Bessarabia to her empire and lengthen her frontiers to the Dniester. The great powers of Europe should regulate the commercial interests of all the states on the Danube and guarantee the freedom of navigation on the Black Sea. Turkey should be compensated for the loss of Moldavia by the acquisition of the Crimea. Russia should retain Odessa, Nikolayev, and Kherson, which would give her facilities for commerce and a navy necessary for the needs of a great nation but not enough to menace the balance of power in Europe. Since Austria should have compensation on the Danube, she should give Lombardy to Sardinia-Piedmont, but she should still retain Venetia. After the war the deliberation of a European congress would be necessary to attain the desired solution, and thus achieve a true European equilibrium.[59]

Although the evidence of an extremely limited circulation belied any higher inspiration, the ideas of the pamphlet were similar to sentiments reflected in court circles. The emperor spoke frequently of Austria exchanging her Italian possessions for the Roumanian principalities and indemnifying Turkey in Asia Minor.[60] The idea of a congress to arrange and settle European problems was a consistent part of Napoleonic thought. Prince Napoleon also expressed similar peace goals. His aims were to establish an independent Poland, regenerate Turkey through reforms, and push back Russia from the West so that her future development would be in Asia.[61]

The Crimean war was costly in life and money. Austria remained neutral, and Sardinia-Piedmont entered the war to assure Cavour a voice in the peace conference. The fall of Sebastopol in September 1855 was a great victory for France. Napoleon III was anxious for peace in spite of English reluctance, for the war had served its purpose. France was important again, and the old alliance that had bound Austria, Prussia, and Russia was broken. There were economic advantages to peace – Russia

[59] *La revision de la carte d'Europe,* reprinted in Sturdza, *Acte si,* II, 461-465.

[60] Cowley to Stratford de Redcliffe, 23 July 1854, V. Wellesley and R. Sencourt, [*Conversations with Napoleon III* (London, 1934), p. 57.]

[61] Prince Napoleon to George Sand, 5 April 1854, "Lettres inédites de George Sand et du Prince Napoléon, 1852-1863," RDM. XVI (1923), 849.

would require change and reform, and France could become the financier to help her effect them. Furthermore, there was always the possibility of a future alliance with Russia. For Russia, too, there were advantages in peace. For economic development she would need French money, and any future friendship might be an asset against Austria and England in any attempt to extend her influence into the Balkans and Turkey.[62] Therefore, surreptitiously, Napoleon III started to negotiate for peace and a peace congress, employing Seebach, the Saxon minister to France, as intermediary. The four points already proposed at Vienna in 1855 were used as the basis for the future peace settlement: renunciation by Russia of her protectorate over the Principalities, freedom of navigation on the Danube, neutralization of the Black Sea, and settlement of the religious question in Turkey without the interference of Russia.

Napoleon III chose the form of an anonymous pamphlet to announce publicly to both France and Europe his desires for a congress of sovereigns to decide the issues. Entitled *D'une nécessité d'un congrès pour pacifier l'Europe par un homme d'état,* the pamphlet appeared about 17 December 1855. Charles Duveyrier was its author, but rumors attributed its inspiration to either the emperor or Prince Napoleon. The Austrian ambassador was told that it reflected "the thought of the emperor and it was destined to prepare the world for a meeting of a congress." [63] Delord, a journalist and friend of Duveyrier, reported that the pamphlet "had certainly passed under the emperor's scrutiny before its publication." Delord claimed that only Duveyrier knew the true facts of its composition.[64]

Charles Duveyrier was one of the more creative, exciting personalities among the writers of the Second Empire. He was born in April 1803 in Paris where he completed his studies by obtaining a law degree. In 1828 he published a *Histoire des électeurs de 1789.* Shortly after, he was introduced to Saint-Simonian teachings and became a fervent apostle. He wrote a series of articles for the Saint-Simonian journals *L'organisateur* and the *Globe,* and a book *l'Exposition de la doctrine de Saint-Simon,* which ran into several editions. He traveled to Belgium and England as a socialist missionary, but he received a cold reception and returned to Paris. One of his articles on the role of women brought him, as well as Enfantin and

[62] V. Boutenko, "Un projet d'alliance franco-russe en 1856," *Revue historique,* LV (1927), 279-280.

[63] Hübner to Buol, Paris, 27 December 1855. Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, MSS, Politisches Archiv (hereafter cited as HHSA, PA) Frankreich, IX, 61, no. 110.

[64] Delord, I, 660-661.

Chevalier, a year's imprisonment for "outraging public morality." [65] After he served his sentence Duveyrier turned to the theater. His brother was already a famous playwright, and he found a receptive audience. From 1834 to 1842 he wrote a series of dramas and comedies almost all of which were "hits." Tiring of the theater he turned to business and created the "Société générale d'annonces," the first advertising agency, which was used by most of the larger newspapers.[66] The revolution of 1848 re-awakened his interest in Saint-Simonian socialism, and he became an editor of *Le crédit,* where he supported the candidacy of Cavaignac.[67] Strangely, the Empire which he did not like became the friend to Saint-Simonian socialism and Duveyrier, like many others, served the emperor through the good offices of Prince Napoleon. Besides the above pamphlet he also wrote *Pourquoi de propriétaires à Paris?* in 1857 and in 1864 *L'avenir et les Bonapartes,* an argument for "liberal" empire. He died in Paris in 1866.[68]

The brochure consisted of only fourteen pages and was very succinct. The author cited the need to create a permanent peace that would not humiliate the losing power. The only way to attain such a peace and settle all the problems affecting the European equilibrium would be through a congress of the great powers. In calling for this congress, Napoleon III was actually asking public opinion to decide international matters; for the emperor believed "that public opinion will always gain the last victory." [69] It would be best if the Russians actually initiated the congress, using as the preliminaries of peace the proposals made by Austria. Russia, in renouncing her Eastern policy for the sake of European peace, might triumph in that area by becoming a great civilizing and moral force. This congress, it continued, could solve not only the Eastern question, but the problems that have menaced Europe since 1815. "Finally if the secondary powers contribute directly to the reestablishment of peace – if Europe owes to them in great part the resulting development of great works, reforms, and general prosperity, will not such a service be a better guarantee than any protectorates for the independence of the weak in all the eventualities of the future?" [70]

[65] Vapereau, pp. 614-615.
[66] Bellanger, I, 122, AN, Série 113 AP 3, Duveyrier to E. de Girardin, Paris, 1847.
[67] Bellanger, II, 224.
[68] Vapereau, pp. 614-615.
[69] The emperor used this phrase in a speech 15 November 1855 (Case, *French Opinion,* pp. 40-41).
[70] *D'une nécessité d'un congrès pour pacifier l'Europe par un homme d'état* (Paris, 1855).

The pamphlet created excitement throughout Paris.[71] The stock market rose a little, and conversations at the Bourse were concerned with whether a brochure meant peace negotiations and whether it emanated from high sources.[72] The *Journal des débats* claimed that it would "cause a sensation in the political world" and reproduced the entire pamphlet.[73] This gave rise to innumerable rumors concerning the author, which ranged from the emperor to Guizot, La Guéronnière, Drouyn de Lhuys, and Walewski.[74] Finally, three days after its appearance it was correctly attributed to Duveyrier. The *Siècle* added more fire to the rumors by declaring it had "high inspiration." [75] Almost all the Paris papers either reprinted the brochure in full or had large excerpts. All the papers treated it with respect, though not all agreed with its final conclusions. Another reason for its favorable reception was that the pamphlet fitted the mood of the times – a desire for peace – which permeated the French population.[76]

The newspapers reflected this same yearning in their analysis of the little work. *Patrie* reproduced the whole pamphlet, but declared that the opinion and responsibility was the author's alone. "Thus it has not the importance that has been wrongly attributed to it." But the editor declared in the next sentence that it had real value. It was responsive to the public desire for peace, a peace that France wishes and Russia needs. *Patrie* continued that the brochure treated the idea of a congress "in a manner that is both calm and elevated." [77] The *Journal des débats* felt that the peaceful tone of the pamphlet presaged successful negotiations.[78] However, the *Revue des deux mondes* declared that the small work made a greater sensation than it deserved. Its ideas were chimerical and unrealistic. A congress will be unable to solve all the problems of Europe and make necessary reforms. Indeed, Forcade (the editor) claimed that, in the midst of the peace talk, preparations were being made for continued war. The new year asks the question whether there will be peace or war: "whose proportions still remain a mystery." [79] The democratic *Siècle* felt that Duveyrier had expressed the concept of a congress well and in such a way that Russia could accept peace with honor. The main problem

[71] Cowley to Clarendon, Paris, 28 December 1855, PRO, FO, France 519/5.
[72] *Morning Herald,* 29 December 1855.
[73] *Journal des débats,* 27 December 1855.
[74] *Daily News,* 29 December 1855.
[75] *Siècle,* 27 December 1855.
[76] Case, *French Opinion,* pp. 41-42.
[77] *Journal des débats,* 28 December 1855.
[78] *Ibid.,* 27 December 1855.
[79] RDM, ser 2, I (1 January 1856), 214-216.

would be to convince Russia to accept the propositions.[80] The *Presse* felt that a congress would have the same impotency as the Congress of Vienna because its decisions would be based on majority rule. "Majority and truth are not any more synonymous than that of error and minority." A pamphlet by Emile de Girardin, which had appeared the previous March entitled *La paix,* was the *Presse's* program for peace. The bases for the reconstruction of peace would be the establishment of the nationalities of Poland, Roumania, Italy, and the other oppressed peoples of Turkey and Austria. The other principle would be freedom of the seas. To insure this, the destruction would be necessary not only of all the fortifications on the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, but also of Gibraltar.[81]

The Catholic and Legitimist press liked Duveryrier's pamphlet but thought it a bit premature. The *Gazette de France* was in complete sympathy with all the sentiments expressed and felt the neutral powers would contribute greatly to the peace. Judging by the foreign press, the proposals of a congress might be premature, but the *Gazette* thought that there was hope of peace if the brochure had the importance which had been attributed to it.[82] The *Univers* felt that the pamphlet's contents were vague. What were the bases on which a new European equilibrium would be established? The pamphlet limited its arguments to goals that are just.[83] The *Union* agreed that the brochure's language and purpose made it worthy of the general attention it received. The editor approved of its tone of equality in its reference to Russia.[84]

British reaction to the semi-official French pamphlet was very unfavorable because the English were reluctant to negotiate peace, in spite of the constant demands of the French. There was disagreement on the four points that Austria had proposed. Albert, the prince consort, on 24 December 1855, spoke of continuing the war until English aims had been met so that European order could be preserved for at least another generation.[85] The English were also opposed to a congress to settle European problems. They still smarted from their experience at the Congress of Vienna. Lord Cowley's reaction to the brochure, though unrealistic, reflected his English prejudices. He felt it impossible that the emperor could have inspired the brochure "unless Napoleon III is prepared to place the honor of France at the mercy of the minor sovereigns of Europe for it is

[80] *Siècle,* 27 December 1855.
[81] *Presse,* 28 December 1855.
[82] *Gazette de France,* 28 December 1855.
[83] *Univers,* 28 December 1855.
[84] *Union,* 27 December 1855.
[85] T. Martin, *The life of his royal highness the prince consort* (New York, 1879), III, 313-328.

evident that the congress here advocated is one which every sovereign in Europe would be invited to attend." But cautiously he queried Count Walewski who, of course, blandly denied the government connection. The difficulty with this brochure, Cowley complained, was that it kept alive the hopes of peace in France, which would only end in disappointment.[86]

If official England deplored the brochure's appearance, the English press exploded. There were complete English translations and large editorials condemning not only the quest for peace, but also the concept of a congress. The London *Times* declared that it could find no agreement at all with Duveyrier's viewpoint. The conference should consist of belligerents only, and they should conclude a peace that they have won. "We hope we shall not be cheated by diplomacy out of terms that we are able to exploit by force. . . ." [87] The *Morning Herald* disliked the apologetic tone used toward Russia. Obviously France had her glory and desired to retire from the conflict. The British, it continued, may feel regret, but would not be deterred from the war.[88] The *Standard* expressed great surprise that "anyone could think him [Napoleon III] capable of proposing to descend to the humiliation of sitting in a congress with German emperors, kings, and princes." A congress could only benefit Russia and Austria for it would ratify the partition of Poland and legalize the tragedy of Italy.[89] The *Daily News* declared, "Congresses have proved to be nothing more than the conspiracies of kings against their subjects . . . their adjustments of the affairs of Europe have proved sad, rickety, and ephemeral affairs; men are sick of the very name and want to hear no more of them." [90] The *Morning Post* claimed that Napoleon III was as innocent of the pamphlet as Lord Palmerston. The brochure "is as shallow in argument as it is pretentious in style." The English have been deceived enough at Vienna not to trust the diplomats at a proposed congress. It will be arms alone that will determine the peace.[91]

In spite of the English clamor, Napoleon III had his way, although he was forced to compromise. The sovereigns of Europe were not asked to participate. Prussia was permitted to agree to the treaty; and Sardinia's invitation limited her only to the matters which concerned her future. She was permitted to air her grievances, but received no concrete help. The congress was held at Paris on the 25 February 1856. A Hatti-Hayoum

[86] Cowley to Clarendon, Paris, 28 December 1855, PRO, FO, 519/5.
[87] London *Times,* 28 December 1855.
[88] Morning *Herald,* 29 December 1855.
[89] *Standard,* 28 December 1855.
[90] *Daily News,* 29 December 1855.
[91] *Morning Post,* 29 December 1855.

(decree) was extracted from Turkey which promised reforms throughout the empire. The treaty was signed on 30 March. Under its terms Turkey was admitted to the European concert. Freedom of navigation on the Danube and the Dardanelles was declared, as well as demilitarization of the Black Sea. Part of Bessarabia was ceded to Moldavia. The provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia remained under the suzerainty of the Porte, their future to be decided at another conference in Paris after a vote was taken of the population. The treaty was a temporary expedient to prevent Russian designs and Turkish weaknesses from creating more wars. The integrity of the Turkish empire was guaranteed.

After the treaty had been signed and the plenipotentiaries had gone home, the emperor commissioned a pamphlet in which the subject of the regeneration of Turkey was discussed. The main purpose of this work seemed to be educational; it was not written to influence any diplomatic mission. Public opinion believed that Turkey was not enforcing the Hatti-Hayoum. Roumanian refugees and French liberals, in promoting the cause of Moldavian and Wallachian union, had harshly criticized Turkish administration in brochures and newspaper articles.[92] Therefore, the pamphlet was issued to explain the problems of Turkey and to clarify the aims and accomplishments of the peace conference.[93]

In the fall of 1857 Prince Napoleon was sent to negotiate the arrangement, but it took almost a year before the pamphlet was completed. His assistant was Schefer, who had been the first dragoman at the French embassy at Constantinople during the Crimean War. Afterwards he became professor of oriental languages in Paris and was part of the intellectual coterie of Prince Napoleon. Together they arranged the first draft, gave it the tentative title of *Les Turcs en Europe,* and sent it to the emperor.[94] Napoleon III read the work, inserted his corrections and observations, and said: "The plan is drawn out well, only we must not omit to make it an entirely religious and civilizing question and in no way an English, French, or Russian matter." [95] Prince Napoleon after waiting a few months then suggested that Peyrat, a republican journalist be commissioned to rewrite the brochure.[96] The emperor agreed and said that Peyrat could name his own price, provided he wrote well and signed

[92] See Chapter III.

[93] *La Turquie devant l'Europe* (Paris, 1858), pp. 7-9.

[94] Prince Napoleon to the emperor, Paris, November 1857, E. D'Hauterive, *The Second Empire and its downfall,* translated by Herbert Wilson (New York, n. d.), p. 84.

[95] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Compiègne, 11 November 1857, *Ibid.,* p. 86.

[96] Prince Napoleon to Napoleon III, Paris, June 1858, *Ibid.,* pp. 93-96.

his name to the pamphlet in order to prevent any rumors of government inspiration.[97] Evidently Peyrat declined the commission, for the pamphlet appeared anonymously under the title *La Turquie devant l'Europe*. The style was heavy, dull, and very learned, which suggested that the final pen belonged to the savant Schefer rather than the journalist Peyrat.

The pamphlet declared that the delay in the promulgation of the reforms of the Hatti-Hayoum was caused not by the recalcitrance of the Porte, but rather by the resistance of his peoples. Other factors which have slowed these desired changes were the tremendous size of the empire, the relative feebleness of the administrative organization, and the conflict of nationalities and races. Many reforms have been attempted: law courts were opened to the public, each religion was respected, and a revision of the criminal and commercial codes was undertaken. The prison system was reformed, and the use of torture was forbidden. Christians had gained the right to serve in the army and were subject to the conscription laws. The sultan had the tax structure studied, so that taxes could be levied more equitably. Plans had been made to establish banks and other institutions in order to help facilitate the necessary reforms of the monetary and fiscal systems, which would help to increase internal improvements such as roads, canals, etc. The author concluded that Turkey should be maintained as a power, for her existence was necessary to the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe.[98]

When the brochure appeared on the political scene in the fall of 1858 it passed virtually unnoticed. It excited no press comment and no rebuttals from other pamphleteers. Its style and subject matter did not arouse interest. Its theme, the regeneration of Turkey, had become old news and nothing is harder to sell than a dated headline. During 1858 other political topics such as the attempted assassination of the emperor and the conference on the Roumanian principalities claimed public attention. Therefore, it is not surprising that *La Turquie devant l'Europe* was not able to command a large reading audience or attract widespread comment in the press. New brochures, better written and more controversial, claimed public attention. They are the subject of the next chapter.

[97] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Plombières, 6 July 1858, *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[98] *La Turquie devant l'Europe* (Paris, 1858).

CHAPTER III

BROCHURES ON ENGLAND AND ROUMANIA, 1858

The beginning of 1858 was marked by the violent reopening of the refugee question, which had been dormant since 1852. An Italian, Felice Orsini, attempted to assassinate Napoleon III by throwing four bombs at the imperial carriage on its arrival at the opera on 14 January. The plot failed, although 10 persons were killed and 140 wounded. Upon investigation the French authorities discovered that the whole conspiracy had been planned in England. The refugee problem was to be discussed again with bitterness and sharp criticism. The English deplored the regicide attempt, but were annoyed and resentful of the French attitudes toward their laws and freedom.

In order to facilitate better French relations, Palmerston introduced a bill into parliament on 9 February which would have stiffened the penalties for conspiracy in an assassination. Although the bill was denounced bitterly in the house of commons, it passed the first reading. Then bad publicity from France created a ministerial crisis. On 20 January, Walewski sent a despatch to Persigny which was to be read to the English foreign minister. In this letter he demanded further security for the French against the political refugees.[1] This demand caused hostility in official circles and created a storm of abuse and bitterness when it was published. Parliament responded to popular feelings, and the Conservatives, led by Lord Derby, seized an opportunity to embarrass the Liberals. They added an amendment to the bill which chided the Palmerston ministry for not replying forcefully enough to the despatch of 20 January. There was so much support for the amendment that Palmerston felt he had received a parliamentary censure and resigned, although Derby forces later withdrew the amendment. The original bill was passed in March 1858, but it took some time for the ruffled feelings of public opinion to subside.

[1] Walewski to Persigny, 20 January 1858, *Moniteur universel,* 9 February 1858.

In a move that was calculated to be conciliatory, Napoleon III commissioned Arthur de la Guéronnière to write a pamphlet. *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre,* on the refugee question.[2] La Guéronnière was the second of three sons and one daughter sired by a noble who was able to trace his lineage back to the crusades: Antoine du Breuil Hélion de la Guéronnière. During the Restoration the father was inspector general of the hospitals, a position he lost in the revolution of 1830. He retired to his château of Thouron in Haute Vienne where he raised his family.[3] Little is known of Arthur's early years. At the age of twenty he made his journalistic debut on the Legitimist paper *L'avenir national* (founded and edited by his older brother Alfred) in Limoges.[4] He developed a great respect and admiration for Lamartine; he left Limoges for Clermont to found his own paper, and use his columns to espouse the philosophies of Lamartine and Chateaubriand. He pleaded the cause of Legitimacy legalized by popular sovereignty. The February revolution in 1848 brought a new lift to his fortunes. He was appointed *commissaire* (prefect) of Corrèze, a position he refused. Instead he went to Paris to become an aide to Lamartine, who was acting as minister of foreign affairs. When Lamartine resigned to become head of the provisional government, La Guéronnière, unemployed, founded a new journal, *Bien public,* which foundered financially and went bankrupt after six months. La Guéronnière then became an editor-in-chief on Père Lacordaire's daily paper *L'ère nouvelle,* which also disappeared quickly. In his work on these two ephemeral journals, La Guéronnière revealed his literary talents, and Emile de Girardin engaged him for the *Presse.*[5] Within a short period he became its editor. However, he tired of the mercurial Girardin and moved to the *Pays,* which had remained loyal to Lamartine.

On 10 December 1848 Louis Napoleon became president of the Second Republic, and, after a series of prolonged and bitter fights with the legislative body, engineered the coup d'état of 1851 in which he became prince president. La Guéronnière, lukewarm to the Bonapartes, opposed the coup and on 4 December published a letter to Morny, minister of the interior, in which he spoke for his younger brother and rejected the latter's appointment as *sous-préfet* of the government.[6] Why and how the

[2] Cowley to Malmesbury, Paris, 11 March 1858, PRO, FO, 519/6. no. 73.

[3] Vte. de la Guéronnière, *La Guéronnière publiciste, 1811-1884* (Paris, 1937), pp. 10-11.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 11-13.

[5] Texier, pp. 90-119; Hippolyte Castille, *Les journaux et les journalistes depuis 1848 jusqu'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1858), p. 24.

[6] *Pays,* 4 December 1851; Horace de Viel-Castel, *Mémoires sur le règne de Napoléon III 1851-1864* (Paris, 1942), I, 105; Cassagnac, I, 86-87.

government became interested in La Guéronnière remains unknown, but it is said that Morny, hoping to attract talent to the Bonapartist cause, called on Arthur and was supposed to have persuaded him: "Come with us, we are youth, future and fortune; we will carry you far and high!" [7] Whatever the reasons, La Guéronnière enrolled in the cause, reversed his stand, supported the coup and the establishment of the empire in 1852. The government remained true to its words and almost immediately La Guéronnière's fortunes revived – so much so that a contemporary characterized him as "a pen devoid of morality and loyalty . . . always ready to change as the exigencies of his own interests demand . . ." [8]

In the elections of 29 February and 1 March 1852 the government backed his candidacy as a deputy from Chantel and he was duly elected.[9] A year later he became a member of the Council of State. The latter position paid him 25,000 francs, as a deputy he received 12,000 francs, and a later appointment as the director of publicity paid him an additional 30,000 francs. He remained editor of *Pays* for a short time only, but he served the regime loyally: visiting the Tuileries frequently and printing articles dictated by the chief of state.[10] In 1853 he was appointed director general of the press and library and left *Pays*.

In this capacity he continued the policy of supervision, repression and manipulation of the daily press. He felt that supervision of the press in France had been successful, but he also wished the government to exert a more positive role in the management of opinion: "it had the obligation to give inspiration (*impulsion*) and information." He called for new measures to make this phase of regulation successful. Prefects should be sent publicity which should then be printed in the departmental papers, and when important issues were debated, they should be treated in the local press. He felt the director of the press should be in direct communication with the different agencies of the government as well as the departments in order to receive the necessary information and then deliver them to the press. This he claimed would result in more unity and direction in the manipulation of the press.[11] The results of this policy were not so successful as La Guéronnière hoped. Large sums were also expended under his direction to subsidize magazines or literary newspapers. Most of these revues had a small circulation, and played an insignificant role

[7] Avenel, pp. 458-459.
[8] Viel-Castel, *Mémoires*, II, 138.
[9] AN, C1336, dr. 188, prefect report.
[10] AN, F 18, 400 dossier on *Pays;* H. de Viel-Castel, *Les coulisses du Second Empire 1851-1864* (Paris, 1964), p. 97.
[11] AN, F18, 310, Paris, 7 December 1859.

in creating opinion. None were able to challenge the Orleanist *Revue des deux mondes* which had tripled its subscriptions to more than 10,000 since 1851.[12]

In 1856 he published a book of flattering political portraits of personages of the Empire.[13] While director of the press, La Guéronnière played a major propaganda role, but what would bring him more notoriety would be the position of being the Emperor's pen. Louis Napoleon, a journalist before his rise to power, always maintained a strong interest in writing. La Guéronnière was the most famous and prolific of his ghost writers. *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre* was the first of these collaborations.

This brochure, corrected and edited with great care, was published on 11 March simultaneously in Paris and London in English and French. O'Meagher, the Paris correspondent of the London Times, who had heard rumors of its preparation, bribed a printer with 1500 francs to see the work before it went to press, and then announced its impending appearance. This action certainly helped to assure it a good circulation in England. The language of this imperial manifesto was La Guéronnière's, but Cowley, the British ambassador, thought that its framework and ideas had been dictated by the emperor.[14]

L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre, unsigned, was an attempt to be conciliatory, but still firm, on the question of the refugees. It began by saying that the assault of 14 January upon the emperor's life, which was prepared, encouraged, and financially supported in England, caused a break in confidence between the two peoples. Other crimes less terrible in results but no less guilty in intention also were hatched in England. The police discovered a cache of bombs near Fontainebleau on 9 January 1852 destined for an assassination attempt, and the correspondence that was seized proved the plans were made in England. Other conspiracies had been planned in London by Ledru-Rollin Mazzini. Magen, Carpeza and Pianori. All this revolutionary activity in England had produced much anxiety among many parts of French opinion, and the attempt on the emperor's life on 14 January of this year brought it to a climax. The French immediately coupled the tolerance of the English law with this activity and placed as much responsibility on it as on the actual perpe-

[12] AN, F18, 306, Note sur les revues subventionnées; Vielcastel, *Mémoires,* I, 24.

[13] Arthur de la Guéronnière, *Études et portraits politiques contemporains* (Paris, 1856); at the same time an article by him entitled "Napoléon III" was inserted in the English and German newspapers, *Circulaires,* p. 187.

[14] Cowley to Malmesbury, Paris, 11 March 1858, PRO, FO, 519/8, no. 73; London *Times,* 6, 9 March 1858; *History of London Times,* II, 180-279 citing AN, F18, 544B, Angleterre, 189.

trators of the crime itself. These plots have become a threat to the entire French nation and the people demand more security for their monarch be provided by the English laws.

The English claimed that France had demanded that her neighbors renounce the right of asylum, a right France herself practiced and respected. The right of asylum should not be confused with the license that permitted these refugees to be free from all responsibilities to society. France only desired that she be given some guarantees against the men who planned the murder and destruction of her civilization. At the end, the author claimed that England had never "found an ally more loyal, more persevering, more independent of rancors and small passions." The alliance of the two peoples would be necessary for the security and peace of Europe.[15]

The pamphlet was read avidly in France and was praised by the press. The *Constitutionnel* advertised it by printing copious excerpts. In addition the paper commented on its contents before its official sale at the bookstalls. "A pamphlet which will be an event will be on sale tomorrow. It exposes with authority the conduct of our government in its relations with England. It makes our policy stand out with its irresistible precision, its good faith, moderation and wisdom. This exposé, so sober, so calm, and so eloquent in its truth, will produce in Europe an immense sensation; we are convinced that in England it will aid in appeasing passions . . . and that it will enlighten public opinion on the true sentiments of France. . . ." [16] The *Moniteur universel* noted that 10,000 copies had been sold in one day.[17] In political circles there were rumors that the new pamphlet had high inspiration which, coupled with its promotion, guaranteed that it would have a good sale and create a new topic of political discussion for a few days. Therefore, the public rushed to buy the pamphlet; before 10 A.M. the day of its publication the first edition was exhausted.[18]

The press contributed to the success of the pamphlet by ample comments and editorials. The Orleanist *Revue des deux mondes* noted that "the brochure bore the unmistakable imprint of an official character," and its great merit lay in its spirit of conciliation and the avoidance of "wounding British susceptibilities." The pamphlet, he wrote, agreed that the alliance between France and England was needed, and, though diffi-

[15] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre* (Paris, 1858).
[16] *Constitutionnel,* 11 March 1858.
[17] *Moniteur universel,* 12 March 1858.
[18] A. Darimon, *Histoire d'un parti, les cinq sous l'Empire, 1857-1860* (Paris, 1885), p. 142.

cult, a rapprochement could be worked out between the two countries.[19] The *Journal des débats* declared "this remarkable pamphlet is written with a moderation which will add to the effect it is calculated to produce, and we may hope that it will contribute largely towards a happy solution of existing difficulties." [20] The *Patrie* supported the brochure wholeheartedly. The brochure, it said, put the interest of western civilization above grievances and clearly explained the many irritations of the French toward the conspiracies planned in England. No doubt its final effect would be to end all misunderstandings between the two peoples.[21] The *Pays* agreed that the pamphlet was a "true, lucid, memorandum" on all phases of the refugee question. Both countries, it believed, realized that the general interest of Europe required friendship and alliance of the two nations, and now there was hope that good sense would prevail to preserve the close relationship.[22] The *Journal des villes et des campagnes* declared they were sure that England would respond fairly to the "just observations of our government." If the speeches of her politicians are sincere, England still desires the French alliance." [23] The *Union,* a clerical paper, was less ecstatic but felt that the pamphlet was important because it was well written. However, said the *Union,* the statesmen of London and Paris will settle the difficulties between the two nations without being influenced by this isolated anonymous work, which "imposes responsibility on no one." [24] Even those papers which did not comment reprinted columns of the brochure, thereby assuring it wide publicity.[25]

French brochure response was not heavy, because the topic was too uncontroversial to inspire a tremendous flood of pamphlets. One anonymous response entitled *Un mot sur la brochure L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre* thought that the pamphlet was proof of the moderation of France and her desire to maintain the English alliance. Napoleon III, said the anonymous rebutter, has been the example of great wisdom and goodness; he has brought peace and liberty to France, which had been torn by revolution and strife. The conspirators who have attempted to kill the emperor represent the revolutionary movement and wish to destroy peace and stability France had found. The death of the emperor would disturb Europe because his presence was necessary to preserve her

[19] London *Times,* 13 March 1858.
[20] RDM, ser. 2, XIV (14 March 1858), 480-481.
[21] *Journal des débats,* 12 March 1858.
[22] *Morning Herald,* 15 March 1858, citing *Patrie* of 12 March 1858.
[23] *Siècle, 13 March* 1858, citing *Journal des villes et des campagnes.*
[24] *Union,* 12 March 1858.
[25] *Univers,* 12 March 1858; *Gazette de France,* 12 March 1858; *Siècle,* 12 March 1858.

power balance. That was why France has demanded the expulsion of refugees from England so that this foyer of revolution could be shut. If the English parliament will redress this evil, then there "will be assured between two nations this grand and noble community of ideas which will be their strength, their unity, their future, and the peace of the world." [26]

English press reaction was mixed in tone. The *Morning Post,* which was the spokesman for Palmerston, felt that the brochure "is remarkable for its impressive truthfulness and broadness of views and even assumes an epic grandeur compared with the littleness which characterizes the political writing of our day. It should calm public opinion, and it has shown Napoleon III is desirous of maintaining the English alliance." The pamphlet was an appeal to English honor.[27] The London *Times* was gratified with the pamphlet, which had "a moderate tone, was courteous in expression, and carefully guarded against any word or thought that might wound the national susceptibility; it demands equal moderation and courtesy from us." [28] The *Daily News* regarded the brochure as important. There was much agreement with the many sentiments of the pamphlet. "But if it is to be regarded as a valid plea for the introduction of a sweeping alteration into the laws of this country, then it must be pronounced a complete failure . . . we cannot, and we will not, introduce a law that, under the chimerical and idle pretext of preventing conspiracies among those [whom] your own acts have turned into conspirators, will violate the whole spirit of our free institutions." [29] The *Morning Advertiser,* which was bitterly opposed to the Palmerston ministry and his conspiracy bill, characterized the work as a "quibbling pamphlet from the tawdry pen of La Guéronnière." Napoleon III had tried to bully the English people and when that failed he tried "to wheedle them out of rights." An anti-French tone prevailed in the assertion that England did not need the French alliance, which really meant association with despotism and selfishness.[30] The *Manchester Guardian* declared that the brochure written by the emperor "is homage paid to the influence of public opinion on statecraft." However, England could not change her laws, for to do so would abridge the rights of both liberty and of asylum.[31] The *Economist* said, this epistle emanating from the highest source was most temperate and conciliatory. The French emperor wished to maintain

[26] *Un mot sur la brochure L'Empereur Napoléon III et L'Angleterre* (Paris, 1858).
[27] *Morning Post,* 13 March 1858.
[28] London *Times,* 13 March 1858.
[29] *Daily News,* 12 March 1858.
[30] *Morning Advertiser,* 13 March 1858. The Paris correspondent had correctly attributed the pamphlet to La Guéronnière.
[31] *Manchester Guardian,* 12 March 1858.

the alliance, and, if both countries remained calm, the issues between them could be settled amicably. Nevertheless, the editor criticized many points in the brochure, and he concluded that, although "the French conciliatory tone in the pamphlet will allay much English indignation," France could not expect England to surrender "the deepest principle of her political life . . . because evil intentions go forth from her shores – inspired by hatreds which England did not originate. . . ." [32]

By April the refugee controversy had been resolved quietly. Even before the "peace brochure," Disraeli in parliament had spoken in conciliatory tones about the need for an English-French alliance. The amendment was withdrawn, the bill was passed, and the controversy was buried by both sides.

However, the French pamphlets about England did not stop. The stream continued throughout 1859-1860. Hundreds of pamphlets about England circulated, and although most were not government-inspired, they were permitted to circulate freely, for the French were as fond of twisting the lion's tail as were the Americans. For the most part these brochures enjoyed a small reception, but English observers questioned their inspiration and importance. Many of these works did contain ideas that were popular at the French court. In addition the English were aware of the use of government-inspired pamphlets and strict press censorship. Frequently they assumed that these pamphlets must represent the administration's attitude, whether inspired by important persons or not, because their publication was permitted.[33]

In June 1858 diplomatic conflict over the disposition of the Roumanian principalities brought forth a pamphlet which declared "Cherbourg had been armed as a means of striking a blow at England. If France is humiliated in the matters of the principalities, assuredly the blow will be struck." [34] In early August the brochure *Cherbourg et l'Angleterre* declared that the building of Cherbourg was a glorification of France, and before long England would be reduced to a French dependency, along with the destruction of her navy.[35] Despite the comment it elicited from the English press it has no special importance; it was attributed to Jules Lechevallier, an ex-Saint Simonian and socialist who was a refugee in England until he was pardoned by the emperor and employed as a very

[32] *Economist,* 13 March 1858.

[33] London *Times,* 16 August 1858; *Daily News,* 4 January 1853; RDM, ser. 2, XVI (15 August 1858), 956-957.

[34] Cherbourg had been rebuilt and heavily fortified in 1858. *L'Empereur Napoléon III et les Principautés Unies* (Paris, 1858).

[35] M. Urban, *British opinion and policy on the unification of Italy, 1856-1861* (Scottdale, Pa., 1938), p. 108.

minor official in one of the ministries.[36] The *Courrier de Paris* complained that the English in reading this brochure and others like it would have the mistaken notion that anti-British feeling was prevalent in France.[37]

One pamphlet, *Aurons-nous la guerre avec l'Angleterre?* stated that France did not seek war or conquest and that Europe was unjustly suspicious of her motives. At Cherbourg, said Medoros, the author, France had created a powerful navy, but her emperor was not interested in dynastic adventure, only in the peaceful development of nationality, liberty, and order in Europe. The English, who represented aristocratic rule, not democracy, perpetuated cruelties and tyrannies in Ireland and India. If war were ever to come, France would aid the downtrodden and subjected peoples; and if England ranged herself among France's autocratic enemies, she would become the target of French antagonism.[38] The Paris correspondent of the *Daily News* thought this emanated from a personage high in the counsels of the French government; [39] but there was no evidence to substantiate this belief. A little brochure entitled *Cherbourg, c'est la paix* declared that the fortifications at Cherbourg were made to help France bring the gifts of civilisation to backward peoples. There should be an alliance of the three great powers – England, France, and Russia to facilitate this task. Force was unnecessary: through commerce, custom, and example, new concepts could be introduced. Instead of outright conquest, large equitable protectorates would be organized in the Middle East and Asia. To aid this noble task, a canal would be cut through the Isthmus of Suez.[40] England must forego her rivalries and traditional hates to help new nationalities to achieve justice and liberty. France, in seeking this alliance was going to launch a new crusade, following her natural instincts and her glorious traditions.[41] This was the exposition of the "white man's burden" long before Rudyard Kipling. The *Economist* thought that this pamphlet came from government officials because of its peaceful tone.[42]

Forcade in the *Revue des deux mondes* angrily attacked these pamphlets, calling them "revolting and odious" and condemning their nationalistic ardor. The great danger is that diplomats do not understand the

[36] London *Times,* 16 August 1858.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] S. Medoros, *Aurons-nous la guerre avec l'Angleterre?* (Paris, 1858).
[39] Urban, p. 108.
[40] A favorite idea at court.
[41] *Cherbourg, c'est la paix* (Paris, 1858).
[42] *Economist,* 14 August 1858.

limited freedom of the press and thus mistake their true origin, "taking seriously these shameful brochures." [43]

In November of that year two more pamphlets appeared which had greater significance. The first, *L'Angleterre et la Russie,* was written by Amédée de Césena. There is no proof of Napoleonic editing of this work, but many of its ideas are previews of sentiments expressed in later government manifestos. Césena himself was close to the government, which gave the pamphlet more weight, too.

L'Angleterre et la Russie was very long and written with a heavy hand. It was divided into three sections. The first, entitled "Turkey and Europe," claimed that Turkey would eventually disappear. The Crimean War was merely a temporary expedient to preserve the peace and balance of power of Europe. The West should divide Turkey so that its final dissolution would not cause an upheaval of the power balance. Russia should move into Constantinople, Austria into the Principalities, England into Egypt. Since France was too distant to benefit from a territorial division, compensation would therefore be given to her elsewhere. The other alternative would be to make Constantinople a free city and to establish small independent states from the rest of the empire. Unfortunately the powers would not make any agreement. They would prefer to wait and postpone the final day of reckoning until Russia moved into Constantinople. As a result of the great technological advances of the age, a great railroad could be built that would connect India, China, and even America. It would force the construction of the Suez Canal. This would bring the destruction of English power because her domination of the seas would be useless. "Russia will climb as England descends. America and Russia will be the dominating powers of the world: "the two Romes of the future." [44]

Part two is entitled "England and India." The introductory paragraphs describe the history of English domination of India since 1599, culminating in the insurrection of 1857. England would emerge victorious after paying a heavy price in money and lives. India would become a financial drain because her industry and commerce would be completely destroyed. The best solution would be for England to renounce her empire by opening Indian ports to the trade of all nations. Instead of opposing the building of the Suez Canal, England should take the initiative in its creation to maintain her protectorate and to facilitate trade. England then could create a barrier on the Ganges and the Indus Rivers which Russia

[43] RDM, ser. 2, XVI (15 August 1858), 956-957.
[44] Note the similarity of this idea to the one in the Lavalette Memorandum of 1866.

would not be able to penetrate. But England had lacked the imagination and the resolution to implement such a policy.

The third part is entitled "Italy and the Revolution." Italy had been seething with unrest which must eventually result in European war. Only the right of force had made Austrian domination of the peninsula legitimate. Rome would always be another source of unrest as long as the pope's temporal and spiritual power were the same. The temporal power had prevented progress and reform; if this power were removed, liberty would be restored in the Romagna without revolution. However, the author declared, nothing would be done by the great powers to solve these European questions. General war could come, and the final results of such a terrible war would be that Russia would emerge with such an enormous empire "that its contemplation moves us with secret fright mixed with involuntary admiration." France would remain to serve as a counterbalance: allied with other western nations, she would stop czarism.[45]

Was this pamphlet a trial balloon issued to sound out public feelings? If so, very little comment was elicited in the press or in diplomatic circles. Forcade, defending England and her institutions, condemned the Césena pamphlet for its hostility to England.[46]

Within the same week another pamphlet, which also aroused Forcade's ire because of its anti-English tone,[47] appeared. Napoleon III in a conversation with Villamarina, the Italian ambassador, asked if he had read the brochure, entitled *L'Angleterre et la guerre,* and admitted that this work had received its inspiration from his own personal office.[48]

The author of *L'Angleterre et la guerre* argued that England could not deploy the same resources in 1858 as she had during the wars of the French Revolution and the First Empire. The system of amortization used by Pitt to reduce the national debt had brought much confidence in borrowing. High import taxes aided British agriculture, and the growth of her industry was accelerated by various new inventions. The war had stimulated the rise of great fortunes which provided an unlimited supply of capital. Furthermore, the spoils of India and the commerce from captured French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies had added greatly to the nation's wealth. Since 1815 England had abandoned the system of amortization. She had lost confidence in her ability to liquidate her national debt, and in 1858 had been as reserved in borrowing as formerly

[45] Amédée de Césena, *L'Angleterre et la Russie* (Paris, 1858).
[46] RDM, ser. 2, XVIII (31 December 1858), 22-23.
[47] *Ibid.,* (14 November 1858), pp. 476-477.
[48] Villamarina to Cavour, Paris, 21 November 1858, CCN, I, 206-209.

she was adventuresome. Peace did not bring the prosperity that had been expected, because the continent began to develop industry of its own and erected protective tariff walls barring British exports. Thus British economic policy has become concerned with finding more markets so industry could expand to give work and at the same time provide cheaper prices to assure the sale of its goods. Since England could no longer depend upon trade with the continent, she has discovered new markets in the rest of the world; but this in turn has made her more dependent on foreign lands for her raw materials, particularly grain, since her growing population required more than she could produce herself. If war were to be purely maritime she would be able to meet her expenses by taxation alone. But if she had to maintain a land army, her expenses would be doubled, and she would have to borrow. To exist she must have three things: food for her people, cotton for her industry, and markets for her finished products. In the event of war, if her navy were defeated or her ports blockaded, she would become the prey of a million proletarians without work or bread. Hunger alone would defeat England – there would be no need for an invasion. The Anglo-French alliance was needed to maintain European peace, but it "must rest on justice, equality, and reciprocity of respect." If there was a conflict between the two powers France could be sure of victory." [49]

Despite the emperor's interest, this pamphlet elicited little reaction from the press. There were too many pamphlets about England, and without the support of the government papers to give it the "aura" of higher inspiration, it could not capture public attention. Unfortunately Napoleon III left no evidence of why he supported this brochure. Could his purpose have been that of a veiled threat to England? In July he had already met Cavour at Plombières, and there he had put into motion his plan for Italian confederation. Even before Plombières he permitted the publication of articles in the *Moniteur universel* which attacked the papal administration of Rome. The appearance of the Césena pamphlet with its section on Italy followed by this threat to England indicated that, indeed, this might have been his purpose. However, the pamphlet's effect in England was negligible, just as it was in France, because of the large number of brochures attacking England already in circulation.

But the pamphlets did not stop, for as one English contemporary complained, "it is calculated that if all the pamphlets published within the last few years in France, for and against England were collected, they

[49] *L'Angleterre et la guerre* (Paris, 1858).

would form a column as high as that in the Place Vendôme." [50] *La Guerre à l'Anglais, L'alliance anglaise ou l'alliance russe, L'Angleterre, La France et la guerre* (by Count du Hamel), all repeated the same anti-English ideas, some more violently than others.[51] One, *La politique anglaise,* caused a bit more sensation because the type and paper were similar to those of the official publications, and the eager public seized upon it for a day or so.[52] It was rumored that the emperor had inspired the brochure and that it was edited by his secretary Mocquard,[53] but there is no definite evidence that its inspiration came from the government.

Written in the form of an open letter to Lord Palmerston, *La politique anglaise* began by saying that England must remain allied with France if she were to remain a great power, for Russia has had a perpetual drive to seize Constantinople, and if she were ever successful, England would be reduced to a second rate power. The English viewed the treaties of Vienna as sacrosanct and opposed the French annexation of Savoy. England has tried to prevent a French-Belgian rapprochement, despite the real desires for it by the Belgian people. She feared a strong Italy would be allied to France. England viewed the French building of naval bases at Brest and Cherbourg as a threat, but her real rivals would come from New York or Cronstadt.[54] Although there had been a divergence of interests between France and Russia, the possibility of an alliance could exist whereby France could advance to the Rhine, and Russia to the Bosphorus. The choice the English have had was an alliance between ou two nations, which would prevent Russia's growth from eclipsing English power. "The opposite would be the growth of France, but with it the czar would advance to Constantinople, the routes of Asia would be lost and British rule of the sea compromised forever. Only England can choose. . . ." [55]

La politique anglaise had appeared during the summer months when the populace of Paris was more interested in its summer vacation plans than in politics. However, the rumors prevalent in the salons of Paris indicated that the pamphlet had enjoyed a limited but speculative audience.[56]

Off all the pamphlets written on Anglo-French relations only *L'Empe-*

[50] London *Times,* 15 November 1858.
[51] *Ibid.,* 16 November 1859, 24 October, 17 May 1860.
[52] *Ibid.,* 12, 13 July, 8 September 1860.
[53] *Chronique de la Duchesse de Dino 1831 à 1862* (Paris, 1910), IV, 370.
[54] Note the similarity of this idea and that of Amédée de Césena, *L'Angleterre et la Russie.*
[55] *La politique anglaise* (Paris, 1860).
[56] London *Times,* 8 September 1860.

reur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre was truly important. It had the largest audience because of its extensive publicity and it was noted by the foreign diplomats. The other pamphlets, whether inspired or not, created only a momentary stir.

While England was the topic of conversation in the press, another problem occupied the diplomats of Europe during the years 1857-1858, that of the Roumanian principalities.

The political background of this particular difficulty dated from the peace of Adrianople in 1828, which gave the separate principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia political autonomy under the Sultan of Turkey's suzerainty, acknowledged by an annual tribute and another fixed sum paid upon the election of a life-term hospodar in each province. This autonomy left a power vacuum in the Balkans, and the Russians seized the opportunity to exercise a protectorate over these two small provinces.

The year 1848 saw in the two provinces the same type of upheaval that had swept the rest of Europe. The revolution was poorly organized and almost opéra bouffe in character, but from its failure emerged a new spirit: nationalism and the strong desire for the union of the two provinces under a hereditary prince.

In 1856 the powers found themselves divided on the question of unity and seemed unable to compromise. Austria was opposed to union because she did not desire a unified state on her borders that might stir up nationalistic feelings in her provinces of Bukovina and Transylvania. Moreover, she had begun to penetrate the principalities economically and did not want those interests disturbed. Turkey was in opposition because she remembered her loss of Greece and feared further dismemberment of her empire; while Britain, fearing Russia, wanted no change in the status quo, particularly the establishment of a small state into which Russia might extend her influence. On the other hand, France championed the unity of the principalities with rule by a foreign hereditary prince and nominal suzerainty by the Porte. Napoleon III believed that a united Moldavia and Wallachia would form a state as large as Bavaria and count in the balance of power as a barrier against Russia (who would hesitate to violate an independent state). Furthermore, this new state would fill a badly needed power vacuum in the Balkans, since they could no longer be bought or sold, thus creating greater stability. Most important, unity would answer the needs and desires of the people and add to the strength of the Ottoman Empire.[57] Russia agreed with France, for she desired to form a wedge between the allies, and she also wanted to

[57] Napoleon III to Walewski, 5 March 1856, "Souvenirs," *Revue de France,* I, 506.

pose as a friend of the Roumanians. Sardinia-Piedmont agreed, not because she cared about the principalities (she wished to use them as compensation to Austria to free Italy), but because she felt it expedient to support the principle of nationalism.

The result of the deadlock was the appointment of a special commission to discuss the future status of the Roumanian principalities and a postponement of the final settlement. The powers decided to hold an election of delegates in the two provinces, who were to vote on the question of union. The principalities were then placed under the direction of a congress that met in 1858 in order to prevent any power from exercising special privileges in regard to these states.

The elections were held on 19 July 1857. The election violations were so flagrant that upon the objections of France, the results were annulled and a new election was held in the later part of September 1857, in which the overwhelming majority of the people favored the union of the two provinces and the election of a hereditary prince.

After the revolution of 1848 the Roumanian refugees came to Paris and began to propagandize for their homeland. French liberals such as Regnault, Desprez, Léon Plée, and T. Delord also lent their sympathy and pens to the Roumanian cause. Among the better known Roumanians were Rosetti, Eliade, the Bratiano brothers, and Golescu.[58] The refugees and their sympathizers published many pamphlets, none of which were government-inspired. Chainoi's *Dernière occupation des Principautés par la Russie* discussed the discontent and liberal tendencies of the Moldavian and Wallachian peasants.[59] Bratiano in 1855 declared that France was the "incarnate principle of nationality" and she would earn the gratitude of eastern Europe because she was the source of their regeneration.[60] Another brochure suggested that Turkey was weak and therefore a constant threat to the European balance of power. Because of her weakness Turkey constantly invited Austrian or Russian intervention.[61] Paul Bataillard claimed that Austria was as great a menace in the East as Russia, for she sought to Germanize the Danube. He strongly advocated the unity of the two provinces under the suzerainty of the pope, to be-

[58] C. Sturdza, *De l'Histoire diplomatique des Roumains 1821-1859. Règne de Michel Sturdza 1834-1849* (Paris, 1907), p. 119; R. W. Seton-Watson, *A history of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 258-260; N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations entre la France et les Roumains* (Paris, 1918), pp. 205-217.

[59] G. Chainoi, *Dernière occupation des Principautés par la Russie* (Paris, 1853) in Sturdza, *Acte si,* II, 145-159.

[60] I. C. Bratiano, *Mémoire sur l'Empire d'Autriche dans la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1855).

[61] I. C. Bratiano, *Mémoire sur la situation de la Moldo-Vallachie depuis le traité de Paris* (Paris, 1857), in Sturdza, *Acte si,* III, 149-179.

come a buffer state between Austria, Russia, and Turkey.[62] Boeresco in his little work condemned Turkey for her faulty administration of the election of 1857 and called for greater political reforms.[63]

An anonymous pamphlet entitled *Affaires d'Orient, réorganisation des provinces danubiennes* appeared after the peace congress in 1856. It did not create much excitement, although Sturda claimed that it was "inspired by the French government." [64] Cavour, in a letter to his minister in England, enclosed a copy to be given to Lord Palmerston, and remarked that "it appeared to me to answer all the arguments that have opposed this measure [union of the provinces], even from the Turkish point of view." [65] Cavour did not mention the pamphlet by name, but since the letter was written at the time of the congress, it may be that he was referring to this one.

The pamphlet claimed that the political regime of the two provinces ought to be unified, for Moldavia and Wallachia were of the same Roumanian nationality. Turkey, who had opposed this union, should examine history. A weak divided state on her frontier had left it exposed to frequent occupations and dismemberments. A strong unified province, on the other hand, bound in suzerainty to Turkey, would prevent a recurring danger. This solution would not only be better for Turkey, but would also help to maintain the European equilibrium. A military force strong enough to be an effective barrier against the designs of Austria, who has dreamed of extending her influence into the Danube basin, would be necessary. The establishment of Roumanian unity would make dismemberment difficult and total absorption even more so. The author continued that the Roumanians should have a voice in the creation of a constitution for their own country. There was also the need of a leader who was a foreigner, thus impervious to local pressures, to lead the new nation to effect great economic and political reforms. The leader could not be a Russian, for he would lead to the same dangers that the recent war just ended. No Austrian could be their prince, for he might be an instrument in aiding Austria's expansion. An Englishman would not do, for the English know how to protect but are incapable of organizing a people. He should be a Frenchman: the general who had been the com-

[62] Bataillard, *Premier point de la question d'Orient. Les Principautés de Vallachie et Moldavie devant le congrès* (Paris, 1856), in *ibid.*, III, 372-426.

[63] B. Boeresco, *Le Firman Turc pour la convocation des divans ad hoc dans les Principautés du Danube* (Paris, 1857), *ibid.*, III, 341-351.

[64] *Ibid.*, III, 114.

[65] Cavour to D'Azeglio, n. d., Paris, Nicomède Bianchi, *La politique du Comte Camille de Cavour de 1852 à 1861* (Turin, 1885), pp. 130-131.

mander of the troops during the Crimean War and who had strengthened the throne of the sultan by the capture of Sebastopol. The election of the Duke of Pelissier to the Grand-Duchy of Roumania would develop French influence in the East. The French have had a particular aptitude for spreading the ideas and institutions of modern civilization. France, geographically distant, and lacking commercial interests in the levant, offered no dangers to the balance of power. French cultural influences were already strong in Moldavia and Wallachia: books, tastes, civil and commercial law, and education. "They will bear fruit if the election of the prince is made under the conditions indicated here." [66]

The evidence of government inspiration of this pamphlet is very slight. Although its political ramifications were very negligible, the brochure is worthy of notice because it reflected part of a position the government was to take in regard to the principalities in 1858.

Although the printing presses had been occupied with the Roumanian question since 1853, much greater interest was shown just before and during the Paris conference, which started on 22 May 1858. The *Constitutionnel* claimed that France should insist on the union of the two provinces but should also be conciliatory by giving up the idea of a hereditary prince.[67]

During the course of the conference, the *Pays* became sharply critical of Austrian policy.[68] Support also came from the liberal press, particularly the *Siècle,* under the pen of Léon Plée, who pleaded the cause of unity.[69] The Orleanist *Revue des deux mondes* in a series of articles by Saint-Marc Girardin also condemned the Turkish administration and supported Roumanian aspirations.[70] A pamphlet appeared by an ardent Roumanophile named Henry Ubicini, in which he called for the union of the principalities under an hereditary ruler despite the objections of Austria, Turkey, and England. Europe, he went on, needed a barrier against Russia and would listen to the desires of the Roumanian people. Humanity and the sacrifices of those fallen in the Crimean War have called for this solution. If the new congress failed in its duty, it would throw the principalities into Russian arms. The interviews of Osborne and Stuttgart had

[66] *Affaires d'orient, réorganisation des provinces danubiennes* (Paris, 1856), reprinted in Sturdza, *Actes si,* III, 114-124.

[67] London *Times,* 10 May 1858.

[68] *Ibid.,* 21 June 1858.

[69] *Ibid.,* 12 May 1858; *Siècle,* 22 May 1858, reprinted in Sturdza, *Actes si,* VII, 200-201.

[70] Saint-Marc Girardin, "Les voyageurs en orient et la Turquie depuis le traité de Paris," RDM, ser. 2. XIV (15 March 1858), 392-413; (15 April 1858), 950-975; ser. 2. XVI (1 July 1858), 98-124.

shown that France would not abdicate her claims, and the new congress would give France another victory.[71]

On 30 June 1858, about a month after the Paris congress had been in session and the differences of opinions had been fully aired, a bellicose pamphlet appeared entitled *L'Empereur Napoléon III et les Principautés Unies.* It certainly had the emperor's full approval, but he did not edit it himself or even order it. In writing of it to Prince Napoleon he said: "The pamphlet that has appeared on the Principalities is by a masterhand. Do you know who wrote it?" [72] The diplomatic world thought it to be an imperial announcement, but it was actually commissioned by Prince Napoleon. The prince first contacted Alfred Darimon, a member of the opposition in the legislative body, an ardent republican and one of the "so-called famous Five." Darimon felt he knew too little about the subject to undertake the commission, whereupon the prince sent him a dossier of documents. His study of the folder proved a "pure jumble," and he promptly relinquished the job.[73] Prince Napoleon's final choice was two men, Armand Lévy and Ian Bratiano. They met with the prince secretly for conferences and ideas.[74]

Bratiano was a Roumanian refugee from the revolution of 1848, who had been compromised in a plot on the emperor's life and had been in prison but was given his freedom at the outbreak of the war in the Crimea. He then became part of the intellectual circle of Prince Napoleon, and it was through this friendship that he was taken to meet the emperor, to whom he spoke glowingly of Roumanian aspirations and hopes and gave a memorandum of the subject. After this interview the emperor began to support the cause of Roumanian nationalism.[75]

The other collaborator, Armand Lévy, was a former revolutionary and friend of Prince Napoleon (a part of the "palais royal" group).[76] He was born in 1827 in Précy-sous-Thil (Côte d'or). His father was a notary, a local official and a former secretary to Napoleon I. Armand went to Paris at seventeen, studied law, and was influenced by socialist teachings; the democrat Michelet and the exiled poet Adam Mickiewicz also contributed to his political development. Lévy's friendship with the Polish poet became

[71] *Les Principautés devant le second congrès de Paris* (Paris, 1858), reprinted in Sturdza, *Actes si,* VII, 180-191.
[72] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Plombières, 6 July 1858, D'Hauterive, p. 97.
[73] Darimon, *Les cinq,* p. 190.
[74] *Ibid.,* pp. 195-196.
[75] Seton-Watson, p. 239.
[76] AN, F18, 549, January 1860. The palais royal group consisted of workers under the protection and sponsorship of Prince Napoleon. Armand Lévy was the intermediary. Kulstein, p. 124.

intimate, as the younger man accompanied him on trips to Italy and Constantinople. Thus Armand became a passionate advocate of nationality, of socialism, and democracy. In Paris he studied law until the outbreak of the revolution of 1848. He founded a political club where Pierre Leroux, Madier de Montjean, Bernard, and other radicals met. Lévy's speeches were so wild that he was fined twice by the government. He was arrested and accused of participating in the *journée* 15 May 1848, but was found innocent. However, after the demonstration of 13 June 1849 Lévy was not so fortunate; he fled to Belgium to avoid arrest, but he returned to France shortly. In 1850 he distributed socialist pamphlets, and in the presidential elections of 1848 he supported Raspail.[77] After 1850 Lévy's socialist activities ceased, but he ran often as an opposition candidate, even though some of the republican moderates disliked him.[78] In 1859 he founded at Geneva the newspaper *l'Espérance,* whose purpose was to appeal to the working classes. He requested permission to sell the papers in Paris, which was granted, but he was denied his request to publish there. It is unclear how he came to be reconciled, even half-heartedly, with the empire; but his passionate belief in nationalities and his concern for the workers' welfare co-incided with that of Prince Napoleon. He claimed that his conciliation to the regime came from its sympathy for the oppressed peoples, and the conviction that "a loyal and strong union of Napoleon and democracy alone can prevent misfortune for our country." [79] Later Lévy worked for the *Opinion nationale* and published two brochures on foreign policy: *L'Empereur, Rome et roi d'Italie* and *L'Empereur Napoléon et le roi Guillaume,* as well as innumerable pamphlets addressed to the workers' problems and their right to strike. He vociferously championed Polish nationalism in 1863, protested the treatment of Jews in Roumania in 1868, and travelled widely. On the declaration of war with Prussia in 1870 he returned to France, and in the upheavals of 1870-1871 – the Commune – he became a revolutionary again. The suppression of that insurrection meant exile in Italy until his death.[80]

The pamphlet *L'Empereur Napoléon III et les Principautés Unies* by Lévy and Bratiano called for union of the two provinces as the best solution. The new state would form a barrier against Russia, and the

[77] AN, F18, 281, Police Report, 1 July 1861.
[78] Ollivier, *Journal,* I, 328-329; Darimon, *Les cinq,* p. 195.
[79] AN, F18, 549, Lévy to Persigny, 25 January 1860.
[80] Jean Gaumont, "Un républicain révolutionnaire romantique." *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* (1931), 395-467; Pierre et Paul, "Armand Lévy," *Les hommes d'aujourd'hui,* II, no. 190.

people have declared their wishes for it. The two powers who have opposed union were Turkey and Austria, who in this conference, sabotaged the rights of the Roumanian people. The position of the French government on this question has been to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to protect the rights of Christians, and to give the people of Roumania the union they desire. For Turkey to become a great state the Porte must allow each race to develop its own individuality and gradually he must substitute the authority of the commune for that of the pasha. Then Constantinople would become the universal city – a great center between the two cultures. The authors declared that England's opposition to the unity of the Principalities was based upon jealousy of France's friendship for Roumania. England should unite with France to consolidate peace in the East. If not, threatened the writers, "Cherbourg has been armed as a means of striking a blow at England. If France is humiliated in the matters of the principalities, assuredly the blow will be struck." Russia may have lost the war in the East, but she has not lost her moral position in that area. The peoples of the East have looked to her as being the only power that has protected the Christians while the Western powers have done nothing. As for Austria, she has had no interest but her own unique one: she felt that Roumania on the Danube would place her between two Piedmonts, but it has been to neither France's nor Europe's interest to let her expand to the Black Sea or to the Alps. The Roumanian cause has become a French cause; the union of the two provinces was the first fruit of the war, and the honor of the French government has been too deeply involved for her to cede on this issue.[81]

The pamphlet's title, so similar to other pamphlets on foreign policy which were almost certainly inspired by the government, gave it more importance than it really possessed. The war-like sentiments of the brochure caused a fall on the stock market and impelled Count Walewski, the foreign minister, to issue an indignant denial of any official connection with the brochure at the conference. The *Patrie,* a semi-official paper, also repudiated any government inspiration.[82] Despite this denial some of the English papers were disturbed by the brochure's threats to Great Britain.[83] Although the emperor himself did not inspire this pamphlet, it was important because the diplomats who attended the conference at Paris thought it was a statement of the French government. However, the Paris press gave the brochure little publicity, and it did not create a big sensation or arouse public opinion.

[81] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et les Principautés Unies* (Paris, 1858).

[82] Count Hübner, *Neuf ans de souvenirs d'un ambassadeur d'Autriche à Paris sous le Second Empire 1851-1859* (Paris, 1904), II, 192-193.

[83] Sturdza, *Actes si,* VII, 363-367.

In August the work of the conference drew to a close, and the organization of the Principalities was decided. Turkish suzerainty was reaffirmed, but except for an annual tribute, it was only titular. Hospodars were chosen by the assembly of each province, and each hospodar retained his autonomy. They were subject to the treaties of the Porte provided it did not violate their privileges. Each of the principalities was to have its own army for defensive purposes. The two principalities were to have one supreme court and a central commission, chosen by the provinces, to prepare and codify their common laws.

As the conference ended, the French press was filled with more articles on the question inspired by the foreign minister and the minister of the interior in order to defend the French position in accepting the decision of the conference.[84]

On 4 August 1858 another pamphlet appeared, which Sturdza declared was government-inspired. It caused little excitement and almost passed unnoticed except by the Austrians. Though published anonymously, it was attributed to Charles Duveyrier, who had been employed earlier to write semi-official brochures.[85] Entitled *L'Autriche et les Principautés danubiennes,* it was a scathing denunciation of Austrian policy in the East. The basic causes of Austria's opposition have passed unnoticed by Europe, occupied as it has been by other grave crises. Austria saw in unity an obstacle to the plans she had for the development of the lower Danube. Since 1854, when she occupied that country, she has tried to absorb it, by usurping the hospodar's authority, by preventing all economic progress, and by plunging the people into passivity or anarchy. Austria has taken advantage of her consular privileges to interfere in the internal affairs of the principalities and, by abusing these rights, has infringed on the rights of the citizens of those provinces. The Austrian consuls have their own police, unlike all the other powers, who use the Moldavian-Wallachian forces. These police intervene in internal affairs and disrupt the activities of the native forces. These abuses hindered the administration and the processes of justice by creating a small state within a state. The consular power should not be abandoned, but changed so that these abuses will no longer disrupt the internal administration of the principalities. In 1856, the newspapers of Vienna published a series of articles which were attributed to a Professor Stein. He claimed that the principalities were necessary for the development of Austria. Conquest by arms would be wrong; but it could be achieved by economic penetration,

[84] Villamarina to Cavour, Paris, 18 August, CCN, I, 129-130.
[85] A. A. Barbier, *Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes* (Paris, 1872, 3rd ed.,), I, 323.

control of the navigation of the Danube, greater colonization, and the extension of consular jurisdiction. The tendencies manifested by the Austrian government and her actions in the principalities were exactly the same as the program traced by the "savant-economist." That has been the reason Austria fought the idea of union, to maintain her economic supremacy, which she feared might be displaced under a strong unified Roumanian state.[86]

Hübner reported the appearance of the pamphlet and sent it to Vienna. Buol, the foreign minister, felt that the brochure disparaged and distorted the real facts. He thought it wise to print a refutation in Paris. Since the documents necessary for proper rebuttal were in Vienna, a writer would have to be commissioned there. The work was written in French and published in France anonymously. Hübner was further instructed that the pamphlet was to give no hint of government inspiration (French or Austrian) and that the Austrian ambassador should have no connection with the French publisher. In addition he was told, that "the brochure in question will contain nothing that could offend the French government." [87] On 5 November, Hübner carried out his instructions: Buol received 40 copies of a brochure printed in Paris at the cost of 240 francs, 95 centimes.[88]

The Austrian reply entitled *La juridiction des consuls étrangers et spécialement des consuls d'Autriche dans les Principautés danubiennes* asserted that the Duveyrier pamphlet revealed Austrian hate by recounting half truths and distortions. The basic premise of the refutation was that the Roumanians were half barbaric, and that their administration of justice reflected their low state of civilization. Austrian subjects had enriched the country enormously, but this was not a plan of economic penetration. The Austrian government must protect the rights and interest of her nationals. Since the administration of the principalities was similar to that of the Turkish Empire, Austria had reserved her privilege of maintaining the same rights in both states. If the activity of the Austrian consuls was more obvious than those of other nations, it was simply because of the very large number of Austrians who had contributed to the riches and economic growth of the principalities. "Until the public authority, the administrative and judicial organization, becomes equal to the general recognized standards of Western civilized states, uncorrupt

[86] *L'Autriche et les Principautés danubiennes* (Paris, 1858), reprinted in Sturdza, *Actes si,* VII, 363-387.

[87] Buol to Hübner, Vienna, 4 August 1858, HHSA, PA, Frankreich, XII, 64, no. 6.

[88] Buol to Offenfall, Vienna, 5 November 1858, HHSA, PA, Frankreich, XII, 64, no. 4.

and fair, Austrian consuls will continue to protect their nationals." [89]

Both brochures evidently made little impression, for there was no mention of them either in the French or the English press.

In complete accordance with the terms of the treaty of Paris in 1858, the central commission met and drew up the rules in each of the two provinces for elections to be held for a life-time hospodar. But both provinces openly violated the convention and elected Alexander Couza to be the hospodar of both provinces. On 5 February, Couza himself sent a personal appeal to Napoleon III saying: "The fate of the Roumanians is in Your Majesty's keeping." The emperor responded by supporting the fait accompli of partial union. In the middle of February 1859 an inspired pamphlet announced this policy.[90]

L'Autriche et le prince roumain declared that the unexpected election of the prince had thrown the diplomacy of Europe into turmoil. This election had been perfectly legal and legitimate. The convention of 19 August declared that the nomination for hospodar could either be Moldavian or Wallachian and either province could elect a man from the other. What then could be done when the Moldavians and Wallachians both elected the same man? If the conference had not desired such an outcome, they would have specifically forbidden it. The election of a single prince had not meant absolute union in defiance of the majority of powers. It had only indicated the direction of nationality to which the Roumanian people aspire. The Porte must accede to the elections, for the rights he possessed were those of homage and tribute. He had no veto power. Austria had abused her consular privileges in the principalities. The arrogation by the vice-consuls of additional rights had actually created a state within a state.[91] The removal of these abuses is the first and most necessary reform that must be undertaken. The great powers would permit the election in the principalities. There was nothing else that could be done, unless Turkey and the guaranteeing powers felt that the time had come to proclaim complete union of Moldavia-Wallachia under the rule of a foreign hereditary prince. "Austria would like to contain the storm that is thundering at her from Italy to the Danube, but all she could do would only precipitate events. To see the Vienna cabinet compromise thoughtlessly the peace which is her safeguard is to ask what

[89] *La Juridiction des consuls étrangers et spécialement des consuls d'Autriche dans les Principautés danubiennes* (Paris, 1858).

[90] Seton-Watson, pp. 266-267. The author simply stated the pamphlet was inspired by the emperor but did not cite any evidence for his assumption.

[91] The same ideas are expressed in the pamphlet *L'Autriche et les Principautés danubiennes.*

spirit of dizziness and madness has seized the advisors of the House of Austria." [92]

This pamphlet passed almost unnoticed, because France and Austria were embroiled in a crisis concerning Italy, which pre-empted public attention and publicity. Roumania achieved the first step toward complete sovereignty. In 1866 a European congress officially recognized her unity and the appointment of a foreign hereditary prince, and in 1878 another congress declared the abrogation of the Porte's suzerainty. French attention would henceforth be directed southward to the Italian peninsula.

[92] *L'Autriche et le prince roumain* (Paris, 1859).

CHAPTER IV

BROCHURES ON ITALIAN NATIONALISM, 1859

Italy was a perfect setting for testing Napoleon III's theory of nationalities. Despite many setbacks, the Italian drive for unity had not died. The year 1848 saw the first real attempt to drive Austria from the Peninsula, but the effort failed when Austrian power crushed the Italians and the pope withdrew his support. But failure did not mean destruction of the dream. A new phase of the movement started in the close Franco-Sardinian relations during the Crimean War. Cavour, an able and astute statesman, led his country to war against Russia and, by co-operating with the great powers, had the opportunity to voice his aspirations for Italy and to air his grievances at the Congress of Paris in 1856. Nothing was done for Italy, but recognition was given to her complaints.

Long a firm partisan of Italian nationalism, Napoleon III began to move toward that goal by meeting Cavour at Plombières in July 1858. The emperor told Cavour that he had decided to support Sardinia with all of his forces in a war against Austria, but a pretext would be necessary to force Austria into a war of aggression. The war's purpose was to end Austrian domination in Italy, and to reorganize Italy into a confederation. The Valley of the Po River and the Romagna would be ruled by the House of Savoy as North Italy. The pope would retain Rome and the surrounding territory. The other papal states and Tuscany would form a central kingdom of Italy. The Kingdom of Two Sicilies would remain the same. To compensate the pope for the loss of territory, he would be designated as the president of the confederation, though Victor-Emmanuel would be its actual head. In return for French assistance, Napoleon III demanded the cession of Nice and Savoy to France, and the marriage of Clothilde, the daughter of Victor-Emmanuel, to Prince Napoleon. Other military and financial details were arranged at the meeting.[1]

[1] Cavour to Victor-Emmanuel, 24 July 1858, CCN, I, 103. The English translation

With the future alliance signed, Napoleon III had two tasks: diplomatic, to assure European neutrality; educational, to prepare French public opinion for war. Prussia was not feared by France and Sardinia, because her antagonism towards Austria would keep her neutral. Russia still smarted from Austria's stand in the Crimean War. On 1 September 1858 the emperor began negotiations by sending Prince Napoleon to sound out the tsar on the Italian question. His mission was not successful, but La Roncière le Noury, who was later sent to St. Petersburg, resolved the question with a treaty providing for Russian benevolent neutrality and diplomatic assistance. Russia would have the satisfaction of seeing Austria weakened.[2]

The emperor was also cognizant of the necessity of educating France to his course of action. De la Guéronnière was commissioned to write a pamphlet whose main purpose was to demonstrate that the status quo in Italy could no longer be maintained and to present a plan of confederation.[3] In the meantime other aspects of the campaign began in earnest. A series of articles by Edmond About had already appeared in the *Moniteur universel* describing the inadequacies, corruption and dissatisfactions of the people of Rome.[4] These articles were discontinued after the protests of the papacy. Throughout December 1858 rumors were being spread in the diplomatic chancellories that a crisis might erupt in Italy. The full press attacks began in December 1858 and January 1859. The government papers as well as the *Siècle* and the *Presse* were encouraged by the government to print articles urging Italian freedom.[5]

On 1 January 1859 at an official reception Napoleon III addressed the diplomatically startling words to the Austrian ambassador, Baron Hübner: "I regret that the relations between our two governments are not more satisfactory, but I beg you to assure the emperor that they in no respect influence my feelings of friendship towards himself." [6]

The stock market fell, the French people began to worry, and the chancellories of Europe seethed with excitement and anxiety. To calm war-like rumors, the emperor had a note inserted in the *Moniteur*

is in V. Wellesley and R. Sencourt, *Conversations with Napoleon III* (London, 1934), pp. 142-148.

[2] Charles-Roux, *Alexandre II,* pp. 245-256; c.f. E. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral* (Paris, 1895-1915), III, 499-505.

[3] Rendu to Chiala, 25 August 1883, L. Chiala, *Lettere edite ed inedite de Camillo Cavour* (Turin, 1884-1887, 2nd ed.), III, 385-396.

[4] *Moniteur,* 30 April; 26, 27, 28 May; 11, 19, 26, 28 June; 5, 10, 18, 25 July 1858.

[5] Hübner, II, 233-243; Flemming to Prince-Regent, Paris, 9 December 1858, *Die auswärtige Politik Preussens, 1858-1871* (Oldenberg, 1933), I, 99-100 (hereafter cited as APP); Hatfeldt to Schleinitz, Paris, 6, 7, 8 December 1858, *ibid.,* pp. 96-98.

[6] P. de la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire* (Paris, 1929-1930), II, 380.

universel stating that there was no cause for alarm.[7] On 19 January, Victor-Emmanuel addressed the opening of parliament in Turin. He voiced Italian aspirations and said that all over Italy there was cry of pain [*grido di dolore*] that her rights be recognized. The speech created much excitement throughout Europe; and there was no doubt that it was "cleared" at the Tuileries and that the strong words were urged by the French monarch.[8] On 14 January the proposed marriage of Prince Napoleon and Clothilde was announced. When the newly married couple entered Paris on 3 February, they were greeted coldly because they had become a symbol of a coming war.[9]

An anonymous pamphlet appeared in Paris on 20 January 1859 entitled *Est-ce la guerre; est-ce la paix?* It was generally rumored to have been written either by La Guéronnière or Persigny, but, as one astute republican observer noted, it could not have been written by the latter because he was engaged on a much more important work, *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie.*[10] Although there was no proof of high inspiration most observers felt that the pamphlet was important. The Belgian diplomat, Rogier, said that Walewski denied its alleged government connection and "added that the pamphlet had little importance." [11] But Metternich was certain, just from reading the first few pages and comparing it with a later pamphlet, *Napoléon III et l'Italie,* that they both originated with the emperor.[12] The Paris correspondent of the London *Times* agreed: "The ideas of the pamphlet are those to which the emperor is very partial so as to suppose to some that the writer has some high authority for his arguments . . ." [13] Whether or not it was sponsored by the government (which it probably was), it served the useful purpose of keeping the Italian question in the public mind.

The author of the pamphlet declared that the year 1856 had set a

[7] Napoleon III to Walewski, 6 January 1859, Raindre, "Souvenirs," *Revue de France,* III, 292-293; *Moniteur,* 10 January 1859.

[8] Cavour to Nigra, (n. d.), L. C. Bollea, *Una silloge di lettere del risorgimento di particolare attenenza all' alleanza franco-italiana, alla guerra del 1859 e alla spedizione dei mille 1839-1873* (Turin, 1919), p. 133; Cavour to Nigra, 8 January 1859, *ibid.,* p. 134; Cavour to Nigra, 9 January 1859, *ibid.,* pp. 134-135; London *Times* 8 January 1859; Daniel to Cass, 11 January 1859, State Depart. Corr., Sardinia, VI, 95; G. Massari, *Il generale Alfonso La Marmora* (Florence, 1880), p. 213.

[9] Case, *French opinion,* p. 58.

[10] Darimon, *Les cinq,* p. 218.

[11] Rogier to de Vrière, 22 January 1859, E. Discailles, *Un diplomate Belge à Paris de 1830 à 1864* (Brussels, 1908), p. 496.

[12] Metternich to Dr. Twiss, Vienna, 3 February 1859, C. Burckhardt, *Briefe des Staatskanzlers Fürsten Metternich-Winneburg an den österreichischen Minister des allerhöchsten Hauses und des Äussern Grafen Buol-Schauenstein, 1852-1859* (Munich, Berlin, 1934), pp. 213-215.

[13] London *Times,* 25 January 1859.

precedent for using an assembly of nations to decide European problems; it also had made changes legitimate only if it had European sanction. A meeting of nations should be summoned to discuss the Italian question, a menace to European stability. Every pacific means would be attempted before there was a recourse to arms. In such a congress Austria would freely consent to give up her Lombard Venetian provinces. She should receive compensation for the loss of territory. The pamphlet dedicated much space to the evils in the Roman states and the Austrian injustices in her provinces. If by some strange chance the powers would decide that the Italian situation was not a threat to European stability and the status quo would be maintained, that still would not lessen the dangers from the peninsula. It would only strengthen the chance of an explosion – "a revolutionary one." But there was no fear that the "powerful instrument of peace" created following the war of 1856 would become an instrument of oppression. The decisions of a European congress would be controlled by a judge before whom all must bow – public opinion – of which Napoleon III had said correctly "that to it always belonged the last victory!" [14] If Austria refused to abide by the decisions of the congress, then a legitimate war would have to be undertaken to enforce it, and the blood that would be shed must be her responsibility.[15]

Pays, while in disagreement with some of the points of *Est-ce la guerre, est-ce la paix?* generally approved of it, but denied emphatically that it had any connection with "important persons to whom many had attributed it." [16]

About two days later another pamphlet on the topic of the day appeared, entitled *Aurons-nous la guerre?* and, although the brochure opposed the government's Italian policy, many felt that it was inspired by an important official. As a result, the first edition was sold out.[17] After a few days the government seized the pamphlet and more rumors flew. Some felt that it was seized because the ideas were a bit too bold. Another story was that the author of this brochure was an employee of the interior ministry and that it was written by order of a higher person.[18] The author was Felix Germain, an assistant in the ministry of the interior, who was discharged from his job after the publication of the little brochure.[19] The

[14] This phrase was used in Napoleon III's speech on the opening of the exposition of 1855 and in the pamphlet *D'une nécessité d'un congrès pour pacifier l'Europe . . .*, p. 24.
[15] Summary of *Est-ce la guerre, est-ce la paix?* (Paris, 1859).
[16] *Pays,* 23 January 1859.
[17] Urban, p. 142.
[18] London *Times,* 28 January 1859.
[19] G. d'Heylli, *Dictionnaire des pseudonymes* (Paris, 1887), p. 176.

second edition contained modifications which did not affect basic ideas, but were expressed less offensively to the government.[20] The main thesis of the pamphlet was that the people did not want war, and any belligerent moves by the government would lead only to disappointment in the present regime, and perhaps even to its downfall. War in Italy against Austria, who had done no harm to France, would certainly arouse a European coalition against France. Therefore, France should maintain the balance of power, remain neutral, and keep her friendship with Austria. Although Victor-Emmanuel's speech of the 10 January noted the cries of his Lombard brothers, he himself incited those cries.[21] The emperor in a speech of 1855 remarked that he would not seek to recapture his uncle's glory. The words of Bordeaux, "the empire is peace," should be remembered and the nation should not be alarmed.[22]

This brochure was not inspired by the government, but the editor of the London *Times,* Delane, thought it may have been permitted as a "safety valve." [23] The editorial of the *Constitutionnel* stated that the public was too quickly agitated by the appearance of pamphlets, particularly if they were anonymous and had a blue or yellow cover with an impressive title. "The foreigner becomes amused at these panics; which make fortunes for our pamphleteers, and which make them the 'enfants terribles' of journalism." [24] This brochure may have been circulated because the emperor was anxious to create opinion on the coming Italian war. His own inspired pamphlet and newspapers provoked the question, and the responses kept topics in the public mind. At any rate, both these brochures, one of which was unfriendly, set the stage and prepared the public for the official word on Italy – "the apogee" [25] of imperial thought on the state of the peninsula.

A few weeks after Plombières, as has already been mentioned, the emperor summoned La Guéronnière and commissioned him to write a pamphlet whose main purpose would be to show that the status quo in Italy was detrimental to the peninsula and to France and to introduce a plan of confederation for the Italian states. To aid the author in his work the monarch promised both military and diplomatic documents on the states of Italy. On 12 August 1858 La Guéronnière called Eugène Rendu

[20] London *Times,* 21 January 1859.

[21] In the second edition this phrase was changed: "strong in the experience of the past, let us march resolutely before the eventualities of the future." The reference to Victor-Emmanuel's inciting agitation was omitted.

[22] *Aurons-nous la guerre?* (Paris, 1859, 1st and 2nd editions).

[23] London *Times,* 24 January 1859.

[24] *Constitutionnel,* 24 January 1859.

[25] Villamarina to Cavour, 21 November, CCN, I, 206-209.

(a personal associate who understood Italian politics) to aid him in his commission. The latter entered into the work with enthusiasm and in several nights produced a work within the design that La Guéronnière had indicated.[26] On 10 January 1859, La Guéronnière was invited to a very intimate dinner at the Tuileries where Napoleon III received the pamphlet. The emperor revised and corrected the manuscript from 20 January until 2 February. Although he praised the text of the brochure, he made many revisions. He added phrases in the paragraphs on England and Germany. The section on Austrian strength in Italy was entirely his. Because the emperor was sensitive to the idea of assassination, the phrase referring to Henry IV's demise by "the dagger of Ravillac" was changed to the "premature death of the king." [27]

The *Constitutionnel* on 4 February announced "that the editors Dentu and Didot put on sale a brochure *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie,* and it appears that this pamphlet is destined to have the same reaction as the one which appeared last year, *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre.*" There was a similar announcement in the *Moniteur universel.*[28] Under such advertising the public could scarcely miss the hint that this was government-sponsored.

The pamphlet declared "Italy represents in history more than nationality; she represents civilization . . . in the arts, papacy, politics, poetry, martyrs, historians, consuls, tribunes, civil legislators. She has been a common [the mother] country of all civilized states." [29] There are two possible solutions of the Italian question: the revolutionary which would threaten European order, and the national, which had European sanction. A review of Italian attempts at unification with England's support followed: in the Crimean War the Sardinian troops participated with loyalty and courage, and at the subsequent Congress of Paris the plenipotentiaries of the ruler of Piedmont sat with the great powers of Europe and heard the English statement of sympathy for Italy. "England is a liberal nation, and her great aristocracy maintains itself because she has always marched at the head of civilization and progress. The cause of Italy responds to all that England respects – to all that is her mission to propagate in the world." [30] Austria has been concerned with maintaining the status quo;

[26] Rendu to Chiala, 25 August 1883, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 385-396.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Constitutionnel,* 4 February 1859; *Moniteur,* 4 February 1859.
[29] Rendu to Chiala, 25 August 1883, Chiala *Lettere,* III, 385-396; Napoleon III introduced this phrase himself and also added a quote from Tacitus: "We should have lost memory itself without voice if it was in our power to forget as well as be silent: *Memoriam quo que ipsam cum voce perdidissimus . . .*"
[30] Napoleon III inserted this paragraph on England (*ibid.,* p. 390).

but the rest of Germany was more interested in its own nationality, and therefore would be sympathetic to Italy's quest of the same goal. Prussia, seeking leadership of the German states, was a rival of Austria and would not object to her reduced power. The Diet of Frankfurt, organized in the bloody revolutions of 1848, recognized Italian national aspirations, although it gave Austria the right to hold Italian soil down to the Mincio River.[31] Furthermore, "the French Revolution has made its influence felt beyond France's borders in its institutions, laws, and customs." "If France who wishes peace were forced to make war, no doubt Europe would be anxious, but she ought not to be disquieted for it would not be her *independence* which would be at stake." [32] The Roman states faced difficulty because divine law and the temporal authority were in conflict; canon law was not enough to guarantee the protection and development of modern society. The national aspiration of the Italians placed the pope in a difficult position because of his dual sovereignty as an Italian prince and as the spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church. "The pope as a sovereign supported the cause of independence; as chief of the church he condemned the war and refused to break with Austria. Placed in a double duty, he necessarily sacrificed the political to the spiritual." The solution to the dilemma was to make the pope independent of the questions of nationality, war, armament, and domestic and foreign defense by establishing a papal army in lieu of the French occupation troops with the added protection of an effective Sardinian force.[33] As for the rest of Italy, Austria would relinquish her spheres of influence over Tuscany, Modena, and Parma and give up Lombardy and Venetia. The Kingdom of Two Sicilies, isolated from the rest of Italy by the clause in the treaty of Vienna which bound them close to Austria, should be released. The topography of the peninsula made it easy for Austria to remain dominant. "The conclusion is, for all men of war, this incontestable truth that Italian nationality will never be the result of a revolution and that it would not be able to succeed without foreign aid." La Guéronnière then suggested that federation should be the new political form of state for Italy, with Rome as the capital and the pope the titular leader.[34] The brochure

[31] The emperor added paragraphs on Germany (*ibid.*).

[32] La Guéronnière originally wrote: "If France who wishes peace were forced to make war, Europe would no doubt be anxious, but she ought not to be disquieted by it, it is not her independence, *her territorial divisions, her dynasties,* which would be at stake." Napoleon III crossed out the above italicized phrases saying, "If we have to go to war, we will be forced to change several things." (*Ibid.,* p. 390).

[33] Napoleon III approved of this paragraph (*ibid.,* p. 390).

[34] Napoleon III approved of the federation plan for Italy. The quoted words are those added by the emperor (*ibid.,* p. 390).

concluded: France has desired to call upon public opinion in order not to use force.

> We do not have any hostility against Austria. Italy is the only cause of difficulty which can exist between her and France. We respect her position in Germany. The solution of the Italian question would have the result of effacing all resentments between France and Austria. These two powers can be reconciled by many common interests, and it is not too much for all the great governments of Europe to prevent future complications leading to war. There are dangers in Italy, we pointed them out; . . . it is the cause of the nationality of a living people, of the balance of power in Europe and the independence of the Papacy, which France has always defended. . . . Glory does not tempt us . . . *We therefore ardently desire that diplomacy shall do on the eve of a struggle what it should on the morrow of a victory.*[35]

Napoleon III's plans produced a sensation! "The pamphlet was on everyone's tongue and the bookstalls were sold out. It was the absorbing topic of the day." [36] In a few hours more than ten-thousand copies were sold.[37] One observer called the work "a gun fired before the declaration of war." [38] The stock market, economic barometer of the nation, fell. The business community felt a strong desire for peace and an equally strong fear of war.[39] "The pamphlet of La Guéronnière . . . produced the most detestable effect . . . all these anxieties paralyze our industries." [40] French agitation was so great that for a long time Napoleon III was forced to remain cool toward Prince Napoleon, called by Nigra "the personification of war." [41]

Some thought the plan for Italian confederation utopian and impossible.[42] One critic thought the brochure "ably written, but more clever than statesmanlike." [43] Lacordaire, a liberal Catholic, was reported to have written of the pamphlet in glowing terms – "full of foresight, justice, generosity, grandeur;" the plan would free the pope from the pressure

[35] Napoleon III liked the concluding paragraph and inserted the last phrase himself (*ibid.,* p. 390); *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie* (Paris 1859).

[36] London *Times,* 7 February 1859.

[37] Darimon, *Les cinq,* pp. 219-220; *Constitutionnel,* 6 February 1859, reported 25,000 copies sold in one day.

[38] Baron D'Ambes, *The intimate memoirs of Napoleon III,* translated by A. R. Allison (Boston, 1912), I, 125.

[39] *Moniteur,* 4, 5 February 1859; London *Times,* 7 February 1859.

[40] Viel-Castel, *Mémoires,* II, 104-105.

[41] Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 4 March 1859, CCN, II, 51; Mason to Cass, Paris, 8 March 1859, State Depart. Corr. France, 45, no. 377.

[42] Rogier to de Vrière, Paris, 5 February 1859, Discailles, p. 499.

[43] L. Kossuth, *Memoirs of my exile,* translated by Ferencz Jausz (New York, 1880), pp. 116-120.

to which a foreign occupying power necessarily subjects him.[44] But other moderate Catholics disagreed, feeling that, while La Guéronnière's sentiments were noble, the plan was impractical since only war would make it acceptable to Austria or the papacy.[45] Montalembert, another liberal Catholic who sympathized with Italian nationalism, felt the emperor's policy presaged ultimate danger to the papacy.[46]

Those closest to the emperor were equally divided. Persigny reminded Napoleon III that he had promised not to upset Europe.[47] Walewski, left in the dark during the preparation of the pamphlet, was shocked and "deeply saddened." [48] He was pro-papal in sympathy and viewed the whole Italian policy with misgiving. He also felt that the reaction to the imperial manifesto was very bad. "If it [*Napoléon III et l'Italie*] had an official character, then not tomorrow, but today Europe would be coalesced not against France, but against the emperor personally." [49] Morny also disagreed with the pamphlet; [50] Rouher hesitated to give a direct opinion. Fould and Delangle felt that there was no danger of war; while Prince Napoleon, Mocquard, Conneau, and Pietri hailed the work.[51] Fearing bad public relations in the chancellories of Europe, Napoleon III suggested that Walewski write to London to inform the diplomats that La Guéronnière had signed the pamphlet.[52] By ending the anonymity of the pamphlet, he made the attempt to lose the stigma of his inspiration, but failed.

As might be expected, the semi-official Paris papers welcomed the pamphlet and thought it excellent. The *Constitutionnel* praised *Napoléon III et l'Italie* by claiming that the author did not attempt to hide the situation or to minimize the gravity of the case. The editors piously hoped that "peace will prevail." [53] The *Pays* lauded the pamphlet, saying that the viewpoints of La Guéronnière reflected great judgment and "profound knowledge" of Italy.[54]

[44] J. Maurain, *Politique écclesiastique du Second Empire* (Paris, 1930), pp. 326-327.

[45] De Tocqueville to De Corcelle, Cannes, 15 February 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* IV, 367.

[46] R. P. Lecanuet, *Montalembert* (Paris, 1905), III, 209-213.

[47] O. Aubry, *The Second Empire,* translated by Arthur Livingston (Philadelphia 1940), p. 206.

[48] Walewski to Napoleon III, 4 February 1859, Raindre, "Souvenirs," *Revue de France,* III, 295.

[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 295-296.

[50] C. Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria from 1852-1860* (London, 1887), II, 220-221.

[51] Aubry, p. 206; Viel-Castel, *Mémoires,* II, 104-105; Beyens, I, 146-149.

[52] Napoleon III to Walewski, answer to letter of 4 February 1859, Raindre, "Souvenirs," *Revue de France,* III, 295.

[53] *Constitutionnel,* 9 February 1859.

[54] *Pays,* 5 February 1859.

The Orleanist point of view expressed by the *Journal des débats,* was sympathetic to Italian aspirations, but feared a change in the status quo. It foresaw the possibility of revolution (especially in the Mazzini movement) and felt that it could only be thwarted by diplomatic negotiations and reform. Orleanist policy, it said, had always recognized the problem of Italy, and Guizot's policy toward the peninsula was one of friendship and support for Italian nationality, but sympathy does not include war with Austria.[55] Another Orleanist viewpoint was that the pamphlet was too chimerical. Since the liberal goals of Italy could not be accomplished in 1848 when liberalism was the height of fashion in Europe, how could it be done after the reaction had set in? The calling of a congress could not solve the problem because "to validate any ruling of the congress, force would have to be used." Would this use of force be justified by the true interests of France or "only by the generosity of the cause. . . .?" [56]

The republican papers were the most ardent partisans of Italian unification. Louis Jourdain, a writer on the *Siècle,* declared that it was France's self-interest that Italy be free. "The brochure has reproduced with a great elegance of form and with instructive development all the arguments that we have furnished to the discussion." The author wisely recognized the impossibility of the existing Italian situation. The status quo contained many dangers to European order. The call to opinion before resorting to force is a sentiment that the *Siècle* has long expressed.[57] The *Presse,* under the editorship of Guéroult, praised this Italian policy and agreed that there should be changes in the treaties of 1815 resulting in Italian unification and freedom. But Guéroult complained that the pamphlet treated the revolutionaries too harshly and the pope too kindly. Revolution occurred when the government was no longer efficient or when it was tyrannical. The excuses made for the pope only demonstrate more sharply the necessity for the secularization of the Papal States.[58]

The clerical and legitimist papers, on the other hand, were angry with the pamphlet. The clericals feared for the papacy, and the legitimists opposed any movement which might dethrone legitimate rulers, particularly in the smaller Italian states. A typical comment noted that the pamphlet led to unclear conclusions: "Is a congress desired: and should the congress fail, is war to occur?" The public is as uncertain about the future after reading the pamphlet as it was before it was published.[59] The

[55] *Débats,* 6 February 1859.
[56] RDM, XIX (14 February 1859), 998-1001.
[57] *Siècle,* 5, 6 February 1859.
[58] *Presse,* 8 February 1859.
[59] London *Times,* 7 February 1859, cites the *Union,* 5 February 1859.

Univers, the most ultramontane and pro-papal of the French press, opposed the pamphlet unconditionally. Praise was heaped upon Austria and the concordat she had made with the pope in 1855. The conclusion reached was that any conflict with Austria would only serve the cause of revolution.[60] The weekly *Mémorial diplomatique* declared. "There are some who proclaim France the first nation in the world, provided she will go to receive orders at Turin. No! French policy will not move rapidly toward war, despite the praises of demagogues who exalt France but wish to use her as an instrument of revolution . . ." [61]

One of the leaders of Liberal Catholicism, Auguste Cochin, was very sympathetic to the aspirations of Italy, but felt that there were dangers to the papacy.[62] Montalembert, who opposed the whole Italian plan, also published many articles in the *Correspondant,* entitled *Pius IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859.* In October 1859 these articles were published as a pamphlet. The basic theme of both the articles and the later pamphlet was the change in spirit between 1849 and 1859. In 1849 French leadership was anxious to do everything they could to save the papacy, but in 1859 France was uninterested in the eventual destiny of the papacy. Montalembert saw inherent in any change of the status of Piedmont a threat to the temporal power of the papacy.[63]

Brochures in rebuttal or praise of the imperial one abounded. The most noteworthy and the most widely read was *La Guerre,* by Emile de Girardin. Girardin was a journalist on the newspaper *Presse* who was, at first, a republican; then he flirted with the empire. Actually he was independent in his thinking and never followed any political allegiance very long or very consistently. He was in the coterie of intellectuals that clustered about Prince Napoleon.[64]

The brochure opened with long quotations from the imperial brochure in order to refute its main points. Girardin claimed that the Italians could never achieve national unity without foreign aid. Austria would never give up her power in Italy except by force. To induce Austria to leave Italy peacefully, Europe would have to give her compensation in Moldavia-Wallachia. This would produce the anomaly of freeing Italy but enslaving Roumania. The policy of nationality was dangerous to France, particularly if Prussia should lead the movement in Germany. If the

[60] Maurain, p. 326.
[61] London *Times,* 15 February 1859.
[62] Maurain, p. 327.
[63] Montalembert, *Pius IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859* (Paris, 1859).
[64] M. Réclus, *Emile de Girardin, le créateur de la presse moderne* (Paris, 1934), pp. 185-200.

emperor really felt that war was necessary to secure his dynasty, he should seek to destroy the treaties of 1815 and create a new unity in Europe that would be desirable for everyone. The ally in this enterprise should be Russia; France would make a declaration to Europe of her intentions. All the peoples would join. Thus France would establish the confederation of Europe in which European interests would dominate over national interests.[65]

This pamphlet sold so rapidly that in the space of two days it had gone through four editions.[66] But while Girardin was suggesting that war against Austria was merely an imperialist design masked by the concept of Italian nationality, some took his ideas seriously. The *Gazette de France* declared that Girardin had created a "fairy world." "We cannot treat seriously a policy which is only supported, like tales for children, by impossible suppositions and ifs" [67] Anatole de la Forge, in a brochure *C'est la guerre, c'est la paix,* attacked Girardin bitterly and supported the imperial position. "It is fitting that France should follow her glorious destinies in Italy and that she should not allow herself to be influenced by selfish or mean considerations." Its first edition was sold out in one day.[68]

The English press took *La guerre* more seriously than it deserved. The London *Times* expressed the feelings of much of the British press.[69] At first the *Times* thought that Girardin had attempted to illustrate the "full absurdity of the Bonapartist pretensions and theories." But his ideas were those of a large body of Frenchmen, and so long as these thoughts were popular the publication of such a work made the state of peace precarious.[70]

Simultaneously Proudhon was busily engaged with his brochure, *Comment les affaires vont en France et pourquoi nous aurons la guerre,* which had the same design as his friend's: "to fight . . . the imperialist project of a war with Austria under the pretext of Italy." [71] The pamphlet was published in Brussels and had little reverberation in France.[72]

Because the Italian question had become the main topic of the day a rain of pamphlets flooded the Parisian bookstalls. The democratic liberal arguments eagerly supported Italian freedom and sometimes went much

[65] E. de Girardin, *La guerre* (Paris, 1859).
[66] Darimon, *Les cinq,* p. 228.
[67] London *Times,* 14 February 1859.
[68] *Ibid.,* A. de la Forge, *C'est la guerre, c'est la paix?* (Paris, 1859).
[69] Urban, p. 154.
[70] London *Times,* 14 February 1859.
[71] Darimon, *Les cinq,* pp. 225-228.
[72] In later works Proudhon enlarged upon his opposition to Italian unity. (M. Amoudriez, *Proudhon et l'Europe* [Paris, 1945], pp. 52-80).

further than the government position. *En avant,* attributed to Paul Boitu but published anonymously, defended the need of an Italian war to perpetuate revolutionary and republican theories. It was seized by the French government because of its anti-imperialist sentiment.[73] *La Prusse et la question italienne* was published first in Berlin but translated into French. It emphasized the anomaly of autocratic France helping constitutional Italy.[74] *Affaires de Rome* by John Lemoinne was originally written for the troubled times of 1848; but the author republished it again because he felt it was applicable to the situation of 1859. His sentiments were antipapal, and he made the demand for a free Italy. He called upon the pope to support such a movement. "This reorganization of Italy will give the emperor in every probability the most favorable occasion to loosen the reins of his power in France without seeming to give in to internal pressure." [75] *Pius IX et l'Italie* condemned *La guerre,* and enthusiastically hailed the Italian solution of the government, but it presented no new arguments.[76] One writer, Reyre, in *La guerre et la bourse,* complained that the war scare had been greatly exaggerated. The drop on the stock market was not caused by fear, but by the manipulations of speculators. All that it had proved was that there was a need for reform of the bourse.[77]

Those on the political right condemned *Napoléon III et l'Italie.* Bishop Gerbet in *La question italienne en 1859* declared heatedly that the papal presidency of the Italian confederation would be only a nominal title to cover up the despoiling of his states. Where would his independence and sovereign influence be if these Italian states were as respectfully devoted as Piedmont had been? It was the duty of Catholic Frenchmen to attack its policy which in the name of the "monomania of Italian independence must again excite fraticidal wars and through its fruits, democracy, which will force the church again to submit to new intrigues." [78] Count Charles Catinelli in *La question italienne* declared that Austria must not be weakened, for that would upset the balance of power; and the loss of Austrian power in Italy would cause the peninsula to revert to the chaotic conditions that existed from the sixth to the eleventh century.[79] These

[73] London *Times,* 2 March 1859.
[74] RDM, 20 (7 April 1859), 955-977.
[75] J. Lemoinne, *Affaires de Rome* (Paris, 1859), RDM, XX (31 March 1859), 741-742.
[76] A. de Grandeffe, *Pie IX et l'Italie* (Paris, 1859).
[77] C. Reyre, *La guerre et la bourse* (2nd ed., Lyons, 1859).
[78] O. P. Gerbet, *La question italienne en 1859* (Paris, 1859).
[79] *La question italienne: études du Charles Catinelli,* original French edition edited by Henri Shiel (Brussels, Leipzig, 1859).

represent only a few examples of the numerous works which were published in response to the government brochure.[80]

The emperor had to wait until the quarterly reports of his procureurs-generals before he could learn how his pamphlet had affected the population outside of Paris. The reports dealt with the much larger problems of the Italian question rather than the specific brochure in question. One of these reports illustrates the problem of literacy: "The Italian question with which the newspapers, and a famous pamphlet have dealt . . . have successfully enlightened those who read; but the Italian question remains very obscure for the greater number who do not read." [81]

The ramifications of the Italian question had resolved itself to one burning question: peace or war. Most of the comments reflected an intense desire for peace because the people feared war would bring an increase in taxes and a conscription of men badly needed on the farms.[82] Others saw in the war an obstruction for commerce, and a disruption of business, while some conservatives feared that the government might fall if the war was a failure.[83] Reaction seemed to be stronger and more open in the cities than in the country districts where there was less political discussion.[84] One report claimed that the people feared and disliked the war because they understood neither the aim, the necessity, or even the situation itself.[85] The essentially industrial and commercial communities, which did understand the situation better, followed the rest of the nation; they wanted peace.[86] Another observer noted that the masses remained indifferent to the whole question but the middle classes feared war.[87] Besides the commercial and financial interests, the clergy were active leaders against the independence of Italy because they feared for the temporal power of the papacy.[88] This report was typical of the many that the emperor must have read:

. . . The people have learned that they are making preparations for war and they do not know against whom: later they learned that it was Austria and

[88] *Ibid.*, 373, Besançon, 9 April 1859; 382, Nancy, 9 April 1859.

[80] Armando Saitta, ed., *Il problema italiano nei testi di una battaglia pubblicistica* (Rome, 1968) contains in its four volumes the most complete collection of newspaper accounts and documents on the European reaction to the French pamphlet of 4 February 1859 and other brochures which appeared later.

[81] AN BB 30, 382, Nîmes, 1 April 1859.

[82] *Ibid.*, Orleans, 1 April 1859; 576, Colmar, 5 April 1859; An Fic III, Rhine 7, 3 March 1859.

[83] AN BB 30, 384, Vers Seine and Oise, 5 February 1859.

[84] *Ibid.*, 377, Douai, 9 April 1859.

[85] *Ibid.*, 375, Caen, 13 April 1859.

[86] *Ibid.*, 374, Bordeaux, 14 April 1859, 382, Nancy, 2 April 1859; 370, Agens, 7 April 1859.

[87] *Ibid.*, 379, Lyon, 7 April 1859.

they do not know why: the revelations of the pamphlet *Napoléon III et l'Italie* have not produced a great effect; these old treaties of Austria with her neighbors were not of the nature to arouse . . . their imaginations . . .[89]

The right wing parties, the Legitimists and Orleanists, used the Italian situation as a pretext for active opposition.[90] The republicans on the other hand, though very much in the minority, seemed to be in favor of Italian nationalism and opposed to Austrian dominance. A report from Besançon seemed to sum up in general the sentiment of the people:

Italy and Piedmont excite little sympathy . . . opinion is not favorable to Austria whose armies have left sad memories in these parts in 1814-1815; but general opinion does not see the interest and honor of France sufficiently engaged in the Italian question, and it desires the maintenance of peace. . . . The state of war appears to it preferable for commerce and industry to the uncertainties of the actual situation.[91]

Diplomatically the propaganda attack launched by the emperor agitated Europe. England feared change in the status quo. Victoria urged Napoleon III "to remain faithful to the treaties and take steps to prevent war in Europe," for if war occurred England could no longer be allied with France. Napoleon III answered her appeal as artfully as possible, declaring that, if Austrian aggression caused war, France would follow her own self-interest and still respect the European treaties.[92] Lord Cowley, reflecting many official feelings, wrote sadly: "I did not expect a document so little adapted to calm the anxiety which has for the last few weeks pervaded the public mind." Three days later he wrote to Malmesbury that he was reassured after speaking to Walewski and receiving private information that the emperor had abandoned all thoughts of war.[93]

At the opening of parliament the statesmen asserted their positions. Lords Granville, Gray, and Derby left no doubt that Austria's title to Lombardy and Venetia were founded on treaties which had been accepted by Europe. Lord Brougham denounced Sardinia-Piedmont's support of Italian nationalism as an excuse for extending her territory in Italy; while Lord Derby declared that Austria had a legitimate right to Lombardy and

[89] *Ibid.*, 370, Agens, 7 April 1859.
[90] *Ibid.*, 382, Nancy, 9 April 1859.
[91] *Ibid.*, 373, Besançon, 9 April 1859.
[92] C. Seignobos, *Le déclin de l'Empire et l'établissement de la Troisième République* in E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine* (Paris, 1921), VII, 107-108.
[93] G. Rothan, "Napoléon III et l'Italie," RDM, CLII (1899), 336.

Venetia and "neither we nor any other nation has a right to deprive her of them." Disraeli admitted that conditions in central Italy needed reform, but changes could not be obtained by subverting the established order. Furthermore, he said, France was the "faithful ally" of England, and the emperor was too wise to start a war. Lord John Russell agreed, but added: "We must not blind our eyes to those serious misfortunes which from time to time have been inflicted upon Italy." He suggested both Austria and France should remove their troops from the Roman states, and leave the Italian people to settle their own problems. Lord Palmerston in his comments upon Austrian domination in the Italian peninsula added: "Right or wrong, that was an arrangement in which all the great powers concurred. I humbly submit that no power can justly violate that treaty without reason." "Treaties are standing obligations which ought to be respected." [94]

The English press had always been the champion of the Italian drive for unity. Intermingled with sympathy for Italian nationalism was suspicion of French motives. Stylistically the pamphlet sounded like the "sonorous generalities of a professor's lecture," complained the London *Times*. The brochure did not offer any cogent reasons to start a war or to violate European treaties. The *Times* feared that Napoleon III was using the Italian question as a pretext for war and French aggrandizement.[95] The *Morning Post,* which had always been sympathetic to Italy, felt that France was right and agreed wholeheartedly with Napoleon's pamphlet. The *Post* thought Austria was the stumbling block to the solution of the Italian problem. Italian unity could only be achieved by Austrian expulsion from the peninsula, because her occupation was unjust, illegal, and dishonest. The *Morning Post* agreed that only an international congress could solve the problem peacefully. "Therefore, the parties to the making of the treaties may also be parties to the unmaking of the treaties, when they endanger the peace, and should be so particularly in the case of Italy." [96] "Of the secondary sources of information, the semi- and quasi-official publication on the French and Austrian quarrel which have been thrown out during the last six weeks unquestionably the first place belongs to La Guéronnière . . .," observed the *Daily News*. Despite the fact that the arguments in the pamphlet are "luminous and explicit," complained the paper, the reader remains puzzled as to whether the brochure is a statement of belligerence, "or merely one of those numerous

[94] Great Britain, 3 Hansard, CLII (1859), pp. 39-49, 85-93, 94-99, 72-75.
[95] London *Times,* 7 February 1859.
[96] Urban, pp. 149-150 (*Morning Post,* 5, 7, 9, 16 February 1859).

benevolent thoughts never to be realized," to which the Bonapartes are so prone.[97] The *Economist* disagreed with the emperor's plan for Italy. The crisis in the peninsula was artificially stimulated. "We express our hearty abhorrence of the meddling Napoleonic propensity to play providence to European nations. . . ." [98]

Contemporary reports on English public sentiment agreed that the people were opposed to an Italian war; and furthermore "were irritated against the person of the emperor and his war-like projects." [99]

As could be expected, reaction in the Italian peninsula was varied and strong. Capponi, in reporting on Tuscany, said, "The brochure produced a great effect. . . . In spite of her calm temperament and calm manners in politics as in everything, she is on fire." [100] The pamphlet and speech of the seventh, said the *Times,* was commented on as often in Genoa as in Paris and seemed to have produced a very favorable impression. In Rome, those who read the brochure felt that the Italian question remained ambiguous. There was little comment or analysis of the brochure, but everyone was eager for news. The Romagna was far more excited.[101] Piedmontese statesmen were ecstatic. The Italian question was "well treated in every sense." [102] Cavour congratulated Rendu for the excellent job in helping on the pamphlet.[103] Massimo d'Azeglio not only accepted the pamphlet wholeheartedly, but he who had always opposed Cavour's policies guaranteed his wholehearted support so that Cavour's project might succeed.[104]

Across the Rhine, in the German states, interest in the pamphlet ran high. The brochure was thought to be the declaration of the French government, and as a result it sold 35,000 copies in one day.[105] Throughout Germany the responses to this epistle seemed almost unanimously opposed and they became more antagonistic as the months progressed.

[97] *Daily News,* 7 February 1859.

[98] *Economist,* 12 February 1859.

[99] Count Kisseleff showed Walewski secret reports from the Russian court which were sent to the French emperor, Raindre, "Souvenirs," *Revue de France,* III, 296.

[100] Capponi to Rendu, Florence, 8 April 1859, *Lettere di Gino Capponi e di altri a lui* (Florence, 1882), III, 250.

[101] London *Times,* 12, 18 February 1859.

[102] Victor-Emmanuel to Prince Napoléon, Turin, 15 February 1859, F. Masson, "L'Italie libérée, lettres au Prince Napoléon," RDM, XIII (1923), 62; A. Comandini, *Il Principe Napoleone nel risorgimento italiano* (Milan, 1922), p. 103.

[103] Cavour to Rendu, Turin, 23 March 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 52.

[104] D'Azeglio to Rendu, Paris, 9 February 1859, E. Rendu, *L'Italie de 1847 à 1865, correspondance politique de Massimo d'Azeglio* (Paris, 1867), pp. 91-94; for more detailed accounts see Saitta, I.

[105] H. Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik Deutschlands vom Eintreten der neuen Aera in Preussen bis zum Ausbruch des deutschen Krieges* (Munich, Berlin, 1935) I, 25-26.

Germans seemed to unite in their hate of Napoleon III: liberals because they felt he was a despot; conservatives because his regime was based upon democratic ideas of popular sovereignty and plebiscite; clericals because they feared for Catholic temporal power. Some called for war to retake Alsace-Lorraine and expand to the Po River.[106]

In Prussia, the liberal papers of Berlin, the *Nationalzeitung* and the *Volkszeitung,* were sharply anti-French.[107] One of the few dissenting voices was Ferdinand Lassalle in the pamphlet *Der italienische Krieg und die Aufgabe Preussens.* His argument was that Napoleon III was destroying Austria, and by supporting Italian aspirations Germany would be working toward her own unity.[108] More common were polemics like that written by Leue, *Preussen und Österreich gegen Frankreich.* He felt that Napoleon III was friend of neither German nor Italian nationalism. His real goals were the isolation of Austria from the German confederation so that eventually France might reconquer the Rhineland and Belgium.[109] Prussian opinion, Launay, the Italian ambassador, reported, seemed to be rather indifferent as to whether Austria lost her Italian possessions – just so long as the fight remained localized between Austria and Italy – but if France intervened, feeling would be aroused not in Prussia alone but in all Germany.[110]

Feeling in southern Germany was reported to be hostile. The people were very wary of Napoleon's policies and would sooner prefer war to the suspense of various international crises. "In Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, there is talk of making the federal contingents mobile." [111] The British consul in Frankfurt wrote that not only was the German press violently anti-French, but that in this case he believed Germany would support Austria enthusiastically.[112] The ministries of the small German courts were very agitated. Reports from all over Germany were remarkably alike. On 3 March the English consul general at Leipzig reported that events had stirred up German feelings in the same way as those of 1814 and 1815. Sir Strafford Jerningham affirmed that "never since fifty years ago has Germany been so irritated." As a whole the press was pro-

[106] G. Weill, *L'Europe du XIXe siècle et l'idée de nationalité* (Paris, 1938), pp. 261-262.
[107] D. Footman, *Ferdinand Lassalle, romantic revolutionary* (New Haven, 1947), pp. 108-109.
[108] H. Oncken, *Lassalle, eine politische Biographie* (Stuttgart, Berlin, 1920), pp. 136-150.
[109] F. G. Leue, *Preussen und Österreich gegen Frankreich* summarized in Rosenberg, I, 44.
[110] Launay to Cavour, Berlin, 8 February 1859, APP, I, 228.
[111] London *Times,* 11 February 1959.
[112] Urban, p. 165.

Austrian, but what was surprising was the liberals' abandonment of Italy. Paris was so alarmed that an envoy, Bourée, was sent on a secret mission to determine the tendencies of German public and government opinion. The reports sent back to Paris were most pessimistic.[113]

The Austrian ambassador, Hübner, declared that he had never read anything "more absurd, more poverty-stricken in argument, and more feeble in logic." "But this is the thought of Napoleon III," he firmly believed. "On that subject doubt is not possible." [114] The Austrian pamphleteers were also contemptuous of *Napoléon III et l'Italie.* Collot-Edward, an Austrian officer, attacked France bitterly and defended Austrian supremacy in Italy as just and necessary. He was incensed at references to German disunity and declared that all German states would be one in repulsing an attack on any state.[115] Friedmann agreed that the aim of Napoleonic policy was not the freedom of Italy but simply the first attempt to destroy the treaties of 1815 and revise the map of Europe. Only common action by the European powers would prevent this eventuality.[116] The *Wiener Zeitung* characterized the pamphlet as being a smokescreen to hide the real French purpose: to preserve the Napoleonic dynasty.[117] Official reaction was that the war scare which existed up to and after the publication of the 4th was dissipated by Napoleon III's speech of 7 February. Nevertheless, the government felt they should proceed with care and watchful waiting.[118] The *Österreichische Korrespondenz,* the official paper, more fully explained the government position. The Austrians, it said, believed that peace could be maintained only if France respected the treaties established in 1815. The speech of the seventh was indicative of the pacific intentions of the emperor of France, and it was viewed with satisfaction. But before Europe could have true repose, France must implement her words by ceasing her armaments.[119]

From the surface manifestations of public reaction to *Napoléon III et l'Italie,* the emperor realized that he had to quiet French apprehensions and yet not promise peace. He accomplished this in his speech of 7

[113] Rothan, "Napoléon III et l'Italie," RDM, CLII, 352.

[114] Hübner, II, 278 (Hübner to Buol, Paris, 10 February 1859).

[115] E. Callot, *Italien und die Karte von Europa, deutsche Antwort auf La Guéronnière's 'Napoleon III und Italien' und E. De Girardin's 'Europa im Jahre 1860'* summarized in Rosenberg, I, 28.

[116] B. Friedemann, *Kaiser Napoleon III und die Revision der Verträge zur Beleuchtung der Kriegs-und Friedensfrage, ibid.,* I, 27-28.

[117] H. Bastgen, *Die römische Frage* (Frieburg, 1917-1918), I, 414-415 (*Wiener Zeitung,* 14 February 1859); the same ideas were expressed by a Berlin paper (*ibid.,* I, 407).

[118] Flemming to Prince Regent, Vienna, 9 February 1859, AAP, I, 229-231; Flemming said that the *Österreichische Korrespondenz* reflected the government position.

[119] London *Times,* 14 February 1859.

February before the legislative body. He stated that the public spirit was fraught with worry and anxiety although there was no cause. The emperor recalled the moderation of his policies and referred to his Bordeaux speech: "The Empire is peace." Unfortunately, he continued, Vienna and Paris have had differences on some questions, such as the Danubian Principalities. France's interest in them had been based on justice, and it was natural that France drew closer to Piedmont, who followed French policy. The marriage of Prince Napoleon and Clothilde, daughter of Victor-Emmanuel, therefore had no secret significance; it was merely the consequence of a friendship between the two states. The conditions of Italy have been unstable, but that was no cause for war. France must stay on the path of right, of justice, and of national honor, and his "government will not allow itself to be either provocative or pusillanimous." The emperor closed his speech by saying that he hoped the nation would not be troubled about the threat of war. He ended, "My policy is firm but conciliatory." [120]

The speech did seem to allay some of the anxieties, as evidenced by a rise on the stock market on 8 February, though it did not return to the heights of the 3rd. While the speech did not quiet the disturbed diplomats, it did pacify the French.[121] Cardinal Pie was hopeful that the speech held the promise that the dangers inherent to the papacy in the Italian policy would be assuaged. He was further reassured in an audience with the emperor on 22 March, when Napoleon III promised that the Eternal City would not be violated but really protected.[122] The speech was received coldly by the legislature.[123] The procureurs generals reported that the speech was well accepted and was interpreted to mean peace.[124]

The English unlike the French viewed the speech of Napoleon III with distrust and suspicion rather than relief. Prince Albert felt that the speech of the 7th "can in no way set either Europe or France at rest." [125] It reminded him of a speech in the *Mémoire* of Prince Eugene in which Napoleon I told his adopted son, "speak of peace, but act . . . with war." [126]

The speech has "negative merit" in that it does not connote war, but

[120] *Moniteur,* 8 February 1859; London *Times,* 8 February 1859 has the English translation.

[121] London *Guardian,* 16 February, 1859.

[122] Mgr. Baunard, *Histoire du Cardinal Pie, Évêque de Poitiers* (Paris, 1886), I, 663-665.

[123] From the diary of Alfred Darimon, 7 February 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* IV, 362.

[124] AN BB 30, 378, Haute Vienne, 6, 8 April 1859; 374, 14 April 1859; 382, Nancy, 2 April 1859; 370, Agens, 7 April 1859.

[125] Martin, IV, 313.

[126] Rothan, "Napoléon III et l'Italie," RDM, CLII, 336.

on the other hand it does not promise peace, complained the *Times*.[127] The *Guardian* echoed the same idea: "it is as difficult to ascertain whether there will be war or peace as it was before the speech. Everyone has seen how leaders of opinion sometimes adopt obscure and roundabout ways of letting a project be known." It concluded that, "if the pamphlet answers this description, then war in Italy is imminent." [128] The *Daily News* stated, "the emperor has used this speech to play the injured party, but he holds the peace in his own hand." [129]

In Turin, Cavour hailed Napoleon III's speech. "I do not doubt that it will succeed in molding public opinion to favor his noble project." [130] But in Prussia, Baron Schleinitz, the foreign minister, was not reassured by the speech of Napoleon III and remarked that a passage which alluded to the friendly relations of France and Prussia "has been ill received by the other German governments who feel that Prussia has not taken a strong enough position in upholding Austrian interests." [131] Moustier (the French ambassador to Berlin) wrote on 10 February that reports from London and Vienna stated that the emperor's speech was well received and had dispelled the anxiety caused by the pamphlet of 4 February. There was, he continued, a great "flood" of feeling throughout Prussia to stand with Germany and support Austria.[132]

Following closely the speech of the emperor, on 11 February, a brochure in the form of a small map without any text, entitled *L'Europe en 1860,* caught the public attention. The map showed the following changes: England was to receive Cyprus and part of the territory on the Euphrates River. France remained the same. Prussia ceded the left bank of the Rhine to Belgium and Holland and was compensated by Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Brunswick. The Electoral Hesse was to be enlarged to include the principalities of Waldeck, the three Anhalts, the two Lippes, and part of Schwarz-Sonderahausen. Russia was to receive Galicia; while Austria was enlarged by Serbia and Bosnia. She relinquished Lombardy, Venetia, and Galicia. Piedmont annexed these Italian territories plus the duchies of Modena and Parma, and the Romagna. Tuscany remained unchanged. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was to renounce the Two Abruzzi; the Duke of Parma gave up his lands to Italy and took Sicily. Sweden received Denmark. Hanover was granted Rumelia, while

[127] London *Times,* 10 February 1859.
[128] *London Guardian,* 9 February 1859.
[129] *Daily News,* 8 February 1859.
[130] Cavour to Villamarina, Turin, 13 February, 1859, CCN, I, 225.
[131] Bloomfield to Malmesbury, Berlin, 8 February 1859, APP, I, 227-228.
[132] *Ibid.,* p. 228, n. 2 (Ministère d'affaires étrangères, Paris).

the Duke of Mecklenburg (who had given up his Duchy) became the monarch of the united principalities of Roumania and Bulgaria. Montenegro acquired northern Albania, while Greece annexed the southern part. Spain acquired Morocco. Turkey would have lost all her European possessions except Constantinople. Jerusalem was to be a free city.[133]

There were varied rumors concerning the origin of this unusual map. However, the government, which had contemplated seizing the map, decided that such a move would focus too much attention on a work which had no intrinsic importance.[134] The English felt that it was published with the emperor's permission, for thousands of copies were sent into England. It had a large sale in France.[135] Another story was that it was written by a Belgian priest or perhaps it was a "monster device, which by the argument of contrast may make the mere expulsion of Austria from Italy seem a small affair." [136] For a short time "the map caused almost as much excitement as the pamphlet." [137] But the agitation was short-lived because the general reading public was still more concerned with *Napoléon III et l'Italie.*

Napoleon III's press campaign had succeeded in placing the problem of Italy before the public. Europe and France anxiously awaited peace or war. While Napoleon was torn between the European efforts to avert war and Cavour's attempt to find a *casus belli* with Austria, he paused in his campaign long enough to commission another pamphlet.

The pamphlet ordered in the early days of March was to educate the French people to the evils and inefficiencies of the Roman regime. Edmond About, the author, was born in 1828, and proved to be a brilliant student. Upon his graduation from the Ecole normale he visited Greece and published the book *La Grèce contemporaine* (1855). This work revealed his brilliant, sharp prose style, and also made him famous because of his criticism of the Greeks. His métier, however, was the drama: his most famous works were *Gaetano* and the *Roi des montagnes.* His literary importance was recognized by his election to the French Academy a year before his death in 1885. He also was part of the intellectual coterie and circle of Fould, Princess Mathilde, and Prince Napoleon. Through the influence of his friends he became involved with politics from 1857-1865, writing several brochures and many articles for

[133] *L'Europe en 1860* (Paris, 1859); London *Times,* 14 February 1859.
[134] Rogier to de Vrière, Paris, 12 February 1859, Discailles, p. 501.
[135] Earl of Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an ex-minister* (London, 1884), II, 155.
[136] Dallas to Cass, London, 11 February 1859, G. M. Dallas, *A series of letters from London 1856-1860* (Philadelphia, 1869), pp. 89-90.
[137] London *Times,* 14 February 1859.

the *Opinion nationale* (later collected and published as *Lettres à sa cousine*). His main cause was support of national aspirations and anti-clericalism. His political services were honored by the award of the legion of honor.[138]

When About had returned to Paris after a trip to Rome in 1858, he was asked to write a series of articles which appeared in the *Moniteur universel* in June and July 1858. After a few issues had stirred up French public opinion and disturbed the papal court, the articles were abruptly discontinued.[139]

In late February or early March 1859 the emperor called About to him and asked him to compile and rewrite these articles in pamphlet form. By 10 March the work was almost ready, and news of its coming publication leaked out. Nigra reported to Cavour that a new book would soon appear which would treat the Italian question from "our point of view, and that the papal government is attacked in it with a recklessness and freedom of language that is extraordinary." [140]

At the end of March the proofs were back from the printer; and About wrote to his mother: "Here in two words is the situation on the book. The emperor has read it. I took it this morning to Morny who had asked for it. I must send it this evening to Prince Napoleon upon his request. The emperor told me that he authorized its [the book's] sale in France, because the volume was published in Brussels." [141] Later in a social gathering About said that the emperor had corrected the proofs, Fould had shared in writing it, and Morny provided the end. He further embellished his story by reporting that Fould had confided to him that a suite of rooms was being prepared at Fontainebleau for the pope, just in case the pope "showed any disposition to be spiteful, or if Antonelli played the same trick!" [142]

The book, entitled *La question romaine,* finally appeared in Paris about 12 May 1859 in the midst of the Austro-Sardinian War. The book's main thesis was that the pope's temporal power should be limited to the city of Rome. There was economic progress everywhere in Italy except in the Roman states: economic policies were detrimental to growth, administration was inefficient, and education and intellectual pursuits were discouraged. About characterized the pope as a respectable, devout, good,

[138] M. Thiébaut, *Edmond About* (7the ed., Paris, 1936), pp. 72-75; Vapereau, pp. 7-8.

[139] London *Times,* 26 May 1859.

[140] Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 10 March 1859, CCN, III, 76.

[141] Thiébaut, pp. 84-85.

[142] *Edmond and Jules de Goncourt with letters and leaves from their journals,* translated by M. A. Belloc and M. Shedlock (London, 1895), I, 137.

and simple man who was completely dominated by Cardinal Antonelli and "now allows more evil to be done in his name than he himself has ever done good." [143] The cardinal was a self-seeking rogue from the poor mountain districts who rose rapidly in the papal organization, not by his good deeds, but by his wits and intelligence. "All classes of society hate him equally. . . . He thinks first of himself, secondly of his family which is flourishing." The laws of the Papal States were brutal and cruel. Crimes, particularly the violent kind, were numerous. However, the criminal code was administered mildly for "the most unpardonable sins in the eyes of the clergy are those which are offensive to heaven." Therefore, there was no tolerance in Rome. The plight of the Jews in the Roman states was very bad; they lived in ghettos, excluded from many jobs and educational opportunities. The Mortara affair was an example of bad papal treatment of the Jews outside of Rome; [144] it was much worse within the city. About concluded his harsh exposé of Roman conditions by suggesting that the only way to remedy bad administration and injustice was by reducing the size of the Papal States. "Just free the Adriatic and at the worst leave Rome to the pope." [145]

The book created a stir not only because of its anticlerical content, but also because of the memory of the articles in the *Moniteur universel*; the public rightly assumed that the work had been commissioned by Napoleon III; therefore it enjoyed a lively sale and widespread comment. The controversial nature of the subject also caused strong feelings in the press, no doubt stimulating its sale. Jourdain and Vilbort, writers for the *Siècle,* had been told by About of the emperor's approval and editing, and pledged their secrecy.[146] But the *Siècle* could not resist advertising it: "The exact and conscientious study of Edmond About on the Roman states had been published at Brussels. There is assurance that the French government recently authorized the introduction in France of this remarkable work." [147] The semi-official papers had been silent, except *Pays,* which declared that the announcement in the *Siècle* was erroneous; the government, in refusing permission to print the book, has done all it

[143] About declared that the emperor had dictated the description of the pope. J. L. Adams, *Mes premières armes: littéraires et politiques* (Paris, 1904), pp. 189-190.

[144] The Mortara affair was the case of a Jewish family in Bologna whose six-year-old son had been secretly baptized by a servant girl. The papal authorities took the boy from his family by force and had him raised in a monastery. The affair caused unfavorable repercussions throughout Europe; it "caused as much damage to the church as the Dreyfus Affair" (F. Hayward, *Pie IX et son temps* [Paris, 1948], pp. 196-197).

[145] E. About, *La question romaine* (Brussels, 1859); E. About, *The Roman question,* translated by H. C. Coape (New York, 1859).

[146] Adams, *Mes premières armes,* pp. 189-190.

[147] *Siècle,* 12 May 1859.

could to prevent its circulation in France. Furthermore, Granier de Cassagnac said "these are vulgar diatribes, such as could be found in the senile pen of Voltaire against the fundamental dogmas of Catholicism." [148] The *Revue des deux mondes* thought the book was neither amusing, moving, or sympathetic, and completely lacking in tact. The chapter on Antonelli caused the comment "that invective is no longer literature, and [About] scorned the obvious interest of Italy and France in the actual crisis." [149] Veuillot of the *Univers* had the most vitriolic attack. "As to the book of M. About. . . . its odor is more repugnant and odious than that of the goat. It defames the temporal power of the papacy and then asks the kings to suppress it." Moreover, he went on, the government was not without the means to prevent the book's sale and distribution if it so desired.[150] About's irony and sarcasm, which followed the tradition of Voltaire, appealed to the *Siècle,* and that paper vigorously defended the book. About, it declared, did not deserve the bitterness of the attack that he had received from the *Univers.* Furthermore, it went on, France was engaged in a war to free Italy and should not become involved in other questions until that struggle had been concluded.[151]

Clerical opinion was aroused enough to inspire brochures which attacked *La question romaine.* Typical was one entitled *Réponse à la question romaine de M. E. About,* which accused About of writing "a long tissue of stupidities, perfidies, and falsehoods." Chapter by chapter Magnan, the author, denied the allegations of the official brochure. He declared that the Roman people adored the Holy Pontiff and that revolution had been stirred up by paid agents. The government at Rome was not perfect but attempts had been made to correct abuses. About's work was full of calumny and hate.[152]

The papacy, of course, did not view the book with favor. The pope was reported to have said, "Well, all he [About] says is untrue, he is really not worthy of such an honor" [of papal comment on the brochure].[153] The Roman nuncio complained to the French ministry about the publication. He was told that, in the event he could find defamation of character against high persons, he should seek damage in the courts. However, the nuncio felt that the French government would take little action for two reasons: About was a known favorite at the Tuileries, and in

[148] *Pays,* 13 May 1859.
[149] *RDM,* XXI (14 March 1859), 473
[150] *Univers,* 14 May 1859.
[151] *Siècle,* 14 May 1859.
[152] Abbé Magnan, *Réponse à la question romaine de M. E. About* (Paris, 1860).
[153] Odo Russell to John Russell, Rome, 17 July 1859, Benson and Esher, *The letters of Queen Victoria, a selection of her majesty's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861* (London, 1908), III, 356-369.

Paris anticlerical books were always popular. This one was no exception.[154]

But the government was not ready to alienate the Catholics of France, and the protest of the papacy and the vigorous outcry of clerical opinion led the ministers to take action. The empress (in charge while the emperor was fighting in Italy) had received many complaints about *La question romaine* and, to avoid scandal and incidents, she ordered the brochure removed from the bookshelves upon the advice of Walewski and Billault.[155] The pamphlet had been published abroad, and the authorities had no means of repression since they could not get to the source. Napoleon III may have realized the pamphlet would not be able to circulate too long. He may have felt publication abroad would insure the greatest distribution, even though the government would be forced to seize it. The emperor believed that there were never "too many polemics on this subject; it is necessary that every Frenchman have his personal opinion on it." [156] The book created discussion in intellectual circles, but had little political importance. In a few months a new political problem – namely the annexation of Nice and Savoy – was to occasion new semi-official pamphlets.

All efforts to avert a war between Piedmont and Austria proved fruitless. When the war broke out in Italy, France rushed to support her ally, Piedmont. Though the Austro-Sardinian War brought great victories to French arms, it was called to a sudden halt when Napoleon III decided to make peace with Austria in July 1859. The preliminaries of Villafranca were probably concluded because of unrest at home based on fear for the pope's temporal power, and even more important, Prussia's mobilization on the Rhine. Prussian entry into the war seemed very probable as French and Italian victories were bringing the Austrians back to the strong fortresses (the quadrilateral), so caution took precedence over idealism. The armistice in July 1859 did not end Italian hopes, for revolts had broken out in June in the provinces of Romagna and the three duchies. With the conclusion of peace, the emperor had relinquished his claims to Nice and Savoy because Piedmont received only Lombardy.

Early in July, rumors and fears of French annexation of Nice and Savoy began to circulate in diplomatic circles. The Swiss and the Germans were particularly alarmed. The British inquired concerning

[154] Bastgen, I, 416-417.

[155] Minutes of the session of the council of ministers, 14 May 1859, R. Halt, *Papiers sauvés des Tuileries suite à la correspondance de la famille impériale* (Paris, 1871), pp. 262-265.

[156] Adams, *Mes premières armes,* pp. 189-190.

French intentions, and Walewski implied that if Sardinia was to become a larger kingdom she would have to make "territorial concessions." [157] On 23 August and 3 September, Walewski again claimed that France would be obliged to demand the session of Savoy if Piedmont were enlarged by the acquisition of the revolting provinces. Piedmont was enlarged, and in March 1860 France annexed Nice and Savoy. When the English protested they were reminded by the French government that they had been warned that this was the French price of Sardinia's growth.[158]

Two pamphlets regarding Nice and Savoy appeared in August 1859. Although there is no proof that they were edited at the Tuileries, the authors were well rewarded and after publication became politically close to the emperor. This was a sign that, if not edited, they certainly had imperial blessing. They were written by men who apparently had little connection with the imperial regime and who purported to represent Savoyard sentiments, stressing the belief that Savoy earnestly desired annexation and explaining the great benefits that would accrue to Savoy from the anticipated event.

The first and most important of the two pamphlets was by Anselme Petetin. He was a journalist and administrator, born in Savoy, but then residing in France. During the reign of Louis-Philippe he wrote for the republican opposition. After the revolution of 1848 he became prefect in the department of Ain and then minister plenipotentiary to Hanover. With the end of the republic and the coup d'état he retired from public life and returned to journalism on the staff of the *Siècle*. During the Italian war of 1859 he worked actively for the annexation of Nice and Savoy and through this intense interest finally became reconciled to the Second Empire. When the annexation of the two provinces became a *fait accompli*, he was named prefect of Savoy in 1860. Following a conflict with the minister of the interior, he resigned his position in 1861. His career in the government, however, was secure. He became a director of the imperial printing office, then counsellor of state, and finally chevalier of the legion of honor. The Ollivier Ministry saw his retirement. He died in 1873.[159]

The brochure was called *De l'annexation de la Savoie,* its main thesis was that Savoy ardently desired annexation to France, an event which would be beneficial to both Savoy and France. Savoy had been French

[157] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 4 July 1859, *British foreign and state papers* CL, 457 (London, 1867). Herafter cited as BFSP.
[158] Martin, IV, 404.
[159] Larousse, XII, 787; London *Times,* 14 April, 19 July 1860; 16 January 1867.

for a long time with the same language, customs, and culture. Moreover she was separated from Italy geographically by natural boundaries. Economically she was bound to France. Piedmont had exercised complete tyranny upon this province because it was the only way she could maintain her control. Petetin declared: "If *popular sovereignty* is sacred in the duchies why is it not so in Savoy? . . . You support liberty so bravely for its grandeur in Italy and yet are willing to let it be erased right at the frontier." France would gain a strategic base in case of invasion from the south plus the addition of thirty thousand men by the annexation of Savoy, and she would achieve satisfaction against the hated treaties of 1815. For Savoy, annexation would answer her need for popular sovereignty.[160]

The other pamphlet, *La Savoie doit-elle être française?,* was published anonymously, but it was attributed to Charles Bertier, who was the editor of the *Courrier des Alpes,* a conservative newspaper in Chambéry. During a stay at Aix, the son of the minister Baroche suggested to the French government that Bertier serve as the intermediary on the commission of the plebiscite between France and Savoy in 1860. During the whole Italian war he was a very ardent worker for annexation to France.[161]

La Savoie doit-elle être française? declared that at the start of the Italian campaign in 1859 the stipulation had been made that Savoy would obtain the opportunity to vote for her own destiny, but sudden peace had threatened that hope. Savoy had already indicated that she would vote overwhelmingly for union with France. Racially, culturally, linguistically, Savoy shared the same heritage with the French. In addition, her economic life was completely bound with that of France, because of the natural barriers between Savoy and Piedmont. Union would bring the development of manufacturing and natural resources which were stifled now by French custom duties. The problem of annexation was not concerned with the kind of government that each respective country had. As a minority group in Sardinia-Piedmont, Savoy was not interested in either Italian federation or nationalism. Her only desire was to become a part of the great French nation.[162]

The official papers avoided any mention of these brochures until 25 January 1860, when the *Patrie* published an article by Paulin Limayrac declaring that France should acquire her natural frontiers and quoted from the Petetin pamphlet. This article was reprinted in another govern-

[160] A. Petetin, *De l'annexion de la Savoie* (Paris, 1859).

[161] J. Trésal, *L'annexion de la Savoie à la France 1848-1860* (Paris, 1913), pp. 194-195.

[162] *La Savoie doit-elle être française?* (Lyon, 1859).

ment paper, the *Pays*.[163] The brochures had the effect of unleashing a press campaign in the Catholic press for the annexation of Savoy. The *Univers* declared its sympathy for the oppressed Savoyards and congratulated Bertier on his pamphlet which showed respect for legality and established order, regretting that the whole Italian question was not treated with the same restraint.[164] The *Gazette de France* started a series of three articles entitled "Savoy and France," which simply repeated most of the ideas of the Petetin brochure.[165] The rest of the Catholic and Legitimist papers, such as the *Union, Ami de la religion, Salut public,* and *Courrier de Lyon,* all declared wholeheartedly for annexation. They gave much space to quotations from the pro-French newspapers of Savoy.[166] The liberal press, on the other hand, was not enthusiastic. The *Journal des débats* declared on 26 August that the whole question had been raised at an inopportune moment and that the annexation movement had no chance of success.[167] The *Siècle,* when challenged by the Catholic press, remarked that it was unaware of the strength of the pro-French movement in Savoy. If such feelings existed, *Siècle* must support the wishes of the people; France would be happy to receive her natural frontiers. The *Presse* refused to take a stand.[168] During the last three months of 1859, however, the prefect reports declared that there was considerable agitation for the annexation of Nice and Savoy in south-eastern France, as well as in Savoy itself. The French government did not need to prepare public opinion; it simply followed it.[169]

A flurry of pamphlets appeared in late August 1859, continuing until March 1860. They were not semi-official nor were they responses to the Bertier or Petetin brochures.[170] The Catholics of France and Savoy were ardent in support of annexation, but the extreme liberals fought the idea, partly because they were violently anticlerical, and partly because they felt France was more despotic than Piedmont.[171]

[163] *Patrie,* 25, 27 January 1860; *Pays,* 27 January 1860.
[164] *Univers,* 24, 25 August 1859.
[165] *Gazette de France,* 22, 23, 25 August 1859.
[166] *Ibid.;* R. Avezou, *La Savoie depuis les réformes de Charles-Albert jusqu'à l'annexion à la France* (Chambéry, 1934), pp. 332-333.
[167] *Ibid.,* p. 333.
[168] *Gazette de France,* 25 August 1859.
[169] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 118-119.
[170] These pamphlets were not included because they had no political significance. Those in favor of annexation were J. Réplat, *Une solution de la question de la Savoie* (Annecy, 1860); *De l'annexion de la Savoie à la France par un Savoisien.* (Turin, 1859); *Circulaire au clergé* (Paris, 1859); Those opposed to the annexation were A. Blanc, *La Savoie et la monarchie constitutionnelle* (Chambéry, 1859); *De l'annexion de la Savoie à la France* (Turin, 1859); Clozmann. *Die Savoyerfrage vom europäischen Standpunkte* (Bern, 1860). c.f. Trésal, pp. 341-343; Avezou, pp. 332-333.
[171] Trésal, pp. 341-343: Avezou, pp. 332-333.

The English and the German newspapers were almost unanimous in their opposition to the annexation.[172] The Germans felt the acquisition of Nice and Savoy by France was only the prelude to her seizing the Rhineland. That was the favorite theme of the pamphlets and articles which appeared across the Rhine.[173]

The Swiss had been nervously apprehensive of French designs; but, in fighting annexation, they were also bargaining to profit by it. The Swiss wanted to acquire the neutralized parts of Savoy called the Chablais and Faucigny. The most vociferous and marked reaction appeared in the canton of Geneva. The Petetin pamphlet produced very strong comments. The editor of the *Journal de Genève* stated that there could be no question as to its imperial origins; "it proves to us that this great question has not been buried. Switzerland should demand annexation of her own territory, the Chablais and Faucigny, in the interests of security if Piedmont cedes Savoy and Nice to France." [174] In Savoy the Petetin pamphlet was widely sold and distributed and had become part of the growing press campaign championing separation.

The importance of these brochures lay in the fact that they were the beginnings of a press campaign in Savoy and France for annexation. In France the struggle was initially shouldered by the clerical press, which soon relinquished the fight when a new controversy (concerning the revolt in the Romagna) overshadowed what was an essentially popular cause. The whole question was happily resolved by plebiscite and the two provinces were added to France in June 1860. The two brochures on Nice and Savoy were probably approved by the government, but they represented essentially their author's viewpoints. They did not have the full support of the semi-official press and this limited their effect within France.

The question of Italian nationalism and the possible repercussions of that movement upon the future of the papacy had led to a great political uproar in France. The controversy divided French public opinion by causing the defection of the Legitimists and clericals. From February 1852 until 1859 that press had been politically quiet. The Legitimist papers: *Opinion publique, Gazette de France* and the Orleanist *Journal des débats* refrained from comment on internal affairs; while Veuillot, fiery clerical, used his *Univers* to support the regime as "the only saviour of the Church against the 'red menace.' " The events of the Italian war

[172] Trésal, pp. 160-161.
[173] Rosenberg, I, 292-298.
[174] Avezou, pp. 336-338.

and the revolts following it led the Legitimist and Clerical press to support the Pope and the status quo. The Clericals, especially, became bitter and vitriolic in their criticism. The most strident polemics appeared in Louis Veuillot's *Univers* for which he received two avertissements.[175]

The events of the Italian war which helped Piedmont recover Lombardy provided the republican press – *Siècle* and the smaller, less influential *Presse* – with a mission: the support of nationalism coupled with anticlericalism. The government needed allies in the press in addition to its own semi-official papers. In this propaganda task of selling the Italian war, Prince Napoleon used his influence and money to found the first new political paper since 1852. Adolph Guéroult was the editor and director of the new journal *Opinion nationale*.[176] Guéroult was a Saint-Simonian, who had started his newspaper career during the Orleans monarchy. For a short period he served as a consul in Mexico. During the Revolution of 1848 he supported the Second Republic in his paper the *République*. During the coup d'état he was arrested, but was released through the good offices of the Péreire brothers (influential Saint-Simonian bankers). He worked for the Péreires in their bank, the Crédit mobilier, from 1851 to 1858, and then returned to journalism as editor of the *Presse*. He moved to his new post on the *Opinion nationale* shortly. As editor he unswervingly supported the regime's foreign policy: its Italian, Roman, and later its Prussian positions. In domestic affairs, however, he did not hesitate to attack the government's policies; but he believed that social amelioration was possible under the Second Empire. He used his paper to discuss the workers' interests and problems.[177] As passionate partisans of Italian nationality both Guéroult and Havin were offered the legion of honor "for the independence of their opinions, their patriotism, their sincere convictions, and their very lively national sentiments." Both men refused the honor as they wished to run for office as opposition candidates.[178] Havin ran for the local Conseil général with the blessing of his local prefect and the minister of the interior, as well as for parliament.[179] He died soon after in 1866. Guéroult ran as an opposition candidate for the legislative body and was elected in 1863. Later in 1869

[175] The avertissements were received by the *Univers* on 11 July and 26 December 1859, Bellanger, II, 279-280.

[176] AN F18 396; E. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral* (Paris, 1895-1915), XI, 492; A. Darimon, *Histoire de douze ans. 1857-1869* (Paris, 1883), pp. 196-197; Delord, II, 647-648.

[177] Kulstein, pp. 158-161.

[178] AN F18 417, August 1861.

[179] *Ibid.;* Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral,* V, 310.

he was defeated by a more ardent republican Jules Ferry. After the fall of the Empire he rallied to the Third Republic.

The so-called new alliance with the left proved advantageous to the government because the anticlerical republican press was increasing its circulation as the more conservative papers were losing influence.[180] The younger republicans were disgruntled and irritated by what they felt was the betrayal of their cause by the papers' support of the government, and these young men remained unreconciled to the regime, a factor which would become more significant in the later 1860's.

In the struggle to convince public opinion of the need of its policy concerning the power of the papacy, the government needed to recruit as many allies as possible. To do this meant loosening the restrictions on the press and seeking a tenuous reconciliation with the moderate opposition. We shall examine these changes in the next chapter.

[180] AN F18 295.

CHAPTER V

BROCHURES ON THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1859–1870

In August and September 1859 the revolutionary governments in Tuscany, Parma, and the Romagna held elections for representative assemblies in which annexation to Piedmont was the dominant issue. The outcome was overwhelmingly against the return of their former rulers and for annexation to Sardinia-Piedmont. This decision created a major crisis throughout Europe, for it represented not only a change in the status quo by revolution, which frightened the conservative powers, but also a religious controversy because the revolt in the Romagna had endangered the possessions of the Holy See. Austria, a Roman-Catholic power, would not permit a diminution of papal power, or the dispossession of the Austrian granddukes. The European congress provided by the Treaty of Zurich (following the armistice of Villafranca) should have been able to settle the issue. However, in such a congress, the two powers willing to allow the *fait accompli* would probably be outvoted by the three northern states. The emperor's problem was twofold: to prepare the French people for the pope's loss of the Romagna and at the same time to prevent the congres's decision to return the Romagna to the pope. He managed this delicate task by the pamphlet *Le pape et le congrès* published on 22 December 1859. There was no question in diplomatic and public minds that it was government-inspired. Napoleon III admitted to Cowley, the British ambassador that, while he did not write the pamphlet, he approved of all its ideas.[1] The Belgian ambassador wrote that the brochure may have appeared anonymously "but M. de la Guéronnière finally accepted the responsibility of this brochure that the emperor himself had composed, or at the least inspired." [2] Nieuwerkerke, the superintendent of the museums, claimed that Napoleon III admitted to him his author-

[1] Cowley to Russell, 25 December 1859, Martin, V, 15.
[2] Discailles, p. 565.

ship of the work.[3] Prince Napoleon sent several copies to his Italian friends and informed them that the pamphlet represented the future policy of the French government.[4] The semi-official newspaper *Constitutionnel* announced on 22 December that there was a pamphlet about to appear "worthy of attracting attention because it was concerned with a question of high interest." Contrary to behavior about other brochures, the emperor made no attempt to disavow or deny the rumors, except for two weak and ineffectual insertions in the semi-official paper, which stated simply that, while the brochure was not inspired, it was nevertheless important.[5] This pamphlet produced such a stir in both Europe and France that it became a classic illustration of the strength of the written word.

The main theme of *Le pape et le congrès* was that the pope could have an independent state without forcing upon its people a government they no longer wanted. The pope must be free of domination from all the European nations; otherwise his pontificate would lose its universal character. But the pope's temporal and spiritual powers have been incompatible. Only if his state were reduced in area could the pope maintain his temporal power without a foreign military occupation. "The smaller the territory the greater the sovereign." Rome had a different destiny. She belonged to the chief of the church. The pope would be protected by the armies of the Italian federation of which he was a part. Roman Catholics throughout the world would defray his expenses. The Romagna had already separated from the papal dominions and had been administered from central Italy. It was a *fait accompli.* The revolting states should not be returned to the pope or the Archdukes because the provinces would be a state engaged in insurrection and resistance. France would not aid in the restoration, because her mission was to free peoples, not to oppress them. "France would not interfere to re-establish the pope in the Romagna and she would not permit Austria to resort to force in order to restore the grand dukes." Europe, however, in the form of a congress could provide a legitimate orderly solution. The competence of a European congress had been established by international law and tradition. Since the Congress of Vienna created the political divisions of Italy and gave the pope his territory, the signatory powers of 1815 should revise the situation. The spiritual power of the pope was unchangeable; but the

[3] Viel-Castel, II, 186.

[4] Farini to Minghetti, telegram, Modena, 27 December 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, cccix.

[5] *Pays; Constitutionnel,* 22, 23 December 1859; For full document coverage of reaction to the brochure, c.f. Saitta, III.

temporal power must be bound by human changes and should be separated from the divine. There were two extreme views: to keep the *status quo* as before, or to sweep away all the pope's possessions. Either proposal was impossible. Napoleon III, in freeing Italy, had achieved a great victory; but such a victory would be sterile if, in giving nationality, he did not assure the security and independence of the pope.[6]

The pamphlet was an immediate sensation. "All of Paris is excited by the pamphlet, and the general feeling is that of alarm." [7] It was the subject of "all preoccupations." [8] As many as 43,000 copies of the brochure were sold in one day.[9] The stock market reflected the uncertainties that the new Italian policy presaged, by going into a panic on 30 December.[10] The effect of the brochure was enormous; it was as hostile to Austria as Napoleon III's New Year's Day greeting speech to Hübner in 1859.[11] A month later a contemporary recorded that no one could speak of the pamphlet or the emperor's letter to the pope without "frothing with passion." [12] The Orleanists were divided in their support. Cuvillier-Fleury, a member of the Academy, the Duke D'Aumale, Thiers, and Guizot all felt that the Roman question should be a diplomatic matter, not a controversial issue of public opinion.[13] Cousin declared heatedly: "My books are put on the Index, but I do not care. I remain faithful. In spite of this indignity I take the liberty in these deplorable circumstances to place myself among her [the Church's] defenders." [14]

The empress was distressed by the whole crisis. The brochure, she claimed, would not deprive the pope of his temporal power, but showed that the Romagna could be maintained only by force. "I fear some great complications for the States of the Church which breaks my

[6] *Le pape et le congrès* (Paris, 1859); the pamphlet was attributed not only to La Guéronnière but also to Eugène Rendu and M. F. Ambroise Perron. Perron was a former professor of letters at Besançon, then political editor in the ministry of state, Quérard, II, 771.

[7] Case, *French opinion,* p. 111, citing Cowley to Russell, 24 December 1859, PRO, Russell papers, G.D. 22/53.

[8] Pourtalès to Schleinitz, Paris, 31 December 1859, APP, I, 845.

[9] London *Times,* 29 December 1859; Rogier to de Vrière, 29 December 1859, Discailles, pp. 566-567. Rogier declared that 45,000 copies were sold.

[10] *Economist,* 31 December 1859; London *Times,* 3 January 1860; Rogier to Vrière, 30 December 1859, Discailles, pp. 567-568; La Gorce, III, 179.

[11] Vimercati to Castelli, Paris, 24 December 1859, L. Chiala, *Carteggio politico di Michelangelo Castelli* (Rome, Turin, Naples, 1890-1891), I, 274.

[12] Darimon, *Les cinq,* pp. 319-321.

[13] Cuvillier-Fleury to Duc d'Aumale, 12 January 1860. *Correspondance du Duc d'Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury* (Paris, 1912), III, 33-37; Discailles, p. 572; Maurain, p. 356.

[14] Lecanuet, III, 219.

heart." [15] The foreign minister, Count Walewski, unaware of the collaboration of the emperor, had asked that the pamphlet be suppressed or at least disavowed by a notice in the *Moniteur universel.* Napoleon III refused. Walewski threatened to resign. The emperor asked him to wait a few days. During the interval the pamphlet was circulated widely with encouragement from the semi-official press. Walewski resigned.[16] He was replaced by Thouvenel, who, most diplomats felt, was more in sympathy with the emperor's new policy. Pourtalès, the Prussian ambassador, wrote: "The resignation of Count Walewski is, in my eyes, a formal denial of the principles set forth in the pamphlet *Le pape et le congrès.* Also I regard this as not just a simple delay of a congress, but the new basis in creating a future settlement of the Italian question." [17] It also confirmed in the public mind the higher inspiration of the pamphlet.[18]

The French press praised or damned the pamphlet along the new political directions which had emerged as the result of the Italian war of 1859. The semi-official press welcomed the pamphlet. The *Constitutionnel* accepted with approbation all the arguments of the pamphlet, and said that France was a Catholic power, and must accept the duty of supporting the papacy. The editor expressed delight that the pamphlet produced as much satisfaction abroad as in France.[19] The *Pays* echoed the same ideas, and added that there was a mistaken impression that the pope's territory would eventually be reduced to Rome alone. That was not so. The pope would give up only the Romagna. The English, the *Pays* continued, in approving the brochure's solution, have also made the same mistake.[20] Both papers reprinted large parts of the brochure.

The papers of the left were enthusiastic in praise. Guéroult of the *Opinion nationale* was so lavish in praise of the imperial policy that one republican complained that the newspaper "would soon become the official paper of the empire." [21] The *Siècle,* commenting on the pope's allowance and the loss of the Romagna said, "We cannot but approve of this double solution. It is in accord with the spirit of the French Revolution

[15] Eugénie to the Duchess of Alba, 14 January 1860, *Lettres familières de l'impératrice Eugénie* (Paris, 1935), pp. 166-167.

[16] Rogier to de Vrière, 30 December 1859, 7 January 1860, Discailles, pp. 567-570; Beyens, I, 92; London *Times,* 26 December, 1859. Unfortunately, Walewski did not leave any letters indicating his feelings.

[17] Pourtalès to Schleinitz, Paris, 5 January 1860, AAP, II (pt. 1), 10.

[18] *Ibid.,* Desambrois to Dabormida, Paris, 7 January 1860, CCN, III, 9-10; Cavour to de la Rive, 7 January 1860, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 167-169.

[19] *Constitutionnel,* 23, 24, 26 December 1859.

[20] *Pays* 23, 24 December 1859.

[21] Darimon, *Les cinq,* pp. 314-315.

as well as political necessities. . . . All sincere Roman Catholics will rejoice with us at such a transformation, which will save the papacy." [22]

The Orleanist newspapers gave their grudging support, although many of the leaders did not. The *Journal des débats* noted that the brochure would help to establish a new accord with England on the question of central Italy.[23] While Forcade, in the *Revue des deux mondes,* was sympathetic to the Italian cause, he objected to the use of the anonymous brochure as an expression of French national policy, noting that this practice was undignified and harmful to foreign relations. He also argued against the decisions of a proposed European congress by declaring that the Italians themselves should resolve those questions which concern them. Thus France could avoid controversy in her internal life.[24]

The clerical papers were all in agreement in condemning the pamphlet. The *Gazette de France* was horrified and felt the pamphlet ought to be seized and the author prosecuted. The *Union* thought the ideas expressed in the little work were "the lucubrations of an insignificant, anonymous author, but they should not be permitted to take a hold on public opinion, however puerile they may be." The *Univers* lashed out in its attack and declared: "Whoever may be the author of this pamphlet, his authority will be null and void on Catholics." [26] Even stronger was Veuillot's article in the same paper on 24 December 1859, which said that the time had come for all loyal Catholics to support the Holy Father by signing a petition to the Holy See which had been started at Lyons and Boulogne. The *Journal des villes et des campagnes,* and the *Gazette de France,* as well as several other clerical papers received a government warning for reprinting Veuillot's article.[26] Many papers, however, did not heed the official warning: *France centrale,* the *Journal de la Guadeloupe,* the *Gazette de Lyon,* the *Bretagne,* and *Algérie nouvelle* were all suppressed by February 1860. Veuillot's paper, *Univers* was suppressed and replaced by the *Monde,* which had an ultramontane viewpoint but was less violent in its language.[27]

The liberal Catholics in a series of four articles, written by De Cochin, Count de Falloux, Prince de Broglie, and De Courcelle, and published in the *Correspondant,* stated their position. The temporal power was absolutely necessary for the independence of the pope, and any attack

[22] *Siècle,* reprinted in London *Times,* 27 December 1859.
[23] London *Times,* 27 December 1859.
[24] *RDM,* XXV (15 January 1860), 223-232, 483-490.
[25] London *Times,* 27 December 1859.
[26] Maurain, pp. 257-258.
[27] Avenel, pp. 504, 583-584; Viel-Castel, II, 159; Maurain, pp. 357-358, 368-369. Veuillot was refused authorization to found another paper.

upon it was an attack upon the spiritual power of the papacy. The paper received a warning on 25 January.[28]

Three clerical deputies who had been elected as official candidates – Cuverville, Keller, and Lemercier – had requested an audience with the emperor to discuss the Roman question. They were refused. On 9 January they wrote a joint letter to the emperor, in which they said:

> Sire, your refusal to receive us saddens us deeply. In the midst of changing interests and situations, religion alone speaks from the hearts of peoples. That is the basis and perpetuation of Empires. The church is assured of divine protection. It is in the interest of our beloved country, of you, of your dynasty that we deplore this uncertainty which reigns and, by continuing, separates you from sincere Catholics.[29]

In the latter part of February 1860 these same three deputies signed the same petition and sent it to the senate; it was published in the paper *Bretagne* on 11 February. On 14 February that paper, too, was suppressed.[30] Billault, in explaining his reasons for this action, said that the deputies had failed in their duty as official candidates. The three men responded that "they were not bureaucrats to approve all government acts, good or bad; but rather they were members of the legislative body with a mission to fulfill, the most elevated and free." [31]

About 12 or 13 February a meeting was held in Paris attended by two hundred persons, containing members of all parties, including businessmen, lawyers, and former politicians. There was complete agreement that all legal methods should be used in the support of the papacy's temporal power. The delegates sent a petition to the senate:

> According to the twenty-fifth article of the constitution under which we live the senate is the guardian of the fundamental pact and of the public liberties. The most essential of these liberties is liberty of conscience. The liberty of conscience for Catholics has as its condition the independence of the august head of the church. Now the independence of the pope is his temporal sovereignty – the most venerable of sovereignties. Any attempt against that sovereignty is an attempt against the liberty of conscience. The undersigned have, then, the honor to ask you, members of the senate, to be pleased, in virtue of the right given to you by the twenty-fifth Article of the Constitution, to intercede with the government, that faithful to the glorious traditions of the eldest daughter of the church, it shall employ its influence in favor of the temporal rights of the Holy See.[32]

[28] La Gorce, III, 183-184; Duc de Broglie, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1938), I, 294-295; A. Cochin, *Ses lettres et sa vie* (Paris, 1926), I, 220; Saint-Amand, *L'Apogée de Napoléon III* (Paris, n. d.), p. 35; Maurain, p. 362; Lecanuet, III, 217-218.

[29] London *Times,* 22 February 1860; Maurain, pp. 363-364.

[30] *Moniteur universel,* 16 February 1860.

[31] Maurain, pp. 373-374.

[32] London *Times,* 22 February 1860.

The address was widely circulated in the provinces as well as in Paris.[33] This was only one of dozens of petitions which flooded the senate.[34]

Despite these forms of protest, pamphlets still became the chief instruments of propaganda. The Bishop of Orleans, Dupanloup, published a pamphlet entitled *Lettre de Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans à un catholique sur la brochure le pape et le congrès* in the *Gazette de France*. First he declared that "never in his life had he encountered such sophisms and flagrant contradictions . . . the most palpable absurdities." He said that the revolution in the Romagna was instigated by paid agents of Piedmont, and a European congress would never sanction the principle of popular sovereignty. The destruction of the pope's temporal power would mean the loss of independence of the Holy See.[35]

The *Siècle* immediately protested against his "pernicious doctrines." Religion would neither be menaced nor compromised even if the pope were reduced to live in poverty, as did our Saviour. Furthermore, the irate editor continued, the bishop's letter stirred up hates and was, therefore, antireligious. "The Bishop of Orleans has consequently committed an impious act, a bad action." [36] Emile Ferrière, in a series of articles in the *Constitutionnel* entitled *Lettre d'un journaliste à Monseigneur l'évêque d'Orléans,* defended *Le pape et le congrès* by describing the historical instances of the failures and inadequacies of the temporal power.[37]

On 20 January the *Gazette de France* published a second letter of Bishop Dupanloup which was a reply to the letter of Napoleon III to the pope.[38] The loss of the Romagna by the pope would be the first time a neutral power would be despoiled of her rights simply because she was feeble. Such a precedent could lead to international chaos, and the triumph of revolution.[39] He was congratulated subsequently by Pious IX.[40]

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Quentin-Bauchart, *Études et souvenirs sur la Deuxième République et le Second Empire 1848-1870* (Paris, 1901), II, 259-263.

[35] *La brochure: Le pape et le congrès: Lettre à un catholique par l'évêque d'Orléans* (Paris, 1860); London *Times,* 30 December 1859; Rogier to de Vrière, Paris, 29 December 1859, Discailles, pp. 566-567.

[36] London *Times,* 2 January 1860.

[37] *Constitutionnel,* 29, 31 December 1859; 2, 3, January 1860.

[38] See below, pp. 225-226.

[39] *Seconde lettre de Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans à un Catholique sur le démembrement dont les états pontificaux sont menacés* (Paris, 1860); London *Times,* 10 February 1860.

[40] Maurain, p. 360.

On 3 February the *Constitutionnel* reproduced a publication by Rousseau (formerly Bishop of Orleans in 1810), which was fundamentally opposed to Dupanloup. Immediately Dupanloup wrote another letter to the editor of the latter paper, in which he declared that Rousseau had been "ignorant of history, true principles, and episcopal honor." Furthermore, he went on to say, Rousseau had a mediocre mind and his writings were extremely vulgar.[41] The *Siècle* saw defamation of character and, with the niece of Rousseau, started a sensational lawsuit in March 1860. Berryer and Dufaure were retained to defend Bishop Dupanloup. Their defense rested on the law of 1819, which claimed that defamation did not apply to the dead, for if it could, it would make the writing of history impossible. The clericals who had supported the bishop during the trial were jubilant when he was acquitted.[42]

Hundreds of other pamphlets and letters were published in response to *Le pape et le congrès.* Many of the arguments were the same: the pope's temporal and spiritual power was indivisible; the destruction of one aspect of his power might mean the loss of the other.[43] One writer, du Buisson, complained that the revolt in the Romagna represented revolutionary activity at its worst. The Romagna had been ruled by terror and atrocity. Piedmont had supported the principal of "fait accompli" because she had learned to instigate revolt and profit by it. The author wished French troops moved into the Romagna to supervise a vote in the province.[44] Le Comte de Champagny declared that words used in the political struggle had obscured the real issues. *Nationality, progress, liberty* were masks to hide their real intent, which was the war against the church. Nationality was a dangerous principle which would lead to great and bitter wars; liberty was a fallacious principle, for political liberty was illusory, and personal liberty was impossible, if people were to live in social harmony. The word *progress* was ambiguous, because, despite advances in technology, there had been moral and spiritual deterioration.

[41] *Constitutionnel,* 3 February 1860; *Lettre de Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans à M. Grandguillot* (Paris, 1860); Grandguillot was the editor of the *Constitutionnel.*

[42] Maurain, p. 399; Avenel, p. 502; Viel-Castel, II, 164.

[43] The bishop of Arras published an even more violent pamphlet than the one of Dupanloup, Discailles, p. 572; the bishop of Poitiers published his passionate episcopal address in pamphlet form, London *Times,* 20 January 1860; *De la brochure intitulée Le pape et le congrès: lettre de Mgr. l'évêque de Nîmes au clergé de son diocèse* (Paris, 1860); Orsini, *Réponse à la brochure intitulée, Le pape et le congrès* (Paris, 1860); M. Poujoulat, *Les droits du pape, réponse à la brochure Le pape et le congrès* (Paris, 1860); A. Celeste, *Étude théologique sur le pouvoir temporel du pape* (Paris, 1860); A. Nettement, *Appel au bon sens au droit et l'histoire en réponse à la brochure Le pape et le congrès* (Paris, 1860).

[44] Mesnil du Buisson, *La France et le congrès* (Paris, 1860).

The revolution which incorporates these phrases was nothing more than hate of the Catholic Church, and had been so since 1789.[45]

Another pamphlet published by Guerber, Curé of Haguenau, had a great success, for this one mixed antisemitism with the Roman question. It was seized by the procureur-general in March 1860 after the Jewish community had complained. The procureur failed to follow up the order when he discovered that the bishop had corrected the proofs.[46] A priest named Popineau published a pamphlet entitled *Le pape devant un maire de village,* which attacked the government bitterly. His brochure was seized, and he was arrested despite the support he received from Bishop Pie; but he received a very slight sentence and a small fine.[47] Bishop Gerbet of Perpignan complained that Napoleon had broken faith with the Catholics, because he had guaranteed the papacy's temporal rights. The Roman Church was unique as were her contributions to the world, and so were her rights.[48] Another writer, de Mongeat, declared that France's assistance to the revolutionaries could only lead to the threat of revolution within France. The best thing that France and the great powers could do was to return the Romagna to the pope in the name of justice and international law.[49] Villemain's arguments were based on the legal rights of the papacy and were quickly quoted and copied by other writers. The official brochure menaced not just the principles of one government, or the church, but the peace of Europe. The basic issue was whether force or law prevailed in international relations. International law was the safeguard of modern society, which included the pope. Permitting its violation would only lead to international anarchy. "Public law had stated that no neutral power is ever despoiled of territory. The papal states were neutral territory during the Italian war and possessed a legitimate and solid sovereignty. Therefore, they were inviolable." [50]

John O'Sullivan, the United States minister at Lisbon, suggested that the federation of Italy establish Rome as an independent city in the same

[45] F. de Champagny, *De la puissance des mots dans la question italienne* (Paris, 1860).

[46] Maurain, p. 386; Extracts of reports of the inspector generals, 1861, 1862, 1863. *Circulaires,* pp. 268-273.

[47] Maurain, pp. 393-394.

[48] Mgr. Gerbet, Évêque de Perpignan, *De la papauté en réponse à l'écrit intitulé, Le pape et le congrès* (Paris, 1860).

[49] A. S. Rastoul de Mongeat, *Appel aux catholiques; exposé des droits de la papauté* (Brussels, Leipzig, 1860); *Défense des droits de la papauté par l'auteur de l'appel aux catholiques* (Brussels, 1860).

[50] A. F. Villemain, *La France, l'empire, et la papauté* (Paris, 1860); London *Times,* 16 January 1860. A solution similar to this and the others quoted above was suggested by De la Tour du Pingouvernet, *Solution possible à la question romaine* (Paris, 1860).

way that the District of Columbia was established in the federation of the United States.[51] Another attempt at a compromise between the government and the clericals was suggested by Abbé Michon. A viceroy should be appointed at Rome by the great powers with the consent of the pope. The viceroy, independent of the pope, would administer the secular duties while the pope would exercise only spiritual power.[52]

Bishop Ségur produced a tract, *Le pape sur les questions du jour,* which was written in a simple manner so that many could understand it. The message was that the temporal power was synonymous with the religious power. Although priced at fifteen centimes (a few pennies), 20,000 copies were distributed free of charge all over France by the Committee of St. Peter. This tract was given to the school children, who were told that it should be read in the homes.[53]

The liberal Catholics, sympathetic to Italian nationalism, fought against the official policy. One of their leaders, Père Lacordaire, who had been elected to the French Academy on 2 February 1860, defended Italian aspirations and the attack on Austria, but he declared that papacy should not be despoiled.[54] Saint-Marc-Girardin, an Orleanist and liberal, also attacked the brochure, saying its ideas were absurd and impractical. Despite corruption and mismanagement at Rome, the pope had attempted reforms, and progress had been made. While Italian nationality could not be stopped, it should not be at the pope's expense. He offered no solution to the problem, but he rejected the emperor's.[55] Montalembert's articles, which had appeared in the *Correspondant* and then republished as a pamphlet in 1859, had been seized. The brochure was then recirculated without government interference. The pamphlet insisted that if real constitutionnal governments had existed in both France and Austria, the Italian war would have been impossible. The great powers' responsibility in this crisis was one of abnegation. France should have been able to stop Piedmont, prevent the revolution, and save the papacy. She had promised that the Holy See would be protected against all consequences of war. The republic of 1849 realized and fulfilled its obligations: the empire had not.[56] This argument inspired the rebuttal that

[51] Dallas to Cass, London, 3 February 1860, Dallas, p. 187; London *Times,* 9 February 1860.

[52] *Ibid.,* 7 February 1860.

[53] London *Times,* 22 February 1860; Maurain, pp. 371-372; Ségur, *Le pape, questions de l'ordre du jour* (Paris, 1860).

[54] R. P. Lacordaire, *De la liberté de l'Italie et de l'église* (Paris, 1860).

[55] Saint Marc-Girardin, *De la situation de la papauté au 1er janvier 1860* (Paris, 1860).

[56] Montalembert, *Pie IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859* (London, 1859); London

the temporal power of the priests was incompatible with the liberalism represented by nationality and popular sovereignty.[57]

The defenders of the official brochure were just as vociferous and emotional in their defense as the clericals in their attack. One anonymous writer dedicated his little pamphlet to mothers and fathers of all religions and retold the story of the Mortara affair as an example of papal maladministration and injustice.[58] Another claimed that the Romagna wanted to be united with Piedmont because she was the symbol of Italian nationality.[59] The question in the papal states, said another, de Lasterie, was the one between divine right and national sovereignty, liberty or oppression. Therefore annexation to Piedmont was the best solution because it would stimulate the budding nationalism in the peninsula and bring economic benefits to both parties.[60] Victor Chauvin declared, "We wish to prove that unity is the normal condition of Italy – the best and even the only guarantee of her independence and prosperity." [61] St. Amand gave a history of the papacy in order to prove how illusory were her claims to the temporal power. He refuted the Lacordaire brochure by insisting that the pope was not a good Italian. If he were, he would have initiated more domestic reforms and actively joined the Italian movement toward unity.[62] One pamphlet was directed to the Catholics as an answer to sixty pamphlets and ten mandements and urged the Catholics to become the party of moderation between the pope and France. It declared that the loss of the temporal power with its inherent problems would make the papacy stronger and more respected. The brochure warned the ultramontane party not to fight nationalism and liberty because this was the movement of the future, and the liberty of both Italy and Rome was necessary for the tranquility of the world.[63] Another writer, du Castera, in addressing himself to the Ultramontanes declared "the intelligent generation actually takes pity on these ridiculous ruffians of another age." [64] Another approach by Huzar attempted to show that from the religious viewpoint, temporal power was incompatible

Times, 26, 29 December 1859; *RDM,* XXV (15 January 1860), 291-299; *Circulaires,* pp. 268-273.

[57] *La France et le pape réponse à M. le Comte de Montalembert* (Paris, 1860), attributed to E. L. Chastel.

[58] *Edgar Mortara* (Paris, 1860).

[59] *Le gouvernement des Romagnes aux puissances de l'Europe* (Paris, 1860).

[60] F. de Lasterie, *Italie centrale l'annexion considérée au point de vue italien et français* (Paris, 1860).

[61] London *Times,* 9 February 1860.

[62] St. Amand, *Les Romagnes* (Paris, 1860).

[63] *Le pape et le parti catholique* (Paris, 1860).

[64] J. du Castera, *Napoléon III et sa politique en Italie* (Paris, 1860).

with the spiritual. It could not be sustained without the use of force because it was contrary to every right and justice.[65] Another pamphleteer declared that the papal encyclical denied the right of nationality. The pope, old and pious, thought he could maintain religiosity by fighting the future. France had always held the balance between the pretensions of the Holy See and the anticlericalism of the revolution. Napoleon III was maintaining a wise tradition of helping the church to fit into the concepts of modern life, of nationalism and popular sovereignty without the separation of church and state. The papacy must learn to do this in Italy and Rome.[66] Moncaut claimed that only France helped free the papacy from the threats of Austria on the one side and Mazzinian revolution on the other. The pope should fight heresy and unite the Latin world.[67]

Some of the extreme anticlericals went farther than the official brochure by declaring that the pope needed no temporal power at all to be independent.[68] The congress idea should be abandoned, and no guarantees should be made to the pope. He would either have to make necessary reforms and join the movement of Italian unity or he would lose his temporal authority completely.[69]

The same feverish propaganda activity which was seen in Paris was evident throughout the country. From Nîmes came a report that priests carried addresses to the pope from house to house and were attempting to get as many signatures as possible.[70] In some areas many people actually resented the clergys' activity in the political arena.[71] At Grenoble the address to the pope and the petitions to the senate received very few signatures.[72] The procureur general added that the people and the bourgeoisie disliked the Church's interference in politics, and the clergy, in turn, prudently conformed to their parishes' desires.[73] Reports from the Pyrenees. Champagne, and Bourgogne were all similar: the people were

[65] E. Huzar, *Le Christ et le pape* (Paris, 1860).

[66] H. Castille, *Le pape et l'encyclique* (Paris, 1860).

[67] Moncaut, *La France et l'Europe latine, le pape et l'Italie, questions de droit supérieur* (Paris, 1860); C. de la Varenne, *Le pape et les Romagnes, le pouvoir temporel dans les États Romains* (Paris, 1860) cited the evils and social problems of the Papal States.

[68] N. P. Doubeveyer, *À Monseigneur Dupanloup, La papauté devant la religion et l'Italie* (Paris, 1860); J. Onnée. *Le pape, l'empereur, et l'Univers* (Paris, 1860); N. P. Doubeveyer, *Le pape et ses pouvoirs* (Paris, 1860).

[69] *L'église et les nationalités* (Paris, 1860), attributed to J. Amigues.

[70] Extract of a report of the police of Nîmes, 31 December 1859, Maréchal de Castellane, *Journal* (2nd ed., Paris, 1896), V, 278-279.

[71] AN BB30, 376, Colmar; Maurain, p. 386.

[72] AN BB30, 378, Grenoble, first quarter 1860.

[73] AN BB30, 378, Limoges, first quarter 1860.

indifferent to the issue; and, while the clergy were dissatisfied, they took a moderate stand, so long as the religious aspects of the church were not endangered.[74] From Rennes, information disclosed that the agitation was almost exclusively in the upper classes and among the Clericals; the peasants remained indifferent, while in the cities anticlerical sentiments were expressed.[75] Some of the observations however, revealed some agitation. In Brittany and parts of the south the reports said: "There is a great feeling of irritation and exasperation not only with the concluding portion of the pamphlet, but also with its general tone." [76] The procureur general of Agens wrote, "We have witnessed the preaching of a veritable crusade. . . ." [77] Lande, too, said, "the discontent of the clergy is active, vociferous, propagandizing . . . but they have no effect on the population." [78] In Lyons the discussions about the pamphlet were very serious and lengthy and the pamphlet seemed to have embittered everyone. All those who were dissatisfied with the government found their enmity focused on *Le pape et le congrès.*[79] In Franche-Comté "public opinion was scarcely prepared for the revelations found in the pamphlet, and resigned itself with difficulty to the territorial restrictions which seemed, alas, necessary in the states of the Holy Father. . . ." Nîmes reported that public opinion was aroused. "The great majority of our people who ardently desire the maintenance of the territorial possession of the church in their entirety, saw with deep regret the acceptance of M. Walewski's resignation as a serious presumption that the imperial government shared the ideas expressed in the pamphlet. . . ." [80] Despite the clergy's frenzied efforts, the excitement subsided in April. East Normandy reported that the pamphlet was ignored in the rural areas; in the cities many felt the pamphlet did not go far enough, especially among the democratic bourgeoisie. The Legitimists joined the church in attacking its principles.[81] Many of the bishops attempted to keep the agitation under control but frequently had difficulty in preventing the parish priests from preaching and engaging in the distribution of pamphlets and petitions.[82]

Summing up the general reaction of the public, independent of the clergy and exclusive of the majority of Legitimists, it appears that, while

[74] AN BB30, 383, Paris, first quarter, 1860; 387, Rouen, fourth quarter, 1860.
[75] Maurain, p. 396; AN BB30, 388, Toulouse fourth quarter 1859 reported the same attitudes.
[76] Viel-Castel, II, 190.
[77] AN BB30, 370, Agen, first quarter 1860.
[78] Maurain, p. 392, citing AN BB30, 451, 16 February 1860.
[79] Police report, Lyon, 1 January 1860, Castellane, V, 278-279.
[80] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 115-116.
[81] *Ibid.,* p. 116.
[82] Maurain, pp. 373-381.

there was opposition, a large number either were indifferent or were in favor of the brochure's ideas. The reports showed that the clergy were unable to stir the populace, and in many localities their activity was even resented.[83] The main effect of the pamphlet was not the alienation of the grass-roots from the support of the government but the continuance of the loss of the clergy and many of the conservatives. Moreover, instead of subsiding, the Roman question became the dominating theme of propaganda (especially from the church) until the fall of the Second Empire.

The government felt that it was necessary to control the pamphlet agitation. In February 1860 the organized repression began. The prefects were given instructions to stop the free distribution of pamphlets which had not been authorized by the government. Another circular was addressed to the archbishops recalling the services of the Second Empire to the Catholic Church and asking them to desist from the agitation. They should cease to use the pulpit to attack the regime.[84] On 22 February a circular was distributed to the procureurs generals. "Some badly interpreted and misunderstood events have excited anger. The attacks, timid at first, have grown and are spreading bitterness. If the brochures continue to be distributed, if the pulpit is converted into a political tribunal . . . if in spite of the laws the person of the sovereign is the object of accusations and of outrages . . . do not hesitate to begin carrying out your instructions." The circular also recommended that the procureurs act "with as much circumspection as firmness." [85]

These rulings, however, were not acted upon too successfully. Some of the procureurs were clericals, some mayors feared that they might cause trouble in their communities, and the police forces were frequently undermanned or composed of men of little ability. In addition, once action was taken, it was frequently difficult to find witnesses, or otherwise prove the seditious content of the sermons. Few priests were prevented from preaching, or convicted if arrested. However, the distribution of the pamphlets was easier to prove and thus easier to stop. As time passed, the distribution of the opposition brochures slackened, and hostile sermons became more infrequent. After several weeks, the agitation practically ceased, probably due in part to the government's repression, the moderating instructions of the bishops, and the indifference of the people them-

[83] *Ibid.*
[84] *Moniteur universel,* 20, 22 February 1860.
[85] Maurain, pp. 376-378; D'Ambes, II, 184-185.

selves. Beginning in March, the procureur reports indicated that the whole controversy at the pulpit level had almost ended.[86]

The strong reaction to the brochure *Le pape et le congrès* in France was to be expected, but it produced just as violent feelings abroad. The pamphlet was known immediately to the Vatican because the papal nuncio, Sacconi, received the proof sheets. The papacy demanded a formal and public denial of any government inspiration. The French foreign minister remained evasive in his answers. As a result a meeting of cardinals was held on 28 December 1859 in which they decided that Cardinal Antonelli could not attend any congress unless the temporal rights of the papacy were recognized as its basis. They decided that it was necessary to increase the papal army. They also issued a condemnation of the pamphlet, which was published in the *Giornale di Roma.*[87]

The pope, in his New Year's Day greeting to the French commander of troops at Rome, called the pamphlet "a notable monument of hypocrisy and an ignoble tissue of contradictions," and felt that the emperor would certainly repudiate the brochure.[88] A few days later Napoleon III sent a letter to the pope in which he said:

> Facts have an inexorable logic and despite my devotion to the Holy See I would not avoid a certain amount of connection with the results of the national movement caused in Italy by the struggle against Austria. What, then, is to be done? For this uncertainty cannot always last. After a serious consideration of the difficulties and dangers which the present situation presents, I say with sincere regret that, however painful the solution may be, what seems to me most in conformity with the interests of the Holy See would be the sacrifice of the revolted provinces.[89]

The pope's official reply came in an encyclical on 19 January 1860, in which he declared that he could not give up the Romagna without doing a wrong to all Catholics and without "weakening the rights, not only of those Italian sovereigns who have been unjustly deprived of their dominions, but of the sovereigns of all Christendom." The abnegation of the papal rights would lead only to the introduction of the "most pernicious principles." Finally the pope stated that he would defend his temporal power "which belongs to the whole Catholic world." [90]

The *Univers* published the encyclical without permission and was

[86] Maurain, p. 381.
[87] London *Times,* 9 January 1860.
[88] A. J. Whyte, *The political life and letters of Cavour 1848-1861* (London, 1930), p. 339; L. Zini, *Storia d'Italia* (Milan, 1866), IV, 254.
[89] *Moniteur universel,* 11 January 1860.
[90] R. H. Edleston, *Napoleon III and Italy* (Darlington, 1908), p. 19; Delord, II, 692.

immediately suppressed, having already received two warnings for defending the temporal power.[91]

The official paper of the papacy, *Giornale di Roma,* characterized the official brochure as "homage paid to the revolution. . . . a cause of anguish to all good Catholics . . . containing errors and insults which have been many times refuted triumphantly." [92] The *Constitutionnel* immediately took issue and remarked that it was perfectly natural that the pamphlet should be criticized: but it was very sad that the official paper of the church should use such violent language.[93] The *Gazzetta Romana* also printed an official article denouncing the brochure and concluded it with a "despairing appeal to the 'King of Kings.' " [94]

The papal nuncio was disturbed by the unlimited circulation of the pamphlet, as was Antonelli, the papal foreign secretary. The latter protested that in France books had been permitted that attacked the papacy, but its defenders had been forbidden. "The brochure is a . . . direct incitation to revolt against his [papal] authority." [95] Rome itself was bubbling with so much excitement that the French troops had to take "extraordinary precautions to prevent an outbreak . . . which gives the city the appearance of a place besieged," but there was no open violence.[96]

English reaction, on the whole, tended to be more favorable. The Manchester papers, the *Scotsman* and the *Economist* were satisfied. In fact the latter paper called the pamphlet a credit to the emperor's statesmanship and courage and urged that England should give her "full, cordial, unhesitating support." There was disagreement on one point: "We must have no more political guarantees from the non-Italian power;" in order to prevent any interference at any time by foreign powers in Italian affairs.[97] The *Morning Post* called the pamphlet an announcement of a new era in man's religious history when "the eldest son of the Catholic church, the successor of Charlemagne and St. Louis . . . announced the intention of restricting in the future the temporal sovereignty of the pope to the city of Rome." The *Daily News* claimed that Napoleon III was no longer bound by the desires of the papal court. The co-operation of the emperor and Cavour at the coming congress

[91] *Moniteur universel,* 29, 30 January 1860; Viel-Castel, *Mémoires* II, 159.
[92] London *Times,* 6 January 1860; La Gorce, III, 179.
[93] *Constitutionnel,* 6 January 1860.
[94] *The Roman journals of Gregorovius, 1852-1874* translated from the second German edition by G. W. Hamilton (London, 1907), p. 75.
[95] Rogier to de Vrière, 30 December 1859, Discailles, pp. 567-658; Maurain, p. 357.
[96] Stockton to Cass, Rome, 31 January 1860, State Depart. Corr., Papal States, VIII, 18.
[97] Urban, p. 340.

would be a guarantee of support for Sardinia-Piedmont. The *Morning Advertiser* was suspicious of French motives. "The Bonapartist policy never yet tried its hand on any liberal question without perverting it to its own purposes." The *Morning Herald* was delighted that France would remain true to the policy she proclaimed before the Italian war. The *Standard* felt that Napoleon III had gone as far in the support of Italy as could be expected.[98] The London *Times* regarded the brochure with satisfaction and felt there was "the promise of a cordial understanding between the two countries in the coming deliberations." While the paper agreed fully with the pamphlet's conclusion, it did differ with many of the arguments used to reach the solution.[99] The *Morning Chronicle* asked, "Where is there a Catholic who can oppose such a program? We have confidence in the political sagacity of the Holy Father. He will listen to the voices of moderation and reason." [100]

The opinions of the English Catholics were the same as in France. Pro-papal meetings increased in number and intensity, and ardent addresses of fealty were sent to Rome.[101] Petitions bearing the names of the most prominent Catholics in England, including baronets, peers, and members of parliament, were addressed to Lord Palmerston, asking for help for the pope. The Roman Catholics of Scotland and Ireland were not to be outdone, and they too addressed petitions to Lord Palmerston asking him "to preserve the neutrality of the dominions of the Holy See." [102] Brochures abounded. Lord Normanby asserted that a revolution had been fomented by foreign money and agents, which had resulted in the attempt to annex those states. If permitted, Piedmont might help to establish a new principle of revolution, which would be a dangerous threat to English security. Any power might attempt to extend this idea to the English possessions like the Ionian islands or Ireland.[103] John Francis Maguire's book *Rome and her institutions* was widely read and quoted; and T. Pope Hennessey's pamphlet *Ireland and Italy* was highly critical of English foreign policy – particularly as conducted by the Whigs. George Bowyer, with advice from the papacy, refuted the argument of *Le pape et le congrès.* He denied the allegations of incompatibility be-

[98] *Economist,* 24, 31 December 1859; Urban, pp. 340-341.
[99] London *Times,* 23 December 1859.
[100] *Constitutionnel,* 24 December 1859.
[101] Urban, p. 342; London *Times,* 9 January 1860.
[102] Urban, pp. 342-343.
[103] Lord Normanby, *Le cabinet anglais, l'Italie et le congrès* translated by C. F. Audley (2nd ed., Paris, 1860).

tween the spiritual and temporal powers or between "progress" and dogma.[104]

Prince Albert characterized the pamphlet as being "so reasonable that it must do the emperor the greatest harm although and perhaps because he owns to being the father of it." [105] Lord John Russell wrote to Cowley that the eventual result of the pamphlet would be the prevention of the congress and the loss of the pope's provinces.[106] Further, he complained that England practiced nonintervention in central Italy and urged the same policy on Cavour, but the French by means of publications in Paris have aroused the hopes of the people of the Umbria and the Marches who look, therefore, to Florence for political support.[107] Disraeli did not disapprove of the brochure, but he scornfully suggested that the emperor of France has "introduced a new system of governing mankind – by anonymous pamphlets. . . ." [108] Lord Greville felt that the pamphlet presaged a good relationship between England and France and made policy toward Italy easier and "more promising." [109] Clarendon thought the brochure a "bold and clever stroke of policy to give notice to the whole world of the sentiments . . . of the emperor." [110] "However," he continued, "Napoleon III might have committed a grave mistake, for this pamphlet would settle the entire Catholic world against him and make him even more dependent upon the English alliance." [111] Palmerston thought the pamphlet reflected intimate thoughts of the emperor, and the problem would eventually be solved if the powers invited to the congress would refuse to attend, thus allowing the annexation of the Romagna to Piedmont.[112]

In Russia the postponement of the congress caused great worry because the Russians were apprehensive of a closer rapprochement between France and Great Britain.[113] The court believed that the pamphlet was inspired by the emperor and disagreed with it. Gorchakov advised the French ambassador that the government should disavow the pamphlet in the *Moniteur universel;* for, "if she [France] continues to trouble European

[104] Urban, p. 344.
[105] Prince Consort to Stockmar, 29 December 1859, Martin, IV, 423.
[106] J. M. Villefranche, *Histoire de Napoléon III* (Paris, 1897), II, 72.
[107] Russell to Cowley, 11 February 1860, BFSP, L, 562.
[108] Disraeli to Mrs. Bridges, 16 January 1860, W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield* (New York, 1912-1916), IV, 318.
[109] Greville, *Memoirs,* II, 277-278.
[110] *Ibid.*
[111] Clarendon to the Duchess of Manchester, 7 January 1860, H. E. Maxwell, *The life and letters of Lord Clarendon* (London, 1913), II, 206-207.
[112] Palmerston to Clarendon, 4 January 1860, *ibid.,* 199.
[113] Pickens to Cass, St. Petersburg, 16 January 1860, State Dept. Corr., Russia, XVIII, 61.

peace, she would alienate Russian friendship." Gorchakov added that, though he was shocked by the pamphlet, he did feel that France had a right to her own policies just so long as Russian interests were not disturbed.[114]

German Protestants were either indifferent or sympathetic, but Catholics were angry, especially in Prussia. The one exception was the Polish provinces, where there was complete indifference. The archbishop of Posen refused to put his name on an address that the Prussian Roman Catholic bishops had sent to the prince-regent.[115] On this occasion the Poles behaved more in the interests of their own nationality than in that of their religion. As a whole the Prussians were disinterested in European problems that did not affect their destiny. Despite a latent hostility toward France, public opinion seemed to be favorable to the ideas of the pamphlet.[116] A petition to the prince-regent, addressed by the Catholic bishops to protect the Holy See, in general produced a bad impression. The *Westfälische Zeitung* summed up the Prussian attitude by declaring that the bishops were Prussian subjects and as such had no right to attempt to influence the foreign policy of their government or even "to menace their ruler." [117] Official Prussian opinion felt that the brochure *Le pape et le congrès* would not result just in the postponement of a congress, but would establish a new basis for the future of Italy. This feeling was strengthened by the resignation of Walewski and the appointment of Thouvenel as foreign minister.[118] Schleinitz, the Prussian foreign minister, was shocked by the pamphlet and thought that the government epistle would lead to the complete harmony of London and Paris.[119] But, although Prussia might practice nonintervention, "as an abstract principle" she must be opposed to the concept of popular sovereignty which allows a people to choose their form of government.[120] While the Prussian press was not unanimous in praise, some, like the *Nationalzeitung* of Berlin, were enthusiastic and agreed with almost all the points of the pamphlet. Furthermore, the editor declared that the return of the Romagna to the

[114] F. C. Roux, "La Russie et la politique italienne de Napoléon III," *Revue historique,* CV (1910), 62; S. Gorianov, "Les étapes de l'alliance franco-russe," *Revue* de Paris, XIXX (February, 1912), 62.

[115] Budberg to Gorchakov, Berlin, 20 January 1860; 1 February 1860, APP, II, 80-83.

[116] London *Times,* 15 January 1860.

[117] *Ibid.,* 7 January 1860.

[118] Pourtalès to Schleinitz, Paris, 5 January 1860, APP, II, 8-10.

[119] Chotek to Rechburg, Berlin, 28 December, APP, I, 557.

[120] Bloomfield to Russell, Berlin, 31 January 1860, BFSP, L. 541.

papacy would make the pontiff more dependent on Austria than ever before, a factor that German governments must avoid.[121]

In the South, however, the area of Germany where Catholic sentiment was strong, there was much opposition to the French program, although some sympathy was expressed for Italian nationalism. A large percentage of the people feared that France would extend her influence in the peninsula.[122] Beust, the Saxon foreign minister, felt that the very issuance of these anonymous pamphlets kept European diplomacy constantly agitated. The conclusions of *Le pape et le congrès,* he angrily declared, were immoral, and the irritation it aroused among the German Catholics would certainly cause them to rally to Austria.[123] In parts of Bavaria some clergy attempted to obtain signatures of the ignorant peasants for the addresses to the pope by saying that the French emperor was oppressing the pope.[124]

Austrian official opinion was angry because the French government had permitted the pamphlet to appear and then refused to disavow it in the midst of negotiations. According to the London *Times* the Austrian government attempted to persuade the independent newspapers of Vienna to attack the brochure, and the *Volksfreund, Kirchenzeitung,* and *Gegenwart* plus a half dozen pamphleteers heaped invectives on the French. The Ultramontanes and the aristocrats vehemently defended the pope's temporal power, but the middle and lower classes remained indifferent.[125] The Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna issued a pastoral letter, boldly asserting that a great power has "imperiled the possessions of the church." The revolutionary forces in the Romagna were weak and could easily be dispersed. "The policy of France, Sardinia, and England in Italy must be condemned by all righteous men." [126]

As might be expected, the brochure caused great joy and excitement in Italy. It was the "most talked of subject" and was frequently reprinted in translation in Sardinia-Piedmont.[127] The emperor of France was again popular; he became the "idol of the liberal party." [128] Most people in Turin regarded the papacy as the real cause of the "degradation of the peninsula" and felt that the breach between France and the church could

[121] *Constitutionnel,* 26 December 1859.
[122] Bastgen, I, 429-431.
[123] The report of Werner, Dresden, 28 December 1859, *Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs 1859-1866* (Berlin, 1934), I, 69.
[124] London *Times,* 7 January 1860.
[125] *Ibid.,* 2, 3, 13, 17, 18 January 1860.
[126] *Ibid.,* 11, 13 January 1860.
[127] D'Azeglio to Rendu, Turin, 14 January 1860, E. Rendu, *L'Italie de 1847 à 1865 correspondance politique de Massimo d'Azeglio* (Paris, 1867), pp. 145-156.
[128] Daniel to Cass, Turin, 31 January 1860, State Depart. Corr., Sardinia, VII, 132.

only bring progress.[129] In Milan the newspapers jubilantly reprinted large parts of the pamphlet. Once again the French were popular, and nothing else was spoken of but the pamphlet. In Emilia 24,000 copies were sold in one day.[130] "The popularity of Napoleon III rose directly in proportion to the rage of Legitimists and the Clericals." [131] But despite the glee and triumph created by the brochure, the postponement of the congress left uncertainty, and accompanying restlessness. The people were anxious for a decision.[132] The Venetians read into the pamphlet their hopes of freedom from the Austrians. In Naples the pamphlet was criticized sharply at court, while the liberals were thrilled. The Dominican and Benedictine orders were favorable, but the rest of the church leaders were divided. There were a few ecclesiastics who thought that the loss of the Romagna might even benefit the church.[133]

"The brochure will render an immense service not just to Italy but to the whole world. I have forgiven the emperor the peace of Villafranca; he has given Italy a victory greater than Solferino," declared Cavour. He added that the political and diplomatic campaign of the emperor has been "glorious" and he has served humanity greatly.[134] Farini, the dictator in Modena, echoed the Cavourian phrases – "the French emperor has given Italy a great victory, and will earn himself a glorious place in history!" [135] Desambrois, a Sardinian diplomat, believed that the publication would lead to a greater entente between England and France, even though it would be a tenuous alliance and probably fall apart at the first disagreement.[136]

The Roman question and the little brochure had aroused European and French articulate opinion. Most of the support for the government position in France had come from the opposition, the republicans. The government thought it wise to give additional propaganda support to *Le pape et le congrès.*

On 26 December 1859 a play opened in Paris, entitled *La tireuse des cartes;* it was a smash hit, playing to standing room only in Paris, and

[129] Daniel to Cass, Turin, 12 January 1860, *ibid.,* VII, 130.
[130] London *Times,* 2, 9 January 1860.
[131] Farini to Prince Napoleon, Modena. 26 December 1859, Comandini, p. 183.
[132] Cavour to Desambrois, Turin, 23 January 1860, CCN, III, 139; c.f. Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 180-186.
[133] London *Times,* 13, 14 January 1860.
[134] Cavour to Countess de Circourt, Turin, 9 January 1860. "Carteggio Cavour-Circourt" in *Cavour e Inghilterra carteggio con V. E. d'Azeglio* (Bologna, 1933), II, 263-264; Cavour to de la Rive, Turin, 7 January 1860, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 167-169.
[135] Cavour to Prince Napoleon, Turin, 25 January 1860, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, 186-187; Commandini, pp. 182-183.
[136] Desambrois to Cavour, Paris, 29 December 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, ccxv.

well patronized in the provinces, especially at Strasbourg.[137] Mocquard, the emperor's personal secretary, had secretly collaborated with Victor Séjour in writing the drama.[138] Based on the sensational Mortara affair,[139] the play was a melodramatic story in five acts of a Jewish family in Rome, whose daughter was secretly baptized and then taken and raised by a Catholic family. The Jewish mother disguised herself as a gypsy fortune teller (hence the title) in order to search for her child. Finally she discovered her daughter, and the two mothers engaged in a tearful struggle for the possession of the girl.[140] The play's success was due in part to the fact that the audiences liked melodrama, and partly to the topic, which suggested government approval. The government official who had to give his permission for its performance was very dubious because it "raised questions which were inspired by the recent baptism of the Mortara child, which can be applied to actual international and religious policies." He therefore referred it to his superior who granted the authorization for the performance, but agreed that changes in the play were necessary to "attenuate that which would arouse too much religious antagonism directly." "We have eliminated all that appears blasphemous or impious." The characters of the play were changed so that there was no religious intervention in the raising of the child, and ecclesiastical authorities, though spoken of, were never seen.[141]

In January, Rouland, the minister of worship, wrote a note to Victor Duruy, professor of history at the University of Paris. "You are a professor of history, you must know about the Papal States. . . . I wish notes on the Roman question. Speak freely on what you know." Duruy was already acquainted with Marshall Randon, for whom he had written a brochure defending the latter's administration of the province of Algeria. The emperor had read his scholarly *Histoire des Romains,* and had had an interview with him. Duruy sent his notes to Rouland, and after several days the minister wrote back telling him that his notes were to be published. Duruy asked that he be allowed to edit them so that they would acquire a literary form. Rouland permitted the professor three or four days to rewrite his pamphlet. Then the government decided to publish the notes in a series of five or six articles which were to be inserted in the *Patrie.* But Duruy was in a hurry to leave for Greece, so as a

[137] *Constitutionnel,* 28 December 1859; Maurain, p. 386.

[138] Castelli to Minghetti, Turin, 31 December 1859. Chiala, *Carteggio Castelli,* I, 279-280; Vimercati to Castelli, 28 December 1859, *ibid.,* pp. 276-277; A. Zazi, *La politica estera del Regno delle Due Sicilie* (Naples, 1940), p. 193.

[139] See below p. 88.

[140] V. Séjour, *La tireuse des cartes* (Paris, 1860).

[141] *La censure sous Napoléon III* (Paris, 1892), pp. 148-149.

compromise the articles were to be published as an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Les papes, princes italiens.*[142] Duruy's conclusions were far more daring than those of *Le pape et le congrès.*

The pamphlet itself was a long, well written history of the Papal States, designed for the highly educated, rather than for mass consumption. Duruy declared that the church had always been absolute in the realm of spiritual affairs, but now had added a new dogma – the inviolability of her temporal power. He challenged this dogma by citing examples from the long history of the papacy. In fact he said, the temporal power had led the church to debase her inspiration. In the crisis of 1860, reforms were necessary in the Papal States if peace was to be assured, for maladministration still existed. There was little commerce, no freedom, too much brigandage, excessive taxation, the inquisition, and other evils. France could not use force to keep the Romagna from joining Piedmont-Sardinia. The only solution would be to satisfy the people's demands. "The church talks each day of the virtues of sacrifice; let her do it. In renouncing the Romagna she will sanction a sacrifice already accomplished. The papacy will gain a new kind of independence, freedom from Austrian domination and the beginning of a new era of moral grandeur." [143]

The pamphlet was a great success in Paris for about eight days, selling about ten or eleven thousand copies in one week.[144] The Italians were impressed by the author's broad knowledge of history.[145] The work inspired very little attention from the press, either in France or elsewhere, but it did produce a violent pamphlet rebuttal by Avenel. He declared that the anonymous writers attacked the papacy but were too frightened to reveal their identity. There was no doubt that the pamphlet was related to *Le pape et le congrès* and like the former was full of inaccuracies and half-truths.[146]

The most important result of Duruy's semi-official pamphlet was that the emperor was pleased with it and brought Duruy into the government service in 1862 as inspector general of the schools.[147] He proved to be one of the ablest and most intelligent of the government officials in the Second Empire.

[142] Victor Duruy, *Notes et souvenirs 1811-1894* (2nd ed. Paris, 1902), I, 106-116, 390; c.f. Ollivier, *L'empire libéral,* V, 73-74.
[143] *Les papes, princes italiens* (Paris, 1860).
[144] Duruy, *Souvenirs,* I, 106-116.
[145] Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 16 March 1860, CCN, III, 189.
[146] J. D. Avenel, *Le pape, prince italien réponse à la brochure Les papes, princes italiens* (Paris, 1860).
[147] Duruy, *Souvenirs* I, 119.

The government's purpose in the publication of *Le pape et le congrès* and of the additional works which supported it were two-fold. One was to test the devotion of the French people to the temporal power of the papacy; the second was to influence European diplomacy ready to decide the fate of the Romagna in a congress. As to French public opinion, the procureur reports showed the general reaction of the populace surprisingly indifferent over the pope's temporal power. So long as the pope himself and the Catholic religion were untouched, the people were unconcerned about the fate of the Romagna.[148] In view of the tremendous propaganda war waged through the press and the pulpit it is astonishing to see how limited was clerical influence.

The immediate diplomatic consequences of *Le pape et le congrès* were the indefinite postponement of the congress because the papacy insisted on a guarantee of the status quo before sending a representative. Austria made the same demands. The French refused to make any previous commitments.[149] "Pamphlets these days are events. *Le pape et le congrès* has led to the loss by the pope of more than one half of his dominions, and has prevented the meeting of a European congress," was Russell's reaction expressed at a later date.[150] The loss of the Romagna by the papacy might have quieted European and French public opinion, but the process of unification had not stopped and new events in Italy were to keep the question alive.

Events in the Italian peninsula embroiled the papacy in new crises concerning its temporal power. In May 1860 a revolt erupted in Sicily. This was an opportunity for Garibaldi, ardent patriot and democrat, to send forces to help the rebels. Newly recruited men landed in Sicily under Garibaldi's command and were successful. Alarmed at the turn of events, Cavour sent his agents to meet with the French emperor at Chambéry in order to gain Napoleon's consent for a Sardinian invasion of the Umbria and Marches, papal territories. He wished to prevent them from falling into the hands of Garibaldi, to avoid war with France or Austria, and to minimize the importance of the new Italian hero. The emperor gave his guarded assent. "Good luck, but do it quickly." Piedmont immediately sent troops into the papal states on 10 September 1860. They met the papal troops, and the two decisive battles of Castelfidaro and Ancona gave

[148] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 115-118.

[149] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 1 January 1860, BFSP, XLIX, 251; Schleinitz to Bismarck, Berlin, 31 December 1859, *The correspondence of William I and Bismarck,* translated by J. A. Ford (New York, 1903), II, 77-78; Desambrois to Dabormida, 27 December 1859, Chiala, *Lettere,* III, cccxiv.

[150] Russell to Cowley, 24 December 1860, *Selections from speeches and despatches of Earl Russell 1817-1865* (London, 1870), II, 345-346.

Piedmont the victory. Victor Emmanuel marched into Naples, where he met Garibaldi on 7 November 1860. The latter turned over his conquests to the Italian king. France protested the invasion of the Papal States and withdrew its ambassador from Turin, but it was only to quiet conservative opinion. The Russians, who had befriended King Francis II of Naples, felt France was only protecting Rome, but otherwise permitting revolution. Therefore the czar called for a conference at Warsaw with the prince-regent of Prussia, the emperor of Austria, and Napoleon III. The emperor did not attend, but he sent a note explaining that his policy was one of nonintervention and suggesting that a new congress be convened to arrange the final status of the various Italian states. The conference met at Warsaw on 20 October 1860. Russia and Prussia agreed to a policy of neutrality so long as their interests were not affected, while Austria maintained her position of watchful nonintervention.[151]

While the eyes of diplomatic Europe were on Warsaw, their attention was diverted for a moment by a pamphlet entitled *Alexandre II et l'entrevue de Varsovie,* which appeared about the 20 October 1860. There is no evidence that it had the support of the administration, and its effect far exceeded its importance. The anonymous author declared that great changes had occurred in Italy which had aroused the apprehensions of a few European sovereigns. They should realize that a new era had dawned: one celebrating popular sovereignty and liberalism. The czar was too wise a monarch to renounce his policy of moderation. Russia could still play a salutary role in the political affairs of Europe by becoming the conciliatory power in this road of progress. Prussia might voice her reassurances to Austria, but as long as she remained the hope of the German liberals she would be the natural enemy of the Hapsburgs. The German princes supported Austria, not out of fear of France, but because they realized their weaknesses and unpopularity. If Russia allowed herself to become the champion of divine right, she would receive no support from western Europe. The whole civilized world would turn against her.[152]

There was little comment either in France or western Europe, but the reading public in St. Petersburg attributed it to the influence of either Prince Napoleon or the emperor. The French ambassador, when questioned about it, denied that there was any inspiration from the government.[153] The pamphlet was quickly forgotten, however, because on 24

[151] L. M. Case, *Franco-Italian relations, 1860-1865* (Philadelphia, 1934), pp. 24-25; Roux, "Russie et la politique italienne," *Revue* hist., 105, 288.

[152] *Alexandre II et l'entrevue de Varsovie* (Paris, 1860).

[153] Montebello to Thouvenel, St. Petersburg, 19 November 1860, Archives du

October the *Constitutionnel* published an article by La Guéronnière which had been inspired by the emperor and which gave the official French position.[154] The article stated that the French government could not take sides in the Italian question without losing its role as arbiter and moderator both in Europe and France. Support could not be given to either the revolutionaries or the conservatives without military intervention, which would disturb the European equilibrium. The solution to the problem would be a meeting of a European congress which could arrive at a compromise.[155]

As a further concession to conservative opinion, Napoleon III sent a French fleet to Gaeta to support the King of Naples, who was besieged by the combined forces of the peninsula. In January 1861 the emperor withdrew his fleet and Gaeta fell. The unification of Italy was almost complete. Venetia and Rome were all that remained apart.

The question of Venetia was not solved until 1866, but as early as January 1860 there were suggestions that Austria sell that territory to Piedmont. English statesmanship began to champion the idea actively by September and October. The British had even asked the Prussian government to urge Austria to sell Venetia.[156] The French evidently considered the idea, for in the midst of the controversy over *Le pape et le congrès* there appeared a pamphlet by Count du Hamel entitled *Venise, complément de la question italienne.* It was a trial balloon, issued through the governmental press, passing virtually unnoticed until it was revived later by the same press with the appearance of a new imperial manifesto.[157] The du Hamel pamphlet declared that Austria's varied and distant provinces drained her wealth and resources, as well as being a center of revolutionary activity and agitation. Venice was not a useful port like Hamburg and Bremen and she wished to belong to Italy. Crete would be an excellent compensation for Venetia, because Crete would give Austria a dominant and central position in the Mediterranean sea. Turkey was willing to sell the island, because she was in financial difficulty. The

ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, MSS, Mémoires et Documents, Thouvenel Papers (hereafter cited AMAE, MD, Thouvenel) XIV, 193.

[154] Mérimée to Panizzi, 23 October 1860, M. Parturier, editor, P. Mérimée, *Correspondance générale* (Toulouse, 1946), X, 43.

[155] *Constitutionnel,* 24 October 1860; a translation of the article is in London *Times,* 25 October 1860.

[156] K. Ringhoffer, editor, *The Bernstorff papers,* translated by C. E. Barrett-Lennard and M. W. Hoper (New York, Bombay, London, 1908), II, 97; Urban, pp. 582-583; *Economist,* 7 April 1860; the editorial calls for the sale of Venetia.

[157] Desambrois to Cavour, Paris, 31 January 1860, CCN, III, 33-34. The American minister claimed that the idea of the sale of Venetia was to be part of the agenda of the coming congress which was cancelled by the brochure *Le pape et le congrès.* Daniel to Cass, Turin, 12 January 1860, State Depart. Corr. Sardinia, VII, 130.

sanction of all the great powers needed for this task would be granted in a European congress. France would have achieved her goal of seeing the "Gordian knot" in Italy untied without "having to cut it with the sword." [158]

The controversy over *Le pape et le congrès* had pre-empted public attention. The press ignored the du Hamel brochure in January 1860. The pamphlet was a failure. The Venetian problem was buried beneath a flood of propaganda on other problems. Events in Italy during later 1860 focused attention on the problems of Venetia and Rome. Napoleon III responded to the revived talk by permitting the publication of a new brochure entitled *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe*. Rumors were wildly circulated as to its origin; [159] the truth was that the house of Péreire, using Charles Duveyrier as the author, prepared the pamphlet and, before publishing it, submitted it to Napoleon III. The latter felt that the idea was impractical since the Austrians would never consent to the sale of Venetia.[160] The last part of the pamphlet, which discusses a congress system [see below], is in line with Napoleonic thought.[161] *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe* declared Austria should relinquish Venetia in return for a just indemnity. This action would give the Austrian emperor the right to demand advantageous conditions for the pope and the Kingdom of Naples in addition to the compensations for his sacrificed interests. The Austrian treasury, operating at a deficit, could not afford the support of Venetia; thus giving up Venetia would result in great economic gain, as Austria would probably receive an indemnity from 500 to 600 million francs. She would guarantee peace and lessen her deficit financing, which in turn would lead to the greater prosperity and the well-being of her people. There should be a meeting of a new European congress to consummate the transaction and give the sale the sanctity of a solemn treaty. Europe should intervene and determine the fate of Italy as she had done for Greece, Belgium, and the Principalities. This congress established to arrange the sale would have an opportunity to reform the basis of European society. Economic and technological progress had necessitated changes which were vital to the future security of the different states. To solve their mutual problems the states

[158] Comte du Hamel, *Venise, complément de la question italienne* (Paris, 1860).
[159] Darimon, *Les cinq*, p. 310; London *Times*, 20 December 1860.
[160] Pourtalès to Schleinitz, Paris, 19 December 1860, APP, II, (pt. 2), 58, n. 3; H. Salomon, *L'ambassade de Richard de Metternich* (Paris, 1931), p. 58. Barbier attributes the pamphlet to Duveyrier, Barbier, *Dictionnaire*, II, 99; London *Times*, 17 December 1860.
[161] A. Pingaud, "Un projet de désarmement de Napoléon III, 1863," *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, XXI (1931), 472-273.

should establish a universal permanent congress "where all the powers, without exception, come to renew the agreement to respect their frontiers, and where recognized arbitration and respect imposes a pacific solution of all differences." This had been the spirit of the congress of Vienna, whose compromises had given Europe forty years of peace. "To revive and reestablish the great idea of a holy alliance in the interest of peoples and kings on bases conforming to the needs of the times and to make *the present frontiers* of France and of all the states of Europe become forever sacred in the eyes of all, such is the universal wish of nations and governments, such is the grand enterprise of the century."[162] The solution of the problem of Venetia was necessary for the stability of Europe. The advantages of the sale had been clearly shown. "It is not arms, it is opinion which wins the last victory." [163]

The pamphlet was a best seller because it received the usual press support that previous government productions received. In spite of opposition from the party at court who opposed the imperial policy, the *Constitutionnel* published a series of articles inspired by Persigny, the minister of the interior.[164] The editorials, written by Grandguillot, said that as long as Venetia remained in Austrian hands, she would be a "future casus belli" because Austria's rule was tyrannous and opposed the national desires of the people. She was unwilling to give up Venetia without just compensation. Grandguillot continued, about twenty pamphlets had appeared on the Venetian question, but only two had really treated the problem with clarity. The most important, *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe*, had the most elevated and practical tone. It had been widely discussed in the European press. Its arguments were completely irrefutable. M. Harnel in his pamphlet *Venise, complément de la question italienne* suggested that the island of Crete should be compensation for Venetia. However good this solution sounded, closer examination would reveal that the solution of one problem would only create a new European dilemma.[165]

[162] Napoleon III changed the original phrase "Les frontières de la France" to the "les frontières actuelles de la France," Pourtalès to Schleinitz, Paris, 19 December 1860, APP, II (pt. 2), 58, n. 3. The Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* thought that the change in phrasing indicated that Napoleon III had given up the idea of conquest. This story was widely circulated in Paris; *Manchester Guardian,* 19 December 1860.

[163] *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe* (Paris, 1860). Note that the last phrase has been used in previous government-sponsored pamphlets.

[164] Vimercati to Cavour, Paris, 24 December 1860, *La questione romana negli anni 1860-1861, carteggio del conte di Cavour con Pantaleoni, Passaglia, Vimercati* (Bologna, 1929), I, 145-148.

[165] *Constitutionnel,* 20, 22, 23 December 1860.

The Orleanist press supported the Duveyrier brochure. Forcade praised the pamphlet, claiming that the author attacked the Venetian problem with "great competency and a rare maturity." He understood the tragedy of another war and showed mastery of the economics involved. Although it appeared to be a utopian solution, it was actually very practical for Austria and provided Europe with a solution to a thorny problem.[166] The *Journal des débats* felt that Austria found the possession of Venetia a liability, and agreed with the conclusions of the pamphlet. It would be a most happy occurrence if all the problems that disturb the repose of Europe could be regulated peacefully.[167] The democrats enthusiastically hailed the pamphlet. Guéroult supported the editorial comments of the *Constitutionnel* and felt that the sale of Venetia was a practical solution of the Italian question. He was delighted that the British press were unanimous in their praises.[168] The *Siècle* lauded the proposal: "The author established with a rigorous clarity the state of affairs in Austria," and showed all the advantages of the sale. "The brochure *François-Joseph et l'Europe* will remain, with the famous pamphlet which opened the Italian campaign, one of the most substantial that these times have produced." [169]

The Catholic and Legitimist presses dissented sharply. The *Monde* declared bitterly that a province was not an article of goods to be bought or sold. How could Austria accept a solution that was dishonorable? The only solution for Italy was to restore the papal state and the princes to their thrones. The author of the pamphlet had to be either a Jew or a Saint Simonian, for they alone believed that problems could be solved by buying or selling! All that was required to maintain the peace was to have respect for treaties.[170] The *Union* agreed, declaring that the brochure's suggestions were "a revolutionary type of deal and a menace." The auction of a province is a cannon shot, and the promised peace is a prognostic of war." The brochure claimed that the sale was a means to save Austria. "Austria does not need to be saved; it is shame they offer her!" Though there were rumors that many officials high in the government approved of this pamphlet, the editors thought it more likely to have emanated from Turin.[171] The *Gazette de France* attacked the Republican paper for its support of the official brochure and declared that the sale of Venetia would be an insult to the honor of Austria.[172]

[166] *RDM,* XXX (15 December 1860), 1028.
[167] *Union,* 22 December 1860, citing *Journal des débats.*
[168] *Opinion nationale,* 22 December 1860.
[169] *Siècle,* 20 December 1860.
[170] *Monde,* 20, 22 December 1860.
[171] *Union,* 20, 22 December 1860.
[172] *Gazette de France,* 21 December 1860.

The British press as a whole greeted the pamphlet happily. The *Economist,* which had earlier advocated the sale of Venetia, declared it "a very judicious and conclusive pamphlet." Austria must agree to a sale, for it was well known that the statesmen of France, Sardinia, England, and Prussia have considered the matter. None of the powers could guarantee her possession of Venetia unless she obtained the sanction of popular sovereignty. The compensation of money was quite just.[173] The London *Times* agreed, saying, "England wishes for peace and a united and prosperous Italy . . . which can only be secured by making Venetia Italian." Sale was the ideal solution, for if compensation were made in the form of another territory, it might only bring new problems and antagonisms.[174] Venetian independence was just a matter of time, declared the *Morning Post;* Austria could in no way justify her subjection of an Italian province.[175] The *Morning Advertiser,* on the other hand, did not question the necessity of selling Venetia, but doubted the motives of the French emperor. "We may be permitted to question the sincerity and good faith of Napoleon III when he recommends the cession of Venetia by Francis-Joseph as a means of safety." The real purpose of the imperial brochure was once more to introduce the idea of a European congress to sanction French policy, particularly the annexation of Nice and Savoy. If Napoleon III could be trusted, a congress might be a good idea. However, since he had openly violated so many treaties in the past, a congress would only provide new agreements he could break.[176] The *Morning Herald* agreed that Venetia should be sold, but the cession would not help to solve the problems of the tottering Austrian empire. She must effect widespread reforms. "In the face of ambition, pride, and sentiment, concessions must be made: and he is the best friend of Francis-Joseph who will teach him to rely on the affections of contented subjects rather than on the devotion of an army of half a million men." [177]

English leadership viewed the pamphlet with divided opinion. Russell and Palmerston favored the sale of Venetia. They had introduced the idea themselves, but Queen Victoria feared French motives. She thought that France might seek to use Venetia as a pretext for another war with Austria that would benefit France alone. She recommended that the cabinet adopt a policy of nonintervention in regard to Italy, including no diplo-

[173] *Economist,* 22 December 1860.
[174] London *Times,* 18 December 1860.
[175] *Morning Post,* 20 December 1860.
[176] *Morning Advertiser,* 21 December 1860.
[177] *Morning Herald,* 22 December 1860.

matic support of the Venetian sale.[178] What concerned Lord John Russell was the suggestion of a congress system to regulate the affairs of Europe. Such a system was an enemy of European independence, he said, for it would be the center of intrigue and the "organ of the boldest and the most unscrupulous of the prevailing powers." Furthermore, the congress could only represent the interests of the more conservative powers and would be directed against those who believed in political liberty. Basic English policy had been to further the cause of nationality and independence among the states of Europe, which in turn had led to that "general security which has contributed so much to wealth, knowledge, and freedom. . . . Under a congress system . . . the weak states having no longer a combination or coalition of powers to look to for support, would fall before the strong, and behind the names of Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Holland, or Belgium, would be in fact the mere dependencies of some one or two great states." [179] The ghosts of 1815 were back to haunt the English statesman and the fears of Canning in regard to the conservative powers were re-echoed in 1860 despite the changes that were reshaping Europe. Russell could not foresee that this was to be the only possible answer to international disputes; but he foresaw the problems that could arise as the result of inequalities in the power balance and differences in ideology.

Austria, of course, found nothing worthwhile in *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe*. The Viennese press was derisive in tone. The *Gazette du Danube* was disdainful of the solution offered by Duveyrier. "As if Europe had had peace before they invented the Italian question!" "The question of Venetia is reopened in order to seek a cause for a new war; but the sale of Venetia will not be "the magic means of assuring peace or preventing new European questions from arising." [180] The *Österreichische Blätter* asserted angrily, "We will not exchange our honor for money!" [181] The *Wiener Zeitung* felt that the solution to the disposition of Venetia did not lie in the hands of the Austrian government, but in the wishes of her people, who certainly did not wish the power, honor, and rights of Austria to be subjected to this new humiliation.[182] The *Wanderer* echoed the same ideas and bitterly repudiated the sale of any Austrian territory. An Austrian brochure rebuttal, entitled *Le rachat*

[178] Queen Victoria to Russell, 16 December 1860, C. P. Gooch, *Later correspondence of John Russell 1840-1878* (London, 1925), II, 268-269; Martin, V, 232.
[179] Russell to Cowley, 24 December 1860, *Speeches and despatches,* II, 345-346.
[180] *Union,* 23 December 1860; *Constitutionnel,* 23 December 1860.
[181] *Constitutionnel,* 27 December 1860.
[182] *Ibid.,* 21 December 1860.

de la Vénétie est-il une solution?, was written in Paris by Debrauz (who had previously published pamphlets expressing the Austrian viewpoint). He proposed a return to the terms of Villafranca, with some modifications. Austria would retain Venetia; France would retain Nice and Savoy. Both these territories would become members of the Italian confederation. Through a joint participation in the affairs of the peninsula the rivalries between France, Austria, and Italy would be buried, and the papacy would be safe and independent.[183]

As expected, the press of Turin unanimously approved the ideas of Duveyrier's official pamphlet. The brochure was reproduced in almost all the papers and received very favorable comments. Only one exception was found. The *Unità Italiana* said: "Rome and Venetia belong to us. We must take them from those who have taken it from us, not buy them; that is our duty." [184]

The Germans, on the whole, were not so enthusiastic, although some of the liberal newspapers were friendly to the sale of Venetia. For example, the *Hamburger Novellenzeitung* recalled that its editors had advised Prussia to sell the canton of Neuchâtel to the Helvetian confederation. This paper felt that solution was the precedent for the sale of Venetia.[185] The Prussian journal *La Feuille Hebdomadaire Prussienne,* representing the government of Berlin, condemned the brochure, calling the idea "the speculation of the stock market on foreign policy." [186] Many other papers in Germany likewise condemned the idea of sale because the pamphlet had received the widespread support of the French semi-official press in Paris.[187] A German pamphlet entitled *Soll Österreich Venedig verkaufen? eine Tagesfrage* reflected the political feeling that existed towards France. Published at Leipzig in the middle of January 1861, the pamphlet declared that the Duveyrier program was the first step in the attempt to weaken Austria. The principle of nationality would destroy her as a great power, leaving her in Germany to lead the "klein-deutsche" movement, but then she would lack power to withstand France or Russia. Germany would lose the left bank of the Rhine and would probably become either a French or Russian protectorate. The triumph of the principle of revolution could lead only to chaos and civil war in Germany.[188]

[183] *Ibid.,* 22, 23 December 1860.
[184] *Journal des débats,* 22 December 1860.
[185] *Constitutionnel,* 27 December 1860.
[186] *RDM,* XXXI (1 January 1861), 239-240.
[187] Launay to Cavour, Berlin, 24 December 1860, APP, II, 2, 56.
[188] Rosenberg, I, 300-301.

Official Prussian leadership supported Austria's possession of Venetia. They regarded the quadrilateral fortresses as necessary for the defense of the Germanic confederation.[189] Furthermore, the Prussian foreign minister declared that the Italian national movement "is neither more nor less than a revolutionary movement which is being promoted, under the cloak of nationality, simply in the interests of imperial France." France desired the Rhineland and was using Venetia as an excuse to create chaos and revolution in Germany. Italy would not become Germany's ally; therefore it was not in Prussia's interest to accede to England's support of the sale of Venetia. Prussia did not want "to pose as the Don Quixote of legitimacy," but "that is no reason why we should not proceed against revolution with all means at our disposal when it makes its way into our sphere of power or our interests." [190]

The Venetian problem remained unchanged, but the situation in Italy did not. The Piedmontese were not discouraged because the transference of Venetia would not be effected. The kingdom of Italy was proclaimed on 17 March 1861, and it continued its drive towards unity and nationality.

The problem of Rome could not be solved so easily. Most Italians desired Rome as their capital and proposed the concept of a "free church within a free state" by which the papacy would give up the temporal power and would be free of all state supervision in the matter of spiritual duties and rights. The pope, however, not only refused to relinquish his political rights, but also demanded the return of all his former provinces: Umbria, Marches, and the Romagna. France suggested as a compromise the return of Umbria and Marches to the Holy See, with Victor Emmanuel ruling these provinces as the vicar of Rome. Rome would remain in possession of the pope.

As long as the question remained unsettled, French troops were kept in the holy city to maintain the papal government. The year 1861 remained one of indecision and diplomatic negotiation, neither side compromising its claims. Napoleon III might sympathize with Italian hopes, but he had to keep an ear bent to French public opinion. Would it favor a new strong state in the south; would it permit the capital of Italy to be wrested from the pope? "What they believe abroad [wrote one observer] is that the emperor can do in France what he wishes. That is not so. He can try to change opinion, suppress the complaints, cause a change in the

[189] Launay to Cavour, Berlin, 24 December 1860, APP, II, 2, 56.

[190] Schleinitz to Bismarck, Berlin, 25 December 1860, *Correspondence of William I and Bismarck,* II, 89-91.

appearance of facts, that is, make the newspapers lie: but in reality he can only do what France wishes, and what France does not wish, the emperor could not do." [191]

January 1861 saw the preparation of a new French propaganda campaign on the Roman question. However, the propaganda milieu was undergoing slow changes. Starting with the decree of 24 November 1860 the government began a gradual easing of the repression. The decree stated that . . . "The debates of the two houses should be published in full," that parliament should vote an address to the throne and that the government ministers should participate in the debates by answering questions and providing necessary explanations.[192] The press policy did not change in its actual administration: authorization remained necessary, and *avertissements,* suspensions, and suppression remained in full force until 1868. Yet the political press thrived and increased, especially the liberal newspapers. Their tone became bolder and more audacious. The publication of the debates and the growth of the opposition press meant that there appeared a wider diversity of opinions and debates on the prevailing political questions.[193]

Many pamphlets of varied opinions appeared: one of particular importance was entitled *Rome et les évêques de France,* which was advertised widely in the Belgian press. The brochure had the same kind of paper, type, and format as former official brochures.[194] It was rumored to have higher inspiration, but did not have widespread press support. The author declared that Napoleon III had followed the traditional policy of France since 1849, that of protecting the independence of the Holy See and the growth of its moral influence. But the pope had not heeded the good and pious advice of the oldest daughter of the church. The pamphlet *Le pape et le congrès,* the author thought, had discussed the Roman question in the most moderate and reasonable language. The flood of invectives and polemics by the French episcopate in reply to it

[191] Marliani to Cavour, Bologna, 24 October 1860, *Cavour e l'Inghilterra,* II, 149-150.

[192] T. Zeldin, *The political system of Napoleon III* (London, 1958), p. 100.

[193] The new papers were: *Courrier du dimanche* (1858), a fusionist Republican and Orleanist paper; *Temps,* founded by Nefftzer in 1861; La Guéronnière's imperial paper *France* (1862). Hippolyte Castille started *l'Esprit public* in 1862, which failed. In 1863, the *Revue de l'Empire* became a political journal and then under Vermorel became the *Courrier français* (almost socialist in tone). The *Globe* (left wing) appeared in 1864. In 1865 Peyrat founded *Avenir national* (rumored to have the patronage of Prince Napoleon); and the same year *Époque* represented the liberal imperial view. Girardin founded *Liberté* in 1866; and in 1867 *Nain jaune* represented the left. Vitu, loyal to the emperor, founded *Étendard,* and finally in 1867 Veuillot was permitted to re-establish *Univers.* Bellanger, II, 322-327; AN F18 295.

[194] London *Times,* 10 January 1861.

was a sharp contrast. The bishops had forgotten the laws of morality in their harsh rebuttals and had allied themselves with the most stringent ultramontane opinions. Their claim that the loss of Rome would make the pope a patriarch and the church a part of the state of Italy was not valid. The present sovereignty of the pope was no more than vassalage to Austria. In civil society the people had the right to choose their leader and the form of government they desired. This doctrine was in perfect harmony with the principle of national sovereignty, but it was a complete contradiction to the doctrines that the French bishops had stated for the basis of the temporal power of the Holy See. The bishops had declared a new public law which places "the supremacy of the interests of Catholic utility over national rights." [195]

The *Patrie* immediately denied the government inspiration of the brochure. But O'Meagher, Paris correspondent of the London *Times,* emphatically declared that this was not so; the writer was an official who submitted his first draft to Napoleon III and "it was not disapproved." [196] The *Moniteur universel* was obliged to insert an article on 21 January 1861, stating that the government could not prevent the publication of pamphlets and books. The public, it argued, should not attribute every anticlerical brochure to the emperor when his policy has always been one of respect for the pope.[197] Certainly the necessity of a denial by an official government paper reflected the interest the brochure caused.

The brochure was followed by two clerical epistles, one by La Rochejacquelein, entitled *Un schisme et l'honneur,* and another anonymous one, *L'état de l'Europe à la fin de 1860.* The former called for troops to maintain the pope in Rome; the latter desired a congress to contain Italian expansion.[198] The government published a collection of diplomatic documents on the negotiations with Rome which caused "a great sensation" in the salons.[199] Called an *Exposé de la situation de l'Empire,* it contained the despatches of Gramont, the French ambassador at Rome. It was the first of the French yellow books (*Livres jaunes*), and its purpose was to reveal to parliament and the public the hostility of the papacy to any compromise with Sardinia-Piedmont.

In 1861 La Guéronnière left his post as director of the press and found himself once more embroiled in the controversy over the Roman question. Persigny was planning a pamphlet and commissioned La Guéronnière

[195] *Rome et les évêques de France* (Paris, 1861).
[196] London *Times,* 10, 11 January 1861.
[197] *Moniteur universel,* 21 January 1861; London *Times,* 22 January 1861.
[198] *Ibid.,* 12, 17, 19 January 1861.
[199] Circourt to Cavour, Paris, 18 February 1861, *Cavour e l'Inghilterra,* II, 287-288.

to rewrite and edit it.[200] Its publication was to be withheld until after the emperor had delivered his speech to the legislature on 4 February 1861.[201] Vimercati, the Italian ambassador, urged the publication of the work as soon as possible, for he thought that it would help the negotiations already under way. Persigny hoped that the pamphlet would make a good impression and that the French clergy would come to realize that France would no longer support Rome, only the person of the pope.[202] Thouvenel, the minister of foreign affairs, opposed the publication, but finally acceded after he changed the ending. He felt that the original conclusion changed the question from a purely domestic matter to one of foreign affairs. Persigny agreed to the change, for he felt that this modification was unimportant, since "the conclusions are obvious to the reader." The brochure was prepared and sent to the emperor for a final reading. Thouvenel requested that La Guéronnière sign his name to the brochure, and the title be changed from *Le pape et l'empereur* to *La France, Rome et l'Italie*.[203]

The propaganda barrage opened its attack on 4 February when the emperor delivered his speech before the legislature. He declared that France's policy toward Italy should be one of non-intervention. Such a policy would disturb the extremists on each side because it was a compromise. One faction desired that France should assist all revolutionary movements, while the other wished her to be the leader of reaction. Napoleon III vowed that he would not be influenced by either of these extremes. He said that he had increased the military protection of the pope when he was menaced, and he had sent his fleet to Gaeta to assist the King of Naples. The fleet had been withdrawn after four months when it appeared that its presence was a violation of French neutrality.[204]

The official pamphlet, *La France, Rome, et l'Italie* was put on sale 14 February. The government acknowledged its inspiration by making certain that the press gave it conspicuous attention. First, rumors were circulated by many officials about its future publication. Then, a week before it actually appeared, the *Patrie* declared that a new pamphlet would "complete the insight into negotiations between France and Rome,

[200] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 15 February 1861, PRO, FO, 519/228, 170; Vimercati to Cavour, Paris, 5 January 1861, *Questione romana,* I, 178.

[201] Vimercati to Cavour, Paris, 5 February 1861, *Questione romana,* I, 226-269.

[202] Vimercati to Cavour, Paris, 21 January, 11 February 1861, *ibid.,* 211-212, 279-281.

[203] Vimercati to Cavour, Paris, 14 February, *ibid.,* I, 294; Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 17 February 1861, L. Thouvenel, *Le secret de L'Empereur* (Paris, 1889), I, 431-434.

[204] London *Times,* 5 February 1861, contains both French and the English translation of the speech.

given by the publication of documents, and will make France and Europe judges of imperial policy." [205] The public, prepared by the advance publicity, was eager to buy; the subsequent reviews after its publication helped to insure its success.

La Guéronnière claimed in his preface that he wrote *La France, Rome et l'Italie* independently with the permission of Persigny. He also quoted extensively from the despatches of Gramont published earlier. The pope, he claimed, had not lost territory because of French policy, but because of his shortsightedness. Those in opposition to the Empire had made the Roman issue the focus of their animosity and the clergy had been the dupes of these political prejudices. The policy of the Roman church also fell under the same influences. Instead of following the sage councils of the French, they returned to the principles of 1815. The emperor would continue to support diplomatically the principle of the inviolability of the pope. He would continue to support the authority of the Roman Catholic faith in France by the erection of new churches and the return of those prerogatives which the bishops had lost earlier in the French revolution.[206] The aim of France, therefore, had been to see Italy respected in independence, the papacy protected in its secular power. The emperor had continually urged the papacy to make reforms in the Roman states to satisfy the people and prevent revolution. If the papacy had made concessions in the Romagna, Piedmont would have refrained from annexation. Rome refused. The Tuileries attempted another compromise. An Austrian or French army would have enabled the pope to carry out reforms. A subsidy would have been provided by all the Catholic powers to offset the loss of revenue from the Romagna. The papacy remained recalcitrant. When Piedmont sent her troops into the Roman states to prevent Mazzinian revolution, the French emperor immediately withdrew his ambassador from Turin and doubled his army of occupation. Because the Vatican had remained blind to the good wishes of France and had persisted in her obdurate course, she had lost her allies, provinces, and her armies. It was difficult to conceive of an Italy without the pope, or the pope without Italy. They had been bound to each other through tradition and history. The emperor would remain faithful to his original purpose. "He will leave his sword at Rome to protect the security of the Holy See. . . . he cannot sacrifice Italy to the court of Rome nor deliver the papacy to revolution." He would patiently continue to try to recon-

[205] *Ibid.*, 14, 16 February 1861.

[206] This criticism of the French clergy is similar to the ideas of *Rome et les évêques de France*. It also repeats the idea expressed in *Exposé de la situation de l'empire.*

cile the divergent viewpoints that separate Rome from the rest of Italy.[207]

The pamphlet was poorly received in the salons, clubs, and other intellectual centers because "its conclusion weakens the effects of its deduction." "It is, they say, a dagger from which the point has been carefully blunted." [208] The comments were sharply critical, and many thought that the brochure was an attempt to prepare public opinion for the adoption of the idea of the vicariate of Victor Emmanuel at Rome. The stock market reflected no great change in activity. There was a generally confident feeling that the pamphlet presaged a peaceful policy.[209]

Once the pamphlet had reached the bookstalls, all the Paris papers reproduced it in full or had large excerpts. Almost every paper commented extensively, thus keeping the pamphlet a topic of discussion by the public. As might be expected, the semi-official press was effusive in its praise. The *Constitutionnel* felt that the brochure had clearly illustrated the diplomatic situation and reflected the wishes of the people. It was "elevated in tone and moderate in its opinion." [210] The *Patrie* declared, "This is high reasoning in grand style, it might be called the idea of Napoleon III developed by the author of the *Génie du Christianisme.*" [211] The *Pays* said: "The pamphlet expressed beautifully the moderation of the emperor and his sentiments of devotion to the Holy See. La Guéronnière by this work has just rendered a great service to the cause of truth, of religion, and of liberty of the peoples." [212]

The Orleanist *Journal des débats* felt that the brochure's conclusion was unclear and left the reader confused about France's Roman policy.[213] Forcade, the other influential Orleanist voice in the *Revue des deux mondes,* felt that the Italian policy of the imperial government was contradictory. On the one hand France assisted the national movement of Italy, but on the other hand she still continued to maintain the temporal power of the papacy by force. This same contradiction existed in La Guéronnière's work.[214]

The democratic press not only favored the brochure's ideas but also read anticlerical solutions in the obscure conclusion. Guéroult exclaimed that the exposure of the diplomatic facts can be considered no more than

[207] A. de la Guéronnière, *La France, Rome et l'Italie* (Paris, 1861).
[208] Circourt to Cavour, Paris, 18 February 1861, *Cavour e l'Inghilterra,* II, 287-288.
[209] *Daily News,* 18 February 1861.
[210] *Constitutionnel,* 15, 16 February 1861.
[211] London *Times,* 18 February 1861.
[212] *Pays,* 16 February 1861.
[213] *Journal des débats,* 17 February 1861.
[214] *RDM,* XXXII (28 February 1861), 251-258.

a "cry of impatience with the papacy!" La Guéronnière did not openly declare that Rome should be the capital of Italy; that would be too bold a conclusion for a work of almost official character. But the exposition of the facts clearly showed that this was the only logical solution.[215] The *Siècle* declared that there could be no peace or tranquility if the Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches were restored to the papacy. The pope is not only the leader of Christendom, but also the leader of Ultramontanism. "After reading the government documents and the luminous work of La Guéronnière, we can see the government of the cardinals has condemned itself." The *Presse* tried to prove that the papacy had never had absolute independence, by reviewing its history. The pope no longer had the support of his own people. He had to be sustained in his temporal power by foreign troops. There was no dogma of the Catholic Church which called for the temporal power. To be independent spiritually, Pius IX had no need of a temporal kingdom.[216]

The Catholic and Legitimist press remained adamant in opposition and criticism. The *Ami de la religion* declared that the interests of France were bound with the fate of the papacy. Once Rome was the capital of Italy, the popes would either be exiled or become harried pontiffs or docile patriarchs. "To deliver up the popes to the Kingdom of Italy is to prepare the pact for either degradation or martyrdom." [217] The *Gazette de France* was perturbed by the accusations that the pope was being deceived and had been led to scorn the services of the emperor. The editor denied that the Legitimist support of the papacy was motivated by dynastic opposition. Then the *Gazette* asked, "Why has France not protected the States of the Church against the invasion of Sardinia, destroyed the revolution, crushed the influence of Austria, and returned liberty and independence to the chief sovereign of the Catholics?" [218] The *Monde* claimed that, since France recognized the sovereignty of the pontifical government, that government had the right to reject advice. The papacy asked only for the integrity of her states and recognition of her temporal sovereignty. To accept the King of Italy as a vicar would be to accept "the most violent enemy of the Holy See." [219] The *Union* attacked the pamphlet bitterly, protesting the invectives written about the Holy Father. Wrongs had been perpetrated upon "this martyr of right, of justice, and of honor; and we seem to hear from high on Calvary, this sad victim

[215] *Opinion nationale,* 17 February 1861.
[216] *Siècle,* 17 February 1861, citing *Presse.*
[217] *Monde,* 17 February 1861.
[218] *Constitutionnel,* 17 February 1861, citing *Gazette.*
[219] *Monde,* 17 February 1861.

repeating like his divine model: 'Forgive them, Lord, for they know not what they do!' " As for the French episcopate, they were still the staunch defenders of Catholicism and the champions of the temporal rights of the Holy See.[220]

Thouvenel had hoped that the publication of the brochure would help to "counterbalance" the protesting clerical literature that had continued long after the appearance of *Le pape et le congrès*.[221] He was mistaken; the new pamphlet, *La France, Rome* et *l'Italie,* simply unleashed a new flood of protest, some of which was most violent. Bishop Dupanloup, through the pages of the *Correspondant,* published another open letter to La Guéronnière, which later appeared in pamphlet form. The basic wrongs of the official brochure, thundered the bishop, were that it was incomplete and lacked objectivity. The allegation that the Catholic party was a part of the political opposition to the empire was completely false. The pope had not opposed reform, as evidenced by a series of ameliorative laws just promulgated in Rome. Speaking of a compromise with Piedmont, Dupanloup declared, "Be, sir sincere and logical . . . Either advocate the maintenance of the temporal power and tell Piedmont not to touch it – or, if you want to abandon the papacy, say so; but do not insult your victim." [222]

An even stronger condemnation came from Cardinal Pie, bishop of Poitiers. His work was published in the *Monde,* and later printed in pamphlet form. He praised the pope effusively, "Pious IX is the king, I say, I say further, he is the man of the century: ecce homo!" Victor Emmanuel was castigated as the contemptible leader of revolution, a brutal aggressor, "the instigator and beneficiary of the most revolting usurpations!" Pie reserved the strongest and most damning criticism for the emperor himself. Despite his protestations, the emperor would deliver Rome to those who covet her. Pie compared the emperor to Pontius Pilate:

Pilate who seeing the growing exigencies of his situation had agreed to the wishes of the multitude . . . and ordered water be brought to him; he washed his hands and he said: "I am innocent of the blood of this just man. . . . But has posterity ratified the absolution Pilate gave himself? . . . Wash your hands, O Pilate; declare yourself innocent of the death of Christ: For every response we will say each day, and the most backward posterity will still say:

[220] *Union,* 17 February 1861.

[221] Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 17 February 1861, Thouvenel, *Le secret,* I, 431-434.

[222] London *Times,* 28 February 1861; c.f. Mérimée to Panizzi, Paris, 27 February 1861, Mérimée, *Lettres à M. Panizzi 1850-1872,* (2nd ed., Paris, 1881), I, 173-177.

I believe in Jesus Christ who is born of the Virgin Mary, who has endured the death and passion under Pontius Pilate.[223]

Persigny permitted the circulation of the *mandement,* for he thought that the violence of the language would only substantiate the charges of the official pamphlet in the eyes of the public.[224]

Eugène Veuillot, former editor of the suppressed *Univers* wrote a brochure rebuttal. He denied that the clergy opposed the empire; indeed they were its most loyal supporters. The papacy had been deserted by the emperor, who had permitted its gradual spoliation while supporting popular sovereignty. He had put the interests of revolution first and permitted its gradual spoliation while supporting popular sovereignty. He had put the interests of revolution first and permitted Rome to become her victim. Since the papacy alone represented order and peace, the emperor had only one course. His duty as a Catholic was to support the Holy See in her just cause.[225] Another Catholic writer, Chantrel, declared that compromise was impossible between Rome and Piedmont, for the latter represented the spirit of revolution. La Guéronnière's brochure contained flagrant contradictions and half-truths; the French were completely responsible for the papacy's predicament because they lent assistance to Piedmont and abandoned the pope.[226]

The edict of November 1860, which permitted open debate in the legislative body in response to the emperor's speech, took effect in March. La Rochejacquelein, de Heeckereen and Marquis de Gabriac defended the temporal sovereignty of the papacy. Piétri opposed them vigorously, and on 1 March Prince Napoleon delivered in the senate a speech which caused a great sensation. "You may be able to judge yourselves that these defenses have come from Legitimist and Clerical circles, for it is only a repetition of what we have heard for several months in the newspapers that speak for this party." Clerical ideas represented "sentiments of another age." The party he stood for, said the prince, represented "modern society." The emperor supported popular rights, not divine right. French sympathies should not go to Francis II but to the "glorious Italian cause." He described the papacy as "this crystallization of the middle ages." He concluded by proposing that the pope be allowed to

[223] *Mandement de Mgr. l'évêque de Poitiers au sujet des accusations portées contre le clergé français dans la brochure intitulée La France, Rome et l'Italie par M. de la Guéronnière* (Paris, 1861); c.f. Dallas to Markoe, London, 1 March 1861, Dallas, pp. 223-223; Baunard, II, 110.

[224] Delord, III, 211; Persigny expressed this opinion in a letter to his prefects, London *Times,* 2 March 1861; Giacometti, II, 153-159.

[225] E. Veuillot, *Le pape et la diplomatie* (Paris, 1861).

[226] J. Chantrel, *La réponse de Rome à M. de la Guéronnière* (Paris, 1961).

keep his temporal power in the Vatican area west of the Tiber river, while Italy took over the rest of the city.[227] Cavour and Victor Emmanuel thanked the prince for the speech and sent translations of it to Venice and Rome.[228] The emperor, too, sent his felicitations, although he claimed he did not agree with all of the Prince's speech.[229] Clearly the debates formed another means of exposing the Roman question to the people in order to ascertain opinion. Some of the procureurs' reports indicated that the workers and the lower middle class favored the speech of Prince Napoleon, while the upper classes disagreed. But other reports revealed that outside Paris, little attention was paid to the debates, and, as in the case of *Le pape et le congrès* the Legitimists and the Clericals were unable to stir up real agitation on the Roman question.[230]

The English press reception to the brochure *La France, Rome, et l'Italie* was mixed. According to the *Economist* the brochure was the "issue of another pamphlet-oracle from the Delphi of the Tuileries . . . professing to propound the emperor's policy with reference to Rome." "It is perplexing and obscure." The only meaning that could be gleaned was that the pope must remain at Rome, but he must not prevent Italian unity. How this dual objective could be realized was not resolved.[231] The London *Times* complained that La Guéronnière's pamphlet was unusually "heavy and verbose." Its purpose, the editor complained, was difficult to discover unless it was preparation for new concessions to the Italians, which would be a real blow to the Catholic and Legitimist parties who had always been staunch supporters of the empire.[232] The *Daily News,* on the other hand, felt that French policy could be deduced from the "tone, spirit, and general drift of the pamphlet," which was "incisive and eloquent." La Guéronnière had ably shown that the pope had destroyed his temporal power by his own recalcitrant policies. He had to be content with spiritual authority, and until the "pope makes his peace with Italy, the French would remain at Rome to protect the papacy." [233] The *Morning Post* cried, "The pamphlet may be here regarded as a

[227] *Moniteur universel,* 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 March 1861. "Prince Napoleon under orders from the emperor spoke for two hours defending Italy before a secret session of the senate on 10 February 1861," Vimercati to Cavour, 11 February 1861, *Questione Romana,* I, 279-284.

[228] Cavour to Prince Napoleon, Turin, 17 March 1861; Victor Emmanuel to Prince Napoleon, Turin, 17 March 1861; Masson, ed., "L'Italie libérée," *RDM,* XIV (1923), 383-387.

[229] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Paris, 2 March 1861, Comandini, pp. 208-209.

[230] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 136-138.

[231] *Economist,* 23 February 1861.

[232] London *Times,* 18 February 1861.

[233] *Daily News,* 18 February 1861.

luminous commentary on the diplomatic correspondence with the Court of Rome which the French government has just submitted to the chambers." Italy could not be truly unified until Rome was her capital. From the tenor of La Guéronnière's work this would not be too far distant.[234] The *Morning Advertiser* agreed in part, saying that the new pamphlet without doubt destroyed the temporal power of the Papacy. The editor, who disliked the Second Empire, continued, "When Louis Napoleon issues a publication of this kind it is well for the world to be on its guard; for such pamphlets are generally the plumed harbingers of some deadly political shaft." The pamphlet is "all flowers and honey on the surface whilst a dagger lies hid amidst the fragrant blossoms." The solution offered by France covered hidden designs against the budding independence of the peninsula.[235] The *Manchester Guardian* was equally suspicious. "There is an insolence in the tone of these semi-official manifestos which is becoming unbearable." La Guéronnière was writing as though Italy were a prize disputed by Rome and revolution, which France had the power to bestow upon the rivals. Europe was weary of having these assumptions constantly preached to her. England and Prussia were both following a policy of nonintervention in the peninsula. As long as French troops remained in Rome, France's claim to the same policy was not valid.[236] The *Morning Herald* attacked what it called the ambiguous conclusion of *La France, Rome et l'Italie*. Remarking that the French emperor frequently resorted to using pamphlets to test public opinion, the editor said, "Whatever happens, his dicta are like those prophecies which, on account of their obscurity, are always justified by the event." The only way for Rome to be given to Italy and yet preserve the papal dignity was by the French evacuation of troops from Rome. The pamphlet could have no significance unless followed by deeds.[237] Thus English press opinion generally was in favor of French aims. But intermingled with this sympathy lay suspicion and distrust of the emperor's motives and policies in Italy.

The Austrian newspapers were irritated by French policy. The *Wiener Zeitung* and the *Ost-Deutsche-Post* sounded the loudest cries. The latter said that perhaps the French emperor himself had not attacked Naples, but he had permitted a successful assault. He had not prevented Sardinia from annexing territory, and had not protected the papacy. The same

[234] *Morning Post,* 18 February 1861.
[235] *Morning Advertiser,* 18, 20 February 1861.
[236] *Manchester Guardian,* 18 February 1861.
[237] *Morning Herald,* 19, 20 February 1861.

thing would happen to Austria if a similar attempt were launched against her.[238]

Reaction in Piedmont was lively. The press discussed the brochure in full. It was the topic of all political conversations in Turin, where the Roman question always produced much excitement among the people.[239] At the same time the brochure had appeared in Paris, an Italian priest, Passaglia, was sent to Rome to negotiate a settlement with the papacy. "He [Passaglia] can aid us greatly," said Cavour, "if he speaks at Rome in the same language as that of the La Guéronnière pamphlet." Napoleon III was informed of this project, but Passaglia requested absolute secrecy; and Gramont, the French ambassador at the Vatican, was "kept in the dark." No settlement was reached.[240]

Rome attacked the pamphlet immediately. On 18 March 1861 Pious IX addressed the cardinals in a secret consistory. Without explicitly naming the brochure, he said there were those who either mistakenly or fearfully desired to give advice which would be favorable "to the unjust disturbers of civil society. They should be persuaded that these disturbers will never be satisfied so long as they cannot overturn every principle of authority, every curb of religion, every rule of right and justice." [241] Antonelli sent a letter of protest to the chargé d'affaires of the Holy See [at Paris] asking him to deny "this unjust imputation" of papal responsibility for the crisis at Rome. The aim of the official brochure was to place the blame on the Holy See for all the conditions of Italy, but there was not a single fact in the pamphlet which could not be refuted.[242] The highly controlled Roman press unanimously condemned the pamphlet. The *Giornale di Roma* and the *Gazzetta di Roma* denied La Guéronnière's claim that papal recalcitrance prevented settlement of the Roman question. The *Giornale di Roma* further asserted that this brochure was written "with the same duplicity as the former French pamphlets on the Roman question." [243]

The reaction of the foreign press caused the French government to issue an article in the *Patrie,* announcing that a great number of Italian and English journals had misinterpreted the brochure by saying that the

[238] *Union,* 18 February 1861.

[239] Rayneval to Thouvenel, Turin, 25 February 1861, AMAE, Correspondance politique, Italie, I, CXX, 12, no enclosures.

[240] Cavour to Vimercati, Turin, 21 February 1861, Giacometti, II, 107-108; Chiala, IV, 177; Bollea, *Una silloge,* p. 431.

[241] Hayward, p. 256.

[242] Antonelli to Mérode, Rome, 26 February 1861, Bastgen, II, 42-52.

[243] *Journal des débats,* 8 February 1861; London *Times,* 25 February 1861; Gregorius, *Journals,* pp. 125-126.

French government was going to evacuate Rome. France's policy was precisely the contrary. "We are convinced that until the Catholic powers have succeeded in finding a way of effecting a rapprochement, France will not be freed of her duty to protect Rome." [244]

La France, Rome et l'Italie was an important pamphlet because it created controversy in France and excited comment throughout Europe, but is was only a defense of France's papal policy and was ambiguous in its conclusion. Despite all the excitement it caused, it had little real effect upon diplomacy. All it did was heighten clerical antagonism towards the government. The Roman question remained unsettled.

The problem of Rome was debated fully in the daily press, brochures, and the legislative assembly. Despite the campaign the people were indifferent throughout 1861 to the fate of the temporal power.[245] Politically the most important events were the death of Cavour and the announcement of French recognition of the kingdom of Italy. The problem of Rome's status remained unchanged.

On 30 August 1861 another pamphlet appeared which created more controversy than it deserved. Entitled *L'Empereur, Rome et le roi d'Italie*, it was thought to be semi-official by the English press and just as quickly denied by the French government.[246] The brochure had been announced in the foreign press, and the anticlerical Paris papers had carried articles which demanded the removal of French troops from Rome. Therefore, it is not surprising that the public thought the pamphlet semi-official, and that by the evening of the first day of its appearance it had been completely sold out.[247] Then rumors began to fly, attributing its authorship either to La Varenne or Vimercati, the military attaché at the Italian legation.[248] Mérimée claimed that its origin was not official, "but it appeared that the author has expressed well the thought of the person to whom he wished it to be attributed." [249] The diplomats were correct in this instance when they reported that it had no importance and that its inspiration came from Ricasoli the Italian prime minister.[250] Its true author was Armand Lévy, who had been commissioned by the Italian foreign minister.[251]

[244] Giacometti, II, 152.
[245] Case, *French opinion*, p. 147.
[246] Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 6 September 1861, Thouvenel, *Le secret*, II, 164-165.
[247] London *Times*, 2 September 1861.
[248] Mérimée, *General corres.*, X, 235.
[249] Mérimée to Panizzi, Paris, 8 September 1861; *ibid.*, X, 235.
[250] Mülinen to Rechberg, Paris, 5 September 1861, HHSA, PA, Frankreich, IX, 55; Cowley to Russell, Paris, 3 September 1861, PRO, FO, France, 27/396, no. 1084.
[251] Barbier, *Dictionnaire*, II, 100.

The pamphlet averred that the Italian nation demanded its three rights: Rome for its capital, liberty of conscience, and national sovereignty. "A nation without a capital is in a vegetable state." Because the capital was the center of political life, culture, and unity, Rome by her traditions and history was the natural capital for the new Italy. There had not been a single moral or material guarantee which had not been offered by Italy for the independence of the Holy Pontiff. Since every means of reconciliation had been tried, the only solution was to make an appeal to the Roman people; a plebiscite should be held under the supervision of French troops. Since the people would surely choose to be part of Italy, French troops would be replaced by those of Victor Emmanuel. The pope could remain, or he could depart; but he would continue to be the spiritual leader of Roman Catholics. Rome could be the seat of Roman Catholicism and at the same time the capital of Italy.[252]

The *Moniteur universel* denied semi-official inspiration of the brochure. "Several foreign newspapers have commented upon the pamphlet *L'Empereur, Rome, et le roi d'Italie.* These comments are void of all foundation, and the government issues a formal denial." [253] Grandguillot in the *Constitutionnel* minimized the pamphlet's importance by saying he had no comments because at least fifty or sixty brochures on politics appeared daily and he did not have the space to comment on all of them.[254] The lack of sustained press reaction meant that the pamphlet's effect was shortlived. It should have had little political significance in France. The French government, however, had resorted so frequently to publishing brochures in the past that this one caused a monetary sensation. The policy of inspired pamphlets was beginning to lose its effectiveness.

In 1862 England and Italy made further attempts to have France evacuate her troops from Rome. The liberal elements in Italy were growing restive, and in the summer there were hints of new revolts. The hints became a reality on 25 August 1862, when Garibaldi and his men landed in Calabria. They were promptly defeated in the battle of Aspromonte on 30 August 1862 by the Piedmontese soldiers, but Garibaldi was wounded. Italian public sentiments were startled and aroused. Their national hero was hurt in an attempt for a popular cause. Their military action had embarrassed both the French and Italian governments. It

[252] *L'Empereur, Rome, et le roi d'Italie* (Paris, 1861).

[253] *Moniteur universel,* 5 September 1861. The importance of the anonymous pamphlets in general can be determined by the fact that this English editor took the trouble to reply to the *Moniteur,* "We are disposed to think that the pamphlet is really a semi-official experiment on French opinion," *Economist,* 7 September 1861.

[254] *Constitutionnel,* 5 September 1861.

made the evacuation of French troops more difficult; and it stirred the Italian populace even more in their desire for Rome as the national capital. Durando, the minister of Italian foreign affairs, felt the pressure of public opinion and wrote a circular note to his diplomatic agents on 8 October 1862. He claimed that the Italian government was strong enough to back any guarantees that would be made in regard to the papacy; but, instead of asking for removal of French troops, he demanded Rome as the capital of the new state. "The European powers will understand how irresistible is the movement which draws the entire nation toward Rome." [255] The immediate effect in France was unfavorable to Italy, but no new government pamphlets were published in response to the political crisis.

The Italian question, however, did catch the attention of France's journalists. Even as La Guéronnière was engaged in the editing of Persigny's brochure, he had received a subsidy of 4000 francs to found a newspaper, *La France, politique, scientifique, et littéraire.* However, the final authorization and arrangements were not completed until one year later.[256] The following August (1862), he opened the venture with a series of articles which later appeared in pamphlet form. It was an analysis, divided into sections, of the first ten years of the Second Empire. The first articles were on the domestic achievements; the second part was devoted to the foreign policy of France. The basic policy of the Second Empire was "that of restoring France's rank in the world, effacing and repairing her defeats and . . . establishing her legitimate influence on European movements." This step was accomplished by the Crimean War, in which France regained her natural leadership in Europe. In Italy, France had supported the aspirations of nationalism and unity. French policy had helped to keep the national movement free from the revolutionary one and prevented the seizure of Rome.

> If we were (previously) in Rome from duty, we shall remain there from honor . . . hence, whenever we wish, and when a more conciliatory disposition shall prevail at Turin and at Rome, we shall be able to procure with advantage a congress to give its definite sanction to Italian independence . . . while recognizing the necessity of maintaining the pope in his territorial sovereignty, in order to secure against all human contingencies his spiritual sovereignty and the liberty of conscience of 200,000,000 Catholics.[257]

[255] Case, *Franco-Italian relations,* pp. 203-204.
[256] AN F 18 570, La Guéronnière to the minister of the interior Paris, 29 March 1861; Paris, 3 June 1863.
[257] London *Times,* 11, 12 August 1862.

These articles and the pamphlet they became, written by a widely known high official of the government, naturally created profound excitement. The public was uncertain as to whether this represented imperial policy, or was written independently. O'Meagher, Paris correspondent of the London *Times,* claimed that the emperor had no knowledge of the publication and was annoyed with the semi-official tone that the author used. What bothered Napoleon III most, he claimed, was the paragraph on Rome which said that as the army went to Rome out of a sense of duty, it would remain there from a sense of honor. French troops were at Rome only because the emperor could not help himself; he would have preferred to evacuate Rome immediately.[258] A few days later the *Constitutionnel* declared: "We are authorized to declare that the article by M. de la Guéronnière on the policy of the emperor has not only *not* received the approbation in high quarters which has been reported but has not even officially communicated to the cabinet of the emperor." That paper continued to attack *France,* which it claimed was only permitted because Persigny wanted a variety of opinion. The *Patrie* joined the disavowal by saying: "In order to put an end to the rumors which have circulated about La Guéronnière's journal *France,* the emperor has given positive orders to his private secretary and his clerks not to have any relations with the editor of the journal." [259] La Guéronnière answered the *Constitutionnel,* and a battle of the semi-official press was on. The rest of the Parisian press could not resist a good battle: The *Opinion nationale,* the *Siècle,* and the *Charivari* all condemned La Guéronnière because he was too conservative in regard to the papacy, while the Catholic and Legitimist press refused him support because he did not uphold the pope's temporal power as completely as they desired. As a result of all the controversy the *France* did very well financially.[260] Co-incidentally with the publication of the articles, La Guéronnière was asked to relinquish his position as political director of the paper because the "government must attribute responsibility to someone and it would be embarrassing to exercise authority over a Senator, thus selecting another [director] would leave us both greater liberty." St. Poncy became the new director, but La Guéronnière continued his interest in the journal.[261]

The Roman question proved a divisive force within the administration itself. Prince Napoleon and his party dreamed of a united Italy with

[258] *Ibid.,* 14 August 1862.
[259] *Ibid.,* 18, 19 August 1862; *Constitutionnel,* 17 August 1862.
[260] London *Times,* 13 to 25 August 1862.
[261] AN F 18 351, Paris, Minister of public instruction and cults to La Guéronnière, 7 August 1862; Report of 19 May 1863.

Rome as her capital. The temporal power of the papacy was not important. The clericals felt, however, that the pope had been despoiled of his rightful possessions and that the temporal power he still possessed at Rome was inviolable. Louis Napoleon maintained his troops at Rome to placate the Clericals, but at heart he sympathized with the Italian desire for Rome. La Guéronnière's maiden speech in the senate supported the emperor's policy – "the maintenance of the temporal power is necessary for the independence of the papacy." He claimed that the emperor and the empress warmly congratulated him and invited him to the Tuileries for longer talks.[262] However, the emperor did not wish to have this policy enunciated so fervently. La Guéronnière, unperturbed by the controversy he had launched or by the earlier government disavowals, wrote in his paper another series of articles, which was also reproduced in pamphlet form. It had no inspiration from the emperor; its importance lay in what the Italians thought of it and the rumors that the *France* now represented that faction at court which supported the papacy.[263] The brochure was at first entitled *L'Europe et la papauté,* then changed to *L'abandon de Rome.* La Guéronnière declared that the abandonment of Rome would lead to the triumph of revolutionary forces in the peninsula, for once Rome belonged to Italy, the Venetia would arise to achieve the same end. These two events would alienate the conservative Catholic elements, and make the Mazzinian movement very strong. French national interests were threatened because the goal of the Austro-French-Sardinian war was to create an Italian federation. Events had modified the original peace of Villafranca. The annexations had already strengthened Piedmont, and with the acquisition of Venetia and Rome, Italy would become a first-rate power. The real solution to the problem was federation. In the north would be Piedmont with her capital, Florence, awaiting eventual annexation of Venetia. In the south would be Naples and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, whose position on the Mediterranean would control commerce between the west and middle east. Between the two states would be Rome – the center of nationality and the capital. The obstacles to federation were Turin and Rome, but a European congress could reorganize Italy. The papacy would be rid of the onerous burden of administration, and the French could evacuate Rome. If Rome or Turin

[262] Viel-Castel, *Mémoires,* II, 190-191, 3 March 1862.

[263] Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 25 September 1861, Thouvenel, *Le secret,* II, 408-409; London *Times,* 6 September 1862. The pro-papal group at court consisted of the empress, Walewski, Magne, Rouland, and Marshal Randon.

refused to abide by the decision of the congress, the French would remain in Rome until the compromise was reached.[264]

The press reacted just as it had earlier. All factions condemned La Guéronnière's ideas, and a lively newspaper attack ensued. While the French enjoyed the sharp diversity of opinion among the journalists, the Italian statesmen nervously speculated on the inspiration of *L'abandon de Rome.* The *Gazzetta Ufficiale* of Turin criticized La Guéronnière: "We cannot understand how a serious journal can propose to give order and completion to Italy by undoing the monarchy and breaking in two the crown which universal suffrage, valor, and the work of centuries laid on the brow of the prince who guides its destinies." It continued that the unity of Italy was not a subject for discussions or for the agenda of European congresses. "The unity of Italy will be safer and firmer security of pontifical independence than either confederacy or the neutrality and autonomy of St. Peter's territory." [265] It was felt in Turin that La Guéronnière still reflected the emperor's viewpoint, and Italians were offended and irritated by the pamphlet.[266] The emperor ordered the publication in the *Moniteur* of three documents whose purpose was to reiterate France's desire for papal-Italian reconciliation, the hope of a self-government for the Romans, and the pope's intransigence.[267] It did not lessen Italian suspicions. On 15 October, Thouvenel was dismissed as foreign minister. This action was prompted by other political considerations, but it confirmed the belief of Italian public opinion that the emperor had changed his policy as indicated by the pamphlet. Turin, though disappointed, was not surprised, for the Italians believed that the *France* was directly inspired by the Tuileries in order to prepare public opinion for a return to the policies of Villafranca.[268]

The zealous support of the papacy expressed in the columns of *France* irritated Persigny, who wished the paper to have a more restrained tone. On 22 May 1863 *France* received a warning for an article (which its editor insisted was harmless). La Guéronnière wrote to the emperor complaining of the minister's action toward so loyal and devoted a newspaper. Napoleon III assured La Guéronnière that the first warning had been issued without his knowledge. In June, Mocquard, the emperor's

[264] La Guéronnière, *L'abandon de Rome* (Paris, 1862).

[265] Zini, II, 805, citing the *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* 17 September 1862; the English translation is in the London *Times,* 22 September 1862.

[266] Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi et son temps, documents inédits correspondance souvenirs intimes* (Paris, 1881), I, 640.

[267] Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 25 September 1862, *Le secret,* II, 408-409; *Moniteur universel,* 25 September 1862.

[268] Marsh to Seward, Turin, 20 October 1862, State Depart. Corr., Italy, X, 53.

private secretary, warned La Guéronnière of Persigny's intentions to suppress the paper. Once again the emperor saved the journal.[269] But La Guéronnière's usefulness as a publicist was over. His connections with *France* were embarrassing to the government, and his notoriety made anything he wrote, independently or not, subject to public and diplomatic speculation. He was gently removed from the publicity centers, but because he was having financial difficulties the government had to find him a suitable position. He sold his interests in *France,* which continued its loyalty to the Empire.[270] He was considered for the post of minister of the interior, which was open in 1867, but Rouher felt that he did not possess the necessary qualities. "He would have dangerous friends in the press; he would endeavor to engage their interests. . . . We do not wish to offend him. . . . We are not rich in official defenders, and it is our own interest not to run the risk of losing them. . . ." Therefore, Rouher felt it necessary to find a suitable post for La Guéronnière, one in which he could repair his fortunes, and at the same time remove the restless bright man from Paris where he no longer served the emperor.[271] La Guéronnière was appointed ambassador to Belgium in 1867, and later ambassador to Constantinople in 1869. His career ended in 1870 with the fall of the empire.

In November 1862 another pro-Italian pamphlet created a momentary stir. It was written by Emile Hubaine, the personal secretary of Prince Napoleon. His connection with Prince Napoleon immediately gave rise to the assumption that the brochure had the prince's approval. The book was a collection of documents on the Roman question which showed the incompatibility of the temporal and spiritual powers and the corruption of the Neapolitan governments.[272] There were rumors that the emperor disapproved of the publication, but O'Meagher felt that, on the contrary, the emperor wished to give this impression while actually he was in agreement with his cousin.[273]

No pamphlets on Rome appeared in the next years because the Roman question remained unchanged and there was no major political crisis. In the early part of 1864 the procureur reports and the election returns indicated that French opinion had cooled toward the Clericals.[274] This helped to make the French government eager to negotiate a compromise for the settlement of the Roman question. The result was the convention

[269] Viel-Castel, *Mémoires,* II, 215, 227.
[270] AN F 18 351, Report to Minister of the interior, Paris 16 July 1867.
[271] Rouher, 15 October 1867, *Papiers et corr.,* II, 128-133.
[272] E. Hubaine, *Le gouvernement temporel des papes jugé par la diplomatie française* (Paris, 1862).
[273] London *Times,* 24 November 1862.
[274] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 155-159.

of 1864, signed on 15 September. The treaty provided that Florence was to be capital of Italy. The Italians would assume the debts of former papal territories. The pope would stay at Rome with an Italian guarantee of no future attacks. In addition he would establish an army with foreign recruits to keep order. The French would gradually withdraw their troops over a period of two years. Public reaction to the convention indicated widespread approval so long as the pope preserved his independence within the restricted territory. The press reacted along traditional lines, finding fault because either too few or too many concessions were made to Italy.[275]

In October 1864 the *France* announced the appearance of an anonymous pamphlet called *La convention du 15 Septembre.* Its format, cover, type, and style were reminiscent of former official brochures, and its announcement in La Guéronnière's paper gave rise to speculation that its true origins were in the Tuileries.[276] Although the *France* was not an official paper of the government, La Guéronnière's association with that paper gave any announcement more significance than perhaps it deserved.

Piedmont has agreed, the pamphlet declared, to make Florence her capital and to recognize the temporal sovereignty of the Holy Pontiff. The French occupation had only been a temporary expedient necessitated by the new movements in Italy. The two obstacles to the temporal power had been the patriotism engendered by the national movement, which had demanded Rome as the capital, and the political intransigence of the Holy See, which denied necessary reforms and recognition of the new movement. France signed the present treaty because Italy assured the temporal independence of the Holy See and thus made possible the union of the papacy and of the Italian peoples. The objections in Italy had come from the Mazzinian forces, who desired to keep Italian claims to Rome alive. Even if Italy had tried to use the agreement as the first step in seizing Rome, the treaty provided the safeguard of the gradual evacuation of French troops after Italy had shown her good faith. The signing of the convention of 15 September has been the repudiation of Mazzinian revolutionary theories. The papacy would have time to create its own internal security by establishing a small army to maintain order. The September Convention would allow France to evacuate Rome, while preserving the independence of the papacy and the unity of Italy.[277]

The brochure was received quietly with little newspaper comment or

[275] *Livre jaune* (1864), pp. 43-45; Case, *French opinion,* pp. 162-163.
[276] London *Times,* 24 October 1864; Bastgen, II, 485-486.
[277] *La convention du 15 Septembre* (Paris, 1864).

public reaction, because the convention was widely accepted. O'Meagher, Paris correspondent of the London *Times,* felt it most unlikely to be official because of its almost negligible reception.[278]

The Roman question was settled, it seemed, until political events two years later created a new crisis. In the summer of 1866 Italy acquired Venetia after the Austro-Prussian war, and again her people cast covetous eyes upon Rome. In April 1867 Garibaldi invaded the remainder of the papal states. The French, fearful of Clerical reaction at home, sent troops back into the city to defend the pope, and on 26 October 1867 they defeated Garibaldi at the battle of Mentana. Rome was re-occupied by French troops, although Napoleon III still wished to retire from the city. Once more he turned to the idea of a European congress to settle the Roman question and any other problems that still haunted Europe. Once again the powers rejected his suggestion. In November 1867 a pamphlet appeared, entitled *Napoléon III et l'Europe.* It declared that a congress could solve not only the problem of Rome, but also the differences between France and Prussia.[279]

On 14 January 1868 another anonymous pamphlet appeared, *La papauté et l'Italie, de la nécessité d'un congrès,* which the *France* claimed had high inspiration. The author had held a high position in the government. O'Meagher reported, according to rumors, that the official was General Montebello, who had commanded French troops at Rome for five years, "and as General Montebello is aide-de-camp to the emperor, it is probable that it has been written and published with His Majesty's assent and approval." [280] The incident that prompted the pamphlet was a speech by Rouher, the government spokesman, before the legislative body on 5 December 1867, in which he averred that "Italy will never take Rome! Never will France permit such a violent act committed against her honor and against Catholicism!" [281]

The author opened his pamphlet, *La papauté et l'Italie, de la nécessité d'un congrès,* by remarking that a formal declaration had been made in the legislative body that France would never permit Italy to seize Rome. French policy was that only a congress of European nations could establish a rapprochement between Italy and the pope. The French occupation of Rome should last only long enough for an agreement between the states to be negotiated. However, if Rome were to be truly independent, certain reforms would have to be introduced into her adminis-

[278] London *Times,* 27 October 1864.
[279] For more on this pamphlet see Chap. VI.
[280] London *Times,* 13, 14 January 1868.
[281] Case, *French opinion,* p. 173 *Moniteur universel,* 6 December 1867.

tration. At present the lay group, the nobles, bourgeoisie, and the people did not participate in the government. "The emancipation of the lay element is the crux of the question. From this first and principal reform all others will naturally follow." A concordat could prevent future clashes between church and state. It would assure Italy prosperity and Rome her adequate revenues. To complete the rapprochement and establish the political security of the Holy See, all of Europe would guarantee her neutrality. This agreement was the question that the congress would have to resolve, a question which was completely foreign to religion and was not attached to any social or political point of view and whose final solution could only be found in the final reconciliation of the papacy and Italy.[282] The emperor may have wished to weaken Rouher's strong statement in reference to the evacuation of French troops from Rome without openly repudiating his minister of state. *La papauté et l'Italie, de la nécessité d'un congrès* could have served that purpose. However, this little pamphlet produced no reaction and no comment in either the foreign or French press. Napoleon III still felt that the ultimate solutions to all his foreign problems lay in the meeting of a European congress.

After 1861 no major semi-official brochures were written on the Roman question. Those which appeared thereafter created a very short-lived interest because none received sustained press support. Furthermore, government leadership was following public opinion after 1861 rather than leading it. The Roman question remained unresolved until the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, and events across the Rhine slowly engaged more and more of French diplomatic and public attention. As the government gave up the publicity initiative on the Roman question, it found itself forced to respond to public outcries on Prussian, Polish, and other crises.

[282] *La papauté et l'Italie, de la nécessité d'un congrès* (Paris, 1868).

CHAPTER VI

BROCHURES ON GERMANY AND HER NEIGHBORS, 1860–1870

The Roman question had aroused press opinion and had led to changes in French political loyalties. But Italy and Rome were only one part of foreign policy. The area across the Rhine always played an important strategic role in French diplomacy. Napoleon III foresaw the possibility of German unity and was not averse to this movement under the leadership of Prussia, provided France had security. A note, partly dictated and partly in the emperor's handwriting, supports this contention. He spoke of the necessity of France's acceptance of German nationalism under Prussian leadership. He stated that the Rhine provinces were German, and French attempts to annex them might cause a war with Germany.[1]

In January 1860 the emperor, faced with controversy over the Roman question, began to turn to non-Roman projects.[2] He was aware of the enormous animosity toward France, aroused in Germany by the publication of *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie*. The Italian war, particularly the annexation of Nice and Savoy, further intensified these feelings.[3] The annexation of the provinces brought a flood of pamphlets demanding war with France and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the German states.[4] One entitled *La question de la Savoie* asked that the European power balance be maintained at any cost. Other contemporary reports tell the same story.[5]

[1] *Papiers secrets brulés dans l'incendie des Tuileries* (Brussels, 1871), pp. 159-161.

[2] King of Belgium to Queen Victoria, Laken, 6 January 1860, "La Reine Victoria d'après sa correspondance inédite," *RDM,* XLII (1907), 289-290.

[3] Malmesbury to Hudson, London, 20 May 1859, Great Britain, *Parliamentary papers,* 1859. Vol. LXVIII *Accounts and papers,* Vol. XXXIII, Cmd. 2527, "Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Italy, February-June 1859"; H. Abeken to Rudolf Abeken, Berlin, 2 March 1859, *Bismarck's pen, the life of Heinrich Abeken,* translated by Mrs. Barrett-Lennard (London, 1911), p. 168; Saint-René Taillander, "La Prusse et l'agitation allemande," *RDM,* XXII (1 July 1859), 210-227.

[4] Comte Reiset, *Mes souvenirs* (Paris, 1903), III, 136-140.

[5] E. Leseur, *Le prince de la Tour d'Auvergne et le secret de l'impératrice* (Paris, 1930), pp. 140-141.

During the Italian crisis the *Moniteur* published a statement which foreshadowed later French propaganda. The emperor, the article stated, was a true friend of Germany and would not be opposed to her unity. "The policy of France cannot have two weights and measures. What she seeks to create in Italy, she will also create in Germany. We would not be menaced by . . . a national Germany which would reconcile its federal organization with the tendency to unite in one body, a whole principle that has been already laid down in the great commercial union of the Zollverein." [6] Forcade, attributing the article to La Guéronnière, hoped that this was not the expressed policy of the government, for a unified Germany would be a real menace to France.[7]

The goal of the pamphlets which followed this article in 1860 was to placate German suspicions and to test her feelings on unity. The first brochure appeared in January in the midst of the raging polemic war over *Le pape et le congrès.* The French thought the pamphlet was in support of the latter brochure, because it so ardently upheld the theory of nationalities and popular sovereignty. There was no evidence of higher inspiration, but its effect in Germany gave it significance.[8] Entitled *L'Allemagne avant le congrès,* it declared that Europe was now watching national movements sweeping both Italy and Germany. History indicated that these changes were part of progress. In ancient times individual interests predominated, then were subordinated to the city-state. In the middle ages the province became all powerful. In modern times, the province ceded its interests to the nation. Those governments not following "this instinct of assimilation" have had warnings of the stirrings of nationalism. The French revolution destroyed the last vestiges of feudalism in France and carried the seeds of its triumph throughout Europe. At present "two countries appear to have disobeyed this geographic law." They are Italy and Germany. There was no reason to fear the movements of unification in these countries. These new movements would lead to the final realization of nationality, which in turn would stabilize the political equilibrium of Europe. The hope of German unity lay in Prussian leadership. "She has been called to become the Piedmont of another Italy, to carry the German flag high and far to all the lands where the German

[6] *Moniteur universel,* 10 April 1859; Napoleon III, in an interview with Kossuth at the same time this article appeared, said, "Two Germanies I would not mind; but one Germany – *ça ne me va pas,*" Kossuth, p. 80.

[7] *RDM,* XX (15 April 1859), 1002-1003.

[8] London *Times,* 5 January 1860. Later, after the pamphlet had appeared, some German papers declared that the French government had hinted to Prussia that she could enlarge if France was indemnified by her natural frontiers. In Paris, however, the reports were discounted. London *Times,* 13 January 1860.

language is spoken." By helping to hasten this inevitable development of nationalism, Europe would have the opportunity to arrive at a general disarmament.[9]

The little pamphlet created no stir in France; it was lost in the welter of more ardent pleas for and against the papacy. However, it excited diplomatic circles across the Rhine. The smaller states were disturbed by the tone of the brochure, but little opinion was expressed in Berlin.[10] Vienna suspected that it had had inspiration from highly placed French officials and expressed anxiety over Prussian reaction to the idea of leadership in Germany. The Austrians believed that the conservatives in Berlin would disregard such liberal notions, but would the "Young Turks"? Bismarck in particular, it was feared, would be interested; for he had already spoken quite frankly of giving the Rhineland to France as compensation for the incorporation of Hanover and Hesse by Prussia.[11]

The question of Germany was dropped by the French government until the spring of 1860. Napoleon III asked the prince-regent of Prussia for a personal interview at Baden-Baden. The prince assented only if all the smaller German states were represented. At the same time a group of pamphlets appeared. Though they may not all have been directed from the Tuileries, they were on the same subject and substantially in agreement.

The first of the pamphlets was *La coalition,* which appeared in April. Pingaud, the French historian, has declared that Adolph Guéroult was the true author of this anonymous work.[12] However, there were many differing contemporary reports – each reporter assured that he possessed the truth. Nigra, the Italian ambassador, thought La Guéronnière had corrected the proofs, which had been directly inspired by the emperor.[13] Metternich, the Austrian envoy, claimed that the brochure was only "semi-official and therefore not so important." [14] The English ambassador claimed that a well-informed source told him that the pamphlet was written by a journalist named Dupont, who lived in Belgium, as an imitation of *Le pape et le congrès,* which had profited its author nearly 100,000 francs. The cover and type were of the same kind as the official

[9] *L'Allemagne avant le congrès* (Paris, 1860).

[10] London *Times,* 11 January 1860.

[11] Rechberg to Karolyi, Vienna, 14 January 1860, *Quellen,* I, 88.

[12] A. Pingaud, "Une page de la politique secrète de Napoléon III," *Revue de France,* VI (1931), 262. He gives no authority for his assumption of Guéroult's authorship, but he is usually well informed about these pamphlets. In this case the contemporary reports invalidate his claim.

[13] Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 18 April 1860, *CCN,* III, 262; Duchesse de Dino, IV, 344.

[14] H. Salomon, *L'ambassade de Richard de Metternich* (Paris, 1931), pp. 57-58.

publications so as to dupe the public into purchase. However, he was "assisted by persons capable of giving him more information than he possessed." [15] Klindworth, an Austrian secret agent, gave his superiors a summary which included all the rumors prevalent in Paris. *La coalition* had been written, he said, by Léonce Dupont, following the ideas and instructions of the emperor. La Guéronnière had received and corrected the proofs. Dupont was not a resident of Belgium as Cowley reported. He was an employee of the ministry of the interior, and had been a former editor of *Opinion nationale,* Guéroult's paper. This report was probably closest to the truth, despite the fact that Klindworth was not the most reliable informant.[16]

La coalition declared that fear of the First Empire had caused the coalition against France and the creation of the Holy Alliance in 1815. They had both disappeared because the principles upon which they were founded had been replaced by others. Popular sovereignty and nationality has been substituted for divine right and legitimacy. Today it was impossible to form a new coalition against France. England, the leader of the old coalition, was now the ally of France. An enormous chasm had been created between England and Russia by the Crimean War. Prussia could not head the coalition because Russia still smarted from the policy of neutrality that Prussia had followed during the Crimean war. Even if the coalition could vanquish France, there was the added risk that it might strengthen Austria. If France triumphed, Prussia would be in danger of losing the Rhine provinces. Austria could not assume leadership of a coalition because there was a gulf between liberal Protestant England and conservative Catholic Austria. English sympathies for Piedmont had also alienated Austria. France was strong in power and principles. She could oppose any coalition against her, if one could still be formed. The European power balance had changed, and new needs and aspirations motivated Europe. France alone could prevent Prussia from establishing her hegemony in the Germanic confederation. All she asked was security that the possession of her natural frontiers would give her against a new powerful neighbor, and she would co-operate with Prussia to make Germany satisfied and content in a new-found nationality. "We

[15] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 19 April 1860, PRO, FO, France, 27/1337, no. 487; Christina Trevulziodi Belgioso to Cavour, 9 October 1860, Bollea, *Una silloga,* pp. 251-252.

[16] Klindworth reports, Versailles, 28 April 1860, HHSA, PA, Belge. The amount of detail contained in this letter gives credence to the report.

repeat, in closing, neither France nor the Empire have fear of monarchial coalitions. The people are with them." [17]

The effect of the pamphlet was sensational; for days it was the only topic of conversation in intellectual circles. The stock market reacted by falling sharply because the French business community suspected that the pamphlet had been inspired by the government.[18]

The minister of the interior, Billault, was unaware of La Guéronnière's connection with the pamphlet. He had a strong denial of government inspiration inserted in the *Constitutionnel.*[19] The newspaper declared that *La coalition* was the work of a private individual who neither directly nor indirectly had been inspired by the government.[20] On the same day, 18 April 1860, at two o'clock, Billault received the Russian ambassador. La Guéronnière dropped in for an informal visit. A conversation concerning *La coalition* ensued. The ambassador, Kisselev, protested the brochure's appearance. Then he turned to La Guéronnière and said: "I do not claim to know whether you are the author of this one [*La coalition*], as you *were of the first* [*Le pape et le congrès*]." "It must be acknowledged that if you have not written *La coalition,* it is the *work of those who have made a study of your style and who have been able to imitate it so well that the reader could be fooled.*" Apparently annoyed, La Guéronnière answered, "I do not believe what you say – there is not the slightest resemblance of style between the two brochures." Count Kisselev replied: "I must say otherwise, I have found entire phrases of *La coalition* which have come from your august mouth; I was tempted to greet them as an old acquaintance." Billault interrupted: "*La coalition* is an independent work. I beg you, Monsieur Ambassador, to take my declaration seriously. Besides you cannot ignore the fact that it was disavowed *this morning* in the *Constitutionnel.*" "Ah!" retorted Kisselev, "it is not in the *Constitutionnel,* it is in the *Moniteur* that I wish to see a disavowal of this anonymous work." "Be calm, Monsieur," Billault said, "tomorrow *La coalition* will be denied without equivocation in the *Moniteur.*[21]

The next day the minister of the interior in a meeting of the council of ministers gave the emperor a very strong note intended for the *Moniteur* denying any government connection with *La coalition.* The emperor rejected the suggested article, claiming that he had no feeling

[17] *La coalition* (Paris, 1860).
[18] Duchesse de Dino, IV, 344.
[19] Klindworth Reports, Versailles, 28 April 1860, HHSA, PA, Belge.
[20] *Constitutionnel,* 18 April 1860.
[21] Klindworth reports, Versailles, 28 April 1860, HHSA, PA, Belge. The italicized words in the text were those underlined by Klindworth.

on this subject one way or another. "The brochure is what it is, its origins do not matter. I feel we ought to leave it alone to make its own way. Has the author said anything dangerous? No one claims that, so leave him alone. *After all, it is not bad to permit the circulation of his ideas to France and Europe.... We will see the effect of it.* If there has been speculation on the stock market as result of this pamphlet, then stop it. That is what the *Moniteur* ought to say, nothing more, nothing less." Immediately the emperor dictated several sentences and handed the note to Billault. It was sent to the *Moniteur* to be published without delay.[22] The next day an announcement in the official government paper asserted that the pamphlet had been written by speculators to upset the stock market. While criminal action could not be taken against the printer, a judicial inquiry would be started to see who signed the brochure that caused "such public anxiety." [23]

Although the emperor disclaimed interest in the brochure to his ministers, he did not hesitate to condemn it strongly to foreign diplomats. In a conversation with Cowley he not only criticized the pamphlet, but "expressed regret that under the law the printer could not be prosecuted." [24] Thouvenel, the foreign minister, also forcefully rejected the rumors, using the same language as the emperor in a talk with the Belgian ambassador.[25]

The two denials in the government newspapers caused O'Meagher of the London *Times* to believe that in this particular case the denials might be true.[26] But there were those in Paris who remained skeptical. These people claimed that if the pamphlet had not been directly inspired by the emperor, it must have had help from other powerful persons. Dentu (the publishing house of *La coalition* would not have dared to print the brochure without a guarantee that it would be neither prosecuted nor seized.[27]

The readers of Paris barely had time to finish reading this brochure when a new pamphlet appeared, entitled *Les frontières du Rhin* by Louis Jourdain. Jourdain was a writer on the *Siècle,* a paper supposedly in opposition to the Empire. The date of this pamphlet's appearance (early May) and its similarity to *La coalition* seemed to imply approbation of the administration.

The author stated that new principles of nationality and popular sover-

[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Moniteur universel,* 19 April 1860.
[24] Cowley to Russell, 19 April 1860, PRO, FO, France 27/1337, no. 487.
[25] F. Rogier to de Vrière, Paris, 21 April 1860, Archives des affaires étrangères belges, MSS, Brussels, France (hereafter cited as AMAEB), Vol. 19 (2), 172.
[26] London *Times,* 21 April 1860.
[27] Duchesse de Dino, IV, 344-345.

eignty were established in Europe. Italy had started to unite, and Germany, too, would seek the same goal. A struggle would ensue between Prussia and Austria for mastery in the confederation. Austria would lose because she still represented old principles. Hungary and Poland would strive for independence, and the inevitable reorganization of European society would have for its bases the rights of people and the destruction of the influence of the clergy. Peace in Europe was impossible unless the treaties of 1815 were revised. Changes were in the air and "if the kings remain intransigent to revolution, they will perish by it." France would turn to the rectification of her frontiers, because she must satisfy her desire for her natural boundaries. One of these was the Rhineland. The treaties of 1815 had left Germany divided and weak. A rewriting of the treaties would give Germany unity, cohesion, and power. She then would without apprehension see France annex the Rhine provinces. France must undertake this task and attempt to rally public opinion. "We believe public opinion always carries the last victory." [28] The treaty of 1815 should be revised to permit German unification and the annexation of the Rhine frontier by France.[29]

The pamphlet circulated for a few days and sold well; then it was seized. The reason for its confiscation, declared the *Siècle,* was that the government feared that the personal viewpoint of Jourdain would be misconstrued by both France and Europe to be the ideas of the administration.[30]

However, there was no question that these pamphlets reflected many of the emperor's ideas. In a conversation with Metternich, Napoleon spoke of the necessity of satisfying the legitimate aspirations of France by restoring her natural frontiers so that she could disarm. "Ever since he has been upon the throne he has had the idea of a pacific revision of the map of Europe, and we must now be prepared for hints given to Prussia that she may extend her territories in the north, provided that France obtains compensation along the Rhine. . . ." [31] Pepoli, an Italian diplomat, said that the emperor regarded Prussia as the future leader of Germany, who, in fulfilling her great destiny, would have French sympathy.[32]

In the spring of 1860 the emperor commissioned Edmund About to write another pamphlet. On 30 April the men collaborated in the compo-

[28] This phrase was used in other official brochures and the emperor's official speech at the exposition of 1855, Case, *French Opinion,* p. 41.

[29] L. Jourdain, *Les frontières du Rhin* (Paris, 1860).

[30] London *Times,* 17 May 1860.

[31] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 2 May 1860, Wellesley and Sencourt, *Conversations,* p. 182.

[32] Villefranche, II, 139.

sition of *La nouvelle carte d'Europe*.[33] This was a gay and amusing brochure, whose ideas were similar to other pamphlets which asked for a change in the boundaries of Europe. The brochure's format consisted of a group of travellers of differing nationalities gathered in a hotel. They were a French captain, a pretty English woman, an old Roman monk, a Piedmontese army officer, a Turk who was married to 750 women, an enormous Russian of good sense and appearance, a Prussian, an American, and two young men who could have been taken for brothers, although one was from Vienna and the other from Naples. The Piedmontese suggested that because of their differing nationalities they ought to form a congress. "Here is France, England, Russia, Turkey and even America . . . Let us deliberate!" They pretended they were plenipotentiaries of their respective nations, gathered together to revise the frontiers of Europe. The French captain became the president of the group. Following a spirited argument the conversationalists agreed that the Turkish empire should be dismembered for the welfare of Europe. England was to occupy Egypt; in return she would permit the building of the Suez canal. She would no longer need the islands of Corfu, Malta, or Gibraltar. Greece should be enlarged by the addition of European Turkey and its new capital would be Constantinople. Then Russia would acquire the semibarbarous provinces in Asia Minor to which she would bring the fruits of civilization and not threaten the European balance of power. In return for her new provinces she would sacrifice Poland, which would be established as a free and independent state. It would include the province of Bessarabia so that Poland would have ports on the Black Sea.[34] To aid the development of this country, Prussia would give up Posen. Poland's boundaries would then stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Prussia's compensation would be the establishment of an enlarged Germany with the people's assent under her leadership. The final re-arrangement of Germany would probably consist of Prussia, Hanover, and perhaps Saxony. Clustered about Austria would be the small states of Württemberg and Bavaria. Then the Prussian declared that France should take the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine. Indeed, said the English lady, Belgium is also partly French. Yes, answered the Frenchman, "but I promised not to be aggressive." The assemblage begged the Frenchman to take his territory, but he remained firm. Peace has been firmly established, so "the reduction in armaments can contribute to the

[33] Thiébaut, pp. 56-57.

[34] Bessarabia is Roumanian rather than Polish. About was not disturbed by this inconsistency.

building and creation of new enterprises throughout Europe. France can devote her time to internal affairs; such as economic development, improvement of education and eventually completion of her liberation of the press." [35]

La nouvelle carte bore a definite resemblance to earlier works.[36] The one difference was the rejection by France of the left bank of the Rhine. The emperor did not relinquish his desire for territorial compensation in return for an enlarged Prussia, but he may have felt it wise to play down this issue. He was supposed to meet the prince-regent of Prussia, and he may have hoped to quiet apprehension stirred up by *La coalition* and the Jourdain pamphlet. Despite the lack of press comment in France and Europe, About's clever style made this pamphlet popular. In several weeks twelve-thousand copies had been sold.[37]

The flow of pamphlets, supplemented by newspaper articles, had accomplished part of the imperial purposes. While the suggested annexation of the Rhineland did not create controversy, it did become the topic of conversation in the salons.[38] It seemed to one American observer that "All parties and classes in France were united by the wish to regain France's natural frontiers." [39] But another American thought France desired peace even more than the Rhineland.[40]

The propaganda campaign made Palmerston suspicious of the emperor's intentions. When Clarendon confronted him with the pamphlets, Napoleon III calmly denied his role in their publication, saying that he could not prevent their appearance. However, having once used the pamphlet as a political tool, he would always be suspected of employing that method, particularly when they coincided with some of his expressed intentions.[41] The brochures, especially Jourdain's *La frontière du Rhin,* accentuated fear of France in Germany.[42]

The most important of the government epistles on this subject was not designed primarily for the French reader. On the eve of the meeting of the German princes and the emperor at Baden-Baden, Napoleon III asked About to write another pamphlet. He was meeting the Prussian

[35] E. About, *La nouvelle carte d'Europe* (Paris, 1860). In his introduction About disclaimed all imperial inspiration.

[36] Cf. Césena, *L'Angleterre et la Russie;* anonymous, *L'Europe en 1860.*

[37] Thiébaut, pp. 87-91.

[38] N. W. Senior, *Conversations with distinguished persons during the Second Empire 1860-1863* (London, 1870), II, 94, 241, 256, 288, 295, 312, 323, 334.

[39] Daniel to Cass, Turin, 3 April 1860, State Depart. Corr., VII, 142.

[40] Faulkner to Cass, Paris, 12 June 1860, State Depart. Corr., XLVII, 26.

[41] E. Ashley, *Life and correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston* (Lond. 1879), II, 389-390; Martin, V, 150-151.

[42] Reiset, III, 140.

prince-regent to silence European suspicions of France and her desire for natural frontiers. "About was the member of the orchestra assigned to reassure Europe on the point." The result was *La Prusse en 1860,* written in collaboration with Fould and the emperor, which sold ten thousand copies.[43] Thousands of copies were sent into Germany.[44] When the pamphlet was prepared for the printer, Billault, minister of the interior, gave orders that it was to be seized at the bookstalls. About, learning of this order, hurried to inform the minister of the identity of his co-authors.[45]

La Prusse en 1860 declared that Germany, like Italy, had a legitimate aspiration toward unity and progress. Certainly a people with the same language, culture, and laws should enjoy nationhood. The claim of German princes that France would not permit German unity was wrong. France would see without fear an Italy of twenty-six million on her south and a Germany of thirty-two million on her eastern frontier. Two great states vied for the privilege of leading the German national movement: Austria and Prussia. Austria represented divine right; therefore this nation, consisting of many peoples held together by force, could not inspire the German people. Prussia personified nationality, religious liberalism, commercial progress, and constitutional liberalism. She had founded the Zollverein, the customs union of the confederation. German unity under the leadership of Prussia would be accomplished without bloodshed if the German princes would join the movement of their peoples and help to create this inevitable reform. It would have the blessing of international diplomacy. Austrian leadership of such a movement would menace the balance of power in Europe and create international anxiety. At the present time there was more freedom in some of the smaller states than there was in Prussia. If the prince-regent has the noble ambition to reign legitimately over all Germany, let him declare amnesty for the political exiles of 1849. German journalists had spoken ill of French intentions since the establishment of the Second Empire. The annexation of Nice and Savoy had made the Germans even more vitriolic against our policy. They claimed France desired to annex the Rhineland, which was not true. The French people had no desire to incorporate lands that contain other nationalities. The German people should be animated by

[43] Thiébaut, pp. 87-88; Dallas to Cass, London, 19 June 1860, Dallas pp. 214-215; London *Times,* 18 June 1860. Klindworth claimed that Fould, the minister of state, not only commissioned the brochure, but also suggested the ideas. He gave About the documents to use. About was paid four thousand francs for his work. Klindworth reports, Versailles, 18 June 1860, HHSA, PA, Belge.

[44] London *Times,* 20 June 1860.

[45] Thiébaut, pp. 89-91.

the same spirit, and desist from demanding the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. About concluded his pamphlet by criticizing Prussia for its secret police and oppressive bureaucracy. Both of these institutions were in need of reform if Prussia was to lead the German nation to the fulfillment of her destiny.[46]

At the meeting with the German princes at Baden-Baden in June 1860, Napoleon III stated his peaceful intentions and hoped to quiet German agitation caused by the French annexation of Nice and Savoy. He complained of the bellicose tone of the German press toward France. The king of Württemberg retorted that it was a very natural occurrence because the "French press either in brochures or newspapers daily proclaim that the left bank of the Rhine is the natural frontier of France." The emperor answered, "The press is a power today against which I can do nothing." "But Germany feels that the only will in France is that of Napoleon III," replied the king. Napoleon reiterated his wish for peace.[47] In his conversation with the prince-regent of Prussia, Napoleon III mentioned the About pamphlet *La Prusse en 1860,* which had just appeared, claiming that he disagreed with its views and regretted its publication. He also complained of an article printed in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* which asserted that the French emperor's motives in coming to Baden-Baden were those of "falsehood and treachery." The prince-regent replied that he had seen neither the pamphlet nor the article. He continued, "The effective way you can neutralize both [writings] is to publish a disclaimer of any aggressive intent." [48] The prince-regent disavowed any interest in a German unity which would give compensation to France. He did not *say* to Napoleon III that he would "surrender no spot of German land," but let him only surmise this.[49] Napoleon III's press campaign was not succesful at the conference. The meeting, however, helped to stem some of the German animosity towards France.[50]

The diplomatic corps reacted instantly to the official pamphlet, although it created small stir within France. The Austrian ambassador characterized the About work as being "as absurd as it is infamous." [51]

[46] E. About, *La Prusse en 1860* (Paris, 1860). The original title, *Napoléon III et la Prusse,* was changed upon publication.

[47] A note of the Duke of Nassau on the conversation of the emperor with the prince of Prussia and other German sovereigns at Baden-Baden, Napoleon III and the king of Württemberg, 19 June 1860, *Quellen,* I, 279-289.

[48] Report of the prince-regent, Baden-Baden, 15 June 1860, APP, II, 493-494; cf. Martin, V, 110-112.

[49] William to Bismarck, Berlin, 30 January 1863, *Corr. William and Bismarck,* I, 8.

[50] Schleinitz to Bismarck, Baden-Baden, 25 June 1860, *ibid.,* II, 79-82; Nigra to D'Azeglio, Paris, 18 June 1860, *Cavour e Inghilterra,* II, 82.

[51] Salomon, *Ambassade de Metternich,* p. 58.

The English government instructed Cowley to discover the origin of the pamphlet. He questioned Thouvenel and received the same denial which had been inserted in the semi-official *Constitutionnel.*[52] Grandguillot denied that *La Prusse en 1860* had any official inspiration. It was ridiculous to suppose that the emperor would lend his pen to such a writing on the eve of a political meeting, which he was attending, as a portent of his peaceful intentions. The publication had no importance other than the personal reputation of its author. It must be constantly reiterated that the government was not responsible for all the pamphlets that were published in France.[53] Despite the official denial, Cowley wrote, "I have reason to think that the contents of M. About's pamphlet were known to the emperor before it was given to the world.[54]

The English newspapers noted that About was an official writer, and therefore the brochure was more important than the government admitted. The implications of the pamphlet caused great uneasiness and an upsurge of distrust of France in England.[55]

The pamphlet produced a number of angry rebuttals in Germany. Fischel declared that About's plan would necessitate the payment of German territory "à la Sardinia." By becoming a friend of France, Prussia would become Germany's enemy, to enslave rather than protect her.[56] Another declared, Austrian power must be preserved to protect Germany against France and Russia. There could be no understanding between France and Prussia, if the price was the surrender of German land to France. German liberals should try to preserve their principles, but, if necessary, they should be laid aside temporarily to assist Prussian domination in Germany.[57]

These pamphlets from *L'Allemagne avant le congrès* to *La Prusse en 1860* were trial balloons. *La nouvelle carte d'Europe* reflected Napoleonic ideas on the congress system. The brochures were published in an attempt to elicit French opinion about German nationalism, and as feelers to test Prussian reaction to the unification of Germany with compensation to France. Their general importance was diminished because too many pamphlets had been published and none received sustained press support.

[52] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 22 June 1860, PRO, FO, France, 27/1340, no. 781.
[53] *Constitutionnel,* 20 June 1860.
[54] Cowley to Russell, Paris, 22 June 1860, PRO, FO, France, 27/1340, no. 781.
[55] London *Times,* 18 June 1860; *Economist* 23 June 1860.
[56] E. Fischel, *Gallischer Judaskuss Antwort auf Edmund About's Schrift Preussen im Jahre 1860* (Berlin, 1860), summarized in Rosenberg, I, 273.
[57] *Napoleon III und Preussen Antwort eines deutschen Flüchtlings auf Preussen in 1860 von Edmund About* (England, September 1860), summarized in Rosenberg, I, 273.

Therefore, the results evidenced by press reaction and the conference of Baden-Baden were not successful.

In October 1861 William I of Prussia visited the emperor at Compiègne. The meeting gave rise to speculation, but it had little political significance. It was a courtesy visit in return for the meeting at Baden-Baden.[58] On the eve of the visit, however, two anonymous pamphlets appeared. One entitled *Le roi Guillaume et l'Empereur Napoléon III* was immediately repudiated by the official *Moniteur*.[59] The other, *Le Rhin et la Vistule,* created a momentary sensation because it was thought to have higher inspiration.[60] It was written by Ladislas Czartoryski, a Polish prince.[61] The pamphlet may have had aid from the Palais Royal, because Prince Napoleon was very sympathetic to the Polish émigrés. Its appearance, coinciding with the visit of King William, suggested the purpose of reassuring the Prussian monarch. Certainly these circumstances justified the suspicions of its higher inspiration.[62]

The author of *Le Rhin et la Vistule* felt that Germany was anxious and suspicious of France's intentions. France did not wish to acquire the Rhineland. It was German, and the consequences of annexing that territory could be dangerous – for the French were a homogeneous people. If Germans were added, they would remain German and continue to cherish their bonds with their countrymen across the Rhine. A quasi-independent minority, angrily seeking union with Germany, would be created. But France's frontiers must not remain as they were drawn in 1815. The French should acquire fortified cities, like Landau and Saarlouis. This rectification, entered in freely by both sides, would satisfy the French needs of national defense and yet not irritate the national pride of Germany. The real threat to Germany is not France but Russia. The creation of an independent Poland would provide a buffer state on the Vistula, and an alliance with France would bring the German states security against a Russian attack.[63]

[58] Martin, V, 329; H. Abeken to Rudolf Abeken, Berlin, 24 October 1861, *Bismarck's pen,* p. 188.

[59] *Moniteur universel,* 13 October 1861. This brochure contained a letter from Napoleon III to William I which the *Moniteur* declared had never been written. William's comment was that he had never received it. Reuss to William I, Paris, 15 October 1861, APP, II, 2, 478-480.

[60] H. Oncken, *Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870-1871* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1926), I, 15-16; London *Times,* 4, 7, 8 October 1861; Martin, V, 329; Brandenburg to Schleinitz, London, 8 October 1861, APP, II, a, 470-471.

[61] Barbier, *Dictionnaire,* IV, 363; Larousse, V, 739.

[62] London *Times,* 8 October 1861.

[63] *Le Rhin et la Vistule* (Paris, 1861).

Comment appeared in a few papers in France and England, but after a few days the attention subsided without support from the official French press. The emperor denied any connection with *Le Rhin et la Vistule*.[64]

There has not been any conclusive evidence to link *Le Rhin et la Vistule* to the administration. However, its date of publication, and its sentiments similar to those of the emperor, indicate that it could have had either the emperor's or Prince Napoleon's support. *Le roi Guillaume et l'Empereur Napoléon III* was not inspired; it received a denial in the official *Moniteur*. Too many pamphlets on diplomatic topics had acquired more importance than they intrinsically deserved, thus weakening the effects of government-sponsored works. In a conversation with the Prussian ambassador, Reuss, Napoleon III said, "These anonymous brochures are a true plague because the public almost always thinks that they are the expression of the ideas of the government." "It is with a certain justice," added the emperor, "that . . . the imperial government which has several times used the anonymous brochure to spread its ideas is punished today by the appearance of all the anonymous pamphlets that have been since attributed to the government." Reuss was amazed by this confession, and he agreed wholeheartedly that the system of pamphlets had "grave drawbacks and its effects had almost always turned against its own government." [65]

The journalists of the Second Empire wrote of the boundaries of 1815 and of Italian and German nationalism, but a continuing and a favorite theme was the reestablishment of an independent Poland. That ideal was to be reactivated by a series of political crises in that unhappy country.

The Poles were indefatigable fighters, and their story from the partition of Poland between 1772 and 1795 to the first world war was one of struggle to regain that independence. In 1815 independence was denied the Poles, but the treaties granted them a separate constitution and a limited autonomy under the Russian tsar as their king. Many European peoples between 1815 and 1870 were caught in the new waves of nationalistic fervor and a search for freedom. The Poles were no exception. In 1830 and 1848 the Poles rose against their masters in all three states. These attempts were abortive and led to repressive measures. They brought hundreds of Poles to Paris, where they found a most hospitable and friendly atmosphere. France was always sympathetic to the cause of Polish independence, because of her traditional policy to create a friendly

[64] Brandenburg to Schleinitz, London, 8 October 1861, APP, II, 2, 470-471; London *Times*, 8 October 1861.

[65] Reuss to William I, Paris, 15 October 1861, APP, II, 2, 478-480.

buffer state against Russia. In addition, both peoples were Roman Catholic. The idea of an independent Poland was frequently mentioned by Napoleon III, and the theme was often repeated in the government-inspired pamphlets.[66] The result of the unsuccessful revolt in Russian Poland led to an abrogation of her separate constitution. In Prussia and Austria a policy of ruthless Germanization was imposed upon the Poles. This was resented by the Poles in Posen, who protested vigorously in the Prussian parliament.[67] In 1861 the Poles in Russia organized peaceful demonstrations to protest against Russian oppression. The police answered by firing upon unarmed crowds, and the ensuing mass arrests caused great bitterness. A series of articles appeared in the French press which attacked Russian tyranny, and indicted Prussian policy in Posen. The official press said little, particularly in reference to Russia.[68] After 1861 it became more and more apparent that the government was no longer leading, inculcating, or directing public opinion. The Polish question was a particularly noteworthy case, in that government "inspiration" would be directed at pacifying and quieting French attitudes rather than creating new opinions. But the diplomats were not sure. Their suspicions in some instances could have been justified, since as in the Roman question there were passionately differing feelings in the government which frequently were expressed in the semi-official journals or even the opposition ones.

The Polish refugees in Paris were busy. Financially aiding the struggle of their compatriots, they published many brochures pleading their cause. They were aided by Prince Napoleon, an ardent apostle of Polish independence. A series of pamphlets published in January 1861 disturbed the Prussians because of their anti-German animus.[69] They were not only pro-Polish, but were considered "Napoleonic" in style, giving rise to rumors that they were inspired by either the emperor or Prince Napoleon.[70] Loftus, the British ambassador in Berlin, felt that the crisis was being publicized in France "to bring before the notice of Europe the Polish question and to set forth the grievances under which the Polish nation is now suffering. Thus it is hoped the sympathy of Europe would

[66] Malmesbury, II, 330; Cowley to Clarendon, 6 October 1854, Wellesley and Sencourt, *Conversations,* pp. 63-64; Granville to Clarendon, 7 October 1855, Fitzmaurice, *Clarendon,* pp. 120-122.

[67] Belcastel to Thouvenel, Berlin, 28 October 1861, APP, II, 2, 482-483.

[68] Schleinitz to Reuss, Berlin, 6 April 1861, APP, II, 2, 270-278.

[69] *Ibid.,* n. 9 (Reuss to Schleinitz, Paris, 12 April 1861).

[70] Schleinitz to Theremin, Berlin, 25 March 1861, APP, II, 2, 256-260, n. 7 (Karolyi, Paris, 22 March 1861 HHSA); Schleinitz to Reuss, Berlin, 6 April 1861, APP, II, 2, 270-278, n. 9 (Reuss to Schleinitz, Paris, 12 April 1861).

be aroused, and by producing a 'cry of anguish' obtain material aid to support their cause." [71]

One such pamphlet on Poland was entitled *La Prusse et les traités de Vienne*. As usual it was published anonymously, but its true author was Henri Lasserre.[72] Lasserre was a Bonapartist journalist who worked with Granier de Cassagnac on the newspapers *Pays* and *Réveil*. His twin enthusiasms were the defense of papal temporal power and Polish nationalism.[73] The pamphlet claimed that the political exigencies of the time kept Poland divided between Austria, Prussia, and Russia; but Europe attached certain conditions and rights for a partitioned Poland. The treaties "did not aspire, in any way, to annihilate, by a violent and impossible fusion with three different peoples, a nationality of twenty million people." The part of Poland to be assigned to Prussia was to be a distinct province ruled by the Prussian king; the Poles would have not only the right of representation but also the continuation of those institutions which would assure the preservation of Polish nationality, and finally the Polish rights would be placed under the safeguard and guarantee of Europe. In administering Posen the Prussian government had violated these treaty stipulations. It had established a Prussian bureaucracy and imposed its laws, language, and administration on the province. It was settling Germans upon the land, had shown animosity to the Roman Catholic religion, and had caused the German language to be taught in the schools. The Polish question should be submitted to Europe, for the only way to stop the threat of revolution was to provide justice.[74]

La Pologne et son droit by Joseph Vilbort [75] appeared simultaneously with the Lasserre brochure with the same arguments as its predecessor, but it was even stronger in tone. In his opening paragraph, Vilbort declared that "the restoration of a national Poland will be imposed upon Europe, not only as an act of justice and reparation, but as an inevitable necessity." He condemned Russia, Austria, and Prussia for their policy of assimilation, and declared that eradication of Polish nationality was impossible.[76]

[71] Schleinitz to Theremin, Berlin, 25 March 1861, APP, II, 2, 256-260, n. 7 (Loftus to Russell, Berlin, 23 March 1861, PRO, London).

[72] Barbier, III, 1098.

[73] Vapéreau, *Dictionnaire* (5th ed., Paris, 1893), pp. 928-929.

[74] *La Prusse et les traités de Vienne,* (Paris, 1861).

[75] Joseph Vilbort was a Belgian journalist who later became a naturalized French citizen. He came to Paris in 1855 and wrote poetry and plays. He was a journalist on the following newspapers: *Courrier de Paris, Presse, Opinion nationale,* and *Siècle.* Vapereau, pp. 1565-1566.

[76] J. Vilbort, *La Pologne et son droit* (Paris, 1861).

The Prussians felt uneasy about the pro-Polish propaganda. They believed that both these brochures distorted the history of the treaties of 1815. They also suspected that Prince Napoleon had inspired these works and were fearful of his influence on the emperor. The Prussian ambassador was instructed to commission Dr. Bambery, a Prussian consul, to publish an anonymous refutation. On 15 June a work entitled *Situation politique et sociale du grande-duché de Posen* appeared. It was also published in Brussels, Berlin, and Vienna. Schleinitz, the Prussian foreign minister, warmly congratulated the author and instructed the legation at Paris to assume the costs of the publication.[77]

Bambery declared that many pamphlets on the political administration of Posen were biased and inaccurate, especially one entitled *La Prusse et les traités de Vienne*. The treaties of 1815 did stipulate that the Poles should have political representation and should retain their national institutions, but that was *not* a guarantee of the political autonomy which the Poles claimed. At first the three powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, scrupulously fulfilled their obligations, but the Poles rebelled and gradually lost their liberties. Charges of Prussian tyranny were false. Thousands of documents proved that Prussian laws had helped the peasants who were exploited by the Polish nobility. The people had achieved a high degree of prosperity. Posen was never all Polish. There were many original German inhabitants who constituted a sizable percentage of the total population. Hence the German language had to be used in the province. The whole issue of Poland was confused by misunderstanding the words *nationality* and *state*. "It is not nationalities which march toward great destinies. It is the states which lead them there." [78]

The Polish situation grew worse. In 1862, Russia issued a decree which conscripted Polish men for military duty. Its aim was to remove the young men from the influence of nationalistic opinion and send them to Russia on military duty. But the Poles chose rebellion instead, and the young men conscripted themselves into guerilla duty. A great insurrection erupted. Both sides committed terrible outrages and brutalities. Western Europe was shocked!

In February 1863, French opinion was further shaken when Bismarck negotiated the Albensleben convention with Russia, providing for the cooperation of Russian and Prussian military authorities in the frontier districts against the Polish rebels. On 21 February, Drouyn de Lhuys

[77] Schleinitz to Theremin, Berlin, 25 March 1861, AAP, II, 2, 256-261; Reuss to Schleinitz, Paris, 12 April 1861, *ibid.*, 270-278, n. 9.

[78] *Situation politique et sociale du grand-duché de Posen* (Paris, Brussels, Vienna, Berlin, 1861).

proposed to Great Britain and Austria that the three powers issue a joint note of protest to both Berlin and Russia. The first note of protest was delivered on 17 April to Gorchkov. He was very conciliatory and said he would not object to discussing the Polish question at a general European congress provided other problems were on the agenda. But his answer did not satisfy French opinion, so Drouyn de Lhuys, driven by this pressure, joined with Great Britain and Austria and sent another note on 17 June 1863, demanding an armistice in Poland and the establishment of an autonomous state. This note was peremptorily brushed aside by Gorchakov. In August a British and French note was issued condemning Russian policy. On 4 November, Napoleon III called for a European congress to discuss European problems, and if necessary, to revise the map of Europe. The plan was rejected by all the great powers.

The *procureurs-générals'* reports indicated that opinion was unanimously sympathetic to Poland in France. No matter how divergent political opinions were, they had a common meeting place in their feelings for Poland. Case says that "French opinion was universally and unanimously sympathetic to the Polish insurrectionists all during 1863." Between April 1863 and January 1864, twenty-seven of twenty-eight districts showed sympathy for the Poles. The desire for peace, however, was even stronger.[79] The French people wanted their government to give active support to the Polish rebels without resorting to armed force.

To further inflame these feelings the nation's press was filled with polemics. In the beginning the newspapers were very moderate in tone, with the exception of the *Siècle* and *Opinion nationale.* The imperialist papers refrained from comment, and *France* called on the Poles to make peace, hoping that the Russians would make concessions. The Catholic press was divided. The *Union* felt an aversion to the Polish rebellion, while the *Gazette de France* felt the Poles were justified, and the *Monde* sided with the republican press in demanding government intervention to assist the Poles.[80]

By mid-June, as the rebellion continued, and the first note was rejected by the Russians, the tone of the press became much bolder. The *Monde, Patrie, Opinion nationale,* and *Siècle* demanded French intervention to enforce French demands. The *Union* was disturbed that diplomatic pressure by the western powers had failed to achieve peace in Poland. The *Gazette de France* remained optimistic as to the value of diplomatic pres-

[79] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 179-180.

[80] M. Fridieff, "L'opinion publique française et l'insurrection polonaise de 1863," *Le monde slave,* II (1938), 363-365.

sure, but rejected "peace at any price." The *Journal des débats* and the *Temps* joined in condemning the Russian note. In April, "a great person" had begun to send notes to the semi-official press (*Constitutionnel and Pays*), suggesting that they quiet their tone and introduce a more moderate attitude toward Russia.[81] By August the government papers faithfully followed the suggested line. They declared that the question was not Polish or French but European; and therefore, only diplomatic negotiation could solve the crisis. The rest of the papers including the imperialist *Patrie* remained bellicose. The *Temps* felt that the failure of diplomacy would only make war inevitable.[82] The pamphleteers helped to swell the chorus of protest against Russia. As with the press, the right and the left joined forces in a common cause. Montalembert, the liberal Catholic, produced a small storm with his *L'insurrection polonaise.*[83] He believed that only a menacing gesture by France was needed to force Russia to grant reforms in Poland. The anonymous *La Pologne et l'intervention Européenne* wholeheartedly concurred, as did B. Marius's *Le tocsin de la Pologne.* Ladislas Mackiewicz's *Lettre au comte de Montalembert* protested vehemently against the union of Russia and Poland under the tsars. Cayla's *Le pape et la Pologne* beseeched the pope to lead a crusade for Poland. Edgar Quinet, apostle of French democracy, took up his pen for Polish freedom. *La Pologne et les traités de Vienne* by Paul Thureau asked for the re-establishment of an independent Poland. La Rochejaquelein in *La France avant la Pologne* opposed not only war, but even moral intervention on behalf of Poland. France, he insisted, needed Russian friendship; the insurrection lacked national character and consisted of small armed bands on the frontiers.[84] Emile de Girardin was sympathetic to Polish nationalism. But he declared that "the judgment of the public has reached maturity, and it will not allow itself to be easily led astray by the warlike strains of journalists who are doing their best to raise up one half of Europe against the other." "Public opinion is opposed to war." [85] The Polish insurrection had an enormous coverage in both the newspapers and in the pamphlet literature. The plight of Poland stirred French imagination deeply. The government had little need of the imperial pamphlet to educate the people. By July, however, after the failure of French diplomacy a moderate tone was needed.

[81] Senior, *Conversations,* I, 256.
[82] Fridieff, "L'opinion publique," *Monde slave,* III, 58.
[83] Lecanuet, III, 341-346.
[84] Fridieff, "L'opinion publique," *Monde slave,* III, 58; K. Kaiser, *Napoleon III und der polnische Aufstand von 1863* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 55-56.
[85] London *Times,* 25 July 1863.

Two pamphlets appeared in this period of aftermath. One similar in format and style to former works edited in the Tuileries caused a momentary excitement. It had no real importance.[86] Entitled *L'Empereur Napoléon III et la Pologne,* it was attributed to Charles Marchal.[87] The brochure was very bellicose in tone. Marchal demanded that the czar should guarantee freedom of religion and establish a regular and legal system of conscription in Poland. In addition, Polish should be the official language of the province. If these demands were refused, then "we must pass from words to deeds, and the work of diplomacy having collapsed, war will appear in its inexorable necessity." [88]

The other anonymous brochure, *L'Empereur, La Pologne, et l'Europe* was inspired by the government and caused great interest abroad.[89] Paris once more was filled with rumors concerning the anonymous writer. Many thought that the brochure was composed by Mocquard, the emperor's personal secretary. Others felt that La Guéronnière wrote it because of its similarity to earlier semi-official pamphlets. Some reported that Granier de Cassagnac was the author.[90] The Paris correspondent of the *Morning Herald* heard that this pamphlet had been written early in the year, but its publication had been deferred. He claimed that it had undergone revision and was carefully edited "by the masterly hand" in Vichy.[91]

The author, Granier de Cassagnac,[92] in his brochure, *L'Empereur, La Pologne, et l'Europe,* declared that all the civilized peoples of the world were moved by the plight of the Polish people. However, in affairs of state reason took precedence over emotion. Napoleon III had abstained from rash policy, but that did not mean he would ignore Poland. In the past Poland had been divided between three great powers; and every insurrection had created a coalition against Poland and the power which attempted to defend her. To overcome such a coalition, it would be necessary to call upon revolution as an ally. The emperor could not do this, for he personified the cause of order. He had successfully attempted to prevent the renewal of the Holy Alliance. A policy of moderation must

[86] F. Vitzthum, *St. Petersburg and London in 1852-1864, reminiscences,* translated by E. F. Taylor (London, 1887), II, 212.

[87] Barbier, *Dictionnaire,* II, 99. Marchal was a French journalist who had worked on many papers including the *Revue des deux mondes,* (Vapéreau, p. 86).

[88] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et la Pologne,* (Paris, 1863).

[89] Fridieff, "L'opinion publique," *Monde slave,* III, 80-81.

[90] *Manchester Guardian,* 1 August 1863; *Daily News,* 1 August 1863; *Morning Herald,* 3 August 1863; Bernstorff to Bismarck, London, 1 August 1863, APP, III, 687. Bernstorff was repeating speculation in London.

[91] *Morning Herald,* 3 August 1863. The emperor was vacationing in Vichy at the time the brochure appeared.

[92] Barbier, *Dictionnaire,* II, 99.

be maintained to continue these twin goals. The press, which had been so enthusiastic in its support for the insurrection, did not represent the French people's wishes. Public opinion remained moderate. The Polish question was not just a national problem but a European one and could not be settled by unilateral action. Open recognition of Poland could lead to war. Before she assumed any course of action, France would resort to diplomatic negotiations. Terrible acts of barbarism, pillage, and executions had been perpetrated, which had led England and France to send notes to St. Petersburg, but they had been ignored. However, Prussia had not joined with the other western powers to protest the inhumane actions of the regime at Vilna and Warsaw. If there was no change in the situation, local military action could help. An Anglo-French-Swedish fleet could control the Baltic Sea, and in the south the Anglo-French-Italian fleet would control the Black Sea. Polish frontiers on the west could be guarded by Austria and Prussia. Prussia must choose sides, for in her hands alone now rested the hopes of peace in Europe. Great Britain and France both desired amelioration for the Poles and the establishment of a system for Russian Poland that could guarantee stability.[93]

Unlike the earlier official pamphlets, the brochure was not supported by the French press. There were some comments, but on the whole the response was quiet. Political circles speculated over the identity of its true author, and the stock market was slightly disturbed because the pamphlet was considered to be the work of the government.[94] The *Temps* questioned the semi-official status of the pamphlet, since they claimed that its only purpose was to influence Prussia.[95] The government press did not bother to mention the brochure but continued their moderate and peaceful articles.[96] The *Presse* attacked Cassagnac bitterly.

> Pacific on one page and warlike on the next, this pamphlet is a mere tissue of contradictions. What would make us think it was written by M.Granier de Cassagnac is the fact that it is equally injudicious and superficial. Had its object been to alienate us from England by threatening Prussia, it could not have set about the task in any other manner, or have come to a different conclusion. As was truly remarked yesterday in Paris, it is not a pamphlet but a paving-stone slipped from the hands of a man who has fallen in the attempt to throw it.[97]

[93] *L'Empereur, la Pologne, et l'Europe* (Paris, 1863).
[94] *Union,* 1 August 1863; *Manchester Guardian,* 1 August 1863; *Daily News,* 1 August 1863.
[95] *Temps,* 30 July 1863.
[96] *Constitutionnel,* 28, 31 July 1863; *Pays,* 28, 31 July 1863.
[97] *Union,* 1 August 1863; *Morning Herald,* 3 August 1863.

This position was supported by the conservative *Union*.[98]

The English press noticed the pamphlet and reported both its appearance and the rumors of its official origins. The little comment that it excited was unfavorable. The *Daily News* said, "The pamphlet amounts to very little, and it is only repeating what the government press has been saying." [99] Delane, the editor of the London *Times,* felt that the brochure was published to "draw the fire" of public opinion, and that it would be disavowed when its purpose had been accomplished. He said that England should use every means of diplomacy to bring succor to the Poles, but the "people of England will not be led into any war . . . to help establish an independent Poland or revise the map of Europe." [100]

Although it had limited effect, Cassagnac's pamphlet was important, because it was semi-official. Its ideas were repeated by the Bonapartist press, although they made no special note of its appearance. The difference between this inspired work and those which had appeared earlier was that its predecessors had hoped to test opinion, whereas this one was published primarily in the hope of moderating the bellicose tone of the opposition press. But it failed: it sold well, created speculation, and then was quickly forgotten. Such imitations of government-inspired pamphlets as Marchal's *L'Empereur Napoléon III et la Pologne* helped to weaken the effect of the Cassagnac brochure. The political position enunciated by Cassagnac was too moderate to satisfy those who desired open intervention in Poland and too firm for those who wanted peace at any price. His position was essentially negative; it did not attempt to create a climate of public opinion but to compromise with it.

In November 1863 the French emperor sought a European congress to settle the Polish question. The Prussian king immediately spurned the French proposal, writing that Napoleon III "wishes to do with the pen what his uncle did with the sword." [101] The imperialist press, *Constitutionnel, Pays, France,* and *Patrie* began publishing daily articles lauding the congress idea.[102] One anonymous pamphlet appeared and by its cover and type of print attempted to appear semi-official. Entitled *L'Empereur Napoléon III et le congrès* it declared that only a congress of powers meeting at Paris could solve the problems upsetting the repose of Europe. The concepts of nationality, natural boundaries for each state, and the

[98] *Union,* 1 August 1863.
[99] *Daily News,* 1 August 1863.
[100] London *Times,* 3 August 1863.
[101] Napoleon III to King William, Paris, 4 November 1863, APP, IV, 107-108, n. 1 (Oubril, report, 10 November, Moscow); King William to Napoleon III, Berlin, 18 November 1863; *ibid.,* IV, 162-163.
[102] London *Times,* 2 December 1863.

movement for disarmament must be accepted by all nations. If the great powers could not accept the congress, they must prepare themselves for war – which will become inevitable.[103]

The lack of rumors questioning the authorship of this brochure and the absence of press comment seemed to indicate that it was one of the imitations of the semi-official pamphlets. It had no effect upon diplomacy or public opinion, for it was published after the congress had been rejected by the powers.

Russia settled the Polish question unilaterally at the end of 1863 by crushing the insurgents. France lost ground diplomatically. She had antagonized Russia with her diplomacy but gained nothing because she abstained from force. Prussia, on the other hand, gained Russian confidence by remaining aloof from the general European condemnation of Russia. England was still suspicious of France, and a new crisis arose which further isolated the latter.

The Polish insurrection was still agitating European opinion when a new crisis embarrassed European diplomacy. The question of Schleswig-Holstein was the first open controversy in the struggle between Austria and Prussia for the mastery of Germany. The two provinces had a large German population, although Schleswig was partly Danish. The treaties of 1815 made Holstein an autonomous member of the Germanic confederation under the personal rule of the Danish king. In 1848 the Danes attempted to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark; the Germanic states intervened, and Russia, France, and Great Britain re-imposed the Vienna treaties at London in 1852. In November 1863 Frederick VII died, and his successor, Christian IX, decided to annex Schleswig. This move aroused the great mass of German opinion in both the duchies and the confederation. Bismarck was determined to recognize Christian IX, but at the same time preserve the autonomy of the provinces. To forestall the Diet's action to protect the Duchies, Bismarck formed an alliance with Austria to force Danish compliance with the treaty of London. On 1 February 1864 the allies occupied Schleswig.

French and English public opinion was disturbed. The French emperor recalled from the Polish experience that protest without force was useless, so he did nothing. The Danes were defeated. On 1 August the preliminary peace was signed. The duchies were to be administered jointly by Austria and Prussia. Austria supported the duke of Augustenburg as the head of the duchies while Prussia desired outright annexation. They were unable to arrive at a final settlement. In October they compromised on joint

[103] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et le congrès* (Paris, 1863).

ownership, which caused further disagreement. On 14 August 1865, therefore, the two powers signed the Gastein convention. By its provisions Prussia would administer Schleswig and Austria, Holstein.

French opinion was very hostile to the convention,[104] and Drouyn de Lhuys, the foreign minister, strongly denounced it.[105] Despite the outward animosity toward Prussia, a gradual movement toward rapprochement with her began in the Tuileries.[106]

In September 1865 Guéroult in the *Opinion nationale* published a series of articles which advocated a Franco-Prussian alliance. This was followed by an anonymous pamphlet called *La convention de Gastein.* There were rumors that it was written by Prussian officers.[107] Others speculated that it was inspired by the pro-Italians around Prince Napoleon, supported by liberals like Türr and Kossuth. The only Prussian representatives were those men friendly with this Piedmontese group. This anonymous work was intended to prepare the public for a triple alliance between Italy, France, and Prussia. There were even rumors concerning French annexation of Belgium, and talk of French sympathies in that little country.[108] The real inspiration of the little pamphlet came from Bismarck, who in August 1865 had given documents to a French journalist he had met at Baden.[109] This meant that Bismack did not have time to polish or edit the pamphlet. What had given the pamphlet its importance was the Guéroult articles, for he was known to be very close to Prince Napoleon.[110]

The pamphlet explained that Austria and Prussia defeated the Danes in response to the German plea for help and brought Schleswig back to the German confederation. The preliminary treaty made the provinces the indivisible property of Austria and Prussia. To prevent the friction

[104] Case, *French opinion,* p. 193.

[105] Drouyn de Lhuys, circular, Paris, *Origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870-1871* (Paris, 1912), VI, 453-454.

[106] Goltz to William I, Paris, 29 August 1865, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* I, 65-69. The emperor spoke of Prussia leading the German national movement.

[107] London *Times,* 20 September 1865.

[108] Mülinen to Mensdorff, Paris, 25 September 1865, HHSA, PA, Frankreich, IX, 42.

[109] R. Kendell, *Fürst und Fürstin Bismarck Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1846 bis 1872* (Berlin, Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 221-222. There is always the possibility that the French journalist whose name is not mentioned was one who was friendly with Prince Napoleon. The prince was very pro-Prussian, except in the case of Poland.

[110] Radowitz claimed that Guéroult was an honest journalist. J. M. Radowitz, *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters J. M. Radowitz* (Paris, 1925), I, 76. The American minister said that Guéroult was acquiring more official authority because in the legislative body (he represented the city of Paris), he supported the government and Rouher. C. F. Bigelow to Seward, Paris, 7 September 1866, State Depart. Corr., 61, #366.

of condominion, a convention was signed at Gastein on 14 August 1865. The terms of the agreement provided for the geographic division of the duchies: Austria assumed administration of Holstein and Prussia, Schleswig. Outcries of reprobation greeted the announcement of the convention in Germany and France. The only real fault that could be found in the convention – and it was by no means a minor fault – was that popular sovereignty had not been recognized by the two powers. Perhaps when events were propitious, Bismarck would make an appeal to popular sovereignty. England and France, who both disliked the convention, did not offer the slightest obstacle to the war; therefore, they could offer none to the peace. They remained spectators, and counseled moderation. Certainly Bismarck had been moderate. The annexation did not in any way threaten the balance of power. France and Prussia were natural allies. United with Italy and England, they could control Europe and, with the friendship of the United States, the entire world.[111]

This little pamphlet did not create a major controversy despite Guéroult's support. The press remained anti-Prussian. Was the brochure a sign of growing pro-Prussian feeling in the court? Since Guéroult represented the views of Prince Napoleon's faction, Mülinen's report may very well have had true basis. Although the contents of the pamphlet were basically pro-Prussian, the emphasis on popular sovereignty and the closing paragraph had a Napoleonic sound, very similar to earlier official ideas.

The convention of Gastein was only a temporary expedient. Austria continued to support the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg to rule the duchies. Bismarck realized that a showdown was necessary for the final settlement of the Danish question. In October 1865 he visited the French emperor at Biarritz, where Napoleon III agreed to remain uncommitted in case of an Austro-Prussian conflict. Bismarck desired Prussian domination in Germany, while the emperor wished to acquire Venetia for Italy. Therefore, he encouraged Italy to negotiate a treaty with Prussia of three months duration, in which Italy promised to support Prussia in case of war with Austria. Tension mounted between the two states, and, though many attempts were made to preserve the peace, they failed. On 1 June, Austria placed the question of the duchies on the agenda of the federal diet. Bismarck occupied Holstein, and Austria broke off diplomatic relations on 12 June. Immediately, a motion was carried in the federal diet to mobilize against Prussia. Bismarck then declared the confederation at an end and invaded Saxony; Italy entered the war as Prussia's ally.

[111] *La convention de Gastein* (Paris, 1865).

Napoleon III's major goal was to acquire Venetia for Italy. He had no objection to the strengthening of Prussia and partial unification of Germany. Therefore, he wished Prussian success,[112] because he thought that the Germanic confederation was an anachronism. He envisioned two federations – one to the north of the Main River and one to the south, with adequate compensation to France.[113] French public feeling was hostile to Prussia, but the desire for peace was even stronger.[114] Walewski frankly admitted that the nation's hostility to war was forcing the government to adopt a position of neutrality. The emperor, he said, was very concerned with public opinion.[115]

Thus the appearance in early April 1866 of a pamphlet friendly towards Prussia could have well been a trial balloon. However, without the wholehearted support of the daily press, the brochure made little public impression.

The basic theme of the pamphlet entitled *Napoléon III et la Prusse* was that an alliance between France and Prussia was necessary for the peace of Europe. If Bismarck was to achieve his goals, he must have a solid alliance – powerful in case of war, "invincible in the case of conference or congress." Only one power could give Prussia this kind of support – that nation was France. The right of nationalities had become a new international law, and it was the traditional policy of the Tuileries. To achieve a French alliance and to destroy the old specter of the French desires for the Rhineland, Prussia needed only to give up the Saar. By ceding this territory she would cement French support. The alliance between France and Prussia would be excellent for France and yet would not menace the power balance of Europe. Permanent stability would be acquired between the two countries.[116]

Despite the strong views enunciated towards the new menace of Prussia, the government seemed content to leave the issue discussed by the numerous newspapers and the published debates of the parliament. Pamphlets on this occasion played almost no significant role in the government arsenal of indoctrination.

On 3 July the battle of Sadowa assured Austria's defeat in the war. Bismarck's lenient terms ended the war quickly and created a completely new balance of power. Venetia was given to Italy, and the German con-

[112] J. Reinach, "Napoléon III et la paix," *Revue historique,* CXXXVI, (1921), 177.

[113] J. Dontenville, "La France, la Prusse et l'Allemagne au lendemain de Sadowa," *Nouvelle Revue,* LI (1921), 120-122.

[114] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 209-211.

[115] G. Rothan, *La politique française en 1866* (Paris, 1879), pp. 122-123.

[116] *Napoléon III et la Prusse* (Paris, 1866).

federation was ended. Austria was henceforth excluded from German affairs, and Prussia created the North German Confederation. This was the final agreement of the peace of Prague on 23 August 1866.

The Prussian victory aroused feelings in France, which had already been mounting, as many Frenchmen were beginning to feel uneasy about the creation of a new great state. The swiftness of the Prussian victory showed that she was a great military power. Noting the apprehensive feelings of the French people, the emperor felt the time was propitious to introduce a subject which he had contemplated for many years – the reorganization of the army. As far back as the Italian campaign in 1859, he had seen the weakness of the nation's military structure. On 27 July 1860 he wrote to Persigny: "Though entirely wishing for peace, I desire to organize the strength of the country on the best possible footing, for the last foreign wars have not been brilliant, I have seen their deficient side, and I wish to remedy it." [117]

In the autumn of 1866 the emperor appointed a commission of generals who met at Compiègne with Prince Napoleon. At this meeting it was agreed that the conscription law needed revision. The law of 1832, which remained the basis of recruiting during the Second Empire, had provided that the legislative body establish the size of the draft of men at the age of twenty (usually 100,000) which was to serve in the regular army for seven years. Rejected, of course, were those who were breadwinners or had physical disabilities. Those young men who could afford it were permitted to purchase exemptions from military service. The rest participated in a lottery and those who drew the "good" numbers were henceforth freed from all military service. The well-to-do bourgeois and the peasants had been satisfied with this system. However, the military commission's new recommendations were that, to increase the size of the army, military service should now be universal, with the purchase of exemptions no longer permitted. The lottery system would be retained, but on a new basis. Those young men who drew "good" numbers would be in the reserve, subject to periodic drill. Those who were inducted into the regular army would serve six years and remain three additional years in a new organization called the mobile national guard. This would give France a regular army of 800,000 and 400,000 in the new guard.[118]

[117] Pinard, I, 93-97.

[118] At the Compiègne meeting the military men first proposed universal military service in the regular army – the term of service lasting from seven to nine years. Prince Napoleon agreed but wanted the service to last three years. The ministers present at the conference negated these suggestions by declaring that the legislative chambers would never support such a measure. *Ibid.*, I, 93-97; General Lébrun, *Souvenirs militaires 1866-1870* (Paris, 1895), pp. 1-8.

The proposed changes were published in the *Moniteur* to test immediate public reaction.[119] The procureur reports showed strong opposition.[120] In addition, over one hundred petitions were sent to the legislators protesting the proposed changes, although the prefects had attempted to forbid distribution in public places.[121] Typical was this one from Yonne: "We envisage the proposed law with fright and sadness. We lack manpower on our farms, and now it is proposed to take the most active part of our population from our fields. And why? Does the enemy menace our frontier? If that is so, then a 'levée en masse' [total mobilization] should be proposed." [122]

The opposition immediately joined in protesting the changes. From December 1866 until the passage of the final version of the law, newspapers and pamphlets opposed to change in the law of 1832 circulated widely. Typical was a hastily written brochure by Allain-Targé, a republican, which echoed the views of the petitions. It was a huge success. Its first edition was exhausted by the eighth day after its appearance because the democratic newspapers spontaneously gave it support.[123] Count Daru, who had retired from politics after 1848, published his views calling for a more efficient organization of the army. He demanded that the law of 1832 be retained with some modifications in the length of service. In time of war, however, exempt bachelors between the ages of twenty and twenty-five should be called.[124] Jules Simon in *La politique radicale* declared that soldiers were not necessary to defend a nation, for a nation composed of free citizens was completely invincible.[125] The Legitimists also participated in the criticism. The most noteworthy of their brochures was Prince de Joinville's *Etude sur Sadowa.* He declared that the conscription act of 1832 had demanded all the sacrifices a nation could ask of its people in time of peace. To ask any more would result in the destruction of the race, which "unfortunately shows several symptoms of weakness." That is to say it would be like . . . killing the geese who lay the golden eggs." The proposed system of recruiting could not last, because it would be too impractical.[126] Emile de Girardin in his newspaper

[119] *Moniteur universel,* 12 December 1866.

[120] G. Wright, "Public opinion and conscription in France 1866-1870," *Journal of modern history,* XIV (1942), 30-31; Case, *French opinion,* p. 235.

[121] Wright, "Conscription," *Journal mod. hist.,* XIV, 30-31.

[122] F. Engerand, "Le projet Niel et l'opinion," *Correspondant,* CCL (25 March 1913), 1093-1111.

[123] Allain-Targé to father, Paris, 21, 22 December 1866, Allain-Targé, *La république sous l'Empire, lettres 1864-1870* (second edition, Paris, 1939), pp. 192-193.

[124] London *Times,* 6 June 1867.

[125] P. Guériot, *Napoléon III* (Paris, 1933), II, 106-107.

[126] Reinach, "Napoléon III et la paix," *Revue hist.,* CXXXVI, 198-199; La Gorce,

Liberté protested "the Prussification" of the French army. "France," he declared, "has only one course to follow: that is to renounce war and become exclusively the great nation of peace." [127] Opposition also came from military men. Two pamphlets caused enormous excitement. The first, by General Changarnier, vigorously defended the French army. He felt that the law of 1832 was excellent. There was room for improvement in the weapons and communication lines. There should also be an increase in the number of students at Saint-Cyr, the French West Point. As for the proposed law, he felt that service of five years was long enough to train men; the reserve law was bad. Men in the reserves should be permitted to marry, and there was no need of an additional training period. Young men should be able to raise their families, and return to their civilian jobs, thus adding to the wealth of the nation.[128] The other pamphlet, *L'armée française en 1867,* published anonymously, had 67 editions. The public quickly learned that its true author was General Trochu.[129] He claimed that the weakness of the French military system was not only its conscription laws, but also its training, organization, and equipment. He devoted three-quarters of his long brochure to suggesting measures to improve these deficiencies. He also favored universal military training, with three-to-five years in the regular army and three more years in the reserves, permission to marry being granted in the last year of service.[130]

In response to public disapproval the government modified the proposed army reforms in March 1867. Service in the regular army was reduced from six to five years, after which the recruit spent four years in the reserves. Paid exemptions were permitted. Those who drew "good numbers" served four years in the reserves plus five years in the mobile national guard (which required no more than 15 days a year service in peace time). The public rejected this proposal just as vigorously as it did all the other army changes.[131]

The government then launched a press campaign, with special use of syndicated articles. In addition there were many speeches to support the law, and many rumors of war threats used in the hope that opinion would

V, 334; Ollivier, *Liberal Empire,* X, 337-338.

[127] Reinach, "Napoléon III et la paix," *Revue hist.,* CXXXVI, 198-199.

[128] General Changarnier, "Un mot sur le projet de réorganisation militaire," RDM, LXVIII (15 April 1867), 874-890; c.f. Ollivier, *Liberal Empire,* X, 332-335.

[129] V. Cartier, *Un méconnu le Général Trochu 1815-1876* (Paris, 1914), p. 335.

[130] *L'armée française en 1867* (15th ed., Paris, 1867).

[131] Wright, "Conscription," *Journal mod. hist.,* XIV, 35-36.

be changed. But these measures failed to sway the people.[132] The new conscription law was passed in January 1868.

The government made a partially successful attempt to popularize the new law. A little brochure was published for the peasants, explaining its benefits. The brochure sold for a few pennies in Paris, but it was distributed free in the provinces by the rural postmen, mayors, and justices of the peace.[133] On its frontispiece was portrayed a large imperial eagle, but the brochure did not have the official stamp to show that its publishers had paid prepublication duty; therefore it was attributed to the emperor himself.[134] Entitled *Exposé succinct de la loi sur le recrutement de l'armée*, it explained the provisions of the reorganized conscription program. "How can one fail to recognize that this law is more favorable than the one of 1832?" The new law provided a much more efficient and solid basis for the military forces of the nation. The greatest advantage of the new system consisted of being able to recall the most vigorous and best trained men at the moment when war was declared – the time they were needed most. The new law also created a force called the mobile national guard as an auxiliary to the regular army. Its function in time of war would be to provide internal protection to guard forts and supplies within the country while the regular army fought the battles. All bachelors of twenty to thirty who have been exempt from regular army service under the law of 1832 or the new law of 1867 must serve in some position. They would meet for training fifteen days a year at a place close to their homes so they could return there for the night. Their length of obligation was five years. The law on the army reorganization had been passed "not because the government fears an immediate war, but because experience during the Crimean war and the Italian campaigns showed that our military forces were not good enough for a great nation like France." [135]

This little pamphlet had the desired effect, for the procureur reports in the next few months indicated much less dissatisfaction with the new law as the peasants realized their sons would actually be serving a shorter term in the army.[136]

Exposé succinct de la loi sur le recrutement de l'armée was definitely inspired by the government. The use of officials to distribute it left no doubt as to its purpose – to convince the peasants that the new con-

[132] Case, *French opinion*, p. 237.

[133] Wright, "Conscription," *Journal mod. hist.*, XIV, 39.

[134] London *Times*, 27 January 1868. There is no evidence to indicate that the emperor himself inspired the pamphlet.

[135] *Exposé succinct de la loi sur le recrutement de l'armée* (Paris, 1868).

[136] Wright, "Conscription, *Journal mod. hist.*, XIV, 39, citing Vandal to Conti, 2 April 1868, ABXIX, 174.

scription law was not as bad as they thought. Evidence indicates that the effort was successful. The press was not needed to "sell" the pamphlet. Its prose style and its ideas were simple and concise so that its readers could grasp the argument easily. The government used as its main arguments patriotism and, especially, the self-interest of the peasants. It was evident that the authorities understood how to utilize the available media to convince the peasants. What remains puzzling is why they used it so infrequently. One surmise is that the officials of the Second Empire were grappling with the subleties of manipulating mass, *semi-literate* public opinion: that they had not realized the true potentialities of this opinion; and had not taken all the advantage of the possibilities of propaganda.

The army reorganization bill had been so watered-down in response to the public opposition, that it was little improvement over the law of 1832. In addition, the government hesitated to put the new changes into effect. Hence, the French were woefully unprepared to face the new Prussian threat. Yet, while public opinion resisted a broader conscription law and military preparedness, it supported the concept of territorial compensations. Indeed, the tone of public statements took on a querulous and angry tone aided by the passage of a new press law in 1868 which encouraged even more freedom of expression. These developments will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII

BROCHURES AND THE APOLOGY FOR DEFEAT, 1868–1870

The sweeping Prussian victory at Sadowa in 1866 changed the European power balance. France had two choices: one was to arm heavily and demand territorial compensations to redress the power balance. The other was to accept an enlarged Prussia and seek her friendship and alliance. Napoleon III chose both and failed. The army question, settled after an acrimonious debate, did not add to French military strength. The search for compensation was to prove equally unsuccessful. The French knew that they could not ask for the Rhine boundary or even the small fortifications along that river without arousing violent German reaction. In 1867, Rouher, the minister of state, requested Prussian approval of the French annexation of Luxemburg, and later, if possible, Belgium. Bismarck agreed to accept a *fait accompli* of the annexation of Luxemburg, but he was not willing to be an active partner. Negotiations were started with the king of Holland, but before the final cession he publicly notified the Prussians. German public opinion and English apprehensions were aroused. On 11 May 1867 a conference in London settled the problem of Luxemburg. She was declared a neutral state, and France lost the hope of any new territorial aggrandizement.

While the emperor was trying to strengthen France, he was also seeking to assuage French pride and encourage recognition of the new Germany. The first step in this attempt was the publication of the *Lavelette Memorandum* in September 1866. The memorandum admonished France to accept Prussian growth, for her destiny was to aid the growth of new nationalities. It predicted that the enormous potential resources of the United States and Russia would lead to their emergence as the two great powers of the world.[1] France's role would be to encourage the growth of national states in Europe so that the continent would be the balance be-

[1] Cf. the similarity of ideas in De Césena, *L'Angleterre et la Russie,* and see above Chap. II.

tween these two future giants. The memorandum also hinted that France would be willing to accept annexations of lands with people who were French in culture, and it declared that the time had come for improvement in the French military establishment.[2] Thus the memorandum clearly outlined the new dual goals for France.

King William of Prussia visited the French emperor during the international exposition held in France in 1867. Their conversations stressed the need of peace and disarmament for their two countries.[3] In early October of the same year an anonymous pamphlet appeared entitled *La dernière guerre par un ancien diplomate*. There were many rumors concerning its origin. Some claimed that it was written by La Guéronnière. Others thought that it was based upon a memorandum that the emperor requested Drouyn de Lhuys to write on the European situation, suggesting a foreign policy that would restore French prestige. The *Patrie* issued a strong denial of government inspiration and ended the rumors by revealing that the author was really a minor official.[4]

La dernière guerre par un ancien diplomate stated that war between France and Germany was inevitable unless France received territorial compensation of the Rhine provinces and Belgium plus an alliance between the two countries.[5] If war could not be avoided it would be the last one in Europe. The Eastern question would be settled quickly by the unanimous accord of the powers who would maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. If Belgium did not wish to return to France, France would not force annexation. However, she ought not to continue to have false illusions about neutrality. "There is no neutrality for any people unless they can defend it. Would Belgium be able to resist the shock of France and Germany when their armies seize her country for their battle-ground?" She ought to renounce her neutrality and form an offensive and defensive alliance with France. Unless rectifications were made in the European power balance, France would not and could not endure the humiliation of German growth and her desire for Alsace-Lorraine.[6]

[2] *Moniteur universel,* 17 September 1866; Case, *French opinion,* pp. 221-226 gives an excellent analysis. Marquis de Gricourt in his *Des relations de la France avec l'Allemagne* (Brussels, 1871), p. 5 states that the emperor himself wrote the memorandum.

[3] A. Pingaud, "Un projet de désarmement en 1870," *RDM,* I (1932), 907.

[4] London *Times,* 3 October 1867.

[5] This was the same proposal that Rouher had made to Prussia.

[6] London *Times,* 3 October 1867. O'Meagher quoted from Napoleon III's speech that same year in which he said German unity was inevitable and France must accept it.

Another pamphlet appeared on 15 November, very different in spirit and edited by Napoleon III. The author of this anonymous work, *Napoléon III et l'Europe,* was Abbé Bauer.[7] He was born in Hungary of a rich Jewish family. The abbé came to France and served under Cavaignac in 1848. He then became a painter and photographer. After embracing Catholicism, he became a famous preacher in Berlin, Vienna and Paris. In 1866 he came to Paris, and by 1867 he was in charge of the chapel of the Tuileries, although he continued preaching at other churches. After the Franco-Prussian War he left the church and went into business.[8]

The emperor worked on the brochure and edited it carefully, although he claimed that he did not agree with all its conclusions. He ordered Conti, his secretary, to inform Limayrac, the editor of the *Constitutionnel,* of the appearance of the brochure and insert a notice in his paper. Limayrac complained to Conti that this insertion could create enormous excitement, but Conti insisted that this was the emperor's wish. Therefore, according to Metternich, the pamphlet was "awaited with the same impatience as *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie.*" [9]

The pamphlet *Napoléon III et l'Europe* stated that the peace which both the world and France wanted must be based on the legitimate aspirations of all nations. Therefore, any program of peace must include the acceptance of a united Germany and a settlement of the Roman question based on the September Convention or an equivalent guarantee. German unity was an accomplished fact. France could do nothing to hurt this new movement. She had assisted it in Italy and could not, therefore, destroy across the Rhine what she had created across the Alps.[10] In the event of a conflict, all of Germany, including the states south of the Main River, would be aroused to repel the invader. Italy, remaining neutral, would have to give up Rome to the Garibaldian forces. Even if France could achieve victory, she would also suffer defeat because a war between these two peoples would lead only to bitterness.

> Many generations yet unborn would appear upon this earth only to be, when arriving at adolescence, mown down upon the plains of Belgium, the Palatinate, or Westphalia. What a victory for Death . . . representing the gigantic shock of two great nations in arms, making generous victims pay for the fatal error of a few!

[7] Metternich to Beust, Paris, 15 November 1867, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* II, 477-478.

[8] Vapéreau, p. 107.

[9] Metternich to Beust, Paris, 15 November 1867, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* II, 477-478. Metternich said that his information was authentic because he spoke to Limayrac and saw Conti's letter.

[10] This was the phrase used in an article in the *Moniteur,* 10 April 1859.

Only the eventual alliance of France, Germany, and England would bring a strong guarantee for the peace and stability of Europe. A peace congress was necessary to consolidate these aims. It must have as its basis three premises in order to make its influence permanent: independence for the Pope in Rome, security and satisfaction for France, and general disarmament for Europe. Then, reassured of the fate of the papacy, France could turn to the task of finding her way to "maturity" – the mingling of authority and liberty. Now in 1867, Europe, even more anxious for peace, should hear that same voice saying, "You must listen to me for I speak in the name of France." [11]

The pamphlet created only a brief sensation. It was eagerly bought, avidly read – and then quickly forgotten. No peace congress resulted; no new peaceful overtures were made to Prussia. Thus, despite its limited diplomatic importance, this pamphlet is important historically, because it contains the emperor's views and echoes statements that had been exposed earlier in newspapers, speeches, and pamphlets.

However, the Austrian ambassador was disturbed by this anonymous work. He was well aware of the emperor's interest in the brochure. Metternich felt that it marked a change of French policy. An alliance with Prussia would give France "elbow room" in Italy. Of course, Metternich cynically declared, the pamphlet could not represent the true aims of the Second Empire. France had no intention to disarm, nor were there to be any further grants of liberty in her internal political life. The brochure masked French aims, which were to keep Italy quiet and Germany calm, and to seek Prussian friendship. As for Austria, the emperor had nice words and kind smiles, but he would make no serious commitments.[12] The Austrian foreign minister, Beust, wrote Metternich that he was being overly pessimistic. If Napoleon III accepted the new Prussia, there would be no danger for Austria. As yet he still had not approached Prussia diplomatically or made any overtures to Bismarck.[13]

But the French were hopeful that Prussia would accept a French alliance, and permit some kind of French annexation that would rectify the power balance. Thus the government wished the press to soften its anti-Prussian and bellicose sentiments. In January 1868, instructions were

[11] *Napoléon III et l'Europe* (Paris, 1867). The English translation is in the London *Times,* but there was no editorial comment. London *Times,* 18 November 1867. Carroll wrongly thought that this pamphlet was written by an opposition journalist. E. M. Carroll, *French public opinion and foreign affairs 1870-1914* (New York and London, 1934), p. 22.

[12] Metternich to Beust, Paris, 15 November 1867, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* II, 477-478.

[13] Beust to Metternich, Vienna, 19 November 1867, *ibid.,* II, 479.

sent to the prefects to preserve a peaceful tone in the imperial press.[14] However, in 1868 such a policy by the government was futile. The easing of restrictions on the press had led to the founding of many new papers, and the published parliamentary debates had made the imperial papers less important. Even in the provinces, where the prefects had maintained a much closer control, the slow growth of an independent press had sapped the strength of the official organs.

The growth of an independent press and the gradual diminution in the use of government-inspired brochures were caused by a series of developments which changed the propaganda milieu.

The first of these was the appearance of a new type of newspaper on 1 February 1863, *Le petit journal.* This new paper, small in size, and reduced in price to 5 centimes, was aimed primarily for the working classes and the peasants. It created new problems for the government. Nonpolitical in origin, this paper could, however, by omissions and by the placement of its topics, subtly suggest political viewpoints. The phenomenal success of this new type of journalism led immediately to a large number of imitators in Paris and in the provinces. Because its appeal was directed to the less educated and less thoughtful segments of the population, the "petite *press*," as it was called, relied on more sensation, scandal, and crime than did the regular press. By the end of the Second Empire some of these techniques were being incorporated by the larger press.[15] The government did not ignore the *petite press*; it joined the competition by founding a smaller and cheaper edition of the *Moniteur universel,* which became known as the *Petit moniteur.* But despite strong efforts of the prefects, its circulation remained smaller than the other papers, although its circulation was much greater than the *Moniteur universel.*[16]

The second development which lessened government influence in the press and rendered brochures less significant was the divisions and disagreements among the ministers. Disagreements were rife over policy: the Roman question, Prussia, and internal policy as the government began to move in the direction of "liberal empire." The older press often had reflected the ministers' doubts about the new policies which the government seemed to be undertaking. The most notorious and reactionary were the Cassagnacs, Granier and Paul, who as the editors of the *Pays* remained staunch advocates of authoritarian empire. The result was an

[14] Pingaud, "Un projet," *RDM,* I, 707; London *Times,* 24 January 1868.
[15] Bellanger, II, 327-330.
[16] Kulstein, p. 46.

effort by the emperor to found new papers and to lure new writers more in agreement with his position. *Revue de l'Empire,* founded as a literary paper, was given authorization as a political journal in 1862. In June 1866 Auguste Vitu founded *L'Etendard,* which was not financially successful. Florian Pharaon became the editor of *Etincelle* and Clément Duvernois, formerly an antagonist of the Empire, became an editor of *Epoque* and later founded *Peuple français.* The older as well as the newer press continued to receive heavy subsidization from the government. However, the younger writers were not joining the government because they were not attracted to the Liberal Empire, and they devoted their efforts to a more strident opposition, which in 1868 was able to express itself because of the passage of a new press law.

A third development in the propaganda milieu was most important in reducing governmental influence on the press and in diminishing the significance of the brochures. This development was the passage of the press law of 11 May 1868. The law ended the preliminary authorization required to start a newspaper; it lowered the stamp duty; and it discontinued the government's rights to warn, suspend, or suppress newspapers. Government officials still retained the power to regulate the locations where papers could be sold, and the laws of libel remained available. But officials found these powers difficult to enforce; and, on the whole, the new law encouraged the founding of a tremendous number of papers, especially in the provinces. The huge number of opposition papers, many of which were moderate, further weakened the position of the imperial press. Subsidization proved of little help.[17]

In 1870, the creation of the Liberal Empire, with Emile Ollivier as prime minister, saw the collapse of government influence upon the press. All papers and factions found fault with the Ollivier ministry. Defenders of the authoritarian empire, *Pays* and *Patrie* continued their devotion to the emperor but threw their support to the right-wing opposition. Duvernois, the imperialist editor of *Peuple français,* disliked Ollivier personally, and therefore opposed him. The Legitimists regarded the Empire as an usurpation. The Clericals were still angry over the Roman issue, while the Republicans felt that Ollivier had betrayed their cause: and even Ollivier's close friend Girardin, editor of *Liberté,* advocated a vehement anti-Prussian policy.

Restrictions were also removed from the pamphlet, and brochures now appeared on every political topic. Those which attracted the German diplomats' attention were bellicose. Inspired pamphlets had been some-

[17] Collins, pp. 147-149.

times difficult to detect, but their frequent appearance in the past continued to make all of them suspect of higher inspiration now. One example was an anonymous brochure which appeared in April 1868. *Nos frontières sur le Rhin* asserted that the annexation of the Rhineland and Belgium was necessary for France's security. They were part of the natural frontiers of France and should not be abandoned. The imperialist press ignored the pamphlet: its sentiments were contradictory to the peaceful conciliatory articles in the Bonapartist newspapers.[18] There is no evidence that this pamphlet was government-inspired, but its sentiments reflected those of a large body of Frenchmen.

In the fall of 1868 three new maps of Europe appeared which caused much speculation, discussion, and criticism. All the daily press assumed that the maps had emanated from the government because they reflected the attitude of the imperial papers.[19] There were rumors that they were inspired by the emperor himself.[20] The maps created enormous discussion in the press partly because both the *France* and the *Constitutionnel* gave them great publicity and praise; but also because the maps were so unjustified in their assumptions and so contrary to political realities that they provoked an outcry. And controversy breeds interest.

These maps illustrated the position of France during three different periods: the Restoration, the Orleans monarchy, and the Second Empire. Each had a short accompanying text. The third map was the most important. Its boundaries were drawn according to the provisions of the Treaty of Prague of 1866. Although Prussia had been greatly enlarged, France's position had not been weakened. According to its text, before 1866 Prussia and Austria, combined, controlled Germany, which had 80 million men. Now the states surrounding France were independent. Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland were neutral. "Prussia in her North German Confederation has 30 million men, the German states of the south, bound to Prussia by a military convention, have 8 million. Austria has 35 million and Italy 23 or 24 million men. France with her 40 million population including Algeria, certainly has no cause to fear any state." [21]

French press reaction to the maps was generally uniform, despite divergent political viewpoints. With some justification the maps were

[18] Quadt to Ludwig II, Paris, 17 April 1868, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* II, 559-560.
[19] London *Times,* 30 October 1868; Vitzthum to Metternich, Paris, 27 October 1868, Oncken, *Rheinpolitik,* III, 49-51.
[20] London *Times,* 30 October 1868.
[21] *RDM,* LXXVIII (30 October 1868), 232-235; London *Times,* 30 October 1868; *Journal des débats,* 28 October 1868.

thought to be illusory and deceptive. However, the imperialist press supported them without reservation. The *France* gave them much publicity, while the *Constitutionnel* declared that France's position had been much improved by the events of 1866. "Today she [France] is much freer from movements and alliances across the Rhine." [22] The conservative *Union* answered the government spokesmen by insisting that French foreign policy, indeed, had acquired more liberty – the liberty of isolation.[23] The *Monde* declared that the map makers were trying to reassure not only the public but also themselves that Sadowa had not weakened France's position.[24] The *Gazette de France* asked two questions: "If the Germanic Confederation was so menacing, how was Prussia able to destroy it in eight days? If France's position is now so much stronger, why must she triple her spending for national defense?" [25] The *Temps* echoed the latter paper's question. Why was it necessary to strengthen the military organization of France if her most important rival was so enfeebled? Why did France seek territorial compensations? [26] The *Siècle* felt that the new expenses for the army were not justified if the maps were correct in their analysis of European affairs.[27] The *Gaulois* stated: "It cannot be disputed that the destruction of the Germanic Confederation gives Prussia a greater freedom of policy, which in spite of all denials is a menace to us, or at least an obstacle." The *Avenir national* believed that before Sadowa a renewal of a northern coalition against France had been impossible, but now it was quite probable.[28] The liberal *Presse* declared: "No map can efface this sad fact. . . . The events of 1866, in destroying the Germanic confederation and delivering Germany to Prussia, have diminished a part of the influence of our country and substituted danger where before she found security." [29] Forcade in the *Revue des deux mondes* attacked the maps as a "puerility in color. . . ." "It was just as much of an illusion as the Lavalette memorandum because neither corresponded to political realities." "The new state of Prussia plus her allies, the South German states, are a real threat to France because they are energetic, ambitious, alert, and ready to march." No combination of pretty colors on contrived maps could change these facts. Public opinion

[22] *Union,* 27 October 1868; *Temps,* 25 October 1868; *Presse,* 26 October 1868, all in rebuttal of *France* and *Constitutionnel.*
[23] *Union,* 27 October 1868.
[24] *Monde,* 30 October 1868.
[25] *Ibid.,* quoting *Gazette de France.*
[26] *Temps,* 25 October 1868.
[27] *Siècle,* 29 October 1868.
[28] *Monde,* 30 October 1868, quoting *Gaulois* and *Avenir national.*
[29] *Presse,* 26 October 1868.

has not been reassured by these geographical artifices. It will be neither satisfied nor confident. . . ." [30] Guéroult of the *Opinion nationale,* did not condemn the maps – they illustrated what he had always claimed. A free Italy and Germany gave France a better power position than she had had before, for now she had freedom to form alliances. If Prussia was hostile, Austria could ally herself with France. She did not have to depend on Italy alone. This change would be a strong assurance of peace if the French government "knew what it wished and what it believed; if it did not go from one idea to another from morning to evening: one day the administration demanded compensation from Prussia; the next day it tried to prove that France had no need for it. Did the government really believe what it said today? Then let its actions conform to its words!" [31]

As these maps illustrated, France faced a dilemma in her foreign policy. She was faced with a new power to the east – Prussia. To meet this threat she needed a strong and consistent foreign policy. It is difficult indeed to build up armed forces and to seek redress of the power balance while simultaneously speaking of peace, friendship, and disarmament with your new neighbor. The propaganda tools of the Second Empire reflected this dilemma. The official policy was to seek compensation and alliance with Prussia. Much of French public opinion, however, expressed apprehension and alarm over the change in the power equilibrium. And as long as the territorial compensation was not granted to France, French fears remained.

In 1868, 1869, and even in the early part of 1870 peace looked possible and even probable. The match which fired the conflagration was lit by Bismarck and fanned by French pride and fear. The throne of Spain was vacant. The Spanish crown was offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen of the Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family. The French feared that his acceptance would mean Prussian encirclement. On 9 July the French ambassador, Benedetti, presented to King William the demand that the offer be withdrawn. The offer was withdrawn. However, when the renunciation came, French leadership was still dissatisfied. The French demanded the further assurance that the candidature would not be accepted at any future time. On 13 July, Benedetti presented this request to the Prussian king at Ems. William courteously but firmly refused to pledge an eternal renunciation. Bismarck, by shortening the king's answer, gave it a militant sound which aroused French resentment. War was declared on 19 July 1870.

[30] *RDM,* LXXVIII (30 October 1868), 230-234.
[31] *L'Opinion nationale,* 29 October 1868.

France was woefully unprepared. By the first week of August, Alsace and Lorraine felt the invaders' boots as the French army lost battle after battle. Commanded by General Bazaine, the army was blockaded at Metz on 20 August. An attempt to relieve Bazaine by General MacMahon failed, and his army was defeated at the battle of Sedan. As a result of this capitulation both MacMahon and the emperor were taken prisoners and kept at Wilhelmshöhe. In Paris the shock of the unexpected and terrible defeats led to revolt on 4 September. The empress fled to England where the emperor joined her a year later. Until his death in 1873 he wrote and supervised the writing of pamphlets in which he justified his regime's policies.

The first of these brochures was started as soon as the emperor arrived as a prisoner at Wilhelmshöhe. He frequently met with his friends, read them the drafts of his work, and asked for criticism.[32] Persigny refused to sign his name to the final draft so the author's signature was that of the Marquis de Gricourt,[33] one of the emperor's chamberlains who had shown complete devotion and loyalty to him.[34] The brochure, entitled *Des relations de la France avec l'Allemagne,* was published in Brussels.

The pamphlet declared that before 1866 France had formed an alliance with England to prevent the czar's aggressive designs, which led to the Crimean war. In 1859 Napoleon III was again obliged to lead the nation to war by becoming the champion of oppressed nationalities. The emperor wanted to avert conflict on the Rhine, so he concluded a quick peace in Italy. He put the needs of France before Italian nationalism. Many other problems challenged Europe: Schleswig-Holstein, the Polish rebellion, unification of the Danubian Principalities, and the pope's temporal power. Napoleon III believed that European congresses could have solved these crises. The great powers, however, had treated the idea with disdain. France wished Germany to realize her dream of nationality, but she wanted territorial compensation in order to preserve the European equilibrium. After the decisive battle of Sadowa, Napoleon III declared his policy in the Lavalette Memorandum, which he wrote almost entirely in his own hand. The emperor desired an entente with Prussia

[32] G. Girard, *La vie et les souvenirs du Général Castelnau 1814-1890* (Paris, 1930), p. 250; Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Torquay, 15 October 1871, D'Hauterive, p. 247.

[33] E. Ollivier, *The Franco Prussian war and its hidden causes,* translated by G. B. Ives (Boston, 1912), pp. 397-399; Comte Fleury, *Souvenirs* (Paris, 1897), II, 287; J. Kühn, "Après Sedan, Bismarck et Napoléon III," *Revue des études napoléoniennes,* XXIII (1924), 112-113; H. Friedjung, *The struggle for supremacy in Germany 1859-1866,* translated by A. J. P. Taylor and W. L. McElwee (London, 1935), p. 180.

[34] *Papiers et correspondance de la famille impériale,* II, 83-86.

because he realized that the growth of a neighboring state did not mean a diminution of the grandeur and prosperity of France. The opposition attacked both the emperor and Prussia. The annexation of Luxemburg could have solved this problem, by satisfying French apprehensions, and thus silencing the opposition. A liberal parliamentary regime was introduced into France, and 1870 looked peaceful. However, four years of opposition by the press and parliament had embittered the national consciousness. The Hohenzollern affair was the crisis that led to war. Public opinion, reflected in the legislature, desired war. On the eve of the war, Napoleon III held a meeting with his ministers at the Tuileries which lasted several hours. Though the emperor was a constitutional monarch, he could have prevented war; but such conduct would have been called cowardice. The duty of the emperor was to be wiser than the nation and to avoid the conflict – even at the risk of his crown. Yet the ministers, the opposition, the whole country wished the struggle, and the emperor did not resist the general enthusiasm.[35]

Emile Ollivier read this brochure and immediately wrote to the emperor. The brochure, he said, was "excellent except in the last part where you separated yourself from your ministers and threw upon them the burden of a common decision . . ." He criticized the pamphlet further because he thought it was an apology for the war itself. The Prussians in their despatches from Berlin and Ems had insulted the French. "If France had not declared this war, she would have fallen into the mire; it is much better that she has fallen on the battlefield." Napoleon III promptly defended his work. "I do not propose to separate my responsibility from that of my ministers in the declaration of the ill-fated war. . . ." The brochure's purpose was to show that the war was not undertaken to further Bonapartist dynastic ambitions "but in response to a justly offended sentiment of the country." [36]

None of the pamphlets written after 1870 was politically effective in France.[37] Because *Des relations de la France avec l'Allemagne* was not published in Paris, it had very small circulation there. Why are this and

[35] Marquis de Gricourt, *Des relations de la France avec l'Allemagne,* (Brussels, 1871).

[36] Ollivier, *Franco-Prussian war,* pp. 397-399.

[37] One pamphlet has not been included in the text. It is *La vérité sur la campagne de 1870-1871* by Fernand Girardeau. It was an attempt to show how the nation's desire for war influenced Napoleon III. Girardeau was an official in the ministry of the interior. De Maupas, *Mémoires sur le Second Empire* (Paris, 1884), II, 522; Carroll, *French opinion,* p. 679. However, Girardeau wrote the book independently and the *emperor read* it *after* its publication. His comments were: "It is the most complete justification of my conduct. . . ." Napoleon III to Eugénie, Wilhelmhöhe 10 March 1871, "Lettres à l'impératrice Eugénie 1870-1871," *RDM,* LIX (1930), 29.

other brochures written after Sedan significant? They were written (if not signed) by the emperor himself, and thus they are his few remaining surviving documents. It must be remembered that the pamphlets either written, edited, or supervised by him were published after the events he attempted to justify, and therefore must be interpreted as defence of his policies. These pamphlets are significant in revealing an interesting aspect of the emperor's character. There is little trace of rancor or of shifting responsibility for his own omissions and failures. He had accepted bravely and clearly his lack of leadership during France's great crisis. This is indeed the mark of a worthy failure. Yet, not all details of the story of France's weakness and failure were revealed in this pamphlet. The emperor admitted that the reason for the sudden peace at Villafranca was fear of Prussian mobilization. He also assumed complete responsibility for the Lavalette memorandum. He also unconsciously showed the ineptitude of his diplomacy. He declared that he had sought a rapprochement with Prussia after 1866 – yet how clumsily both his diplomatic and propaganda staffs handled this problem! Furthermore, the evidence that Case compiled to show how influential public opinion was in the formulation of foreign policy of the Second Empire is substantiated, particularly its role in the French declaration of war in 1870. That fact alone gives Gricourt's pamphlet historical significance. The emperor admitted that the desire for war in the press, legislative body, and prefect reports had influenced his judgment on 16 July. That there was much bellicose sentiment in Paris in July 1870 has been shown by Case's study.[38]

In September 1871 Prince Napoleon, in exile in Switzerland, wrote a small work in which he defended himself against the attacks of the republicans, especially Jules Favre. The brochure, *La vérité à mes calomniateurs* was sent to Napoleon III, who read it with great care. He made a few changes in phraseology, but otherwise thought it was "perfect." [39]

The prince declared that he had been unjustly attacked by Jules Favre in a speech before the national assembly. He did not, as he was accused, provoke the war, and he did not flee before the enemy. On 8 June 1870 he had left France to visit Norway. Informed of the crisis, he hurried home. Napoleon III gave the prince the command of a corps which was to land in Denmark and the northern coast of Prussia. The expedition was never undertaken, because of the rapid defeats of the French army. However, on 19 August the emperor asked Prince Napoleon to go to

[38] Case, *French opinion,* pp. 241-269.

[39] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Chislehurst, 29 August 1871, D'Hauterive, pp. 246-247.

Italy to see Victor Emmanuel. He carried out his assignment, and remained in Florence until 30 August, torn by indecision. Should he fulfill the emperor's orders or disobey and rejoin the army? Prince Napoleon decided that "in difficult circumstances the strict line of duty and discipline must be followed." The prince continued to receive bad news. Finally after the establishment of the Government of National Defense the prince left Italy for Switzerland. He wrote the emperor asking to join him in his captivity. The latter was touched by the request but wished to remain alone. The prince felt that eventually the judgment of the people would vindicate both the emperor and himself.[40]

The brochure attracted little attention and was read by only a few. Renan, who had received a copy of it, wrote to Prince Napoleon, complimenting him for his forceful defence.[41]

Louis Napoleon kept busy with publicity activities. While correcting the prince's manuscript, he was engaged in correspondence with Granier de Cassagnac, who had fled to Belgium, where he published a Bonapartist newspaper, *Drapeau*. Since its circulation was forbidden in France, the paper's effectiveness was limited. In December 1870 the emperor permitted Cassagnac to write a brochure explaining the military disaster of Sedan. Napoleon III supplied the principles and details.[42] The first draft of the manuscript was sent to Chislehurst, the emperor's residence in England. The emperor asked his advisors to read it to him. He listened carefully. When he was satisfied, he nodded and said, "Yes that is very true," of "very exact." When he was dissatisfied he said: "That is not quite so," or "no, that is a detail that must be corrected." The harsh criticism by Cassagnac annoyed the emperor, and he said, "Mark this page, delete that phrase." [43] He returned the manuscript to Cassagnac and wrote that it ought to have a good effect. He congratulated the author but thought Cassagnac's writing, like the army, needed discipline. Napoleon III hoped that he would accept his written page of suggestions, and Cassagnac complied.[44]

The completed pamphlet was entitled *A chacun sa part dans nos désastres, Sedan ses causes et ses suites*. It declared that the capitulation of Sedan was the immediate cause of France's unsettled condition. The causes leading to the defeat at Sedan were complex. The military cause

[40] Prince Napoléon, *La vérité à mes calomniateurs* (Paris, 1871).

[41] Renan to Prince Napoleon, *Sèvres*, 4 August 1871, F. Masson, "Correspondance de Renan et Prince Napoléon," *RDM*, XII (1922), 227.

[42] Granier de Cassagnac, *Souvenirs*, III, 194.

[43] L. Girardeau, *Napoléon III intime* (Paris, 1895), 462-463.

[44] Napoleon III to Granier de Cassagnac, Chislehurst, 4 September 1871; Rouher to Cassagnac, Cerçay, 1 October 1871, Granier de Cassagnac, *Souvenirs*, III, 199-200.

was General MacMahon's indecision. He was torn between what he felt was military necessity and the government's demands that he aid General Bazaine. Acceding to civilian orders, he found that he was too late to save Bazaine, so he retreated to Sedan where he met the Germans and defeat. If he had executed the cabinet's plan quickly and with authority, he might have had success. Instead MacMahon's hesitations enabled the German army to follow and defeat him. The responsibility of the cabinet for the final defeat lay in its not clearly recognizing the danger of the opposition. The Palikao ministry failed to realize that the left and the center parties represented, not government opposition, but revolution. The emperor's responsibility for Sedan lay in his repugnance to shed blood in support of his dynasty. He should have returned to Paris and seized power, because the war could only be fought by a united France. Instead, the revolution of 4 September had prevented France from concluding peace and had "enfeebled her immensely by the disorder that it unleashed." These same men then tried to place the whole blame for both the war and the defeat upon the empire. The emperor had strived for army reorganization, but public opinion and the opposition deputies denied its realization. Yet the whole nation desired the conflict: the press, the opposition, the parliament. "It was not Napoleon III who declared the actual war. It was we who forced his hand." [45]

The pamphlet was published in England, where it enjoyed a lively sale. Its first edition was completely sold out in January 1872. Those few copies that circulated in France were not noticed by the press.[46]

It is evident in this brochure that the emperor wished to avoid giving offense to his former associates. Cassagnac's stronger phrases were deleted. The defeated monarch assumed responsibility for his omissions and his inertia. However, he lost no opportunity to damn his political opponents.

At Chislehurst, Napoleon III enjoyed the services of a group of faithful friends. One of these men was the Count de la Chapelle, who was a late convert to Bonapartism. For twenty years he had travelled around the world as a newspaper correspondent and had returned to France in 1870 to report on the war. In the spring of 1871 de la Chapelle had crossed the channel, gone to Chislehurst, and placed himself at the disposal of the emperor.[47] One day in 1872 Napoleon III asked the count to write a pamphlet on the "abandonment of principles; the chief source of all the

[45] *À chacun sa part dans nos désastres, Sedan ses causes et ses suites,* MSS, reproduced in *ibid.,* III, 201-273. All the corrections and additions that the emperor made in the original manuscript are reproduced in these pages.

[46] *Ibid.,* III, 194.

[47] I. Guest, *Napoleon III in England* (London, 1952), p. 192.

misfortunes which are afflicting Europe; for principles are the bonds which maintain communities in their normal state and keep governments on the right path. You have some notes on this subject." [48] The count published a pamphlet based on these notes called *Les principes par un ancien diplomate.* Few changes were made in the original notes which had been dictated by the emperor, and the pamphlet, therefore, was largely written by Louis Napoleon.[49] The little essay declared that Europe by recognizing the illegal insurrection had aided anarchy and disaster in France. The revolution of 4 September assumed the title "Government of National Defense" which aroused the French imagination; but instead of dealing with the invader, it had squandered French wealth to satisfy "presumptuous ambition." The continual defeats brought France lassitude and apathy, which made the excesses of the Commune inevitable. Napoleon III felt that the coup d'état of 2 December 1851 had been essential for the well-being of the nation, and his action was legalized by the eight million votes. Yet he always refused to celebrate the deed, which he felt was basically illegal. The republicans had not been so scrupulous. Since 1793 all constitutional changes had been sanctioned by the verdict of the nation except the one of 4 September. "The only way to restore France to her grandeur is to proclaim the principles of "morality, law, justice. . . . Order cannot be re-established unless power is based on right. . . ." The only way legitimate government can be established is by appealing to a verdict of the nation.[50]

The pamphlet was not circulated widely. An examination of its contents reveals that it was a political document calculated to discredit the revolution which overthrew the Second Empire.

Even before Louis Napoleon came to England he was writing a brochure on the 1870 campaign.[51] As with his earlier pamphlet, he consulted his friends, read it to them, and then listened to their comments. They were critical of the emperor's ideas. Some felt he was too apologetic and did not attack the Republicans sharply enough. So strongly did this imperial faction feel that they opposed its publication. But the imperialist criticism came to naught, and the emperor finished *Les forces militaires de la France en 1870.* Count de la Chapelle's name appeared on its title

[48] Count de la Chapelle, *Posthumous works of Napoleon III in exile* (London, 1873), p. 7.

[49] Guest, pp. 191-192; E. Legge, *The empress Eugenie 1870-1910* (New York, 1910), pp. 61-62.

[50] *Principles by a late diplomatist* (MSS of the emperor) reproduced in de la Chapelle, *Posthumous works,* pp. 7-20.

[51] Napoleon III to Prince Napoleon, Torquay, 15 October 1871, D'Hauterive, p. 247.

page, even though he had not written a word of it.[52] It was finally published in early 1872.

The emperor said that the French people had had an exaggerated sense of security based on a false concept of the strength of their military forces. While the people were lulled by the continuing success in Africa and Crimea, French leadership had perceived weaknesses in the armed forces. The emperor, therefore, had considered methods of strengthening the army. The first problem was to educate public opinion "which refused to acknowledge the inferiority of the military organization." Some attempts were made to increase the number of battalions, but the law of 1832 was not changed. In 1866 the nation became aware of the menace of Prussia. Some questioned the fallacy of economy in military affairs. However, the public figures who most strongly resisted innovations in the military organization demanded war with Prussia at the moment when the army was the weakest. Another factor which had depleted the strength of the armed forces was the Mexican expedition. The emperor appointed Marshal Neil minister of war in 1867, and Neil established a commission of officers under General Lebrun to study the situation. The commission's recommendations modified by the legislative bodies became the law of 1868 which strengthened the armed forces. What weakened the French cause was the lack of military efficiency. French soldiers were poorly equipped and trained. Many of the new weapons had never been distributed to the troops, and large numbers of men had never learned how to use them. This was the real cause of French misfortunes on the battlefield.[53]

The emperor's friends, failing to prevent the writing of the brochure, worked to avoid its distribution in Paris, hoping that "a conspiracy of silence would suffice to stifle the emperor's words." [54] Napoleon III asked de la Chapelle to try to get the papers to review *Les forces militaires de la France,* but the Bonapartists would not co-operate. There upon the emperor sent a copy to the *Figaro,* whose editor, a Republican, reviewed it fairly. Saint-Genest, the editor, by his courageous act forced the other papers at least to notice the pamphlet.[55] However, his comments were not favorable. He claimed that Napoleon III's crime was that of declaring war when he ought to have known that France was not prepared to wage it. "It would be more just to say that the emperor's mistake was that of

[52] Guest, pp. 191-192; E. Legge, *The empress Eugenie 1870-1910* (New York, 1910), pp. 61-62.
[53] Count de la Chapelle, *Les forces militaires de la France en 1870* (Paris, 1872).
[54] Legge, p. 55.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 61.

reckoning upon the exactitude of the state of affairs and upon the possibility of reuniting in a few days the various elements of which the armies were composed." [56] This brochure was the only one of those written after 1870 that received any notice at all in France.

This pamphlet again revealed Louis Napoleon's kindly nature. There was no vindicative criticism, no attempt to shift responsibility. Instead the brochure was a straightforward account of France's military position and showed the emperor's fear of public opinion and his inability to lead. He admitted that he had been aware of the weaknesses of the French army in 1859, but so fearful was he of national opposition that he waited until after Sadowa to attempt to direct his people to support a change in the law of 1832. Until that day the French press and brochures had never discussed the army. Nor can we be sure that, even if reform had been attempted earlier, better results would have been achieved. But the emperor had never tried to educate the public on army reform in the earlier years when he had less public opposition and a packed legislative body. In 1870 he said he was influenced by the popular demand for war, rather than the best interests of the nation. He admitted that his fear of unpopularity had clouded his judgment. In assessing France's military defeats he did not try to escape his own responsibilities, but he pointed out the inherent weakness of the organization and training of the army. The best written conscription laws are not worth much if the training, generalship, logistics, and weapons are not properly ready for battle.

Disappointed and heart-broken over the French defeat and the downfall of the Second Empire, Napoleon III passed his remaining days in exile. But those days were to be very short. Plagued since 1866 by the pain and debilitation of kidney stones [57] he finally submitted to surgery and died in 1873.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[57] E. A. Pottinger, *Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 190-191.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

I have already indicated in the earlier chapters that it was important for Napoleon III to ascertain, understand, and lead public opinion. Furthermore, having come to power without a widespread political organization, he had to create a propaganda milieu which would provide him with support from the country. How did his press policy succeed?

As in many other practices Napoleon III inherited the traditions and bureaucracy of earlier regimes. The press had been subsidized and supervised earlier. But the older policy had used the press primarily to influence the elections. The men of the Second Empire went far beyond these primitive manipulations. The emperor respected the power of the media and believed that a successful government policy needed the concurrence of public opinion. He utilized the press during elections to promote government candidates but found that the press played a small role in persuading voters during elections.[1] However, communication did and still does play a prominent role in molding and effecting prejudices, opinion, and stereotypes. How the news is reported, the placement of headlines, the emphasis on type of story can subtly distort or inform the reader according to the prejudices of the papers and their reporters. Seeking to give "inspiration" to the press by permitting a variety of opinions and an opposition contained within limited political boundaries, by subverting journalists, and by subsidizing friendly papers, the emperor was attempting far more than to influence elections. He was trying to create a political *consensus* to educate a new generation and free them from radical revolutionary doctrine. This meant that a variety of viewpoints could and would be encouraged so long as pernicious and dangerous social ideas were not enunciated. It was axiomatic that the Empire and the emperor himself could not be attacked anywhere in the press.

[1] T. Zeldin, pp. 88-95.

The earlier part of the empire (1852 until the early 1860's) represented what Napoleon III described as "Caesarian democracy" – the attempt to blend order and liberty in the press as well as in politics. Limited freedom would be permitted until "a new political generation" would be able to replace those active in political life who had been misinformed and "perverted by the French revolution of 1848." [2]

Government policy toward the press was thus repressive, especially in the provinces; but even during the most repressive part of the Second Empire (the 1850's) police powers were never fully utilized. The prefects frequently practiced restraint except for the first few months after the coup d'état when the prefects and the procureurs acted with overenthusiastic zeal. Circumspection and discretion were necessitated in the provinces by the fact that the Legitimists and the Clericals were influential, and the journals of these two parties provided the bitterest opposition over the Italian and Roman questions. Although many *avertissements* were issued, few papers were suspended or even suppressed. The provincial authorities were more zealous in their regulation of papers and often proposed *avertissements* which were deliberately ignored by the Parisian authorities. The government was also loath to suppress newspapers because it was felt that suppression would be a denial of property rights and could be politically disastrous if abused.[3]

Although suppression sparingly used was sufficient warning to the remaining papers, the process of industrialization was far more effective in moderating the virulence of the French press. This process consisted of the emergence of the Havas news agency and the commercialization of the newspapers. They had become business enterprises needing large circulations to pay their investors. Since suspensions and suppression were financially costly, the newspapers practiced political caution. However, the process of moderating the polemics of the press backfired upon the government after the press became freer. The warning system had created a prudent mood among the opposition papers. They not only became very powerful financially but they also built great circulations, while continuing their political independence. The Bonapartist press was never able to catch up with or to compete in popularity and circulation with the opposition.[4]

[2] Granier de Cassagnac, *Souvenirs*, II, 84-85; Maupas, I, 580-587; Payne, p. 180.
[3] Between December and August 1854, forty-nine *avertissements* were issued to eight Parisian and nineteen departmental papers. During an average year, however, about nineteen warnings were issued. AN F18, 294; F 18, 570.
[4] AN F18, 294; F18, 295.

The administration used pressure to contain criticism and opposition to the regime, but it also understood the use and the need of government "inspiration" to lead and educate public opinion. That particular policy enunciated by the various directors of the press [5] necessitated a firm commitment to a common ideology and common political beliefs. These were lacking in the Second Empire. The political differences became more apparent as the empire drifted to a more liberal parliamentary system. Rifts among the bureaucrats occurred over such issues as freedom of the press, power of the papacy, and policy toward Prussia. As these differences became sharper, the imperial papers began to disagree among themselves.

Thus, the press policy of the Second Empire was not wholly successful. The consensus was not really established among the literate and among the journalists. The regime did not create a national Bonapartist party of any real size or strength. The press itself never became molded into a Bonapartist viewpoint. Even the so-called "Imperial" press could not agree, and frequently these papers became the tools of the warring ministers.

What then can be concluded about the government's use of brochures during the Second Empire? The administration made widespread use of them to indoctrinate public opinion, and their importance was usually determined by the amount of publicity given them in the official press. Brochures were used in a variety of ways. The most significant were used to announce the government's pending policies – those like *D'une nécessité d'un congrès, L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Angleterre, L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie,* and *Le pape et le congrès.* More than trial balloons, they were important events with varying degrees of influence on foreign policy. They could be compared to the modern presidential press conference in which policy is announced unofficially. The pamphlets were also used to test both foreign and domestic opinion. Used in this fashion, they were effective and practical. They were headline news not only in France but also in Europe generally. Through them the emperor announced his plans and then judged from the reaction how far he could lead his people. He learned that the Italian war was unpopular, but he persisted in aiding Italian nationalism. *Le pape et le congrès* postponed a European conference, and Napoleon III ascertained how much of the pope's temporal possessions could be seized by Italy without incurring opposition of his countrymen.

Some pamphlets, like Duruy's *Les papes, princes italiens,* were used

[5] La Guéronnière, 7 December 1859. AN F18, 310.

to debate current issues. Others were attempts to feel out foreign as well as French reaction. *De l'Allemagne avant le congrès* and *La Prusse en 1860* tested Prussian feelings on German nationalism. *La Turquie devant l'Europe* was published merely to educate public opinion. *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe* enunciated the emperor's concept of a congress system. De Cassagnac's *L'Empereur, la Pologne, et l'Europe* was published in hopes of moderating the bolder pleas to help Poland.

Prince Napoleon played a large role in the production of these pamphlets. His position as a liaison officer between various journalists and the emperor and his role in the composition of some pamphlets indicated his close ideological relationship to Napoleon III. Therefore, a study of inspired pamphlets must include an evaluation of Prince Napoleon. Because he was an official in the administration, his connection with some brochures gave significance to these works. In two cases the prince inspired brochures independently of the emperor: Hubaine's *Le gouvernement temporel des papes* and *L'Empereur Napoléon III et les principautés unies*. However, they had the emperor's approbation. His association with the Polish exiles and their brochures made the Prussians apprehensive enough to commission a refutation of those works. And certainly *La convention de Gastein* was important because of the articles written by Adolph Guéroult, a known friend of the Prince. This friendship inspired rumors of Prince Napoleon's approval of the pamphlet. The use of brochures in a conspiratorial manner and the appearance of innumerable maps of Europe that seemed to reflect Napoleonic policy aroused suspicion and rumor and frequently gave far more significance to writings that were unimportant.

The last work to cause significant excitement appeared in February 1861 – *La France, Rome, et l'Italie*. After the appearance of this brochure, both the use and the effectiveness of brochures on foreign relations diminished sharply. Although there were many that caused speculation and even worry among the diplomats, none after February were political events in themselves. There are numerous reasons for the decline of the pamphlet's importance. Although this study has illustrated how successfully the brochure had originally been used to initiate policy, a myriad of lessor efforts soon appeared on so many varied topics that it became difficult for contemporaries to determine their importance. Those like *Est-ce la guerre? Est-ce la paix?* served the useful function of preparing opinion for the major pamphlets. But others like *L'Autriche et les principautés unies, La Turquie devant l'Europe, L'Angleterre et la guerre* were written to educate the public. The effect of this repetitive use of inspired pam-

phlets upon all subjects obeyed the law of diminishing returns in propaganda. Adding to the public's confusion in assessing the importance of brochures was the emperor's method of inspiring these works. He frequently resorted to conspiratorial methods in planning pamphlets. His ministers were frequently unaware of Napoleon III's connection with their composition. Moreover, if it was politically expedient, he never hesitated to deny the government connection and, if necessary, to have the pamphlet seized. For instance, the government-inspired *La coalition* caused a sudden drop on the stock market, whereupon the official press and the government emphatically denied any connection with the offending brochure. There were no less than four conflicting reports of its origin by astute observers. *Le roi d'Italie, la France, et Rome* enjoyed a short lively sale because the public thought that it had been inspired by government officials. Actually it had been commissioned by Ricasoli. La Guéronnière's *France* and his subsequent brochures after he founded his newspaper enjoyed a tremendous sale because of public knowledge of his role as a former official writer. Although it was widely known that his views did not represent the emperor's, his works still caused uneasiness and distress in Turin. In addition, by 1863 authors and publishing houses both had discovered the financial profit to be reaped by imitating the style and format of the imperial pamphlet. This acceleration in the number of works published not only added to the public confusion but also, as Napoleon III complained to Reuss, added to the embarrassment of the imperial government. Moreover, this constant publication and denial made all brochures, even the most innocuous, suspect of having higher inspiration. Thus, suspicion fell on pamphlets like *L'Empereur et le congrès, Napoleon III et la Pologne,* and *La dernière guerre.* The ambiguity of these little works inflamed the latent anxieties, distrusts, and apprehensions of foreign governments. To sum up, Napoleon III had debased and occassionally repudiated his propaganda currency, and then discovered that others often counterfeited it.

Another factor which often confused foreign observers was the nature of French censorship. Forcade, editor of the *Revue des deux mondes,* criticized these pamphlets and the dangers they created in foreign policy because of the misunderstanding of the press laws by foreign observers.[6] The subtleties of the administration of the *avertissements* and the seizure of brochures confused foreigners, who often thought that if a pamphlet circulated it represented an approved opinion. Sometimes, editorials in the provincial press as well as those in Paris convinced observers that they reflected secret government policy because the paper was not warned or

[6] *RDM,* ser. 2, XVI (15 August 1858), 956-957.

suspended. As I have shown, this was simply not so. Variety of opinion was permitted so long as the regime was not criticized or revolutionary doctrine was not preached. After 1860 controls relaxed. The general amnesty of 1859 permitted more papers to circulate. In 1861 the *Moniteur* began the regular printing of the legislative debates, which was soon followed by the publication of the *Livres jaunes*. At first the legislative body was largely packed with Bonapartists and conservatives, but gradually, as more opposition deputies entered the parliament, differing opinions appeared. Thus the *Livres jaunes* and the debates served to test opinion.

An additional factor in the less frequent use of inspired pamphlets was the difficulty of securing the services of younger men in the later years of the Second Empire. The reason lay in the very nature of an established political institution. Its early supporters had to be rewarded, and this meant that there were fewer opportunities which could lure able men to serve the empire. Just as in politics, so it was in journalism. After 1867 it became more and more difficult to lure younger authors into either the government press or ghost-writing service.

The loss of French initiative in foreign policy after 1861 was accompanied by the decline in the use of the brochure. It was difficult to write pamphlets testing opinion or even to announce a new plan of action when the government was unsure as to what it stands for or what it wishes to do. It was also difficult to generate excitement about policies that were essentially negative or defensive. During the Polish crisis in 1863, propaganda was indulged in by all opinions and parties in France. Sympathy was overwhelmingly in favor of the insurgent Poles. Not until July did the official press and propaganda operate to quiet bellicose feelings. Cassagnac's *L'Empereur, la Pologne et l'Europe* was ineffectual. Its reception was critical and small compared to the reception that earlier semi-official pamphlets had enjoyed. In the case of Poland the government was following opinion, attempting to quiet it, not molding or directing it as formerly. *Napoléon III et l'Europe* and *La papauté et l'Italie, de la nécessité d'un congrès* demanded congresses to solve French international dilemmas, but the regime knew that to realize this was impossible. In earlier years pamphlets usually had press support – articles, criticism, or comment – but these did not. *Napoléon III et l'Europe* appeared after a diplomatic defeat and while the government was encouraging warlike rumors in order to popularize changes in the army law. The three little maps which appeared in 1868 were an attempt to justify the political situation, but their arguments were so weak and fallacious that they aroused justifiable press

antagonism. The decline of political leadership was reflected in the absence of effective propaganda by the government.

The great majority of the brochures were designed for the articulate literate classes. Only one exception appeared, *Exposé succinct de la loi sur le recrutement de l'armée.* Inability to write for the masses was not the reason, for the success of this brochure resulted from considerable skill, both in composition and distribution. Obviously the other brochures were deliberately designed to reach for the educated. Their style and subject matter were such that only the educated could understand. The historical evidence substantiates this conclusion. The *procureurs* reports on the reaction to *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie* frequently allude to the fact the people did not understand the underlying political issues. They were concerned only with the larger problem of war or peace. Therefore, the government desired to influence French political and intellectual leaders in the hope they would establish a climate of opinion which would seep down to the semiliterate. Zeldin illustrates how candidates and political choices were not always dictated by loyalty to Bonapartism, but rather by the individual's standing in the community, by his ability to influence the voter.[7] No doubt this philosophy pervaded the thinking of those who ran the nation's press.

How much did the brochures reflect Napoleon III's philosophy of foreign policy? The historian must be careful in evaluating these works, for not all government-inspired brochures contained the emperor's thoughts. Some were inspired by lesser officials. Even those that Napoleon III edited reflected their author's viewpoint. Thus it is not strange that he could say he did not agree fully with the conclusions of *L'Empereur François-Joseph I et l'Europe* or *Napoléon III et l'Europe.* There are inconsistencies. *La Turquie devant l'Europe* supported Turkish attempts to reform her political and economic institutions. *La nouvelle carte d'Europe* spoke of the dismemberment of the Turkish empire as necessary for the welfare of Europe. Further analysis can explain this variance of ideas. *La Turquie devant l'Europe* was a justification of the Crimean War and the peace congress of 1856. Turkey could not be partitioned unless all the powers of Europe agreed and unless those countries acquiring new territory were enlarged without upsetting the power equilibrium. The Crimean war prevented Russia's seizing new lands that would have made her so powerful as to have upset the intricate balance of power.

[7] T. Zeldin, p. ...

But there are enough of the same ideas throughout the brochures to indicate that Napoleon III had a very definite philosophy of foreign policy. Just as he sought to fill the gap between the vast ideological differences besetting French political life, so he wished to establish some order in international relations by which problems would not be settled by force but by discussion and compromise at a conference table. Many of his plans and designs changed or failed because of the exigencies of practical foreign relations and his own inherent weaknesses and conspiratorial nature. Basically he desired peace in Europe, and he envisioned no program of conquest and domination as his uncle had. Within this framework he wanted French hegemony, but this leadership was to be through moral influence rather than physical force. Before France was to exercise her great "civilizing" influence, she had to be secure. Security meant the destruction of the peace settlement of 1815 so that the physical losses of her natural frontiers could be rectified. Napoleon III was always haunted by the fear that France would not grow as rapidly as her neighbors, industrially, economically, or demographically; therefore the acquisition of her natural boundaries would make the invasion of France more difficult. He was far more of an internationalist than his contemporaries, for he felt that a congress system would be a safeguard not only for French security but also for the peace of Europe. He based his congress system on the precedent of the settlement of 1815, but with a different basis for this system. The base was to be broadened and enlarged upon the principles of the French revolution, those of popular sovereignty and nationalism. He hoped that the revisions of French boundaries and the unification of peoples would have the sanction of the congress of the great powers and would not occur through revolution or sudden coups. He felt that France must aid and encourage national policy. He foresaw the emergence of the United States and Russia as the powers of the future, with Europe as the third force. Though in many ways a prophet, he based his international system upon long-established principles which had successfully maintained a precarious order after 1815 – the concepts of a European power equilibrium with a congress system to sustain it. The final result was the destruction of the congress system of 1815 and of the balance of power. Despite the internationalist base of his system, Napoleon III resorted to unilateral action to achieve many of his aims. The Franco-Prussian war, his ultimate failure, did not result merely in German hegemony but was also the final destruction of the congress system and the development of alliance systems which eventually led to increased international anarchy.

The emperor's policy was shaped and altered as a result of the inter-

actions of European international developments and the reaction that it might arouse in France. There was a direct contradiction at times, an ambivalence in his foreign relations. He believed in the inevitability of nationalism and in a congress system that would peacefully permit the emergence of new nations and the revision of French boundaries. Yet, in the case of Italy and of the Roman question in 1860 he deliberately avoided the calling of the very congress he so often advocated. The reason was political realism. In a European conference the conservative powers would have prevented realization of his goals. So he chose unilateral action. He spoke constantly of the inevitability of German nationalism, and when Prussia led the movement to a successful conclusion, he found himself torn between a desire for recognition of this movement and a frantic search for the means to guarantee French security. The result was confused and ineffectual diplomacy, coupled with an equally confused and vacillating propaganda effort.

The difficulty the emperor encountered in shaping his propaganda program was that it was often directed to the vagaries of French domestic opinion and therefore the pamphlets often expressed ideas that might cause suspicion and alarm in foreign embassies. Whatever the benign intentions of the emperor, the molders of foreign policy could only judge his motives on the diplomatic exchanges and the reports of French policy as expressed in the media. Since France was considered the most powerful nation in Europe, her policy – active or passive – was decisive for the future of all the powers. That France remained isolated in Europe in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian war cannot be laid at the door of French pamphlets; rather they can be considered a minor contributing factor in the general malaise that affected the European powers' attitude toward France.

To conclude, I must state that the pamphlet policy in the earlier years showed that it could succeed admirably in influencing foreign policy and leading French opinion. Continual use for minor questions and repudiation of its own brochures by the government resulted in their debasement. This confusing behavior also led the public and foreigners to believe mistakenly that many independent brochures were government-inspired. The resultant confusion dissipated their propaganda value within France and served to increase and heighten the existing suspicion toward her by the other great powers.

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