

Leading the South: Emerging Powers in International Institutions

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A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of
The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences
of The George Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2017

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Leading the South: Emerging Powers in International Institutions

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Dedication

For my parents, Fred and Patricia Wade, whose continual support made this dissertation possible.

Acknowledgments

They say it takes a village, and this dissertation is no exception. First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee for their ongoing support, feedback and guidance on the journey to this PhD. One of the main reasons I pursued my M.A. at GWU was Cynthia McClintock's leadership of the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies program at the time. She graciously hosted a small group of us for dinner after the program Open House, and the community she fostered among our cohort was a huge part of my decision to attend GWU (not to mention, of course, her vast knowledge and experience in Latin American politics). Her continued support throughout my Master's program, and her guidance and encouragement were fundamental in my decision to pursue a doctoral degree in Political Science at GWU. Cynthia, you were formative in my academic journey, and I can't thank you enough for your support and guidance over the years.

I owe another debt of gratitude to Stephen Kaplan, was also central in my scholarly development through our frequent meetings that helped me clarify and refine my argument and methodology immensely. The opportunity to be a teaching assistant for Stephen's undergraduate classes allowed me to witness his gift for capturing students' attention in fun and unique ways, all while challenging them intellectually with projects and ideas that were "outside the box." Stephen, your feedback throughout the dissertation process was invaluable, and I always appreciated your practical help and advice about time management as well, given the unique challenges of balancing parenthood with a doctoral degree.

Susan Sell, thank you for taking on another committee for a student you never yourself had, for graciously meeting with me about my project and kindly offering me chocolate during our meeting at the Wilson Center (chocolate always makes things better, in my opinion). You stuck with me throughout an international move and remained upbeat and cheerful – something not overlooked by tired doctoral students who often desperately need an injection of positivity to continue down the road. Your insight on global governance was always enlightening and added significantly to my project, and your presence on the committee made the whole dissertation process was more enjoyable. I am incredibly grateful to my committee, who graciously handled the multiple “life events” the emerged for me throughout this process – I truly would not have been able to complete this project without your persistent support.

I am also indebted to the kind help of many preeminent scholars and practitioners of Brazilian politics. The scholarship of Sean Burges with ANU on Brazilian foreign policy was highly influential in my decision to concentrate on the country in my doctoral studies. Thank you, Sean, for making possible some of my most informative and memorable interviews, and for graciously sharing your wisdom and advice on the practical matters of field research in Brazil. Mark Langevin with BrazilWorks and GWU always provided great insight on Brazilian current affairs, and his input on my interests, my topic, and his enormous help in putting me in touch with some fabulous Brazil contacts and interviewees, greatly strengthened my field research experience. I also owe a heartfelt thanks to Renata de Melo Rosa at UNICEUB, and David Fleischer and Danielly Ramos at UnB, and for their feedback and the many contacts they provided for my field research in Brazil. Throughout my M.A. and PhD program, Paulo Sotero with

the Wilson Center has provided feedback on my projects, suggested avenues of interest for research, and even presented a paper on my behalf at LASA when I had just arrived home with a newborn. He kindly reached out to his many Brazilian friends before my trip to personally introduce me to several ambassadors, who graciously invited me into their homes as a guest and friend of Paulo's. While in Brazil, I had the opportunity to meet with Valter Pomar of UFCABC, Eduardo Viola of UnB, and Amado Cervo of UnB and IRBr, all of which were incredibly enlightening interviews that opened my eyes to new perspectives toward the country's foreign affairs, climate change policy, and history of diplomacy. Hélio Tollini with ICTSD and Denilson Galbero with ABRAPA shared with me their expertise in the country's trade and agriculture policy as well, which greatly strengthened my understanding of Brazil's position within the WTO. Sergio Leo with Valor Econômico also kindly provided a dynamic perspective on the country's current foreign affairs. Without the time and insight of the many scholars and practitioners listed above, my field research would have been far less rich.

I would also like to thank the numerous Brazilian diplomats who remain unnamed in this dissertation, with whom I spoke during my field research. Thank you for your time, your insight, and for sharing honestly about the current challenges in Brazil, yet reminding me what promise the country possesses – as evidenced by your graciousness, expertise, and guiding belief in multilateral solutions, and continual commitment toward achieving that end. Despite the difficulties facing the country economically and politically, the diplomats of Itamaraty reflect highly of their country. To the ambassadors that graciously invited me into their homes for a *cafezinho* and openly discussed their experiences and thoughts with me, these are conversations that opened my eyes to the

trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy, and memories of my field research I will always cherish. Thank you to Ambassador Brito Cruz, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, Ambassador Rubens Barbosa, Ambassador Castro Neves, Ambassador Roberto Abdenur, and Ambassador Seixas Corrêa (the latter who generously gifted me my own signed copy of his foundational *Brazil in the United Nations: 1946-2011* during our interview). A huge thank you to Mariana Klemig as well for working with schedules and persisting in making an interview with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim possible, and thank you to Ambassador Celso Amorim for your openness and friendliness. Discussing your experiences as a central figure in some of the most important moments of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, while enjoying the view of Copacabana and the tram of Pão de Açúcar on my last day in Brazil, was unforgettable.

An enormous hug to all the friends and family who provided dinners, childcare, and emotional support during the challenges of writing a dissertation as a full-time mom to two kids under three years of age. This includes far more names than I could list here, but thank you to Cindy Brown, Nikki Baker, Natalie Apodaca, Holly Bechard, Becky Turnbull, Julia Macdonald, Helen Harris and Madeleine Wells, among many others. My family can't be thanked enough either – my sister, Katherine Wade, always offered understanding and encouragement, and my mother in law, Nancy Alcorn, regularly watched the kids so I could get away and focus on my writing. I would be months behind if it weren't for "Nana."

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, because they truly made this dissertation possible. All their support during my M.A., which opened the door to pursuing a doctorate, to their continual belief in the value of education, allows me to be

here today. They made my field research in Brazil their vacation, utilizing their time and finances to accompany me (a tired, emotional, 20-weeks-pregnant PhD student at the time) and provide childcare for our son while I traveled around for interviews, all without having been to Brazil before or speaking Portuguese. Brazil, and all the amazing interviews and experiences of our time there, would not have happened without them. I can't thank you both enough, Mom and Dad. Thank you for all the sacrifices you made to help me pursue my academic dreams.

To Riley and Eden, my two “dissertation babies” – you both made the journey to the doctorate longer and more circuitous, but I wouldn't trade it for anything. Bringing you, Riley, (and Eden, who was on the way) to Brazil with Daddy, Mimi and Grandpa, was unforgettable. I will always cherish the memories of you playing in the sand and surf of Ipanema and drinking out of a fresh coconut bigger than your face. I hope someday, when you and Eden are old enough to understand, you'll be proud of your mom for juggling the demands of full-time motherhood and a doctoral program, and for pushing through to get this PhD.

My husband and I had recently started dating when I began the PhD program, and Joshua has been my biggest fan, supporter, and rock throughout the ups and downs of the past seven years; through marriage, two kids, job changes, and a cross-country move. I joke that he deserves half a PhD (at least), because he's been a proofreader, coordinator, time management consultant, Excel wizard, sounding board for my ideas and theory, strategy consultant, and life coach the whole way through. In the low points of tears and exhaustion where I doubted I could continue, his unwavering belief in me sustained me

and helped me find the strength to keep going. This program has been a journey for both of us, and I'm forever grateful you were by my side. The best is yet to be.

Abstract of Dissertation

Leading the South: Emerging Powers in International Institutions

The lack of representativeness in key global organizations like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and World Trade Organization (WTO) increasingly undercuts the credibility and efficacy of these institutions in solving pressing international issues, largely because they often fail to reflect the needs and preference of the majority of their members. Given that improving domestic economic and social development underlies any lasting solution to global challenges like food scarcity, rising temperatures, and refugee crises, adjustments to better reflect the priorities of developing countries within the global institutional environment are paramount. How are pressing issues of trade, security, and the environment negotiated and managed in core international institutions? How are greater voice and representation achieved for developing countries desiring a stake in achieving common goals in the global sphere?

This dissertation argues emerging powers like Brazil or India seek more than security or autonomy; but instead pursue leadership toward the resolution of common goals with other developing countries, whose fate depends on their collective ability to negotiate, reform and engage core global institutions toward the common goal of greater development. While scholars often describe states' foreign policy activity by employing the term "leadership" to describe behavior, the concept remains underspecified and unoperationalized, lacking a conceptual framework that would allow for comparing leadership over time or across countries. Building on literature regarding regional and middle powers, as well as arguments about autonomy as a driving force for foreign policy, I define leadership in international institutions as an acceptance of "opportunity

costs” (whether material, ideational or diplomatic) associated with fulfilling a representative function on behalf of a specific subset of “followers” toward the resolution of salient international issues. In the cases of interests in this dissertation, “followers” are global South countries that possess common issues, interests and goals as leading states, yet that lack the ability or will to lead.

Extent literature on regional and middle powers also lacks concrete linkages to domestic-level factors that give rise to this behavior in the global arena. This dissertation argues the ability to provide leadership in international institutions stems from three specific state-level factors: 1) capability from economic growth and stability; 2) credibility from a shared “Southern” development perspective; and 3) willingness from bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence. Variation in these domestic-level components impacts leadership provision in key global forums, affecting the possibility of reforming and restructuring key global institutions to better represent the interests of the developing world.

This theory seeks to help us understand what enabled emerging powers like Brazil to lead in the late 1990s to 2010 timeframe, and what precipitated a decline in leadership provision thereafter. It also explores whether the framework of capability, credibility and willingness could “travel” to other countries like India and Mexico, explaining leadership or the lack thereof in global institutions. Particularly given the current international context where key multilateral forums prove increasingly sidelined and mired in stalemate, emerging power leadership is all the more critical to equitable development on the part of the global South, as well as to the management of pressing international issues.

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List of Acronyms

ABC (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)
ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)
AMEXCID (Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation)
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
BAU (Business-as-Usual)
BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative)
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
CDF (Clean Development Fund)
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism)
COP (Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC)
DPA (Development Partnership Administration)
DSM (Dispute Settlement Mechanism)
FIP (Five Interested Parties)
G-20 (Group of 20)
G-4 (Group of Four)
G-77 (Group of 77)
GCF (Green Climate Fund)
GHG (Greenhouse Gas)
GRULAC (Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries, UNSC)
INDC (Intended Nationally Determined Contribution)
IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)
MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India)
MERCOSUL (Common Market of the South)
MONUSCO (UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
MRE (Ministry of External Relations, Brazil)
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)
NEP (National Environmental Policy)
NG-5 (Non-Group of Five)
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation Development)
ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique)
P-5 (Permanent Five, UNSC)
PMNC (National Climate Change Plan)
SRE (Secretariat of External Relations, Mexico)
UFC (United for Consensus)
UN (United Nations)
UNATAET (United Nations Transitional Mission in East Timor)
UNAVEM (United Nations Angola Verification Mission)
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)
UNGA (United Nations General Assembly)
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)

UNSC (United Nations Security Council)
WTO (World Trade Organization)

Chapter 1: Leadership in International Institutions

“It is right for Brazil to play a more active role internationally. So we don't want to discuss with America just Brazil, the United States, or South America. We want to discuss also what is happening in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. We believe a change is due...Brazil is ready for the responsibilities of a permanent member seat, and we have confidence that other countries believe Brazil is ready to play this role.”¹

- *Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil, 1999*

Although they contain most countries around the world as members, current global organizations like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and World Trade Organization (WTO) concentrate decision-making power in the hands of a small group. This lack of representativeness increasingly undercuts the credibility and efficacy of these institutions in solving pressing international issues, largely because they often fail to reflect the needs and preference of the majority of their members. A core concern for Southern states regarding multilateral institutions is the need to adjust the rules of the international system so that the “bottom billion” issues of poverty, inequality and social justice can be addressed.² Given that improving domestic economic and social development underlies any lasting solution to global challenges like food scarcity, rising global temperatures, border conflicts and refugee crises, adjustments to better address and reflect the priorities of developing countries within the global institutional environment is paramount.

How are pressing issues of trade, security, and the environment negotiated and managed in core international institutions? How are greater voice and representation achieved for developing countries desiring a stake in achieving common goals in the

¹ James F. Hoge, Jr. 1995. “Fulfilling Brazil’s Promise A Conversation with President Cardoso.” *Foreign Affairs*.

² Paul Collier. 2007. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. New York: Oxford University Press.

global sphere? Dirk Nabers suggests, “The more universal the character of the issues is and the greater the number of participating states tends to be, the more important effectual leadership is in order to move forward toward an accord.”³ This dissertation argues that emerging power leadership in global institutions is indeed critical to more equitable development on the part of the global South, as well as to the management of key international issues.

I define leadership in international institutions as an acceptance of “opportunity costs” (whether material, ideational or diplomatic) associated with fulfilling a representative function on behalf of a specific subset of “followers” toward the resolution of salient international issues. In the cases of interests in this dissertation, “followers” are global South countries that possess common issues, interests and goals as leading states, yet that lack the ability or will to lead. Broad consensus exists that leadership generally entails influencing followers toward a mutual goal – which often involves gaining legitimacy, building coalitions, acting as a mediator, building institutions, resolving disputes, and providing public goods.⁴ Additionally, leadership may also require pragmatism, flexibility, fairness, imagination, compromise, technical expertise, etc.⁵

Amrita Narlikar provides a general summary of leadership behavior as described in current literature:

³ Dirk Nabers. “Power, Leadership and Hegemony” in Flemes, Daniel, ed. 2010. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 59. See also Christer Karlsson and Charles F. Parker. “Leadership and International Cooperation” in Rhodes, R.A.W. and Paul t’Hart, eds. 2014. *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*. Cambridge, UK: Oxford University Press. 581.

⁴ Please see Chapter 2 for a full discussion of literature on leadership.

⁵ For example, Oran Young. 1989. The politics of international regime formation: managing nature resources and the environment.” *International Organization* 43(3): 349-275; Sandra Destradi. 2010. “Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership.” *Review of International Studies*. 36 James MacGregor Burns. 1978. *Leadership*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers; James MacGregor Burns. 2003. *Transforming Leadership*. New York, NY: Grove Press; David A. Deese. 2008. *World Trade Politics: Power, principles and leadership*. Oxon: Routledge; Jarrod Wiener. 1995. *Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT: A Study of International Leadership*. Hants, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., among others.

“Being a leader at the international level goes beyond the ability of a state to assert its own interests, and includes an ability and willingness to advance original solutions, broker compromises, and share a significant proportion of the burden of providing global public goods (such as free trade or the maintenance of international stability and peace).”⁶

While scholars have categorized and described states’ foreign policy activity at a regional and global level, sometimes employing the term “leadership” to describe behaviors, the concept remains underspecified and unoperationalized, lacking a conceptual framework that would allow for comparing leadership over time or across countries. This dissertation hopes to contribute greater clarity and specificity to the study of leadership in the global arena.

In addition to confusion regarding the concept of leadership, extant literature on regional and middle powers also lacks concrete linkages to domestic-level factors that give rise to this behavior in the global arena. This dissertation argues the ability to provide leadership in international institutions stems from three specific state-level factors: 1) capability from economic growth and stability; 2) credibility from a shared “Southern” development perspective; and 3) willingness from bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence. Variation in these domestic-level components impacts leadership provision in key global forums, affecting the possibility of reforming and restructuring key global institutions to better represent the interests of the developing world. This theory seeks to help us understand what enabled emerging powers like Brazil to lead in the late 1990s to 2010 timeframe, and what precipitated a decline in leadership provision thereafter. It also explores whether the framework of capability,

⁶ Amrita Narlikar. 2010a. *New Powers: How to Become One and How to Manage Them*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 14.

credibility and willingness could “travel” to other countries like India and Mexico, explaining leadership or the lack thereof in global institutions.

The Global Institutional Context

International institutions are “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe or authorize behavior,”⁷ which for the purposes of this dissertation are explicit organizations with physical locations and staff. States can guide and lead collective action toward specific goals by utilizing the norms, rules, procedures and structures of international institutions. Dirk Nabers argues that leadership requires the “continuity, stability and repetition” of an institutional context that allows states to “actively engage in institution-building to create the environment in which leadership can be exercised.”⁸ Institutions provide a specific, routinized context for multilateral negotiations that makes the study of leadership methodologically and practically possible. Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold further contend that “leadership is the very essence of a capacity for collective action” in the context of multilateral negotiations.⁹ Without leadership, collective action problems in the international arena, where no central governing body with the power of ultimate enforcement can monitor and punish, prove intractable.

Leadership in international, multilateral institutions may also be preferable to developing countries because of the constraints it places on the need to provide material resources. Countries like India or Brazil are home to the “bottom billion,” facing a

⁷ Barbara Koremenos et al. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” *International Organization* 55(4): 762.

⁸ Dirk Nabers. 2010. “Power, leadership, and hegemony in international politics: the case of East Asia.” *Review of International Studies* 36: 935.

⁹ Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. 1970. *Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 128.

significant tradeoff between addressing the pervasive poverty and inequality within their domestic populations, and devoting resources to foreign policy.¹⁰ Multilateral institutions allow costs to be dispersed among members, even if leading states assume a larger portion than “follower” states. States seeking leadership in international institutions can coordinate positions, offer technical or financial support, spearhead joint proposals, etc., toward common goals with the global South without necessitating the level of material resources developed countries bring to the table.

Global South countries may also prefer negotiations in multilateral forums because they can plausibly result in more equitable solutions. One of the problems with the bilateral/trilateral agreements developed countries like the US have pursued with developing countries like Peru, for example, is that often the terms of the agreement benefit one state asymmetrically. In this case, the US achieved greater control over intellectual property rights and the ability to restrict the Peruvian government’s ability to pass certain domestic regulations.¹¹ In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico, the latter failed to negotiate many of the significant agricultural provisions with the US that would have provided greater protections to their domestic sectors – provisions that the G-20 coalition of developing countries (G-20) insisted be addressed in the World Trade Organization (WTO)

¹⁰ See Paul Collier. 2008. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About It*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).

¹¹ The US-Peru Trade Agreement went into effect in 2009. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, has written on the topic of asymmetric trade agreements within the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), specifically how the agreement raises intellectual property protections and limits, for example, the ability of countries to produce generic medications. It also restricts the ability of governments to pass regulations to protect public health, safety and the environment. See Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2015. *The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them. Price of Inequality*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company; Joseph E. Stiglitz and Adam S. Hersh. 2015. “Nobel de Economía a Humala: No permitan que el TPP encierre al Perú en relaciones comerciales desiguales.” *La República*.

ministerial in Cancún in 2003.¹² In addition to avoiding asymmetric agreements, one Brazilian minister explained developing countries' preferences for multilateral institutions as a matter of efficiency; multilaterals avoid duplication and overlapping, and simplify rules, procedures and negotiations.¹³ Rather than pursue a series of bilateral agreements, rising powers prefer to negotiate in one forum and end with a single agreement with less asymmetry of benefits between developed and developing countries.

This dissertation does not seek to minimize the importance of regional or sub-regional institutions or agreements, but merely focuses instead on institutional negotiations at the broader global level. Although regional institutions are significant; for example, Brazil in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL) or India in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ASEAN ARF), ultimately many core issues facing the world today hinge on global, multilateral agreements. For example, although a region might enact a climate change policy; it is unlikely this will unleash the type of mitigation efforts required to effectively address the issue of global warming. Likewise, myriad regional trade agreements in effect often overlap and conflict with larger attempts at global free trade, making the need for international coordination and compromise all the more pressing.

Moreover, whereas regional strategies often center upon groupings of countries with common political and economic policies, broader global institutions like the WTO or UN contain members possessing a wide variety of foreign policy “strategies.” For example, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation Development (OECD) groups a

¹² This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 6. See also John Buell. 2008. “US-Peru Trade Deal Adds Insult to NAFTA’s Injury.” *Common Dreams Organization*. Available: www.commondreams.org.

¹³ Personal interview with Director of Department of Inter-Regional Mechanisms, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE). 6 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

set of market-oriented countries with neoliberal economic policies and closer ties to the US; the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) centers around socialist governments in Latin America pursuing a very different foreign policy strategy. The study of broad institutions like the WTO and UN allows for a more equitable comparison of states with different strategies, within organizations that possesses members from a variety of perspectives.

Countries of Interest

Many smaller, developing countries lack the resources (material, ideational or diplomatic) to spearhead efforts toward reforming core global institutions. While smaller states often exercise leadership in a more regional context (Cuba or Venezuela, for example, accept costs and provide goods toward Caribbean and Andean “follower” states through ALBA); broader projection to a global audience requires more significant resources, and sufficient capability, credibility and willingness may prove less likely (though not impossible) in smaller states.

Emerging powers, in contrast, may increasingly possess the resources needed to gain greater voice and representation in these forums. Yet, only a select group of emerging states has proven willing to pay the costs of providing leadership needed to unify and articulate concrete ideas, proposals, and policies which reflect these common interests of the global South. For example, Brazil, Mexico, and India all possess a history of strong activism within global institutions in the 1960s and 1970s, creating the Group of 77 (G-77) developing countries within the United Nations (UN) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War. Yet only Brazil and India demonstrated leadership during the timeframe of interest in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Why do some states, on the whole, provide more leadership than others? This dissertation argues that variation in state-level capability (stemming from economic growth), credibility (garnered by a shared Southern development perspective) and willingness (possessing bureaucratic capacity and presidential influence/interest) impacts the provision of leadership in core global institutions. For example, Brazil, Mexico and India have all possessed sufficient levels of capability for a large portion of the timeframe of interest. Yet for Brazil and India, credibility from development aid and membership in global South institutions, as well as sufficient investment in bureaucratic resources and executive interest in foreign policy, resulted in leadership in institutions like the UNSC, WTO, and UNFCCC.

Brazil (along with India) spearheaded the creation of the G-20 of developing nations which pressured developed countries like the US or European Union (EU) at multiple Doha Rounds of the WTO.¹⁴ Brazil is involved in more peacekeeping missions than any other Latin American country, and is the only major Latin American country to hold leadership of a mission (United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti, MINUSTAH), a fact that stands in contrast to other regionally influential states like Mexico and Venezuela, neither of which are significantly involved in UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁵ India is an even more significant contributor to UN Peacekeeping than Brazil.¹⁶ Brazil and India are key members of the Group of Four (“G-4,” along with Germany and Japan) pushing for an expansion of the United Nations Security Council to

¹⁴ Pedro da Motta Viegas. “Case Study 7: Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries” in Gallagher, Peter, Patrick Low, and Andrew L. Stoker, eds. 2005. *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 109-119.

¹⁵ Venezuela does not contribute, and Mexico has provided 30 contributions in the form of military experts (rather than troops). “Contributions by Country.” 31 December 2016. *UN Peacekeeping*. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

grant more balanced representation to the body.¹⁷ In the UNFCCC, even though Brazil possesses relatively low levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs), Ken Johnson argues Brazil demonstrates a “desire to provide leadership even on issues in which it does not have a direct stake.”¹⁸ In sum, Brazil has “engaged decisively in international cooperation, having become a key donor among the developing nations, with a strong emphasis on poverty alleviation, health, agriculture and education.”¹⁹

While Mexico also possesses sufficient material resources for leadership, lackluster credibility from “follower” states, as well as insufficient willingness both in terms of bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence, have generally precluded a leadership bid in the global arena during the timeframe of interest. In contrast to Brazil and India, Mexico has largely played a muted global role, with the exception of climate change negotiations. Despite its activism in bilateral and trilateral trade pacts, the country is comparatively less active on developing-country coalitions and issues in the WTO and lost a bid for the Secretary-General position to Brazil in 2013. In terms of the UNSC, Mexico has only held the GRULAC seat on the UNSC 4 times, in comparison with Brazil’s 10 or India’s 7.²⁰ Mexico is also noticeably absent from UN peacekeeping operations, whereas Brazil and India play a substantial role in missions.²¹ The exception to Mexico’s pattern of non-leadership, however, emerges in the realm of climate change negotiations around 2009, when an uptick in presidential interest and

¹⁷Mônica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima. 2006. “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” *International Affairs* 82(1): 32.

¹⁸ Ken Johnson. 2001. “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change.” *Journal of Environment & Development* 10(2): 185.

¹⁹ Costa Vaz 2012, 142.

²⁰ “Countries Elected Members of the Security Council.” *United Nations Security Council*. Accessed 3 February 2017. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp>.

²¹ UN Peacekeeping, 2016.

influence under former president Felipe Calderón led to a period of Mexican activism within the UNFCCC.

Beyond variation *between* countries, differing levels of capability, credibility and willingness can also shed light on variation in leadership provision *within* a country over time. Through the 1990s until 2010, Brazilian capability, credibility and willingness increased and corresponded with a greater engagement in global institutions, peaking around 2010 with unprecedented activism through the acceptance of costs and provisions of goods to “follower” states. Although excitement regarding the BRICS countries and “emerging powers” experiencing skyrocketing growth was ample leading up to 2010, enthusiasm has since significantly declined. For example, when the Indian economy slowed around 2012, reduced material capacity hindered the country’s ability to accept costs toward compromising on agricultural negotiations in the WTO, contributing to stalemate and frustration among members of the organization.²² While India has largely been able to recover its economic growth since this time, in the Brazilian case leadership has declined precipitously post-2011.²³

This dissertation explores patterns of capability, credibility and willingness toward a greater understanding of emerging power leadership given its pressing need in international institutions. Jonathan Koppell argues, “The more a GGO’s [global governance organization] activities ‘matter,’ the more valuable influence over the GGO

²² This will be further explored in Chapter 7.

²³ See for example Catherine Putz. 11 November 2015. “Is It Time to Put Away the BRICS?” *The Diplomat*; Hamish McRae. 1 April 2015. “Is the concept of the Bric countries still valid, 14 years after its presentation?” *The Independent*; Daniel W. Drezner. 10 November 2015. “The rise and fall of the BRICS.” *The Washington Post*; Carl Meacham and Marcos Degaut. 21 October 2015. “Do the BRICS Still Matter?” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*.

becomes.”²⁴ This places a premium on possessing a seat at the “decision-making table” of core economic, security and environmental institutions shaping governance for the world. Yet, a lack of representativeness largely means that the global South fails to get what it wants from the existing global system, and complicates any movement toward solving collective action problems at the global level. Moreover, as developed countries like the US and UK increasingly signal a preference for “exiting” the system, emerging power leadership to reinvigorate the multilateral system appears even more critical.²⁵

Plan of the Dissertation

After introducing my argument in the context of current global power structures, Chapter 2 further delineates my theory of leadership in international institutions, providing background on the cases of interest and an overview of the key variables and methodology employed in the dissertation. Chapter 2 will also review relevant literature on leadership and regional powers, and present plausible alternative arguments to my theory of leadership in international institutions. Chapter 3 will explore my main case of interest, Brazil, analyzing the broad trajectory of variation in the country’s leadership in international institutions during the timeframe of interest. Chapter 4 considers patterns in domestic-level factors (capability, credibility and willingness) that contribute to differing levels of leadership provision explored in the previous chapter. Chapter 5 goes into greater detail of Brazilian leadership within three major international institutions – the WTO, UNSC, and UNFCCC – tracing over time the country’s activism within these key

²⁴ Jonathan Koppell. 2010. *World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy and the Design of Global Governance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 7; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” *International Organization* 53(4): pp. 699-732.

²⁵ The US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change agreement under President Trump, and Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) are two recent examples.

global forums. Chapter 6 then analyzes Mexican foreign policy, comparing the country's relative absence of leadership in international institutions with that of Brazil and exploring differences in domestic-level capability, credibility and willingness that might explain the country's more reserved role in the global arena. Chapter 7 considers Indian foreign policy in international institutions, seeking to understand to what extent my theory "travels" to a different region and geopolitical context. In Chapter 8, I assess overall trends in capability, credibility and willingness, and their relationship to leadership provision comparatively. I then explore the plausibility of alternative arguments in the cases of interest, and conclude the dissertation with an analysis of my findings and a discussion of how leadership on the part of emerging powers relates to the broader question of changing global governance and the future of multilateralism.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

While the previous chapter explored the pressing need for leadership in global institutions, this chapter considers how the concept is currently addressed within international relations (IR) literature on middle powers and regional powers. Although the word “leadership” is evoked frequently in this literature, a concrete, operationalized definition remains lacking. This chapter considers extant literature on middle powers (often seen as leaders) and regional powers (potential leaders of their regional space), highlighting the confusion surrounding regional and global leadership and the subsequent need to reevaluate existing theories. It then unpacks my theory of leadership in international institutions, providing a framework for better conceptualizing leadership based on “opportunity costs” of concrete actions taken by states to provide material, bureaucratic and/or ideational goods for “follower” states in key global institutions. This chapter also considers motives underlying the leadership behaviors of emerging powers, like a quest for autonomy that could plausibly explain instances of leadership in the global arena. These alternative arguments, though insightful, ultimately fail to delineate specific determinants leading to the outcome of global leadership. Seeking to remedy this issue, this chapter argues that leadership in international institutions stems from specific domestic-level factors of capability, credibility and willingness.

Transactional Approaches to Leadership

Oran Young and Arild Underdal represent IR scholars who have most notably extended the concept of leadership to the international arena, focusing on leadership as a means to solve collective action problems. Underdal defines leadership as the “asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior

of others toward a certain goal.”²⁶ The most prominent theorization of leadership in international relations is Young’s study of global environmental governance, which utilizes a transactional approach to leadership categorized in three distinct veins: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual. Leadership is defined as “the actions of individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining.”²⁷ His work focuses on individuals who “raise the possibility of success in creating contracts that all parties are willing to accept” (although leadership does not always guarantee success) and argues these individuals are key in understanding international regime formation.²⁸ One must ask, however, if the specific individuals can explain longer-term foreign policy trajectories that exhibit institutional leadership even as specific individuals come and go from positions of prominence in foreign policy. Are there attributes of leadership that can be attributed to states in general, moving up the ladder of abstraction to inform us how we might see leadership in international organizations by states over time? James MacGregor Burns argues that we can move past envisioning leadership as a function of mere individuals toward “... leadership as the basic process of social change, of causation in a community, an organization, a nation - perhaps even the globe.”²⁹

This dissertation argues for a broadening of the concept of leadership to the level of the state. While Young’s categorization leads us on the right track to explicate a

²⁶ Arild Underdal. “Leadership theory: Rediscovering the arts of management” in Zartman, W.I. 1994. *International multilateral negotiation: Approaches to the management of complexity*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1994. 178.

²⁷ Oran Young. 1989. The politics of international regime formation: managing nature resources and the environment.” *International Organization* 43(3): 285.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ James MacGregor Burns. 2003. *Transforming Leadership*. New York, NY: Grove Press. 185.

definition of leadership and draw out the different types we might see in global governance, it fails to explore why these different veins emerge in the first place or how/if the type of leadership employed by states changes or remains constant over time or issue area. Moreover, there remains a focus on individual leaders without considering how this may overlap with the state and the state's method of applying leadership in international institutions. The question also remains as to why we see certain states practicing leadership and others not, nor why certain states might at times demonstrate leadership and not at other moments. For example, does leadership stem purely from state size or material capabilities? In short, this literature fails to explore the variation on the outcome of interest, and how this might stem from additional domestic sources besides mere economic power.

Other authors who focus on institutional bargaining at the international level include leadership as a significant – if not necessary – variable to achieve collective action. Transactional approaches focus on the importance of leadership in the provision of global public goods, often in the context of institutional bargaining.³⁰ However, the type of public good provided does not have to be material – Young argues that leadership can include material resources (structural leadership) as well as innovative ideas (intellectual), or the power of persuasion (instrumental). Charles Parker and Christer Karlsson address the overlap within the main modes of leadership and suggest four broad types: structural, directional, idea-based, instrumental.³¹ Structural leadership invokes hard power resources and can include coercion, utilizing “sticks and carrots;” directional

³⁰ Amrita Narlikar. 2013. “Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” *International Affairs* 89(3): 568.

³¹ Young 1991, 287-288 identifies three types of leadership: structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial; Underdal 1994, 183-91 categorizes them as coercive, unilateral, and instrumental. For a discussion of the overlap between leadership categorization, see Karlsson and Parker 2014, 858.

involves being a “first-mover” and committing to act in a manner that invokes others to follow; idea-based (or Young’s “intellectual” leadership) involves changing others’ ideas about a particular problem and offering new solutions; and finally, instrumental (Young’s entrepreneurial leadership) also promotes innovative solutions but through negotiation and bridge-building between parties to create agreements on policy. While the classification of different types of leadership style is useful, studies like Young’s are primarily interested in leadership as an explanation for the outcome of regime formation, rather than in leadership as an outcome itself.³² This dissertation, in contrast, focuses on the domestic-level variables that point to the outcome of leadership – in other words, leadership is the phenomenon to be explained. The variation on the outcome of interest in this study is the emergence of leadership or the lack of leadership.

While scholars like Young and Underdal have elaborated distinct types of leadership, most contend that a combination these are often necessary to move participants toward the goal. This is an interesting consideration for the extension of the concept of leadership to emerging powers; states like Brazil, India or South Africa lack the material resources to wield significant structural leadership based on the provision of sticks and carrots. Therefore, central to a discussion of leadership on the part of these emerging powers is the ability to utilize a more ideational type of leadership with a lesser emphasis on structural power. Miles Kahler, for example, argues, “Negotiating styles have compensated for deficits in capabilities. India and Brazil, for example, share an activism and engagement, particularly in trade negotiations, that cannot be explained by

³² Young: The individuals who assume leadership roles are key in understanding regime formation in international society (p.285).

sheer commercial power.”³³

Middle Powers as Leaders

Classical middle powers (MP) literature focuses on similarities in the behaviors of “intermediate states” located between great and weak powers in the international system, summarizing this behavior in the term “middlepowermanship.” Andrew Cooper’s *Niche Diplomacy*³⁴ is laden with the term “leadership” as he and contributing authors seek to understand emerging multipolarity and the widening scope of issue areas in which MPs are exercising leadership. Many of the activities undertaken by MPs as described in this literature are related to leadership, such as institution-building, agenda-setting, and policy coordination.³⁵ The concept of an MP is often linked to the strategy of multilateral engagement in international institutions as a means to exert influence regionally or globally. Both Robert Keohane and Robert Cox also emphasize the strategy of middle powers in the realm of international organizations through which middle powers can have an impact.³⁶ MPs tend to work in multilateral institutions and focus on norm building, similar to “soft power” techniques.³⁷ Cooper et al suggest that MPs embrace multilateralism as a means to solving international problems, by adopting positions of compromise in international disputes, and utilizing the concept of a “good global citizen”

³³ Miles Kahler. 2013. “Rising powers and global governance: negotiation change in a resilient status quo.” *International Affairs* 89(3): 721.

³⁴ Andrew F. Cooper, ed. 1997. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd. 25-45.

³⁵ Andrew Cooper, Kim R. Nossal and Richard A. Higgot. 1993. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Washington: University of Washington Press. 26.

³⁶ Robert O. Keohane. 1969. “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics.” *International Organization*. 23(2): 291-310; Robert W. Cox. 1989. “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order.” *International Journal* 44(4): 823-862.

³⁷ David A. Cooper. 2011. “Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for ‘Middle Power Theory.’” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7. 321; Robert W. Cox. 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 243.

in diplomatic relations.³⁸ Literature on middle powers argues these states possess common characteristics; their “abiding preference for multilateralism rather than bilateral approaches to statecraft; middle powers also manifest a marked preference for conducting their diplomacy in the context of international institutions.”³⁹

Yet classic MP literature does not accurately reflect the world today where emerging powers have increasingly reformed institutions and created their own organizations in which to exercise leadership. Classical MP literature defined middle powers and their ability to exercise influence as largely a function of their relationships with dominant powers like the US or EU. The concept, traditionally used to describe states that are allies of the US such as European countries and Canada, fails to accurately capture the diversity and foreign policy orientations – as well as the material capabilities – of countries like Brazil, China or India. Ironically, Chris Alden et al note the classical MPs referenced in this literature (like Switzerland or the Netherlands), lost out as emerging powers like Brazil gained access to the New Quad of core negotiating countries in the WTO or received greater voting rights in the IMF.⁴⁰ This dissertation seeks to build upon extant MP literature interested in how non-dominant states exercise leadership in the international arena, but with an eye to how emerging powers have broken the MP mold as described in the literature. While emerging powers like Brazil or India lack the material capabilities to challenge greater powers like China or the US, they are quite different from traditional MP states like Canada or Australia. This illustrates

³⁸ Cooper et al 1993, 19.

³⁹ Kim R. Nossal and Richard Stubbs. “Mahathir’s Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?” in Cooper, Andrew F., ed. 1997. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 151.

⁴⁰ Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira. 2010. *The South in World Politics*. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. 216.

fundamental problems in the conceptualization of MPs, particularly when the definition of a middle power itself remains tautological. Cooper contends “Middle power status, then, is determinable by whether a state behaves like a middle power...rather than using a defined conceptual tool to predict behavior, it looks to behavior in order to discern the category.”⁴¹ Although scholars in this vein tend to advocate a behavioral approach to studying middle powers (as did traditional middle power scholars as well),⁴² this creates a problem in trying to systematically categorize what states can accurately be called middle powers.

This dissertation also seeks to clarify the concept of leadership and study it as an interesting outcome in and of itself, rather than as one of many behavioral components of MP states as described in this literature. MP scholarship often refers to leadership, which could be understood as an activity that a middle power undertakes, particularly in a niche area where it has technical expertise.⁴³ However, middlepowermanship should not be confused with leadership – middlepowermanship may include leadership as an activity subsumed within its definition, just as a hegemon might demonstrate leadership. As with hegemonic stability theory, middle powers are structural conceptions that focus on a state’s position in the international system– therefore, a “state of being.” Just because a power is in the “middle” in terms of systemic power and capability, this does not necessarily predict concrete diplomatic patterns. We can look at specific domestic features that hold sway and influence foreign policy; however, MP literature focuses on

⁴¹ Cooper 2011, 321-322.

⁴² See Cox 1996; Cooper 1997; Sandra Desdradi. 2010. “Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership.” *Review of International Studies*. 36: 903-930; Daniel Flemes. 2007. “Emerging Middle Powers’ Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.” *GIGA Working Paper No. 57*. Hamburg, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. For a critique of this approach, see Jonathan H. Ping. 2005. *Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.; Cooper 2011, 2014.

⁴³ Cooper 1997.

behaviors related to a structural state of being. In contrast, this dissertation argues leadership is an *activity* rather than a *state of being* – one that emerges not just from being a rising power in the system, but from specific domestic components that can vary over time based on fluctuations in state-level variables. Finally, while middlepowermanship often includes the idea of being a “good international citizen,” extant MP literature does not adequately address the issue of followership, which I argue is key to understanding leadership in international institutions.

Regional Powers as Leaders

Given the changing global landscape, more recent MP literature seeks to extend the term beyond describing traditional middle powers like Canada or Australia to emerging or potential regional powers like Brazil, India and South Africa. This has led to a muddling of the terms “MP” and “regional power” within the literature, and considerable confusion. David Cooper notes that literatures on MPs and regional powers are “...intertwined and sometimes overlapping concepts, which at the same time have their own distinctive criteria.”⁴⁴ Some literature refers to regional rising states as “middle powers,”⁴⁵ and others “emerging regional powers” or “emerging middle powers.”⁴⁶ Daniel Flesmes discusses the challenges of differentiating between regional powers and middle powers, but argues, “While traditional middle powers are defined by their role in

⁴⁴ David A. Cooper. 2014. “Somewhere Between Great and Small: Disentangling the Conceptual Jumble of Middle, Regional and ‘Niche’ Powers.” *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14: 29.

⁴⁵ Andrew F. Cooper. “A Conceptual Overview” in Cooper, Andrew F., ed. 1997. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press. 1-24; Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar. 2006. “A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations.” *Global Society* 20(4): 415-433.

⁴⁶ Daniel Flesmes. 2007. “Emerging Middle Powers’ Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.” *GIGA Working Paper No. 57*. Hamburg, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ed., 2007. *India, Brasil y Sudafrica: el impacto de las nuevas potencias regionales*. Buenos Aires: Libros de Zorzal.

international politics, the new middle powers are, first of all, regional powers (or regional leaders) and, in addition, middle powers (with regard to their power resources) on a global scale.”⁴⁷ In sum, middle powers do not have to be regional powers, but regional powers are generally middle powers.

The main distinction Flesmes draws between regional and middle powers is that regional powers “bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the maintenance of regional order.”⁴⁸ Like middle powers, regional powers often focus their attention on institutions and building multilateral coalitions within international institutions in attempts to bind the great powers.⁴⁹ Therefore, regional middle powers utilize many of the “soft” balancing strategies explicated above.⁵⁰ In addition to representing the perspective of general “developmental” or developing regions, regional powers are also often ascribed the responsibility of organizing, governing or maintaining their respective regional space. For example, Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen argue that

⁴⁷ Daniel Flesmes and Detlef Nolte. “Introduction” in Flesmes, Daniel, ed. 2010a. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 6-7. Flesmes gives the following definition of a regional power: it is 1) part of a geographically delineated region, 2) ready to assume leadership, 3) has the material and ideational capabilities for regional power projection, and 4) is highly influential in regional affairs. Also, Flesmes notes these could be others: 1) economic, political and cultural linkages within region, 2) provision of collective regional goods, 3) existence of an ideational leadership project, and 4) acceptance of leadership by potential followers. See also Maxi Schoeman. 2000. “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power.” *African Security Review* 9(3): 47-58; Stefan A. Schirm. 2010. “Leaders in need of followers: emerging powers in global governance.” *European Journal of International Relations* 16(2): 197-221; Detlef Nolte. 2007. “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics,” *Paper to the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops*, Helsinki, Finland. 7-12 May 2007.

⁴⁸ Flesmes and Nolte 2010, 6.

⁴⁹ See Denis Stairs. “Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles” in Booth, Ken, ed. 1998. *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 29-55; Andrew F. Cooper. “The Evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: the Re-orientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas” in Hurrell, Andrew ed., 2000. *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*. Working Paper No. 244. Washington, DC: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center. 12-38.

⁵⁰ Flesmes argues that these IBSA states have challenged the current international hierarchy through a soft balancing strategy that does not directly challenge the US, but utilizes coalitions through the UN, for example, or the strengthening of economic ties to reduce the ability of the US to utilize unilateral power. See Daniel Flesmes. “Brazil: Strategic Options in a Changing World Order” in Flesmes, Daniel, ed. 2010a. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 97.

Brazil, India and South Africa (IBSA states) should be treated as a distinct analytical category within regional powers given their aspirations and abilities to “shape the agendas and outcomes of their regional settings.”⁵¹

This vein of literature poses an alternative argument to my theory of leadership in international institutions: that leadership is a strategy emerging from regional leadership or hegemony, undertaken by countries that may be “natural” leaders of regions by nature of their physical size and resource endowment. Andrew Hurrell notes, for example, “It is intuitively plausible to believe that having a regional power-base is an important stepping-stone to acting as a major power in the global system.”⁵² Sean Burges and Leslie Armijo argue, “Middle powers that potentially lead their regions, even if they do not dominate them, will have more global influence than middle powers lacking regional sway.”⁵³ The pathway from regional to global leadership may be that gaining regional hegemony grants states more credibility and support for a leadership role at the international level.

Regional powers literature suggests dominant regional states utilizes strategies of “consensual,” or “cooperative” hegemony to pursue self-interest and regional power.⁵⁴ For example, Thomas Pedersen posits that regionally dominant states may utilize “non-coercive [or “soft rule”] means, such as regional institutionalization, side-payments, power-sharing and differentiation through which major states may advance their interests

⁵¹ Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen. “The Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers” in Flandes, Daniel, ed. 2010a. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 70.

⁵² Hurrell 2006, 20.

⁵³ Leslie Elliott Armijo and Sean W. Burges. 2010. “Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC.” *Polity* 42(1): 19.

⁵⁴ Sean W. Burges. 2008. “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War.” *International Relations* 22(1): 65-84; Sean W. Burges. 2011. *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

regionally.⁵⁵ This allows emerging regional powers to gain the support of other regional actors without necessarily requiring economic or military dominance.⁵⁶ Gaining hegemony of the regional sphere is the goal, therefore, which can “springboard” a state to greater influence in the international arena. The hypothesis drawn from this vein of literature is as follows:

Alternative Hypothesis 1: Successful regional hegemony is a prerequisite for leadership in international institutions.

Observable Implication: States exercising leadership in the international arena have first gained regional support and backing for their global institutional agenda.

While this alternative hypotheses merits further investigation, particularly given the complex overlay of regional and global goals and institutions, there are reasons for skepticism. Within this vein of literature, the term “leadership” is often evoked to describe the dominant power’s attempts to construct and control the regional project; however, a specific definition of leadership and a consideration of common goals fail to be explicated. The idea of actual shared interests that might join leaders and followers together is overlooked for a more self-interested approach. In addition, the conceptualization of regional, “consensual” or “cooperative” hegemony stems primarily from studies of Brazil, calling into question the generalizability of this alternative hypothesis.

Moreover, emerging powers may seek leadership in global institutions *in spite of*, not *because of*, their regional settings. Marco Vieira and Chris Alden contend that countries like Brazil, India and South Africa “...cast [their] initiative in broader

⁵⁵ Thomas Pedersen. 2002. “Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration.” *Review of International Studies* 28: 110.

⁵⁶ Burges 2008, 69.

ideological terms using traditional foreign policy ideals from heyday of Southern activism” precisely because of the contested nature of regional leadership.⁵⁷ Flesmes also notes the difficulty that regional powers face in terms of “synchronizing” their global and regional agendas, given their unique position at the “nexus” of regional and international arenas.⁵⁸ Regional power dynamics may actually exhibit significant constraints on the global influence of rising powers, for example the reluctance of Argentina, Mexico or Pakistan toward Brazil and India seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC. Most of today’s emerging powers maintain complex relationships with regional neighbors, yet have still managed to gain greater influence in key global forums despite regional resistance. A consideration of regional dynamics is certainly critical in assessing the validity of this line of argument. This dissertation seeks to not overlook regional complexities, but to recognize that emerging powers confronting a contested regional setting may strategically use the global South as a frame for leadership at a broader, international level.

Quest for Autonomy

Another hypothesis specific to Brazil argues an underlying “quest for autonomy” explains the country’s foreign policy, dating back to the Rio Branco era of 1902 to 1912.⁵⁹ Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani suggest the defining goal of Brazilian foreign policy post-Cold War has been autonomy, although the means of achieving such a goal (or the “insertion strategy,” as they call it) have varied depending on the particular

⁵⁷ Marco Antonio Vieira and Chris Alden. 2011. “India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA): South-South Cooperation and the Paradox of Regional Leadership.” *Global Governance* 17: 515; Agata Antkiewicz, Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy J. Shaw. 2007. “Global and/or regional development at the start of the 21st century? China, India and (South) Africa.” *Third World Quarterly* 28(7): 1255-1270.

⁵⁸ Flesmes 2010a, 4.

⁵⁹ Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani. 2009. *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.

administration in power.⁶⁰ “Autonomy through distance” focused on domestic market development, autarky, and preservation of sovereignty above interaction with great powers. In contrast, “autonomy through participation” sought involvement in international regimes with the goal of changing the rules of the system to better favor the country. Finally, “autonomy through diversification” led to adherence to international regimes with an emphasis on South/South relations and non-traditional partners.⁶¹ Although the authors only employ a single case study, Brazil, the hypothesis stemming from their argument remains salient for other cases. For example, sovereignty and autonomy are historically important cornerstones of Indian foreign policy as well. Therefore, a generalized hypothesis gleaned from Cepaluni and Vigevani’s argument is as follows:

Alternative Hypothesis 2: Leadership in international institutions stems from a consistent, underlying quest for autonomy on the part of emerging powers like Brazil.

Observable Implication: Institutional activism would be centered on issue areas of salience to the country that garner direct benefits to Brazil and would remain constant over time, accompanied by rhetoric suggesting that concerns about autonomy are central to foreign policy decisions.

In the case of Brazil or even India, autonomy remains a key feature of the country’s foreign policy, evidenced by myriad documents, speeches, etc. Yet this dissertation argues that autonomy only partially captures the pattern of institutional activism on the part of emerging powers like Brazil, which are better described as leadership in international institutions. Some of the implications of this “quest for autonomy” are similar to that of leadership in international institutions, such as seeking to

⁶⁰ Cepaluni and Vigevani 2009, 52.

⁶¹ Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani. 2007. “Lula’s foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification.” *Third World Quarterly* 28(7): 1313.

change the “rules of the game” to be more representative. National development – and the concomitant autonomy needed to develop – may be central to the country’s foreign policy, yet cannot alone explain why Brazil accepts costs for the sake of broader goals of the global South.

Indeed, Cepaluni and Vigevani utilize the word “leadership” several times in their volume when referencing particular actions of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) administrations, also noting that both administrations aspired to a leadership role, whether regionally or globally.⁶² For example, if domestic autonomy is the goal, why has Brazil proved willing to make concessions that sometimes go against national interest? The authors suggest that leadership aspirations were present in the case of at least two administrations; yet this concept fails to be elaborated. As Kurt Weyland contends, “[Brazil’s] quest for influence, prestige and power – not for autonomy as such – has constituted the guiding principle of Brazilian foreign policy for many decades, since long before the time period investigated by Vigevani and Cepaluni.”⁶³ Categorizing the various strategies of autonomy pursued by Brazilian presidential administrations is enlightening, but Cepaluni and Vigevani’s argument also lacks systematic consideration of the domestic-level factors, nor specifies causal mechanisms, leading to the outcome of autonomy. This dissertation is interested in what specific domestic-level variables lead to the foreign policy choices undertaken by emerging powers. Moreover, given that the author’s argument is country-specific, seeing if the “quest for autonomy” “travels” to other

⁶² Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 1318.

⁶³ Kurt Weyland. 24 July 2013. “Review – Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times.” *E-International Relations*. Available: <http://www.e-ir.info/author/kurt-weyland/>.

emerging countries as an explanation for foreign policy behavior is critical for exploring the generalizability of their core thesis.

Defining Leadership in International Institutions

In contrast to mere autonomy or regional hegemony, this dissertation argues that emerging states seek a leadership role in international institutions. I define leadership in international institutions as acceptance of “opportunity costs” (whether material, ideational or diplomatic) associated with fulfilling a representative function on behalf of a specific subset of “followers” toward the resolution of salient international issues. Performing a representative function means accepting of costs and providing of goods toward representing common interests with a defined group of “followers” within global institutions. “Followers” are states that possess common issues, interests and goals as leading states but lack the ability or will to lead. In the cases of interests in this dissertation, “followers” are global South countries.

While some states might merely employ the rhetoric of leadership, an assessment of their specific actions and initiatives within international institutions provides a more concrete measurement of their actual cost acceptance toward common goals of “follower” states. As indicated in the table below, the degree to which states have accepted costs and provided goods is determined by analyzing institution and coalition creation, the generation of initiatives and proposals, mediation and conflict resolution, as well as reform efforts and bids for high-level positions within key international organizations.

Measures of Leadership				
Institution or Coalition Creation	Initiatives/Proposal Generation	Mediation/Conflict Resolution	IO Reform Efforts	Bids for High-Level Positions

Table 1: Measures of Leadership: Acceptance of Costs and Provision of Goods

Institution or coalition generation requires an acceptance of costs through coordination with leaders and officials of various states, discussion and rule-setting, as well as delineating procedures and boundaries toward a specifically defined common goal. Material costs (travel expenses for leaders and staff, building leases, etc.) as well as bureaucratic and ideational expenditures (dedicating bureaucrats to create, implement and oversee the goals of the new institution, funding technical or operational expertise to “follower” countries on key international issues, creating joint proposals, mediation between institution or coalition members, etc.) will be considered. Beyond the creation of new institutions, specific initiatives and proposals seeking to ameliorate common issues and provide “goods” within global institutions will be counted and analyzed.

States accepting the risks and costs of conflict resolution also demonstrate leadership in international institutions, providing a common good by acting as a mediator and broker, as well as facilitating post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Mediation and conflict resolution are risky and costly, as mediators may not be fully accepted by one or more parties in conflict, and may require significant material and bureaucratic commitment. Beyond mediating conflicts regionally and globally, states displaying leadership in international institutions also prioritize reform. The decision-making structures (voting and veto rights, representation, etc.) of Bretton Woods institutions like the UN and GATT (now WTO) largely remain skewed in favor of developed countries and often overlook the preferences and concerns of global South countries. Efforts at reforming these institutions constitute a provision of goods for the global South, because they seek to efforts to redress and correct these imbalances in a way that grants greater voice and decision-making power to the global South. States demonstrating leadership in

international institutions would evidence efforts to reform decision-making bodies to be more inclusionary for developing country members.

Bids for high-level positions within key global forums will be also assessed, as these entail a responsibility for the coordination, management, agenda-setting and negotiation of specific issues in the international arena. States pursuing leadership in international institutions should have a higher number of bids for high-level positions within these prominent global institutions. In contrast, non-leading states would be less involved in institution and coalition creation and would provide fewer concrete proposals or initiatives toward addressing common global issues, nor would they contribute greatly toward reforming key institutions to be more inclusionary. Moreover, we would expect non-leading states to have comparatively lesser involvement in mediation, conflict resolution, and fewer bids for high-level leadership positions. We would also expect states to exhibit variation over time in their level of leadership provision (e.g., institutional creation, proposal generation, mediation and reform efforts, etc.) depending on domestic levels of capacity, credibility and willingness.

In addition to assessing concrete proposals, mediation and reform efforts, and institution or coalition creation as evidence of accepting costs toward providing goods in key global institutions, for each country an overall calculation of “opportunity cost” of leadership is considered— namely what percentage of GDP the country commits to foreign policy activism, and what plausible domestic programs could have been bolstered with these resources instead. This “opportunity cost” calculation is comprised of the average budgets allocated to foreign ministries and development agencies, the average sum of aid given to developing countries, as well as yearly funding to troops in UN

peacekeeping operations. We would expect states exhibiting leadership in international institutions to accept a higher opportunity cost than states not pursuing a leading role. Opportunity cost will be assessed in aggregate terms, as a total dollar amount allotted toward foreign policy activism compared to the investment of other countries, as well as well as relative to domestic GDP.

Independent Variables – Capability, Credibility and Willingness

While the section above sketched the parameters of the outcome of interests in this dissertation – leadership in international institutions—the subsequent section turns to explore the determinants of this leadership. While scholars like Tyler Oliniski et al concede that some combination of capability, acceptance and will are important in understanding rising powers, few have considered specific domestic level sources of these three components.⁶⁴ Charles Parker and Christer Karlsson also note that most scholars agree that leadership requires both capabilities and credibility, and that different types of leadership require different kinds of credibility.⁶⁵ Other scholars utilize slightly different components, such as intentions, capabilities and opportunities.⁶⁶ In the case of structural leadership, for example, material resources are most significant in judging capability – if you have lots of “sticks” or “carrots,” you can utilize these to alter pay-offs in a way that compiles other actors to cooperate. For developing countries like Brazil or India, which may lack the concrete resources for many “sticks,” capability and credibility may stem from alternative sources. These authors note that they are seeking to create a

⁶⁴ See, for example, Harold Trinkunas. 2014. “Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance.” *Latin American Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings*, 4-6; Tyler Oliniski, Sonja Pfeiffer and Alessandra Ricci. 2014. “Determinates of Regional Leadership: IBSA in Perspective.” *UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2014/10*.

⁶⁵ Christer Karlsson and Charles F. Parker. “Leadership and International Cooperation” in Rhodes, R.A.W. and Paul t’Hart, eds. 2014. *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*. Cambridge, UK: Oxford University Press, 856-587.

⁶⁶ Trinkunas, 2014; Oliniski et al, 2014.

useful conceptual framework for further theorization on leadership,⁶⁷ and do not explicitly trace domestic-level independent variables (specific actors or institutions, for example) which contribute to the determinants necessary for institutional leadership.

This dissertation seeks to provide a plausible way to parse out domestic level factors producing a leadership bid in international institutions. This dissertation argues that capabilities required for leadership in international institutions stem from economic growth and stability, while credibility stems from a shared Southern worldview with “follower” states. Finally, willingness for a leadership role in international institutions stems from presidential interest/influence and bureaucratic capacity. These variables are mutually insufficient and jointly necessary for an outcome of leadership in international institutions, defined as the acceptance of costs toward common goals for “follower” states. To restate, the central argument in this dissertation is as follows:

Leadership in international institutions results from sufficient levels of capability, credibility and willingness.

Figure 1. Capability + credibility + willingness => leadership

Components Necessary for Institutional Leadership		
Capability	Credibility	Willingness

Table 2. Components Necessary for Leadership in International Institutions

The section below will discuss each component in detail, providing hypotheses surrounding each independent variable and highlighting the mechanisms through which the above indicators influence the outcome of interest in this dissertation – institutional leadership.

Capability: Economic Growth and Stability

⁶⁷ Olinski et al, 2014.

Leslie Armijo and Sean Burges define capabilities as “objectively measured resources that could be deployed toward goals.”⁶⁸ Capabilities are often equated with power in the international system; without power, influence is limited. Fareed Zakaria argues, “With greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad,” linking financial resources to the pursuit of a more active foreign policy.⁶⁹ Although states could ostensibly wield different kinds of power (Joseph Nye’s “soft” power, for example), much of the IR literature has measured power as material resources (or “hard” power), operationalized by looking at a country’s gross domestic product (GDP).⁷⁰ The economic growth and rising GDP of the BRICS countries, for example, was a critical component of the greater influence they began to wield in the international arena in the early 2000s.⁷¹ If a state lacks financial resources for the acceptance of costs and provisions of goods to “follower” states (such as development aid, peacekeeping troops, or delegations to key international institutions), a bid for institutional leadership is unlikely. Figure 2 below illustrates the components of capability:

Figure 2: Economic growth + stability => Capability

The following hypothesis posits the following relationship between capability and leadership in international institutions:

⁶⁸ Leslie Elliott Armijo and Sean W. Burges. 2010. “Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC.” *Polity* 42(1): 16.

⁶⁹ Fareed Zakaria. 1998. *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁷⁰ Robert O. Keohane, 2004. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Joseph S. Nye 2005. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs; Robert Gilpin. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁷¹ The BRICS term’s origin was from a Goldman Sachs economist who grouped these countries together as ones who would be the original BRIC acronym traces its origins to a 2001 paper by Jim O’Neill, a Goldman Sachs economist, which analyzed the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, and China as economic powerhouses. See Jim O’Neill. 2001. “Building Better Global Economic BRICs.” *Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 66*.

Hypothesis 1: Economic growth and stability are critical components of a state’s leadership bid for in international institutions.

Observable Implication: States demonstrating institutional leadership possess stable or rising annual gross domestic product (GDP) and reduced/stabilized inflation levels.

Measures of Economic Growth	
GDP	Inflation

Table 3: Measures of Economic Growth

Economic growth and stability will be measured by analyzing yearly GDP trends and annual inflation levels. A country experiencing low or negative growth, and/or high levels of inflation, is hindered from providing collective goods and accepting costs on behalf of “followers,” central components to fulfilling a leadership role. We would expect to see high levels of leadership at times when states have significant or at least stable levels of growth and relatively low inflation; this economic growth would provide a state the concrete resources to devote (should they choose) to hosting leaders’ summits, creating new international institutions, expanding diplomatic networks, providing development assistance, etc. Conversely, periods of high inflation and/or low or negative growth should be associated with lower levels of leadership provision, as a lack of financial resources constrains the state’s ability to allocate money toward foreign policy.

Credibility: Shared “Southern” Worldview

In addition to material resources, leadership in international institutions requires support from “follower” states that share common goals with the leader and provide “buy-in” for the leading state’s reform efforts, coalitions, proposals, etc. Literature on credibility largely focuses on past behavior; yet this overlooks shared identities (such as that of the global South) that might play a significant role in gaining the support of

followers.⁷² James Macgregor Burn's seminal book on leadership was one of the first to include the importance of followership: "Leadership is leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations – the wants and the needs, the aspirations and the expectations – of both leaders and followers."⁷³ Burns differentiates between transactional leadership (based on give-and-take transactions between leaders and followers) and transformative leadership, in which leaders seek to not merely work within, but rather to change organizational culture and values through changing the "expectations and aspirations of followers."⁷⁴ Other constructivist scholars of the English School also seek to correct transactional leadership approaches that overlook the importance of common interests and goals that may bind leaders and followers together in a mutually beneficial relationship extending beyond transactional exchanges.⁷⁵ For example, scholars like Arild Underdal highlight the centrality of followership to leadership and extends the focus to the demand side of the concept,⁷⁶ while Dirk Nabers conceptualizes followership as a "constraint" on leadership that may preclude certain options from being pursued.⁷⁷ Andrew Hurrell argues, "Power is relational and great attention has to be paid to the reception of all attempts at exercising

⁷² For a sample of realist literature on the importance of credibility, see Robert R. Powell. 1990. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Problem of Credibility*. Cambridge University Press; Daryl Press. 2005. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell; Glenn H. Snyder. 1961. *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thomas C. Schelling. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁷³ Burns 1978, 19.

⁷⁴ Burns 1978, 2004.

⁷⁵ For example, see Desdradi 2010 and Daniel Flesmes. "Brazil: Strategic Options in a Changing World Order" in Flesmes, Daniel, ed. 2010a. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 93-112.

⁷⁶ Underdal 1994, Parker and Karlsson 2014.

⁷⁷ Dirk Nabers. 2010b. "Power, leadership, and hegemony in international politics: the case of East Asia." *Review of International Studies* 36: 935.

power and to the successful cultivation of “followership.”⁷⁸ Accordingly, this dissertation considers followership a key component of credibility.

Figure 3: Shared Southern Worldview => Credibility

Marco Antonio Vieira and Chris Alden argue the emergence of countries like Brazil or India has “imbued the South with renewed commitment and capacity to articulate a vision of global governance that is rooted in the contemporary concerns of developing countries.”⁷⁹ The country’s membership in key developing-country institutions like the G-77 and NAM has garnered followership from other developing countries, and also gained credibility in the eyes of developed countries that further view them as “bridges” or mediators/negotiators between the North and South. Amrita Narlikar argues global South coalitions and institutions continue to exist despite a very different global context “...because maintaining these relationships key to exercising leadership and having legitimacy.”⁸⁰ Leading states gain “follower” support by being a credible broker and representative of common positions and goals on key international issues that highlight the distinct developmental needs of the global South. The use of the global South as a means to gain credibility and support from “followers” is a critical component of leadership role in the international arena, as suggested in the hypothesis below:

Hypothesis 2: Credibility for leadership in international institutions stems from a shared Southern development trajectory and framing the need for institutional actions (reforms, coalitions, initiatives) as a shared interest of the global South.

Observable Implications: Countries seeking leadership in international institutions maintain active ties to the global South through diplomatic relations,

⁷⁸ Andrew Hurrell. “Regional Powers and the Global System from a Historical Perspective” in Flesher, Daniel, ed. 2010a. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 16.

⁷⁹ Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira. 2010. *The South in World Politics*. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. 127.

⁸⁰ Narlikar 2010a, 46.

development assistance to the global South, etc. Reform proposals within key international institutions are framed as common goals for developing countries. The fruit of these efforts is born out in comparatively high levels of support from “follower” states.

Measures of Credibility			
Southern Institutional Membership	Development Assistance	Gini Coefficient	Support from “follower” States

Table 4: Measures of Credibility

Membership in global South institutions would cultivate and deepen a shared identity and allow for coordination of policy positions and initiatives to push for shared goals in international institutions. Sharing domestic experiences with poverty reduction through technical cooperation projects and the broader provision of development aid to the global South would also cultivate increased diplomatic ties, coordination on policy issues, and the signing of cooperation agreements. A “follower” state would be more likely to support the initiatives, coalitions and proposals of a leader not only improving the lives of their own constituents through successful domestic programs, but also providing concrete aid and technical assistance to other developing countries facing similar challenges of poverty and inequality. Avenues of South-South cooperation would be opened through the formation of developing-country institutions and coalitions, which generate meetings, points of contact and allow for negotiation/coordination on policy issues affecting the global South. Membership in global South institutions, domestic strides against inequality, and the provision of monetary and technical assistance toward development to “follower” states would allow a shared Southern identity to persist and be reinvigorated over time, garnering credibility for the state seeking leadership in international institutions to represent common interests for developing countries.

Willingness: Presidential Interests/Influence and Bureaucratic Capacity

States that possess credibility and capability will fail to exercise leadership in international institutions if they lack political willingness for such an endeavor, which stems from bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence.

Figure 4: Presidential Interest/Influence + Bureaucratic Capacity => Willingness

These two actors or institutions, generally speaking, are the main formulators, representatives and implementers of a country's foreign policy. The president (or prime minister) represents the "face" of a country at key global forums, and whose rhetoric, international trips and state visits, and personal presence at significant international events, signal the importance (or lack thereof) of foreign policy in general, as well as specific global issue areas. Leadership in international institutions would be difficult without a president willing to be active in key global forums. While the president is often the individual representing his or her country in these forums (for example, giving a speech at the United Nations General Assembly), a state's foreign policy bureaucracy works behind the scenes to create, refine, negotiate and implement specific foreign policies for the state. These two actors and institutions, and their relationship with willingness for leadership, is stated in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: A state seeking leadership should evidence willingness for this role through a president/prime minister highly interested and involved in foreign policy and/or a strong foreign ministry.

Observable Implications: States with higher levels of presidential influence and interest in foreign policy and stronger bureaucratic capacity evidence more leadership in international institutions. Conversely, states with low presidential influence/interests and low bureaucratic capacity would be less likely to exhibit institutional leadership.

Presidential Influence/Interest

Presidential influence/interest impacts willingness for leadership in the global arena, because this individual serves as the primary leader and figurehead representing

the country within major global institutions and influences the degree to which foreign policy is prioritized within an administration. Noting the importance of individuals on foreign policy, Daniel Bryman and Kenneth Pollack argue “The goals, abilities and foibles of individuals are crucial to the intentions, capabilities and strategies of a state,” which have implications domestically and internationally.⁸¹ Margaret Hermann et al contend that understanding the leadership style of a particular single, powerful individual can help explain foreign policy decisions, and that when a powerful leader possesses a particular interest in foreign policy, individual will try to control the agenda to influence foreign policy decision-making.⁸² For example, a president and his administration may exert significant influence on certain foreign policy issues (such as security or the environment), and may also influence the flow of resources to a foreign ministry relative to other bureaucracies. The relationship between willingness and presidential interest/influence is posited as follows:

Hypothesis 3a: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions have presidents/prime ministers who are highly interested and influential in foreign policy.

Observable Implication: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions should possess a president engaged in significant international travel, who prioritizes funding to the foreign ministry, and is personally involved on key global issues. This president’s rhetoric would also manifest a desire for the country to play a leading and active role in international institutions.

Measures of Presidential Influence/Interest			
Trips Abroad	Personal Presence	Rhetoric	Impact on Foreign

⁸¹ Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack. 2001. “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” *International Security* 25 (Spring 2001), 109.

⁸² Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw. 2001. “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals,” *International Studies Review* 3 (2): 83-131. The idea of a powerful president is also supported by Krasner, who argues that presidents highly influence the foreign policy agenda on issues they consider important. See Stephen D. Krasner. 1971. “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1971): 160.

	on Key Issues		Ministry
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Table 5: Measures of Presidential Influence/Interest

Presidential influence and interest in foreign policy is measured by the extent of time spent abroad and personal involvement in key global issue areas, rhetoric surrounding the state’s role in the international arena, as well as presidential influence on the foreign ministry (in terms of additional funding or budget cuts, changes to staff, etc. stemming from the Executive branch). High scores on these indicators would demonstrate that an administration prioritizes foreign policy and is willing to devote time and resources toward leadership in international institutions. A president seeking leadership in international institutions would seek to expand foreign relations, demonstrating a willingness to engage in foreign policy through personal travel to interface with other heads of state, opening additional embassies and consulates in areas of interest globally. If a president were highly interested in global climate change, he or she would be more likely to be personally present during key conferences and forums on this issue, presenting speeches, proposals, etc. that demonstrate the country’s commitment to engaging the issue. Moreover, a president with the political will for leadership in international institutions would devote additional resources through funding, staff, etc. to the country’s foreign policy apparatus. States with higher levels of presidential influence and interest in foreign policy should evidence more leadership in international institutions. Conversely, states with low presidential influence/interests would be less likely to highlight foreign policy should lack willingness to pursue institutional leadership. States with high levels of presidential influence/interest but low levels of bureaucratic capacity may evidence leadership during particular administrations; once the

particular leader with interest in foreign policy leaves office, however, we would expect to see bureaucratic capacity begin to drop significantly.

Bureaucratic Capacity

While individual presidents can yield significant effects on a state's foreign policy during their tenure, leadership in international institutions also depends on the capacity of domestic-level bureaucracy to utilize the various material and ideational resources of the state to implement solutions to global collective action problems. Bureaucratic politics models, perhaps most famously envisioned in Graham Allison's Model III,⁸³ highlight the importance of these bureaucratic institutions on foreign policy, seeing policy outcomes as a result of bargaining games among multiple political actors. These models point to the importance of the domestic political context and the "pulling and hauling" between domestic actors in autonomous bureaucracies who "stand where they sit," or in other words, who seek to increase the budget and advance the interest of their particular bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic politics approaches tend to downplay the role of the president in foreign policy decision making,⁸⁴ instead highlighting the importance of multiple actors competing in intra-national games. For example, Jeffrey Cason and Timothy Power note that scholars of Brazil's Itamaraty are "virtually unanimous" in their assessment of the bureaucracy's importance in postwar Brazil due to its high level of professionalization,

⁸³ Graham T. Allison. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 707.

⁸⁴ See Stephen D. Krasner. 1971. "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy* 7: 159-179 and Robert J. Art. 1973. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." *Policy Sciences* 4: 467-90, for critiques of the bureaucratic politics model.

relative autonomy, and the monopoly it possess over foreign policy responsibilities.⁸⁵

Without the ability to provide content knowledge, negotiate positions between countries, propose innovative strategies that stem from domestic-level inputs like a bureaucracy, institutional leadership will be difficult to achieve even with a highly interested and influential Executive. A country investing substantially in institutionalizing and professionalizing its foreign ministry would likely do so because it places a premium on foreign relations and seeks greater influence and status in key regional and international institutions. This following statement hypothesizes the relationship between bureaucratic capacity, willingness and leadership:

Hypothesis 3b: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions possess strong bureaucratic capacity.

Observable Implication: States seeking an institutional leadership role in the global arena possess insulated, professionalized, well-funded bureaucracies that play a significant role in foreign policy formation.

Measures of Bureaucratic Capacity			
Funding	Staff	Expertise	Continuity/Ethos

Table 6: Measures of Bureaucratic Capacity

Bureaucratic capacity is measured by the level of funding allocated to the foreign ministry and the overall size of the diplomatic corps, as well as the balance between career diplomats versus political appointees and their training. The stability of a bureaucracy insulated from presidential politics and comprised of mainly career diplomats allows for continuity in terms of foreign policy methods, goals and “ethos,” which will be assessed from interviews and curriculum materials. Professionalization through rigorous and consistent entrance exams, and extensive training for employees,

⁸⁵ Jeffrey Cason and Timothy Power. 2009. “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making from Cardoso to Lula.” *International Political Science Review* 30 (2): 117-140.

for example, indicates a high level of investment in foreign policy on behalf of a country. We would expect to find that states pursuing leadership roles in international institutions possess insulated and professionalized foreign ministries with historically strong and consistent worldviews, play an important role in the crafting and implementation of foreign policy. States that seek to play a leading role must possess bureaucracies with the money and time to research important issues in detail, gain expertise, train staff appropriately, and employ cogent negotiating skills or mediation skills toward innovative solutions to global issues. This lends them the capacity to lead coalitions of other developing countries that have less experience or bureaucratic/diplomatic resources toward a particular issue or organization.

Overall levels of bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence, as well as the balance between the two components, impact willingness for global leadership over time. For example, a state might demonstrate international activism under a particular president, but the underlying foreign ministry remains weak. When that president leaves power, we would expect to see a severe dip in foreign policy engagement. Conversely a state with a disinterested president but a relatively strong and insulated foreign ministry may continue to pursue activism in international institutions despite a lack of prioritization in the executive branch and a cut in resources channeled its organization. In the case of convergence between a president with high levels of interests and influence on foreign policy, in addition to strong bureaucratic capacity, leadership levels should be at their peak. Alternatively, a disinterested president would deprioritize foreign policy, and when combined with a weak foreign ministry, leadership in international institutions should prove unlikely. The ability to retain comparatively high

levels of these bureaucratic indicators despite significant economic or political crises and/or presidential disinterest, however, would suggest a commitment to foreign policy and bureaucratic insulation allowing for some measure of leadership in international institutions despite external circumstances or presidential administrations. The table below summarizes the key variables of interest in this dissertation.

Indicator/Variable	Type	Definition	Measurement
Capability	IV	Economic stability and/or growth	GDP growth; inflation levels
Credibility	IV	Shared “Southern” development perspective	Surveys of “follower” states’ perceptions of Brazil; development accords and flows to global South; membership in Southern institutions; Gini coefficient and poverty levels
Willingness	IV	Bureaucratic resources and presidential interest/influence	Funding and size of foreign affairs ministry; consistency of ethos; professionalism and expertise of corps; rhetoric reflecting state’s view of role in world; activism of president in terms of trips abroad & embassies opened
Leadership	DV	Acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward common goals	Membership in IOs, institution/coalition creation, provision of proposals/initiatives, mediation/conflict resolution; reform efforts; “opportunity cost” of foreign policy endeavors

Table 7: Overview of Key Variables in Argument

Case Selection

To assess whether or not variation in leadership provision over time stems from changing capability, credibility and willingness (as this dissertation argues is the case), I employ both within-country, as well as cross-country, comparisons from 1995 to present for Brazil, Mexico and India. These countries were all historically active in the

international arena, dating back to the 1960s and 1970s with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77) developing countries. However, from 1995 to present, these countries exhibit variation over time in their capability, credibility and willingness, in turn impacting their acceptance of opportunity costs toward leadership in global institutions. In the case of Brazil, the country generally experienced increasing capability, credibility and willingness from 1995 onward, peaking around 2010 at a comparatively notable level across these three indicators. This corresponded with a flurry of leadership in key global forums, with an unprecedented acceptance of opportunity cost for foreign policy activism. Post-2011, however, significant declines in economic capability and presidential willingness greatly reduced the country's ability to accept costs and provide goods toward leadership in international institutions.

Mexico and Brazil possess many structural similarities that can be “held constant” across cases; they are both in Latin America, have sizable landmass, populations and economies, have a legacy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and are generally seen as potentially “natural” leaders for the region.⁸⁶ Yet Mexico's pattern of capability, credibility and willingness vary from that of Brazil. Although possessing the material capability for a more active global role, Mexico's credibility from “follower” states remains lacking, and willingness (both in terms of bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence) is weak. This has largely precluded Mexico from demonstrating leadership in international institutions, although an uptick in bureaucratic capacity and

⁸⁶ See for example, Janina Onuki, Fernando Mouron and Francisco Urdinez. 2016. “Latin American Perceptions of Regional Identity and Leadership in Comparative Perspective.” *Contexto Internacional* 38(1). Available: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292016000100433; Andres Lizcano Rodriguez, Ariel Stulberg, Fernando Peinado, Hector Trujillo, Krisztian Simon and Max Marder. 4 April 2013. “The Great Debate: Will Mexico Assume Clear Leadership of Latin America?” *SIPA Journal of International Affairs*. Available: <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/great-debate-will-mexico-assume-clear-leadership-latin-america>.

presidential interest has increased the country's willingness for leadership in the realm of climate change recently. In the Mexican case, the timeframe of analysis will begin in 2000, which marks the reemergence of democracy in the country after the National Action Party (PAN in the Mexican acronym) defeated the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and ended the latter's 70-year rule.

Like Brazil and Mexico, India is classified as a regional and middle power, but located in East Asia.⁸⁷ Considering a country case in a different geopolitical context provides an opportunity to probe to what extent capability, credibility and willingness are salient concepts that "travel" elsewhere in the globe. On the whole, the Indian case represents one of sufficient levels across capability, credibility and willingness, but exhibits a more muted trajectory across these indicators than that of Brazil. India has exhibited the most consistent capability over the timeframe of interest, and although its regional context constrains "followership," its massive development aid flows bolster credibility globally. Finally, India maintains sufficient bureaucratic capacity, although it invests less in its foreign ministry on the whole than that of Brazil. Recent upticks in interest and influence within the prime minister's office further increase willingness for leadership in the global arena, in contrast to the decline associated with the Brazilian case post-2011.

The timeframe of 1995/2000 to present is chosen for Brazil, Mexico and India because this generally coincides with a recent return to democratization domestically,

⁸⁷ Armijo and Burges 2010, 17. See also Daniel Flesmes. 2007. "Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum." *GIGA Working Paper No. 57*. Hamburg, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and Andrew Hurrell. 2006. "Hegemony, liberalism, and global order: what space for would-be great powers?" *International Affairs* 82(1):19.

thereby allowing for regime type to be held constant across all three cases.⁸⁸ Moreover, by the beginning of this timeframe, Latin America countries had already passed through the peak of their hyperinflation crises, which avoids skewing economic indicators due to massive fluctuation in currency values occurring prior to 1995.

After considering patterns of capability, credibility and willingness for Brazil, Mexico and India, the dissertation considers how fluctuation in the independent variables corresponds with the trajectory of each country’s leadership provision. This is done by assessing the acceptance of opportunity costs through the provision of concrete goods (such as proposal generation, mediation, or reform efforts) in three major international institutions dealing with different issue areas: trade, security and the environment. These are arguably the three most salient issue areas over the past decades; states seeking leadership in the global arena would be likely to demonstrate it within these forums. Moreover, these institutions are open to all countries across the globe, allowing for comparison not be possible within other region-specific institutions or those requiring a certain level of economic development, such as the OECD.

Subject Area	Institution
Trade	World Trade Organization (WTO)
Security	United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Environment	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Table 8: Issue Areas and Relevant Institutions

Methodology

The research of this dissertation centers on personal interviews, archival work, survey data and secondary research. The archival component of the dissertation focuses on documents from the foreign ministries of case countries like Brazil, India and Mexico,

⁸⁸ Brazil returned to democracy in 1985.

including speeches from presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers, data on government budgets and development assistance flows, as well as information on diplomatic formation (such as entrance exams, posts and training). Data collection also stemmed from World Bank economic and social indicators, specifically the World Development Indicators database, as well as survey data from Latinobarómetro (Latin Barometer). I also utilized major newspapers and magazines like Folha de São Paulo, O Globo, Estadão de São Paulo, Carta Capital, Excelsior, The India Times, etc. from each country to further assess the foreign policy profile of each country. For a more detailed look into each issue area, I relied heavily on information from international institutions (such as the UN and WTO) themselves – member status, dues owed, proposals presented, number of peacekeeping troops, etc. Finally, to “fill in” my research and acquire a more first-hand understanding of foreign policy motives and goals of my main case of interest, I undertook nearly thirty interviews with various current and former bureaucrats, diplomats and ambassadors from Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE, also known as “Itamaraty”), as well as the former Foreign Minister under the Lula administration, Celso Amorim. In addition to interviews with officials from the MRE, I spoke with prominent news reporters, political party officials, and professors who specialize in the country’s foreign policy and could provide an “unofficial” perspective on Brazil’s role in international institutions.

While I worked from a general format for these interviews, allowing for open questions and discussion, with each interviewee I endeavored to glean their perspective on what role Brazil did or (did not) play in international institutions, their thoughts about accepting costs associated with foreign policy, as well as their take on Brazil’s ability to

represent broader goals in common with other developing countries. I also questioned them on specific domestic factors they believed contributed to what they defined as Brazil's role in the global arena. These semi-structured interviews provided enormous insight into the workings of the country's foreign policy from the perspective of individuals helping shape and inform the future of the country's activism in the global arena.

Contribution

Given the myriad trans-national issues facing states in the 21st century, leadership appears critical to any attempt at problem solving in the global arena. There appears to be broad acknowledgement of this fact, as illustrated by how frequently the term is used in various strands of literature; as a concept, however, it remains convoluted and nebulous. Further elaboration is needed to clearly define what leadership means functionally, in order to compare substantively between countries regionally and globally.⁸⁹ Regional literature and rising powers/middle powers literature mention leadership as part of neo-Gramscian strategies of hegemony (like "consensual" or "cooperative" hegemony), but remains focused largely on single-country studies. A related vein of literature argues a "quest for autonomy" motivates Brazil's foreign policy strategy, but fails to develop specific domestic-level variables contributing to this

⁸⁹ See Nabers 2010a, 2010b; Burges 2008, 2011; Pedersen 2002; Flesmes 2007, 2010a; Daniel Flesmes and Douglas Lemke, "Findings and Perspectives of Regional Power Research" in Flesmes, Daniel, ed. 2010. *Regional Leadership in the Global System*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 313-334; Stefan A. Schirm. 2010. "Leaders in need of followers: emerging powers in global governance." *European Journal of International Relations* 16(2): 197-221; Destradi 2010; Thomas Volgy et. al, eds. 2011. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan; Monica Herz. "Brazil: Major Power in the Making?" in Volgy, Thomas, ed. 2011. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 159-180.

outcome, nor considers whether Brazil's international strategy might extend beyond mere autonomy to leadership.

This dissertation hopes to add to a still-nascent literature on leadership in the global arena by offering a more elaborated concept that can be systematically measured and studied comparatively. It seeks to link specific domestic-level variables to the outcome of institutional leadership in a systematic manner, contributing to comparative leadership studies that move beyond a one-country focus to other states and variation over time. Further developing the study of leadership in the international arena is pressing for modern political science, with important implications for the future of global governance.

On one hand, states like Brazil have secured greater voice and representation in key international institutions; yet the current economic and political challenges facing emerging countries has greatly reduced the optimism that surrounded the "BRICS" states leading up to 2010. Does this spell the end of emerging power leadership in international institutions? To get at this question, the following chapter explores variation in capability, credibility and willingness in the Brazilian case from 1995 to present, and subsequently links this pattern to changing leadership in key international institutions like the WTO, UNSC and UNFCCC. To the extent that solving collective action problems requires leadership, sustained activism on key global issues remains currently tenuous, but all the more critical.

Chapter 3: Brazilian Leadership in International Institutions

This chapter applies my theory of leadership in international institutions to the main case of interest, Brazil. I begin by considering whether the country can be classified as a leader given the definition put forward in this dissertation: the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward the representation of common goals with “follower” states. In particular, the early 2000s until 2010 represented a zenith in Brazilian leadership in international organizations, which has declined in terms of institution/coalition creation, proposal-generation and mediation efforts since 2011. This overall trajectory is also confirmed by considering the “opportunity cost” of leadership; namely, how much a country was willing to forgo to accept costs and provide goods toward common goals with “follower” states.

The degree to which Brazil has accepted costs and provided goods is assessed by analyzing the concrete actions and initiatives the country has undertaken toward representing common interests and moving toward mutual goals in key global organizations. This includes institution and coalition creation, the generation of initiatives and proposals, mediation and conflict resolution, as well as reform efforts and bids for high-level positions within key international organizations.

Measures of Leadership				
Institution or Coalition Creation	Initiatives/Proposal Generation	Mediation/Conflict Resolution	IO Reform Efforts	Bids for High-Level Positions

Table 9: Measures of Leadership: Acceptance of Costs and Provision of Goods

Institution and Coalition Creation

Institution or coalition generation requires an acceptance of costs, through coordination with leaders and officials of various states, discussion and rule-setting, as

well as delineating procedures and boundaries toward a specifically defined common goal. Institution creation requires both material costs (travel expenses for leaders and staff, building leases, etc.) as well as bureaucratic and ideational expenditures (dedicating bureaucrats to create, implement and oversee the goals of the new institution, funding technical or operational expertise to “follower” countries on key international issues, creating joint proposals, mediation between institution or coalition members, etc.). An institution can also be a means of providing goods to “followers,” in that institutions create formal arrangements to coordinate and express opinions, proposals and actions toward a shared goal. As explained by one Brazilian Ambassador, “It’s easier to work in the multilateral arena, to use diplomacy to convince others to adopt your position - Brazilian diplomats have excelled in this aspect.”⁹⁰ While coalitions are less formal than institutions, they can still represent an acceptance of costs and provision of goods (coordination, mediation, providing expertise, etc.) and are thereby included in this measure as well.

From 1990 to present, Brazil has averaged membership in around 75 institutions and formal coalitions; this is higher than other countries like Chile or Argentina, slightly lower than Mexico, and on par with other global emerging states like India.⁹¹ In the early-to-mid 1990s, the country entered or created 7 institutions.⁹² This rose to include membership in 14 new institutions between 2000 and 2010 under the Lula administration, compared to 10 new institutions by Mexico during the same timeframe. Illustrating Brazil’s activism across multiple issue areas and institutions, former Ambassador Rubens

⁹⁰ Personal interview with former Brazilian Ambassador. 17 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

⁹¹ Please see Appendix B, Table I: “Institutional Membership of Selected Latin American Countries.” Brazil is in 75 institutions, while Mexico is in 77. Chile is in 62; Argentina in 69, and Venezuela in 60.

⁹² “Brazil.” 15 January 2017. *CIA World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. Available: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>.

Ricupero counted the country as part of a “very short list of countries that are active everywhere [across multiple issue areas]...it’s hard to find a significant forum where Brazil is *not* interested.”⁹³

While Brazil remains a member of many regional and global institutions, the *generation* of institutions and coalitions has waned since 2011, with only 3 new institutions created or joined under the Rousseff administration. This downturn is mirrored in the Mexican case, where only 4 new institutions were created or joined during the same timeframe.⁹⁴ The type and cost of institutional creation varies between the two countries as well. Mexico helped found the Pacific Alliance in 2012, an institution centered on economic integration and trade to which India became an observer in 2014. In contrast, Brazil’s more recent engagement in international institutions has involved an acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward global security. In 2013 Brazil reengaged with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), where an esteemed former commander for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) left retirement to lead MONUSCO. In addition, in 2014 Brazil formally joined the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the first Latin American country to do so, contributing close to \$10 million in food supplies for refugees on top of \$8 million in previous years.⁹⁵ This suggests that Brazil continues to provide a measure

⁹³ Personal interview with Ambassador Rubens Ricupero. 9 November 2015. São Paulo, Brazil.

⁹⁴ “Mexico.” 15 January 2017. *CIA World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. Available: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html>.

⁹⁵ “UNRWA Commissioner-General Visits Brazil In Recognition of Growing Partnership.” 7 May 2015. Available: <http://www.unrwa.org>. “Secretary-General Appoints Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz of Brazil Force Commander for UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo.” 17 May 2013. *United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. SG/A/1407-AFR/26233-BIO/4474. Available: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sga1407.doc.htm>.

of leadership through UN conflict resolution efforts despite ongoing political and economic issues continuing to confront the country.

Institutional membership provides an initial assessment of whether or not a state is present in key global forums, and the data above illustrates that Brazil is similarly present to other regional and extra-regional emerging powers like Mexico and India. Institutional membership alone, however, is insufficient to determine actual leadership within international institutions. Beyond mere membership, leadership requires concrete actions within these institutions that provide common goods to “follower” states. States demonstrating leadership in international institutions must go beyond static membership to the provision of concrete goods – whether material, ideational, or diplomatic – toward common goals within these institutions. In the words of another Ambassador, Brazil’s ambitions are to play a leading role: “Brazil wants to influence norms, rules, and values, and transfer and deepen these...this is the global aspiration.”⁹⁶

Initiatives and Proposal Generation

To capture this behavior, specific initiatives and proposals that seek to ameliorate common issues and provide “goods” within global institutions were counted and analyzed. Brazil has been quite active over time in proposing initiatives across various international organizations and issue areas; this level and frequency of proposal generation for the 1990s through 2011 stands in contrast to other regional powers like Venezuela, Mexico or Argentina across the WTO, UNSC or UNFCCC (with the exception of Mexican in the latter).⁹⁷ Ambassador Ricupero noted that in terms of submitting proposals, concrete opinions, and formulating ideas others could follow,

⁹⁶ Personal interview with Brazilian Ambassador. 5 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

⁹⁷ Please see Appendix B, Table E: “Initiatives and Proposals” for a full list of proposals.

“...usually Brazil is active everywhere, contributing or clarifying for groups of like-minded.”⁹⁸ This was reinforced by another former Ambassador, who felt that Brazil’s strength lie in “proposing things.”⁹⁹

While the subsequent chapter delves more fully into these endeavors, three mini “case studies” are briefly delineated below to illustrate Brazil’s provision of proposals and initiatives toward common goals in several core international institutions. The first is Brazilian leadership in creating the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The country was able to transform its negative image as a significant Amazonian deforester into a proactive leader within the Framework as the 1990s ensued, proposing a “Clean Development Fund” which eventually became codified in the Kyoto Protocol as the CDM. This proposal created a fund providing financing to developing countries according to its proportion of contribution to global temperature increase, as well as provisions for temperature trading credits among Annex I developed countries. The CDM, therefore, both protected the global South from severe carbon-emission targets that would hinder their development, and provided a means for developed countries to offset emissions through a carbon market scheme. In noting the significance of the CDF/CDM proposal, Ken Johnson argues, “Thus, through a Brazilian initiative, the developing world stands to gain more benefits from the emerging climate change regime.”¹⁰⁰

Brazil remains engaged with the CDM, proposing a revised “CDM+” at the COP-21 in Paris 2015, which elaborates a “concentric differentiation” approach allowing

⁹⁸ Personal interview Ricupero, 2015.

⁹⁹ Personal interview with Brazilian Ambassador, 10 November 2015. São Paulo, Brazil.

¹⁰⁰ Ken Johnson. 2001. “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change.” *Journal of Environment & Development* 10(2). 199.

developing countries to move gradually toward wider emissions cuts while pursuing development. Through the CDM, Brazil has offered concrete ideational and bureaucratic resources toward common goals with “follower” states – achieving climate change mitigation while protecting the right to develop –within the UNFCCC. Brazil’s activism in the UNFCCC stands in contrast to India, for example, which has continually proven recalcitrant toward reducing its own emissions despite its status (like Brazil) as an emerging economy and major contributor to global warming, and has not pursued bilateral agreements or engagement on the topic until recently.

Brazil has also demonstrated leadership in the WTO through the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward common goals with “follower” states by pushing for global access to HIV/AIDs drug patents. Despite facing legal ramifications from both the US and WTO for violating the organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), “The threat of either WTO or US sanctions did not deter Brazil in its goal of fighting AIDS.”¹⁰¹ The country utilized a presidential decree established under Fernando Henrique Cardoso to authorize Brazilian drug companies to create and supply generic AIDS drugs domestically and to African communities with high instances of HIV/AIDs, reducing treatment costs by over 70%.¹⁰² Brazil’s willingness to accept risks and push for exceptions to WTO rules for health emergencies achieved a fundamental change in TRIPS interpretation which opened channels for wider access to HIV/AIDs treatment, providing a key resource for developing countries. While India was similarly involved in the effort to redefine TRIPS, Mexico proved unwilling to risk US sanctions to pursue this matter, and Chile signed a bilateral agreement with the US that

¹⁰¹ “Brazil, AIDs and Intellectual Property.” January 2002. *TED Case Studies*. Number 649. American University. Available: <http://www1.american.edu/TED/brazil-aids.htm>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

circumvented TRIPS and secured greater patent protection for the US against the production of generic medicine.¹⁰³

In the realm of security, Brazil spearheaded another key initiative toward common goals with “follower” states along with India, leading to the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) under the UNSC. The country was critical in the negotiations resulting in the PBC, based upon Brazil’s longstanding belief that the underlying cause of political conflict stems from lack of social and economic development. Brazil’s push toward the creation of the PBC was centered on trying to redirect the focus of peacekeeping from security alone to preventative measures that would avoid conflict in the first place, through addressing poverty, inequality and social issues. Brazil also pushed for greater developing-country involvement in conflict management and coordinated with other like-minded states, including India, on negotiating the entity’s creation and structure. Brazil’s activism in the creation of the PBC stands in contrast to other regional states, which proved unwilling or uninterested in the negotiations for the body’s creation.¹⁰⁴

As illustrated by the three cases above, Brazil sees itself as a key player in terms of addressing issues of international security and development, as evidenced by a former Ambassador who argued, “On global questions, Brazil *is* and *will* continue to be a major global power because one can't think of the environment or economic/trade issues without Brazil.”¹⁰⁵ Brazil allocated key material, bureaucratic and ideational resources

¹⁰³ Collins-Chase, Collin T. 2008. “The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries Facing Aids Epidemics.” *Journal of International Law* 29 (3): 779.

¹⁰⁴ Gilda Motta Santos Neves. 2010. *Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz – Perspectiva Brasileira*. Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. Ministério das Relações Exteriores: Brasília, Brazil. 127.

¹⁰⁵ Personal interview with former Ambassador. 20 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

toward providing concrete proposals and solutions to issues of importance to the global South, thereby providing common goods to “follower” states across three different institutions and issue areas.

Mediation and Conflict Resolution

Another means by which states can demonstrate leadership in international institutions is through accepting the risks and costs of conflict resolution. In this manner, leading states can provide a common good in terms by acting as a mediator and broker, as well as facilitating post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Mediation and conflict resolution are risky and costly, as mediators may not be fully accepted by one or more parties in conflict, and mediation (for example, in the case of the Iranian nuclear crisis) may diverge from preferences of great powers like the US. When mediation and conflict resolution take military form, such intervention is materially costly as well. In an interview with one Brazilian military advisor, he stated, “Brazil solves problems with diplomacy even if it doesn’t have [material] capabilities; it has a role as an arbitrator.”¹⁰⁶

Since 1990, Brazil has been involved in mediating and brokering 20 conflicts or crises with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping and democracy promotion in Latin America, as well as globally.¹⁰⁷ Brazil’s efforts at mediation and conflict resolution since 1990 have been comparatively extensive when assessed next to other regional powers like Chile and Argentina. It also stands in contrast to India’s experience with failed conflict management in Sri Lanka and ongoing border conflicts with neighboring

¹⁰⁶ Personal interview with Consultant for Ministry of Defense and Professor at Universidade de Brasília. 3 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

¹⁰⁷ Please see Appendix A, Table F: “Brazilian Involvement in Mediation and Conflict Resolution” for a full list.

Pakistan, which limit the country's ability to serve as a credible mediator in the region.¹⁰⁸ Whereas many Latin American and Central American states (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina and Chile, to name just a few) have been involved in cross-border conflicts themselves since 1990, Brazil has achieved a peaceful resolution of its boundaries with its neighbors despite having the largest number of neighboring states in the region.¹⁰⁹ Prior to the 1990s regional mediation efforts by Brazil were minimal, in contrast to ongoing Mexican activism in the Central American peace process during 1960s through 1980s. Brazil reengaged in mediation and conflict resolution under the Cardoso administration, however, when the country was repeatedly involved in conflict resolution from 1995 to 2001, involving neighbors such as Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Paraguay over border disputes, internal conflicts and diplomatic crises.¹¹⁰

Beginning in 1999, Brazil deepened its involvement in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions, first in the Democratic Republic of Congo and later in Haiti, where Brazil assumed the unprecedented position of leading the MINUSTAH mission, a role that it retained for over a decade despite its own domestic economic and political downturn. Regional mediation and conflict resolution reached a zenith under the Lula

¹⁰⁸ For recent developments, see Ravi Agrawal. 29 September 2016. "Could India and Pakistan go to war?" CNN. Available: <http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/21/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-conflict/>.

¹⁰⁹ "Cinco peleas latinoamericanas que llegaron hasta la justifica internacional." 14 December 2012. *BBC.com*. Available:

http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2012/12/121213_americalatina_diferendos_ante_la_cij_bd. "Argentina Revives Long-Time Border Dispute with Chile in Patagonian Ice Fields." 20 May 2010. *Merco Press*. Available: <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/05/20/argentina-revives-long-time-border-dispute-with-chile-in-patagonian-ice-fields>.

¹¹⁰ In 1995, Brazil hosted mediation talks between Peru and Ecuador regarding their 57-year border dispute; in 1998 Brazil unveiled the settlement between the two countries in conflict and again hosted mediation talks toward peace settlement. In 2001, Brazil attempted to mediate Venezuela's political crisis following the coup attempt against former Venezuela President Hugo Chávez. While Brazil's mediation efforts regarding the Peru/Ecuador border conflict in the late 1990s were successful, the country's more recent attempts at mediation between the Venezuelan government and opposition have proved more intractable. Please see Appendix B, Table F: Brazilian Involvement in Mediation and Conflict Resolution, for more details.

administration, with the addition of several significant attempts at extra-regional mediation, most notably Lula's unprecedented invitation to the Annapolis Conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2007 as well as his personal attempts to broker a deal with Iran during the country's nuclear crisis in 2010 despite facing severe international pressure and high security stakes. While both Mexico and Brazil have served in a mediating capacity regionally, at the global level a stark difference emerges between the two powers. Similar to Mexico, Brazil shares many similar, historic concerns regarding the protection of sovereignty and non-intervention; yet the country has remained engaged in mediation and conflict resolution through peacekeeping missions of the UNSC whereas Mexico (and Venezuela for that matter) are noticeably absent.

Mediation and conflict resolution indicators in Brazil have fallen post-2010 under the Rousseff and Temer administrations, however. For example, Brazil abstained on resolutions for interventions on Libya and Syria although the country joined a mission to Damascus to attempting dialogue with the Syrian Al-Assad regime.¹¹¹ Like Mexico, Brazil also proved "exceedingly timid" and avoided involvement in neighboring Venezuela's political crises, to much criticism.¹¹² While regional mediation and conflict resolution have declined outside of the UN and OAS for Brazil after 2011, the country has remained engaged in UN peacekeeping operations at levels similar to those pre-crisis, and significantly higher than other regional states.¹¹³ Although Temer had initially

¹¹¹ Along with India and South Africa.

¹¹² See for example Oliver Stuenkel. 31 May 2016. "How Latin America Should Address the Crisis in Venezuela." *Americas Quarterly*. Available: <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-latin-america-should-address-crisis-venezuela>; Andreas E. Feldmann, Federico Merke and Oliver Stuenkel. "Venezuela's Political Crisis: can regional actors help?" 30 November 2015. *Carnegie Endowment*. Available: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/30/venezuela-s-political-crisis-can-regional-actors-help-pub-62076>.

¹¹³ "Country Profiles." *Providing for Peacekeeping*. 17 November 2016. Available: <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/>. As of November 2016, Brazil had 1303 troops in PKO, compared to 471 for Argentina, 436 for Chile, and 23 for India.

signaled that Brazil would withdraw its troops from Haiti due to UN mandate changes by the end of 2016, the mission (under continued Brazilian leadership) was subsequently extended to mid-2017.¹¹⁴ Moreover, Itamaraty has signaled its intention to engage in additional missions after Haiti, possibly in Mali or Lebanon, despite current financial constraints.¹¹⁵

Reform Efforts

Beyond mediating conflicts regionally and globally, states displaying leadership in international institutions also prioritize reform efforts and seek high-level positions in international institutions. The decision-making structures (voting and veto rights, representation, etc.) of Bretton Woods institutions like the UN and GATT (now WTO) largely remain skewed in favor of developed countries and often overlook the preferences and concerns of global South countries. Efforts at reforming these institutions constitute a provision of goods for the global South, because they seek to efforts to redress and correct these imbalances in a way that grants greater voice and decision-making power to the global South. Similarly, vying for high-level positions within these institutions serves not only a country's own national interest, but plausibly the interests of other developing countries more broadly. Brazil's efforts for inclusion into the club of key decision-makers on security and economic issues dates back to the League of Nations post-WWI, or the GATT emerging after WWII, indicating a historic quest for influence within the

¹¹⁴ "Ministro diz que militares brasileiros deixarão Haiti em 2016." 21 May 2016. *Globo.com*. Available: <http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2015/05/ministro-diz-que-militares-brasileiros-deixarao-haiti-em-2016.html>; Throughout early to mid-2016 there were indicators that Brazil was planning to withdraw from MINUSTAH, however, the mission was extended in fall of 2016 and Brazil has reiterated their commitment to the one-year extension with normal troop levels, and the preparation of additional troop reinforcements if needed. See Jamil Chade. 12 April 2016. "Canadá se oferece para substituir Brasil em missão de paz no Haiti." *Estadão Internacional*; "Ministro diz que militares brasileiros deixarão Haiti em 2016." 21 May 2015. *O Globo*; "Haiti – Seguridad: Embajador ofrece aclaraciones sobre retiro de Brasil de la MINUSTAH." 3 February 2017. *Haiti Libre*.

¹¹⁵ Luis Kawaguti. 14 October 2016. "O Brasil vai enviar tropas para outra missão de paz após deixar Haiti?" *BBC Brasil*. Available: <http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-37648987>.

global arena. Brazil has been a key player in pushing for reforms of both the UNSC as well as the GATT/WTO, with a particular emphasis on this post-1990.

Within the WTO, Brazil has offered candidates for Director-General twice, more than any other Latin American country, and was successful in gaining the position in 2013 and again in the subsequent 2017 election.¹¹⁶ In 2003 Brazil spearheaded the creation of the G-20 coalition of developing countries at the WTO, which for the first time were able to halt negotiations in the Doha Round and push for greater concessions and rights for developing countries in the organization. A former Ambassador argued that many of Brazil's decisions to spearhead the G-20 and launch a candidate for WTO were “undertaken with the mentality of leadership.”¹¹⁷ When asked if he thought Brazil was a leader in the global arena, former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim carefully remarked, “I don’t want to say this because it sounds very self-serving, but there was Brazilian leadership...for example, Brazil moved from periphery to the core negotiating group in the WTO/Doha Round. Brazil has been at the forefront of multilateral trade for a long time.”¹¹⁸

Brazilian leadership in helping create the G-20 coalition stands in contrast to other regional players like Mexico, which joined the coalition for the purpose of addressing agricultural issues it had ignored or overlooked in its efforts to sign FTAs with the US and Canada.¹¹⁹ In contrast, Brazil was willing to make concessions for the unity of the group, seeking protections for vulnerable developing countries opening their markets that

¹¹⁶ Only Mexico and Uruguay have offered candidates for the position, in 2013 and 2005 respectively. Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo was reappointed for another four-year term as Director-General in February 2017.

¹¹⁷ Personal interview with former Ambassador. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

¹¹⁸ Personal interview with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

¹¹⁹ This will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

went against Brazil's own commercial interests. Following the G-20's influence in the Cancún Ministerial of 2003, Brazil was included in the core group of "Five Interested Parties" or "New Quad" in the lead up to the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial in 2005, the only Latin American country to be present.¹²⁰ This marked a significant reform in the decision-making structure of negotiations in the organization, which had previously included only developed countries. In the words of Ambassador Ricupero, "It's hard to envision a solution without Brazil in these two areas [the environment and trade]."¹²¹

In the realm of security, Brazil has made formal statements on UNSC reform 67 times from 1990 to 2016, compared to Mexico's 7 statements, Argentina's 5 and even India's 31.¹²² Brazil has lobbied for reform of the UNSC since the mid-1990s, beginning with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim's statement regarding Brazil's intention to gain a permanent seat during the Franco administration. Cardoso's entrance into the presidency in 1995 confirmed this effort, as he reiterated Brazil's willingness and readiness to acquire a permanent seat. This intensified when the G-4 was created in 2004 to jointly lobby for an expansion in the number of UNSC permanent seats and a specific proposal to this end (draft resolution A/59/L.64). Activism in terms of reform efforts in both the WTO and UNSC continued through the Lula and Rousseff administrations, with routine meetings of the G-4 and consistent rhetoric at the UNGA regarding the need for reform. Despite the country's persistent criticism of the lack of representativeness of the UNSC and bid for reform, Brazil remains the country to have held the rotating, non-

¹²⁰ Along with Australia, India, the EU, the US and Japan.

¹²¹ Personal interview Ricupero, 9 November 2015.

¹²² "Statements on Security Council Reform." 25 October 2016. UNSC Global Policy Forum. Available: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/49905-statements-on-security-council-reform.html#mexico>. "Security Council Reform." 25 October 2016. *Permanent Mission of India to the UN*. Available: <https://www.pminewyork.org/reform.php?id=3&page=2>. "General Assembly of the United Nations." 25 October 2016. *United Nations*. Available: <http://www.un.org/>.

permanent seat for the GRULAC countries (Latin America and the Caribbean) more times than any other neighbor in the region, as illustrated in Appendix A.¹²³

While Brazil currently maintains many of the positions, proposals and initiatives of the 1990s and early 2000s, a stark reduction has occurred since 2011 across nearly all indicators of leadership. In other words, the expanding foreign policy of the late Cardoso and Lula administrations, (particularly the latter), has significantly contracted under the Rousseff and now Temer administrations in the midst of political and economic crises. In the words of one professor, “The impression is that the [Rousseff] government sees no need to concern itself with external ‘leadership.’”¹²⁴ The country is still willing to accept a degree of material, ideational and bureaucratic costs – for example, continued efforts at UNSC reform, proposing the enhanced Clean Development Mechanism at the 2015 Paris Conference of the UNFCCC, and most notably continuing to participate (however truncated) in global peacekeeping missions. However, the creation of new institutions and coalitions, as well as involvement in current mediation/conflict resolution efforts, has sharply declined. Brazil did commit troops to the UN mission in Lebanon in 2011; however, the Rousseff administration avoided intervention (or even making critical statements in some cases) on key global conflicts such as Libya, Syria, and Crimea. Brazil also refrained from creating or joining statements condemning human rights issues in Syria and Bahrain in 2013, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Even regional conflicts, such as the Venezuelan political crisis throughout 2014, were largely ignored as Brazil shrunk back significantly from its previous role as a credible mediator and broker

¹²³ Please see Appendix B, Chart C: “United Nations Security Council Membership.”

¹²⁴ Deutsche Welle. 13 January 2015. “Com novo ministro, Itamaraty luta por prestígio.” *Carta Capital*. Available: <http://www.cartacapital.com.br/internacional/com-novo-ministro-itamaraty-luta-para-resgatar-prestigio-385.html>.

in the region. Besides the withdrawal from Haiti, Temer also announced Brazil would need to leave six institutions under his administration in order to cut costs associated with fees and dues to international organizations.¹²⁵

As will be discussed in the subsequent section, this retraction of leadership in international institutions corresponds with a decline in credibility, capacity and willingness, particularly the latter two indicators. Brazilian economic woes severely curtailed the country's political will and ability to provide material goods toward accepting costs and providing goods toward common goals with "follower" states. Under Rousseff, the Brazilian government undertook "selective defaults" on payments to various international institutions, such as the UN (where debt was approximately \$225 million USD in 2015) and OAS.¹²⁶ Still facing the loss of voting rights because of mounting debt in various international organizations (now to the tune of \$950 million USD), in October 2016 Temer sanctioned a bill freeing just under \$1 million USD from the country's National Treasury to liquidate Brazil's debts to certain institutions, and announced the country would leave six organizations to cut the country's expenses.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ It is unclear whether this occurred, or which institutions Brazil left, but in July 2016 Brazilian newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo* obtained a list of 34 institutions from the Ministry of Planning, earmarked as potential options for exiting due to budget constraints. Marcelo Ninio. 6 October 2016. "Brazil to Liquidate Debts with Global Entities, Confirms Minister." *Folha de S. Paulo*. Available: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/world/2016/10/1820432-brazil-to-liquidate-debts-with-global-entities-confirms-minister.shtml?cmpid=newsEN>. Pedro Peduzzi. 1 October 2016. "Temer sanciona lei que permite envio de R\$ 3 bi a organismos internacionais." *Agencia Brasil*. Available: <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2016-10/temer-sanciona-lei-que-permite-envio-de-r-3-bilhoes-organismos-nacionais-e>. "Graziano awards Brazil dirs.3 mln 'discount' at FAO." 1 June 2016. *The Italian Insider*. Available: <http://www.italianinsider.it/?q=node/3922>.

¹²⁶ Roberto Simon. 5 January 2016. "Brazil's Foreign Policy Failures." *Foreign Affairs*.

¹²⁷ Marcelo Ninio. 6 October 2016. "Brazil to Liquidate Debts with Global Entities, Confirms Minister." *Folha de S. Paulo*. Available: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/world/2016/10/1820432-brazil-to-liquidate-debts-with-global-entities-confirms-minister.shtml?cmpid=newsEN>. Pedro Peduzzi. 1 October 2016. "Temer sanciona lei que permite envio de R\$ 3 bi a organismos internacionais." *Agencia Brasil*. Available: <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2016-10/temer-sanciona-lei-que-permite-envio-de-r-3-bilhoes-organismos-nacionais-e>. "Graziano awards Brazil dirs.3 mln 'discount' at FAO." 1 June 2016. *The Italian Insider*. Available: <http://www.italianinsider.it/?q=node/3922>.

As one Ambassador pointed out, this represents “a major contradiction in foreign policy” that is “very damaging, very bad.”¹²⁸ Brazil’s reduced material capability and a lack of political willingness to accept costs and provide concrete goods curtails the country’s current leadership in international institutions.

The “Opportunity Cost” of Leadership

To illustrate the degree of commitment of the Brazilian government to leadership in global institutions over the timeframe of interest, I consider the “opportunity cost” of Brazilian activism in the global arena— namely what percentage of GDP the country commits to foreign policy, and what plausible domestic programs could have been bolstered with these resources instead. This opportunity cost is comprised of the yearly budget allocated to the Foreign Ministry (MRE) and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC in the Portuguese acronym, responsible for channeling development flows and partnerships with the global South), annual development assistance given by Brazil to developing countries, as well as yearly funding to troops in UN peacekeeping operations.¹²⁹ The graph below illustrates trends in opportunity cost in the aggregate as well as a percentage of GDP over time, compared to other cases of interest.

¹²⁸ Personal interview with former Ambassador. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

¹²⁹ When data for 2016 was not available, the closest possible year’s data was used. No data earlier than 2013 was used, once the Brazilian economy had already begun to slowdown, therefore this should not severely distort the calculation and should reflect a sense of costs in the midst of financial uncertainty. Normal dues to international organizations like the UN, as well as assessed contributions to general peacekeeping funds were not considered because these would be requested of all member states, and would not necessarily reflect a special “commitment” to foreign policy above the average cost of being a member. Although Brazil owes debt to major institutions, much of that is absorbed into the structure of the organization, and does not necessarily preclude the provision of additional resources for specific programs or missions (like peacekeeping operations (PKO). Moreover, interim President Temer’s has pushed for a to liquidate money from the National Treasury to pay these institutional debts. See for example, Ninio 2016.




Figure 5: Total Opportunity Cost of Foreign Policy¹³⁰

¹³⁰ “Outcome Budget 2016-17.” 2016. Government of India. Available: https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/26823_1-MEA_Outcome_2016-17_English_1.pdf; “Orçamentos Anuais.” 15 January 2017. *Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*. Governo do Brasil. Available: http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br/orcamentos-anuais/orcamento-2016/orcamentos_anuais_view?anoOrc=2016; Riley, Charles. 15 January 2014. “Inside China’s \$2.2 Trillion Budget.” *CNN Money*; “Presupuestos Históricos.” 7 May 2017. *Dirección de Presupuestos*. Gobierno de Chile. Available: <http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-multipropertyvalues-2129-15192.html>; “Presupuestos.” 7 May 2017. *Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto*. Secretaría de Hacienda. Gobierno de la República Argentina. Available: <http://www.mecon.gov.ar/onp/html/#>; “Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación.” 2005. *Gobierno de México*. Available: <http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/temas/pef/2005/>; “Contributions by Country.” 31 December 2015. *UN Peacekeeping*. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>; “Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009.” 2010. *Institute for Applied Economic Research*; Costa Vasquez, Karin. 24 November 2014. “Brazilian South-South Technical Cooperation in 2015: integration, transparency and the Objective of Sustainable Development.” *Cafezinho Blog*. Available: <http://cafezinhoblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/cooperacao-tecnica-sul-sul-brasileira.html>; Gutierrez, Alexis and Dany Jaimovich. 2014. “A new player in the international development community? Chile as an emerging donor.” *University of Heidelberg*. Available: http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/ssdc_jaimovich.pdf; “Mexico’s Development Co-operation.” 2015. *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/mexicos-development-co-operation.htm>; “World Development Indicators.” 2017. *World Bank Data Bank*. Available: www.data.worldbank.org.




Figure 6: Opportunity Cost of Foreign Policy as a Percentage of GDP¹³¹

While in 2000, Brazil’s opportunity cost as percentage of GDP was similar to that of Mexico and India, by 2005 it was higher than either country, continuing to increase until 2010 at almost double that of Mexico. This confirms the broader trajectory of Brazilian leadership in international institutions discussed earlier in the chapter; namely that a significant uptick in institution creation, proposal generation, mediation and reform efforts occur in the early 2000s leading up to 2010, when the country was at its height of cost acceptance and provision of goods toward common goals for “follower” states.

In 2015, however, Brazil’s acceptance of opportunity cost declined to equal or slightly lower than its regional or extra-regional counterparts. Again, this corresponds with the country’s broader contraction in the measures of leadership explored throughout the chapter. While this reduced opportunity cost as a percentage of GDP reflects the economic and political instability Brazil faced post-2011, in the aggregate Brazil

¹³¹ Ibid. Please see Appendix B, Table J: “Comparative Opportunity Costs” for data on a wider subset of countries.

continues to spend more on foreign policy than does Mexico, Chile or South Africa.¹³² For example, while the amount of opportunity cost as a percentage of GDP in 2015 was lower in Brazil than in Mexico, Brazil still invested more toward foreign policy in real dollars; this is important since a larger amount of annual investment will have a greater impact as international institutions and initiatives that rely on that funding. Until 2015, Brazil accepted more than double the opportunity costs as Mexico over the timeframe of interest. In addition, Brazil's average opportunity cost as a percentage of GDP still remains higher on average than other regional emerging powers like Mexico or Chile, as well as extra-regional players like China.

Although diminished, Brazil's continued acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward leadership in international institutions is reflected in national budget priorities under interim president Temer.¹³³ For example, in 2016, Health and Education Ministries were both targeted for significant cuts (with cuts of over \$300 to \$700 thousand USD respectively); just a year prior Brazil's conditional cash transfer program, *Bolsa Família*, suffered an \$285 thousand USD cut.¹³⁴ Comparatively, the MRE only

¹³² In 2015, Brazil's opportunity cost was \$1.5 billion; Mexico's was \$923 million, and Chile's was just \$194 million. Ibid.

¹³³ This sum is likely an underestimation, as it only includes concrete numbers for Brazil's commitment to MINUSTAH and does not account for other PKO in which the country is involved. Brazil's continued leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) alone cost the country around \$387 million USD over 10 years. Kawaguti, 2014. For China, actual budget figures are extremely difficult to come by given the lack of transparency regarding government data. Spending on development aid was used as a proxy for foreign policy spending, which likely overestimates China's opportunity cost given the significant amount the country spends on this yearly. Even still, China's opportunity cost for foreign policy is far lower than the US, Brazil, or other countries surveyed at 0.0003%. See Charles Riley. 15 January 2014. "Inside China's \$2.2 Trillion Budget." *CNN Money*.

¹³⁴ Josie Jeronimo. 21 January 2016. "Sobrou até para o Bolsa Família." *Istoé*. Available: http://istoe.com.br/420467_sobrou+ate+para+o+bolsa+familia/.

faced a reduction of about \$5 thousand USD and Itamaraty employees were also spared from salary adjustments for 2016, which hit other ministries like Social Security.¹³⁵

Although an estimation, this indicator represents concrete costs allocated to international activism and reflects an overall picture of the “price” of foreign policy the country is willing to accept. If Brazil remains willing to accept opportunity costs despite a declining GDP, this underscores a commitment to foreign policy even amidst the country’s current backdrop of political and financial uncertainty. While this chapter laid the foundation for understanding trends in Brazilian leadership in international institutions by analyzing institution and coalition creation, proposal general, mediation and reform efforts, as well as an overall assessment opportunity costs, the subsequent chapter turns to consider the domestic-level determinants of this leadership. Specifically, it asks what role capability, credibility and willingness play in the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward common goals of “follower” states.

¹³⁵ Ivanir José Bortot. “Servidores do Itamaraty ficam sem reajuste salarial em 2016.” 2 June 2016. *Os Divergentes*. Available: <http://osdivergentes.com.br/ivanir-bortot/servidores-do-itamaraty-ficam-sem-reajuste-salarial-em-2016/>; Karina Trevizan e Tais Laporta. 19 February 2016. “Veja os efeitos do corte de R\$23,4 bi no Orçamento de 2016.” *Globo.com*. Available: <http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2016/02/entenda-os-efeitos-do-corte-no-orcamento-de-2016.html>.

Chapter 4: Capability, Credibility and Willingness in the Brazilian Case

The previous chapter explored the trajectory of Brazilian leadership in international institutions, charting the country's expanding activism in the 1990s to a zenith in 2010, followed by a sharp reduction post-2011 across various indicators of leadership like institutional creation, coalition-building, and mediation efforts. This chapter asks: what explains variation in Brazilian leadership in international institutions? The section below considers the impact of three key independent variables: capability, credibility and willingness, on leadership provision in the timeframe of interest.

Determinants of Leadership in International Institutions		
Capability	Credibility	Willingness

Table 10: Determinants of Leadership in International Institutions

Capability: Economic Growth

Hypothesis 1a argued that economic growth and stability was a critical component of a state's leadership bid, by making available resources for the acceptance of costs and provisions of goods to "follower" states such as development aid, peacekeeping troops, or delegations to key international institutions. As indicated in the table below, economic growth is measured by analyzing yearly gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation levels.

Measures of Economic Growth	
GDP	Inflation

Table 11: Measures of Economic Growth

A country experiencing low or negative growth, and/or high levels of inflation, is hindered from providing collective goods and accepting costs on behalf of "followers," central components to fulfilling a leadership role. Therefore, we would expect to see high levels of leadership at times when states have significant or at least stable levels of

growth and relatively low inflation. Conversely, periods of high inflation and low or negative growth should be associated with lower levels of leadership provision.

As discussed in further detail below, the expectations set forth in hypothesis 1a are consistent with the Brazilian case from 1990 onward. As indicated in Appendix C, since the country's hyperinflation crisis of 1992-1993, Brazil's gross domestic product (GDP) increased annually, peaking in 2011.¹³⁶ Moreover, inflation levels have decreased on the whole since the country's hyperinflation crisis, with a more recent uptick in 2015.¹³⁷ This period of growth and stability from the mid-1990s through 2010 corresponds with higher levels of leadership provision in international institutions, beginning under Cardoso but intensifying under the Lula administration when the gains of economic growth combined with strong political willingness to accept costs and provide goods toward common goals in the global area. In the mid- to late-1990s, incipient economic growth and stability coupled with controlled inflation allowed Brazil to engage more significantly in the region, spearheading mediation and conflict resolution efforts between countries like Ecuador and Peru, as well as Paraguay and Venezuela. The country also amplified its rhetoric during this time regarding UNSC reform, overtly stating its intention to gain a permanent seat on the Council as well.¹³⁸

Driven by a commodities boom and high demand from China, the Brazilian economy soared to record levels of growth from 2004 to 2010 during the Lula administration, which granted the president unprecedented material resources, many of

¹³⁶ Please see Appendix C, Graph A: "Brazilian GDP, 1990 to Present (Billions of USD)."

¹³⁷ Please see Appendix C, Graph B: "Brazilian Debt, 1995 to 2015" and Graph C: "Inflation Levels, 1990 to 2015."

¹³⁸ See Appendix E, Table H: "Rhetoric about Global Influence."

which were allocated to the MRE.¹³⁹ This booming economic growth made possible a highly active foreign policy, under which the scope and expansion of Brazil's leadership in international institutions was unparalleled in the country's post-independence history. This period represents the peak of Brazil's acceptance of costs and provision of goods to "follower" states, which took place across multiple issue areas and institutions.

For example, Brazil and India spearheaded the G-20 coalition at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, which fundamentally altered the decision-making body of the WTO, and Brazil lodged a historic case against US subsidies in the organization's Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Brazil also assumed leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti in 2004, the first Latin American country to lead a UN peacekeeping operation, during this period. The country also helped found the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) and UNITAID (an organization for the prevention and treatment of AIDs globally), presented a proposal on UNSC reform with the G-4, pushed for the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and pursued a biofuel agreement with the US. The trajectory of Brazil's leadership in international institutions, which expanded through the late 1990s and reached a peak from 2004 to 2010, matches the period of rising Brazilian GDP growth and its zenith in 2010 to 2011 as well.¹⁴⁰

Post-2010, however, a decline in Brazilian growth and rising debt and inflation levels contributed to a retraction of the country's leadership provision.¹⁴¹ In 2015, for example, Brazil's economy contracted by 3.6% in 2016, and is forecasted for only 0.5%

¹³⁹ Corresponds with peak funding for MRE. See Appendix E, Graph A: "MRE Budget, 2003-2017."

¹⁴⁰ Please see Appendix C, Table A: "Brazilian GDP, 1990 to Present." A significant drop in GDP growth occurs in 2009 with the US financial crisis, however, 2010 growth skyrockets to previously unmatched levels.

¹⁴¹ Please see Appendix C, Table A and Table B: Brazilian Debt, 1995 to 2015."

growth in 2017.¹⁴² Negative or low growth is compounded by rising inflation and government debt, as well as large-scale corruption scandals in state-owned oil company, Petrobras, which implicated former President Rousseff and led to her impeachment in December 2015. According to a Minister in the Economics Department of Itamaraty, given the pro-cyclical nature of external policy, “The capacity to try and build new partnerships and coalitions is exhausted during times of crisis,” both because of finances and lack of political capacity.¹⁴³ In other words, he argued, “[A country’s] self-confidence declines with the economy. This is important.”¹⁴⁴ In the words of a former ambassador, “When your economy is booming, your voice matters more.”¹⁴⁵

Just as economic growth granted Brazil the capacity to pursue leadership in international institutions through spearheading coalitions, formulating proposals and pursuing reform efforts, economic instability has curtailed Brazil’s activism in the global arena as the country lacks material resources to accept costs toward representing common interests of “follower” states. The concomitant reduction in leadership is reflected both in the large debt amassed by Brazil in recent years in various international institutions like the UN and OAS,¹⁴⁶ as well as the country’s dwindling institutional creation and proposal and initiative generation, discussed in the previous section. While material resources are constrained at present, however, Brazil’s activism in the global arena is still comparable if not greater to that of other regional powers. This suggests that some measure of political willingness remains to allocate resources to foreign policy, even

¹⁴² Pan Kwan Yuk. 7 March 2017. “Brazil’s economy shrinks 3.6% in 2016.” *Financial Times*.

¹⁴³ Personal interview with Minister of Economics Department, MRE. 6 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Personal interview with former Ambassador. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

¹⁴⁶ See Appendix B, Table H: “Brazilian Debt to UN Agencies.” These were largely paid off by fall of 2016, when the Brazilian Congress authorized approximately \$900 million USD to be released to pay debts to international organizations. See Fernanda Calgaro. 18 October 2016. “Congresso autoriza país a quitar dívida de R\$ 3 bi com órgãos internacionais.” *O Globo*.

drastically reduced from previous levels of funding or global visibility. Despite the current economic climate, Hamish McRae argues the “...fundamental strengths of Brazil’s economy will reassert themselves” in the future, making possible a renewed capacity for leadership.¹⁴⁷

Credibility: Shared “Southern” Worldview

Hypothesis 2 of this dissertation argues that another key component of a leadership bid in international institutions is credibility. This stems from a shared Southern development trajectory, which allows followers to “trust” leading states with whom they can relate in terms of common challenges of development, and who have prioritized a commitment to Southern empowerment over time. This entails maintaining and cultivating ties to the global South through developing-country institutions and coalitions, and efforts to reinvigorate and reinforce a shared Southern identity. Brazil views ties with the global South as critical to achieving shared goals in international institutions, with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim arguing, “Greater South-South coordination - at the WTO, International monetary Fund, United Nations, and new coalitions such as the BRIC - has raised the voices of countries once relegated to a secondary position.”¹⁴⁸ Beyond a presence in global South institutions, states seeking credibility for a leadership role should prioritize assistance toward reducing poverty and inequality domestically and globally, providing development aid to the global South as a means of demonstrating solidarity with developing countries. The fruit of these efforts should be demonstrated through surveys illustrating general support for the leading state from “follower” states, as well as information on specific proposals and coalitions of the

¹⁴⁷ McRae, 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Celso Amorim. 13 September 2010. “Seven years of progress, expansion.” *Miami Herald*.

leading state that were supported or opposed by the global South. These measures will be utilized to assess whether a state actively cultivates credibility among “followers” over time, as well as the degree to which “followers” support the leadership bid of states in international institutions.

Measures of Credibility			
Southern Institutional Membership	Gini Coefficient	Development Assistance	Support from “follower” States

Table 12: Measures of Credibility

Based on the indicators above, a country with sufficient credibility for leadership in international institutions should possess an equal or greater instance of membership developing-country institutions than other key regional and extra-regional states.

Leading states should possess programs aimed at mitigating domestic poverty and inequality, evidencing reduced levels of these indicators (such as the Gini coefficient).¹⁴⁹

States with credibility would also exhibit high or rising levels of developmental aid to global South countries. Moreover, survey data as well as anecdotal accounts of various initiatives in the global arena should indicate support from “follower” countries for the leading states’ initiatives. States lacking sufficient credibility for global leadership would have low levels of developing-country institutions and development aid levels, stagnantly high Gini coefficients, and would not possess significant support from “follower” states as indicated through surveys and anecdotal evidence on specific initiatives or proposals.

As measured by development assistance, diplomatic ties, domestic policies and survey responses, Brazilian credibility levels rose as the 1990s ensued, experiencing an

¹⁴⁹ The Gini coefficient measures the variation in the distribution of income among households, and is used to illustrate the degree of income inequality (and/or poverty) within a country. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality. See “Income Gini Coefficient.” 20 January 2017. *United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports*. Available: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient>.

uptick leading up to 2010, and declining thereafter. This is consistent with the trajectory of Brazilian leadership during the timeframe of interest, supporting Hypothesis 2 that posits credibility as a necessary component of a state's ability to exercise leadership in the global institutions. As Brazil's domestic inequality improved and greater funds allocated to South-South development aid, the country's activity and leadership in international institutions also increased. Post-2010, however, a flattening or contraction in development aid and domestic inequality reduction corresponds with reduced global leadership as measured by coalition creation, mediation efforts, etc. Despite dwindling domestic and international contributions, however, when looking at survey responses collected by *Latinobarómetro* Brazil comparatively retains the highest level of perceived leadership in the Latin American region, suggesting the country still garners credibility in the eyes of regional "followers" that allow for some level (however limited) of leadership provision.¹⁵⁰

The first indicator of a shared "Southern" worldview is membership in institutions and coalitions that were created by and for countries of the developing world.¹⁵¹ Countries that remain committed to these institutions, despite achieving a greater level of development, would more likely be seen as credible brokers for common issues and concerns of the global South within the international arena. Brazil is a member in twice the number of formalized developing country institutions as is Mexico; not including additional forums like the BRICS and IBSA where Brazil is also active.¹⁵² Moreover,

¹⁵⁰ "Data Bank." 2016. *LatinBarometer*. Available: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.

¹⁵¹ This variable is distinct in that it considers the specifically *Southern* nature of institutional involvement, in contrast to broader institutional membership as discussed in the previous chapter which does not delineate between developed and developing country institutions.

¹⁵² Brazil is a member of the G-15, G-24, G-77 and African Development Bank. Mexico is a member of the G-15 and G-24; it was also member of the G-77 until 1994, when it left this organization to join the OECD. See "Brazil," *CIA World Factbook* and "Mexico," *CIA World Factbook*.

Brazil maintains membership in key Southern institutions (like the G-15, G-24, G-77, and as an observer to NAM), whereas countries like Chile and Mexico have exited to join developed-country institutions and trade agreements, like the OECD, NAFTA and the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Being part of institutions uniquely created by and for developing countries suggests a commitment to this identity that is important to gaining credibility and legitimacy with “follower” states. In the words of Former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Brazil’s own struggle to find internal socioeconomic balance “...makes it possible to understand the needs of different countries better.”¹⁵³ Sean Burges argues that Brazil’s more “ideational” leadership led smaller states to see the country “...as a potential source of political support, developmental assistance and commercial opportunity...generating important elements of political support for key Brazilian initiatives” from other developing countries.¹⁵⁴

Demonstrating strides toward reducing domestic poverty and inequality is an important component of gaining the credibility necessary for a leadership bid in international institutions. Brazil’s Gini coefficient, which measures inequality or the income distribution of a country’s residents ranging from values between 0 (representing perfect equality) and 100 (using World Bank measures, 100 representing complete inequality), illustrates the country’s success in reducing domestic inequality since 1990, moving from a peak of 60.5 in 1990 to a trough of 52.67 in 2012.¹⁵⁵ The increase in the per capita income of the poorest 10% was nearly four times that of the richest 10% from 1999 to 2009, and since 2002, 35 million were lifted out of poverty and into the middle

¹⁵³ Interview with Amorim, 2015.

¹⁵⁴ Sean W. Burges. 2013. “Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?” *International Affairs* 89(3): 582.

¹⁵⁵ Please see Appendix D, Graph C: “GINI Coefficient, 1990 to 2014.”

class.¹⁵⁶ Brazil’s reduction in inequality is “remarkable” compared to other Latin American countries, declining almost twice as fast as the Latin American average, while in the other BRICS or the OECD countries as a whole inequality has risen in the same timeframe.¹⁵⁷




Figure 7: Brazilian GINI Coefficient, 1990-2014¹⁵⁸

A major component of Brazil’s success in reducing poverty and inequality stems from the country’s innovative conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, called *Bolsa Família* or “Family Purse” in English. This program gained international prominence for its success in improving health and education in the country through directly transferring wealth to in-need families provided they meet certain health and educational criteria.¹⁵⁹

While inequality increased in China, Russia and India from 2000 to 2010, Brazil moved

¹⁵⁶ Herwin Loman. 9 January 2014. “Brazil’s social challenges.” RaboBank– Economic Report. Available: <https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2014/january/brazils-social-challenges/>.

¹⁵⁷ Loman, 2014 and “Inequality: Improving Policies to Reduce Poverty and Inequality.” November 2015. Brazil Policy Brief. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*. Available: <https://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/brazil-improving-policies-to-reduce-inequality-and-poverty.pdf>.

¹⁵⁸ “Gini Coefficient.” *World Development Indicators*. World Bank Databank. Available: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

¹⁵⁹ See for example, Deborah Wetzel. 4 November 2013. “Bolsa Família: Brazil’s Quiet Revolution.” The World Bank. Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-Brazil-quiet-revolution> and Jonathan Tepperman. 2016. “Brazil’s Antipoverty Breakthrough.” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2016).

40 million into the middle class and increased per capita income by 27%.¹⁶⁰ *Bolsa Família*'s success has not only led to reduced poverty and inequality domestically in Brazil, but serves as a model for other developing countries to ameliorate these issues as well. More than 63 countries have sought to emulate the program, including both developing countries as well as developed countries like the US.¹⁶¹ According to *The New York Times*, *Bolsa Família* is "likely the most important government anti-poverty program the world has ever seen."¹⁶²

Brazilian assistance in implementing similar programs in other Southern countries has garnered much influence and credibility in the global arena, and highlights Brazil's shared identity and experience as a developing country. Mexico has also gained international prominence through its CCT program called *Oportunidades* (formerly *Progresas*, now *Prospera*), which has similarly led to a decrease in income inequality domestically. India implemented a nation-wide CCT program in 2005 called the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), focused on reducing maternal and infant mortality. Challenges in the identification and integration of households to banks and services, however, have led analysts to encourage India to "...emulate the successful bottom-up implementation approach of Brazil's *Bolsa Família* with the gradual scale up from the regional to the national level."¹⁶³ This illustrates the credibility of the Brazilian CCT model for other global Southern countries grappling with similar issues of poverty, inequality, and high mortality rates for vulnerable populations. While the Mexican model was the first nationwide program of its kind, both Brazil and Mexico remain pioneers in the CCT

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Tina Rosenberg. 3 January 2011. "To Beat Poverty, Pay the Poor." *The New York Times*.

¹⁶³ Kartik Akileswaran and Arvind Nair. 19 August 2013. "India's cash transfer model: a rushed and flawed welfare scheme?" *The Guardian*.

approach to sustainably reduce poverty and inequality, whose programs have been replicated globally.

Beyond ameliorating domestic poverty and inequality through CCTs, Brazil became an increasingly significant donor to the global South through development aid as the 1990s continued. This was based the country's own internal struggle for development through combating hunger, reforms in education and health sectors, and agriculture and energy initiatives, which serve as valuable "starting points for Brazilian cooperation."¹⁶⁴ Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira also linked domestic achievements in combatting poverty and inequality with Brazilian activism in the global arena. In his words:

"In fact, the victories Brazil has achieved domestically, in the fields of equality and social inclusion, further boost our credentials for championing these same values in the international arena. The consolidation of these advances increases Brazil's soft power, increasingly manifested through our cooperation with friendly countries. International cooperation is a unique tool that allows us simultaneously to share innovative experiences and to incorporate and disseminate technical and technological advances in Brazil's productive and scientific sectors. The strengthening of international cooperation as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, and therefore of the country's technological and economic development, constitutes a central objective that requires Itamaraty's full engagement."¹⁶⁵

Brazil's domestic experience with development reinforces its shared Southern worldview and lends credibility to Brazilian leadership in international institutions because of the similar concerns and issues it shares with the global South.

The arm of the Brazilian government responsible for South-South cooperation, the Agência Brasileira da Cooperação (ABC), was created in the late 1980s and operates under the MRE. In comparison, the Chilean Agency for International Cooperation (AGCID) was created in 1990, and Mexico's Agency of International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) only in 2011. According to the CEO of Brazil's ABC, the

¹⁶⁴ John de Souza 2010. "Brazil as an Emerging Actor in International Development Cooperation: A Good Partner for European Donors?" *German Development Institute*. Briefing Paper 5/2010. 3.

¹⁶⁵ Former Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira. 2 January 2015. *Speech on the occasion of the ceremony in which he took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs*. Brasília, Brazil.

Agency's mission is aligned with the concept of solidarity diplomacy, making "...Available to other developing countries the experiences and knowledge of specialized national institutions with the objective of collaborating in the promotion of economic and social progress of other people."¹⁶⁶ The majority of Brazil's aid takes the form of technical cooperation, knowledge exchange and capacity building programs.¹⁶⁷ From 2000 to 2010, ABC's budget increased from just over half a million USD to over \$11 million, evidencing a greater number of resources being devoted to development assistance throughout this period.¹⁶⁸ Overall development assistance in Brazil increased from \$158 million in 2005 to \$362 million in 2009, and peaked at over \$900 million in 2010.¹⁶⁹ The chart below illustrates an approximated comparison of Brazil and Mexico. In 2009, Mexican levels of aid were approximately \$105 million, trailing Brazil as well as other BRICS countries.¹⁷⁰ In comparison, in 2010, Chilean development assistance fell even lower, somewhere between \$4 and 16 million.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ Fernando José Marroni de Abreu. 23 October 2013. "The Evolution of International Technical Cooperation in Brazil." *Mural Internacional* 4(2): 6.

¹⁶⁷ John de Souza 2010, 2.

¹⁶⁸ Please see Appendix D, Graph A: "Annual Budget of ABC, 2000-2014."

¹⁶⁹ Please see Appendix D, Graph B: "Development Assistance from Brazil, 2005 to 2013." In terms of specific South-South aid flows, the most recent ABC report illustrates an increase from less than \$5 million USD in 2008 to over \$20 million in 2010 routed to developing countries globally. While statistics on development assistance for DAC countries is accessible through the OECD website, finding official numbers on development assistance in non-DAC countries proves difficult. Officials in the Brazilian government have noted that Brazil has no plans to report development assistance flows to the DAC of the OECD, although in recent years the Brazilian government has attempted to better quantify and professionalize its development cooperation through computerized monitoring of projects, manuals and guidelines regarding projects and programs. In 2009, the Agency published a report detailing Brazilian development assistance covering the period from 2005-2009. A subsequent report was released in 2014 and details some of the trends encompassed in the report. See "Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009." 2010. *Institute for Applied Economic Research* and "Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2010." 2014. *Institute for Applied Economic Research*. Available: http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21530.

¹⁷⁰ Juan-Pablo Prado Lallande. 2015. "Mexico's Role in Development Cooperation: Bridging North and South." *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*. November 2015. Available:




Figure 8: Brazilian Development Aid¹⁷²

While Brazilian development assistance initially outpaced that of Mexico and Chile, beginning in 2013 ABC’s budget and overall development aid dropped dramatically from over \$900 million in 2010 to around \$26 million in 2011, falling lower in 2012 and 2013 as well.¹⁷³ As indicated in Appendix C, by June 2013, the budget for SSC in Brazil had fallen by almost 34% compared to its peak of 2008, and in 2014 confronted a budget reduction of almost 40%.¹⁷⁴ Brazilian development assistance in 2013 trailed that of other Latin American countries like Mexico and Chile, both in overall numbers as well as percentage of GDP.¹⁷⁵ Domestic development assistance contracted in Brazil as well,

http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/news/2015/UNUCPR_MexicosRoleinDevelopmentCooperation_Lallande_.pdf

¹⁷¹ Dany Jaimovich. 2014. “A New Player in the International Development Community? Chile as an Emerging Donor.” Paper presented at the workshop: South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). 26-27 September 2014. University of Heidelberg. Heidelberg, Germany. Available: <http://developmenttherapy.blogspot.com/2012/07/new-player-in-international-development.html>. As a non-DAC member, exact numbers are difficult to come by.

¹⁷² Karin Costa Vasquez. 24 November 2014. “Brazilian South-South Technical Cooperation in 2015: integration, transparency and the Objective of Sustainable Development.” *Cafezinho Blog*. Available: <http://cafezinhoblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/cooperacao-tecnica-sul-sul-brasileira.html>.

¹⁷³ Please see Appendix D, Graph A: “Annual Budget of ABC, 2000-2014.”

¹⁷⁴ Karin Costa Vasquez 2014. Please see Appendix D, Graph B: “Development Assistance from Brazil, 2005 to 2013.”

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. Please see Appendix D, Graph B: “Development Assistance from Brazil, 2005 to 2013.”

with *Bolsa Familia*'s budget was also reduced by approximately \$260 thousand USD in 2014.¹⁷⁶ Yet, Brazil still managed to reduce its Gini coefficient despite these constraints from 2013 to 2014.¹⁷⁷

Despite domestic political and economic crises that reduced important channels of Southern solidarity (like development assistance), Brazil has managed to retain a comparatively high measure of credibility in the eyes of regional “follower” states. While domestic strides to reduce poverty and inequality and the provision of development assistance to the global South are both necessary for a state to garner credibility for a leadership role in the global arena. Yet alone these are insufficient; confidence, support and “buy-in” from “follower” states is another critical component to a state’s ability to lead in international institutions. Without the support of “follower” states that view the leading state as a credible broker and representative of their interests, states will be unable to lead. An analysis of survey responses also differentiates Brazil from other countries that might also employ leadership rhetoric, yet not actually be perceived as leaders.

Between 1995 to 2015, public opinion group Latinobarómetro asked Latin American citizens in which country they placed most confidence or that most demonstrated leadership in the region. Throughout the time period, Brazil was the country in which most respondents placed the most confidence and/or the country they believed had the most leadership in the region.¹⁷⁸ In contrast, Mexico scored low every

¹⁷⁶ Jeronimo, 2016.

¹⁷⁷ For the two most recent available years, the Gini was 52.87 (2013) and dropped to 51 (2014). Please see Figure 7 above. World Development Indicators 2014.

¹⁷⁸ “Data Bank.” 2016. *LatinBarometer*. Available: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>. Please see Appendix D, graphs C1-C3, “Confidence in Latin American Leadership.” The specific question asked of respondents changed in certain years; however, all centered on comparing levels of

single year, whereas Argentina and Venezuela had greater variance throughout the time period, but never gained the lead from Brazil on these questions. From 2010 to 2015, Brazil scored overwhelmingly higher than its regional counterparts on this indicator, from over 15-20% as compared to Mexico, Argentina or Venezuela, none of which even broke the double-digits. Even in 2015, the graph below illustrates that 19.9% of respondents felt that Brazil demonstrated the most leadership in the region, as compared to 4% for Argentina, 2.6% for Mexico, and 3.7% for Venezuela. The high level of confidence is not necessarily surprising in 2010, at the height of Brazilian leadership and Lula’s popularity. However, the continued high scores in 2015 are notable given the political and economic turmoil unfolding in the country during this period, suggesting credibility from “follower” states persists.




Figure 9: Confidence in Latin American Countries, 2009-2015¹⁷⁹

leadership/confidence/influence between Latin American countries and therefore serve as an appropriate proxy for credibility.

¹⁷⁹ Latinobarómetro 2017. *Specific question asked for 2009, 2010 and 2011 was: "Which country in Latin America has more leadership over the region?" For 2015, an almost identical question was asked: "Which Latin American country has most leadership in the region?" Data above represents the percentage of times a particularly country was named.

Brazil's overall trajectory of growth and poverty reduction achieved since the 1990s remains significant; these levels are now lower than those of other leading regional powers. When comparing the two peaks of development assistance for each country, in 2009 for Brazil and 2013 for Mexico, the amount of assistance given by Brazil was roughly double that of Mexico,¹⁸⁰ suggesting an extraordinary measure of credibility leading up to 2010 in Brazil. Falling levels of credibility on all indicators but survey data are consistent with the contraction post-2010 in our indicators of leadership (reduced institutional creation, coalition-building, mediation/conflict resolution, etc.), suggesting that credibility is a necessary component of a global leadership bid. Yet persistent "follower" support despite declining levels of development aid and a rising Gini coefficient has allowed maintains a level of credibility even in the midst of political and economic turmoil. This may contribute to Brazil's ability to continue exercising a degree of leadership in international institutions (for example, in the discrete realms of peacekeeping or climate change) despite an overall decline in activism post-2011.

The country's future credibility among "follower" states may be impacted by the movement of the Temer administration away from the global South institutionally and economically since assuming office.¹⁸¹ Six Latin American leaders walked out in protest during Temer's first UN General Assembly speech in September 2016, claiming that he was "an illegitimate president, the product of a coup d'etat," illustrating the contentious

¹⁸⁰ \$529 million by Mexico in 2013 and over \$900 million by Brazil in 2010. See Lallonde, 2013 and "Mexico's Development Co-operation." 2015. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/mexicos-development-co-operation.htm>.

¹⁸¹ See Fernando Barasuol. 10 September 2016. "Brazilian Foreign Policy: Neoliberal (re)Turn." *E-International Relations*. Available: <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/10/brazilian-foreign-policy-neoliberal-return/>. Andrei Netto. 11 June 2016. "Nota do Itamaraty sobre mudança de posição preocupa UNESCO." *Estadão Internacional*.

nature of his presidency.¹⁸² As the interim president seeks to reform MERCOSUL and pursue bilateral trade agreements outside the realm of the WTO, for example, this neoliberal direction may cost Brazil some degree of support on the part of developing countries in major international institutions.

Willingness: Presidential Influence/Interest and Bureaucratic Capacity

States may possess material goods (capacity) and a shared Southern identity (credibility)—such as Mexico or Argentina respectively, for example—yet without political will, leadership in the global arena is not pursued. Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that political will for a greater role in the global arena is necessary for states seeking institutional leadership, which stems from a combination of bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence. Kurt Weyland argues that Brazil’s quest for global influence “...provides a constant goal and explains the broadest gamut of foreign policy initiatives,” representing the “guiding principle” of the country’s foreign policy for decades.¹⁸³ Several interviewees noted this as the key defining difference between Brazil and the “Mexico’s and Canada’s” of the world – their country’s *willingness* to play a leading role.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² These countries were ALBA members Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua; more surprising was Costa Rica who left in protest of the “doubtful process” deposing of Rousseff and bringing Temer to power. After domestic and international criticism, Costa Rica later denied coordination with ALBA and acknowledged resulting tension with Brazil over the incident. See “Costa Rican Delegation Leaves UN General Assembly in Presence of Michel Temer.” 28 September 2016. *The Caravel*; “Michel Temer Defends His Legitimacy Before United Nations.” 20 September 2016. *Plus55*; H.E. Mr. Michel Temer, President. 20 September 2016. *Speech at UN General Assembly General Debate of the 71st Session*. New York, NY; Simon Romero. 29 September 2016. “Brazil’s New President, Michel Temer, Defends Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.” *The New York Times*.

¹⁸³ Kurt Weyland. 24 July 2013. “Review: Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times.” *E-International Relations*. Available: www.e-internationalrelations.com.

¹⁸⁴ For example, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, as well as several former and current Ambassadors who requested to remain anonymous.

Presidential Influence/Interest

Hypothesis 3a from Chapter 1 argued that presidential (or prime ministerial) influence/interest willingness for leadership in the global arena, because this individual serves as the primary leader and figurehead representing the country within major global institutions and influences the degree to which foreign policy is prioritized within an administration. For example, a president and his administration (or a prime minister and his cabinet) may exert significant influence on certain foreign policy issues (such as security or the environment), and may also influence the flow of resources to a foreign ministry relative to other bureaucracies. We would expect to see states with higher levels of presidential influence and interest in foreign policy evidence more leadership in international institutions. Conversely, states with low presidential influence/interests would be less likely to highlight foreign policy should lack willingness to pursue institutional leadership. States with high levels of presidential influence/interest but low levels of bureaucratic capacity may evidence leadership during particular administrations; once the particular leader with interest in foreign policy leaves office, however, we would expect to see bureaucratic capacity begin to drop significantly.

Presidential influence and interest in foreign policy is measured by extent of time spent abroad and presence on key international issues, as well as rhetoric surrounding the state's role in the global arena and the amount of time in significant speeches allotted to foreign policy. In addition, presidential influence on the foreign ministry is also considered in terms of additional funding or budget cuts, changes to staff, etc. stemming from the executive branch.

Measures of Presidential Influence/Interest			
Trips Abroad	Personal Presence on Key Issues	Rhetoric	Impact on Foreign Ministry

Table 13: Measures of Presidential Influence/Interest

As the 1990s ensued under Cardoso, presidential interest and influence rose in Brazil, peaking under Lula's administrations from 2002 to 2010 and declining afterward under Rousseff and now Temer. Under Cardoso, trips abroad, rhetoric, and personal presence on key issues increased, which coincides with greater engagement in leadership activities like mediation and conflict resolution, as well as pushing for reform and a permanent seat on the UNSC. For example, while in Brazil a diplomat was historically hired every 76 days, under Cardoso this shrank to 13-23 days, illustrating increasing willingness for foreign policy activism in the 1990s through enlargement of the diplomatic corp.¹⁸⁵

Moreover, the rhetoric used by Cardoso in speeches and interviews suggests a nascent willingness for the country to expand its engagement in regional and global affairs. The former president repeatedly utilized the word "active" to describe Brazil's posture toward international institutions, and particularly noted that this activity was increasing.¹⁸⁶ Cardoso's rhetoric also suggests a vision of Brazil as increasingly significant in the global arena, stating, "Brazil becomes more relevant for the well-being of the world."¹⁸⁷ Second only to Lula, Cardoso's inaugural speeches in 1995 and 1999 devoted more time to foreign policy than did other Brazilian and Mexican presidents, as indicated in the graph below. Averages for Brazilian presidents were also higher than

¹⁸⁵ Rogério de Souza Farias and Gécica Carmo. "Filhos da democracia: os diplomatas brasileiros na Nova República (1985-2010)." *Mundorama*. ISSN 21752052.

¹⁸⁶ Please see Appendix E, Table H: "Rhetoric about Global Influence."

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Rhetoric from each presidential administration was chosen from speeches at key international institutions (such as the UNGA, for example) that would display country's main foreign policy goals, as well as personal interviews with high profile newspapers of specific presidents that would indicate a more personal picture of their own interest in and preferences for foreign policy.

other Latin American countries like Argentina or Chile, whose recent leaders spent approximately 2 to 4% of their inaugural address on foreign policy.¹⁸⁸




Figure 10: Percentage of Speech Spent on Foreign Policy¹⁸⁹

Under Lula, record levels of funding and staff for the MRE combined with strong presidential influence and interest in foreign policy, resulted in extraordinary willingness on the part of the Brazilian state for leadership in international institutions from 2002 to 2010. During this timeframe, we see peaks in all measures –MRE budget, diplomats accepted in to the Rio Branco Institute, number of embassies created, and the overall size of the diplomatic corps – as indicated in the charts and graphs of Appendix E. Under Lula’s second administration, presidential influence in foreign affairs increased with

¹⁸⁸ For example, Chile’s Michele Bachelet spent 2% of her 2006 inaugural speech referencing foreign policy issues, and Argentina’s Mauricio Macri (2015) spent 4% of his on foreign policy. See Michelle Bachelet. “Discurso Posesión Michelle Bachelet.” 11 March 2006. El Palacio de la Moneda, Santiago, Chile; “Mauricio Macri toma posesión como nuevo presidente de Argentina.” 10 December 2015. *Forbes México*.

¹⁸⁹ To analyze amount of time spent on foreign policy by leaders, speeches of an annual nature, equivalent to a US State of the Union address or inaugural speech, were chosen and assessed by looking at the number of words spent discussing foreign policy relative to the total length of speech. “Leia a íntegra do segundo discurso de posse de Lula.” 1 January 2007. *BBC Brasil*; “Leia na íntegra o discurso de Lula no Congresso Nacional.” 1 January 2003. *Folha de São Paulo*; “Leia a íntegra do discurso de posse do segundo mandato da presidente Dilma Rousseff.” 1 January 2011. *O Globo*; “Veja a íntegra do discurso de Michel Temer.” 5 December 2016. *O Globo*.

unprecedented funding for the MRE, leading to the largest diplomat corps graduating from the Rio Branco Institute in 2008 to 2010.¹⁹⁰ Whereas the Rio Branco Institute (responsible for training Brazilian diplomats) averaged 28 available seats per year prior, the number of new diplomats accepted into the course jumped to 105, representing an increase of nearly four times the previous average under Lula by 2006.¹⁹¹ Likewise, the size of the diplomatic corps was just under 1,000 at the end of Cardoso's second term; at the end of Lula's, this expanded to almost 1,500, with the addition of over 400 new seats.¹⁹² In comparison, under Mexico's Calderón less than 200 diplomatic seats were opened from 2006 to 2012.¹⁹³

The MRE also opened multiple new embassies in countries like Africa, as well as new divisions within Itamaraty. Brazil possessed 150 diplomatic posts under Cardoso; the number increased to 217 (40 new) under Lula while the length of time between the hiring of diplomats shrank to 4 days.¹⁹⁴ In addition to an increase in funding to the MRE, an expansion of Brazilian embassies and diplomatic corps, Lula spent an unprecedented 19% of his time abroad in his second administration, compared to Cardoso's 11% or Rousseff's 5%, or an average of 11.5% for Mexican presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, Lula engaged in highly controversial global issues, most

¹⁹⁰ Isabel Fleck. 25 December 2014. "Itamaraty perde espaço no Orçamento." *Folha de São Paulo*.

¹⁹¹ Please see Appendix E, Table C: "New Diplomats accepted into Rio Branco Institute."

De Souza Farias and Carmo, 2015; Gabriel Mestieri. 1 November 2009. "Lula cria 35 novas embaixadas e abre quatro vezes mais vagas para diplomatas." *R7 Notícias*.

¹⁹² Fleck, 2014. See Appendix E, Table D: "Size of Diplomatic Corps."

¹⁹³ Georgina Olson. 13 March 2013. "Servicio Exterior trabaja "al límite", hay déficit de diplomáticos." *Excelsior*.

¹⁹⁴ Mestieri, 2009.

¹⁹⁵ President Nieto has traveled about 8% of his term so far. See "Agenda." 2017. Presidencia de la República. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/archivo/agenda>. "Viajes realizados al extranjero por el C. Felipe de Jesús Calderón." March 2012. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available: www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/spe/SPE-ISS-01-12.pdf. "Viajes realizados al extranjero por el Vicente Fox Quesada." June 20014. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sia/coord/pdf/coord-iss-16-04.pdf>.

notoriously his attempt to broker a deal with former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over the country's nuclear program. Lula was also the first president invited to the Annapolis Conference on the Israeli-Palestine Conflict in 2007, indicating his personal interest in Middle East affairs.

Lula's rhetoric further confirms his vision of Brazil as a leader as indicated in Appendix E, arguing that Brazil "naturally plays a leading role" and his foreign minister Celso Amorim noting the period of "great dynamism" that Lula's presidency ushered in for foreign policy engagement.¹⁹⁶ In comparison, Mexican presidents were more cautious in their rhetoric regarding the country's role in the international sphere, highlighting Mexico as a "major player" in the global arena rather than a "leader."¹⁹⁷ While former Mexican president Felipe Calderón did much to restore bilateral relationships in the Latin American region and was active in the realm of climate change, analysts bemoaned the fact that even during his term Mexico had been, on the whole, "...decidedly quiet on the international front."¹⁹⁸ Current Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto, while initially suggesting his intention to make Mexico a greater global player, is increasingly sidelined by economic and security issues domestically.¹⁹⁹ As

¹⁹⁶ Please see Appendix E, Table H: "Rhetoric about Global Influence."

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Shannon K. O'Neil. 1 December 2008. "It's time for Mexico to take the lead, from Mexico's The News." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available: <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2008/12/01/it's-time-for-mexico-to-take-the-lead-from-mexico's-the-news/>; Mexican President Peña Nieto's Ratings Slip with Economic Reform." 26 August 2014. *Pew Research Center*. Available: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/08/26/mexican-president-pena-nietos-ratings-slip-with-economic-reform/>; Nick Miroff. 13 April 2014. "Mexico's President Enrique Peña Nieto slumps in polls despite policy wins." *The Washington Post*; Jude Webber. 1 September 2016. "Mexico's Peña Nieto suffers PR disaster from Trump meeting." *Financial Times*.

¹⁹⁹ "In historic U-turn, Mexico to join U.N. peacekeeping missions." 24 September 2014. *Reuters*.

indicated in Figure 10 above, Lula spent more time discussing foreign policy in his inaugural address than did other Brazilian or Mexican presidents.²⁰⁰

While Lula epitomized the foreign policy-minded president when compared to FHC or even Mexico's Calderón, Rousseff exhibited little penchant or interest for international affairs. Under Rousseff, heightened by larger political and economic crises, sharp declines occurred in the MRE budget, staff and embassies; the percentage of the Executive budget spent on the MRE fell by nearly half by 2013, to 0.27%.²⁰¹ In the same year, 400 additional diplomatic seats were created *de jure*, but *de facto* left unfilled by the Rousseff administration.²⁰² Another major contraction was scheduled to occur in 2015 and 2016, where the MRE was initially allocated just over \$8 million USD and faced mid-year cuts further reducing this figure by over \$1 million.²⁰³ Ambassadors around the globe were subject to missing payments on rent and utility bills, and Brazil began to undertake “selective defaults” on its payments to various international organizations.²⁰⁴ Ultimately, the ministry secured another \$1 million USD later in 2015 to cover costs, yet the initial budget cuts reflected the lower priority of foreign policy to the Rousseff administration and represented a significant change from the booming financial resources of the Lula years for global affairs.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ “Leia a íntegra do segundo discurso de posse de Lula.” 1 January 2007. *BBC Brasil*; “Leia na íntegra o discurso de Lula no Congresso Nacional.” 1 January 2003. *Folha de São Paulo*.

²⁰¹ Please see Appendix E, Table B: “MRE Budget as Percentage of Executive Budget.” Flávia Foreque. 28 May 2015. “Chanceler diz que corte no Orçamento não afetará atuação do Itamaraty.” *Folha de São Paulo*.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Foreque, 2015; Michelle Macedo. “Embaixadas do Brasil sofrem com cortes e terão só 1/3 da verba neste ano.” *Correio Brasileiro*. 29 January 2015.

²⁰⁴ Please see Appendix B, Table H: “Brazilian Debt to UN Agencies.”

²⁰⁵ Fleck, 2015.

The length of time between hiring diplomats increased under Rousseff's administration, while only 8 new embassies were created, leading one reported to describe the period under Rousseff as the "retracting or downsizing of diplomacy. Rousseff spent only 9% of her time abroad during her first term, dropping down to 5% during her second administration; both percentages fall well short of Lula's time abroad or even Cardoso or Felipe Calderón's 11.5%.²⁰⁶ Trips to Japan and Vietnam were canceled due to budgetary constraints, yet interviewees suggested these cancelations also resulted from Rousseff's lack of interest.²⁰⁷ Rousseff also announced she would not attend the already-planned IBSA Summit in New Delhi, India in 2013, which was never rescheduled.²⁰⁸ Her administration also avoided involvement in Venezuela's ongoing political crisis, and failed to take a coherent stance on critical global crises like Syria, Libya, or Russia's annexation of Crimea – although neither did Mexico nor most other Latin American countries.²⁰⁹ Moreover, every interviewee, even a professor that serves as a foreign policy advisor to the Worker's Party (Partido de Trabalhadores, or PT in the Portuguese acronym), admitted that foreign policy was not a priority under Rousseff's administration.²¹⁰ The rhetoric of the Rousseff administration further reflects the shift from leadership to more low-level activism – no longer is the word "leader" used as in

²⁰⁶ Please see chart in Appendix E, Table I: "Presidential Trips Abroad."

²⁰⁷ Simon, 2016.

²⁰⁸ Oliver Stuenkel. 10 June 2016. "Time for Brazil's Foreign Minister to help relaunch the IBSA grouping." *Post-Western World*.

²⁰⁹ See W. Alejandro Sanchez. 28 March 2014. "Latin Americas mixed response to the Ukraine crisis." *La Opinión*; "From Mexico to Brazil, how is the Ukraine crisis playing in Latin America?" 17 March 2014. *Christian Science Monitor*.

²¹⁰ Personal interviews with former and current Ambassadors, Ministers of MRE, journalists, and PT policy advisor in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Brasília. 3-23 November 2016.

Lula's administration, and her references to foreign policy in speeches dropped into single digits.²¹¹

Since assuming office after Rousseff's impeachment in August 2016, interim president Michel Temer has signaled a measure of renewed activism in foreign policy, albeit with a new focus. Although just in office for 150 days, he has already spent 12% of his time abroad – more than Rousseff's average over her (almost) two terms.²¹² Temer and newly appointed Foreign Minister José Serra have shifted foreign policy strategies away from the South-South orientation of his PT predecessors to focus on relationships with Argentina and the developed world (like Japan and the US), often in a bilateral context. Serra has already received criticism on certain foreign policy moves, such as threatening to close embassies in Africa and the Caribbean opened by Lula, voting against the country's long-standing pro-Palestine stance in the United Nations, and indicating a movement away from multilateral forums like the WTO.

These moves reflect the broader attempt by the Temer administration to strongly break with the foreign policy stance of his PT predecessors and move Brazil's foreign economic policy toward a neoliberal agenda.²¹³ Ensuing budget cuts and striking MRE workers has further distanced the Minister from the organization at large, comprised of

²¹¹ Please see Figure 10 above.

²¹² Luciana Amaral. 13 October 2016. "Na quarta viagem internacional, Temer vai à Índia para cúpula do Brics." *Globo.com*. Available: <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2016/10/na-quarta-viagem-internacional-temer-vai-india-para-cupula-do-brics.html>; Filipe Matoso, Fernanda Calgaro e Luciana Amaral. 30 September 2016. "Temer fará primeira visita à Argentina depois de viagens a Chile e EUA." *Globo.com*. Available: <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2016/09/temer-fara-primeira-visita-argentina-depois-de-viagens-china-e-eua.html>.

²¹³ Fleck, 2015; Minister José Serra. 18 May 2016. *Speech on the occasion of the ceremony in which he took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs*. Brasília, Brazil; Luiza Bandeira. 20 May 2016. "Desfazer o que Lula fez em política externa não é bom para o Brasil." *BBC Brasil*; João Filho. 26 October 2016. "Gaffes, Mistakes and Humiliations Define Brazil's New Foreign Policy." *The Intercept*. Available: <https://theintercept.com/2016/10/26/gaffes-mistakes-and-humiliations-define-brazils-new-foreign-policy/>; Netto, 2016.

mostly career diplomats.²¹⁴ One political leader described Serra’s actions as Foreign Minister thus far akin to “a bull in a china shop” and another lamented, referring to Temer, that “...undoing what Lula did for foreign policy is not good for Brazil.”²¹⁵

It remains to be seen to what extent future state visits, trade agreements, etc., on the part of Temer administration will enhance or tarnish Brazil’s lagging leadership in the global arena. Certainly a concerted movement away from multilateral forums like the WTO will diminish the country’s ability to represent shared interests of the global South, and with it, Brazil’s leadership in international institutions. The analysis above suggests that the particular proclivities of presidential administrations impact the willingness essential to leadership in international institutions. Yet, as explored below, these have an exacerbated or mitigated effect on willingness for leadership depending on how they coalesce with underlying bureaucratic capacity.

Bureaucratic Capacity

Hypothesis 3b posited that a strong bureaucracy is necessary, as this organization is usually the primary generator and implementer of foreign policy within the state, providing the human capital, diplomatic skill and ethos to be an influential state in key global forums. A state demonstrating willingness for leadership should possess high levels of bureaucratic capacity, measured through funding, staff, expertise and professionalism, as well as strength and consistency in ethos informing their foreign policy agenda.

Measures of Bureaucratic Capacity			
Funding	Staff	Expertise	Continuity/Ethos

²¹⁴ Netto, 2016; Matheus Leitão. 27 September 2016. “Greve no Itamaraty dá munição a opositores de Serra.” *Globo.com*. Available: <http://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/greve-no-itamaraty-da-municao-opositores-de-serra.html>.

²¹⁵ Leitão, 2016.

Table 14: Measures of Bureaucratic Capacity

The MRE holds central importance in Brazil as the country’s main formulator and implementer of external policy. In the words of a Secretary in the UN Division of Itamaraty: “Without Itamaraty, Brazil wouldn’t have the same international projection.”²¹⁶ When overall MRE funding is compared to countries like Argentina or Mexico, it suggests an overall higher level of political willingness for activism in international institutions on the part of the Brazilian state during the 2007 to 2010 period. As indicated in the table and chart below, Itamaraty’s budget is significantly higher than other Latin American countries, traditionally hovering around \$1 billion USD during the timeframe of interest as indicated in the table below.

Average Foreign Ministry Budgets in USD, 2003-2016			
Brazil	Mexico	Chile	Argentina
\$1.3 billion	\$617 million	\$158 million	\$175 million

Table 15: Average Foreign Ministry Budgets, 2003-2016

The MRE budget at the peak of 2008 was over a billion dollars higher than peak funding of Mexico’s foreign ministry (the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, or SRE) in 2012.²¹⁷ Brazil’s Foreign Ministry also commanded a greater percentage of domestic GDP than Mexico and Argentina until 2013, as indicated in the figure below.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Personal interview Sra. Maria Clara Tusco, Second Secretary in UN Division of MRE. 3 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

²¹⁷ In 2008, MRE reached a peak budget of \$1,798,965,636. In 2012, Mexico reached a peak budget of \$ 773,506,335.

²¹⁸ “Evolución 2006-2012 del Presupuesto Autorizado a la SRE: Logros e Retos.” 2012. *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*; “Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación.” 2005. *Gobierno de México*. Available: <http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/temas/pef/2005/>; “Sector Presupuestal: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.” 18 January 2016. *Portal de Obligaciones de Transparencia*. Gobierno de México. Available: http://portaltransparencia.gob.mx/pot/presupuesto/showPresupuesto.do?method=begin&_idDependencia=00005; “Orçamentos Anuais.” 15 January 2017. *Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*. Governo do Brasil. Available: http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br/orcamentos-anuais/orcamento-2016/orcamentos_anuais_view?anoOrc=2016.




Figure 11: Foreign Ministry Budgets as % of GDP, 2003-2015²¹⁹

While spending on Itamaraty as a percentage of GDP has decreased since 2013 due to domestic financial constraints, other Latin American countries (with the exception of Chile) have only recently begun to invest equivalent resources into their respective foreign policy bureaucracies. Significant jumps like that of Argentina represent a type of “back-pay” stemming from a previously severely underfunded bureaucracy.²²⁰ Moreover, despite political and economic crisis, after significant initial budget cuts in 2015 the MRE secured unprecedented additional funding in October of that year and ended up receiving over \$1 billion USD for its operations, in line with previous, non-crisis years, suggesting commitment to foreign policy despite domestic constraints.²²¹ In explaining the decline in resources allotted to the MRE, one diplomat argued that Itamaraty’s budget was somewhat bloated under the Lula administration and that cuts occurring under Rousseff were merely a “correction” back to historical levels.²²²

²¹⁹ Spike for Argentina in 2015 a result of salary adjustments for exchange rates and refurbishment of buildings for employees posted abroad. “Amplían el presupuesto de la Cancillería en más de \$ 1000 millones,” 2016.


²²⁰ “Amplían el presupuesto de la Cancillería en más de \$ 1000 millones.” 25 October 2016. *El Cronista*.

²²¹ See Fleck, 2015 for a sketch of the evolution of the budget.

²²² Interview Tusco, 2015.

Ambassador Ricupero noted that the downsizing occurring post-2011 was a “natural process” and that “Brazil already has one of the largest (diplomatic) networks in the world, it doesn’t need to expand much more.”²²³

In addition to funding, the size of Brazil’s diplomatic corps remains higher than other regional powers, although numbers have dwindled post-2011. The number of Brazilian diplomats grew in the 1990s, spiked from 2003 to 2010, and fell back to pre-2003 levels in recent years. In 2014, only 18 new diplomats were accepted into Itamaraty, representing the lowest number in decades.²²⁴ A Secretary at the Instituto Rio Branco (IRBr, Brazil’s diplomatic training academy) admitted that one impact of Brazil’s current financial crisis was fewer classes and professors for diplomatic training in recent years.²²⁵ Yet when compared to the size of other diplomatic corps of Mexico or other Latin American neighbors in the graph below, Brazil on average maintains a higher number of staff despite current budget cuts and downsizing.



²²³ João Fellet. 8 May 2014. “Prova da seleção para diplomata revolta candidatos.” *BBC Brasil*.

²²⁴ See Oliver Stuenkel. 15 February 2014. “Is Brazil abandoning its global ambitions?” *Post-Western World*.

²²⁵ Personal interview with Second Secretary at Instituto Rio Branco. 5 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

Figure 12: Size of Diplomatic Corps, 2013²²⁶

While Brazil maintained 3,122 members of the foreign service in 2013; Argentina had almost a thousand less at 2,316 and Mexico has generally retained the same number since 1975 –leading Mexican foreign policy experts to lament the country’s approximately 1,311-person staff as “insufficient to confront reality.”²²⁷ As indicated below, when further comparing presence abroad, as of early 2017 Brazil maintained the largest number of embassies in the region at 139 –more than Mexico, Argentina and Cuba– even more than India’s 122.²²⁸




Figure 13: Number of Embassies Abroad, 2017²²⁹

When assessed in terms of budget or diplomats, Brazil’s MRE is currently in a trough, which coincides with lessened willingness for leadership in international institutions. Yet the country’s current political and economic crises do not fully negate the underlying influence of Itamaraty on foreign policy, which continues to push Brazil

²²⁶ Olson, 2013; Ramón Xilotl. 26 April 2012. “Servicio Exterior Mexicano, propuestas para su mejoramiento.” *Gaceta Parlamentaria* XV (3449-IV). Available: <http://archivo.diplomaticosescritores.org/obras/RXilotlSobreServicioExtMex.pdf>.

²²⁷ Olson, 2013; Xilotl. 2012. 1,114 are seats for career diplomats, 197 are seats for political appointees.

²²⁸ “Embassies and Consulates around the World.” 21 January 2017. *Embassypages.com*. Available: <https://www.embassypages.com>.

²²⁹ Embassy Pages 2017.

toward activism in international institutions even if tempered or reduced by political and economic circumstances. Beyond staff numbers and budget, another key variable to bureaucratic capacity is the level of professionalism and strength of worldview/ethos within a diplomatic corps. Bureaucracies with high levels of training, professionalism and a consistent worldview illustrate a dedication to foreign policy on the part of a country, which has devoted resources to foreign policy in order to make a significant impact on key issues in the global arena. Diplomats trained with a vision of activism and impact in the international arena may continue to push for leadership in global arena despite a disinterested Executive or reduced budget, even if their ability to implement proposals, establish coalitions, and mediate conflicts, is hindered on some level by these other variables.

In the Brazilian case, Itamaraty prides itself on consistency and professionalism in their diplomatic formation, implemented chiefly through the country's Instituto Rio Branco (IRBr). Yearly exams for diplomats to enter IRBr are extremely competitive, and the training rigorous. In 2015 alone, there were 5,271 applicants for only 22 seats – or 240 candidates for each seat, meaning that less than 1% of applicants actually obtained a seat.²³⁰ This is similarly (if not more) competitive to the US Department of State, where just 3 to 5% of applicants to the US State Department pass examinations and about 1.5% of applicants are hired.²³¹ In comparison, there were only 7,982 applicants to become

²³⁰ See Fellet, 2014 and “Quero trabalhar na área diplomática! Faço Direito ou Relações Internacionais?” 8 December 2014. *Guia Estudante*. Available: <http://guiadoestudante.abril.com.br/blogs/pordentrodasprofissoes/category/diplomacia/> and similar percentage for 2014.

²³¹ Martin Austerhuhle. 28 January 2014. “Hiring Slowdown at State Leaves Candidates in Limbo.” *The Washington Diplomat*.

Mexican Foreign Service Officers throughout the entire period of 2002 to 2016.²³²

Speaking to the competitive nature and professionalism of its corps, a former diplomat noted, “The academic formation of diplomats is consistent, solid; most have a Master’s or Doctorate...they are very well-formed, not just technically, but academically.”²³³

Itamaraty is mainly comprised of career diplomats rather than political appointees, as the Foreign Minister is the only position the Brazilian President appoints.²³⁴ Mexico, in contrast, typically possesses more Foreign Service representatives appointed by the president than career diplomats (at 197 to 114 respectively).²³⁵

The high composition of career diplomats in Brazil lends itself to greater continuity in foreign policy goals and ethos from one administration to another, despite changing staff numbers or budget. This also tempers the influence of particular presidents over the long-term goals of Brazilian foreign policy. A Secretary at IRBr noted that the Institute had maintained many of the same teachers for decades, and that training materials have remained consistent as well, regardless of whether a politically “left or right” government is in power.²³⁶ Another military advisor stated, “Brazil has a long memory. [Foreign policy] positions are informed by 200 years of history, aiming at 2-3 generations ahead, not just today.”²³⁷ This allows Brazil to maintain some degree of bureaucratic capacity independent of political and economic stability, as well as protection from the proclivities of particular presidential administrations.

²³² Tania Del Rio. 23 February 2016. “Using Data to Uncover Hurdles for Mexico’s Female Diplomats.” *Council on Foreign Relations*.

²³³ Personal interview with Amado Luiz Cervo, Professor at Instituto Rio Branco and Universidade de Brasília. 5 November 2015.

²³⁴ Interview with Castro Neves, 2015.

²³⁵ Olson, 2013.

²³⁶ Personal interview with Second Secretary at Instituto Rio Branco. 5 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

²³⁷ Personal interview with Consultant for Ministry of Defense and Professor at Universidade de Brasília. 3 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

This is evidenced by the pushback from Itamaraty to Serra's pro-Israel stance in UNESCO last year and ultimately the official MRE memorandum confirming that there would be no change to Brazil's long-standing policy on Palestine.²³⁸ Another Secretary in the UN Division of Itamaraty argued that *means* might change across administration, but not the *goals* – all points back to promoting Brazilian national development.²³⁹ Moreover, despite recent dips in budget and number of diplomats, Itamaraty still exhibits consistency in training, professionalism and ethos despite changes in the executive branch, and maintains higher levels of staff and budget than other regional powers even in the midst of Brazil's larger economic problems. This suggests that Brazil maintains a measure of willingness for leadership in international institutions, particularly on the part of Itamaraty, even if the ability to exercise such leadership is constrained by presidential disinterest or reduced funding at this time.

The trajectory sketched above illustrates three different combinations of the subvariables presidential interest/influence and bureaucratic capacity. Under Cardoso, presidential interest and influence was on the rise, as was bureaucratic capacity – corresponding to a period of increasing international presence and leadership from 1990 until the early 2002s. The Lula administration ushered in extremes on both variables, as extraordinary presidential interest and influence coalesced with unprecedented funding and staff for Itamaraty, leading to a zenith of Brazilian willingness for leadership in international institutions like the WTO, UNSC and UNFCCC. This high/high combination of the two willingness variables under Lula is unique not only in terms of

²³⁸ Netto, 2016.

²³⁹ Interview Tusco, 2015.

the Brazilian experience, but also relative to other regional presidents and foreign ministries in the timeframe of interest such as Mexico or Argentina.

Post-2011, under Rousseff and now Temer, presidential interest and influence for foreign policy has decidedly waned, and limited finances have undoubtedly diminished Itamaraty's budget and resources (as illustrated by the numerous strikes confronting both administrations). Though representing a decline in terms of bureaucratic capacity compared to the Lula years, when contrasted with other regional powers, Itamaraty remains well-funded and fairly insulated from extensive presidential politics given its majority composition of career diplomats. This has allowed Brazil to retain a level of activism in international institutions despite presidential disinterest, suggesting that although the executive undoubtedly plays an important role in a state's foreign policy activism, a strong bureaucracy can continue to pursue a measure of global leadership even if a particular president is less inclined.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the determinants of the peaks and troughs in Brazil's institutional leadership. The Brazilian case suggests that capability (economic growth and stability), credibility (a shared South development perspective) and willingness (bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence) are three critical components for the outcome of leadership in international institutions. As the 1990s ensued, increased economic growth and stability (capacity) corresponded with greater activism in international institutions. Credibility (from rising development aid and a reduction in domestic poverty and inequality) and willingness (investment in the foreign ministry and presidential interest in foreign affairs), also experienced an uptick through the 1990s and early 2000s. The period from 2008 to 2010 corresponds with unprecedented growth,

granting significant material capability; greater South-South engagement through development assistance, and extraordinary bureaucratic resources and presidential interest in foreign policy, which corresponds with the height of Brazilian leadership in international organizations. The zenith of Brazil's institution and coalition-creation, reform efforts, and proposal generation (indicators of leadership in international institutions, the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward the common goals of "follower" states) correspond with this same time period.

The downturn and trough of leadership indicators (like institution and coalition creation or mediation and conflict resolution attempts) also occur when capacity, credibility and willingness are at low levels. Beginning after 2011, economic growth slowed and began to descend, domestic inequality increased and South-South development assistance declined, compounded by slashed bureaucratic budgets and a presidential administration with little interest or influence in foreign policy affairs. This led indicators for leadership to fall precipitously as well. This does not completely preclude activism in certain arenas of international institutions, thanks in large part to lingering support from "follower" states and underlying bureaucratic capacity which grant Brazil the ability to maintain engagement in certain issue areas of the global arena. Yet the overall pattern suggests that capacity, credibility and willingness are indeed mutually necessary for states pursuing leadership in international institutions; when these variables decline, leadership is reduced. The subsequent chapter will explore in greater detail Brazilian leadership in three specific organizations and issue areas from 1995 to present –namely, the WTO, UNSC and UNFCCC.

Chapter 5: Brazilian Leadership in the UNSC, WTO and UNFCCC

While the previous chapter explored trends in domestic-level variables impacting Brazilian leadership in the global arena, this chapter turns to a more in-depth study of the country's leadership provision within specific institutions and issue areas, exploring variation in Brazilian acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward representing common goals with the global South. Three institutional case studies are analyzed, entailing distinct issue areas: the UNSC (security), the WTO (trade) and the UNFCCC (climate change). The broad trajectory of Brazilian leadership provision corresponds with changes in capability, credibility and willingness as sketched in the earlier chapter: the 1990s brought increasing engagement, first peaking in the mid-2000s and continuing upward until around 2010, then declining post-2011.

Brazil in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Brazil historically played an active role in the establishment of the UN's post-WWI predecessor, the League of Nations, and almost acquired a permanent seat on the UNSC after WWII, but Russian and British opposition eventually precluded this outcome.²⁴⁰ Yet the UNSC remains one of country's preferred forums for exercising leadership, evidenced during this timeframe by reform proposals seeking to make the Council more representative, deepening engagement in peacekeeping operations (PKO),

²⁴⁰ Post-WWI, the country was shown favor by US President Woodrow Wilson and granted three representatives rather than the standard one delegate. Brazil was active in the League as a de-facto representative of the Americas during the lifespan of the League, particularly after the US failed to join and other Latin American countries showed disinterest. Brazil was again one of fifty states forming the San Francisco Conference in 1945 after sending troops to fight on the Allied side during WWII. While US President Theodore Roosevelt promised Brazilian President Gertúlio Vargas a permanent seat on the Security Council for the incipient UN at the Yalta Conference of 1945, Russian and British opposition eventually precluded the country from permanent status. See Stanley Meisler. 2017. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. New York: Atlantic Press. 81-82; Britta Crandall. 2011. *Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of US-Brazilian Relations*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 50.

and providing ideational goods through the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and “Responsibility While Protecting.” Brazilian leadership provision in the UNSC rose as the 1990s continued, and peaked around 2005 as the country assumed greater costs and provided significant goods to the global South through initiating leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) and spearheading the creation of the PBC.

Reform Efforts

One indicator of leadership provision is reform efforts, as countries seek to change the rules about decision-making within prominent international institutions that remain skewed toward developed country preferences. Given its historical experience of vying for a permanent UNSC seat to no avail, Brazil has consistently pushed for an expansion of this body throughout the timeframe of interest, though with varying intensity. Brazil is a member of the Group of Four (G-4), along with Germany, India and Japan, which has pushed for a two-thirds expansion of the UNSC from 15 to 25 members by adding 6 permanent and 4 non-permanent seats.²⁴¹ In 2002, Secretary General Kofi Annan personally lobbied for reform efforts in the UN, including but not limited to UNSC reform, and appointed a High-Level Panel to report on the “threats, challenges and change” facing the organization, of which Brazil was the only Latin American member.²⁴² This report presented two models (A and B) for UNSC expansion, one

²⁴¹ The proposal would assign 2 permanent seats to Africa and Asia (India), 1 to Western Europe (Germany), and 1 to Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil). One non-permanent seat each would go to Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin American and the Caribbean. The reform effort would be reviewed after 15 years and the veto considered at that time, and new permanent members would not be able to utilize the veto until these later discussions. In a draft proposal, Brazil and other G-4 countries wanted reform with veto power for additional seats, but ultimately these was left out because of push-back from countries that supported the G-4, leading to an agreement to review the veto system in 15 years time.

²⁴² Following a wave of decolonization taking place in the mid-20th century and a resulting representation issue, in 1965 the UN Charter was reformed under Resolution 1990 to allocated ten new non-permanent (rotating) seats to the Security Council. This included a rotating seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC). Asia-Africa received 5, Eastern Europe 1, Latin America and Caribbean received 2,

proposing Brazil and India as permanent members along with Germany, Japan and two African countries, and the other granting the countries semi-permanent status via a rotation schedule. In 2005, the G-4 and other 28 countries presented a revised United Nations draft resolution A/59/L.64, which had agreed to review the veto system in 15 years' time.²⁴³

Although other proposals (from the “Small-5” and Panama) have emerged since this critical juncture, reform remains elusive.²⁴⁴ The difficulty of reform stems, in part, from the high bar set for amending the UN Charter that requires a two-thirds majority vote from the General Assembly to be passed, not to mention subsequently needing to be ratified by national Parliaments or Congresses domestically. Reform is further complicated by the veto power of the Permanent Five (P-5) countries, which would have to support (or at least not oppose) the reform.²⁴⁵ Regional rivalries also complicate existing models for reform; Pakistan, for example, strongly opposes India's bid for a permanent seat. The veto system itself remains a contentious point, with fewer

and Western European and Other States received 2. This occurred after two-thirds of member states ratified the Resolution in addition to the P5. As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the issue of UNSC reform was reinvigorated as numerous state conflicts as well as pressure from underrepresented African nations. See Melanie Zorn. 2007. “The United Nations Security Council: Reforms concerning its membership - An Overview. *Center for UN Reform Education*. Available: [http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Overview%20\(2007\).pdf](http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Overview%20(2007).pdf).

²⁴³ The original draft proposal called for additional seats with veto power, but pushback from G-4 supporting countries ultimately led this component to be taken out of the proposal. “Glossario.” 2017. *Ministério de Relações Exteriores*. Available: <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/glossario>. In 2005, reform of the UNSC looked possible, but the UNGA failed to agree on which model of reform to implement. The G-4 proposal, similar to model A from the report (which would grant Brazil, India, Germany, Japan and two African countries a permanent seat without veto power), proved contentious as opposition mounted to each G-4 member.

²⁴⁴ Comprised of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica and Liechtenstein.

²⁴⁵ The “Permanent Five” countries are: the US, the UK, China, Russia and France.

supporters within the UN General Assembly of extending veto power to possible new permanent members in general.²⁴⁶

While no reform models garnered sufficient support for a UNGA vote, the G-4 proposal remains the most influential contender after more than 20 years of reform debate: “...No other proposal of reform has gathered such an expressive support base...Among the members of the Organization, there is a consistent and significant majority in favor of this model of expansion.”²⁴⁷ A publication from Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE) indicates Brazil has achieved a significant base of support for gaining a permanent membership; of the 192 UN members, there are a total of 89 countries that have stated their support for Brazil, with two of them being permanent members on the Security Council (France and the United Kingdom).²⁴⁸ Support for Brazil’s seat also comes from Russia, Indonesia, and the countries of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries.²⁴⁹ The most significant opposition for the G-4 proposal stems from the member countries’ regional neighbors, such as Pakistan, Argentina and Mexico; China also resists the idea of neighboring Japan or India gaining a permanent seat.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Shashi Tharoor. Security Council Reform: Past, Present and Future.” 15 December 2011. *Ethics & International Affairs* 25(4): 397-406.

²⁴⁷ “Brazil and UNSC Reform.” 15 October 2016. *Ministério de Relações Exteriores*. Available: <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php/en/brazil-and-uns-c-reform>.

²⁴⁸ Carlos Enrique Ruiz Ferreira. 2012. “Brazil as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council During the 2010-2011 Term.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Available: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09466.pdf>; *Política Externa 2003-2010. Catálogo de Séries Históricas. Ministério de Relações Exteriores*. Available: https://i3gov.planejamento.gov.br/textos/livro6/6.1_Politica_Externa.pdf; Wilder A. Sanchez. 2013. “Building Support for Brazil’s Bid at the UNSC.” Atlantic Community. Available: <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/building-support-for-brazil-s-bid-at-the-uns-c>.

²⁴⁹ Sanchez 2013.

²⁵⁰ United for Consensus (UFC) Group, Coffee club for example. The members of the UFC group are: Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey. Their reform can be viewed at: “United for Consensus’ Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly.” 2005. UN Meetings and Press News. Available: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm>. It was not accepted by the UNGA, however

Despite yet-elusive reform of the Council, Brazil has continued to lobby for UNSC expansion, and gaining a permanent seat along with the G-4 remains a top priority.²⁵¹ Brazil has made more formal statements and remarks on UNSC reform than fellow G-4 member India, or regional heavyweights Argentina and Mexico.²⁵² Despite the overall decline in leadership provision under Rousseff and Temer, both have reiterated their support for UNSC reform.²⁵³ In the words of a former Ambassador, “Gaining a permanent UNSC seat is the ‘Holy Grail’ of [Brazilian] foreign policy and will continue to be.”²⁵⁴

Brazil, along with the G-4, has demonstrated leadership in working to present a concrete proposal for reform toward creating a more representative, and therefore legitimate, Council. Despite not yet achieving permanent membership, since 1946 Brazil has been elected to the UNSC rotating seat for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) ten times – more times than any other major Latin American country and across a larger temporal spread.²⁵⁵ In comparison to other regional

it did garner some international support, including from China. For a summary of other reform efforts, visit “Glossario.” *Ministério de Relações Exteriores*. Available: <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/glossario> and Zorn 2007. Regarding Chinese opposition, see Indrani Bagchil. 1 August 2015. “China emerges as principal opposition to UNSC reforms.” *The Times of India* and Ryan Berger. 23 September 2011. “Brazil Makes the Case for UN Reform.” *Americas Quarterly*.

²⁵¹ Amaury de Souza. 2009. *A Agenda Internacional do Brasil*. Centro Brasileiro de Relações Exteriores. Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI.

²⁵² Please see Appendix F, Table B: “Number of Formal Statements on UNSC Reform, 1995-2011.”

²⁵³ In her opening remarks to the 69th Annual UNGA in September 2014, Rousseff stated Brazil was “ready to assume its responsibilities” as a permanent member of the UNSC and condemned the UNSC’s current structure as “inadmissible,” in need of reform to grant greater power to emerging countries. See “Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff urges reform at UN.” 2011. *BBC Brasil*; H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Republic of Brazil. “Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” 24 September 2014. New York, NY; Michel Temer Defends His Legitimacy Before United Nations.” 20 September 2016. *Plus55*; H.E. Mr. Michel Temer, President of the Republic of Brazil. “Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” 20 September 2016. New York, NY.

²⁵⁴ Personal interview with former Ambassador. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

²⁵⁵ Brazil’s terms of election are as follows: 1946–1947; 1951–1952; 1954–1955; 1963–1964; 1967–1968; 1988–1989; 1993–1994; 1998–1999; 2004–2005, and 2010 – 2011. Source: United Nations.

heavyweights, Venezuela and Mexico have only been elected six and four times respectively.²⁵⁶ Brazil's leadership on reform efforts and GRULAC involvement also stands in contrast to Venezuela, who in 2005 under former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez placed a new Permanent Representative at the UN in New York and changed all diplomats, leading to a "position of complete intransigence with relation to the reform process, rejecting the use of terms like "rule of law" for alleged imperialist implications and refusing to negotiate on diverse issues."²⁵⁷

A Secretary with the UN Division of Itamaraty noted Brazil's role as a coordinator and leader within GRULAC itself, through the country's willingness to share information and expertise with other Latin American countries regarding the Council.²⁵⁸ She further argued that Brazil "defends the participation of smaller countries in the UNSC, particularly greater representation for Africa and the Caribbean."²⁵⁹ Brazilian diplomat Gilda Motta Santos Neves claims non-permanent members of the UNSC act as a "counterweight" to permanent members trying to legitimate actions outside of the principles of the UN Charter. During its terms on the GRULAC seat of the UNSC, for example, Brazil has proven willing to vote against developed country preferences, prioritizing issues of development and non-intervention which are broadly shared by the global South at large, having "contributed to the doctrinal evolution of the international order."²⁶⁰ While self-interest and greater autonomy of action in the global sphere would

²⁵⁶ Please see Appendix F, Table A: "United Nations Security Council Membership."

²⁵⁷ Gilda Motta Santos Neves. 2010. *Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz – Perspectiva Brasileira*. Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. Ministério das Relações Exteriores: Brasília, Brazil. 128.

²⁵⁸ Personal interview with Second Secretary, UN Division of MRE. 3 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Santos Neves 2010, 177. See Appendix F, Table C: "Brazil Voting Patterns on the UNSC, GRULAC" for list of Brazilian voting patterns during its UNSC tenures.

understandably remain a significant motivation of the Brazilian position on UNSC reform, the country's broader voting patterns, contributions to mediation and conflict resolution efforts, and proposals centered on highlighting development over intervention, indicate a shared perspective with the global South and a leadership role in accepting costs and providing goods toward a more representative Council.

Mediation/Conflict Resolution

Brazil has accepted significant costs and provided critical goods to the global South through its involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKO), demonstrating leadership in this issue area that stands in contrast with its regional neighbors. Both in terms of numbers of troops, level of aid, and roles assumed, and geographical and temporal spread, the country remains a larger contributor than any other regional neighbors. Brazil has been a historic contributor to UN peacekeeping, sending troops to the Suez Canal under the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 as well as participating in six of the ten missions established between 1948 and 1972.²⁶¹ After the military dictatorship ended, Brazil returned to the Security Council as a non-permanent member in 1988, after a twenty-year absence, and reinserted itself into peacekeeping by joining 20 of the existing 42 operations between 1990 and 2002.²⁶²

²⁶¹ Rita Santos and Teresa Almeida Cravo. 2014. "Brazil's rising profile in United Nations peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War." *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center*. NOREF Report March 2014 and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Between 1948 and 1972, Brazil contributed military personnel to missions in the Congo (ONUC), Western Guinea (UNSF), Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) and India-Pakistan (UNIPOM). The military dictatorship ruling Brazil from 1964 to 1985 brought the country's peacekeeping contributions to a halt, withdrawing personnel from all missions and culminating in its exit from the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1977.

²⁶² These were UNAVEM I, II and III and MONUA (Angola); UNOMOZ (Mozambique); UNOMUR (Uganda-Rwanda); UNOMIL (Liberia); UNAMIR (Rwanda); ONUCA (Central America); ONUSAL (El Salvador); MINUGUA (Guatemala); UNPROFOR UNCRO, UNREDEP, UNTAES and UNMOP (in countries of the former Yugoslavia); UNTAC (Cambodia); INTERFET, UNATAET and UNMISSET

During the 1990s, Brazil also expanded its role in PKO by assuming direct leadership within missions such as the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the United Nations Transitional Mission in East Timor (UNATAET). Throughout these missions, Brazil highlighted the need for civilian assistance for peacebuilding (including election monitoring, judicial reform oversight, human rights support, and economic rehabilitation, etc.), in addition to military personnel.²⁶³

Brazil also initiated institutional changes domestically aimed at bolstering the country's peacekeeping expertise, such as the 1996 National Defense Document and the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1997 to coordinate Brazilian armed forces in action abroad.²⁶⁴ In a 1995 speech, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim stated Brazil's intention to "intensify its presence in international peace operations" based upon the "...confidence aroused by the name of Brazil, seen abroad with natural sympathy...and the profound respect that inspires our peaceful tradition, our neutrality and impartiality in the international arena."²⁶⁵

The extent of Brazilian involvement in PKO stands in contrast to the rest of the Latin American region, supporting the claim that Brazil has accepted costs and provided goods toward exercising leadership in the UNSC. The country has contributed more than

(Timor-Leste). See Santos and Cravo, 2; "Troop and police contributors." 17 January 2017. United Nation Peacekeeping. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

²⁶³ "Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2010." 2014. *Institute for Applied Economic Research*. 44. Available: http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21530; Santos and Cravo 2010, 2.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil 2008 22 (77, 2º semestre 1995). Available: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_biblioteca/resenhas_peb/Resenha_N77_2Sem_1995.pdf

17,000 people in 33 peace operations, including troops as well as diplomatic and technical personnel.²⁶⁶ The Lula presidency brought a significant uptick in mission involvement; between 2003-2010 Brazil participated in 6 of 8 missions created in this time frame.²⁶⁷ After assuming command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2005, the country's troop participation spiked from 83 to 1,367 personnel and increased to 2,190 personnel in 2010, in addition to financial contributions to UN Peacekeeping.²⁶⁸ Training facilities Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz (CIOpPAZ) and Escola de Operações de Paz of the army and navy, respectively, were created in 2005 and 2008 for civilian and military training for peace operations. Ministry of Defense documents confirm the government's focus on participation of UN peacekeeping operations during this period.²⁶⁹

Since 2004, Brazil has accepted significant costs and provided goods toward regional peace through leading MINUSTAH, a position it continues to retain currently. Since 2011, Brazil has also led the UNIFIL maritime task force, patrolling the Lebanese coast to deter weapons smuggling and recently adding a new Brazilian vessel to the fleet in September 2016 despite the country's own domestic political and economic issues.²⁷⁰ These numbers stand in contrast to regional neighbors Venezuela and Mexico, neither of which is significantly involved in UN peacekeeping missions; or even Argentina who

²⁶⁶ Carlos Enrique Ruiz Ferreira. 2012. "Brazil as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council During the 2010-2011 Term." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. Available: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09466.pdf>

²⁶⁷ Cravo and Santos 2010, 3.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa: paz e segurança para o Brasil." 2008. *Ministério da Defesa*. Brasília: MoD; 17 and 62. Available: <https://www.defesa.gov.br>; Santos and Cravo 2010, 3.

²⁷⁰ Ibid; "Brazilian General Invited to Lead the Largest UN Peacekeeping Mission." 9 May 2013. *Diálogo*. Available: <https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/brazilian-general-invited-lead-largest-un-peacekeeping-mission>; "Brazilian Vessel Join UNIFIL as Flagship." 19 September 2016. *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*. Available: <https://unifil.unmissions.org/new-brazilian-vessel-joins-unifil-flagship>. See appendix for specific data.

contributes about a fourth of the number of troops as Brazil.²⁷¹ The chart and table below illustrate Brazil’s involvement to PKO in terms of personnel contributions.



Figure 14: Brazilian Resources to Peacekeeping, 1995-Present²⁷²

Beyond being the most significant contributor to PKO in the region, in an unprecedented move in 2004 Brazil assumed leadership command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH)— the first Latin American country to lead such an operation. Following the Haitian hurricanes in 2008 and earthquakes in 2010, the mission was reauthorized and Brazil extended support in various arenas such as forest development, professional development, civil defense, sports as a means of social insertion, water resource administration, and agricultural technology transfer.²⁷³

Moreover, Brazilian leadership of MINUSTAH was revolutionary in the realm of PKOs for emphasizing the interconnection between security, reconciliation and reconstruction

²⁷¹ Brazil contributes 1296 personnel to peacekeeping, second only to Uruguay in the region at 1461. Mexico contributes only 2 and Venezuela does not contribute. Argentina contributed 393 troops as of February 2017. See UN Peacekeeping, 2017. See Appendix E for a chart of comparative troop numbers.

²⁷² UN Peacekeeping 2017; Providing for Peacekeeping 2014.

²⁷³ Gilda Motta Santos Neves. 2010. *Comissão das Nações Unidas para Consolidação da Paz – Perspectiva Brasileira*. Fundação Alexandre de Guzmão. Ministério das Relações Exteriores: Brasília, Brazil. 180.

(the so-called “tripod” for sustaining peace) – differentiating the mission from others.

Former Foreign Minister Amorim highlighted Brazil’s different approach to peacekeeping, based upon this “tripod:”

“The participation of Brazil, as well as other South American countries, in Haiti was not just different in terms of troops: it is a different stabilization mission than those before, which, in our view, should center on a tripod: the promotion of stabilization by the way of peace; the dialogue between various political factions; and institutional, social and economic capacity building of the country. There will be no reconciliation and peace in Haiti if we do not adopt this integrated perspective.”²⁷⁴

Although Brazil was initially scheduled to leave Haiti in the spring of 2016, the country currently remains in leadership of MINUSTAH, at regular troop contribution levels, after a one-year UN extension was granted to the mission.²⁷⁵ The length and depth of Brazil’s commitment, continued even in the midst of significant economic and political crisis, indicate an unprecedented acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward leadership in the UNSC compared to other countries in the region. Gilda Santos Neves argues that although Brazil’s troop contributions are less extensive than those of India or Pakistan, the country’s involvement in cases like Haiti demonstrates its concrete contribution to the stabilization and reconstruction of the country whose “multilateral position is generally very well received by developing countries.”²⁷⁶ An Ambassador in the Fundação Alexandre Guzmão of Itamaraty stated called Haiti “...a prime example of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission...different than previous engagements, and a

²⁷⁴ Celso Amorim. 2005. “A política externa do Governo Lula: os dois primeiros anos.” *Análise de Conjuntura OPISA* 4: 1-14.

²⁷⁵ Throughout early to mid-2016 there were indicators that Brazil was planning to withdraw from MINUSTAH, however, the mission was extended in fall of 2016 and Brazil has reiterated their commitment to the one-year extension with normal troop levels, and the preparation of additional troop reinforcements if needed. See Jamil Chade. 12 April 2016. “Canadá se ofrece para substituir Brasil em missão de paz no Haiti.” *Estadão Internacional*; “Ministro diz que militares brasileiros deixarão Haiti em 2016.” 21 May 2015. *O Globo*; “Haiti – Seguridad: Embajador ofrece aclaraciones sobre retiro de Brasil de la MINUSTAH.” 3 February 2017. *Haiti Libre*.

²⁷⁶ Santos Neves 2010, 175, 179.

good template for peacekeeping” in general because of its emphasis on development as a means to security.²⁷⁷ The country’s continued commitment to Haiti through multiple natural disasters and mandate extensions also illustrates the importance of bureaucratic capacity and counters the argument that leadership only occurs in times of high presidential interest or influence. While Brazil assumed command of MINUSTAH under Lula’s mandate, the country has remain committed through presidential administrations far less inclined toward foreign policy activism. Despite the country’s ongoing domestic issues, one Secretary in the UN Division affirmed Brazil was “actively looking” for PKOs in which to get involved, having just returned from high-level meetings on the matter herself: “Brazil is definitely thinking about this [the next mission] and has it on its mind in terms of considering what’s out there and where they would engaged - if we need to go, we’ll go.”²⁷⁸

In addition to consistent Brazilian involvement in conflict resolution through PKO, the country accepted risks and provided goods in international security crises as well, in which the stakes of negotiation are much greater. Following International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) referral of the country to the UNSC in 2003 for its failure to suspend uranium enrichment, Iran’s nuclear program remained a source of global controversy and proved a disquieting problem to world leaders. The US, which lacks diplomatic relations with Iran (since the 1979 revolution and subsequent hostage crisis), recommended sanctions and a hard line against Iran, backed by Europe. Despite heavy pressure from the US and EU, Brazil voted against the sanctions on Iran and Lula

²⁷⁷ Personal interview with Brazilian Ambassador and head of Fundação Alexandre Guzmão. 5 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

²⁷⁸ Personal interview with Second Secretary, International Peace and Security Division, MRE. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

was critical of US pressure to “isolate” Iran and to call the shots on the world stage.²⁷⁹ In contrast, Mexico (the only other Latin American country holding a GRULAC rotating seat on the UNSC in 2010 along with Brazil) remained relatively silent on the issue, having voted in favor of an economic embargo against Iran.²⁸⁰

In 2009 and again in 2010, Lula personally flew to Iran attempting to negotiate a nuclear fuel swap with the country as an alternative to US-backed sanctions, along with former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan. The US predicted these negotiations would fail, and was not pleased with Brazil’s choice to act as a mediator in the Iranian nuclear controversy, which went against perceived US interests in the matter.²⁸¹ Despite being far-removed from the region, as well as facing significant costs from alienating the US and other developed countries, under Lula’s leadership Brazil pushed for negotiation and mediation between all parties toward a common solution, attempting to “leverage his [Lula’s] friendly ties with Iran’s government to help broker a compromise.”²⁸² While this deal was ultimately unsuccessful, the incident illustrates Brazil’s bid for leadership in the global security arena, which Mark Langevin calls “Brazil’s most ambitious initiative to contribute to international security.”²⁸³

²⁷⁹ Farrar-Wellman, 2010; Neil MacFarquhar. 9 June 2010. “U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran.” *The New York Times*. Brazil criticized Iran’s sidestepping of the IAEA, but supported the country’s right to produce nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

²⁸⁰ Please see appendix for chart of UNSC voting.

²⁸¹ Alexei Barrionuevo and Sebnem Arsu. 16 May 2010. “Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal with Iran.” *The New York Times*; David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman. 17 May 2010. “U.S. is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel.” *The New York Times*; James Kanter. 11 June 2010. “Gate Criticizes Turkey Vote Against Sanctions.” *The New York Times*.

²⁸² Alexei Barrionuevo and Sebnem Arsu. 16 May 2010. “Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal With Iran.” *The New York Times*.

²⁸³ Mark S. Langevin. 2017. “Book Review: Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence” by David R. Mares and Harold A. Trikunas. Washington, DC: Brookings University Press. *London School of Economics Review of Books Blog*.

Institution Creation

Beyond financial assistance and troops on the ground, Brazil also provided ideational goods to push for the inclusion of social and economic concerns within PKOs at a broader level in the UNSC. The country proposed a fundamental change to the nature of PKOs through the creation of a specific Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) within the UNSC in 2005. During the country's 2004-2005 term on the Council, Brazil gathered sufficient international support regarding questions of development in conflict zones that the country was successful in getting this item on the agenda systematically;²⁸⁴ e.g., Brazil was an agenda-setter, making this a consistent topic of conversation within the Council. Leading up to 2005, Brazil was "particularly active in the extensive negotiations that resulted in the creation of the PBC," stemming from Brazil's desire for greater clarity for preventative actions, recognition of the interdependence between social development and peace, and the necessity of grating greater attention to treating the fundamental causes of conflicts.²⁸⁵ Brazilian leadership emerged as the country created a new institutional entity around the common concern of development. According to one Defense Minister, "Brazil identified the establishment of the PBC as an institutional means to defend the interdependence between peace, security and development in the United Nations," seeking to correct the overemphasis on purely security.²⁸⁶

"The proposed establishment of a Peace-building Commission is a concrete expression of such a vision [of combating the root causes of conflict and war]. Brazil has for a long time affirmed the need that due consideration is to be paid to transition processes, from post-conflict to sustainable peace."²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Santos Neves 2010, 122.

²⁸⁵ Ibid 121.

²⁸⁶ Email correspondence with Secretary, Division of International Peace and Security, MRE. 1 December 2015.

²⁸⁷ Despacho Telegráfico de Delbrasonu, nº 819. 7 April 2005. Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores.

Accordingly, Brazil also sought to transform the Commission from a perceived “club of donors” to focus instead on the particular needs and local constraints of each case.”²⁸⁸ In an article for *Folha de São Paulo*, former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim argued:

“Questions like those of Haiti, Sierra Leone, Burundi and many others, in which a political-institutional fragility is added to poverty and underdevelopment, should be the object of integral attention of the United Nations and not remain exclusive to the “club of donors.” This will be the role of the new Commission.”²⁸⁹

Brazilian leadership in the PBC connects to a broader institutional reform effort seeking greater representation and responsiveness to the unique needs of developing countries. The principled Brazilian position stood in contrast to the perspective of other Latin American countries, which “demonstrated little effective interest in the negotiations of the Peacebuilding Commission” whether for political means (the PBC not being worth the political cost of confronting the EU and US), or lack of bureaucratic capacity to engage the debate more fully.²⁹⁰ Brazil focused on “guaranteeing the participation of the greatest number possible of developing countries and seeking equilibrium in the geographic distribution of members,” and advocated a wide composition of 35 members and elections on every category as a matter of principle.²⁹¹ Although the composition of the PBC fell short of Brazil’s aspirations, the country was successful in helping create a fifth category of membership, comprised of members elected to the PBC by the UN General Assembly.

²⁸⁸ Santos Neves 2010, 186 and 187.

²⁸⁹ Celso Amorim, 17 December 2017. “Missão do successor de Kofi Annan e completar reforma das Nações Unidas.” *Folha de São Paulo*. Cited in Santos Neves 2010, 189.

²⁹⁰ Santos Neves 2010, 127.

²⁹¹ *Ibid* 129. Brazil maintained two priorities regarding the PBC’s creation: avoid the Commission’s creation as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC, and guarantee sufficient space for the participation of developing countries—particularly Latin America. Chile and Brazil were the front of the opposition to the Western proposal, with the support of Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, Mexico and Bolivia.

Proposal Generation

Brazil also demonstrated leadership in the UNSC through the provision of an ideational good in its “Responsibility While Protecting” (RWP) proposal, which sought to correct the overemphasis on security and highlight development. RWP emerged on the issue of Libya in 2011 where Brazil was acting President of the UNSC and voted in favor of Resolution 1970, condemning violence against citizens and imposing international sanctions against Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi regime. Brazil abstained, however, from the subsequent Resolution 1973 after a last-minute amendment authorized the use of “all necessary means” for as long as Gaddafi stayed in power, leaving Brazil to believe the original mandate had been distorted.²⁹² Justification for the intervention was given through the controversial concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which in extraordinary circumstances authorize international use of force to protect citizens within regimes viewed as hostile to their own populations.²⁹³

In response to the perceived shortcomings of R2P, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota drafted a concept note entitled “Responsibility While Protecting (RWP): Elements for the Development and Promotion of the Concept.” It reiterated the longstanding Brazilian position that greater emphasis must be placed on

²⁹² Resolution 1970. 26 February 2011. United Nations Security Council. Available: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf>; Resolution 1973. 17 March 2011. United Nations Security Council. Available: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html>.

²⁹³ R2P was adopted unanimously at the World Summit in 2005. It argues the following: The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. See Paragraphs of 138 and 139 of “2005 World Summit Outcome.” 15 September 2005. UN General Assembly. Available: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/wsod_2005.pdf.

prevention and diplomacy prior to conflict, rather than military response after the fact, and also called for greater monitoring and accountability of the UNSC regarding R2P decisions.²⁹⁴ Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho argue, “Never before had questions of who should intervene, under what legitimate authority, and with what mechanisms of transparency and accountability, been so explicitly debated in a setting with such a broad audience and at this level of detail.”²⁹⁵ They further contend,

“In many ways, RWP symbolized the very strategy Brazilian foreign-policy makers aspired to pursue: it acted as a bridge-builder, mediator and consensus-seeker through thought leadership. While embracing R2P as a norm in international society, the proposal also reflected some of Brazil’s most long-standing foreign policy ideas.”²⁹⁶

While continued Brazilian leadership on developing the RWP concept was anticipated after receiving strong international support, continued efforts toward this concept waned along with a broader dip in the country’s activism in the UNSC post-2011. While Rousseff also discussed the concept in September 2012, referring to RWP as a “necessary compliment” to R2P,²⁹⁷ the concept fizzled out moving forward and remained unmentioned in her inaugural speech at the UNGA in 2013.²⁹⁸ This coincides

²⁹⁴ See Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho. 30 June 2014. “Regulating intervention: Brazil and the responsibility to protect.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 14(4): 379-402; H.E. Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti. 10 May 2011. “*Responsibility to Protect: SG Report on the ‘role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect.’*” Available: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/brazil.pdf>, 4.

²⁹⁵ Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014, 394.

²⁹⁶ Ibid 397.

²⁹⁷ H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Statement at the opening of the general debate of the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly. *United Nations* 25 September 2012. New York, NY. Available: <https://gadebate.un.org/en/67/brazil>.

²⁹⁸ There is speculation as to why Brazil failed to follow through on the type of “insider activism” undertaken by smaller nations like Canada or Switzerland; for example, Rousseff’s discomfort with foreign policy she sees as risky, or a lack of bureaucratic commitment to assembling the needed diplomatic resources to push the concept further.²⁹⁸ Stuenkel and Tourinho note that the RWP initiative was handled by a small group of individuals surrounding the former Foreign Minister Patriota and without a deeper institutional structure for continued research and support. Stuenkel and Tourinho 2014, 395.

with a broader period of leadership retraction in the UNSC based upon declining capacity, credibility and willingness post-2011, as explored in the previous chapter.

Rising leadership provision in the late 1990s, as Brazil committed to an increasing number of PKOs and began to push for a permanent UNSC seat in earnest, coincides with greater capacity through economic growth and stability, credibility from a shared Southern development perspective, and greater presidential interest/influence combined with strengthened bureaucratic capacity. Peak leadership provision in the UNSC occurs around 2004/2005, with Brazil assuming leadership of MINUSTAH in 2004 and working to establish the PBC in 2005, corresponding with a significant uptick in capacity, credibility and willingness, consistent with the general trends uncovered in the previous chapter.

Because of Brazil's activism both in the decision-making processes related to security (through its frequent membership as a non-permanent member of the UNSC), as well as the implementation of these decisions (illustrated through sending police and troops to peacekeeping missions), Pascoal Carvalho Gonçalves and Taiane Las Casas Campos argue that Brazil provides a collective good resulting in multilateral action toward international security.²⁹⁹ Moreover, in line with the country's sensitivity regarding issues of poverty, inequality and social exclusion, Brazil has sought to blend security concerns with an underlying emphasis on development in its UNSC activism, both through PKO as well as the PBC. Current political and economic constraints in recent have reduced Brazil's ability to provide goods (such as diplomatic resources toward further developing RWP), yet Brazil still maintains a higher level of troops than

²⁹⁹ Pascoal Teófilo Carvalho Gonçalves and Taiane Las Casas Campos. 2014. "Provisão de Bens Públicos globais: o comportamento do Brasil, Índia e África do Sul nas agendas de segurança e meio-ambiente. *Boletim Meridiano* 47 (15): 3-10.

other Latin American countries, retains leadership of MINUSTAH and contributes a relatively constant number of PKO troops, and remains active rhetorically regarding UNSC reform with the G-4.

Brazil in the World Trade Organization (WTO)

According to a former Director of Itamaraty's Economics Department, "Brazil is more active in WTO mechanisms than its share of world trade would indicate."³⁰⁰

Increasing Brazilian leadership provision in the WTO experienced an uptick in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the country pushed for exceptions to WTO's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), created the Group of Twenty (G-20) coalition, and utilized the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) for a landmark case against developed country subsidies. Peak periods of leadership provision in the WTO coincide with overall trends of increasing economic growth, development aid and ties to the global South, and rising presidential interest and bureaucratic capacity in the 1990s and early 2000s. Just as the provision of leadership corresponds with times of high capability, credibility and willingness, a reduction in Brazil's acceptance of costs and provision of goods in the WTO begins to wane after 2011 along with a general decline in capability, credibility and willingness.

Initiative Generation

Brazil evidenced leadership by accepting costs (the risk of retaliation) and providing goods (through its initiative proposing exceptions to patent laws for developing countries) in an important battle against TRIPS. In 2000, the US lodged a WTO

³⁰⁰ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

complaint against Brazilian patent law granting its domestic companies waivers to produce generic anti-retroviral AIDS/HIV drugs, to the chagrin of foreign pharmaceutical companies. Brazil faced legal retaliation from the US for breaking patents in violation of TRIPS in order to provide less costly generic AIDS drugs to African communities. Instead of backing down, Brazil sought a fundamental change to TRIPS that would legitimize and codify exceptions for developing countries. Peter Capella notes, “The dispute had become a symbol of perceived intimidation by the US and pharmaceutical multinationals against developing countries that sought to obtain cheaper and wider access to essential medicines.”³⁰¹

This case illustrates Brazilian acceptance of costs on behalf of a broader interest of developing countries and provision of goods in representing common interests with the global South.³⁰² According to previous Brazilian president Cardoso, the success of Brazil’s domestic AIDS drug program “...gave Brazil the moral and political strength to respond to the charge made at the WTO that our policy of inducing cost reduction in drug prices violated the TRIPS Agreement.”³⁰³ This willingness to accept costs on behalf of a fellow global Southern continent, Africa, led to a fundamental reinterpretation of TRIPS and an important victory for many developing countries (particularly in Africa) faced with high levels of HIV/AIDS in their populations. Thanks to Brazilian leadership, this

³⁰¹ Peter Capella. 26 June 2001. “Brazil wins HIV drug concession from US.” *The Guardian*.

³⁰² See Susan K. Sell. “Intellectual Property Rights” in David Held and Andrew McGrew, eds., 2001. *Governing Globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 171-188; Jane Galvão. 2005. “Brazil and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health.” *American Journal of Public Health* 95(7): 1110-1116; Daniel Flesmes. 2007. “Emerging Middle Powers’ Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.” *GIGA Working Paper No. 57*. Hamburg, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 13.

³⁰³ Fernando Henrique Cardoso. *Speech at 56th Annual DPI/NGO Conference, Human Security and Dignity: Fulfilling the Promise of the United Nations*. 8 September 2003. United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY.

interpretation now considered ethical and practical issues, ultimately leading to a vast improvement in AIDS care.³⁰⁴

Brazil also exhibited leadership in the WTO through utilizing the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) to challenge developed country subsidies on agricultural goods, providing a historic template for future action by other global South countries. A former Economics Director within Itamaraty argued that Brazil's "technical capacity and ability to generate proposals was central to the success of the case."³⁰⁵ Brazil has been on of the most active users of the WTO's DSM, having lodged more complaints than any other Latin American country.³⁰⁶ According to one former Economics Director, the DSM is significant because "...there is little other international arbitration that the US will submit itself to...Brazil did something important by lodging complaints against the US."³⁰⁷ Another former executive in Brazilian agribusiness explained the country was "...using the system to adjust unfair rules," paving the road for future disputes.³⁰⁸

In 2001, Brazil lodged case DS267 against provisions of the US cotton program, including its use of subsidies in the form of payments and export-credit guarantees that distorted world markets.³⁰⁹ Although the US made changes to its cotton programs and export credit guarantee programs in previous years, Brazil found these did not

³⁰⁴ Galvão 2005.

³⁰⁵ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁰⁶ As of June 2017. Mexico is a complainant in 23 cases, and 81 as a third party; Brazil is in 31 as a complainant and 108 as a third party. "Disputes by Country/Territory." 2017. *World Trade Organization*. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm. Please see Appendix F, Table E: "World Trade Organization Complaints" for a comparative chart.

³⁰⁷ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁰⁸ Personal Interview with former Consultant for Associação Brasileiros Produtores de Algodão (ABRAPA). 6 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁰⁹ Randy Schnepf. 2014. "Status of the WTO Brazil-U.S. Cotton Case." *Congressional Research Service*.

sufficiently reduce trade distortions and a WTO compliance panel upheld this finding. In the words of former Foreign Minister Amorim, “The clock is ticking. Our understanding with the US was good throughout and it never came to acrimony. But they are the biggest subsidizers in the world in terms of what affects us, so we will have to see them in court.”³¹⁰

In 2009, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruled in favor of Brazil’s complaint against US cotton subsidies in a landmark victory for the country. In 2010, the two countries signed a Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the WTO, laying out a path forward toward negotiating a solution and avoiding WTO-sanctioned trade retaliation.³¹¹ As Randy Schnepf notes,

“...With the world closely watching the resolution of the Brazil-U.S. cotton case, the final terms and circumstances of the resolution could serve either as a catalyst or as precedent for future trade disputes related to the agricultural sector, and/or as progenitor of new, more restrictive WTO rules for domestic commodity support programs.”³¹²

Brazil’s decision to challenge the dominance of US subsidies through the DSM has the potential for wide-range consequences that provide developing countries with a framework they can use to challenge trade practices of developed countries that distort or damage their markets. WTO scholar Kristen Hopewell notes how Brazil’s victory in the DSM “...revealed major inconsistencies between US and EU agriculture policies and WTO rules and raised the prospect that those countries could be subject to a wave of

³¹⁰ Jonathan Wheatley. 3 August 2008. “Brazil to dispute US subsidies.” *Financial Times*.

³¹¹ “Cotton production by country worldwide in 2015/2016.” Statista. Available: <http://www.statista.com/statistics/263055/cotton-production-worldwide-by-top-countries/>. Brazil is the fifth largest cotton producer currently, but previously was the second largest in the world. As a result of the ruling, the DSB authorized Brazil to impose significant trade sanctions (worth \$147.3 million a year) against the US in retaliation for domestic subsidies to cotton farmers that distort world prices and hurt other country’s cotton industries. In 2014, Brazil and the US signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding an agreement over the longstanding cotton dispute, under which Brazil relinquishes rights to countermeasures against US trade or furthering the dispute, while the US agrees to creating new rules that reduce cotton subsidies.

³¹² Schnepf 2014, 1.

future WTO challenges.”³¹³ Moreover, given the ongoing stalemate of Doha Rounds in reaching agreement on agricultural issues, the DSM may gain prominence as the primary forum for trade mediation and retaliation. Schnepf notes that the repeated failures of the Doha may mean that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism “...could likely serve as the primary mechanism for effecting future change in domestic support policies.”³¹⁴ Brazilian leadership in filing this symbolic case provides the precedent for other developing countries to consider the same. Moreover, the Brazilian example set a precedent for other developing countries to challenge discriminatory aspects of developed-country subsidies that distort or damage their markets.

Coalition Creation

In addition to Brazil challenging agricultural subsidies in developed countries and international patent laws in the WTO, Brazil also demonstrated leadership through providing material and ideational goods to the global South through the creation of the Group of Twenty (G-20) coalition, fundamentally changing the face of trade negotiations in the WTO. In response to the *de facto* decision-making structure of WTO negotiations that granted little voice to developing country concerns, Brazil demonstrated leadership by providing material and ideational goods toward reforming the decision-making structures at the Doha Rounds to better address the specific concerns of the global South. Although the WTO accords one vote to each member country, previous negotiations within the institution heavily favored developed countries, specifically the US, EU, Canada and Japan (known as “the Quad”). This occurred either through closed-door,

³¹³ Kristen Hopewell. 2014. “Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization.” *Review of International Political Economy* 22(2):14.

³¹⁴ Schnepf 2014, 15.

informal “Green Room” meetings in which agreements were made by a small group and imposed upon other WTO members.³¹⁵ In the words of a former Director of Itamaraty’s Economic Department, the early Rounds were a “pretend” system where developed countries pretend to extend benefits and developing countries pretend to adhere to obligations...the idea was to change it and make it fairer and more representative.”³¹⁶

In response to stalemate at the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), Brazil and India spearheaded a new coalition centered on pushing for developing country gains in the next Round. Attempts at including more developing-country issues on the agenda took place at the 2001 Doha Round, which began with great optimism about the prospects of reforming international trade rules to benefit least-developed countries (LDCs). Brazil “seized the opportunity created by this ‘leadership vacuum,’” and proposed a partnership with India to create a broad coalition opposing US-EU initiatives and presenting proposals on agricultural issues more favorable to developing countries.³¹⁷ One minister stated that Brazil was able to “bring people to the table” and “give form to a substance that was already there, in terms of diplomacy.”³¹⁸ The G-20 emerged at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, and was comprised of over half the world’s population and two thirds of the world’s farmers at the time.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ Ilan Kapoor. 2006. "Deliberative Democracy and the WTO." *Review of International Political Economy* 11(3): 522-41. Cited in Hopewell 2014, 9.

³¹⁶ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³¹⁷ Da Motta Viegas, 2005; Hopewell 2014, 11. The EU-US joint proposal on agriculture presented during the Uruguay Rounds evoked a strongly negative reaction from developing countries who viewed it as another “Blair House Accord,” unfairly attempting to force developing countries to reduce trade barriers while allowing the US and EU to maintain trade distorting subsidies. The text effectively left out several key issues for developing countries, chiefly the reduction and elimination of US-EU farm subsidies.

³¹⁸ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³¹⁹ Hopewell 2014, 11.

Brazil, along with India, coordinated the position of developing countries through strategy creation, including talking points, messaging, and cogent proposals resulting from significant research and analysis. Their ability to do so was based upon their capacity to undertake sophisticated expertise and technical capacity (such as econometric analysis, impact simulations, and proposal creation), which was unavailable to most developing countries.³²⁰ One former Brazilian Economics Director who had been part of the Geneva delegation intricately involved in the G-20's creation explained,

“Many of the G-20 countries simply didn't have the capacity to do this [research and strategy] themselves, so were willing to listen to us and trust us on these proposals...Brazil had to provide services to the group so that they would gain value from the group. This included background knowledge, technical personnel.... not all countries had this.”³²¹

Brazil utilized these resources on behalf of the broader coalition, leading to a rigorous and technically sound proposal for the G-20 paper. In the words of a former Director of Itamaraty's Economics Department, “Brazil was able to organize ‘intellectually’ the ideas of what others wanted to say...this capability allowed Brazil to play a key role.”³²²

Hopewell further notes the “costs they [Brazil and India] have been willing to incur” demonstrate their commitment to collation generation.³²³ Beyond the diplomatic and bureaucratic costs as described above, Brazil also incurred domestic costs by forgoing a more favorable proposal for itself and prioritizing the broader needs of the group:

“Instead, Brazil supported efforts by developing countries to secure flexibilities that would limit the extent of their market opening, despite the negative commercial

³²⁰ Hopewell 2014, 22.

³²¹ Personal Interview with former Director of Economics Department, Brazilian Delegation to Geneva. 4 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³²² Personal Interview with current Director of Economics Department, Itamaraty. 6 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³²³ Hopewell 2014, 22.

implications for its own exporters.³²⁴ To that end, Amrita Narlikar argues that Brazil and India “allowed considerable free riding to facilitate the coherence of the [G-20] group, thereby showing considerable leadership for the provision of the club good of coalition unity.”³²⁵

Brazilian leadership in creating the G-20 at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003 fundamentally altered the organization’s decision-making moving forward. Ultimately, Cancún ended abruptly because of various problems, particularly disagreement on the so-called “Singapore Issues,” which include trade facilitation, investment, competition and transparency in government procurement.³²⁶ A stark divide emerged between developed countries who pushed to include the “Singapore Issues” on the agenda, and developing countries who believed this was merely a stalling or distraction tactic to avoid negotiating core agricultural issues that would challenge developed-country agricultural subsidies. While the fundamental North-South divide over agricultural subsidies remained a deal-breaker at Cancún, the creation of the G-20 was the most highlighted aspect of the Ministerial. One Brazilian negotiator stated,

“The establishment of the group and its composition involved a political decision and sent a message to all participants in the Round, especially the developed countries, that there was a new factor to be taken into account in the negotiations. The creation of the group was a political statement.”³²⁷

Moreover, negotiating texts following Cancún continued to maintain the centrality of these components, illustrating the G-20’s success in reforming the agenda of the WTO trade talks and continuing momentum toward meeting developing country needs. The

³²⁴ Interviews with trade officials. Brasília, May 2010, quoted in Hopewell 2014, 37.

³²⁵ Narlikar 2010a, 113.

³²⁶ These are dubbed the “Singapore Issues” because they stem from four issues introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore.

³²⁷ Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie. 16 July 2004. “The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO.” *The World Economy*.

emergence of the G-20 precipitated reform in the key decision-making body of the Rounds, leading to the creation of the so-called “New Quad” of decision-making states within the WTO in March 2004.³²⁸ The creation of the New Quad evidences the leadership that Brazil and India had displayed in organizing and leading the G-20, and the recognition by developed countries that Brazilian and Indian presence in the core decision-making body would be fundamental to representing developing-countries interests and advancing the Doha Rounds in the future. In other words, because of their leadership in forming the G-20, “Creating a deal at the WTO without Brazil, India or China is now impossible.”³²⁹

One example of the newfound voice of developing countries in the New Quad occurred just a few months after India and Brazil joined the group. The 2004 July Framework agreement dropped three of the four Singapore Issues from the agenda,³³⁰ representing a victory for developing countries concerned with the possibility of these new issues allowing developing countries to utilize the WTO to liberalize their markets and expand access and rights to foreign companies.³³¹ Pedro Da Motta Viegas argues, “The initiative of setting up the NG-5 [or “New Quad”] reflected the recognition that the process of decision-making in agricultural negotiations had to change to integrate the G-

³²⁸ The “New Quad” is comprised of the US, EU, Australia, India and Brazil. This group is also referred to as the Non-Group of Five (NG-5; the name reflecting the eclectic grouping), and the Five Interested Parties (FIP). For more, see “Membership, alliances and bureaucracy.” 2017. *Understanding the WTO: The Organization*. Available: www.wto.org.

³²⁹ Hopewell 2014, 10.

³³⁰ The Singapore Issues are: trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. Of the four Singapore Issues, only trade facilitation was kept on the Doha agenda.

³³¹ See Martin Khor. 2010. “Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the World Trade Organization.” *South Centre Research Paper 30*. Available at http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/RP30_Analysis-of-the-DOHA-negotiations-and-WTO_EN.pdf.

20.³³² Brazil's activism in the creation of the G-20 also spearheaded the country's winning bid for leadership of the WTO, with Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevêdo assuming the role of Director-General of the organization from 2013 to 2016, and achieving reelection to a second term in 2017. Brazil has also sought leadership positions within the WTO more than any other country besides France, who has also nominated candidates twice.³³³

Brazilian capability, credibility and willingness coalesced into strong leadership provision in the WTO, increasing in the 1990s and peaking around 2003 and 2004 with the creation of the G-20 and filing of the cotton case in the DSM. This peak was on the earlier end of the general upward trajectory of leadership in international institutions as described in the previous chapter, but still within the broader range of increasing activism that coincided with rising economic growth, greater ties through aid and collaboration to the region and global South, and a president and ministry interested in foreign policy. A former Ambassador argued that many of Brazil's decisions [for example, in the G-20 or candidacy for WTO Secretary-General) were undertaken with this mentality of leadership.³³⁴ In my interview with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, he also carefully remarked,

“I don't want to say this because it sounds very self-serving, but there was Brazilian leadership...for example, Brazil moved from periphery to the core negotiating group in the WTO/Doha Round. Brazil has been at the forefront of multilateral trade for a long time...there's no doubt that Brazil had a leading role here...we did a lot through diplomacy. Leadership is something you display, not proclaim.”³³⁵

³³² Da Motta Viegas 2005.

³³³ Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico are the only Latin American countries to bid for the Director-General seat of the WTO; Brazil is the only Latin American state who has been elected (twice, in 2013 and again in 2017). France's Pascal Lamy was also elected twice; initially in 2005 and again in 2009.

³³⁴ Personal interview with former Brazilian Ambassador. 17 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

³³⁵ Personal interview with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. 23 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Despite myriad instances of leadership in the WTO in the early 2000s, post-2011 stagnation in capability and willingness limit Brazil's continued leadership in the WTO. A former Ambassador argued that Lula had "overly tied to Brazil to the Doha Rounds, so that it didn't pursue other options...they were blind to the reality that FTAs were negotiated outside the Rounds."³³⁶ This sentiment was reiterated by a Secretary with the Câmara do Comércio Exterior (CAMEX), an organ responsibility for formulating trade policy in Brazil, who agreed that a "clear change" was occurring from previous years: "Brazil previously put all eggs in the WTO basket, and didn't look for bilaterals [bilateral trade agreements] besides in the region. Now the approach is a good balance between the WTO and bilateral agreements."³³⁷ This shift in mindset was apparent at the WTO Nairobi Ministerial in 2015, where Brazil distanced itself from the G-20 coalition to "silently support" the US and EU in pushing for a deal on agriculture, leading Chakravarthi Raghavan to conclude that "Brazil unilaterally abandoned the G20 alliance to join US and EU in trying to act against China and India. In time, they will find it "a costly error."³³⁸

While this may well assist in helping the Brazilian economy recover, reduced capacity from its recession and stagnant growth limits the country's capacity to accept costs and make concession on behalf of the G-20, thus tarnishing Brazil's leadership of the global South through the coalition. When asked if the G-20 would remain relevant for Brazil, an Economics Minister quoted the following Chinese proverb: "It's easier to keep

³³⁶ Personal interview with former Brazilian Ambassador. 17 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

³³⁷ Personal interview with representative of the Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX). 11 November 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

³³⁸ Chakravarthi Raghavan. "News of Doha's Death May Be Premature but India, China Must Fight to Save the Day." 29 December 2015. *The Wire India*.

riding the tiger than it is to dismount.”³³⁹ Although Brazil may remain relatively active in the DSM, proposal generation like that seen with TRIPS and coalition creation toward future trade Rounds currently appears unlikely. This sharp decline in Brazilian leadership at the WTO after 2008 coincides with falling domestic capacity and willingness, compounded by a broader global economic environment, where many countries favor bilateral trade agreements rather than multilateral negotiations as previously undertaken in the WTO. A significant injection of leadership is critical to reviving the Doha Rounds moving forward; yet it remains unclear what role Brazil will play in this arena.

Brazil in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

The final issue area explored in this chapter considers variation in Brazilian leadership in the UNFCCC. Historically, attempts at curbing green house gases (GHGs) from industrial processes and deforestation were seen as contrary to the protection of Brazilian sovereignty and national development. According to Ken Johnson, the Brazilian government was “...all too willing to sacrifice the Amazon in the pursuit of its development and security interests and its quest for *grandeza* – regional or even global power status.”³⁴⁰ This perspective began to change in the early 1990s, when Brazil assumed responsibility of hosting the Rio Summit in 1992. The desire to implement a more progressive climate policy began under former President Fernando Collor de Mello in the early 1990s, who realized Brazil could play an important global role in climate change negotiations given large endowment of Amazon. Increased activism in UNFCCC

³³⁹ Personal interview with Director of Department of Inter-Regional Mechanisms, MRE. 6 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁴⁰ Ken Johnson. 2001. “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change.” *Journal of Environment & Development* 10(2); 188.

negotiations continued after Collor under Cardoso and Lula, as the traditionally conservative view of environmental politics began to shift toward engagement and leadership. In other words, Brazil had possessed "...a defensive posture previously, and was able to turn this into a positive issue, to turn it into something where Brazil is a leader and sees themselves as a bridge between developed and developing countries."³⁴¹

In subsequently years, the country demonstrated leadership through creating the Brazilian proposal on the Berlin Mandate in 1995, helping craft the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) beginning in 1997 and revising the CDM in 2012. Brazilian leadership in the UNFCCC rose rapidly in the late 1990s and has remained relatively stable through the first decade of the 2000s, corresponding with a period of increased capability, credibility and willingness. While declining capability and willingness after 2010 led to a decline in leadership (specifically the acceptance of domestic costs toward representing common interests with the global South), Brazil still retains a degree of activism through offering ideational goods toward common goals with the global South.

Brazil has exercised leadership by accepting costs and providing goods to the global South, despite its own comparatively clean energy matrix that is 75% comprised of a combination of renewable energies like ethanol and hydraulic power.³⁴² Ken Johnson argues, "...Brazil is able to hold itself up as an example of a developing country that is already using clean and renewable resources to fuel its industrialization, " enabling Brazil to "...blunt calls from the developed world that developing countries should begin reducing emissions now because they will soon overtake many developed countries in

³⁴¹ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁴² Brazil's cleaner matrix stems from the country's decision to institute a national ethanol-gasoline program in the 1970s in response to the global oil crisis and limited domestic oil reserves. Please see Appendix E for overview of Brazil's energy matrix.

terms of energy consumption.”³⁴³ This stands in contrast to most developing countries that have higher emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as India, China and Mexico, and grants Brazil credibility as a key broker in climate change negotiations.

Proposal Generation

A cornerstone of Brazilian leadership in the realm of climate change has been the country’s so-called “Brazilian Proposal” and associated Clean Development Fund (CDF), introduced prior to the 3rd Convention of the Parties (COP-3) to the UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan in 1997.³⁴⁴ This Proposal, though not ultimately adopted by the Parties in Kyoto, “...continues to influence the debate over the contentious issue of developing-country commitments and the shape of what has become the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism].”³⁴⁵ Brazil’s proposal was innovative in structuring emissions mitigation requirements according to historical emissions levels, or in other words, on how much countries’ emissions have specifically raised global temperatures. It thus placed the larger onus for emission reductions onto already-developed, Annex I countries who have historically been the major polluters, rather than still-developing Annex II countries who have high current emissions rates but low historical rates. Although the full proposal was not ultimately adopted, Brazil’s proposed framework for structuring emissions, as well as

³⁴³ Johnson 2001, 185.

³⁴⁴ COPs are Conventions of the Parties to the UNFCCC, held annually and referenced according to their numerical order. Please see Appendix F, Table I: “Overview of Decisions, Conference of the Parties of UNFCCC, 1995-2016” for a complete list of COPs and key decisions thereof.

³⁴⁵ Emilio L. La Rovere et al. 2002. “The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for Global Warming.” In Kevin A. Baumert, Ed. *Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 172.

its provisions for temperature trading credits among Annex I developed countries, were fundamental concepts enshrined in the resulting Kyoto Protocol agreement.³⁴⁶

Ken Johnson and Haroldo Machado Filho argue that the Brazilian government has consistently opposed forcing developing countries to assume reductions until the developed countries have taken steps to minimize their own emissions.³⁴⁷ As highlighted in a speech by former Brazilian President Cardoso, “Now, the developed countries must assume their share of the responsibility and not ask us to pay for the destruction they have caused, not leave us to shoulder the costs of repairing the damage caused by a lack of ecological awareness in the past.”³⁴⁸ Brazilian sensitivity toward the challenges of developing countries seeking to reduce GHGs while also achieve growth, according to a Secretary within the Climate, Ozone and Chemical Security Division of Itamaraty (DClima), led to the country’s innovative proposal engendering “the idea of differentiation and a historical right to develop” for Brazil and other global South.³⁴⁹ Johnson argues that one of the major impacts of the Brazilian Proposal is that “...developing countries could delay implementation of potentially costly measures of abatement that would slow their development.”³⁵⁰

In addition to proposing a methodology toward the “common but differentiated responsibilities” clause of the UNFCCC, the Brazilian Proposal called for the creation of

³⁴⁶ Please see Appendix F: Table I: “Overview of Decisions, Conference of the Parties of UNFCCC, 1995-2016” for a complete list of COPs and key decisions thereof. The Kyoto Protocol included legally binding emissions targets for developed (Annex I) countries to be reached in 2008-2012. “Brief Overview of Decisions.” *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available: www.unfccc.int.

³⁴⁷ Johnson 2001, 191 and Haroldo Machado Filho. 1999. “Elementos de um protocolo para a Convenção Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima propostos pelo Brasil em resposta ao Mandato de Berlim.” Speech presented to the Workshop on Flexible Mechanisms. Dakar, Senegal. 6 May 1999. Available: www.mct.gov.br.com.

³⁴⁸ Johnson 2001, 192; M. Christie. 11 November 1997. “Brazil to challenge U.S. over climate treaty.” *Climate News*.

³⁴⁹ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁵⁰ Johnson 2001, 189.

a fund (initially called the Clean Development Fund, or CDF) that would supply financing to developing countries, allowing them to earn credits through emissions-reduction projects.³⁵¹ According to Johnson, the Brazil-proposed CDF intended “...to create a more adequate and equitable financial mechanism for the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries,”³⁵² illustrating Brazil’s provision of goods toward representing common interests of the global South. Primary goals of the CDF were to insure fair representation of developing countries on any CDF board, to maximize technology transfers to developing countries to assist with emissions mitigation, and to maintain the sovereignty of developing-country governments with regard to emissions reductions. This made the CDF the only “...mechanism that will provide immediate benefits to developing countries.”³⁵³ Although Brazil’s proposed CDF was rejected as originally proposed due to issues surrounding financial penalties, negotiations at Kyoto in 1997 modified Brazil’s CDF into what is now known as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), involving market mechanisms for carbon trading, and earning “widespread support from industrialized and developing countries alike.”³⁵⁴

Brazil was integral in ensuring that the transformation of its proposed CDF into the market-based CDM included components beneficial to the global South. A significant concern of Brazil and other G-77 members was that strictly market-based emissions trading agendas (as introduced to the proposal when transforming the CDF to

³⁵¹ Ibid 158; “Brazilian Proposal.” 1997. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available: http://unfccc.int/methods/other_methodological_issues/items/1038.php. Please see Appendix F, Table I: “A Brief Overview of UNFCCC Decisions;” Johnson 2001, 193.

³⁵² Johnson 2001, 193.

³⁵³ Ibid 196.

³⁵⁴ La Rovere et al. 2002, 160.

the CDM) would disadvantage developing countries lacking the finances and technology to adopt greener energy profiles.³⁵⁵ Brazil provided leadership to this end through prioritizing financial and technological assistance to developing countries. At its peak, the CDM garnered over \$356 billion in green investments, and was on track to deliver \$1 trillion in financing, an unparalleled level of private sector investment on climate spending.³⁵⁶ The CDM remains a key bureaucratic and ideational good with far-reaching implications for climate change mitigation through carbon trading: “Despite being proposed only a few months prior to the Kyoto Protocol, it [the CDM] became incorporated in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and is the most thoroughly elaborated of the three protocol mechanisms contained in this protocol.”³⁵⁷ Brazil became the first to register a CDM project when the Kyoto Protocol was activated in February 2005.³⁵⁸ Brazil is the third most frequent host of CDM projects, after China and India.³⁵⁹ Although the initial period following the implementation of the CDM maintained relative price stability, an increase in the number of projects in 2012 to 2013 led to a flooding of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits into the market and a subsequent drop in market prices which has discouraged further investments and led to decreased participation. However, at COP-15 in Paris in 2005, Brazil sought to reinvigorate the CDM through proposing an enhanced version of the mechanism (called the “enhanced CDM” or CDM+) for the new agreement under the UNFCCC, and continued to push for

³⁵⁵ Johnson 2001, 194; Machado Filho 1999.

³⁵⁶ Assad W. Razzouk. 8 November 2013. “Why we should kill the Green Climate Fund.” *The Independent*.

³⁵⁷ Johnson 2001, 199.

³⁵⁸ Viola and Hochstetler 2012, 762; L. Friberg. 2009. “Varieties of carbon governance: the clean development mechanism in Brazil – a success story challenged.” *Journal of Environment and Development* 18(4): 404.

³⁵⁹ “COP21 and the Clean Development Mechanism: deciding the future of international carbon credits.” 29 July 2015. *Climate Policy Observer*.

differentiation between developed and developing countries.³⁶⁰ It proposed doing so using a “concentric differentiation” approach that allows developing countries to gradually move toward economy-wise emissions cuts while simultaneously maintaining the capacity to develop.³⁶¹ The new Brazilian proposal is unique in calling for increasing commitments that rise as level of development rises, indicative of the country’s consistent position on pursuing negotiation and dialogue yet advocating for differentiation for the global South. This allows countries to continue to develop without penalty, yet calls them to greater responsibility as they achieve higher levels of growth, potentially satisfying the often-competing desires of developed and developing nations.

In addition to Brazil’s activism in developing the CDM, the country played a leading role in implementing the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+), a UN program developed at COP-13 in Bali in 2007 and finalized at COP-19 in Copenhagen in 2009 to provide financing in exchange for demonstrated reductions in deforestation.³⁶² While Brazil had been a major deforester prior to 2005, in 2008 Lula signed a National Climate Change Plan centered on reducing emissions and created the Amazon Fund to receive donations related to prevent, monitor and control deforestation. The expertise gained in biodiversity conservation, sustainable management and poverty alleviation makes Brazil “one of the most advanced countries in the world in REDD+ planning.”³⁶³ Moreover, the country has shared its experience and

³⁶⁰ “Brazilian Proposal” 1997.

³⁶¹ Please see Appendix E, Table J: “Brazilian Proposal of Concentric Differentiation to COP21, 2012” for an overview of the concentric circles approach.

³⁶² Virgilio M. Viana et al. 2010. *REDD and Sustainable Development – Perspective from Brazil*. International Institute for Environment and Development. Available: http://www.fas-amazonas.org/pt/useruploads/files/viana_et_al_redd_and_sustainable_development_-_brazil.pdf.

³⁶³ “REDD+ Initiatives in the Amazon Basin.” *Global Forest Atlas*. Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Available: www.globalforestatlas.yale.edu.

knowledge in deforestation mitigation through channels South-South cooperation, for example by providing key insights and training to a REDD pilot program in Ethiopia.³⁶⁴

Brazil also hosted the Rio+20 conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, which resulting in a set of sustainable development goals (SDGs) to build upon the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) already in place. The country worked closely with host Peru at COP-20 in Lima in 2014 to draft a wide-reaching climate agreement (the predecessor to the Paris Agreement at COP-21 a year later) that would be applicable to all parties and legally binding.³⁶⁵ The timeline below highlights the trajectory of the CDF/CDM within the UNFCCC.




Figure 15: Trajectory of CDF/CDM, 1996-2015³⁶⁶

In the words of a Secretary in Itamaraty’s DClima Division, Brazil is “...definitely a leader in climate change,” noting that because of the country’s expertise and resources with regards to climate change negotiations, “Colleagues from other countries are often instructed to look and see what Brazil is doing. [They] use Brazil as a benchmark for their own viewpoint, thinking, ‘Oh, if Brazil is defending that, maybe it

³⁶⁴ “The Ecosystem Marketplace’s Forest Carbon News.” 18 July 2012. *Forest Carbon News*.

³⁶⁵ Jonathan Watts. 9 December 2014. “Lima climate talks: South American diplomats hopeful of progress on deal.” *The Guardian*.

³⁶⁶ Johnson 2001, La Rovere et al 2002, UNFCCC.

has something for me too.”³⁶⁷ Pascoal Carvalho Gonçalves and Taiane Las Casas Campos analyzed the number of times Brazil is mentioned in key climate change negotiations documents (60 times), as compared to other rising powers like South Africa (24) and India (47), ultimately classify Brazil as the “referring elite” that initiates collective action, leading followers and free riders, and is “...willing to pay for the group's organization costs, and in this sense, the leader acts as a political entrepreneur and may receive additional gains.”³⁶⁸ Brazil’s innovative approach seeks to bridge the gaps between developed countries and the global South, and the country’s experience with deforestation mitigation as well as continued involvement with the CDM suggests that Brazil sought to play a leading role in the COP-21 climate negotiations.³⁶⁹ Despite facing lowered capability and willingness due to domestic economic and political turmoil, this highlights the perception on the part of “follower” states that Brazil’s proposals and initiatives in the UNFCCC represent common issues and concerns of the global South more broadly, critical to exercising leadership in international institutions even if currently more muted.

Mediation Efforts

While agreements on climate change mitigation generally represent a mixed bag of achievements and compromise, Brazil has consistently proven willing to negotiate and move talks forward, in contrast to other emerging powers like India and China, or the

³⁶⁷ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁶⁸ Pascoal Teófilo Carvalho Gonçalves and Taiane Las Casas Campos. 2014. “Provisão de Bens Públicos globais: o comportamento do Brasil, Índia e África do Sul nas agendas de segurança e meio-ambiente.” *Boletim Meridiano* 47 (15): 4; Luiz Orenstein. 1998. *A estratégia da ação coletiva*. Rio de Janeiro: REVAN.

³⁶⁹ Sophie Yeo. 29 September 2015. “Analysis: Brazil’s climate pledge represents slight increase on current emissions.” *Carbon Brief*.

countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), who have increasingly played a blocking role in negotiations based upon their critique of the US and its capitalist system at large.³⁷⁰ Brazil demonstrates sensitivity toward the challenge of developing while also limiting GHGs (a significant issue for the global South more broadly), and proves willing to represent this position in its proposals and initiatives. When asked why Brazil often supported or even pushed for positions more beneficial for other developing countries than for itself (given its own relatively clean matrix), the Chief of the DClima Division explained:

“There is lots of solidarity on poverty eradication with developing countries – it’s a totally different situation for countries still needing infrastructure, having poverty, etc. – it’s fundamentally different than developed countries...Brazil’s identity in the world is related to being a developing country - it can still have productive conversations with the US and EU, but this doesn’t mean it wants to be in that club. Brazil could be in the OECD but doesn’t want to be.”³⁷¹

While maintaining solidarity with the global South, Brazil is uniquely poised to play a leading role as a mediator and negotiator between developed and developing countries in the UNFCCC. In the words of Raphael Azeredo, the head of the Brazilian delegation to UN Climate talks, “Brazil is an example, signaling that differentiation should be there, but be flexible, dynamic in ways countries feel they are being supported by the regime.”³⁷² Another diplomat in the DClima Division explained, “Brazil sees itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries,” continuing to push for

³⁷⁰ ALBA rejected the agreement of the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, for example, on the grounds that it was formulated by only a selected group of countries rather than all participants, and called for a systemic change against capitalism as the path forward for climate change mitigation. See “ALBA Declaration on Copenhagen Climate Summit.” 28 December 2009. *Venezuelan Analysis*; “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).” *Climate Policy Observer*; Guy Edwards and Timmons Roberts. 15 February 2015. “Latin America and UN Climate Talks: Not in Harmony.” *Climate and Development Lab*. Brown University.

³⁷¹ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁷² Alex Pashley. 18 November 2015. “Brazil: Redeemer of a Paris climate deal?” *Climate Change News*.

different mitigation responsibilities for the global South yet also emphasizing the need for a universal agreement including both developed and developing countries.³⁷³

Illustrating Brazil's "bridging" role, the country chaired negotiations on the issue of flexibility targets at the COP-3 in Kyoto in 2003, and successfully gained support from the G-77 and China, who had initially been reluctant to allow flexible timetables for Annex I developed countries to reduce emissions.³⁷⁴ Brazil also helped create the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) coalition at the COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009, pushing for an extension of differentiated responsibilities from the Kyoto Protocol past 2012, although disappointed that the coalition rejected a legally binding agreement.³⁷⁵

Brazil was one of the first to submit its pledge prior to COP-15 in 2009, and following the summit passed an executive decree to adopt specific mitigation targets for the future. It was the first developing country to adopt an absolute limit to GHG emissions, to 2.1 billion tons of CO₂e by 2020, and passed a National Climate Change Plan (PMNC) in 2008.³⁷⁶ Significantly, Brazil's national pledge is not conditioned on international funding, making it even more stringent than its international commitments.³⁷⁷ This demonstrates the country's willingness to undertake unilateral

³⁷³ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁷⁴ Johnson 2001, 191. The Convention of the Parties (COP) refers to all states that are signatories to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. A new COP is held annually.

³⁷⁵ This meant developing countries would not be obligated to maintain the same level of climate change mitigation imposed upon Annex I developed countries. While Brazil continues to support "common but differentiated responsibilities," the country and South Africa were hoping the Copenhagen Accord would be a legally binding agreement. See David Steven. 2 February 2010. "A Guide to the BASIC Coalition – climate after Copenhagen." *Global Dashboard*.

³⁷⁶ "Brazil Country Data." Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. London School of Economics. Available: www.ise.ac.uk.

³⁷⁷ "Brazil." 2 November 2016. *Climate Action Tracker*. Available: <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil.html>. Please see appendix E for comparative chart.

commitments, setting an example to developing countries of the possibility of pursuing growth while also committing to targets.³⁷⁸

While Brazil advocates for stricter reductions for developed countries first, this has not precluded the country from exhibiting leadership through mediation and negotiation with all parties toward finding solutions on the issue of climate change.

Ken Johnson argues,

“...Brazil has provided important leadership for developing countries in the negotiating process. However, Brazil is not simply a protagonist of developing world interests. Its support of the US position on flexible timetables and targets is indicative of its willingness and desire to play the role of ‘balancer’ between Northern and Southern interests in the negotiations.”³⁷⁹

For example, Brazil worked closely with developed countries like the US on the transformation of the CDF into the market-based CDM at COP-3 in Kyoto in 1997, and collaborated with the US to push for the inclusion of all six major GHGs in reductions responsibilities, which had been contentious among developing countries. Brazil remained adamant, however, that flexible targets for developing countries should only be implemented only after these states reach a certain level of development.³⁸⁰ US/Brazil scientific and logistical cooperation on climate change continues today, for example in the countries’ 2015 Joint Statement.³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ Kathryn Hochstetler and Eduardo Viola. 2012. “Brazil and the politics of climate change: beyond the global commons.” *Environmental Politics* 21(5): 768.

³⁷⁹ Johnson 2001.

³⁸⁰ Ibid; A.A. Dayrell de Lima. 1996. “Environment and globalization: A Brazilian view.” Available: <http://www.mct.gov.br>.

³⁸¹ Former Presidents Barak Obama and Dilma Rousseff signed a Joint Climate statement leading up to the COP-21 in Paris in 2015, focused on a Binational Land and Forest Program and further cooperation on clean energy partnerships. See Viviane Romeiro and Rachel Biderman. 3 July 2015. “What the U.S.-Brazil Joint Statement on Climate Change Means for the World.” *World Resources Institute*.

Brazil also served as a key coalition partner at COP-21 in Paris in 2015, whose support was viewed as critical for pushing toward a stricter agreement on climate change. Regarding the influence of diverse Latin American countries on climate change, Argentine climate leader Enrique Konstantinidis highlighted Brazil's importance in the issue area: "We have Brazil, we always have Brazil, who has a strong diplomatic body and operates in another "level" of climate negotiations."³⁸² Brazil ultimately aligned with the "High Ambition Coalition," a mix of developing countries like Mexico and Gambia, as well as developed countries such as the US and EU, calling for a stricter agreement. In response to Brazil's decision to join the commission, EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Canete, stated: "This is a game changer. Such a relevant emerging economy joining us is clear proof that the coalition is delivering."³⁸³ The chair of the coalition, the Marshall Islands Envoy Tony de Brum, argued, "Having [Brazil] on board is essential to our success."³⁸⁴ Another analyst argued that Brazil may be the "Redeemer of a Paris climate deal" and that its commitments represented "...an important example to the likes of China, India and Indonesia, whose shares of the emissions space are growing as industrialized nations cut back."³⁸⁵

³⁸² Dirk Hoffman. 7 September 2015. "Las negociaciones climáticas desde Latinoamérica: Entrevista con Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis." *Cambio Climatico Bolivia*.

³⁸³ The Agreement set a goal of climate change reduction to less than 2 degrees Celsius by reaching net-zero emissions after 2050. Previous negotiations had centered on achieving a 2 degrees Celsius increase. The Paris Agreement was historic because of the signatories it achieved – the US, China as well as India – as the "...first truly global international climate change agreement;" "COP21: Brazil joins high ambition coalition; group pushes for strong deal as Paris talks enter final stretch." 12 November 2014. *European Commission Climate Action*; "Paris Agreement signed at COP21 established an International Carbon Trading based on CDM: the 'Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes' or ITMOs." 16 December 2015. *Clima Loop*; David Waskow and Jennifer Morgan. 12 December 2015. "The Paris Agreement: Turning Point for a Climate Solution." *World Resources Institute*.

³⁸⁴ Alex Pashley. December 11 2015. "Brazil backs high ambition coalition' to break Paris deadlock." *Climate Home*.

³⁸⁵ Alex Pashley. 18 November 2015. "Brazil: Redeemer of a Paris climate deal?" *Climate Change News*.

In the lead-up to Paris 2015, countries submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC that detailed the planned commitment of each country toward climate change mitigation. China and India expressed reluctance at adopting faster emissions targets leading up to COP-21. While Brazil has continued to push for differentiated responsibilities, it was the first developing country to pledge an absolute, economy-wide target on emissions reductions. While developed countries are expected to adopt economy-wide targets, “...this is generally not expected of developing economies, who have historically emitted less, and want to be given leeway to continue to emit.”³⁸⁶

In sum, the trajectory of Brazilian leadership in the UNFCCC began with a bang in 1992, deepening with the provision of key ideational goods in the late 1990s and continued activism through initiatives, coalitions and mediation efforts throughout the early 2000s. Coinciding with a downturn in capability, credibility and willingness post-2011 as explored in the previous chapter, after 2012 Brazil’s acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward climate change mitigation declined. The country remained a key negotiator and player at the COP-21 in 2015, and continued to offer ideational goods through its “enhanced CDM.” Yet Brazil has proved increasingly unwilling to accept domestic costs toward climate change mitigation. Economic crisis and political instability imposes limitations on future Brazilian leadership in the arena of climate change, particularly in terms of achieving more ambitious GHG limits in forestry and

³⁸⁶ Developing countries have generally fought against economy-wide targets because this is seen as constraining their ability to adapt climate mitigation toward their specific national circumstance and thus impeding their development. Sophie Yeo. 29 September 2015. “Analysis: Brazil’s climate pledge represents slight increase on current emissions.” *Carbon Brief*. See also Rafael Garcia. 11 December 2015. “Brasil busca consenso em torno de acordo do clima menos ambicioso.” *O Globo*; “20th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change - Joint Statement.” *20th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change*. 27-28 June 2015. New York, NY.

land use than targeted in the country's 2012 INDC.³⁸⁷ Further worrisome is data from a 2016 study of Brazil's Institute of Space Research (INPE) that indicates deforestation has increased by 29% between 2015 and 2016, a disturbing trend that diminishes the country's previous gains in this arena.³⁸⁸

Beyond domestic concerns, a Secretary in the DClima division of Itamaraty admitted that it would be more difficult given the country's economic downturn "...to assume responsibility for helping others assume obligations."³⁸⁹ Brazil, for example, has not contributed to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), initiated by Mexico and Norway at COP-19 in Copenhagen in 2009 to help developing countries with climate change adaptation and mitigation.³⁹⁰ Rather than giving financial support for climate mitigation, a Secretary in Itamaraty's Climate Division emphasized that Brazil was in dire need of receiving such assistance: "Although other countries don't think Brazil needs support [in the area of climate change,] Brazil *desperately* needs this."³⁹¹

The future of Brazilian leadership in the UNFCCC appears to be in even more dire question under Interim President Michel Temer, whose efforts to mitigate Brazil's

³⁸⁷ For example, using a baseline year of 2005 (after which Brazil significantly decreased land use emissions, or LULUCF) to calculate future emissions levels effectively means that Brazil can actually emit more in other energy sectors (non-LULUCF) while still meeting the targets specified in their INDC. See "Brazil," *Climate Action Tracker*, 2016.

³⁸⁸ "PRODES estima 7.989 km² de desmatamento por corte raso na Amazônia em 2016." 29 November 2016. *Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais*. Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovações e Comunicações. Under Rousseff, deforestation began increasing again as economic turmoil led farmers to clear large parcels of land attempting to generate more revenue through crops like soybeans. See Dom Phillips and Nick Miroff. 22 May 2016. "Brazil's new government may be less likely to protect the amazon, critics say." *The Washington Post*.

³⁸⁹ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

³⁹⁰ Mexico has pledged \$10 million and Chile \$0.30 million USD. Brazil has argued that developed countries hold primary responsibility for contributing to the Green Climate Fund, and that the country provides financial assistance for climate change through South-South development flows already in place through other domestic channels. See Lisa Friedman. 9 December 2014. "China launches separate international climate aid fund and sparks 'interesting' politics." *Environment & Energy News* and "Contributors." 17 May 2017. *Green Climate Fund*. Available: www.greenclimate.fund.

³⁹¹ Personal interview with Division Chief, Divisão de Clima, Ozônio e Segurança Química, Itamaraty. 4 November 2016. Brasília, Brazil.

economic crisis have included the appointment of a major soybean magnate Blairo Maggi to the Ministry of Agriculture, whose controversial constitutional amendment PEC 65 would reduce licensing requirements for land developers with damaging environmental consequences.³⁹² Whether Brazil will be able to maintain adequate credibility, capacity and willingness to continue its leadership in the UNFCCC remains to be seen. In the words of a former Environmental Minister under FHC, the Temer administration represents “the biggest regression in environmental management in Brazil since re-democratization.”³⁹³ While this chapter considered the trajectory of Brazilian leadership in key global forums like the UNFCCC, UNSC and WTO, the subsequent chapter explores Mexican engagement in these institutions, seeking to understand whether changes in capability, credibility and willingness coincide with instances of leadership (or lack thereof) in another Latin American case study.

³⁹² Simon Romero. 13 May 2016. “Michel Temer, Brazil’s Interim President may herald shift to the right.” *The New York Times*.

³⁹³ Phillips and Miroff 2016.

Chapter 6: Mexico: Between Leader and Follower?

Whereas the previous chapters explored Brazil's rising leadership over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, Mexican leadership over the same timeframe is largely absent. This chapter considers variation in levels of Mexican capability, credibility and willingness, and the impact of these variables on the relative lack of leadership in international institutions like the WTO, UNSC and UNFCCC. Much like Brazil, Mexico's size and economy naturally lend the country toward an influential role in Latin America and the world. The country played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and G-77 of the 1960s and 1970s along with Brazil, yet since the 1990s Mexican foreign policy has been characterized as "low-profile, low-involvement."³⁹⁴ Mexico does demonstrate high rates of institutional membership compared to the rest of the region; however, these institutions are comprised of more developed rather than developing countries.³⁹⁵

While Mexico possesses the material capability to pursue leadership in international institutions, its institutional alignment with developed countries like the US complicates its credibility as a broker and representative of developing-country interests,

³⁹⁴ Laura Randall. 2006. *Changing Structures of Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Prospects*. M.E. Sharpe, Inc.: Armonk, NY. The political and financial instability following Mexican independence led to low material capability for foreign policy activism from the 1920s until the 1960s. A radical shift from Mexico's traditional tone, however, occurred during the 1960s through mid-1980s (particularly under the presidency of Luis Echevarría, 1970 to 1976), coinciding with a period of economic growth and enhanced material capabilities. Successful import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies and significant oil wealth meant that under the one-party rule of the PRI, Mexico could afford to subscribe to a foreign policy model when the country began to play a more active global role in supporting revolutionary movements worldwide during the Cold War, and concomitantly securing autonomy from its powerful northern neighbor, the US. This led to a period of activism within certain forums of the UN. The crumbling of the socialist model, economic woes associated with ISI and globalization led to a fundamental shift in the country's international activism. The late 1970s brought an overvaluation of the peso and falling oil prices; severe financial crisis in the early 1980s brought the "lost decade" of the 1990s. This experience contributed to Mexico's retraction into a more passive foreign policy in line with its firm stance on non-intervention and historically low-key engagement.

³⁹⁵ Please see Appendix B, Table I: "Institutional Membership of Selected Latin American Countries." Brazil is in 75 institutions, while Mexico is in 77. Chile is in 62; Argentina in 69, and Venezuela in 60.

precluding the support of a defined subset of “followers” which are critical to leadership provision. Moreover, Mexico’s comparatively weak investment in its foreign ministry and minimal presidential interest in foreign policy in the early 2000s demonstrated insufficient willingness for global leadership, although a greater investment in bureaucratic capacity more recently has finally brought Mexico closer to the levels maintained by other regional and extra-regional powers. Specific presidents have pushed Mexico toward moments of foreign policy engagement, particularly Calderón in the realm of climate change, yet comparatively speaking the country has largely failed to accept significant costs in the WTO (such as forgoing bilateral or trilateral trade agreements for the sake of multilateral negotiations) or provide goods (such as troops for peacekeeping missions in the UNSC) toward common interests of the global South. While increased rhetoric about a larger global role emerged under current president Enrique Peña Nieto (2010 to present), concrete action on the part of Mexico remains timid. Guilia Sirigu argues that Mexico has lacked “a precise foreign policy path and solid foreign policy principles,” or generally “the absence of a defined foreign policy,” post-2000.³⁹⁶

Capability, Credibility and Willingness in the Mexican Case

Mexican capability (measured by GDP growth and inflation rates) exhibits variation in the timeframe of interest, particularly affected by “exogenous shocks” of changes in the US economy, to which the country is highly linked through NAFTA. Mexico was particularly hard hit in 1995 during its debt crisis, in 2001 after 9/11, and after the US financial crisis of 2008. In the early 2000s Mexico experienced sluggish

³⁹⁶ Guilia Sirigu. 2015. *Continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy under Fox: a strategic-relational analysis*. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Manchester. Manchester, UK.

growth as compared with their South American neighbor's growth. From 2004 to 2009, Brazil's growth rate nearly doubled that of Mexico, suggesting that Mexican capability for leadership proved far more restricted than for the latter.³⁹⁷ The figure below compares Brazilian and Mexican GDP growth from 1995 onward.




Figure 16: Comparative GDP Growth, 1990-2015³⁹⁸

Around 2012, Mexico's economy began to experience modest growth and lower inflation and debt levels than Brazil, leading *The New York Times* to argue, "A changing of the guard is slowly but surely taking place," given the "reversed fortunes of Latin America's two largest economies."³⁹⁹ The country thus far has grown by 2.7% in 2016, which was higher than government estimates, while Brazil experienced a 3.6% contraction in 2016.⁴⁰⁰ Mexico's export profile is more diversified, whereas Brazil has been highly

³⁹⁷ Sean Goforth. 23 August 2011. "Mexico, the un-Brazil." *Foreign Policy Association*. Available: www.foreignpolicyblogs.com.

³⁹⁸ World Bank 2017.

³⁹⁹ Ibid and Elisabeth Malkin and Simon Romero. 17 June 2012. "World Leaders Meet in Mexico Now Giving Brazil a Run for its Money." *The New York Times*.

⁴⁰⁰ Yuk 2017; Patrick Gillespie. 29 April 2016. "Mexico is Latin American winner as Brazil spirals." *CNN Money*.

dependent on slowing commodity exports, and reduced demand of these products has hit the country hard.⁴⁰¹

In May 2016, Moody's upgraded Mexico's investment status while Brazil's sovereign rating was cut to junk by the same agency in February 2016, leading one investor to remark: "Right now Mexico and Brazil are as different as they come, this is day and night."⁴⁰² According to the President of BBVA Bancomer, "Mexico is going through a historic moment, which will dramatically change its profile as a world player. We are on the right track."⁴⁰³ Inflation in Mexico hit its target for 2015, but slowly increased in 2016; in early 2017 Moody's put the country's credit on a "negative perspective" based on increasing government debt and reduced growth estimations.⁴⁰⁴ Brazil hit its highest inflation rate in 10 years in early 2015 yet closed 2016 with its lowest rate in three years, and is finally expected to achieve positive (although minor) growth for 2017.⁴⁰⁵ While stagnant growth and high inflation in the late 1990s and early 2000s hindered capacity for leadership in international institutions, recent economic growth has opened potential opportunities for greater foreign policy engagement on the part of Mexico, should economic growth continue and the country garner sufficient credibility and willingness for such endeavors.

Credibility for a leading role in the global arena can be gained by demonstrating solidarity through membership in South-South institutions, providing development

⁴⁰¹ Goforth 2011.

⁴⁰² Gillspie 2016; Paula Sambo and Filipe Pacheco. 24 February 2016. "Brazil Credit Ratings Cut to Junk by Moody's." *Bloomberg*.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰⁴ "Moody's warns growing debt weighs on Mexico's rating." 8 February 2017. *Reuters*; "Inflation rate closes 2016 at lowest level in three years." 11 January 2017. *Brazil Government News*; "Mexico: Inflation begins to pick up pace." 7 October 2016. *Focus Economics*.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid*; Yuk 2017; Surbhi Jain. 12 March 2015. "Inflation Varies: US is Low, Brazil is High, and Mexico is On Target." *Market Realist*.

assistance, and achieving domestic strides in poverty/inequality reduction; credibility would also be evidenced by relatively high levels of support by “follower” states in survey data. Recent Mexican achievements in terms of development assistance and reducing domestic poverty and inequality could plausibly lend credence to an emerging leadership bid in international institutions. Mexico was, in fact, the first to implement a conditional cash transfer program called *Progresa* (later called *Oportunidades* and now *Prospera*) to alleviate poverty and income inequality, akin to Brazil’s Bolsa Família albeit at a municipal rather than national level.

Progresa made a significant impact on the global stage, as both the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB) expanded anti-poverty programs to other developing countries based upon Mexico’s model, often in collaboration of *Progresas*’ creators.⁴⁰⁶ Mexico’s example, particularly the rigorous evaluation efforts associated with the program, “set a standard for poverty reduction programs in the developing world.”⁴⁰⁷ Mexican CCTs have led to modest improvements in the country’s Gini coefficient over the past decade, from 51 in 1992 to 48 in 2012.⁴⁰⁸ However, despite Peña Nieto’s campaign promise to lift 15 million out of poverty, the poverty rate grew to 46.2% between 2012 and 2014 alone, largely due to decreasing demand for Mexican oil exports and rising electricity costs.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ “A Model from Mexico to the World.” 19 November 2011. *World Bank*. Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo>; Sergei Soares, Rafael Guerreiro Osório, Fábio Veras Soares, Marcelo Medeiros and Eduardo Zepeda. 2007. “Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Impacts upon Inequality.” *International Poverty Centre*. Working Paper 35 (April 2007); “Mexico’s Oportunidades Program.” 2004. *Shanghai Poverty Conference Case Study Summary*. Available: http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-62.pdf.

⁴⁰⁷ Santiago Levy. 2006. *Progress Against Poverty*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, viii.

⁴⁰⁸ Appendix F details the evolution of Mexican and Brazilian Gini coefficients in the timeframe of interest.

⁴⁰⁹ Umair Irfan. 14 October 2015. “Mexico Challenges Other Nations to Act Boldly against Climate Change.” *Scientific American*.

In addition to reducing domestic inequality, states seeking leadership in international institutions may gain credibility through offering development assistance targeted at mitigating poverty in the global South more broadly. Mexico's foreign ministry (the SRE) considers development assistance "key to bolstering Mexico's presence abroad," and current President Enrique Peña Nieto named development assistance as a central pillar of his administration's foreign policy.⁴¹⁰ Prior to 2013, the country's levels of assistance have traditionally been modest and geographically confined, "trailing all of the BRICS countries in terms of development spending," and inconsistent in level and appropriation.⁴¹¹ For most of the timeframe of interest, Mexican development assistance was minimal; in 2009 Brazilian development assistance was over three times the total of Mexican assistance. Yet by 2013, Mexican assistance had

⁴¹⁰ Carrie Kahn. "Peña Nieto Encourages Mexicans To Embrace Change." 3 September 2013. *National Public Radio*. Development assistance has taken a more central place in the country's foreign policy strategy, as his National Development Plan (NDP) specifically mentioned international development assistance as a main tool of Mexican foreign policy "as an expression of solidarity, and at the same time, a means of promoting the welfare and prosperity of our country and the international community."

⁴¹¹ Juan Pablo Prado Llalande. November 2015. "Mexico's Role in Development Cooperation: Bridging North and South." *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, 2-3; Julie Walz and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2011. "Brave New World. A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance." *Center for Global Development*. Working Paper 273, 7. Development assistance was codified as a central tenant of foreign policy in the 1988 Mexican Constitution. Data prior to 2009 are murky, as the SRE only began to measure development assistance that year. SRE. Figures are murky, but unofficial estimates suggest about \$105 million, or 0.01% of GDP, were spent in 2009. By 2013, this figure was about \$411 million, representing a significant increase. Because Mexico adopted a similar tracking and regulation framework as the OECD for its development flows, Llalonde argues that the country could act as a bridge between developed and developing countries: "without relinquishing its role as a developing country – it attempts to establish dialogue and convergence...between North- South and SSC [South-South cooperation] models. For example, the number of Mexican bilateral projects to Latin America and the Caribbean has been intermittent and variable. At the beginning of the administration of Calderón, there were 68 bilateral projects in total towards the region. In 2008 there was an increase of 108%, with a total of 142 bilateral projects. Due to the global economic crisis, there was a decrease in the number of projects, running that year only 107 projects, an approximate decrease of 25%. In 2010 the Mexican SSC increased to 149 bilateral projects, but they reversed in 2011, with 126. Finally, the administration of Calderón closed 2012 with 153 bilateral projects to the region. Mexican development cooperation is also highly geographically concentrated rather than global; the majority of Mexican aid flows to Guatemala and Costa Rica. Llalonde argues this "...makes Mexico a particular case next to other emerging donors like China, India or Brazil, which carry out significant development cooperation activities in countries outside of their regional neighbors."

increased fivefold to over \$400 million while Brazil's shrank to just over \$4 million USD.⁴¹²

Because Mexico adopted a similar tracking and regulation framework as the OECD for its development flows, Llalonde argues that the country could act as a bridge between developed and developing countries: “without relinquishing its role as a developing country – it attempts to establish dialogue and convergence...between North-South and SSC [South-South cooperation] models.”⁴¹³ Mexico's rising provision of development assistance, now reaching levels appropriate for emerging powers seeking greater influence, holds promise toward potential future credibility gains, should the issue of “followership” be resolved.




Figure 17: Comparative Development Assistance as Percent of GDP⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² Very few data points are available for Mexican development; in 2009 Mexico's budget for cooperation was just over \$100 million USD, while Brazil's was \$362 million USD. Llalonde 2015, AMEXCID 2016 IPEA 2010 and 2016.

⁴¹³ Llalonde 2015, 2-3.

⁴¹⁴ World Bank Databank, Ministry of External Affairs, IPEA/ Llalonde 2015. Data for Mexico is scarce, given the country only began tracking development aid in 2009 through AMEXCID. “Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009.” 2010. *Institute for Applied Economic Research*.

While domestic strides in poverty and inequality reduction, as well as rising development assistance bolster Mexico's credibility, the country's institutional membership and lack of "followers" hinder its potential leadership in international organizations. Without "follower" states that share common interests and goals and create "buy-in" for the leading state's proposals, initiatives, and reform efforts, global influence within core organizations will be lacking.

Despite rising development assistance and a reduced Gini coefficient, Mexico's ability to gain credibility remains complicated by the country's dual identity as a developing country yet closely tied to the US. Previously, Mexico cultivated strong ties with developing countries and possessed foreign policy activism during its period of "revolutionary autonomy" and "terceromundismo" (Third World-ism) in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴¹⁵ This period of alignment with developing country values and activism in offering ideational and material goods to revolutionary movements and reform movements worldwide, however, shifted toward the end of the 20th century as Mexico pursued integration with the US and Canada through NAFTA. Juan-Pablo Lallonde argues that Mexico's "OECD and NAFTA membership also indicate a clear will by Mexican elites to belong to the industrialized North, which makes Mexican leadership in

⁴¹⁵ Pamela K. Starr. 2006. "Mexican Foreign Policy." In Laura Randall, ed. *The Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Prospects*, 2nd edition (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe): 49-57. Mexico's "revolutionary autonomy" from the US and "terceromundismo" led Mexico to support revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. It was the only Latin American country to oppose the embargo against the Cuba and its expulsion from the OAS, and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Castros in the 1960s. The country also supported Salvador Allende in Chile and granted asylum to his supporters, as well as the Sandinista government that came to power in Nicaragua. The country was very involved, along with France, in negotiating the end of the civil war in El Salvador, against US preferences. Mexico also displayed a more active policy in the global arena on behalf of developing countries, such as the Mexican proposal for the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" which was passed in 1974, which established international economic rules in hopes of transferring wealth from developed to developing countries. See also George W. Grayson. 1988. *Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press) and Yoram Shapira. 1978. *Mexican Foreign Policy: Under Echeverria*. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University).

the region suspicious in the eyes of most Latin American countries.”⁴¹⁶ Similarly, Duncan Wood argues that since the 1980s, Mexico has “come to redefine its position and its peer group” in the global arena:

“The shift from member of the G77 to an OECD state, from UNCTAD supporter to active GATT and WTO participant, from ISI proponent to free trade crusader shows how dramatically Mexico has changed both its role in the system of states, and its peer group from the mass of developing countries to the leading economies of the world.”⁴¹⁷

While both Mexico and Brazil are members of a high number of international institutions,⁴¹⁸ Mexico’s institutional membership suggests a greater commitment to developed-country clubs like APEC or the OECD, which Mexico left the G-77 in 1994 to join. Whereas Brazil has sought leadership in the global arena based upon shared interests with the global South more broadly, Undersecretary for North American Affairs Dr. Sergio Alcocer Martinez de Castro explained Mexico’s contrasting approach in which integration with the developed North is seen as key to greater global influence:

“Our increasingly robust institutions and rules have given us the renewed strength and coherence needed to push our principles and interests out into the world. Herein lies our certainty that the country is called to assume a new and enhanced position in the international arena. Facing this new state of things, North America appears as a privileged gateway into the world.”⁴¹⁹

Credibility as defined in this dissertation – namely, possessing a shared Southern development perspective – allows “follower” states to trust leading states with whom they can relate in terms of common challenges of development, and who have prioritized a commitment to Southern empowerment over time. Mexico may possess a form of

⁴¹⁶ Lallonde 2015.

⁴¹⁷ Duncan Wood. 2010. “A Break with the Past or a Natural Progression? Mexico and the Heiligendamm Process.” In Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz. *Emerging powers in global governance, Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*. (Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press).

⁴¹⁸ CIA World Factbook 2017. Mexico (68) and Brazil (with 75) are the highest numbers of institutional membership in Latin America. See Appendix B, Table I: “Institutional Membership of Selected Latin American Countries.”

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

credibility with other states; for example, Chile or Colombia, who have also pursued a foreign policy strategy of greater institutional and economic alignment with the North. Yet the country lacks a cohesive, coherent set of “follower” states in core global institutions, which impedes its ability to represent interests toward common goals shared with this subset of states. Mexico does possess shared goals with other states like Argentina or Costa Rica, for example, who joined together in the United for Consensus (UFC) grouping pushing against the G-4 proposal for UNSC reform at the UNGA. Yet this group lacks the broader support the G-4 have obtained, largely because Brazil and India are viewed as credible representatives of developing country goals and therefore have “buy-in” from other developing countries. This was evident, for example, when Brazil’s candidate for the WTO Secretary-General won the election over Mexico’s candidate in 2013 because the latter was seen as less “representative” of developing country interests.⁴²⁰ Brazil and India have strategically reinforced and utilized their global South identity as a basis for garnering “followership,” in a manner that Mexico has not pursued with either developing or developed countries. In a sense, Mexico falls in an “no-man’s land” between North and South; pursuing a strategy of greater economic alignment with the North yet attempting to maintain its identity as a developing country.

Blanca Torres Ramirez argues,

“In certain ways...Mexico’s interests coincide with those of the developed world. In other ways, however they diverge. Mexico’s foreign policy has also been pulled in different directions, although the gravitational center of that policy has remained: its relation with the United States.”⁴²¹

⁴²⁰ Tom Miles. 7 May 2013. “Brazil’s Azevedo wins race to head WTO.” *Reuters*; Nicolas Bourcier. 21 May 2013. “Roberto Azevedo’s WTO appointment gives Brazil a seat at the top table.” *The Guardian*.

⁴²¹ Blanca Torres Ramirez. “Mexico and Climate change: Was the Country a Multilateral Leader?” *Global Governance* 20 (2014) 148.

While this strategy may garner credibility from developed countries, or a subset of developing countries looking to capitalize on connections with the North for trade or security purposes, Mexican ambivalence on its identity and global role precludes sufficient “followership” and hinders leadership provision in the international arena. While the country could ostensibly garner credibility from “followership” of another subset of countries besides the global South (for example, the global North), providing goods and accepting costs toward common goals is complicated by the large power asymmetry between Mexico and the developed countries with which it has chosen to align institutionally, who far possess greater material and bureaucratic resources.

The complicated nature of credibility for Mexico, given its alignment with OECD countries like the US, is further evidenced by Latinobarómetro surveys illustrating weak levels of confidence in Mexico as a leader, compared to Brazil. As indicated in the figure below, Mexico has scored significantly lower than Brazil when respondents were asked which country they had most confidence in regionally and/or which country in Latin America they believed displayed the most leadership – and in 2005, Mexico’s scores averaged less than half the level of confidence as those of Brazil.




Figure 18: Confidence in Latin American Countries, 2000-2005⁴²²

In addition to credibility and capability, another critical component of leadership in international institutions is political willingness. Without a president and/or foreign ministry that prioritize global affairs and activism in international institutions, a state would be unable to seek (or obtain) leadership in these forums. Although measures of Mexican bureaucratic capacity have slowly increased over the 2000s, only recently have these risen to levels commensurate with other regional and extra-regional emerging powers. Nascent willingness to pursue a more active global presence emerged under Vicente Fox’s administration (2001-2006), with former Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda attempting to push Mexico into greater foreign policy engagement and giving the country’s foreign affairs a “sweeping overhaul.”⁴²³ The events of 9/11, however, and ensuing domestic issues of transnational drug crime and violence severely curtailed

⁴²² Latinobarómetro 2017. Question asked was: Specific question asked for 2000 and 2005 was: “Considering all countries in Latin America, which country inspires you with most confidence? Name only one.” For 2002 and 2004, a similar question was asked: “Which Latin American country do you feel most admiration for? Data above represents the percentage of times a particularly country was named. Please see Appendix D, Tables C1-C3 for comparative graphs of all survey responses for all available years.

⁴²³ Castañeda sought to overturn the prevailing “Estrada Doctrine” of non-interference. See Emily Edmonds-Poli and David A. Shirk. 2012. *Contemporary Mexican Politics, 2nd Edition*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield).

Mexican foreign policy ambitions, and the administration ended its term having severely damaged relationships in with the region and leaving the SRE underfunded and under prioritized.⁴²⁴

Fox's successor, Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), brought renewed presidential interest and influence into the executive by reengaging with Latin America, restoring bilateral relationships with countries like Venezuela and Cuba, as well as promoting democracy and human rights in the region. Calderón fought against Mexico's historically "self-imposed irrelevance" and argued the country "look for more, not less, involvement with the outside world."⁴²⁵ Accordingly, the president increased funding to the SRE and expanded its staff compared to his predecessors, as well as spent more time abroad than his predecessor Fox or successor Peña Nieto.⁴²⁶ Calderón also personally prioritized the issue of climate change; he advocated for the complementarity of development and emissions mitigation and pushing the country toward activism in the UNFCCC.⁴²⁷ Despite the impact of the global financial crisis on the Mexican economy in 2008, Calderón continued to prioritize energy efficiency and commitment to voluntary emission targets as a means to remain competitive in the international energy market, leading Blanca Torres Ramirez to argue that "The President's [Calderón's] lead on

⁴²⁴ Particularly Venezuela and Cuba. See Shannon K. O'Neil. 1 December 2008. "It's time for Mexico to take the lead, from Mexico's The News." *Council on Foreign Relations* and Cory Siskind. 5 July 2012. "Mexico's Peña Nieto to Benefit From Calderón's Foreign Policy Legacy." *World Politics Review*.

⁴²⁵ "Felipe Calderón Foreign Policy." *Washington Post*. Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/Foreign_Policy.pdf.

⁴²⁶ See Appendix G, Table B: "Presidential Trips Abroad." Folha de São Paulo, BBC, MRE, Ministério do Planejamento, Palácio de Planalto, Biblioteca da Presidência da República; "Agenda." 2017. Presidencia de la República. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/archivo/agenda>. "Viajes realizados al extranjero por el C. Felipe de Jesús Calderón." March 2012. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available: www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/spe/SPE-ISS-01-12.pdf. "Viajes realizados al extranjero por el Vincente Fox Quesada." June 20014. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sia/coord/pdf/coord-iss-16-04.pdf>.

⁴²⁷ This personal involvement will be further assessed in the UNFCCC case study section later in this chapter.

climate change would be the decisive factor” in Mexico’s ability to maintain “a high profile on the issue.”⁴²⁸

In comparison to Brazil, however, expansion under Calderón proves relatively minor. For example, less than 200 diplomatic seats were opened from 2006 to 2012 in comparison to Brazil’s 400 in a shorter period of time, and while SRE funding increased it remains far less than Brazil even in the midst of economic crisis.⁴²⁹ While certainly engendering more engagement than his predecessor Fox, outside the realm of climate change Shannon O’Neil argues Calderón’s administration was generally still “decidedly quiet on the international front,” having “failed to take on a global leadership role.”⁴³⁰ Another analyst commented that Mexico under Calderón “punched below its weight.”⁴³¹

President Peña Nieto has signaled interest in raising Mexico’s global profile, traveling more frequently than his predecessors thus far and having senior diplomats routinely document foreign visits on social media using the hash tag #MéxicoGlobal.⁴³² He was also the first president to suggest Mexico commit troops to UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 as part of the country’s “global responsibility,” although contributions remain extremely low comparatively.⁴³³ In terms of rhetoric, quotes from key Mexican policymakers are also more cautious comparatively, as demonstrated by the figure below. Fox and Peña Nieto spent only 3% of their inaugural addresses discussing foreign policy,

⁴²⁸ Blanca Torres Ramirez. 2014. “Mexico and Climate change: Was the Country a Multilateral Leader?” *Global Governance* 20: 149.

⁴²⁹ Georgina Olson. 13 March 2013. “Servicio Exterior trabaja “al límite”, hay déficit de diplomáticos.” *Excelsior*.

⁴³⁰ O’Neil 2008; Kezia McKeague. 17 February 2015. “Foreign Policy Made in North America?” *Americas Quarterly*.

⁴³¹ McKeague 2015.

⁴³² McKeague 2015; “Agenda.” 2017. Presidencia de la República de México. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/archivo/agenda?page=29>.

⁴³³ *Ibid.* Mexico currently contributes 29 military experts and 1 troop to PKO. UNPKO 2017.

and Calderón only 5% - all lower than their Brazilian counterparts, even Rousseff and Temer.




Figure 19: Percentage of Speech Spent on Foreign Policy⁴³⁴

Much of Peña Nieto’s recent foreign policy has centered on the ongoing backlash for accepting an August 2016 visit from then-US presidential candidate Donald Trump. Peña Nieto later called the decision to meet “rushed,” and ultimately canceled his 2017 US state visit over refusal to pay for the wall Trump had initiated executive orders to build between the US and Mexico.⁴³⁵ This debacle has not only cost Peña Nieto domestically, plunging his approval ratings within Mexico, but tarnishes credibility with the global South more broadly. In an effort to perhaps regain some lost stature, Peña Nieto recently showed nascent willingness to engage the issue of Venezuela’s political

⁴³⁴ See “Leia a íntegra do segundo discurso de posse de Lula.” 1 January 2007. *BBC Brasil*; “Leia a íntegra do discurso de Lula no Congresso Nacional.” 1 January 2003. *Folha de São Paulo*; “Leia a íntegra do discurso de posse do segundo mandato da presidente Dilma Rousseff.” 1 January 2011. *O Globo*; “Veja a íntegra do discurso de Michel Temer.” 5 December 2016. *O Globo*; “Mensaje a la nación del Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.” 1 December 2012. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.; “Mensaje a la nación del Presidente Felipe Calderón Hinojosa de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.” 1 December 2006. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.; “Mensaje de Toma de Posesión de Vicente Fox Quesada como Presidente Consitucional.” 1 December 2000. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.

⁴³⁵ Bibiana Belsasso. 21 October 2016. “EPN: fue una decisión acelerada invitar a Trump.” *La Razón*.

crisis. Mexico presented a proposal at the Organization of American States (OAS) earlier this year which strongly called for “full restoration of democratic values” in Venezuela, and committed to pressing the country toward this end diplomatically.⁴³⁶ Some have argued this could be merely a means of appeasing the US before a renegotiation of NAFTA, yet may signal promise for a larger measure of regional activism on the part of Mexico.⁴³⁷ While the Venezuela situation sorely requires regional leadership, one that could potentially provide Peña Nieto a future avenue of personal foreign policy engagement, his current mode seems to center on figuring out how to manage increasingly tense relations with Mexico’s northern neighbor.

While presidential interest and influence wields significant power in garnering state willingness for leadership in international institutions, this can be mitigated or reinforced by bureaucratic capacity (including funding, insulation and professionalization) of the country’s foreign ministry. Over most of the timeframe of interest, Mexican SRE funding falls below that of Brazil’s MRE, both in total dollars as well as percentage of GDP. For example, Mexico’s peak SRE funding in 2012 was over a billion dollars lower than Brazil’s MRE peak budget in 2008.⁴³⁸ The graphs below compare MRE and SRE budgets both in aggregate terms as well as percentage of GDP.

⁴³⁶ Andrés Oppenheimer. 14 April 2017. “Surprise! Mexico is leading a pro-democracy drive in Latin America.” *Miami Herald*.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ In 2008, MRE reached a peak budget of \$1,798,965,636. In 2012, Mexico reached a peak budget of \$ 773,506,335.




Figure 20: Comparison of Mexico and Brazilian Foreign Ministry Budgets⁴³⁹




Figure 21: Foreign Ministry Budgets as Percentage of GDP⁴⁴⁰

While initially funded at much lower levels than Brazil, Mexico’s budget has grown substantially in recent years, by 36.3% from 2006 to 2012 under Calderón.⁴⁴¹ Post-2012, the SRE has been funded at levels relatively equal to that of Brazil in terms of percentage of GDP (approximately 3%).⁴⁴² This highlights both Mexico’s increasing prioritization

⁴³⁹ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 2012; Gobierno de México 2005, 2016; Governo do Brasil 2017.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Gabriela Gutiérrez. 26 September 2011. “Diplomáticos de altos sueldos.” *El Universal Nación*.

⁴⁴² Please see Chapter 4, Figure 8: Foreign Ministry Budgets as % of GDP, 2003-2015.”

of foreign policy issues in recent years, as well as the negative impact of Brazil's economic and political instability on funding for its own foreign ministry. Mexico has also expanded its missions worldwide since 2006; yet the number of diplomatic missions, representatives and diplomats remain significantly lower than those of Brazil and other regional states. Moreover, the number of political appointees working as ambassadors and consulate officers worldwide has also increased recently, suggesting that a measure of SRE's political insulation may be dissipating.⁴⁴³ While on the uptick, as Mexico perhaps realizes the necessity of bolstering bureaucratic resources commensurate with greater influence on the global stage, willingness in general remains lower than Brazil or India both in terms of bureaucratic capacity as well as presidential interests/influence.⁴⁴⁴

An overall indication of a country's commitment level to engagement in international institutions is the "opportunity cost" of activism in the global arena—namely what percentage of GDP the country commits to foreign policy, and what plausible domestic programs could have been bolstered with these resources instead. Mexico's "opportunity cost" is comprised of the average budgets allocated to the SRE and AMEXCID (tasked with overseeing development aid), the average sum of assistance given to developing countries, as well as yearly average funding to troops in UN

⁴⁴³ This led to allegations that the executive was beginning to "abuse" their privilege of appointing political allies with 12 political appointees outnumbering 10 career diplomats from the SRE. See Iván E. Saldaña. 4 June 2016. Proliferan políticos en embajadas; sólo 19% de los diplomáticos son mujeres." *Excelsior*.

⁴⁴⁴ In 2006, Mexico had 79 diplomatic missions worldwide, 72 representatives worldwide, 59 career diplomats, and 13 political appointees. By 2012, the country had 73 representatives worldwide, 56 members of the Mexican Foreign Service, and 17 political appointees on foreign affairs. In 2012, the SRE characterized its foreign policy as more active compared to 2006, yet called for reform of the SRE as well as an amplification of Mexican foreign policy interests. Carolina Lora. 14 October 2014. "Agentes Diplomáticos." Available: <https://prezi.com/wprzqsz-dwy/agentes-diplomaticos/>. While Brazil maintained 3,122 members of the foreign service in 2013; Argentina had almost a thousand less at 2,316 and Mexico possessed only 114—leading Mexican foreign policy experts to lament the country's staff as "insufficient to confront reality." Georgina Olson. 13 March 2013. "Servicio Exterior trabaja "al límite," hay déficit de diplomáticos." *Excelsior*.

peacekeeping operations. When totaling the above numbers, the average “opportunity cost” of Mexican foreign policy is around \$630 million USD, or 0.05% of the country’s GDP from 2000 to 2015.⁴⁴⁵ These numbers are both lower than Brazil’s average of \$1.5 billion and 0.06% GDP over the timeframe of interest.




Figure 22: Opportunity Cost of Foreign Policy, Brazil and Mexico⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁵ Normal dues to international organizations like the UN, as well as assessed contributions to general peacekeeping funds, were not considered because these would be requested of all member states, and would not necessarily reflect a special “commitment” to foreign policy above the average cost of being a member.

⁴⁴⁶ “Orçamentos Anuais.” 15 January 2017. *Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*. Governo do Brasil. Available: http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br/orcamentos-anuais/orcamento-2016/orcamentos_anuais_view?anoOrc=2016; “Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación.” 2005. *Gobierno de México*. Available: <http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/temas/pef/2005/>; “Contributions by Country.” 31 December 2015. *UN Peacekeeping*. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>; “Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009.” 2010. *Institute for Applied Economic Research*; Costa Karin Vasquez, 24 November 2014. “Brazilian South-South Technical Cooperation in 2015: integration, transparency and the Objective of Sustainable Development.” *Cafezinho Blog*. Available: <http://cafezinhoblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/cooperacao-tecnica-sul-sul-brasileira.html>; *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/mexicos-development-co-operation.htm>; “World Development Indicators.” 2017. *World Bank Data Bank*. Available: www.data.worldbank.org.




Figure 23: Opportunity Cost as Percentage of GDP, Mexico and Brazil⁴⁴⁷

While the aggregate cost for Mexico remains lower than that of Brazil, as a percentage of GDP Mexico’s opportunity cost surpassed that of Brazil for 2015, at 0.09% versus 0.06%. This is almost the reverse of the countries’ respective opportunity costs in 2010, when Brazil’s was 0.09% and Mexico’s 0.05%. This reflects the broader trends explored above, namely that in recent years Mexico has gained greater material resources to bolster its foreign ministry, demonstrated growing development assistance to the global South, and possessed presidents with more interest in raising the country’s global profile. This has begun to translate into nascent activism in certain institutions of the global arena, like the UNFCCC, although its concrete actions toward accepting costs and providing goods in international institutions like the UN or WTO lacks a commensurate scale. The following section examines the country’s acceptance of costs and provision of goods in the UNSC, WTO and UNFCCC, comparatively assessing whether or not Mexico has provided leadership within these three key international organizations.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

Mexico in the UNSC

While an increasingly important contributor to general UN funding, Mexican leadership in the UNSC is virtually absent regarding a significant component of cost acceptance and provision of goods to the global South in the UNSC – namely, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.⁴⁴⁸ Mexico has only held the GRULAC seat on the UNSC 4 times (in comparison with Brazil’s 10 or India’s 7); the country believed it might be seen as “contradictory” to hold the seat while simultaneously pushing for UNSC reform.⁴⁴⁹ Jesus Encinas-Valenzuela points out that gaining the GRULAC seat meant, “...Mexico would be directly involved in UN decisions concerning internal situations of other countries, something that goes against the foreign policy principles of Mexico.”⁴⁵⁰ This logic sharply contrasts to that of Brazil, who also seeks reform but through actively utilizing the GRULAC seat to demonstrate its competency as a potential permanent member and representative of broader regional and global South interests.

Like Brazil, Mexico also seeks reform of the UNSC through the “United for Consensus” (UFC) coalition that seeks to expand the Council’s non-permanent seats.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁸ Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield. 15 January 2013. “United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1990-2010.” *Congressional Research Service*; “Regular budget and Working Capital Fund.” 2017. *Committee on Contributions, United Nations*. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml>.

⁴⁴⁹ Jorge I. Domínguez, and Rafael Fernández de Castro. 2009. *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict*. 2nd Edition (New York and UK: Routledge): 57. Please see Appendix E for comparative chart of GRULAC seat membership.

⁴⁵⁰ Jesus Ernesto Encinas-Valenzuela. 2006. “Mexican foreign policy and UN peacekeeping operations in the 21st century.” *Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School*, v.

⁴⁵¹ Also known as the “Coffee Club,” which fights against an expansion of permanent membership in the UNSC, arguing that this “would limit the access of other states to the council and accentuate the differences between its members even more” leading to “more paralysis.” Instead, this group presented alternative proposals in 1995 and 2009 centered on expanding the number of non-permanent seats, favoring “the creation of new long-term members, who would remain in the Security Council during longer periods, with the possibility of immediate reelection.” Other members include Italy, South Korea, Canada, Spain, Turkey, Argentina, Pakistan, and Malta. See “Mexico calls for expansion, reform of UN Security Council.” 29 December 2014. *Latino Fox News*. Also see Samarth Pathak. 22 December 2014. “Mexico’s Foreign Minister Pushes for UNSC Reforms, Strong Ties with India.” *Huffington Post*; “Mexico Against UNSC

From 1995 to 2011, however, Mexico only issued 4 official statements on UNSC reform, compared to Brazil's 26 times.⁴⁵² The UFC has offered two proposals for reform themselves; however, facing less support than the G-4, they pushed for Article 108 to be added to the UN Charter that effectively raised the bar to passing any new UNSC reforms (including the proposal by the G-4). This led to allegations that the UFC states acted as “spoilers,” attempting to “...block or spoil a moment of wide consensus on a final resolution for the reform” because of regional competition.⁴⁵³ Since 2011, the country has begun to reengage this issue by hosting a conference on UNSC reform and recently working with France on an initiative to restrict veto power of the permanent members in the event of mass atrocities, perhaps signaling a period of greater engagement with the issue under Peña Nieto.⁴⁵⁴

While reform efforts (however contentious) demonstrate a degree of activism, Mexico's ambivalence toward accepting costs and providing common goods toward leadership in the UNSC is evidenced by the country's glaring lack of engagement in peacekeeping operations (PKO). Olga Pellicer argues involvement in PKOs has only increased in importance, and is now considered a “central criterion to evaluate the degree

reforms for compromise formula.” 11 March 2016. *Business Standard*; “Mexico calls for expansion, reform of UN Security Council.” 29 December 2014. *Latino Fox News*.

⁴⁵² Please see Appendix E for comparative table on reform statements. “Statements on Security Council Reform.” *UNSC Global Policy Forum*. 25 October 2016.

⁴⁵³ While the UFC group has provided two proposals, one in 2005 and the other in 2009, the group has often been characterized as the In response to other proposals that would increase the number of permanent seats, the UFC presented a draft resolution establishing Article 108 of the Charter, which would only move forward with reforms if a positive vote by a two-thirds majority were achieved. It was shortly after this resolution passed in November 1998 that accusations against the Coffee Club began to allege that they specifically utilized “tactics to delay the reform process” over issues of regional competition. Marina Magalhães Barreto Silva. 2014. *Spoiler or Reformer? The Uniting for Consensus group and UN Security Council reform*. Doctoral Dissertation. Osaka, Japan: University of Osaka: 78-79.

⁴⁵⁴ The country has also been historically hesitant toward the granting of veto power since the UN's establishment in 1945. See Jessica Kroenert. 5 October 2015. “France and Mexico co-host high-level meeting on ‘Framing the veto in the event of mass atrocities.’” *Centre for UN Reform*. Magalhães Barreto Silva 2014, 78. H.E. Mr. Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico. 28 September 2015. *Speech at UN General Assembly General Debate of the 70th Session*. New York, NY.

of commitment amongst member states of the UN toward the restoration and maintenance of peace.”⁴⁵⁵ PKO is, therefore, a key arena in which emerging powers can illustrate a willingness to accept costs and provide goods toward the common goal of global security. While Mexico contributed a small number of civilian police officers (120) to El Salvador in 1992 to 1993, since redemocratization in 2000 the country has only contributed troops in the past three years (2 troops in 2015, 12 in 2016, and 30 in 2017).⁴⁵⁶ This number is extremely small compared to other regional emerging powers like Brazil, India, South Africa, and even Argentina.⁴⁵⁷ When Mexican involvement was initially requested by other Latin American contributors to MINUSTAH, the country failed to provide any resources, standing in sharp contrast to the myriad other regional countries with troop contributions to the mission in Haiti.⁴⁵⁸

At the 2014 UNGA Meeting in New York, Peña Nieto finally announced his country intended to participate in peacekeeping in the future despite “constitutional difficulties” that impeded the country’s ability to engage in PKOs.⁴⁵⁹ In 2015 Mexico ultimately did offer troops to MINUSTAH and a West Saharan mission – bringing the

⁴⁶ Olga Pellicer. 20 October 2014. “Mexico in Peacekeeping Operations: A Late and Controversial Decision.” *The Wilson Center Mexico Institute*.

⁴⁵⁶ 2017’s numbers were comprised of 29 military experts, and 1 actual troop. “Contributions by Country.” 31 December 2015. *UN Peacekeeping*. Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

⁴⁵⁷ Please see Appendix F, Table D: “Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, 1995 to Present” for country comparisons. UNPKO 2017.

Arturo C. Sotomayor. 2013. “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Mexico.” *Providing for Peacekeeping*.

⁴⁵⁸ Pellicer, 2014. Latin American contributing countries include Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay among others.

⁴⁵⁹ Yet following this speech, the president was harshly criticized for failing to consult the Mexican Congress prior to making this statement, illustrating the domestic hurdles to peacekeeping engagement. Mexico’s constitutional article 89 prohibits the country from contributing troops to peacekeeping missions because these constitute “interventions,” which are illegal unless war has formally been declared against a country. In this light, any attempt to undertake PKO in the past was seen by domestic political opposition as “interventionist and thus unconstitutional, and against Mexico’s’ pacifist tradition.” Peña Nieto, 2015; “Peña Nieto Harshly Criticized for Mexican UN Peacekeepers.” 29 September 2015. *TeleSur*; Alfonso J. Motta-Allen. 2008. *United Nations peacekeeping operations: Mexico’s response to an emerging international security paradigm*. Doctoral dissertation. Halifax, Canada: Dalhousie University.

country's total PKO troop provision to 12 individuals that year.⁴⁶⁰ Pellicer notes the lack of "...clear explanation for the strong animosity that came to prevail amongst the ranks of Mexican Government toward participation in such [peacekeeping] operations," yet suggests that segments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were "averse to risks that they perceived as unnecessary, such as joining the Security Council, or taking part in international actions that were far from Mexico's immediate interests."⁴⁶¹

Mexico's absence from the realm of peacekeeping stands in stark contrast with Brazil's acceptance of costs and provision of goods in this arena, particularly given continued Brazilian involvement in PKOs despite reduced economic resources and political instability domestically. Alfonso Motta-Allen pushes back against the perceived "incompatibility" of the Mexican Constitutional non-intervention principles and PKO, arguing that involvement in peacekeeping missions could provide Mexico an opportunity to strengthen UN-centered multilateralism and bolster Mexican national and international goals.⁴⁶² Mexico has justified its paltry participation in PKO based upon concerns regarding sovereignty and non-intervention. Brazil shares these historic concerns, yet has turned them into engagement and leadership in this issue area, based upon credibility and solidarity with the development challenges of the global South more broadly, as well as a surprisingly consistent willingness to accept costs and provide goods toward PKO, even amidst declining material resources and an executive branch less interested in foreign policy than its predecessors.

⁴⁶⁰ "Mexico Contributes 8 soldiers to U.N. peacekeeping operations." 14 December 2015. *San Diego Union Tribune*. Andrew V. Pestano. 2015. "Mexico's first UN peacekeepers to be deployed to Haiti, Western Sahara." *UPI.com*.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶² Motta-Allen, 2008.

Mexico in the WTO

Mexico is highly active in bilateral and trilateral trade agreements, particularly with developed countries like the US, Canada, and Asia-Pacific states.⁴⁶³ However, Mexico is comparatively less engaged in the WTO, stemming from the tension between the bilateral trade agreements that Mexico has preferred since the mid-1990s and a multilateral system like the WTO that negotiates trade rules among many players. Although an active user of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO, and offering a candidate for the organizations' Secretary-General position in 2013, Mexican trade preferences often coincide more with developed-country preferences. The same is true of Brazil, yet in contrast to Mexico the latter demonstrates willingness to accept costs by conceding on issues that would benefit its own interests, instead choosing to represent the interests of developing countries more broadly. While Mexico's institutional alignment with the North through NAFTA and the OECD does not necessarily preclude leadership in and of itself, it complicates the country's ability to gain "followership" that creates credibility and "buy-in" for a leading role, something it remains unclear Mexico even desires to pursue within the multilateral trade system.

In response to the stagnation of the Uruguay Round at the WTO, Mexico responded by focusing on bilateral trade agreements given its perception that "...the multilateral approach was not perceived as an option."⁴⁶⁴ Maria-Cristina Rosas explains,

⁴⁶³ "Comercio Exterior/Países con Tratados y Acuerdos firmados con México." *Secretaría de Economía, Gobierno de México*. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/se/acciones-y-programas/comercio-exterior-paises-con-tratados-y-acuerdos-firmados-con-mexico>; Thomas L. Friedman. 23 February 2013. "How Mexico Got Back in the Game." *The New York Times*.

⁴⁶⁴ Maria-Cristina Rosas. March 2002. "Mexican Foreign Policy in the New Millennium." *APEC Study Center Institute of Developing Economies*. Available: http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/pdf/2001_20.pdf

“Even though multilateralism was identified as an important forum for Mexican authorities, the fact that more than three quarters of Mexico’s total international trade were carried out with one country made the NAFTA negotiations extremely attractive and important.”⁴⁶⁵ Mexico forwent the multilateral approach and instead signed 10 bilateral agreements by the early 2000s, most notably NAFTA with Canada and the US in 1993.

Although this was a strategic geopolitical and economic decision on Mexico’s part, the country’s entrance into NAFTA after the failed negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was seen unfavorably by some neighboring states, and contradicted preexisting regional agreements like the Treaty of the Latin American Association of Integration (LAAI). Brazil, in particular, was strongly critical of Mexico who it perceived had chosen the North over the South and was “turning its back on Latin America.”⁴⁶⁶ Mexico’s entrance into the OECD in 1994 (the first Latin American country to join) also signaled movement toward the developed-country club and complicated Mexico’s attempts to gain high-level positions in the WTO. For example, Mexico’s Herminio Blanco lost to Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo in the WTO Secretary-General bid in 2013, largely because of concerns that Mexico would not be representative of developing countries.⁴⁶⁷

Mexico evidenced engagement through hosting the 2003 WTO Cancún Ministerial, hoping to play a mediating role between developed and developing countries in trade negotiations. According to Antonio Ortiz Mena:

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid 3.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid 4. Brazil claimed that Mexico’s involvement in NAFTA meant it failed to comply with the provisions of LAAI.

⁴⁶⁷ Tom Miles. 7 May 2013. “Brazil’s Azevedo wins race to head WTO.” *Reuters*; Nicolas Bourcier. 21 May 2013. “Roberto Azevedo’s WTO appointment gives Brazil a seat at the top table.” *The Guardian*.

“Mexico sought a leading role in the Doha Development Agenda and secured the Fifth WTO Ministerial for Cancun...Mexico holds that it can be an important broker, bridging the gap between extreme positions, and serving as an informal mediator in North-South issues.”⁴⁶⁸

During the Ministerial, Mexico joined the G-20 coalition of developing countries, with an economics minister reasoning: “...in principle and in general terms, the general goals pursued by the G-20 are the same ones pursued by Mexico.”⁴⁶⁹ Despite rhetoric of suggested solidarity, however, Mexico largely utilized the coalition to address problematic issues from its bi-and tri-lateral agreements with developed country trade partners.⁴⁷⁰ Mexico strategically chose to deal with developed-country subsidies within the WTO where it could “free ride” with the G-20 in confronting the issue, rather than addressing it more directly with its trade partners like the US, Canada and EU.⁴⁷¹ Despite initial rhetoric suggesting Mexico hoped to play a mediating role and broker a deal, the country also received criticism for abruptly ending the conference after claiming there was “...no basis for compromise on the controversial Singapore issues,” to the dismay of delegates who prepared themselves for all-night meetings and consultations to hammer out an agreement.⁴⁷²

Like Brazil, Mexico is a frequent user of the WTO Dispute Settlement

⁴⁶⁸ Antonio Ortiz Mena. 2003. “Mexico in the WTO Debate.” *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. Dialogue on Globalization Briefing Paper 2: 3. Available: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/02043.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Mexico’s focus in the coalition has specifically been to push against developed-country subsidies that were unaddressed in its bilateral or trilateral negotiations like NAFTA, which did not include language making market access conditional on the abatement of export subsidies.

⁴⁷¹ In NAFTA, for example, Mexico failed to push for a reduction in US subsidies on agricultural goods prior to signing the treaty; as a result Mexico’s agricultural sector was severely affected by US farm exports to the country. See Timothy A. Wise. December 2009. “Agricultural Dumping under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of US Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers.” *Tufts University Global Development and Environmental Institute*. Working Paper No. 09-08. Available: <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/09-08AgricDumping.pdf>; Susana G. Baumann. 28 July 2014. “Mexican Farmers Affected By Agricultural Subsidies From NAFTA, Other International Agreements.” *The Huffington Post*.

⁴⁷² “The WTO under Fire.” 18 September 2003. *The Economist*.

Mechanism (DSM), and has provided ideational goods toward improving the procedures of this entity. For example, Mexico offered a proposal for reviewing the entity's dispute settlement procedures through the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in 2002.⁴⁷³ The country hoped to address the "fundamental problem" of the WTO system, specifically the fact that an illegal measure can be in place for a significant period of time without consequence to the respondent. Accordingly, Mexico pushed for an acceleration of WTO proceedings to allow for swifter retaliation, along with other measures.⁴⁷⁴ The response was mixed among developing countries, with Brazil commending Mexico on bringing such important and difficult issues to the discussion, whereas others like Uruguay felt the reforms were too far-reaching and raising additional questions.⁴⁷⁵ Ultimately, the proposal was not included in WTO reforms.⁴⁷⁶ Yet it represents a moment where Mexico sought to provide an ideational good toward resolving a common issue, with the potential to assist developing countries fight dumping and subsidy issues from developed countries. This reaffirms Mexico's proclivity to utilize the WTO for trade issues and disputes unaddressed in its bilateral and trilateral agreements like NAFTA.

Although Mexico has demonstrated moments of activism in the forum, on the whole the country has not been willing to consistently accept costs and provide goods

⁴⁷³ Mexico has 9 cases filed against US, Brazil as 10. As of 30 July 2016. Mexico is a complainant in 23 cases, and 81 as a third party; Brazil in 31 as a complainant and 108 as a third party. "Disputes by Country/Territory." 2017. *World Trade Organization*. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm. Please see Appendix E for a comparative chart.

⁴⁷⁴ "Mexico Presents Proposal on WTO Dispute Settlement Review." 14 November 2002. *WTO Reporter*; Daniel Pruzin. 2002. Mexico Presents 'Radical' Proposal for WTO Dispute Resolution Reform. 19 *International Trade Representative (BNA)* 1984, 1984, 2002.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁶ Thomas Alexander Zimmermann. 2006. *Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding*. London, England: Cameron May Ltd.

toward representing common goals of the global South in the WTO. The country's strategy of economic integration with the North through NAFTA and the OECD hinder a leadership bid within multilateral trade negotiations. Although an official of the Mexican Ministry of the Economy confirmed, "Within the WTO, Mexico participates, has participated and will keep participating as a developing country; we are not renouncing that right,"⁴⁷⁷ the bulk of its negotiations remain outside the multilateral forum. Ortiz Mena argues that Mexican trade interests "are not typical of developing country interests" and that "Mexico is in fact extremely sensitive about developments in the multilateral trading system that might adversely affect its regional preferences."⁴⁷⁸

NAFTA and the myriad other bilateral and trilateral trade schemes of Mexico stand in contrast to Brazil's trade strategy in the region and in the world, which is centered on MERCOSUL and multilateral negotiations through the WTO. Brazil has accepted costs and provided goods toward common interests of developing countries in the WTO through the G-20, for example, whereas Mexico's approach undercuts multilateralism and complicates the ability to negotiate agreements that would significantly benefit the broader global South. The vulnerabilities in Brazil's trade strategy are certainly becoming apparent, particularly given its negative or low economic growth and the increasing preference on the part of developed countries for bilateral and trilateral agreements. Yet cracks in Mexico's strategy of institutional integration with the North are also emerging, particularly given the recent tensions between the two countries after US president Trump's entrance into the White House. The ensuing re-negotiation of

⁴⁷⁷ Isidro Morales-Moreno. 2005. "Mexico's Agricultural Trade Policies: International Commitments and Domestic Pressure." In *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation, Case Study 28*. World Trade Organization. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case28_e.htm.

⁴⁷⁸ Ortiz Mena 2003, 4-5.

NAFTA will illustrate to what degree Mexico remains committed to economic integration with the North versus broader multilateralism in the realm of trade policy, which currently appears quite tenuous.⁴⁷⁹

Mexico in the UNFCCC

Of the issue areas explored in the dissertation, Mexico has strongly engaged in the realm of climate change mitigation, largely due to high levels of presidential interest/influence on this topic under Calderón (2006-2012). Like other emerging economies such as Brazil, Mexico is among the top 15 emitters of CO₂ in the world; in Latin America, it is the second largest CO₂ emitter at 1.6% of global emissions (after Brazil, at 3.1%).⁴⁸⁰ By the mid-2000s, however, Mexico was one of the first developing countries to commit to voluntary reduction pledges and became an active participant in international forums on climate change.⁴⁸¹ Mexico was the first developing country to enact a comprehensive domestic climate change law (General Law on Climate Change, or LGCC in Spanish) in 2012, called “groundbreaking,” “ambitious” and “historic” by climate change analysts.⁴⁸²

At the Bali Conference of the UNFCCC in 2007, Mexico played a key role in adding climate change to the agenda and was ranked fourth in the world for its

⁴⁷⁹ On the future renegotiation of NAFTA, see Julie Hirschfeld Davis. 18 May 2017. “Trump Sends Nafta Renegotiation Notice to Congress.” *The New York Times*.

⁴⁸⁰ Janaina Camile Pasqual et al. 2016. “Implications and Challenges for the Energy Sector in Brazil and Mexico to Meet the Carbon Emission Reductions Committed in their INDC during the COP 21-CMP11.” *Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente*. 37 (May 2016): 31-46; Jake Sturmer et al. 11 August 2015. “What the world’s 15 biggest emitters are promising on climate change.” *ABC News*; “Mexico Seeks to Adapt to Climate Change and Mitigate its Effects.” 17 April 2013. *The World Bank*.

⁴⁸¹ Like Brazil, even though developing countries are not required to limit emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, Mexico has undertaken significant effort to cut its GHG emissions in half. Barbara Kotschwar. 14 May 2009. “Our Model Neighbor.” *Slate*.

⁴⁸² For example, see “Mexico Passes Groundbreaking Climate and Transport Bill.” *World Resources Institute*. The law guarantees citizens’ rights to a clean environment and pledges to use federal funds for low-carbon development and enact new regulations aimed at mitigating GHG emissions, including by changing transportations systems and infrastructure.

commitments to climate issues in the meetings, serving as an example for other emerging economies with less ambitious reduction plans.⁴⁸³ Under Calderón’s personal influence and interest in the issue area, Mexico further offered bureaucratic and ideational goals toward climate change mitigation by proposing the creation of a “Green Fund” at the COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 along with Norway, seeking to provide “increased, predictable funding for climate actions in developing countries” through the UNFCCC.⁴⁸⁴

In 2010, Mexico expended material and bureaucratic resources to host COP-16 in Cancún and attempted to broker a deal satisfactory to both developed and developing countries. However, its acceptance of strict standards and universal targets isolated the Mexican position from the global South, damaging its credibility as a representative of developing country interests and being perceived as more aligned with developed-country preferences. The conference was considered a disappointment regarding the failure to agree on a new emissions framework, yet a success for adaptation programs (dealing with the impact of climate change) like Mexico’s “Green Fund.” After initially being criticized for lack of detail or concrete substance, the Fund was further fleshed out by an advisory committee of countries at COP-16 in Cancún in 2010 and ultimately transformed into what is now called the “Green Climate Fund” (GFC).

⁴⁸³ “Climate Change Performance Index.” 2007. *Germanwatch*. 4; Alexis Madrigal. 2007. “The Local Impact of Global Climate Change.” *Wired*; Duncan Woods. 2008. “A break with the past or a Natural Progression? Mexico and the Heiligendamm Process” in Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz, ed. *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*. (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press): 193-212; Torres Ramirez 2014, 148.

⁴⁸⁴ Brazil initially proposed the creation of a “World Climate Change Fund in 2008; in 2009 this was revamped and combined with a Norwegian model and presented at COP-15 in Copenhagen. Subsequently, it was further fleshed out and adopted at COP-16 in Cancún. See Ambassador Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo. 2008. “World Climate change fund: a proposal by Mexico.” *Workshop on Investment and Financial Flows AWG-LCA*. Bonn, Germany. 5 June 2008. Available: www.UNFCCC.int; Juan Rafael Elvira Quesada. 2009. “Mexico’s Proposal of a World Climate Change Fund (The Green Fund).” *Copenhagen Climate Change Conference*. 7-18 December 2009. Copenhagen, Denmark ““New model for climate funding – the Mexican-Norwegian Proposal.” *Forest Sector Advisory Services*. Available: www.forestindustries.eu/content/new-model-climate-funding-mexican-norwegian-proposal.

Mexico proposed drawing funding based upon each country's emissions, GDP and population with sensitivity to developing countries, yet the Fund's lack of disclosure policies, accountability mechanisms and funding flows led to opposition by developed and emerging powers, as well as developed countries to some extent.⁴⁸⁵ One analyst called for "...the courage to kill the Green Climate Fund and the leadership to get climate action decidedly underway."⁴⁸⁶ While the Green Fund was a laudable effort that demonstrated Mexico's new desire to play a leading role in climate change and its provision of ideational goods toward that end, its addition to the pre-existing "cacophony of parallel climate support vehicles" for climate change undercuts its effectiveness.⁴⁸⁷ For example, there exist several other funds (Adaptation Fund, Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Climate Investment Fund (CIF), the World Bank Group, just to name a few, which also compete for funding toward climate change mitigation.

Sanjay Kumar notes, "In the world of climate finance, the GCF is a tiny player," although it remains the largest, international public climate fund.⁴⁸⁸ After 5 years of uncertain prospects, in 2015 the GFC approved its first \$168 million USD toward projects in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America, and aims to mobilize \$100 billion USD per year toward mitigation and adaptation.⁴⁸⁹ As of May 2017, \$10.3 billions has been raised, largely from developed countries but with some developing country financial

⁴⁸⁵ Gomez Robledo, 2008; Elvira Quesada, 2009; *Forest Sector Advisory Services*; Sanjay Kumar. 20 November 2015. "Green Climate Fund faces slew of criticism." *Nature*; Torres Ramirez 2014, 152.

⁴⁸⁶ Assad W. Razzouk. 8 November 2013. "Why we should kill the Green Climate Fund." *The Independent*.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Kumar 2015.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid; "Mexico Green Climate Fund Meets, Yields Progress." 2 May 2011. *Biores*. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development.

contributions as well.⁴⁹⁰ After significant delays to its implementation, controversy and North-South tensions surrounded a number of the projects funded by the GCF board, such as approving the renovation of a Soviet-era hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan over granting assistance to farmers facing water scarcity in Ethiopia.⁴⁹¹ The effectiveness of the Fund compared to other climate financing vehicles remains to be seen, and certainly US President Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and retraction of funding for the GCF further bring the Fund's future into question.

In addition to proposing a global climate fund that eventually became the GCF, under Calderón's leadership, Mexico hosted the COP-16 in Cancún in November 2010. This entailed expending significant bureaucratic and material costs in sending diplomats worldwide for preparatory meetings, based on Calderón's belief that the conference badly needed to restore confidence in the multilateral system.⁴⁹² Torres Ramirez argues that Mexico "...was prepared to invest serious diplomatic efforts in bringing parties to the table," leading members of the US delegation to praise the country's "extraordinarily good work in trying to find solutions when one would have thought they didn't exist."⁴⁹³

Torres Ramirez explains Mexico's perceived role at the conference as follows:

"Mexico now fully embraced its bridge-like function, balancing the discourse of historic responsibility with acknowledgement of the growing responsibility for emissions reduction by the developing countries. Differentiated treatment should still apply, but it should be 'a more realistic differentiation.'"⁴⁹⁴

Ultimately, Mexico proposed setting voluntarily targets for reduced emissions, but this

⁴⁹⁰ Mexico (\$10 million), Chile (\$0.30 million) and Panama (\$1 million) are Latin American countries that have contributed; Peru has pledged \$6 million but has not yet signed. All numbers are in USD. See "Contributors." 17 May 2017. *Green Climate Fund*. Available: www.greenclimate.fund.

⁴⁹¹ "Green Climate Fund 'a laughing stock,' say poor countries." 4 May 2017. *Climate Home*.

⁴⁹² Ibid 153-154.

⁴⁹³ Torres Ramirez 2014, 155.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid 154.

was still met with some resistance from countries like India.⁴⁹⁵ In this manner, “Mexico scored many strong points with the developing world and emerging powers but...it was open to the establishment of international standards to which the emerging powers especially were strongly opposed.”⁴⁹⁶ In separating from the position of other emerging powers like Brazil, India and South Africa, as well as smaller developing countries, “...Mexico’s bets were perceived to be with the developed world,” particularly given its integration with the US.⁴⁹⁷ For example, although Mexico resisted a review of its own domestic emissions efforts through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it remained open to the creation of international measuring, reporting and verification standards that developing countries argued would de facto “cap” their emissions, hindering the country’s credibility with the global South.⁴⁹⁸

At 2015 COP-21 in Paris, Mexico was the first developing country to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), detailing the actions it would take toward climate change mitigation. Guy Edwards and Timmons Roberts argue, “Mexico is showing leadership among developing nations by being the first in that category to announce its INDC.”⁴⁹⁹ In particular, Mexico notably designated 2026 as a peak year for emissions, and pledged to unconditionally cut emissions by 22% by 2030.⁵⁰⁰ However,

⁴⁹⁵ The division at Cancún fundamentally centered on whether or not to extend the Kyoto Protocol past 2012. Major emitter developing countries like India and China were adamant that any new agreement extend the Kyoto Protocol, meaning they would not be bound to emissions targets. Conversely, developed countries like Russia, the US, Canada and Japan refused to sign a new agreement that failed to hold developing countries to targets as well. See Ibid and John J. Kirton and Ella Kokotsis. 2015. *The Global Governance of Climate Change: G7, G20, and UN Leadership*. London: Routledge. 253-254.

⁴⁹⁶ Torres Ramirez 2014, 154-155.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid 159.

⁴⁹⁸ Torres Ramirez 2014, 154.

⁴⁹⁹ Edwards and Roberts, 2015b.

⁵⁰⁰ The establishment of a peak year was seen as commendable, especially for a heavily industrial state like Mexico, and stands in contrast to other emerging economies like China whose peak year is 2030. Guy Edwards and Timmons Roberts. 27 March 2015. “New leadership on climate as Mexico launches its national Contribution for climate deal in Paris.” *Brookings Institute*.

the INDC fails to state Mexico’s real emissions versus its 1990 baseline (the year from which future climate scenarios are assessed), making it practically “impossible to quantify” and “largely meaningless” because it fails to reflect improvements in efficiency or renewables.⁵⁰¹

Moreover, 15% of the 40% reduction target for Mexican emissions is conditional on external factors, such as global agreement on carbon pricing, border adjustments, and technical cooperation.⁵⁰² Hinging future emissions targets on the provision of numerous external factors such as those listed above sets a high bar to reach for their implementation, leading Edwards and Roberts to describe these conditions as “perhaps the poison pill that Mexico has placed in its ambitious-sounding conditional pledges.”⁵⁰³ While Brazil’s INDC could also be more ambitious, Mexico’s lower, conditional targets stands in contrast to Brazil’s 37% and 43% reduction targets, which are absolute, unconditional, and based on concrete, 2005 emission levels.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰¹ See Guy Edwards and Timmons Roberts. 30 March 2015. “Showing a new way forward? Implications of Mexico’s pledge for global climate action.” *Brookings Institute*; Roger Andrews. 16 July 2015. “Climate Change and Carbon Emissions –the Case for Business-as-Usual.” *Energy Matters*.

⁵⁰² Emissions past 25% are conditional on “... a global agreement addressing important topics including international carbon price, carbon border adjustments, technical cooperation, access to low-cost financial resources and technology transfer, all at a scale commensurate to the challenge of global climate change.” While some of these conditions, such as the provision of financial resources, may happen, others are extremely unlikely, particularly the achieving global agreement on the setting of an international carbon price. No international carbon price was set during the COP-21 in Paris; this condition makes it unlikely that Mexico will achieve even greater targets than the 25% in the short- to medium-term. “Mexico: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution,” 2015; “Brazil INDC,” 2015; Edwards and Timmons 2015b.

⁵⁰³ Edwards and Timmons 2015b.

⁵⁰⁴ Appendix G, Table C: “Comparison of Mexican and Brazilian INDCs” compares the specifics of Mexican and Brazilian INDCs. The INDC also lacked “a single indication of its real emissions versus the 1990 baseline, upon which all expectations and scientific assessments have been built.” The country also leaves the specifics of its accounting methods and measurements unspecified. Brazil’s INDC provides specific emissions amounts for each goal year, while Mexico’s does not. Finally, Brazil’s INDC specifically discusses proposals for collaboration with other South-South countries, whereas Mexico makes no mention of collaboration. Janaina Pasqual et al argue that Mexico emphasizes the reduction of black carbon as a means to reduce emissions, which although a contributor to global warming, is not considered a GHG. Therefore, including black carbon in its GHG targets actually decreases the contribution of emissions reductions. Both Brazil and Mexico are rated as “medium” on the Climate Action Tracker. Mexico does, include LULUCF and energy and industrial processes as well as agriculture in its sectors,

Of the international institutions explored in this chapter, in the UNFCCC Mexico displays the greatest propensity to accept costs and provide goods toward plausible leadership. This began in earnest under Calderón, and at a time when the country's material capacity was hindered due to low growth and implications from the 2008 US financial crisis. This suggests that political will, particularly in the executive branch, plays an important role in explaining Mexico's desire to play a proactive and influential role in climate change negotiations, based upon the president's personal conviction that the implementation of green policies would be paramount to future development.

Yet as with the WTO and UNSC, Mexico straddles a dual identity between developed and developing country at the UNFCCC. Part of Mexico's challenge stems from its acceptance of universal pollution targets, in contrast to Brazil's consistent stance that historical emissions must be considered and that developing countries should not have to accept the same targets.⁵⁰⁵ This tension between those countries willing and unwilling to accept universal targets has historically limited Mexico's ability to represent the interests of the global South, complicating a leadership bid. However, a growing reassessment on the part of developing countries toward the issue of emissions targets, as expressed at COP-15 when countries agreed to voluntary commitments under the 2016

something that the Brazilian INDC fails to include. The shortcomings of the Brazilian INDC are discussed in the previous chapter. See Ibid; "Mexico: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution." 2015.

Government of Mexico. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available: <http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Mexico/1/MEXICO%20INDC%203.30.2015.pdf>; "Brazil: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution." 2015; Pasqual et al 2016, 34; "Tracking INDCs." 2017. *Climate Action Tracker*. Available: <http://climateactiontracker.org/>.

⁵⁰⁵ Per its INDC, "Mexico has expressed its willingness to achieve a legally binding agreement with the participation of all Parties in order to keep the global average atmospheric temperature below 2oC." "Mexico: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution," 2015.

Paris Agreement, may signal growing space for Mexico to play a more leading role should capability and willingness remain.⁵⁰⁶

The cases explored above illustrate the complexities of Mexico's foreign policy approach and its ambivalence regarding its role in the global arena. While historic concerns regarding the protection of sovereignty and non-intervention have often led Mexico to isolation and passivity on the UNSC, these same concerns have led Brazil to pursue leadership through reform efforts, proposal generation, and innovative mediation/conflict resolution centered on redressing and ameliorating these issues for developing countries more broadly. On one hand, greater foreign policy commitments to international organizations like the UN illustrate Mexico's increasing material capacity and political will; the country now represents a significant contributor to the general budget, at times outweighing Brazilian contributions.⁵⁰⁷ The country utilizes the WTO's DSM almost as frequently as Brazil and is highly active in bilateral and trilateral global trade agreements. Under Calderón, Mexico proved capable and willing to offer important ideational and material goods toward climate change mitigation.

Yet at the same time, there are significant gaps in the country's activism. Mexico's plethora of trade agreements outside the WTO convolute and undermine attempts to negotiate multilaterally, and the country has proven mercurial in its commitment to the global South through the G-20. In the UN, the country has largely avoided the pursuit of the GRULAC seat on the UNSC, and most notably has failed to

⁵⁰⁶ The Paris Agreement, created at COP-15 in Paris in 2016, "requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead." This is a universal agreement in the sense that it would apply to all parties; yet emissions targets are self-determined by each country. See "The Paris Agreement." 2017. *United Nations Convention on Climate Change*. Available: www.unfccc.org.

⁵⁰⁷ UN 2017.

contribute to a central component of the Council's responsibilities – peacekeeping operations. Persistent differences between Mexico's vision of emissions responsibilities and those of the global South more broadly continue to complicate the country's attempts to act as a mediator and broker on the issue. Stated more broadly, Duncan Woods argues,

“Mexico is uncertain whether it is a North American or a Latin American country, a developing state or an emerging member of the developed world. From the G77 to the OECD to the G20 finance to G20 developing countries focused on trade, Mexico seems caught between two worlds...”⁵⁰⁸

Should Mexico desire to play a clearer leadership role on the global arena, the country's economic growth and stability, as well as relatively professionalized foreign ministry, are key assets in its ability to do so. However, the country must confront issues of identity and credibility, deciding precisely how to frame its leadership so as to better bridge the divide between the North and South. Like Brazil, Mexico straddles the developed/developing country identity, but its integration with the US and its neoliberal foreign economic policy restrict its ability to accept costs and provide goods toward representing common goals with the global South. Likewise, the country is unlikely to lead the global North, given its placement on the “bottom” of the list of many developmental indicators among OECD countries. Because of the significant power asymmetry between Mexico and its Northern partners, the acceptance of costs and provision of goods Mexico could ostensibly provide toward a leading role for this subset of countries proves more complicated, given the North's far greater material and bureaucratic resources for representing common interests of other developed countries in key global forums. For geopolitical and economic reasons, Mexico has not chosen to pursue leadership of the global South as a strategy for global influence as Brazil has

⁵⁰⁸ Woods 2008, 201.

done. Mexico, however, may have a unique opportunity to play a “bridging role” between developing and developed countries, turning dilemma of its dual identity into an opportunity to “engage both worlds in which its interests lie.”⁵⁰⁹ Moreover, although Mexico lacks the material and bureaucratic resources of its Northern partners, the country could presumably provide ideational leadership through presenting innovative proposals and creative solutions to key global issues, along the lines of the country’s activism with the Green Climate Fund in the UNFCCC. However, if Mexico desires to pursue an ideational leadership and/or serve as an “intermediary” between the North and South, the country must clarify and fortify its role as an emerging power within key international institutions, unlocking potential to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries in a manner unique to that of Brazil.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid, 209.

Chapter 7: India: Pursuing Leadership in an East Asian Context

While previous chapters explored my theory of international leadership in the Latin American context, this chapter turns to consider whether capability, credibility and willingness play a significant role in determining leadership in the case of an East Asian emerging power—India. Like Brazil and Mexico, India was historically active in multilateral forums stemming back to the 1960s and 1970s, seeking to represent the interests of the global South through creating institutions and coalitions like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77) developing countries. C. Raja Mohan asserts India “... believed it was speaking for the rest of the developing world,” creating and implementing the foreign policy of non-alignment and laying the foundation for the NAM movement that continues today.⁵¹⁰

Yet while Mexico moved away from its global South ties and evidenced a more muted foreign policy centered on economic integration with the global North, India (like Brazil) has pursued greater global engagement over the timeframe of interest. Since the early 1990s, Indian foreign policy pursued greater international influence and strategic relationships, leading the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to conclude that India was likely to become the most important “swing state” in the international system, meaning “its presence in any particular international coalition would strengthen that grouping

⁵¹⁰ Particularly under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-1964), India’s first post-independence Prime Minister Nehru is known as the “father” of non-alignment, based on five principles of “Panch Shila:” mutual respect for other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression, non-interference in other’s military affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Nehru was focused on garnering international respect for India based upon its civilizational importance C. Raja Mohan. July 2010. “Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?” *The Washington Quarterly* 3(33): 136; Ian Hall. 2016. Interview by Mengjia Wan. 21 November 2016. “The Legacy of Nehruvianism and the Implications for India’s Strategic Culture.” *The National Bureau of Asian Research*.

significantly.”⁵¹¹ Over the time frame of interest, India has generally retained sufficient capability, credibility and willingness to exercise leadership in international institutions through the acceptance of costs and provision of goods like building coalitions, generating initiatives, and offering resources toward peacekeeping. While pervasive poverty and inequality, as well as a regional context presenting security concerns from China and Pakistan, complicate Indian credibility, the country’s growing economic and bureaucratic resources, significant flows of development aid, and increasing political willingness for global activism, provide the basis for Indian leadership in international institutions. In the words of Rajeev Sharma, “As India continues to rise, Indian diplomacy is spreading its wings globally.”⁵¹² This chapter assesses variation in capability, credibility and willingness in the Indian case, then seeks to understand what role these variables played in the country’s leadership provision in the UNSC, WTO and UNFCCC.

Capability, Credibility and Willingness in the Indian Case

Compared to Brazil and Mexico, India achieved greater economic growth and stability over the timeframe of interest, garnering significant material capacity for leadership in international institutions. Fiscal reforms and liberalization in the early 1990s led to strong GDP growth in India in the 2000s, falling in 2013 but subsequently picking back up and peaking in 2015, at a rate higher than Brazil or Mexico.⁵¹³ The

⁵¹¹ Ashley J. Tellis. 4 April 2016. “India as a Leading Power.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*; Ashley J. Tellis. *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 30.

⁵¹² Rajeev Sharma. 9 June 2012. “India Extends Development Hand.” *The Diplomat*.

⁵¹³ Indian GDP rose over the 1990s, reaching a peak of over \$2095 billion USD in 2015 compared to Brazil’s \$1775 billion or Mexico’s \$1144 billion USD. Dushyant Gosai. 24 April 2013. “History of Economy Growth in India.” *International Policy Digest*.

World Bank named India as the fastest growing emerging economy for 2015 and 2016.⁵¹⁴

The graph below illustrates the trajectory of Indian GDP growth relative to Mexico and Brazil, evidencing generally higher rates of growth with more consistency.




Figure 24: GDP Growth of India relative to Brazil and Mexico⁵¹⁵

According to another indicator of capability, inflation levels, India faced rising inflation that peaked in 2013 at over 12%, higher than Mexico and Brazil; Indian rates have subsequently declined, however, and fell to their lowest levels in January 2017.⁵¹⁶

India’s place as the seventh largest economy in the world, and one of the fastest growing emerging economies, grant the country substantial material resources toward the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward common goals with the global South. Even in 1999, former Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee proclaimed the country’s “...final goal, which is to see the rise of India as an economic superpower.”⁵¹⁷

This goal remains central to Indian foreign policy, with current Indian home Minister

⁵¹⁴ “India’s growth at 7.6% in 2015-16 fastest in five years.” 31 May 2016. *The Economic Times*.

⁵¹⁵ World Bank Data Bank.

⁵¹⁶ Please see Appendix H, Graph A: “Indian Comparative Inflation Rate.” “India Inflation Rate.” 2017. Trading Economics. Available: www.tradingeconomics.com/india/inflation-cpi.

⁵¹⁷ Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 15 August 1998. “Independence Day Address.” New Delhi, India. Available: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/content_print.php?nodeid=9238&nodetype=2.

Rajnath Singh arguing in 2016, "...I can confidently say that no one can stop India from becoming an economic super power in 15 to 20 years..."⁵¹⁸

In terms of credibility from "follower" states stemming from a shared Southern worldview, India remains a key member in global South institutions like the NAM and G-77. Raja Mohan argues India "...saw itself as a leader of the NAM and G-77 Grouping in the United Nations General Assembly; India also believed it was speaking for the rest of the developing world."⁵¹⁹ Like Brazil, India engages with the OECD but strategically avoided becoming a full member based on concerns about joining a "rich men's club" and the "signal it might send to other emerging countries in the South Asian region."⁵²⁰ The importance of the country's global south identity is further confirmed by a senior MEA official who argued, "There is political and emotional consistency in India for India's Third Worldism, and as part of our international influence one that we can't afford to lose."⁵²¹

In addition to Southern institutional membership, India has transformed into an increasingly significant donor of development aid to other global South countries, based upon its own experience with poverty and inequality. Similar to Brazil, India eschews traditional North-South models of donor aid, preferring to focus on development "partnerships" centered on technical cooperation and training. Beginning in the 1960s, the Indian government created the Economic and Coordination Division for development

⁵¹⁸ "India to emerge as economic superpower in 15-20 years: Rajnath Singh." 11 November 2016. *The Economic Times*.

⁵¹⁹ C. Raja Mohan. July 2010. "Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?" *The Washington Quarterly* 3(33): 136.

⁵²⁰ India is also noticeably absent from the US-created preferential trade agreements (PTAs) like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). Indian institutional membership is comparable with Brazil and Mexico; it is a member of 76 international institutions, as compared with Brazil's 75 and Mexico's 77. Vrishti Beniwal. 23 August 2011. "Will not join rich men's OECD for now: India." *Business Standard*.

⁵²¹ Quoted in Narlikar 2010a, 48.

assistance, followed by the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation, based upon the guiding principle that global economic development “is an obligation of the whole international community” where “all countries contribute to the rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without fear or despair.”⁵²²

In the early 2000s, Indian development cooperation underwent another transformation, reducing its reliance on external donors providing aid to India, while concomitantly increasing its assistance to other global South countries. Prior aid programs were thus consolidated into the MEA’s Development Partnership Administration (DPA) in 2012, providing streamlined financial and technical aid to more than 60 countries worldwide.⁵²³ Indian development aid often comprises above 25% of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)’s annual budget, and the country is estimated to donate a half to \$1 billion USD each year while technical cooperation alone averages around \$12 million USD annually.⁵²⁴

In the aggregate, India grants more in development aid than Mexico or Brazil. Until 2013 India and Brazil allotted a significantly higher percentage of GDP toward development assistance than Mexico; after 2013, Mexican aid rises slightly higher than that of India, while Brazilian aid as a percentage of GDP plummets. Of all three

⁵²² Sachin Chaturvedi. 18 January 2014. “Indian Development Partnership: Genesis and Evolution.” *Forum for Indian Development Cooperation*. Available: www.ris.org.in.

⁵²³ Jason Overdorf. 2 July 2012. “India sets up \$15 billion global aid agency.” *Global Post*; “Learning from India’s Development Cooperation.” 2014. *Institute of Development Studies Policy Briefing 70*. Available: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4198/AD_ID148_PB;jsessionid=238AFB1E1162AA0D2F4DFF669D2EB237?sequence=1.

⁵²⁴ In comparison, Brazil’s peak allotment to the ABC was just under \$1 billion USD in 2010. See Ibid; “Development Partnership Administration.” *Ministry of External Affairs*. Government of India. Available: www.mea.gov.in; “Outcome Budget 2016-17.” 2016. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Government of India. Available: https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/26823_1-MEA_Outcome_2016-17_English_1.pdf; “Annual Reports.” *Ministry of External Affairs*. Government of India. Available: http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports.
Vijaya Katti, Tatjana Chahoud and Atul Kaushik. 2009. “India’s Development Cooperation – Opportunities and Challenges for International Development Cooperation.” *German Development Institute*. Briefing Paper 3/2009. Available: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_3.2009.pdf.

countries, Indian development assistance remains the most consistent over the timeframe of interest. Moreover, lines of credit as development aid are not included in assistance estimations, suggesting that India’s actual foreign aid given to the global South is likely closer to \$3 billion annually.⁵²⁵




Figure 25: Annual development assistance⁵²⁶




Figure 26: Development Assistance as a Percentage of GDP⁵²⁷

⁵²⁵ Lorenzo Piccio. 10 May 2013. “India’s foreign aid program catches up with its global ambitions.” *DevEx*.

⁵²⁶ Ibid; Llalonde 2015, AMEXCID 2016; IPEA 2010 and 2016.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

While in terms of institutional membership and development flows, India demonstrates comparatively higher levels of solidarity with the global South than Mexico or Brazil, the country's persistent poverty and inequality present challenges to its leadership potential.⁵²⁸ On paper, India has a significantly lower Gini coefficient than Brazil, averaging 32 versus Brazil's 57 and Mexico's 49.⁵²⁹ However, independent researchers suggest that a paucity of accurate government data masks severe and increasing inequality during the timeframe of interest, which in actuality places the country's GINI at a similar level to Brazil. Taking a closer look at National Sample Survey Data, Parthapratim Pal and Jayati Ghosh further discover that, despite claims to the contrary, inequality has increased in both rural and urban India over the 1990s.⁵³⁰ Post-2000, Thomas Piketty argues that an "extreme lack of transparency with data" means it is largely "impossible to get an accurate picture of inequality in what is now the fastest growing large economy in the world."⁵³¹

To mitigate these trends, in recent years India has implemented several conditional cash transfer programs domestically. These include the *Apni Beti Apna Dhan*, aimed at delaying child marriage, and the *Janani Suraksha Yojana* (JSY), which emphasizes education and maternal/natal health by incentivizing institutional births. Many of the articles and studies analyzing India's CCTs cite Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* as a

⁵²⁸ See Sonali Jain-Chandra, Tidiane Kinda, Kalpana Kochhar, Shi Piao, and Johanna Schauer. 2016. "IMF Working Paper: Sharing the Growth Dividend: Analysis of Inequality in Asia. *International Monetary Fund* WP/16/48. For an overview of these studies, see Parthapratim Pal and Jayati Ghosh. July 2007. "Inequality in India: a survey of recent trends." *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*. DESA Working Paper No. 45; Justin Rowlett. 2 May 2016. "Thomas Piketty: 'Indian inequality still hidden.'" *BBC News*; Nisha Agrawal. 4 October 2016. "Inequality in India: what's the real story?" *World Economic Forum*.

⁵²⁹ "GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011)." 2016. *World Bank Data Bank*. Available: www.databank.worldbank.org.

⁵³⁰ Pal and Ghosh 2007, 25.

⁵³¹ Rowlett 2016.

model of success, particularly its gradual implementation that built upon the experience and network of pre-existing regional schemes. However, in the case of India, rushed timelines and serious implementation issues have plagued the success of CCTs in general, reducing their impact on poverty and inequality in the country.⁵³² The country's low levels of GDP per capita are indicative of pervasive poverty, a common experience of the global South that informs India's position on issues in international organizations like the WTO. As will be explored later in the chapter, Indian poverty and inequality both grant the country common goals with other developing countries (protecting rural farmers and ensuring access to food staples, for example), but can at times limit the country's ability or willingness to compromise and negotiate between the global North and South toward broader institutional agreements.

In terms of "followership," the Indian case presents layers of complexity not present in the Latin American context. Survey data of Asian confidence in regional neighbors is convoluted; a recent poll by Pew concludes that these countries have "quite disparate opinions about each other."⁵³³ In contrast to Latin America, the presence of multiple great powers like China, Japan and Russia, as well as a long history of invasions, wars, and (still ongoing) border disputes, mean distrust runs deep in the region. Although no equivalent of Latinobarómetro is available for the East Asian region, anecdotal analysis suggests that surrounding states look to India as a "balance" to Chinese power. India is viewed more favorably on average than other regional powers in its neighborhood, often garnering the "least bad" score, with obvious exceptions of Pakistan

⁵³² Akileswaran, Kartik and Arvind Nair. 19 August 2013. "India's cash transfer model: a rushed and flawed welfare scheme?" *The Guardian*.

⁵³³ "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other." 14 July 2014. *Pew Research Center*. Available: www.pewglobal.org.

and Bangladesh.⁵³⁴ Moreover, India's "followers" stem largely from Southern states outside its region; for example, the country's bid for a permanent UNSC seat is supported by the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Malaysia and the entire African Union.⁵³⁵ Tense regional relationships and pervasive poverty limit credibility; yet India has strategically offset these problems through significant development assistance to the global South, and by connecting its domestic struggles to common issues of developing countries more broadly, thus serving as a "representative" of global South interests in key global institutions.

Willingness toward leadership in international institutions, as demonstrated through presidential interest/influence and bureaucratic capacity, also proves essential for leadership because states with capability and credibility alone may lack the political will to play a leading role. Following the end of the Cold War, Ashley J. Tellis argues India sought strategic partnerships with over 30 countries, to "...expand specific forms of collaboration that would increase its power and accelerate its rise."⁵³⁶ To do so, India has bolstered its diplomatic credentials. Since the early 2000s, the MEA's budget has increased over 150%, the largest percentage increase of the three country cases explored. This brings MEA funding to a current peak of around \$761 million USD, comparable to

⁵³⁴ Ibid; Daniel Wagner. 13 March 2015. "India's Political Influence in Asia." *International Policy Digest*. Although India is seen with suspicion by neighbors like Pakistan, India garners favorable views from Bangladesh and Vietnam, and possesses the least negative scores than other regional powers like China and Japan. Moreover, younger generations in Japan and Vietnam demonstrate more favorable impressions of India, probably due to older generations' experience with the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan.

⁵³⁵ Venkat Ananth. 06 October 2015. "India's bid for permanent membership to the UNSC, explained." *Live Mint*.

⁵³⁶ Tellis 2016.

Mexico's peak funding in 2012 but lower than Brazil's average of just over \$1 billion USD.⁵³⁷





Figure 27: Foreign Ministry Budgets⁵³⁸



⁵³⁷ “Budget.” 2017. Ministry of External Affairs. Available:

<https://www.mea.gov.in/budget.htm?59/Budget>; Shashi Tharoor. 1 July 2012. “In the Ministry of External Affairs. *Caravan Magazine*. The average budget for India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) hovers around \$2 billion USD; because there is no separate agency for development assistance and it is handled by the MEA, 46-54% of this budget is directly to development assistance and administrative needs.

⁵³⁸ “Orçamentos Anuais.” 15 January 2017. *Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*. Governo do Brasil. Available: http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br/orcamentos-anuais/orcamento-2016/orcamentos_anuais_view?anoOrc=2016; “Outcome Budget 2016-17.” 2016. Government of India. Available: https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/26823_1-MEA_Outcome_2016-17_English_1.pdf; “Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación.” 2005. *Gobierno de México*. Available: <http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/temas/pef/2005/>.

Figure 28: Foreign Ministry Budgets as Percentage GDP⁵³⁹

As illustrated in the graph above, in addition to the general upward trend in funding for the MEA, after 2011 India's aggregate spend on its foreign ministry began to outpace that of Brazil, and remains significantly higher than Mexico. As indicated in the second graph, as a percentage of annual GDP, India's funding for foreign affairs is lower than Brazil but slightly higher than Mexico.⁵⁴⁰

In addition to funding levels, since the 1990s, India more than doubled its intake of diplomats; these individuals face highly competitive entrance exams where less than 0.01% actually gain a seat in the Indian Foreign Service— levels of competition greater than Brazil (less than 1%) and the US (approximately 1.5%).⁵⁴¹ Yet, this number also reflects the fact that India's overall diplomatic personnel numbers are comparatively small given India's GDP and population size.⁵⁴² India possesses 800 diplomats; this is higher than Mexico, yet about half the size of Brazil's corps.⁵⁴³ Although limited in number, India's diplomats are renowned for their skills, intelligence and professionalism, having "long enjoyed a justified reputation as among the world's best in individual talent and ability."⁵⁴⁴

Taken alone, Indian bureaucratic capacity is nominally sufficient for a muted leadership role, yet this has been bolstered by personal interest and influence on the part

⁵³⁹ Ibid; "World Development Indicators." 2017. *World Bank Data Bank*. Available: www.data.worldbank.org.

⁵⁴⁰ Military expenditure was subtracted from aggregate GDP for all countries to give a better sense of state resources to foreign policy, given India's significantly larger defense expenditure because of its regional context.

⁵⁴¹ Tharoor 2012; Sudha Ramachandran. 12 July 2013. "The Indian Foreign Service: Worthy of an Emerging Power?" *The Diplomat*; Guia Estudant 2014; The Washington Diplomat 2014.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ Tharoor 2012; John Samuel Raja D. 17 January 2014. "No One is Talking about India's Real Diplomatic Crisis." *Quartz*; Georgina Olson. 13 March 2013. "Servicio Exterior trabaja "al límite," hay déficit de diplomáticos." *Excelsior*.

⁵⁴⁴ Ramachandran 2013.

of the country's prime ministers (PMs). Although a PM in a parliamentary context is distinct from a president (as in Mexico and Brazil), Juliet Kaarbo argues that these individuals still exerts substantial influence over foreign policy decision-making.⁵⁴⁵ For example, India's first PM Nehru exercised significant personal sway over the country's global affairs, founding the concept of "non-alignment" during the Cold War and his brand of "Nehruism" continuing to be a reference point for Indian foreign policy today.⁵⁴⁶ In the early to mid 1990s, P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) began India's movement toward a "good neighbor" policy that looked eastward, seeking to improve and deepen relations with China, Japan, and smaller regional states. Previous Foreign Minister (who then became Prime Minister) I.K. Gujral (1997-1998) also possessed significant personal interests and influence in deepening regional ties through the "Gujra Doctrine;" this sought to transform India's relations with its neighbors, largely continued by Atal Vajpayee (1998-2004) with an emphasis on pursuing closer ties to Pakistan.⁵⁴⁷

Vajpayee's successor, Manmohan Singh (2004-2014), deepened India's "Look East" policy of greater engagement with regional powers China and Japan, while also

⁵⁴⁵ Just as in a presidential system, ultimately individual interests and influence still impact foreign policy processes, outcomes and outputs within a parliamentary context. For a comparison of foreign policy decision making in both presidential and parliamentary regimes, see Juliet Kaarbo. "Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research." *Political Psychology* 18(3): 1997.

⁵⁴⁶ Nehru focused on independence and non-alignment, as a newly-independent India charter her course away from the UK and navigated the competition between the US and USSR sphere's of influence. While this led to activism in creating new alliances like the NAM or G-77, Nehru eschewed leadership for India in other ways; famously he declined a potential seat on the UNSC, instead suggesting it be granted to China. See Donald S. Zagoria and B. R. Nanda. 1 April 1977. "Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years." *Foreign Affairs*.

⁵⁴⁷ See Kenneth J. Cooper. 22 January 1997. "India Courts Neighbors in Foreign Policy Shift." *The Washington Post*. Gujral was previously India's Foreign Minister, later becoming PM and therefore having sufficient influence and interest in foreign policy. The Gujral Doctrine laid out five principles guiding Indian foreign policy with its neighbors; with respect to smaller countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, etc., India eschewed reciprocity and instead signaled its intention to provide aid, assistance and accommodation, signaling its 'additional responsibility' toward the region. Padmaja Murthy. "The Gujral Doctrine and Beyond." *IDSIA India*. The other five principles include territorial integrity, sovereignty, and peaceful bilateral negotiations.

pursuing closer ties to the US. The “Manmohan Doctrine,” as it came to be known, centered on economic development and globalization, believing “the primary focus of Indian foreign policy has to remain in the realm of economic diplomacy.”⁵⁴⁸ Singh’s premiership produced an uptick in global engagement; the former Prime Minister traveled 14% of his time in office and enjoyed personal rapport with leaders like Pakistan’s former PM Benazir Bhutto and former US president Ronald Reagan in a search for “great power” diplomacy.⁵⁴⁹ Under Singh as well as his predecessor, Narendra Modi, additional mid-year funding for the foreign affairs budget was requested due to the significant increase in international travel on the part of the PM’s office.⁵⁵⁰

While Singh initiated important engagement with the region and developed countries, the end of his premiership witnessed a decline in presidential interest and influence. Singh failed to visit Pakistan during his tenure as PM, as the relationship between India and its neighbor deteriorated following terrorist attacks by Pakistani separatists in Mumbai in 2008.⁵⁵¹ Some critics also viewed Singh’s engagement with the US as problematic for India’s rise as an emerging power.⁵⁵² Despite his initial push toward economic diplomacy, Indian GDP growth and foreign direct investment fell toward the end of his tenure, leading Sadanand Dhume to argue, “Whoever is sworn in as

⁵⁴⁸ Srishti Choudhary. 2 October 2015. “Foreign policy must focus on economic diplomacy: Manmohan Singh.” *The Indian Express*.

⁵⁴⁹ Rakesh Dubbudu. 20 July 2015. “Manmohan Singh Spent 699 crores in 10 years while Vajpayee spent 144 crores in 5 years on Foreign Visits.” *Factly*.

⁵⁵⁰ Chaitayna Mallapur. 15 May 2016. “Modi vs Manmohan: Who’s the bigger globetrotter?” *Business Standard*; “PM’s foreign visits – Narendra Modi joins the club of the most travelled world leaders.” 21 May 2015. *News18*.

⁵⁵¹ Rezaul H. Laskar. 25 December 2015. “Modi’s Lahore Visit: 4 Indian PMs have visited Pak since Independence.” *Hindustan Times*.

⁵⁵² Bhadrakumar 2014.

prime minister later this year [after Singh’s departure] will struggle to return India to the path of high growth and rising global stature.”⁵⁵³

Singh’s successor, Narendra Modi (2014-present) has intensified Indian engagement toward developed and developing countries alike, transforming his predecessor’s “Look East” policy to “Act East” with “great energy” and “a desire to break the mold of the past.”⁵⁵⁴ This shift was evident from his swearing-in ceremony, which was attended by myriad regional heads of state from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan, among others. Modi’s extensive travel during his initial tenure also indicates high personal interest in foreign policy.⁵⁵⁵ The figure below compares the percentage of time spent on international travel by each president or PM in the timeframe of interest:




Figure 29: Time spent abroad⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵³ Sadanand Dhume. 13 January 2014. “Out with a Whimper.” *Foreign Policy*.

⁵⁵⁴ Manoj Joshi. 8 March 2017. “India and the world: Foreign policy in the age of Modi.” *Observer Research Foundation*.

⁵⁵⁵ Modi had visited over 40 countries in more than 53 trips aboard in his first two years in office. *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁶ Folha de São Paulo, BBC, MRE, Ministério do Planejamento, Palácio de Planalto, Biblioteca da Presidência da República; “Agenda.” 2017. Presidencia de la República. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/archivo/agenda>. “Viajes realizados al extranjero por el C. Felipe de Jesús Calderón.” March 2012. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available:

Although criticized by opponents for his frequent travels domestically and the price tag associated with such visits, supporters argued Modi's trips have "changed the international opinion and perception about India," having "elevated the status and stature of India across the globe."⁵⁵⁷ Modi also shielded the MEA from rival political parties, protecting the ministry's autonomy for diplomatic implementation.⁵⁵⁸

The PM's rhetoric further confirms that global leadership is a priority for India, beyond mere activism or autonomy. Modi has stated that the country should "position itself in a leading role, rather than just a balancing force, globally."⁵⁵⁹ Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar argued Modi's global activism stemmed from the country's goal to "aspire[s] to be a leading power, rather than just a balancing power," indicating its broader ambitions than acting as balancer to China.⁵⁶⁰ In annual speeches like the Indian Independence Day address, Modi spent 15% of his time on foreign policy issues, as much time as Cardoso and second-highest to Lula at 25%.⁵⁶¹ The graph below compares the amount of time granted to foreign policy of each PM, illustrating the uptick in foreign policy relevance over time for Indian PMs:

www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/spe/SPE-ISS-01-12.pdf. "Viajes realizados al extranjero por el Vincente Fox Quesada." June 20014. *Cámara de Diputados*. Gobierno de México. Available: <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sia/coord/pdf/coord-iss-16-04.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁷ John Elliott. 11 May 2015. "Modi Should Spend Less Time Abroad, More on Domestic Issues." *Newsweek*; "PM's foreign visits – Narendra Modi joins the club of the most travelled world leaders." 21 May 2015. *News18*.

⁵⁵⁸ Dhruva Jaishankar. 26 May 2016. "India's Five Foreign Policy Goals: Great Strides, Steep Challenges." *The Wire India*. Modi visited Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and was the first PM to visit Pakistan since 2004. David Brewster. 18 November 2014. "End of strategic autonomy." *The Indian Express*.

⁵⁵⁹ Jaishankar 2016.

⁵⁶⁰ "India Wants to be a Leading Power Rather than Just a Balancing Power." 20 July 2015. *The Wire India*.

⁵⁶¹ See "Full text of PM Narendra Modi's 68th Independence Day speech." 16 August 2014. *The Economic Times*.




Figure 30: Percentage of Speech Spent on Foreign Policy⁵⁶²

The PM also spearheaded new initiatives for dialogue regarding foreign affairs, through the creation of the Raisina Dialogue in 2016 that annually gathers global and domestic actors to discuss major geopolitical issues, the first of its kind in India.⁵⁶³ Tellis describes Modi’s belief that “subcontinental stability liberates India to play a significant role on the larger global stage,” leading the PM to visit Pakistan for the first time in almost 12 years, as well as to seek greater engagement with smaller, regional neighbors like Bhutan and Nepal.⁵⁶⁴ Moreover, Dharwa Jaishankar argues that India under Modi is further “trying to bolster its leadership credentials” through development and crisis relief efforts, pushing for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or the

⁵⁶² See “Leia a íntegra do segundo discurso de posse de Lula.” 1 January 2007. *BBC Brasil*; “Leia na íntegra o discurso de Lula no Congresso Nacional.” 1 January 2003. *Folha de São Paulo*; “Leia a íntegra do discurso de posse do segundo mandato da presidente Dilma Rousseff.” 1 January 2011. *O Globo*; “Veja a íntegra do discurso de Michel Temer.” 5 December 2016. *O Globo*; “Mensaje a la nación del Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.” 1 December 2012. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.; “Mensaje a la nación del Presidente Felipe Calderón Hinojosa de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.” 1 December 2006. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.; “Mensaje de Toma de Posesión de Vicente Fox Quesada como Presidente Consitucional.” 1 December 2000. *Presidência de la República*. Estado de México. México, D.F.

⁵⁶³ See “Raisina Dialogue.” *Observer Research Foundation*. Accessed 5 June 2017. Available: <http://www.orfonline.org/raisina-dialogue/>. an overall view of Modi’s speeches, visit: “Speeches.” *Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi*. Accessed 5 June 2017. Available: <http://www.narendramodi.in/>.

⁵⁶⁴ Tellis 2016.

Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as through the creation of new institutions like the International Solar Alliance, the India-Africa Forum Summit, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN). Modi's personal interest in an active regional and global foreign policy, particularly in terms of institutional creation as well as the realm of climate change, bolsters Indian willingness for leadership in international institutions.

India's "opportunity cost" of foreign policy is composed of the country's average annual budget allocated to the MEA, development assistance channeled through the DPA, as well as average yearly funding to troops in UN peacekeeping operations. Over the timeframe of interest, India has spent a comparable amount on foreign policy to Brazil (with the exception of 2010, Brazil's peak), and more than Mexico at each 5-year interval from 2000 to 2015. As a percentage of GDP, India's opportunity cost averages 0.06%, equivalent to that of Brazil and slightly higher than Mexico at 0.05%. India maintained the most consistent increase in opportunity cost over time, relative to the other country cases of interest. The graph below compares the opportunity cost of foreign policy over time for Mexico, Brazil and India, both in aggregate terms as well as a percentage of GDP.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁵ Because of vastly different security environments in Latin America and East Asia, military expenditure was subtracted from GDP for all countries prior to calculating opportunity cost of foreign policy.




Figure 31: Comparative Opportunity Cost of Foreign Policy⁵⁶⁶




Figure 32: Comparative Opportunity Cost as % of GDP⁵⁶⁷

A rising acceptance of costs toward foreign policy over the timeframe of interest is consistent with the broader increase in capacity, credibility and willingness described above. India’s growing wealth since the mid-1990s bolsters material resources for leadership in international institutions, like significant allocations to UN peacekeeping and the creation of new initiatives like the International Solar Alliance. Although

⁵⁶⁶ “Orçamentos Anuais” 2017; “Outcome Budget 2016-17” 2016; “Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación” 2005; UN Office of Peacekeeping 2017; Providing for Peacekeeping 2017; Llalonde 2015, AMEXCID 2016; IPEA 2010 and 2016.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

complicated by domestic poverty and complicated regional dynamics, huge outflows of Indian aid globally, particularly a focus on Africa in recent years, means the country garners “followership” from a broader base of developing countries grants the country credibility to fulfill a representative function on behalf of the global South. Moreover, rising Indian willingness in terms of MEA resources and presidential interest/influence in foreign affairs has led to increased engagement in international institutions like the UN, WTO and UNFCCC since the 1990s and early 2000s, to be explored further below.

India in the UNSC

India demonstrates leadership through the acceptance of costs and provision of goods to the UNSC, as a core contributor to reform efforts, a central formulator of initiatives like the Peacebuilding Commission, and most notably through the country’s consistently strong presence in peacekeeping operations. As a founding member of the G-4 for UNSC reform in 2004, India (along with Brazil) has pushed for an expansion of permanent seats on the Council, utilizing increasingly strong rhetoric at the 2016 UNGA by arguing it was “time to break the impasse” and move past the “never-ending carousel of discussions” toward real reform.⁵⁶⁸ India has held the rotating Asia-Pacific seat on the UNSC 7 times (compared to Mexico’s 4 times), and announced it will bid for the 2022 seat on the Council as well.⁵⁶⁹

India was also a key player, along with Brazil, in discussions leading to the operationalization of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005, joining the “like-minded” group of developing countries concerned with the representativeness and

⁵⁶⁸ “UN members favour UNSC permanent seat for India.” 13 November 2016. *The Times of India*.

⁵⁶⁹ “India puts candidacy for 2021-2022 UNSC non-permanent seat.” 5 December 2013. *The Economic Times*.

legitimacy of the Commission.⁵⁷⁰ India has recently criticized the lack of financial support on the part of other nations for the PBC, stating “...There is little political commitment for commensurate action and substantive support to peacebuilding efforts. The funding available for such efforts remains marginal, severely limited the ability of the Peacebuilding Commission.”⁵⁷¹ India is currently the biggest developing country contributor to the PBC, having donated \$5 million USD since 2006, compared to \$590,000 for Brazil and \$370,000 for Mexico.⁵⁷²

Beyond reform efforts and proposal generation, the keystone of Indian involvement in the UNSC is the country’s significant, long-standing commitment to peacekeeping operations (PKO). India is the third largest troop contributor in the UN system, consistently contributing over 7,000 personnel annually since 1995, as illustrated in the graph below.⁵⁷³ Since 2000, the country’s provision of troops has increased by 338%, in response to the Security Council’s greater need for resources.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷⁰ Santos Neves, 136, 162. For example, Brazil and India were concerned with the ability of permanent UNSC members to impose decisions upon the Commission should representation be unfair.

⁵⁷¹ “Lack of political will in funding UN peacebuilding efforts: India.” 21 April 2017. *Indian Express*.

⁵⁷² “India makes a pledge of US \$2 million to Peacebuilding Commission’s Fund.” 23 June 2006. *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*; “Lack of political will in funding UN peacebuilding efforts: India.” 21 April 2017. *Indian Express*; “The Peacebuilding Fund.” 22 May 2017. *Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office*. United Nations. Available: www.mptf.undp.org.

⁵⁷³ In 2015, India committed an additional 850 troops to UN PKO. “Success of peacekeeping depends not on weapons but on UN’s moral force: PM Modi.” 25 December 2015. *The Indian Express*; “India makes a pledge of US \$2 million to Peacebuilding Commission’s Fund,” 2006.

⁵⁷⁴ See Appendix F, Table D: “Average Yearly Troop Contributions” for more specific data. “Contributor Profile: India.” 5 June 2015. *Providing for Peacekeeping*. Available: <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-india/>.




Figure 33: Comparative Annual Average Troop Contributions⁵⁷⁵

India’s commitment to peacekeeping is framed more broadly as “a statement of commitment to the developing world,”⁵⁷⁶ drawing on historic ideals of a peaceful and harmonious coexistence.⁵⁷⁷ *The Economist* argues that India deserves a permanent UNSC seat largely based upon “...being one of the most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping missions.”⁵⁷⁸ India’s steadily high levels of troop contributions corresponds with the country’s increasing material capability over the timeframe of interest, credibility from development assistance and representing common concerns of the global South, as well as strong willingness for the acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward global security through PKO.

India in the WTO

In the WTO, India has also accepted costs and provided goods through reform efforts and coalition creation toward representing the interests of developing countries,

⁵⁷⁵ UN Office of Peacekeeping; Providing for Peacekeeping.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Dipankar Banerjee. “India” in Bellamy, Alex I. and Paul D. Williams, eds. 2013. *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press. 227. See Appendix E for specific data.

⁵⁷⁸ “Can India become a great power?” 30 March 2013. *The Economist*.

with a particularly emphasis on agricultural protections for the global South. India and Brazil were instrumental in the creation of the G-20 in 2003 prior to the WTO Cancún Ministerial conference, in addition to playing a key role in developing country coalitions such as the G-10, G-33, Like-Minded Group and the NAMA-11 coalition.⁵⁷⁹ In fact, Brazilian negotiators viewed India’s coalition leadership as critical to securing the support of the global South in WTO negotiations, considering India to be “the leading champion of the defensive interests of developing countries in agriculture,” making an alliance with India “critical to gaining credibility as a leader of developing country interests at the WTO.”⁵⁸⁰ India has continually pushed against the inclusion of additional issues of trade and investment into the Doha agenda (the so-called Singapore issues), arguing that these sideline more critical issues of development while also effectively raising the barriers to trade for the majority of global South countries.⁵⁸¹ In Cancún in 2003, for example, Indian negotiators were successful at taking three of the four Singapore issues off the table through the G-20.⁵⁸²

At the 2007 WTO Ministerial meeting in Potsdam, Brazil and India again pushed back against the US and EU regarding imported industrial products, arguing the rate of exchange for such products was inequitable, and ended up contradicting WTO rules maintaining that developing countries should undertake lesser obligations than developed

⁵⁷⁹ The NAMA-11 coalition sought to gain greater market access while also maintain a level of protection for domestic industries in developing countries.

⁵⁸⁰ Kristin Hopewell. 2016. *Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 85-86.

⁵⁸¹ The Singapore Issues are: trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.

⁵⁸² Only trade facilitation remained on the table of the four Singapore issues. See K.M. Chandrasekhar. 15 January 2016. “Think again, at WTO.” *The Indian Express*.

countries.⁵⁸³ While holding a firm stance against opening market access to developed countries (which would make developing countries more vulnerable), India has proved willing to accept costs and provide goods like capacity-building assistance, special concessions and preferential market access to coalition members from the global South in the WTO.⁵⁸⁴ India also remains active in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), as the third most frequent developing country user behind Brazil and Mexico, and is the most frequent third party on disputes of all three countries.⁵⁸⁵ According to Narlikar, "India's record of system challenging behavior in the WTO has won India allies from developing world, endowing it with greater legitimacy claims to its position in core group meetings, and thereby also an increase in its influence in the organization."⁵⁸⁶

However, India's principled stance regarding agricultural subsidies has contributed to stalemate and a fracturing of the G-20 coalition at subsequent Doha Rounds, leaving India isolated at times. For example, at Bali 2013, India was alone in refusing to accept an Agreement on Agriculture even after adjustments and adaptations were made to protect developing countries' agricultural sectors (such as giving them four years to adjust to limits and avoid sanctions). India's position centered on the need to include concessions for developing countries to subsidize and stockpile food, but other WTO member states failed to agree on the country's demands. Subsequently, India declined to ratify the Agreement on Agriculture stemming from the meeting by its due

⁵⁸³ NAMA (Non-agricultural market access negotiations) of the WTO state that developing countries undertake lesser obligations than developed countries. For more, see Martin Khor. 1 July 2007. "Facts behind the figures in post-Potsdam NAMA controversy." *Third World Network*.

⁵⁸⁴ Amrita Narlikar. "Reforming Institutions, Unreformed India?" in Alexandroff, Alan S. and Allen F. Cooper, eds. 2010. *Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance*. Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution Press. 114-115.

⁵⁸⁵ Shaffer et al 2010, 9. Brazil is a third party on 95 cases; Mexico on 75 and India on 108. Data from World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Gateway. 2015. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes.

⁵⁸⁶ Narlikar 2010a, 60.

date of July 31, 2014 and only signed after an extension and additional negotiations with the US.⁵⁸⁷ India remained committed to developing country interests at the 2015 Nairobi Conference for the WTO, criticizing the failure to resolve key issues impacting the global South. In the words of Minister of State for Commerce and Industry Nirmala Sitharaman, “It is regrettable that longstanding issues of interest to a large number of developing countries are being put aside for the future.”⁵⁸⁸

Narlikar argues that while India enjoys a leadership role within alternative coalitions of “follower” states from the global South, this sometimes “...detracts from India’s ability to make concessions, offer new solutions, and show the flexibility that is necessary to exercise leadership internationally.”⁵⁸⁹ India’s obstinacy in the WTO coincides with reduced domestic capability. A sharp economic downturn in the Indian economy at the end of the Singh administration in 2012 and 2013 led to the lowest rate of GDP growth in decades, and a rapid loss of value for the Indian rupee currency led to significant capital flight.⁵⁹⁰ While Indian recalcitrance at the WTO has been criticized by some, the country has proved consistent in its demands that developed countries address issues “prejudicial to the interests of the majority of countries and the vast majority of the population,” and that as the second largest country in terms of population, “India is a vital part of the world economy and will become even more important.”⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁷ A subsequent agreement was reached between India and the US in November 2014 when the 4 year timeframe was removed. See “India and WTO: Detailed Analysis of All Related Issues and concepts.” 20 January 2016. *Insights on India*.

⁵⁸⁸ D. Ravi Kanth. 21 December 2015. “India eclipsed at WTO ministerial.” *Live Mint*.

⁵⁸⁹ Narlikar 2010a, 53.

⁵⁹⁰ Charles Riley and Sophia Yan. 28 August 2013. India in crisis mode as rupee hits another record low.” *CNN Money*.

⁵⁹¹ “India and the WTO: Detailed Analysis of All Related Issues and Concepts.” 20 January 2016. *Insights on India*.

Moreover, at a time when faith and engagement in the WTO has declined substantially, India demonstrates continued commitment to the multilateral trade system. After a period of recovered economic growth more recently, India has been proactive in reinvigorating stalled talks through activism, negotiation and initiative-generation in the WTO. One Indian diplomat confirmed: “Now, at this critical juncture, it is left to India to do the agenda setting along with these and other developing countries.”⁵⁹² For example, the country has held “strategy sessions” with other developing countries, particularly in Africa, hoping to reinvigorate the Doha Rounds after repeated stagnation.⁵⁹³ India has been key in pushing for the conclusion of the Round and the umbrella of issues underneath, and against developed country attempts to force new issues onto the agenda that would require commitments from the developing world.⁵⁹⁴ While at times stalling the implementation of WTO agreements, explained in part by a temporary decline in economic capability, India remains committed to the WTO as the means to negotiate fairer trade for itself and other developing countries of the global South. India’s strategy provides an interesting comparison with Mexico, given India’s growing economic and security ties to the North as well. For example, under Modi, engagement with the US has increased both in terms of high-level visits and exchanges, as well as trade relations and growing direct investment between the countries.⁵⁹⁵ Despite pursuing stronger ties to the North, India has managed to successfully continue prioritizing its identity as a developing

⁵⁹² Arun S. 4 January 2016. “India seeks to lead developing nations at WTO.” *The Hindu*.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ See Chakravarthi Raghavan. 29 December 2015. “News of Doha’s death may be premature but India, China must fight to save the day.” *The Wire India*.

⁵⁹⁵ See for example, “India-US Relations.” 15 January 2016. *Ministry of External Affairs*; Joshua P. Meltzer. 4 June 2016. “India-US: Economic and trade relations.” *Brookings India*.

country, in a manner that maintains credibility with the global South and grants the country “followership” critical to leadership in international institutions.

India in the UNFCCC

In the realm of climate change, like Brazil, India underwent a transformation from a “stubborn resister” to an active participant in climate change mitigation while also protecting the global South’s ability to develop. Historically, India’s stance has been that it “...cannot and will not make emission reduction targets because poverty eradication and social and economic development are first and over-riding priorities,” squarely insisting on differentiated responsibilities in the UNFCCC and placing the “onus of action on the industrialized countries” rather than still-developing states.⁵⁹⁶ In the 1990s, India was viewed negatively on the issue of climate change, being the third-largest emitter globally with heavy reliance on coal, yet refusing to accept targets until developed countries assumed responsibility for historical emissions.⁵⁹⁷ India’s view centered on the idea that “the polluter pays,” based on the fact that India’s per-capita carbon emissions are ten times less than those of the developing countries like the US, and that the country possesses the highest number of people without access to modern, non-solid energy sources.⁵⁹⁸

As India has gained economic capability from economic growth over the 1990s and 2000s, however, the country has begun to accept increasing domestic costs toward mitigation, which lend legitimacy to its emerging activism in this arena. The country was

⁵⁹⁶ Anna da Costa. “India Steps up to Climate Change Efforts.” *Worldwatch Institute*.

⁵⁹⁷ Sunil Tankha and Trude Rauken. 2015. “Climate Politics, Emissions Scenarios and Negotiation Stances in India.” In *The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change*. Ed. Guri Bang, Arild Underdal, Teinar Andresen. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing: 99.

⁵⁹⁸ Justin Worland. 11 December 2015. “Why No Country Matters More than India at the Paris Climate Talks.” *Time*; Samir Saran and Vivan Sharan. 6 May 2015. “Indian leadership on climate change: Punching above its weight.” *The Brookings Institute*.

a key negotiating player in climate change talks beginning in Kyoto in 1997, and again in Bali in 2007, often speaking on behalf of the G-77.⁵⁹⁹ After the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's report, as well as the Bali Action Plan of 2007, India initiated good-faith movement toward reducing its own emissions, while also highlighting concerns about food security and poverty.⁶⁰⁰ The Indian government began nascent engagement by agreeing to quantify its efforts toward climate change mitigation, transforming into more overt rhetoric under PM Modi, whose personal interest and influence in the issue area led to a specific call for Indian leadership in this arena: "India's progress is our destiny and right of our people. But we also must lead in combating climate change."⁶⁰¹

Indian interest in pursuing leadership regarding climate change has led the country to seek coordination with major global South groupings like the G-77, China and the BASIC countries, as well as the Like-Minded Developing countries (LDMC), to move toward common goals. India has often served as a spokesperson for the G-77 on the issue of climate change, meaning "...India has now emerged as a key player and leading voice for the developing/G-77 countries in the North South divide in emissions control negotiations."⁶⁰² Anjali Jaiswal further argues that India viewed itself as a negotiator between developed and developing countries by "bridging the many nations across the world and also bridging development with climate action."⁶⁰³ India has turned initial reluctance to initiatives like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) into opportunities to push developed countries for financing and technology transfers to the

⁵⁹⁹ Narlikar 2010a, 47.

⁶⁰⁰ Jagadish Thaker and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2014. "Shifting discourse of climate change in India." *Climate Change*.

⁶⁰¹ Chetan Chauhan. 1 December 2015. "Climate change is not of our making: Modi at Paris summit." *Hindustan Times*.

⁶⁰² Tankha and Rauken 2015, 98; Raymond E. Vickery Jr. 22 November 2015. "Why India is Key to a Climate Change Agreement in Paris." *The Diplomat*.

⁶⁰³ Worland 2015.

global South through its “strategic bargaining,” thus providing a common good to the global South.⁶⁰⁴ India is now host to the second largest number of CDM projects in Asia.⁶⁰⁵

India has also accepted greater domestic costs toward climate change mitigation, while still placing the onus on developed countries for financing and mitigation efforts. In 2006, India passed its National Environmental Policy (NEP), focused on sustainable development and social justice, and the country has increased domestic production of hydropower, solar and nuclear energy in recent years. In 2010, the Indian government implemented a coal tax (called the Clean Environment Cess), recognizing the unsustainability of continued reliance on this resource and attempting to shift demand toward more renewable energies. The revenues from this tax are siphoned toward the country’s National Clean Environment Fund, used to finance renewable energy projects like solar power plants. In October 2014, the country also implemented a carbon tax, as well doubled the existing coal tax.⁶⁰⁶ Saran and Sharan argue that India is actually “punching above its weight” in terms of climate change mitigation because “despite a very low base of per capita electricity consumption, the scope and ambition of India’s renewable energy initiatives is remarkable,” meaning “India’s response at home has been more than commensurate with its economic weight.”⁶⁰⁷

The country’s movement toward flexibility and proactivity in climate change is further reflected in the Indian Intended Nationally Determined Commitment (INDC) submitted in the lead up to COP-21 in Paris in 2015. In the document, India committed

⁶⁰⁴ Tankha and Rauken 2015, 99-100.

⁶⁰⁵ “CDM Projects by Host Region.” *UN Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development*. Available: <http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm>.

⁶⁰⁶ Saran and Sharan 2015.

⁶⁰⁷ Saran and Sharan 2015.

to obtaining 40% of their power from renewables by the end of 2030, with a significant emphasis on solar energy, as well as reducing emissions by 33-35% by 2030.⁶⁰⁸

Following the COP-21, in June of 2016 India halted the construction of four major, coal-fired power plants, instead investigating instead how the funds might be reallocated toward renewable energy sources.⁶⁰⁹ Moreover, the Indian Parliament ratified the Paris Agreement in October of 2016, followed by receiving the thanks of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon for India's "leadership that moves the world an important step closer" to a globally binding climate agreement.⁶¹⁰ Like Brazil and Mexico, the country's INDC is imperfect; lack of specificity regarding coverage and scope of mitigation plans detracts from the strength of its commitments. However, given the context of India's population size, poverty levels and lack of access to modern energy in significant segments of the country, Indian movement toward a globally binding agreement is noteworthy, and sets an important precedent for other traditionally-defensive global South countries.⁶¹¹

India's nascent leadership in climate change mitigation as a negotiator and "bridge" between developed and developing countries is reinforced by PM Modi's personal interest in the issue area, having stated on numerous occasions the importance of addressing the challenge.⁶¹² Much like Mexico's Calderón, Modi has spurned increased effort and resources toward this issue area domestically and globally. At COP-21 in

⁶⁰⁸ "India." 2 November 2016. *Climate Action Tracker*. Available:

<http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india.html>. Please see appendix G, Table C: "Comparison of INDCs" for a comparison of Indian, Mexican and Brazilian INDCs.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ Rebecca Hersher. 2 October 2016. "India Ratifies Paris Climate Change Agreement." *National Public Radio*.

⁶¹¹ See Apurba Mitra et al. 2 October 2015. "5 Key Takeaways from India's New Climate Plan (INDC)." *World Resources Institute*.

⁶¹² Scott Moore. 26 November 2014. "India's Role in the International Climate Change Negotiations." *The Brookings Institute*.

Paris, for example, Modi evidenced India's desire to blend development with greener policies: "India's progress is our destiny and right of our people. But we also must lead in combating climate change."⁶¹³

Under his leadership, India provided ideational and bureaucratic goods by creating the International Solar Alliance in 2015, focused on increasing solar energy capabilities to lessen dependence on fossil fuels for 120 developing countries. Apurba Mitra et al argue the creation of this alliance "clearly positions India as a major renewable energy player" generating "transformational changes."⁶¹⁴ The country has accepted costs of setting up alliance headquarters in India, and collaborates with major international companies for financing. In the words of French president François Hollande, the project represents "climate justice in action, mobilizing public finance from richer states to help deliver universal energy access."⁶¹⁵

The Indian case presents a distinct geopolitical environment for exploring the argument that capability, credibility and willingness are key components to leadership in international institutions. With important caveats (namely that regional security concerns capture a significant portion of India's budget and color the nature of neighborhood "followership"), India's trajectory of economic growth, commitment to a global Southern worldview, and rising bureaucratic capacity and presidential interest/influence over the timeframe of interest correspond with broader trends in the provision of leadership in international institutions like the UNSC, WTO and UNFCCC. India's general trend of

⁶¹³ Chetan Chauhan. 1 December 2015. "Climate change is not of our making: Modi at Paris summit." *Hindustan Times*.

⁶¹⁴ Mitra et al 2015. India has stipulated an aggressive target on bolstering its solar energy reliance. The country has also recently committed to reducing hydro-fluorocarbons.

⁶¹⁵ Arthur Neslen. 30 November 2015. "India unveils global solar alliance of 120 countries at Paris climate summit." *The Guardian*.

increasing economic growth since the 1990s grants the country increasing financial resources toward accepting costs and providing goods for common goals of the global South. This is illustrated, for example, by Indian's ongoing commitment to UNSC peacekeeping, with financial and troop contributions far greater than Mexico and even Brazil. Exceptions to this general trend of economic growth, such as in 2012 to 2013 when the Indian economy slumped under Singh, coincide with a retraction of leadership in international institutions. India's recalcitrance toward negotiations on agricultural issues at the WTO Bali Ministerial in 2013 can partially be explained by its own domestic economic downturn and resulting decline in material capability.

Indian willingness for leadership in international institutions generally increased since the 1990s, both in terms of financial resources allocated to the foreign ministry, as well as presidential interest and influence. While bureaucratic capacity will need to be further prioritized should India wish to possess a foreign ministry appropriate for their regional and global role, the country's international profile has been heightened under Modi's premiership in particular. Regional attendance of Modi's oath ceremony, high rates of foreign travel, significant rhetoric about foreign policy leadership in key domestic speeches, and the spearheading of new initiatives like the International Solar Alliance and Raisina Dialogue illustrate a personal proclivity for a leading role in global affairs.

Complicating factors to India's leadership in international institutions remain the country's significant domestic poverty, on the slight increase in recent years, as well as regional animosities and security concerns that detract from the country's credibility, particularly in Asia. Moreover, the impact of India's security environment relative to the

other cases of interest in this dissertation is evidenced by its comparatively high level of military expenditure (2.4% of GDP compared to Brazil's 1.36% and Mexico's 0.67%), which diminishes the country's financial resources toward other foreign policy goals.⁶¹⁶ Yet comparatively steady economic growth has allowed for increasing resources for foreign policy, despite high military expenditure. India has managed to bolster its credibility for leadership in international institutions through high and consistent levels of development aid to the global South over the timeframe of interest. Moreover, India strategically utilizes its own experience with poverty and inequality to speak on the behalf of "follower" states from the global South more broadly; voicing common concerns of developing countries in key international institutions. For example, India pushed for special exceptions on NAMA agricultural issues in the WTO and continues its proactivity in reviving the multilateral trade system; the country worked with Brazil toward the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in the UNSC to ensure a greater focus on development and remains one of the largest providers of peacekeeping troops worldwide. Moreover, India continues to advocate for technical and financial assistance for developing countries within the UNFCCC despite evidencing new flexibility on its own domestic stance regarding climate change mitigation.

The Indian case contrasts with that of Mexico, although both countries have experienced greater economic capability than Brazil in recent years. However, deficient credibility and willingness in the Mexican case precludes leadership in international institutions, while sufficient levels of these indicators allow India to pursue a leading role. India has managed to balance its North/South relationships in a more coherent manner than Mexico, pursuing economic and security ties to developed countries like the

⁶¹⁶ "World Development Indicators." 2017. *World Bank Data Bank*. Available: www.data.worldbank.org.

US and Japan while simultaneously reinforcing its developing country identity in a manner that allows for leadership toward common goals with “follower” states in international institutions.

Chapter 8: Leadership in a Changing International Order

In order to pursue leadership in international institutions, the cases examined in this dissertation confirm the importance of capability, credibility and willingness in such an endeavor, which prove individually insufficient and mutually necessary for the outcome of a leadership bid. Material capacity acted as a framing condition which made a leadership bid more or less likely, while not determining the outcome itself; diminished leadership was still possible with reduced material capacity or credibility, but improbable without credibility and impossible without willingness. For example, Brazilian leadership leading up to 2010 was at its zenith, corresponding with a period of skyrocketing economic growth; yet without willingness in the form of strong bureaucratic capacity and a president highly interested and influential in foreign policy (Lula), it is unlikely we would have seen the extent of leadership activities occurring during this time take place.⁶¹⁷

Moreover, these endeavors would have proved difficult without the credibility of “follower” states subscribing to the emerging state’s proposal, reform effort or institution. Even in the context of Brazil’s currently tenuous economic and political climate, the country retains a measure of leadership in international institutions despite limited material capacity. Brazil’s proposal for the CDM+ at the COP-21 in Paris or its continued commitment to MINUSTAH, for example, demonstrates the country’s acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward leadership even if significantly ratcheted back. Brazil is able to pursue a “muted engagement” within the WTO, UNSC and UNFCCC largely because it retains sufficient credibility and willingness, however

⁶¹⁷ Such as institution generation, proposal creation, reform efforts and mediation/conflict resolution.

reduced from the zenith of the Lula years. This is largely due to an insulated, professionalized, and large foreign ministry which exerts willingness toward activism in institutions even while presidential interest/influence under Rousseff (and now Temer) is low, as well as continued support from “follower” states as a credible representative of broader interest of the global South.

The fact that Brazil maintains a measure of leadership, however reduced, refutes the argument that presidential interest and influence alone explain peaks (in the case of Lula) or troughs in foreign policy engagement, in the absence of capability or credibility. A president without economic resources, credibility through “buy-in” from “follower” states, and a relatively professionalized and well-funded foreign ministry to support foreign policy engagement, would remain limited in his or her ability to undertake the breadth of leadership provision occurring around the 2005 to 2010 period. Conversely, continued acceptance of costs toward UN peacekeeping and proposal generation in the UNFCCC post-2011, for example, would be unlikely if leadership depended on solely on presidential interest and influence, without the underlying foundation of an insulated, professionalized bureaucracy that could maintain initiatives and commitments despite lackluster support from the executive branch, and without continued credibility from “follower” states.

This is also illustrated by trends in opportunity costs the country has proved willing to accept over the timeframe of interest. While peak cost acceptance undoubtedly occurred under the Lula administration, subsequently declining post-2011, on average it remains equal to that of India, and greater than Mexico. Moreover, in the midst of political and economic crisis, in 2015 Brazil has still doubled the opportunity cost it has

accepted toward leadership when compared to the year 2000.⁶¹⁸ This indicates that despite a current retraction of leadership, the country still demonstrates a greater acceptance of costs and provision of goods toward global leadership than it did at the beginning of the timeframe of interest.

Including an East Asian case with India allowed for exploring the impact of capability, credibility and willingness in a different regional environment to assess whether these variables retained importance for leadership in international institutions. In the Indian context, key indicators of capacity, credibility and willingness remained relatively stable over the timeframe of interest as compared to Mexico and Brazil – with 2013 as an exception, India experienced generally rising economic growth and stable inflation, garnering capability; the country continues to confront high levels of domestic inequality yet donates massive outflows of development aid which illustrate a shared Southern worldview and a significant prioritization of foreign policy, and finally, while the country's bureaucratic resources are lower than Brazil, they remain higher than Mexico and the country's PMs have evidenced a growing willingness to engage the region and the world with rising personal interest/influence under Modi. This corresponds with an increasing acceptance of opportunity costs over the timeframe of interest, and provision of goods through reform proposals, initiatives and involvement in PKO within the UNSC, engagement through coalition building in the WTO, and growing engagement in the realm of climate change.

India's rupee crisis in 2013 coincided with the country's resistance on pushing forward for an agreement at the Nairobi WTO Ministerial that was seen as unfair to

⁶¹⁸ Brazil's opportunity cost for foreign policy was 0.0006% in 2015 versus 0.0003% of GDP in 2000. Please see Figures 5 and 6 from Chapter 3 for graphs of comparative opportunity costs.

developing countries, but since then the country has continued to pursue efforts to revive the Doha Rounds despite persistent stalemate. Counterfactually, it seems unlikely that India would have continued to offer increasing resources toward PKO without continued economic growth; likewise, without credibility from a shared Southern worldview backed by significant development aid, support for the G-20 would have been difficult. Finally, without sufficient bureaucratic capacity or presidential interest/influence, it is unlikely the country would have moved away from its defensive posture toward climate change and begun to accept costs toward domestic and international mitigation, thinking of innovative solutions to provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries seeking to balance mitigation with continued growth. India's trajectory of rising capability, credibility and willingness corresponds with a steady increase in the acceptance of "opportunity costs" toward foreign policy over time.

In a manner unique to India and Brazil, the Mexican case also confirms that capability, credibility and willingness are mutually necessary and individually insufficient for leadership in international institutions. Initially, Mexico's lagging economic capability in the first decade of the 2000s, combined with insufficient credibility and willingness, meant the country largely failed to demonstrate leadership in international institutions like the WTO or UNSC. The notable exception to this occurred in the UNFCCC, where presidential interest/influence under Calderón's administration raised the country's willingness to accept costs and provide goods toward climate change negotiation and mitigation. As the 2000s continued, Mexico's GDP growth began to rise along with levels of development assistance, funding for the foreign ministry, and presidential interest and influence (at least rhetorically) suggested a movement toward

greater engagement in the global area – all indicators making possible a *potential* leadership bid in international institutions. The rise in capability, credibility and willingness is further illustrated in the country's sharp increase in acceptance of opportunity costs since 2010.

Despite increasing economic resources and greater willingness to accept costs toward foreign policy activism, Mexico's ability to gain "followers" supporting its leadership bid remains complicated by its geopolitical position and institutional alignment with the US rather than developing countries. Although Mexico shares values with other Asia-Pacific countries like Peru, Chile or Singapore, seeking a more neoliberal approach to the global political economy through bilateral and trilateral agreements, this leaves Mexico less likely at present to seek or gain "followership" from a broader group of states toward significant reform and representation within the WTO or UNSC, should that even be a goal they possess.

By largely seeking to pursue its interests outside institutions like the WTO and UNSC (through bilateral or trilateral trade agreements, for example), Mexico has hindered its ability to credibly represent broader interests within these institutions themselves; this is evidenced by lower levels of support for the UFC reform bid at the UNSC, or by Brazil's leadership of the WTO over Mexico. Mexico, in a sense, stands in an international relations "no-man's land," between developed and developing countries, without a concrete set of "followers" for support. Should it even seek leadership in international institutions (which itself remains in question) – who exactly would Mexico lead? Given the asymmetry of power and resources vis-à-vis its Northern partners, leadership through the acceptance of costs and provision of goods seems unlikely for this

subset of countries, although potential for a more ideas-based leadership remains plausible. However, rising tensions between Mexico and the US over border control and NAFTA illustrate current vulnerabilities in the system of Northern integration, which previously represented the keystone of Mexico's foreign economic policy strategy. This may lead to a critical reevaluation of the country's alignment moving forward, potentially forcing Mexico to reembrace the global South to a greater extent, perhaps through increasing regional integration in Latin America. In contrast to Mexico's ambivalent position of alignment between global North and South, Brazil and India have garnered significant support for their reform of the UNSC, pushed their way into the core negotiating body of the New Quad at the WTO based on their leadership in the G-20, and are considered indispensable players in UNFCCC negotiations – largely because they accept costs and provide goods toward representing the interests of a group of “followers” like the global South.

After summarizing the broad trajectory of capability, credibility and willingness and their impact on leadership provision, before concluding this dissertation, I consider whether the alternative arguments presented in Chapter 2 could plausibly explain leadership provision (or lack thereof) on the part of Brazil, India or Mexico. Finally, I conclude with observations regarding the significant changes that have occurred in the international multilateral system in recent years and months, considering the significance of emerging power leadership on the future of global governance more broadly.

Evaluating Alternative Explanations for Leadership

While alternative hypothesis 2, drawn from literature on regional powers, argued *successful regional hegemony is a prerequisite for leadership in international institutions*, the Brazilian and Indian cases challenge this explanation. The observable

implication would be that only states possessing regional hegemony would be seen exercising leadership in international institutions. Yet both Brazil and India face the most significant opposition for their leadership from their regional context; in the case of Brazil this is more benign given the comparatively peaceful geopolitical context of Latin America versus East Asia. Yet core members of the UFC coalition (against the G-4 proposal of addition of permanent seats on the UNSC), are neighboring states to Brazil and India (Argentina and Pakistan, among others) who possess longstanding rivalries and look warily upon their neighbor's rise. In the WTO as well, competition between Brazil's Azêvedo and Mexico's Blanco for the Director-General seat suggest a broader competition for influence in the region.⁶¹⁹

This does not discount the importance of the regional sphere, nor negate that both Brazil and India have sought deeper associations at the regional level through MERCOSUL or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example. Regional integration remains important to a state's ability to manage the economic, political and security environment in which it is located. Regional support can certainly help bolster support for activism in the global arena. Yet, the Brazilian and Indian experience illustrate the power of a global collective identity like the global South, which can be strategically utilized to garner support and "followership" toward greater influence in the global arena, even if confronted with lackluster "buy-in" at the regional level. Despite the limitations of their respective regional contexts, Brazil and India have gained credibility for "followership" from the broader global South, particularly smaller Portuguese-speaking states in the case of Brazil, smaller Asian states for India, and African support for both.

⁶¹⁹ "Brazilian diplomat Roberto Azevêdo wins WTO leadership battle." *Financial Times*. "Oceans Apart: the race for head of World Trade Organization highlights a regional rift." *The Economist*. This suggest this is a broader choice between economic liberalization and

Brazil and India have succeeded in gaining a seat at the decision-making table in the WTO because of their push for representation for developing countries in the new Quad, continuing the quest (with support from a large number of global South countries) for UNSC reform, as well as retaining importance in coalition-building attempts for climate change negotiations.

Another plausible explanation for behaviors of coalition-building, reform efforts, etc. in international institutions, as stated in alternative hypothesis 1, suggests *leadership in international institutions stems from a consistent, underlying quest for autonomy on the part of emerging power*. As illustrated in the case study chapters, however, a “quest for autonomy” would not itself explain the country’s willingness to accept terms in the WTO that restrict their agricultural sector for the broader cohesion of the G-20 coalition for example, nor push for emissions limits on developed countries in the UNFCCC despite having a relatively clean emissions profile itself (in the case of Brazil). A professor and minister in the Brazilian Department of Defense argued that the country’s aspirations went beyond mere autonomy: “Brazil wants the capacity to *influence* international processes to benefit the community as a *whole* as well as Brazil specifically.”⁶²⁰

Brazil seeks autonomy for national development, but it links this pursuit to a broader purpose of bolstering its capacity to influence and contribute to the international community as a whole. As argued by one ambassador, Brazil pursued the “...substitution of a defensive attitude for a posture of constructive leadership in themes of growing

⁶²⁰ Personal interview with Consultant for Ministry of Defense and Professor at Universidade de Brasília. 3 November 2015. Brasília, Brazil. He confirmed that autonomy was important, but this more a “common concern for all countries with a colonial background who traditionally had been exploited,” and that Brazil wanted more.

importance in the international agenda, like the environmental sustainability of development.”⁶²¹ Likewise, India has increasingly moved away from highlighting Nehruvian principles of autonomy and non-intervention toward deeper global engagement with both developed and developing countries, moving from a mindset of “strategic autonomy” to “strategic interconnectedness.”⁶²² Under current PM Modi, rhetoric overtly discussing India’s pursuit of leadership on key global issues like climate change further confirm that the country seeks more than autonomy, but rather desires to “position itself in a leading role” globally.”⁶²³

Leadership and the Future of Global Governance

Excitement about emerging powers like Brazil and India has experienced a tumultuous path since the 1990s, slowly rising in economic and global importance over the 1990s to the height of explosive growth enthusiasm leading up to 2010, and more recently facing significant skepticism after sustainable high growth levels proved fleeting in the short to medium term. Currently, there is decidedly less optimism regarding the concept of the BRICS and the strength of the global South, as these countries confront persistent domestic corruption, poverty, and overreliance on commodity exports which undermine the innovation and competition necessary for continued economic growth and development. While these serious domestic challenges must certainly be confronted for more long-term, sustainable global influence in the future, this should not discount the fact that Brazil and India have spearheaded significant changes in the global institutional

⁶²¹ José Humberto de Brito Cruz. 2014. “A questão do poder nacional e o debate sobre a política externa.” *Política Externa* 23(1): 126.

⁶²² David Brewster. 18 November 2014. “End of strategic autonomy.” *The Indian Express*.

⁶²³ Jaishankar 2016.

landscape over the past two decades. These countries have effectively shown that core international institutions can no longer maintain the status quo, but that developing-country voices must be heard and internalized through change and action in order for these organizations to maintain legitimacy. Through their leadership, Alcides Costa Vaz argues it is now “...clear that there is no lasting [global] solution without the involvement of leading Southern states.”⁶²⁴

While certain goals remain yet unmet, (for example, continued impasse on the issue of UNSC reform), on the whole Brazil and India have accomplished important successes in their leadership in the international arena toward common goals with “follower” states. Through their leadership, TRIPS exceptions were achieved that provide low-cost, generic AIDs/HIV drug options to highly vulnerable populations in “bottom billion” countries. Brazil and India succeeded in pushing for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a means to offset the narrow security focus of the UNSC toward peacekeeping efforts, which overlooked critical issues of development and social justice which are foundational to sustainable peace. While a global agreement on issues of agriculture remains elusive, the creation of the G-20 coalition of developing countries fundamentally changed the power dynamics of the core decision-making body in the WTO, leading to the broad realization that developing country voices must be seriously considered for forward movement in multilateral trade talks. Brazil provided key ideational goods to the UNFCCC through its innovative framework for structuring emissions, trading credits, and creating the precursor to the CDM which continue as fundamental components of the Kyoto Protocol. India has also spearheaded the recent

⁶²⁴ Costa Vaz 2012, 216.

creation of the International Solar Alliance, which holds promise for funding adaptation for alternative energy sources in developing countries.

As one of the highest troop contributors, India's provision of UN peacekeeping assistance continues to increase, with Modi indicating "India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping remains strong and will grow" given the country's successes.⁶²⁵ Brazilian activism in peacekeeping operations, with troop contributions higher than its regional neighbors, retains a central place in the country's foreign policy even in the midst of a prolonged recession. The country's leadership of MINUSTAH succeeded in achieving greater security in the country, and Brazil remains in command of the mission after multiple mandate extensions due to natural disasters and an ensuing humanitarian crisis. Brazil's continued obligation to MINUSTAH has lent cohesion to the Latin American troops remaining in the country and evidences a commitment to stability in peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, despite multiple unforeseen circumstances that required humanitarian assistance in addition to security provision.⁶²⁶

While these successful instances of leadership in international institutions should not be overlooked despite current declines in Brazilian capability and willingness, recent trends in the global institution environment make emerging power leadership more complex, as well as more critical. Multilateral forums like the UNSC and WTO are weakened by continuing stalemate and becoming increasingly sidelined. The danger of institutional irrelevance for organizations like the WTO stems partially from the fact that

⁶²⁵ "Success of peacekeeping depends not on weapons but on UN's moral force: PM Modi." 25 December 2015. *The Indian Express*.

⁶²⁶ MINUSTAH's mandate was extended after devastating earthquakes rocked the country's capital in 2010, leading to a humanitarian crisis. See Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga. "MINUSTAH's success in improving the security environment in Haiti and the "Brazilian way of peacekeeping:" a view from the field. *Paper presented at the ISA-ABRI Joint International Meeting*. 22-24 July 2009 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Jens Glüsing. 26 January 2010. "Brazil Helps to Restore Order in Haiti." *Speigel Online*.

the US, Mexico, and other Asia Pacific countries have increasingly moved their agreements outside these institutions, through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or Pacific Alliance, for example.⁶²⁷ This erodes the legitimacy and functionality of broader multilateral organizations when core, founding members pursue economic or security relationships outside the bounds of the forum. It also delays and undermines attempts at reforming key multilateral institutions to make them more representative of developing country interests.

More recently, however, even the fate of agreements like the TPP appear in question after the entrance of US President Donald Trump into the White House, or the UK's withdrawal from the EU in 2016. Multilateralism, including landmark global negotiations like the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, are increasingly tenuous as major developing countries choose to "exit" the system. Not only does this evidence cracks in the system of Northern integration (of which Mexico has largely subscribed through NAFTA), but it also leaves a vacuum in core global institutions that makes emerging power leadership all the more critical at present. Without leaders with the capacity, credibility and willingness to undertake these initiatives, smaller developing states will lose out should India and Brazil abdicate their *de facto* representative function within institutions like the WTO or UNSC. This bodes poorly not just for the interests of the global South in general, but also for the continued functioning and legitimacy of core global organizations.

⁶²⁷ Created in 2016 to lower non-tariff and tariff barriers to trade and provide dispute settlement for investors and foreign states. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is comprised of: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States (until January 23, 2017) and Vietnam. The Pacific Alliance was created in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru to deepen trade with Asia.

Under Rousseff and now Temer, Brazil risks losing credibility in the eyes of “follower” states unless it treads carefully regarding discussions with the OECD, as well as trade agreements with the EU given the delicacy of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL). The country has left several institutions under the Temer administration in order to reduce costs, and continues to face significant issues at home, given low or negative annual growth as well as ongoing political protests against government reforms.⁶²⁸ While deeper connections with the developed world may be necessary for Brazilian economic recovery, choosing to prioritize these relationships over those with the global South could undercut their continued efficacy. Given the country’s significantly reduced economic capability and lackluster presidential interest in diplomacy, Brazil must tread carefully to maintain sufficient credibility and bureaucratic capacity for even a subdued leadership role. Harold Trinkunas and David Mares argue that to restore its “soft power” given the current economic and political context, the country should think about demonstrating “Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works toward reform of multilateral institutions.”⁶²⁹ The gains in voice and representation that Brazil and India have achieved thus far will fail to bear fruit without continued commitment to reinvigorating leadership in the global institutional sphere, through prioritizing multilateral negotiations, the provision of creative proposals and solutions, as well as continued efforts for inclusive reforms.

In light of sorely needed leadership given the current international context, this dissertation hoped to provide an innovative framework for understanding and

⁶²⁸ Please see footnote 126. Ninio 2016.

⁶²⁹ Harold Trinkunas and David R. Mares. 29 June 2016. “Brazil and the international order: Getting back on track.” *Brookings Institute*.

operationalizing important state-level components (capability, credibility and willingness) necessary for the outcome of leadership in international institutions, as well as better defining and conceptualizing leadership through the lens of opportunity costs acceptance. Given the relative paucity of leadership studies within the international relations field, additional scholarship is sorely needed on this topic moving forward, with potentially far-reaching implications for the future legitimacy and viability of core global institutions. Understanding and engaging emerging power leadership from countries like Brazil or India remains crucial for the achievement of common goals in the global institutional environment, now more than ever.

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Appendix A: Table of Independent Variables and Hypotheses

A. Independent Variables and Hypotheses

Independent Variables		
Capability	Hypotheses	Observable Implications
Economic Growth	<i>Hypothesis 1: Economic growth and stability are critical components of a state's leadership bid for in international institutions.</i>	<i>Observable Implication: States pursuing institutional leadership possess stable or rising annual gross domestic product (GDP) and reduced/stabilized inflation levels.</i>
Credibility		
Shared Southern Worldview	<i>Hypothesis 2: Credibility for leadership in international institutions stems from a shared Southern development trajectory and framing the need for institutional actions (reforms, coalitions, initiatives) as a shared interest of the global South.</i>	<i>Observable Implications: Countries seeking leadership in international institutions maintain active ties to the global South through diplomatic ties, development assistance to the global South, etc. Reform proposals within key international institutions are framed as common goals for developing countries. The fruit of these efforts is born out in comparatively high levels of support from "follower" states.</i>
Willingness		
Presidential Interest/Influence	<i>Hypothesis 3a: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions have presidents or prime ministers who are highly interested and influential in foreign policy.</i>	<i>Observable Implication: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions should possess a president engaged in significant international travel, who prioritizes funding to the foreign ministry, and is personally involved on key global issues. This president's rhetoric would also manifest a desire for the country to play a leading and active role in international institutions.</i>
Bureaucratic Capacity	<i>Hypothesis 3b: States demonstrating leadership in international institutions possess</i>	<i>Observable Implication: States seeking an institutional leadership role in the global arena possess insulated, professionalized, well-funded</i>

	<i>strong bureaucratic capacity.</i>	<i>bureaucracies that play a significant role in foreign policy formation over time.</i>
Alternative Hypotheses		
	<i>Alternative Hypothesis 1: Successful regional hegemony is a prerequisite for leadership in international institutions.</i>	<i>Observable Implication: States exercising leadership in the international arena have first gained regional support and backing for their global institutional agenda.</i>
	<i>Alternative Hypothesis 2: Leadership in international institutions stems from a consistent, underlying quest for autonomy on the part of emerging powers like Brazil.</i>	<i>Observable Implication: Institutional activism would be centered on issue areas of salience to the country that garner direct benefits to Brazil and would remain constant over time, accompanied by rhetoric suggesting that concerns about autonomy are central to foreign policy decisions.</i>

Appendix B: Indicators of Leadership in International Institutions

A. World Trade Organization Complaints

Country	As Complainant	Against US	Against Europe
Brazil	26	10	7
Argentina	20	5	6
Chile	10	2	2
Colombia	5	1	1
Mexico	23	9	3
Venezuela	1	1	0
China	12	9	3
India	21	8	7
S. Africa	0	0	0
Russia	1	0	1

Source: WTO

B. United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions

Country	Police	Military Experts	Troops	TOTAL
Brazil	11	26	1267	1304
Argentina	31	6	345	382
Chile	11	5	364	380
Colombia	16	0	0	16
Mexico	0	0	2	2
Venezuela	-	-	-	-
China	176	23	2883	3082
India	991	55	6962	8008
S. Africa	23	13	2128	2164
Russia	18	53	4	75

Source: UN Peacekeeping

C. United Nations Security Council Membership

Country	Membership Type	Total Times on Council
Brazil	Temporary	10
Argentina	Temporary	9
Chile	Temporary	5
Colombia	Temporary	7
Mexico	Temporary	4
Venezuela	Temporary	4

China	Permanent	Permanent
India	Temporary	7
S. Africa	Temporary	2
Russia	Permanent	Permanent

Source: United Nations

D. Institution or Coalition Creation

Year	President	Institution or Coalition
1990	Collor	Ibero-American Summit
1991	Collor	MERCOSUR; Brazilian-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons
1992	Collor	Brazil-European Community Framework Cooperation Agreement
1993	Franco	
1994	Cardoso	Ouro Preto Protocol of MERCOSUL signed
1995	Cardoso	
1996	Cardoso	Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC); FTA signed between MERCOSUL and Bolivia
1997	Cardoso	FTA between MERCOSUL and Andean Community
1998	Cardoso	New Agenda Coalition
1999	Cardoso	MONUSCO; 1st Financial G-20 Meeting
2000	Cardoso	IIRSA; CASA
2001	Cardoso	World Social Forum; Forum for East Asia- Latin American Cooperation; Brazil/Argentine Agency on Nuclear Energy Applications
2002	Cardoso	Brazil-South Africa Joint Committee
2003	Lula	G-20 coalition at WTO; IBSA; FTA signed between MERCOSUL and Peru
2004	Lula	MINUSTAH
2005	Lula	Peacebuilding Commission at UN; Brazil hosts 1st South American/Arab Countries Summit; FOCEM Fund created for MERCOSUL
2006	Lula	UNITAID; India-Brazil Joint Commission
2007	Lula	Brazil-EU Summit; Brazil hosts 1st Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC); Brazil and France create Strategic Partnership
2008	Lula	UNASUL
2009	Lula	BRICS Summit, BASIC, Bank of the South; 1st Brazil-Africa Summit on Food Security
2010	Lula	FTA between MERCOSUL and Egypt
2011	Rousseff	CELAC
2012	Rousseff	
2013	Rousseff	
2014	Rousseff	
2015	Rousseff	BRICS Bank
2016	Rousseff	
2017	Temer	Brazil-China High Level Business Seminar

Sources: Cepaluni and Vigevani, MRE, Folha de São Paulo, O Estadão de São Paulo

E. Initiatives and Proposal Generation

Year	President	Initiatives
1990	Collor	Brazil and Argentina sign Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy and Economic Complementation Agreement
1991	Collor	Creation of Brazilian-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons
1992	Collor	Amazonian Initiative launched at Rio Group Summit; Brazil hosts UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92)
1993	Franco	
1994	Franco	First Summit of the Americas in Miami where FTAA discussed
1995	Cardoso	
1996	Cardoso	Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) created by Foreign Ministry
1997	Cardoso	Brazil's CDM approved in Kyoto Protocol; FTA signed between MERCOSUL and Andean Community
1998	Cardoso	Brazil ratifies NPT
1999	Cardoso	Brazilian General is incumbent force commander of the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Brazil joins G-20 (developed economies).
2000	Cardoso	Latin American presidential summits commence; creation of IIRSA and CASA (precursor to UNASUL)
2001	Cardoso	Brazil threatens to violate HIV/AIDS drug patents
2002	Cardoso	Brazil offers petroleum assistance to Venezuela during PDVSA strikes; Brazil and France sign agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy; Brazil initiates dispute case DS267 against US cotton subsidies at WTO.
2003	Lula	Brazil heads "Group of friends of VZ;" Creation of G-20 at WTO; Lula first Brazilian Head of State to officially visit the Middle East
2004	Lula	Brazil commits to leadership of MINUSTAH. Brazilian João Clemente Baena Soares is member of the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. WTO settlement panel rules against US cotton subsidies and in favor of Brazil's position in case DS267.
2005	Lula	G-4 presents draft resolution A/59/ L.64 on UNSC reform. Brazil key player in creation of Peacebuilding Commission of UN; Brazil chairs Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; IBSA funds and implements community-based waste management project in Haiti
2006	Lula	Brazil insists on holding CPLC summit in Guinea-Bissau; accepts nationalization of Petrobras assets in Bolivia; Brazil and France spearhead creation of UNITAID for drug assistance for HIV/AIDS/TB; Brazil major supporter of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for UN Human Rights Commission
2007	Lula	Lula and Bush meet at Camp David to discuss biofuel cooperation and sign agreement on ethanol development; Lula attends Annapolis Conference on Middle East; Brazil hosts Internet Governance Forum
2008	Lula	Lula proposes creation of South American security council and argues for a Brazilian seat on UNSC; Brazil coordinates meeting of MERCOSUL, Rio Group, UNASUL and all 34 leaders of Latin America (CALC)
2009	Lula	Rio de Janeiro chosen as site for 2016 summer Olympics after three previous unsuccessful attempts; Foreign Minister Celso Amorim personally tours Gaza after Israeli attacks

2010	Lula	Largest contributor to UN Haiti Reconstruction Fund; Lula visits Iran and works with Turkey to try and find solution to Iran's nuclear program; Lula and Obama administrations initiate the Global Partnership Dialogue to promote biofuels
2011	Rousseff	3rd ministerial meeting of the G-4, led by Brazil; commits troops to peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL); launches Science without Borders initiative with US; Brazil lobbies for 13 Steps to Disarmament at NPT Review Conference
2012	Rousseff	G-4 Ministerial Meeting; Brazil and UN sign deal to transfer Brazilian expertise to cotton farmers in developing countries; Brazil hosts Rio+20 Conference on Climate Change; hosts first Open Government Partnership (OGP) along with US; Rousseff declines face-to-face meeting with Iranian president Ahmadinejad during the UN Rio +20 Summit. Hosts first working group regarding creation of BRICS Bank at BDNES.
2013	Rousseff	Brazil helps prepare approved proposal for the resolution (RES/2030/2011) prolonging the term of UNIOGBIS; Brazil part of UN Advisory Committee on UNSC Reform; Ministerial Meeting of the G-4. Rousseff cancels state visit to US after NSA spying incident. 6th IBSA Summit in New Delhi canceled and yet to be rescheduled despite initial plans for rescheduling in 2015. Brazil fails to join UN statements on human rights on Bahrain and Syrian referral to the ICC. Brazil becomes member of the Human Rights Commission at UN (until 2015).
2014	Rousseff	Brazil attends seminar "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Perspectives and Prospects" in India; Ministerial Meeting of the G-4 and reiteration of common vision of reformed Security Council; Brazil hosts FIFA World Cup. Brazil abstains from UNGA vote on Russia's Crimean Annexation and Rousseff says "Brazil "doesn't have a position on Ukraine." Brazil absent from Munich Security Conference, only country of top 10 economies to be absent. Brazil fails to support joint key statements on human rights in Egypt and Bahrain. Hosts NETmundial conference on internet governance. Rousseff orders Foreign Minister not to attend Geneva II conference on the Syrian Crisis.
2015	Rousseff	Rousseff visits US for first official state visit; Brazil against hosts Internet Governance Forum. Brazil absent from Munich Security Conference. BRICS bank approved by Brazilian congress. Brazil signs modest investment agreement with Mexico.
2016	Rousseff	
2017	Temer	Brazil-China High Level Business Seminar

Sources: MRE, Global Policy Forum, Cepaluni and Vigevani 2009

F. Brazilian Involvement in Mediation and Conflict Resolution

Year	President	Mediation/Conflict Resolution
1990	Collor	
1991	Collor	
1992	Collor	
1993	Franco	
1994	Franco	Brazilian Congress ratifies Treaty of Tlateloco after 27 years
1995	Cardoso	Brazilian President Cardoso mediates Ecuador/Peru border dispute; Brazilian troops participate in UNMIBH mission in Bosnia
1996	Cardoso	Brazil helps avoid Paraguayan coup attempt by threatening closure of transport lines from and payment channels from shared Itaipu electric

		dam
1997	Cardoso	
1998	Cardoso	Cardoso fundamental in signing of Ecuador/Peru peace accord
1999	Cardoso	Brazilian general is force commander of the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Brazil helps mediate Paraguayan political problems.
2000	Cardoso	Cardoso does not attend inauguration of Peru's Fujimori in protest of dictatorship
2001	Cardoso	Brazil takes lead on mediating attempted coup against Chavez in Venezuela. Brazil involved in creating the Inter-American Democratic Charter aimed at Peruvian dictator Fujimori
2002	Cardoso	VZ coup-de-etat; Brazil offers petroleum assistance to Venezuela during PDVSA strikes
2003	Lula	Brazil heads "Group of friends of VZ;" Creation of G-20 at WTO; Brazil involved in resolving constitutional crisis in Bolivia
2004	Lula	Brazil commits to leadership of MINUSTAH mission in Haiti
2005	Lula	Brazilian foreign minister assists with crisis in Ecuador; Brazil offers to mediate in the diplomatic fallout regarding the capture of a Colombian rebel in Venezuela.
2006	Lula	Brazil accepts nationalization of Petrobras assets in Bolivia
2007	Lula	Lula receives unprecedented invitation to Annapolis Conference on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
2008	Lula	Brazil provides assistance during resolution of Colombia/Ecuador/Venezuela border conflict
2009	Lula	Brazil harbors ousted president Zelaya at embassy during Honduran coup and criticizes US for response to coup.
2010	Lula	Brazil and Turkey attempt to broker deal regarding Iran's nuclear program
2011	Rousseff	Brazil commits troops to UNIFIL peacekeeping mission in Lebanon
2012	Rousseff	Brazil and UNASUR try to mediate impeachment of Paraguayan president Lugo; Brazil refuses to move forward with MERCOSUL/EU trade talk without Argentina. MERCOSUL suspends Paraguay.
2013	Rousseff	
2014	Rousseff	Rousseff remains silent on political protests and human rights concerns in Venezuela
2015	Rousseff	

Sources: Cepaluni and Vigevani, UN, Latin American Research Review

G. Efforts at Institutional Reform Led by Brazil

Country	Year	President	Statements on UNSC Reform	Count
Brazil	1990	Collor		
Brazil	1991	Collor		
Brazil	1992	Collor		
Brazil	1993	Franco		
Brazil	1994	Franco	Minister of Foreign Relations Amorim announces Brazil will seek UNSC reform and a permanent seat on UNSC.	1

Brazil	1995	Cardoso	Cardoso explicitly states Brazil's readiness for a permanent UNSC seat.	
Brazil	1996	Cardoso	Foreign Minister Celso Amorim addresses GA multiple times regarding need for UNSC reform.	3
Brazil	1997	Cardoso		
Brazil	1998	Cardoso		
Brazil	1999	Cardoso		
Brazil	2000	Cardoso		
Brazil	2001	Cardoso		
Brazil	2002	Cardoso	Brazil initiates dispute case DS267 against US cotton subsidies at WTO. Brazil initiates dispute case DS266 against EU sugar subsidies at WTO. Brazilian Referendum results in rejection of US-backed FTAA and focus instead on MERCOSUL.	
Brazil	2003	Lula	Brazil leads creation of G-20 group of developing nations at the WTO, pushing for greater rights for developing countries in the Doha Round.	
Brazil	2004	Lula	First G-4 Summit. Brazilian João Clemente Baena Soares member of the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that presents two UNSC reform proposals (one following the G-4 recommendations). WTO settlement panel rules against US cotton subsidies and in favor of Brazil's position in case DS267. Another WTO panel rules against the EU and in favor of Brazil regarding EU sugar subsidies in case DS266. In response to its leadership with the G-20 coalition, Brazil invited to join "FIPS" (Five Interested Parties) as part of the core "New Quad" negotiating group at WTO.	1
Brazil	2005	Lula	G-4 presents draft resolution A / 59 / L.64 on UNSC reform, calling for Security Council enlargement to 25 members, including six additional permanent seats. In attempt to secure permanent membership, the Group of Four (G-4) had accepted to forego their right of veto for at least 15 years. In London ministerial meeting of the G-4 with AU representatives, tentative agreement reached on a joint proposal to reform the UN Security Council, but ultimately fails due to lack of AU support.	2
Brazil	2006	Lula	Draft resolutions of the AU and G-4 (without Japan's support) resubmitted.	
Brazil	2007	Lula	UN General Assembly authorizes the completion of intergovernmental negotiations on the reform of CSN.	1

Brazil	2008	Lula	Lula argues for a Brazilian seat on UNSC. France and the United Kingdom reiterates support to the G-4 and indicate openness to reform the UNSC. UNGA adopts Decision 62/557, which determines the start of intergovernmental negotiations on the reform based on the positions and proposals of Member States until 28/02/2009.	1
Brazil	2009	Lula	Intergovernmental negotiations begin on UNSC reform. G-4 and South Africa collect 140 signatures to support their proposal. Presidents Lula and French President Sarkozy publish an article on asking for comprehensive reform of the UNSC, covering "greater role" for developing countries like Brazil and India. WTO panel rules against US and in favor of Brazil on DS267, a benchmark case against US cotton subsidies.	13
Brazil	2010	Lula	Foreign Ministers of the G-4 meet before the General Debate of the 65th UNGA, the first time since 2005. H.E. Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti presents a statement highlighting the progress made during the 64th General Assembly and urges the intergovernmental negotiations to streamline the text to get closer to finalizing UN reform. She focuses on categories of membership and the issue of the veto. Later in the year, she presents the Brazilian position on the agreement regarding UNSC Reform that the negotiations have yielded.	9
Brazil	2011	Rousseff	Ambassador Viotti stresses that the negotiating text on UNSC reform still needs to be condensed and emphasizes that member states must take the initiative to keep the reform movement moving forward. G4 issued a joint statement on 12 February 2011, in which their foreign ministers agreed to seek concrete outcome in the current session of the UN General Assembly. Brazil leads new G-4 Ministerial Meeting, regarding UNGA draft resolution proposing the expansion of the UNSC in the categories of permanent and non-permanent and the improvement of Council working methods.	3

Brazil	2012	Rousseff	UNGA adopts oral decision to continue the intergovernmental negotiations on UNSC reform. G-4 holds Ministerial Meeting of before the General Debate of the 67th session of UNGA. In visit to White House, Rousseff does not repeat her request that the US endorse its long-standing bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (which it did for India).	1
Brazil	2013	Rousseff	In 69th annual UNGA assembly, Rousseff reaffirms need to reform UNSC. Ministerial Meeting of the G4 to the General Debate of the 67th session of the margin of UNGA. The Ministers reiterated their common vision of a reformed Security Council and stressed the need to intensify efforts to translate the existing agreement into concrete results by 2015. Brazil holds seminar on "Current challenges to peace and security: the necessity of UNSC Reform," organized by the Brazilian government to promote a wider debate on the matter. GA President announces creation of an Advisory Group on continued intergovernmental negotiations on reform, including the Permanent Representatives of Brazil.	1
Brazil	2014	Rousseff	Ministerial Meeting of the G-4 to the General Debate of the 69th Session of UNGA. The Ministers reiterated their common vision of a reformed Security Council	2
Brazil	2015	Rousseff	G-4 Summit held with Heads of State prior to GA meeting, first time since 2004. Question of UNSC reform moves for first time to formal text-based negotiations in the GA through Decision 69/560 by consensus.	2
Brazil	2016	Rousseff		
Brazil	2017	Temer	During first UNGA speech, confirms need for UNSC reform.	1

Sources: MRE, UN, Global Policy Forum

H. Brazilian Debt to UN Agencies

Organization	Debt Amount (in Reais)	Consequence	Recent Activity
UN Peacekeeping	\$87 Million		Paid 2016
UN Secretariat	\$76.8 Million	Brazil has canceled financial meetings with this agency, citing "urgent reasons"	Paid 2016

IAEA	\$35 Million	Lost voting privileges January 1, 2015	Voting privileges reinstated in April 2015 after minimum deposit made
UNESCO	\$23.8 Million	Lost voting privileges May 2015	Debt paid in 2016, voting privileges reinstated
UNIDO	\$15 Million		Brazil negotiates accord to stagger payments
FAO	\$15 Million		Partially paid in late January 2015 to secure reelection of Brazilian Director General to organization; paid again in 2016
ICC	\$6 Million	Lost voting privileges January 1, 2015	
*Total debt to IOs approximately \$950 million USD as of mid-2016. Brazilian Congress authorized approximately \$900 million USD in October 2016 to cover debts to IOs, along with other domestic costs.			


Source: UN, O Estadão de São Paulo, Estadão Internacional, O Globo

I. Institutional Membership of Selected Latin American Countries

Country	Institutional Count
Brazil	75
Mexico	77
Chile	62
Argentina	69
Venezuela	60

Source: CIA WorldFactbook

J. Comparative Opportunity Cost as Percentage of GDP, 2015



Source: MRE, SRE, MEA, Cancillería, MinRel Chile, Costa Vazquez 2014, Guitierrez and Jaimovich 2014, OECD, World Bank

Appendix C: Indicators of Capability

A: Brazilian GDP, 1990 to Present




Source: Trading Economics, World Bank

B: Brazilian Debt, 1995 to 2015




Source: The Economist

C: Brazilian Inflation Levels, 1990 to 2015



Source: World Bank


D: Brazilian Export Profitability, 1997-2013



Source: The Next Recession


Appendix D: Indicators of Credibility

A. Annual Budget of Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), 2000-2014




Source: ABC

B. Development Assistance from Brazil, 2005 to 2013




Source: IPEA/ABC 2009, 2010

C1. Confidence in Latin America Countries, 1995-1997*




Source: Latinobarómetro. Specific question asked was: "For each of the peoples I'm going to read out, which inspire you with a lot, some, little or no confidence?" Numbers above represent the sum of responses "some confidence" and "a lot of confidence"

C2. Confidence in Latin American Countries, 2000-2005*



Source: Latinobarómetro. Specific question asked for 2000 and 2005 was: "Considering all countries in Latin America, which country inspires you with most confidence? Name only one." For 2002 and 2004, a similar question was asked: "Which Latin American country do you feel most admiration for? Data above represents the percentage of times a particularly country was named.


C3. Confidence in Latin American Countries, 2009-2015*



Source: Latinobarómetro. Specific question asked for 2009, 2010 and 2011 was: "Which country in Latin America has more leadership over the region?" For 2015, an almost identical question was asked: "Which Latin American country has most leadership in the region?" Data above represents the percentage of times a particularly country was named.

Appendix E: Indicators of Willingness

A. Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Budget, 2003-2017



Source: MRE, Ministério de Planejamento, Folha de São Paulo

B. MRE Budget as Percentage of Executive Budget

Year	President	Percentage of Budget
2003	Lula	0.50%
2010	Lula	0.33%
2013	Rousseff	0.27%
2014	Rousseff	0.11%

Source: Folha de São Paulo, BBC Brasil

C. New Diplomats accepted into Rio Branco Institute

Years	President	Number Diplomats
1990-1992	Collor	83
1992-1995	Itamar	117
1995-1998	Cardoso	113
1999-2002	Cardoso	124
2003-2006	Lula	222
2007-2010	Lula	423
2011-2014	Rousseff	104

Sources: De Souza and Farias, Mundorama, MRE, Folha de São Paulo, Ministério do Planejamento, Presidência da República

D. Size of Diplomatic Corps

Year	President	Number of Diplomats
2002	Cardoso	997
2010	Lula	1405 (408)
2013	Rousseff	1805 (400)*

*400 seats were created by law 12.601, but have not been filled

Source: Folha de São Paulo

E. Number of Diplomatic Posts (Embassies, Consulates, etc.)

Years	President	Number Posts
-2002	Cardoso	150
2003-2010	Lula	217 (67 new)
2011-Present	Rousseff	227 (10 new)

Sources: Folha de São Paulo, MRE, Ministério do Planejamento, Presidência

F. Number of Brazilian Embassies

Year	President	Number Embassies (New)
2002	FHC	91
2010	Lula	131 (40)
2013	Rousseff	139 (8)
2017	Temer	Potential closure of African embassies

Source: Folha de São Paulo

G. Comparative Number of Latin American Embassies

Country	Number embassies (as of Jan 2017)
Brazil	139
Argentina	86
Cuba	122
Mexico	81
India	122

Source: EmbassyPages.com

H. Rhetoric about Global Influence

Year	Figure	Quote
1995	Cardoso	"I believe that Brazil has a place among successful countries in the world in the next century." ⁶³⁰
1995	Cardoso	"It is right for Brazil to play a more active role internationally. So we don't want to discuss with America just Brazil, the United States, or South America. We want to discuss also what is happening in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. We believe a change is due in the United Nations Security Council. Brazil is ready for the responsibilities of a permanent member seat, and we have confidence that other countries

⁶³⁰ William R. Long. 2 January 1995. "New Brazil Leader Promises Growth, Social Justice: Latin America: President Cardoso, at inauguration, tells buoyant nation its time has come to 'flourish.'" *Los Angeles Times*.

		believe Brazil is ready to play this role.” ⁶³¹
1999	Cardoso	“Brazil becomes more relevant for the well-being of the world.” ⁶³²
1999	Cardoso	“Brazil is, like this, consolidating an active and sovereign insertion into the international system.” ⁶³³
1999	Cardoso	“Brazil will continue to play an active role in the revision of the international financial system.” ⁶³⁴
2003	Lula	Brazil desires “a reformed Security Council, representing modern-day reality, with developed and developing countries of all regions of the world among its permanent members.” ⁶³⁵
2005	Lula	“The expression ‘global player’ can create misunderstandings. The first one is to believe that Brazil, a country with social problems and without effective means to project itself as an international military power, cannot aspire to becoming a full player at a global level [...] Our diplomacy is experienced, well prepared and sufficiently lucid to be neither timid nor foolhardy.” ⁶³⁶
2005	Foreign Minister Amorim	“Brazilian diplomacy is presently going through a period of great dynamism...to expand the geographical reach of Brazil’s foreign relations, to update elements that are part of our universalistic vocation; and to adopt a firm and active position in multilateral as well

⁶³¹ James F. Hoge, Jr. 7 July 2001. “Fulfilling Brazil’s Promise: A Conversation with President Cardoso.” *Foreign Affairs*.

⁶³² *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*. 2008. 22 (77, 2º Semestre 1995). Available: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_biblioteca/resenhas_peb/Resenha_N77_2Sem_1995.pdf

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

⁶³⁵ Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” In *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping*. Ed John T. Fischel and Andrés Saenz. Washington, DC Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007, 100. Bracey 324.

⁶³⁶ Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva. 13 July 2005. Speech at the opening of the debate “Brazil: A Global Player.” Paris, France.

		as regional negotiations, with a view to securing an international regulatory area that is fair and balanced.” ⁶³⁷
2006	Foreign Minister Amorim	“Brazil has international credit because the county is not afraid to fight for its rights...A determined political attitude can make all the difference.” ⁶³⁸
2010	Lula	“Brazil, on its own, plays a leading role, because of its size, its territory, its population. What we think is that world governance needs major reform.” ⁶³⁹
2015	Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira	“Brazil will continue to play the role of a global actor, because that role corresponds to the reality of the country and to the profound aspirations of its people. And Itamaraty will continue to contribute to the coordination of those multiple aspects of our insertion into international affairs which fall into our area of responsibility.” ⁶⁴⁰
2015	Rousseff	“But while Brazil is determined and willing to meet its responsibilities in helping to promote a world of peace, progress, inclusion and sustainability, it must do so in cooperation with the international community, and specifically the United Nations.” ⁶⁴¹
2016	Foreign Minister Serra	“In a period of great changes and, why not say, uncertainties in the international scenario and of promising domestic change, our diplomacy...will have to gradually update itself and innovate, and even to dare, promoting a modernizing

⁶³⁷ Celso Amorim. 25 November 2005. “Foreign Policy in the Lula Government – Two Years.” *Plenarium*.

⁶³⁸ Celso Amorim. 3 April 2006. *Speech given by Minister at the Tiradentes Medal Award ceremony at the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

⁶³⁹ “Lula on his legacy.” 30 Sept. 2010. *The Economist*.

⁶⁴⁰ Mauro Vieira. 2 January 2015. *Speech by the Minister at his swearing-in ceremony as Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs*. Brasília, Brazil.

⁶⁴¹ H.E. Dilma Rousseff. 25 September 2015. *Speech at the 70th UN General Assembly Meeting*. New York, NY.

		reform in the objectives, methods and working techniques.” ⁶⁴²
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Sources: Resenhas do Política Exterior do Brasil, MRE; UNGA, Foreign Affairs

I. Presidential Trips Abroad

President	Years	Countries Visited	Days Outside Brazil	% of Term Outside Brazil
Cardoso	1995-2002	52	324	11%
Lula	2003-2010	134	462	16%
Rousseff	2011-2016	46	156	7%
Temer (interim)	2016-Present	6	16	12%

Sources: Folha de São Paulo, BBC, MRE, Ministério do Planejamento, Palácio de Planalto, Biblioteca da Presidência da República

⁶⁴² José Serra. 18 May 2016. Speech on the occasion of taking office as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Brasília, Brazil.

Appendix F: Brazilian Leadership in International Institutions

A. United Nations Security Council Membership

Country	Membership Type	Total Times on Council	Years of Membership
Brazil	Temporary	10	1946-1947, 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1963-1964, 1967-1968, 1988-1989, 1993-1994, 1998-1999, 2004-2005, 2010-2011
Argentina	Temporary	9	1948-1949, 1959-1960, 1966-1967, 1971-1972, 1987-1988, 1994-1995, 1999-2000, 2005-2006, 2013-2014
Chile	Temporary	5	1952-1953, 1961-1962, 1996-1997, 2003-2004, 2014-2015
Colombia	Temporary	7	1947-1948, 1953-1954, 1957-1958, 1969-1970, 1989-1990, 2001-2002, 2011-2012
Mexico	Temporary	4	1946, 1980-1981, 2002-2003, 2009-2010
Venezuela	Temporary	6	1962-1963, 1977-1978, 1986-1987, 1992-1993, 2015-2016
India	Temporary	7	1950-1951, 1967-1968, 1972-1973, 1977-1978, 1984-1985, 1991-1992, 2011-2012
S. Africa	Temporary	2	2007-2008, 2011, 2012

Source: United Nations

B. Number of Formal Statements on UNSC Reform, 1995-2011

Country	Formal Statements/Remarks on UNSC Reform	Total
Brazil	1996 (3); 1999; 2009 (13); 2010 (8); 2011	26
India	2009; 2010 (5); 2011	7
Mexico	1996 (2); 1997; 1998	4
Argentina	1995; 1996; 2000; 2009; 2014	5


Source: Global Policy Forum

C. Brazil Voting Patterns on the UNSC, Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)

Date	UNSC Resolution	Resolution Description	Brazil Vote
1994	Res. 940	Haitian coup d'état (restoring Aristide and extending MINUSTAH mandate)	Abstain
1994	Res. 944	Haitian coup d'état (suspending sanctions)	Abstain
1994	Res. 948	Haitian coup d'état (lifting sanctions)	Abstain
1994	Res. 964	Haitian coup d'état (augmented MINUSTAH team)	Abstain
2003	Res. 1497	Int'l Criminal Court (exempted US soldiers from ICC)	-
2005	Res. 1593	Sudan and Int'l Criminal Court (referral of Darfur to ICC)	Abstain
2005	Res. 1645	Peacebuilding Commission (establishment of PBC)	Yes
2005	Res. 1646	Peacebuilding Commission (membership of PBC)	Abstain
2006	Res. 1696	Iranian nuclear program (demanding suspension of program)	-
2008	Res. 1803	Iranian nuclear program (tightens restrictions on Iran)	-
2010	Res. 1929	Iranian nuclear program (embargo on Iran)	No
2011	Draft Resolution	Intervention in Syria (demanding end of violence toward citizens by regime)	Abstain
2011	Res. 1970	Intervention in Libya (condemned use of force against citizens by regime)	Yes
2011	Res. 1973	Intervention in Libya (demanding ceasefire and creating no-fly zone)	Abstain
2011	Res. 1984	Iranian nuclear program (extending expert panel on monitoring sanctions)	Yes
2014	(UNGA) Res. 68/262	Russian Annexation of Crimea (affirming territorial integrity of Ukraine)	Abstain

Source: "Security Council Resolutions." UN.

D. Average Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, 1995 to Present




Source: Providing for Peacekeeping; UN

E. World Trade Organization Complaints


Country	As Complainant	As Respondent	As Third Party
Brazil	31	16	108
Mexico	23	14	81
Venezuela	1	1	0
Argentina	20	22	60
India	23	24	126

F. Brazilian Energy Matrix, 2015




Source: Energy Research Agency

G. Brazilian GHG Emissions, 1990-2015



Source: CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World Resources Institute

H. Brazil, India and Mexico GHG Emissions, 1990-2015



Source: CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World Resources Institute; Jose 2015; Indian Express 2016

*Data on Mexico only available up to 2013. See "Inventario Nacional de Emisiones de Gases y Compuestos de Efecto Invernadero." 2016. *Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático*. Gobierno de México.

I. Overview of Decisions, Conference of the Parties of UNFCCC, 1995-2016

COP 1 (Berlin, 1995) 21 decisions, 1 resolution

Parties agreed that the commitments in the Convention were "inadequate" for meeting the Convention's


<p>objective. In a decision known as the Berlin Mandate, they agreed to establish a process to negotiate strengthened commitments for developed countries.</p>
<p>COP 2 (Geneva, 1996) 17 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>The Geneva Ministerial Declaration was noted, but not adopted. A decision on guidelines for the national communications to be prepared by developing countries was adopted. Also discussed - Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Objectives (QELROs) for different Parties and an acceleration of the Berlin Mandate talks so that commitments could be adopted at COP 3.</p>
<p>COP 3 (Kyoto, 1997) 18 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by consensus. The Kyoto Protocol includes legally binding emission targets for developed country (Annex I) Parties for the six major greenhouse gases, which are to be reached by the period 2008-2012. Issues for future international consideration include developing rules for emissions trading, and methodological work in relation to forest sinks.</p>
<p>COP 4 (Buenos Aires, 1998) 19 decisions, 2 resolutions</p> <p>The Buenos Aires Plan of Action, focusing on strengthening the financial mechanism, the development and transfer of technologies and maintaining the momentum in relation to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.</p>
<p>COP 5 (Bonn, 1999) 22 decisions</p> <p>A focus on the adoption of the guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Annex I countries, capacity building, transfer of technology and flexible mechanisms.</p>
<p>COP 6 (The Hague, 2000) 4 decisions, 3 resolutions Part II of the sixth COP (Bonn, 2000) 2 decisions</p> <p>Consensus was finally reached on the so-called Bonn Agreements. Work was also completed on a number of detailed decisions based on the Bonn Agreements, including capacity-building for developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Decisions on several issues, notably the mechanisms land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and compliance, remained outstanding.</p>
<p>COP 7 (Marrakech, 2001) 39 decisions, 2 resolutions</p> <p>Parties agreed on a package deal, with key features including rules for ensuring compliance with commitments, consideration of LULUCF Principles in reporting of such data and limited banking of units generated by sinks under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (the extent to which carbon dioxide absorbed by carbon sinks can be counted towards the Kyoto targets). The meeting also adopted the Marrakech Ministerial Declaration as an input into the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.</p>
<p>COP 8 (New Delhi, 2002) 25 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>The Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development reiterated the need to build on the outcomes of the World Summit.</p>
<p>COP 9 (Milan, 2003) 22 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>Adopted decisions focus on the institutions and procedures of the Kyoto Protocol and on the implementation of the UNFCCC. The formal decisions adopted by the Conference intend to strengthen the institutional framework of both the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. New emission reporting guidelines based on the good-practice guidance provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were adopted to provide a sound and reliable foundation for reporting on changes in carbon concentrations resulting from land-use changes and forestry. These reports are due in 2005. Another major advance was the agreement on the modalities and scope for carbon absorbing forest-management projects in the clean development mechanism (CDM). This agreement completes the package adopted in Marrakesh two years ago and expands the CDM to an additional area of activity. Two funds were further developed, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, which will support technology transfer, adaptation projects and other activities.</p>
<p>COP 10 (Buenos Aires, 2004) 18 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>Parties gathered at COP-10 to complete the unfinished business from the Marrakesh Accords and</p>

<p>to reassess the building blocks of the process and to discuss the framing of a new dialogue on the future of climate change policy. They addressed and adopted numerous decisions and conclusions on issues relating to: development and transfer of technologies; land use, land use change and forestry; the UNFCCC's financial mechanism; Annex I national communications; capacity building; adaptation and response measures; and UNFCCC Article 6 (education, training and public awareness) examining the issues of adaptation and mitigation, the needs of least developed countries (LDCs), and future strategies to address climate change.</p>
<p>COP 11 (Montreal, 2005) 15 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>COP 11 addressed issues such as capacity building, development and transfer of technologies, the adverse effects of climate change on developing and least developed countries, and several financial and budget-related issues, including guidelines to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which serves as the Convention's financial mechanism. The COP also agreed on a process for considering future action beyond 2012 under the UNFCCC.</p>
<p>COP 12 (Nairobi, 2006) 9 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>A wide range of decisions were adopted at COP 12 designed to mitigate climate change and help countries adapt to the effects. There was agreement on the activities for the next few years under the "Nairobi work programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation", as well as on the management of the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol. Parties welcomed the "Nairobi Framework" which will provide additional support to developing countries to successfully develop projects for the CDM. Parties in Nairobi also adopted rules of procedure for the Kyoto Protocol's Compliance Committee, making it fully operational.</p>
<p>COP 13 (Bali, 2007) 14 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>COP 13 adopted the Bali Road Map as a two-year process towards a strengthened international climate change agreement. The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan that was adopted by Decision 1/CP.13. It also includes the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) negotiations and their 2009 deadline, the launch of the Adaptation Fund, the scope and content of the Article 9 review of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as decisions on technology transfer and on reducing emissions from deforestation.</p>
<p>COP 14 (Poznan, 2008) 9 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>COP 14 launched the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, to be filled by a 2% levy on projects under the Clean Development Mechanism. Parties agreed that the Adaptation Fund Board should have legal capacity to grant direct access to developing countries. Further progress was made on a number of issues of particular importance to developing countries, including adaptation, finance, technology, REDD and disaster management. COP 14 also saw Parties endorse an intensified negotiating schedule for 2009.</p>
<p>COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009) 13 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference raised climate change policy to the highest political level, with close to 115 world leaders attending the high-level segment. It produced the Copenhagen Accord, which was supported by a majority of countries. This included agreement on the long-term goal of limiting the maximum global average temperature increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, subject to a review in 2015. A number of developing countries agreed to communicate their efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions every two years. On long-term finance, developed countries agreed to support a goal of mobilizing US\$100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.</p>
<p>COP 16 (Cancun, 2010) 12 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>COP 16 produced the Cancun Agreements. Among the highlights, Parties agreed to: commit to a maximum temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; make fully operational by 2012 a technology mechanism to boost the development and spread of new climate-friendly technologies; establish a Green Climate Fund to provide financing for action in developing countries via thematic funding windows. They also agreed on a new Cancun Adaptation Framework, which included setting up an Adaptation Committee to promote strong, cohesive action on adaptation.</p>
<p>COP 17 (Durban, 2011) 19 decisions and 1 resolution</p>

<p>At COP 17, Parties decided to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015, with work beginning under a new group called the Ad Hoc working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). Parties also agreed a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 1 January 2013. A significantly advanced framework for the reporting of emission reductions for both developed and developing countries was also agreed, taking into consideration the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.</p>
<p>COP 18 (Doha, 2012) 26 decisions and 1 resolution</p> <p>AT COP 18, governments set out a timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015, to come into effect in 2020. They completed the work under the Bali Action Plan to concentrate on new work towards a 2015 agreement under a single negotiating stream, the ADP. Governments emphasized the need to increase their ambition to cut greenhouse gases and to help vulnerable countries to adapt. COP 18 also saw the launch of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020, with the adoption of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.</p>
<p>COP 19 (Warsaw, 2013) 29 decisions</p> <p>At COP 19, governments took further essential decisions to stay on track towards securing a universal climate change agreement in 2015. The objective of the 2015 agreement is twofold: First, to bind nations together into an effective global effort to reduce emissions rapidly enough to chart humanity's longer-term path out of the danger zone of climate change, while building adaptation capacity; Second, to stimulate faster and broader action now. In a breakthrough outcome, the rulebook for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation was agreed, together with measures to bolster forest preservation and a results-based payment system to promote forest protection. The Green Climate Fund, planned to be a major channel of financing for developing world action, will be ready for capitalization in the second half of 2014. Additionally, governments agreed on a mechanism to address loss and damage caused by long-term climate change impacts.</p>
<p>COP 20 (Lima, 2014) 41 decisions, 1 resolution</p> <p>The Lima Climate Conference achieved a range of other important outcomes and decisions and "firsts" in the history of the international climate process. Pledges were made by both developed and developing countries prior to and during the COP that took the capitalization of the new Green Climate Fund (GCF) past an initial \$10 billion target. Levels of transparency and confidence-building reached new heights as several industrialized countries submitted themselves to questioning about their emissions targets under a new process called a Multilateral Assessment. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising calls on governments to put climate change into school curricula and climate awareness into national development plans.</p>
<p>COP 21 (Paris, 2015) 35 Decisions, 2 Resolutions</p> <p>The COP 21 reached a landmark Paris Agreement, which replaced the differentiated responsibilities and created a common framework. The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This includes requirements that all Parties report regularly on their emissions and on their implementation efforts. The Paris Agreement's central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a new technology framework and an enhanced capacity building framework will be put in place, thus supporting action by developing countries and the most vulnerable countries, in line with their own national objectives. The Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of action and support through a more robust transparency framework.</p>
<p>COP 22 (Marrakech, 2016) 35 Decisions, 3 Resolutions</p> <p>COP 22 was the first meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement, from COP 21 the year prior. At Marrakech, the parties committed to a full implementation of the Paris Agreement. The Conference successfully demonstrated to the world that the implementation of the Paris Agreement is underway and the constructive spirit of multilateral cooperation on climate change continues.</p>

Source: UNFCCC


J. Brazilian Proposal of Concentric Differentiation to COP21, 2012



Source: Brazilian INDC Submission to UNFCCC


Appendix G: Data on the Mexican Case

A. Comparison of Brazilian and Mexican Gini Coefficients, 1990 to Present



Source: World Bank

B. Time Spent Abroad



Source: Folha de São Paulo, BBC, MRE, Ministério do Planejamento, Palácio de Planalto, Biblioteca da Presidência da República

C. Mexican Rhetoric about Global Influence

Year	Figure	Quote
1983	President Manuel de la Madrid Hurtado	... The fundamental proposition of the Plan: maintain and

		reinforce the independence of the Nation.” ⁶⁴³
2001	President Vicente Fox	“I believe that with the maturity that we reached today, we can emerge as an active player in the world, and participate in what is happening, whether we like it or not, weather it is favorable or not. We must play a clear role in the world.” ⁶⁴⁴
2001	Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jorge Castañeda	“In the Mexican foreign policy, it has been continuously claimed the defense of our principles and international law. In accordance to this, then we do not have any interest; we have principles instead, which can be qualified as a diplomatic hypocrisy. In the long term, this unfortunate interpretation of the principles undermines any internal support for every real foreign policy (with costs, consequences and benefits) and confers the country an arrogant halo in the international scene.” ⁶⁴⁵
2007	President Felipe Calderón	“We’re going to put forth an active foreign policy that will allow Mexico to be a major player and not merely a spectator of what’s going on in the world.”
2015	President Enrique Peña Nieto	Mexico is not isolated from the world; it is a global player that participates in various global forums.” ⁶⁴⁶
2015	Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Antonio Meade Kuribreña	“Mexico has a global, systemic and important profile on many levels. We are a large economy; we are a populous nation, so there are few topics of global relevance

⁶⁴³ Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. 1983. “Plan nacional del desarrollo, 1983-1988.” *Revista de Administración Pública* (55-56).

⁶⁴⁴ “Anuncia Fox política exterior de México.” 8 January 2001. *Diario del Pueblo*. Cited in Encinas-Valenzuela 2006, 3.

⁶⁴⁵ Mercedes Pereña-García. 2001. *Las Relaciones Diplomáticas de México*. Mexico City, Mexico: Plaza y Valdés: 94.

⁶⁴⁶ Enrique Peña Nieto. 10 November 2015. *Presidencia de la República*. Available: <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/mexico-is-not-isolated-from-the-world-it-is-a-global-player-that-participates-in-various-global-forums-enrique-pena-nieto>.

		where Mexico's voice should not be heard. Especially at a time when Mexico is going through profound economic, political and sociocultural changes that will increase its role on the international stage." ⁶⁴⁷
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Table C: Comparison of Mexican and Brazilian INDCs.

Country	Base Level	Reduction Target	Target Year	Sectors and Gases	Land-use inclusion/accounting method
Brazil	2005	37% 43%	2025 2030	CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O, HFCs, PFCs, SF ₆	Inventory based approach
Mexico	BAU	25% (unconditional) 40% (Conditional)*	2030	CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O, HFCs, PFCs, SF ₆ , Energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, LULUCF, waste	No accounting method specified


Source: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

* Mexico made emissions past 25% conditional on "...a global agreement addressing important topics including international carbon price, carbon border adjustments, technical cooperation, access to low-cost financial resources and technology transfer, all at a scale commensurate to the challenge of global climate change." See "Mexico: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution," 2015; Edwards and Timmons 2015b.

⁶⁴⁷ "Mexico as a Global Player." 29 April 2015. *Foreign Affairs*.

Appendix H: Data on the Indian Case

A: Indian Inflation compared to Brazil and Mexico, 2000-2014



B. Indian Rhetoric about Global Influence

Year	Figure	Quote
1999	Former Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee	"...But we know that this [progress in business, industry and services] achievement is only a stepping stone. It is not the attainment of the final goal which is to see the rise of India as an economic superpower." ⁶⁴⁸
2004	Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh	"We will maintain our tradition of an independent foreign policy, built on a national consensus and based on our supreme national interest. We will expand our international relationships – preserving solidarity with traditional allies and strengthening new partnerships. We will work with like-minded nations for

⁶⁴⁸ Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 15 August 1998. "Independence Day Address." New Delhi, India. Available: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/content_print.php?nodeid=9238&nodetype=2.

		an equitable, multipolar world order, which takes into account the legitimate aspirations of developing countries. ⁶⁴⁹
2014	Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh	“Friends, I am confident about the future of India. I firmly believe that the emergence of India as a major powerhouse of the evolving global economy is an idea whose time has come. Blending tradition with modernity and unity with diversity, this Nation of ours can show the way forward to the world.” ⁶⁵⁰
2017	Prime Minister Narendra Modi	The world needs India’s sustained rise, as much as India needs the world. Our desire to change our country has an indivisible link with the external world. It is, therefore, only natural that India’s choices at home and our international priorities form part of a seamless continuum. Firmly anchored in India’s transformational goals. ⁶⁵¹

Source: Indian Prime Ministers Archive, Raisina Dialogue

Table C: Comparison of Indian, Mexican and Brazilian INDCs

Country	Base Level	Reduction Target	Target Year	Sectors and Gases	Land-use inclusion/accounting method
Brazil	2005	37% 43%	2025 2030	CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O, HFCs, PFCs, SF ₆	Inventory based approach
Mexico	BAU	25% (unconditional) 40% (Conditional)*	2030	CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O, HFCs, PFCs, SF ₆ , Energy, industrial processes and product	No accounting method specified

⁶⁴⁹ Manmohan Singh. 24 June 2004. “Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation.” *Speeches of Former Prime Ministers of India*. Available: <http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1>.

⁶⁵⁰ Manmohan Singh. 17 May 2014. “PM Address to the Nation.” *Speeches of Former Prime Ministers of India*. Available: <http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1445>.

⁶⁵¹ Narendra Modi. 17 January 2017. “The world needs India’s sustained rise, as much as India needs the world.” *Speech at the opening session of the second annual Raisina Dialogue*. New Delhi, India, January 17-19, 2017.

				use, agriculture, LULUCF, waste	
India	2005	33-35% Non-fossil share of cumulative power generation capacity by 40%	2030	Unspecified	Coverage and metrics of intensity targets unspecified

Source: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions; Climate Tracker