

Tal Jonathan-Zamir · David Weisburd
Badi Hasisi

Policing Terrorism, Crime Control, and Police-Community Relations

Learning from the Israeli Experience

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Tal Jonathan-Zamir: *To my father, Aharon (Roni) Jonathan (1944–2012), who would have been so very proud to see this book.*

David Weisburd: *For my fathers, Walter and Charles, who passed on to me a love of scholarship.*

Badi Hasisi: *To my beloved family, Rada, Ram, and Mira.*

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Contents

1 Introduction and Study Context	1
What Are the Potential Consequences of Policing Terrorism?	4
The Potential Effects of Policing Terrorism on the Crime-Fighting Role of the Police	4
The Potential Effects of Policing Terrorism on Police-Community Relationships	6
The Israeli Context for Studying the Outcomes of Policing Terrorism	9
The INP and the Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism	12
Origins and Structure of the INP	12
The Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism	14
Research Questions and Data.....	22
References.....	26
2 Terrorist Threats and Police Performance	33
Clearance Rates and Police Performance	34
The Effects of Policing Terrorism on Clearance Rates: A Study of Israeli Communities	35
Control Variables.....	39
The Findings	41
Discussion	44
Conclusions.....	47
Appendix 1: Categories of Threat Variables at the Station Level	48
Appendix 2: Regression Without the SES Variable	48
References.....	49
3 Police Involvement in Counterterrorism and Public Attitudes Toward the Police	53
Hypothesis 1: Policing Terrorism May Weaken Public Perceptions of the Police.....	54
Hypothesis 2: Policing Terrorism May Encourage Positive Public Evaluations.....	55
Policing Terrorism and the “Rally Effect”	57

The Data.....	59
Surveys of Public Attitudes Toward the INP.....	60
Findings.....	61
Trust.....	61
Procedural Justice.....	63
Performance.....	66
Performance in Policing Terrorism.....	67
Discounting Alternative Explanations to Observed Trends.....	68
Discussion.....	70
Conclusions.....	72
Appendix: Ministry of Public Security Surveys.....	73
References.....	74
4 The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy.....	79
Procedural Justice and Performance as Antecedents of Police Legitimacy in Situations of Security Threats.....	80
Security Threats and Public Attitudes.....	81
The Data.....	83
Sderot: A City Under Severe Security Threats.....	83
Comparison Districts.....	85
Sampling Within the Districts.....	85
Survey of Public Attitudes Toward the Police.....	87
Findings.....	89
Discussion.....	91
Conclusions.....	92
Appendix: Control Variables.....	93
References.....	95
5 How Do Majority Communities View the Potential Costs of Policing Terrorism?.....	99
The Survey.....	100
In-Depth Interviews.....	102
Findings.....	104
Involvement of the INP in Counterterrorism.....	104
The Effects of Policing Terrorism on Police-Community Relationships.....	105
The Effects of Policing Terrorism on the Relationship Between the Police and Israeli-Arab Citizens.....	106
The Impact of Policing Terrorism on the Ability of the Police to Handle Crime.....	107
Discussion.....	109
Conclusions.....	114
References.....	114

6 Policing Terrorism from the Perspective of the Arab Minority	117
Police-Minority Relations and Policing Terrorism	118
The Arab Minority in Israel	119
The Data.....	121
Results.....	122
Policing Terrorism and Police Performance	122
Policing Terrorism and Police-Community Relations	126
Policing Terrorism and Public Cooperation with the Police.....	130
Conclusions.....	131
Appendix 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample and the Population in Israel, by Ethnicity (Jewish/Arab)	133
Appendix 2: OLS Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Policing Terrorism.....	134
References.....	136
7 How Has the Israel National Police Perceived Its Role in Counterterrorism and the Potential Outcomes?	139
Data and Hypotheses.....	141
Period I: The Assignment of the INP with Counterterrorism Responsibilities	142
Assignment with “Internal Security” Responsibilities as a Major Reform	142
Counterterrorism as the Top Priority, at the Expense of Other Obligations	143
Acceptance and Perception of Capabilities.....	144
The Civil Guard as an Important Vehicle for Fostering Police-Community Relationships	144
Period II: The First Palestinian Intifada.....	145
The Transition to Focusing on Counterterrorism as a Major Reform and Shift in Priorities (1988–1989)	145
Reconciliation with the Dual Responsibility (1990–1995).....	146
The Significance of the Civil Guard to Police-Community Relationships.....	147
Period III: The Second Palestinian Intifada	147
Ongoing Reconciliation with and Acceptance of the Dual Role	148
Lack of Resources.....	149
Pride and Grief.....	149
Positive Impact on the Relationships Between the Police and the Public.....	150
Discussion.....	151
Conclusions.....	154
References.....	155

8 Summary and Conclusions..... 157

 Main Findings 159

 The Effects of Terrorism Threats on Police Performance
 in Solving Crime 159

 The Effects of Terrorism Threats on Public Evaluations
 of the Police Over Time 160

 The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents
 of Police Legitimacy 160

 Majority Communities' Perceptions of the Potential Costs
 of Policing Terrorism 161

 Views of Israeli Arabs (in Comparison to Israeli Jews)
 Regarding the Counterterrorism Function of the INP..... 161

 Perceptions of the Israeli Police Regarding Their Role
 in Counterterrorism and Its Implications 162

 What Are the Implications of Policing Terrorism? 163

 Conclusions..... 168

 References..... 168

Index..... 171

Chapter 1

Introduction and Study Context

There is broad agreement among police scholars that the last decades in American policing have “witnessed a remarkable degree of innovation” (National Research Council, 2004, p. 82). However, prior to the September 11 terror attack, such innovation has been concerned primarily with questions of crime and community. American police were in some sense caught unaware when the country’s security priorities were radically altered by the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001 (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2005), and they were not alone. Even countries that had organized to fight terrorism much earlier, such as Great Britain and Germany, began to reappraise their readiness and rethink the role of police in preventing terrorism and limiting its consequences. Since then, homeland security has become a central priority for the police in the USA and many other Western democracies (Bamford, 2004; Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; IACP, 2005; National Research Council, 2004; Randol, 2013)—today, in addition to performing traditional, crime-fighting roles, police are expected to uncover terrorist networks, collaborate with other agencies, respond to suspicious situations, and serve as first-line emergency responders (LaFree, 2012; National Research Council, 2004; Randol, 2013; Shernock, 2009).

The significant involvement of police in counterterrorism raises new problems and questions for democratic police agencies. On one level, counterterrorism can be viewed as a natural extension of traditional police roles in maintaining order in communities and responding to emergencies such as riots or natural disasters. But even if we accept and recognize this role, it is clear that the new security situation may call for new responsibilities for the police that emphasize the investigation and identification of terrorists or the prevention of terrorism (Greene, 2011). LaFree (2012), for example, describes police responses to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, and compares them with the 2009 case of Najibullah Zazi, who tried to carry out an attack on the NYC subway system. LaFree shows that while both cases involved local and federal authorities, the 1993 attack was handled much like

ordinary crime—by responding to the scene and using traditional investigation and forensic methods, while in the Zazi case the police were very proactive, including the use of intense surveillance for months and an attempt by the NYPD to gather additional intelligence from a local source.

Such activities are likely to increase police investment in what some scholars call “high policing” (Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur & Depeyron, 2003). High policing takes an approach that emphasizes controlling rather than servicing the public (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Sidel, 2004; Thacher, 2005; Wilkinson, 2001), and is characterized by its focus on strategic issues at a macro level, rather than local crime and disorder problems that have become the primary focus of many Western, democratic police agencies (Bayley, 2006; Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). High policing is expected to become particularly prominent in times of crisis or moral panic (Greene, 2011), and, in turn, threaten the relationship between the police and local communities, police legitimacy, and accomplishments in handling traditional crime and disorder problems.

Because counterterrorism is a different and relatively new role for many police agencies in the Western world, and because it has become an inherent part of police mission, questions and concerns about policing terrorism have been occupying scholars, practitioners, and policy makers for over a decade now. Indeed, we know more today about the role of the police in counterterrorism than we did in 2001. Much has been written, for example, on what police agencies *should* do in order to prepare for terrorist threats or how they should merge counterterrorism with “traditional” policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing (e.g., Brown, 2007; Carter & Carter, 2009, 2012; Clarke & Newman, 2007; Greene, 2011; Henry, 2002; Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Kelling & Bratton, 2006; Newman & Clarke, 2008; Oliver, 2006). We also know more about what police agencies are actually *doing* to counter terrorism, and the factors that impact preparedness or organizational change (e.g., Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Deflem, 2011; Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009; Joyal, 2012; LaFree, 2012; Lee, 2010; Lum, Habersfeld, Fachner, & Lieberman, 2009; Randol, 2013; Roberts, Roberts, & Liedka, 2012; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Schaible & Sheffield, 2011; Smith, Shields, & Damphousse, 2011). Discussions about effectiveness and evidence-based approaches for assessing counterterrorism strategies more generally have also become prominent (Lum & Kennedy, 2012; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006).

At the same time, we still know very little about the *implications* of policing terrorism in terms crime-control and police-community relations. Do counterterrorism responsibilities affect the ability of local police agencies to respond to crime, or the nature of their relationship with the communities that they serve? This is not to say that these issues have not been raised. Policing scholars and practitioners have introduced concerns and speculations and suggested, for example, that focusing on counterterrorism may come at the expense of addressing “classic” police responsibilities, such as fighting crime and dealing with local, day-to-day community problems, and that this role may result in the militarization of the police, change their focus from “service” to “suspicion,” and thus impede their relationship with the communities that they serve and bring about a drop in public trust (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005;

Greene, 2011; Mastrofski, 2006; Mijares & Jamieson, 2011; Murray, 2005). At the same time, to date, few attempts have been made to examine such arguments empirically. Does increased police involvement in counterterrorism come at the expense of fighting crime, or can the police successfully carry out these two tasks simultaneously? Does the public evaluate the police less, or alternatively more favorably when they engage in counterterrorism? What does the public expect from the police in situations of acute security threats? Do the public and the police recognize the potential, unintended outcomes of policing terrorism?

Our goal in this book is to go beyond theoretical discussions and speculations, and gain an empirical, evidenced-based understanding of the implications of having local police in a democratic society extensively involved in combating terrorism. Our analyses focus specifically on Israel, because it is a setting that provides a unique opportunity to carry out such an examination. Unlike many Western, democratic police agencies, the INP (Israel National Police) has been involved in counterterrorism as early as 1974, when the Israeli government at the time assigned this agency with broad “internal security” responsibilities within the pre-1967 border. Since then terrorism threats in Israel have been significant, but have also varied substantially over time and across communities. This variability, along with the well-established counterterrorism role of the Israeli police, allowed us to test questions about the outcomes of policing terrorism that would have been difficult to test elsewhere.

In the chapters that follow we detail the findings from a 4-year, multi-method study that examined the implications of policing terrorism in practice. Our findings lead to a much more cautious approach to the issue of policing terrorism than that often found in academic discussions and policy papers. Our work suggests that policing terrorism may have negative, unintended consequences for the police and the public. And these consequences should lead to strong caution as Western democratic societies push their public police to deal with terrorist threats. Moreover, it has been suggested that in the face of terrorism, the public is willing to compromise on local policing, just procedures and civil liberties more generally, which have become a hallmark of American and other Western policing at the turn of the century (e.g., Davis & Silver, 2004; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). Our findings in a Western democracy with a history of serious security threats are that the public wants effective responses to terrorism, but not at the price of compromise on just procedures and traditional policing goals.

Before turning to the specific components of the study, we provide in this introductory chapter a more general background on the potential implications of policing terrorism and their importance for policing and society, while tying the discussion to our study setting—policing terrorism in Israel. We will also discuss the Israeli context for studying policing terrorism, provide background on the INP, and review the Israeli model for policing terrorism, focusing on its specific operational components and goals.¹ This will give the reader a better sense of policing terrorism in

¹This review is adapted from: Weisburd, D., Jonathan, T., and Perry, S. (2009). The Israeli model for policing terrorism: Goals, strategies and open questions. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 36(12), 1259–1278. Available online: <http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/36/12/1259.short>.

Israel, as well as a context for understanding the focus on outcomes of policing terrorism in subsequent chapters. We conclude with a description of the specific research questions examined in the individual chapters that follow.

What Are the Potential Consequences of Policing Terrorism?

Since the terror attack of September 11, 2001, police forces in the USA, as well as in other countries, have raised their levels of alert and increased their involvement in counterterrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; IACP, 2005; LaFree, 2012; National Research Council, 2004). While this responsibility may seem natural for the police in Israel or in other countries that have been facing high levels of terrorism threats for decades, it was relatively new for local police agencies in countries like the USA (Greene, 2011; IACP, 2005). Thus, along with the rise in police involvement in counterterrorism, scholars and practitioners have begun to debate and speculate on the effects that policing terrorism may have on the police and the public more generally (e.g., Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005; Greene, 2011; Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005). The hypothesized implications of policing terrorism can be divided into potential effects on the crime-fighting role of the police and on the relationship between the police and the public, as detailed below.

The Potential Effects of Policing Terrorism on the Crime-Fighting Role of the Police

Does police attention to terrorism impact on the ability of local police agencies to address crime and disorder? Or is the policing of terrorism just another obligation that can be carried out in tandem with traditional policing responsibilities? Indeed, there is some evidence that the policing of terrorism can lead to more effective prevention of crime. In an Israeli study of the impacts of closures and other anti-terrorism efforts during the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada, Herzog (2003) found that vehicle thefts in Israel declined significantly. In this case, and perhaps others, heightened surveillance regarding terrorism and related efforts to restrain movements of terrorists can lead to crime-control gains. Such unintended consequences of crime prevention activities are not exceptional. For example, in a program which sought to reduce prostitution in an area in North London, Matthews (1990) found not only a decline in prostitution and cruising, but also reductions in a range of serious crimes, such as burglary and auto thefts. This “diffusion of benefits” (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994) has been identified in numerous studies examining crime prevention programs (see review by Clarke, 2005). More generally, increased surveillance of police in specific areas as a means of preventing terrorism might be

expected to deter other crime and disorder problems. Such heightened surveillance might also be expected to increase the ability of police to identify and capture suspects, thus increasing the performance of the police in solving conventional crimes.

But there are many reasons to suspect that terrorist threats might impair the ability of the police to respond to crime problems. One major concern raised in this context relates to resource allocation—the ability of police to adequately attend to “classic” responsibilities while being extensively involved in countering terrorism. There may be significant opportunity costs in police investment of major resources in counterterrorism functions. Assuming an unlimited supply of resources for the police, it might be possible to predict little impact of policing terrorism on other police functions. But such major increases in policing budgets are unlikely. Rather, police agencies often operate within limited budgets, in which they must balance different services to the public. This has certainly been the experience of the INP, which, for example, did not receive any major increase in its budget during the period of heightened security concerns during the Second Palestinian Intifada, despite the fact that the threat of terrorism increased geometrically (see Atad, 2001; Nahoom-Halevi, 2005).² It is reasonable to assume that in Israel and in other countries, more resources for counterterrorism and homeland security will likely lead to fewer resources for traditional crime-control functions.

How would this affect day-to-day police activities? After a terrorist attack in an Israeli city, for example, or even in the process of preventing an attack, many officers from different units, including administrative staff, are called to stop their routine activities and attend the scene. Everything that is not considered urgent is pushed aside. Many of the issues that trouble local communities may not be viewed as “urgent” in this context, and attention to these problems is delayed or terminated altogether. A similar outcome was found in Montgomery County in 2002: when police were trying to identify and capture a sniper responsible for a series of fatal shootings, a number of units, including the sexual crimes unit, were closed for a period because officers were shifted to the more pressing sniper investigation (University of Maryland Symposium, 2003³).

A reduction in effectiveness in controlling crime may be a consequence not only of resource allocation, but also of the perception of the public that crime control is a low priority for the police. In a forum at the Israeli Democracy Institute assessing the balance between the counterterrorism role of the INP and its other responsibilities, it was argued that many citizens felt during the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada that there was no point in reporting crimes such as theft or robbery to the police since they viewed the police as unable to suitably respond to these types of events given their preoccupation with counterterrorism concerns. Such perceptions, combined with the reality of the limitations of police service to the public, are assumed to lead to great frustration and feelings of vulnerability, which, in turn, are

² Also see <http://www.mof.gov.il/budget2007/docs/302.pdf>.

³ This symposium of police executives from the Washington, DC tri-state area took place at the University of Maryland, College Park on May 9, 2003, and was organized by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Police Research Group.

seen to result in decreased public trust and negative perceptions of the police (Fishman, 2005). Little public trust and support may further undermine the ability of the police to address crime problems (see reviews by Tyler, 2004, 2009). These issues seem particularly pronounced with regard to the Israeli-Arab population (see Hasisi, 2006; Rattner & Hasisi, 2005). We return to the potential effects of policing terrorism on police-community relations in the next section.

A final reason why police effectiveness in fighting crime may drop as a result of counterterrorism responsibilities relates to police preferences. Bayley and Weisburd (2009) point to the potential danger of the attractiveness of “high policing” in contrast to traditional crime control or “low policing” obligations. Anti-terrorism and homeland security activities have particular salience and status for police. When community policing was promoted in the 1980s and 1990s, police resisted taking on its community-engaged and servicing functions, preferring to rely on higher status enforcement activities that generated a large number of arrests (Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Weisburd & McElroy, 1988; Weisburd, Shalev, & Amir, 2002). Similarly, Bayley and Weisburd (2009) argue that there will be a tendency for the police to prefer homeland security related “high policing” over traditional low policing functions. This same tension was noted by Jerome Skolnick (1993) in regard to the natural tendency of police to pursue drug-related arrests. Thus, in addition to fewer resources devoted to crime control and less public cooperation, the police themselves may prefer, whenever possible, to focus on counterterrorism. Taken together, scholars have suggested that there would be a negative relationship between police involvement in counterterrorism and their performance in fighting crime.

The Potential Effects of Policing Terrorism on Police-Community Relationships

A second major concern raised in the context of the outcomes of policing terrorism relates to the potential effects of this police responsibility on the character of the police, the way they view their goals and roles in society and the manner by which they interact with the public. Bayley and Weisburd (2009), for example, have clearly voiced this concern by arguing that extensive homeland security responsibilities may change the focus of the police from “low” to “high” policing (see Brodeur, 1983, 2003, 2007, 2011; O’Reilly & Ellison, 2006), which may affect both their goals and strategies and their character and interactions with the public.

The term “high policing” was originally discussed in the context of the “police state” (Chapman, 1970; also see Manning, 1977), referring to “the use of political intelligence to preserve the power of the ruler, in particular as this involved stealth, spying, espionage, and intrigue” (Marx, 2014, p. 2062). The concept evolved over time and received particular expansion in the work of Jean-Paul Brodeur (1983, 2011), who characterized “high policing” as political surveillance, different from “low policing,” which refers to law enforcement. In his work from 1983 and 2011

he identified a total of nine features of high policing that include, for example, absorbing information by casting a wide net, the use of informants as a major tool, and secrecy (see review by Marx, 2014). As summarized by Bayley and Weisburd (2009), high policing focuses on macro-level issues rather than local problems. The methods of this policing style are characterized by covert tactics such as surveillance and intelligence gathering, which are often less transparent and accountable, and associated with violations of human rights and procedural justice. Thus, high policing may change the orientation of the police from providing service and viewing citizens as clients, to controlling the public and viewing citizens as suspects. Greene (2011, p. 214) adds that “such model of policing gains currency in times of crisis.”

High policing is difficult to control, and the critical nature of terrorist threats may provide justifications for police violations of the law, both in developing intelligence and in prosecuting suspects. The INP, in this regard, has been the subject of repeated investigation and criticism (B’Tselem, 1990, 2001) and American police agencies have also been challenged because of intelligence abuses (Richman, 2004–2005). Thus, policing terrorism may have substantive consequences for police development of contacts with the public. Expressing this concern in regard to the American situation after 9/11, Braga and Weisburd (2006, p. 350) argue:

...this new set of demands, with its emphasis on collecting intelligence on terrorist networks, apprehending terror operatives, and protecting likely targets, may push policing back to a more professional model that is distant from the community. Indeed, there is a real potential for a backward shift as federal financial support and attention has been directed toward enhancing local law enforcement’s role in maintaining homeland security while, at the same time, funding for community crime prevention efforts has been drastically reduced.

Mastrofski (2006) raised similar concerns in the context of the future of community policing. He argued that police involvement in countering terrorism may subordinate the community to the police and undermine police accountability and responsiveness to the public. He further claims that focusing on counterterrorism may result in close association between the police and military or intelligence agencies, which may contribute to the militarization of the police (also see Mijares & Jamieson, 2011), which, in turn, may hamper recent efforts to bring the police and the community closer together. Similar arguments and concerns were raised by other scholars as well (Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005; Greene, 2011; Hasisi et al., 2009; Lyons, 2002; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005). Kim and de Guzman (2012) have recently found support for some of these propositions. Their analysis of LEMAS data revealed that after the terror attack of September 11, police agencies in the USA have generally become less focused on community policing. These authors highlight, however, that beyond the broad paradigm shift, it is not clear if and how this change actually affected the relationship between the police and the public.

We might assume that negative impacts on police-community relationships will be most salient in minority communities that are linked ethnically or nationally to terrorist groups. The police may consider those communities as high risk and may increase surveillance and control (Hasisi et al., 2009). Such surveillance and control

moreover, might not be seen by such communities as representing an improvement in the quality of local policing. Indeed such increases in police activities in minority communities have often been viewed by the communities themselves as a case of their being unfairly profiled by the police as “the enemy within” (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Khashu, Busch, Latif, & Levy, 2005; Thacher, 2005).

These problems are particularly important in the Israeli context because of the familial and national ties of Israeli Arabs to Palestinians in surrounding countries and the Palestinian controlled territories. The INP has tried to develop community policing models that would encourage police-community relationships in Arab villages and towns within Israel (Weisburd et al., 2002). However, the counterterrorism functions of the Israeli police are likely to clash with the goals of creating closer police-community relations in these areas. It is difficult to be “officer friendly” one day and enter a village or town the next to gain intelligence on suspects that may be from the area, or have family or other contacts there. A similar concern was voiced by police in regard to assisting immigration authorities in the USA. Some police managers in areas near the Mexican border responded negatively to requests for help in identifying illegal immigrants because they thought it would damage the strong relations that they had developed with Mexican American communities in those areas (McDonald, 2003).

While scholars discussed the possible negative effects of policing terrorism on police-community relationships, they have often ignored potential benefits that may accrue to the police as a result of adopting counterterrorism and homeland security functions. For example, it has been claimed that perceived police successes in handling terror threats and attacks in Israel during the Second Palestinian Intifada, along with its noticeable presence within and outside city centers during that time, put the Israeli police at the center of public attention, thereby improving their reputation and enhancing public sympathy. Some police and scholars argued that the Israeli police have earned the public support that is usually reserved for the Israeli Army and the General Security Agency (Fishman, 2005).

Clearly, one reason for this is that the Israeli police work closely with communities in their homeland security efforts. They attend schools and educate children about terrorism and its prevention; they encourage the public to report suspicious objects or people and are perceived to respond very efficiently to such calls; they encourage the public to join the Civil Guard and assist in counterterrorism efforts; they make sure public facilities are well secure; and they are generally seen to handle scenes of terror attacks efficiently. Innes (2006) moreover notes in a discussion of policing terrorism in the UK that police can also play a central role in minimizing ethnic conflicts that result from heightened concerns with terrorism. As part of the British Police responses to a terrorist attack, officers carry out activities such as high-visibility “reassurance” patrols at designated areas and mass media campaigns. Additionally, the police in the UK see themselves as responsible for managing the local impact of geopolitical events. For example, when military actions were being taken in Afghanistan, the police were concerned that this would trigger tensions between ethnic groups in local communities. In sum, there are reasons to suspect that police involvement in counterterrorism may have both costs and benefits in terms of police-community relationships.

These two broad themes examining the impacts of policing terrorism on traditional police functions and on just procedures and the legitimacy of police actions have generated much speculation but received relatively little empirical attention as police agencies in Western nations have rushed to develop effective responses to potential terrorist threats. As noted above, much of the literature on policing terrorism is concerned with “how to do it” or “what has been done since September 11.” The question of its implications for policing and society has often been left aside. More than a decade after the September 11 terrorist attack, we think that it is critical for scholars, practitioners, and policy makers to consider the consequences, often unintended, of police involvement in counterterrorism, and our work was designed at the outset to add insight to these questions. We also found it important to consider how these issues are viewed by the *police*. Police agencies may be more (or less) aware of the potential outcomes of policing terrorism, and their awareness (or lack of) may impact issues like training, allocation of resources, measures of success, and how the task of policing terrorism is approached more generally. While there is some indication that the Israeli police have considered some of the potential outcomes of policing terrorism (see Fishman, 2005), we are not aware of consistent hypotheses or findings in this area. Nevertheless, we think it is a crucial component of studying the consequences of policing terrorism. We now turn to the context of our study: Israel as a laboratory for studying policing terrorism, the INP—Israel’s national police agency, and the Israeli model for policing terrorism.

The Israeli Context for Studying the Outcomes of Policing Terrorism

The INP has a long history of experience with the problem of terrorism, and is generally considered highly efficient and professional in its approach to counterterrorism (e.g., Bott et al., 2009; Kamhine, 2000). As detailed in the next section, at least since the early 1970s it has been given significant counterterrorism responsibilities. Thus, unlike local police agencies in many Western democracies that were forced to make counterterrorism a priority only *after* the September 11 attack, in the Israeli case we have almost 40 years of experience in policing terrorism to learn from. Moreover, terrorist activities remained a core national concern throughout this period,⁴ which gave us ample opportunity to examine the outcomes of police investment in counterterrorism, but no less important—terrorism threats in Israel have varied considerably over time and across communities. As detailed throughout this book, this variability allowed us to compare the effects of different levels of terrorist threats (and, consequentially, the extent of the INP’s investment in counterterrorism) on both the ability of the police to control crime and on public views and priorities. Thus, in more than one way the Israeli situation provides a unique and

⁴ See the website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA>.

important example to draw lessons from in terms of the impacts of entrusting democratic police agencies with key counterterrorism functions.

Nevertheless, Israeli policing clearly has elements that are unique, or at least different from those typically encountered in other Western democracies. The INP is a national police force with strong central control. While the centralized model is common in Europe, it is very different from the diffused local model of policing common in the USA. And even in Europe there is a tendency for more local control of policing. For example, despite the strong centralized structure of policing in France and Italy, there are also local police agencies that are responsible to municipal government (Manna & Infante, 2000; McKee, 2001). While there has been an experiment with municipal policing in one small Israeli city (Bilski, 2001), the Israeli model remains highly centralized. The continuing strong links between the military and the police in border security and in the West Bank and the existence of the quasi-military Border Guard (see next section) also suggest strong differences from the structures of policing in many other Western democracies, and especially from the USA (though some Western European countries such as France, Spain, and Italy evidence strong formal connections between the police and the military). Perhaps as a result of such links, Israeli officials suggest that there are close and ongoing formal and informal contacts between the police, the “Shabak” (or GSA—“General Security Agency”), and the military in coordinating counterterrorism activities. This may be contrasted with the situation in the USA before September 11, where the lack of intelligence coordination has been strongly criticized (Henry, 2002; Kelling & Bratton, 2006; Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005).

Whatever the differences between the structure of the INP and that of other Western democracies, it is clear that there are basic similarities. Israel is a democratic country where the police are constrained by regulation from abusing their authority over citizens and are required by law to provide equal treatment irrespective of ethnic, religious, or national origin, and where an independent Supreme Court plays a dominant role. Like police in other democracies, they must justify and explain their actions to the larger public. Though the INP, like police agencies in other Western democracies, may not always meet these standards, these legal requirements link the INP to other democratic police agencies. Most day-to-day responsibilities and activities of local police stations in Israel, such as managing traffic, handling crime problems and providing general services to the public, resemble those of local police agencies in other Western democracies. Even when responding to terrorist threats, police practices are similar to those used in the Western world (see below). Finally, the INP was influenced by recent international innovations in policing, such as community policing, Compstat and “hot-spots” policing (Meniv, 2013; Weisburd et al., 2002; Weisburd & Amram, 2014).

At the same time, what makes Israel a useful case-study also distinguishes it from many other Western democracies. Terrorism is not a new threat in Israel, and indeed it has been a major source of national concern since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The USA and European countries have also experienced terrorist threats in earlier decades. For example, the Puerto Rican FLAN in the USA was responsible for a series of terrorist incidents in the 1970s and 1980s

(Mickolus, 1980; Mickolus, Sandler, & Murdock, 1989); the Baader-Meinhof gang carried out attacks in Germany as early as the 1970s (Townshend, 2002); and the Irish Republican Army was a continual threat in the UK until the peace negotiations (Matassa & Newburn, 2003; Mulcahy, 2005). While the experience in the UK may be closest to Israel in terms of the severity and the long-term nature of the threats involved, it is clear that Israel has faced the most consistent threat of terrorism of any of the Western democracies. Moreover, the threat of terrorism in Israel was linked to a more general conventional military threat to Israel from neighboring Arab states. And in recent years, the terrorist threat has come primarily from the Palestinian Authority territories, which represent administrative areas that are, or had been previously under Israeli military control. Finally, beyond differences in the nature and extent of terrorist threats, there are clearly contextual differences between Israel and other Western democracies. For example, Israel and the USA differ in terms of size (of the country and population); public perceptions of the government (in terms of credibility and responsibility for public safety); sociocultural values; and structure of government (Bott et al., 2009).

There is simply no perfect laboratory for examining the consequences of the police taking on counterterrorism functions, and clearly every national setting has unique components. Nevertheless, we argue that Israel provides an important setting to ask the question of what consequences other Western democracies *may* face as they invest greater policing resources in dealing with terrorist threats, for the following main reasons: Israel is a Western, democratic country; the INP resembles local police agencies in many Western democracies in its core functions and restrains; the INP has been responsible for counterterrorism for nearly 40 years; and finally, there has been significant variation in the nature and intensity of terrorist threats faced by the Israeli police, which is a precondition required for any empirical analysis of causality.

Indeed, and not surprisingly, Israel is frequently used as a case-study to learn from in terms of counterterrorism. For example, Bott et al. (2009) have carried out an in-depth examination of Israeli counterterrorism efforts that involve the public, for the purpose of drawing lessons applicable to the USA. They argue that “the theme of public engagement in counterterrorism measures offers...one of the most innovative aspects of the Israeli experience, and which has great applicability to the U.S. context.” They briefly review and acknowledge the contextual differences between Israel and the USA, but also argue that “there is value in understanding the practices being used by other countries and assessing whether they could be adopted effectively, in some manner, here in the USA.” They further stress that because of the differences, they focused on measures that “had the potential to impact U.S. practices in areas in which significant efforts were also being concentrated,” and that “were generally applicable to the U.S. socio-political, cultural and legal landscape” (p. 12). Similarly to Bott et al. (2009), our study focuses, to a large extent, on the public and its relationship to the police in the context of counterterrorism. Israel has also been used as a case-study for assessing the economic and social effects of terrorism (Morag, 2006); as a comparison to the USA when analyzing reactions to the September 11 attacks through the lens of Terror Management

Theory (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003); as a comparison to the USA and the UK when assessing judicial balancing in the “war on terror” (Rosenfeld, 2005); and as a model for examining key dilemmas faced by decision makers concerning counterterrorism, including intelligence, offensive, deterrent and defensive activities, legislation and punishment, information and education, international cooperation and the media (Ganor, 2011).

We similarly argue that there is much value in understanding the implications of the extensive involvement of the INP in counterterrorism in terms of this agency’s ability to address crime problems and its relationship with the community, both majority and minority. Nevertheless, the reader should clearly keep the unique characteristics of the INP and Israeli setting more generally in mind when reviewing our study and findings. To facilitate this, before turning to the specific research questions of the study, in the next section we provide general background on the INP and describe the model used by this agency to respond to terrorism.

The INP and the Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism

Origins and Structure of the INP

In 1948, following the establishment of the state of Israel, the “police command” of the British Mandate continued to form the legal basis for civilian police activities in Israel. The responsibility for establishing an Israeli police agency was placed on Lieutenant General Yaa’kov Dori, Chief of the General Staff of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces, the Israeli Army) at the time, and on the “Hagana” (the pre-state Jewish militia), which was the only organization with the capabilities and authority to carry out such a task. The INP was originally founded as a brigade in the IDF, and thus depended on the IDF for weapons and supplies. Its initial organizational structure, as well as its preliminary operational procedures, was based heavily on the model of the British Mandate Police, a colonial-military police.

The military influence on the INP was accentuated by the fact that the initial police cohorts were recruited from the overall pool of army recruits. Individuals who were over the age of 35 and without the necessary military qualifications were drafted to the police rather than to military units. “Border Guard” police officers (see below), who comprise about one third of the INP today, are still recruited primarily as part of the national military draft. A number of Israeli policing scholars have noted in this context that the military model is firmly rooted in the organization, culture, and procedures of the INP (Ben-Porat, 1988; Herzog, 2001; Hovav & Amir, 1979; Shadmi & Hod, 1996; Weisburd et al., 2002; also see review by Shalev, 2003).

Israel uses a national model of policing, in which all police units are commanded by the Commissioner of Police, who is appointed by the government following the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security. During the period of the study described in this book, the INP was divided into six districts: Northern, Tel Aviv,

Central, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), Jerusalem, and Southern. Each district (“Machoz”) is again divided into 2–4 sub-districts (“Merchav”), and within the sub-districts are the local police stations. These three geographical levels also represent the hierarchy of command, all subordinated to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the national police agency.

The INP includes two main organizational components: the “regular” police force, often termed the “Blue Police,” and the “Border Guard.” The Border Guard, whose units are for the most part subordinated to the “Blue Police” territorial commander, is the “...operational and professional arm of the police in matters of internal security and combating terrorism...”⁵ The Border Guard is also involved in handling protests and other mass-disturbance events, but, importantly, it also plays a role in traditional police activities such as combating crime. The Border Guard functions as a quasi-military force and makes up about one third of the estimated 28,000 sworn officers in the INP. Its members wear military green rather than the traditional light blue worn by the rest of the INP. The Border Guard is responsible for security activities in areas on the “seam” between Israel and the Palestinian territories and plays a central role in policing areas such as Jerusalem that present special security concerns.

The National Police Headquarters in Jerusalem is composed of seven departments (Patrol and Security, Organization and Planning, Traffic, Community and Civil Guard, Logistic Support, Human Resources, and Investigations and Intelligence Department), which are expected to assist the Police Commissioner in developing policy, allocating resources, planning, coordinating, and supervising the various districts. Headquarters include several additional units, such as the Legal Adviser’s Office, Spokesperson’s Office, Finance Department and Public Complaints Office, which also answer directly to the Police Commissioner. Lastly, several police units operate on the national level and hold various responsibilities including important homeland security tasks, such as the National Unit for Organized and International Crime.

The INP also has authority over the “Civil Guard,” the largest voluntary organization in Israel. The Civil Guard was established in 1974 following several major terror attacks that took place that year. Its estimated 75,000 volunteers directly assist police units in all areas of responsibility throughout the country. Their activities include patrolling, setting road blocks, and securing local and major events, schools and public transportation. Further, volunteers assist in other police duties such as traffic control, investigations, identification of disaster victims and rescue operations. In addition to the significant contribution in terms of manpower, the Civil Guard is considered an important vehicle for fostering police-community relationships (Weisburd et al., 2002).

The responsibilities of the INP, as defined by law, include preventing crime; investigating and clearing crime; identifying offenders and bringing them to justice; supervising and controlling traffic; maintaining public order and safety; the secure

⁵ See www.police.gov.il. Statistical and other descriptive information regarding the Israel National Police in the text that are not cited directly are drawn from this information source.

imprisonment of prisoners; and maintaining homeland security. This last responsibility was assigned to the INP by the government in 1974, following the rise in Palestinian terrorism and a major terror attack in the town of Ma'alot. This new responsibility forced the police to reorganize: The Civil Guard was established and gradually tens of thousands of volunteers patrolled their own neighborhoods. The Border Guard began securing the air and sea ports. A year later the Operations Division was established for the purpose of coordinating all operating forces and increasing their effectiveness. Further, a special unit for combating terrorism was established (the “Yammam”), along with the Bomb-Disposal unit. The INP has been responsible for homeland security in Israel ever since. Within the State of Israel, the INP has full responsibility for counterterrorism functions. Indeed, as in the USA, Canada, and the UK, and in contrast to many European countries (e.g., France, Spain, and Italy) where the military play an active policing role (Lutterbeck, 2004), the military is not legally empowered to engage in ordinary police functions within the borders of the State of Israel. However, in the Palestinian administered areas or areas in the West Bank under military occupation, the Israel Defense Force has primary responsibilities for anti-terrorism activities. As we note below, however, because of the special skills of the INP, it often aids the military in operations in those areas.

The Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism

Our description of the Israeli model for policing terrorism is based on publicly available documentary sources and discussions with high ranking Israeli police officials. We provide below a portrait of how the Israeli police frame and describe their model for policing terrorism. We begin with a description of the counterterrorism training provided to Israeli police officers. We then describe the overarching goal of the Israeli model for policing terrorism and the three levels of counterterrorism activities carried out by the INP.

Anti-terrorism training and education—Since counterterrorism is one of the explicit responsibilities of the INP, all police officers are trained to face this threat. However, a distinction can be made between four levels of specialization in counterterrorism training. First, all officers undergo basic counterterrorism training, which is intended for police officers whose main role within the police is *not* related to counterterrorism. This training prepares officers for situations where they happen to encounter a terrorist incident and focuses on providing first responses such as isolating the site of the terrorist attack. The second level of training is received by the “Yassam,” or “Special Patrol Unit.” These officers are trained to provide rapid responses to terrorist events and bring them to an end as soon as possible. For example, in a case of shootings, their goal is to reach the scene and stop the shooter within minutes. To accomplish this goal, they use special equipment and transportation, such as motorcycles. Their training is oriented toward this goal, and includes related exercises,

such as urban warfare. The third level of counterterrorism training is received by the “Mistaa’rvim” unit. These officers are trained to conduct undercover operations in which they reach their target and make an arrest without being detected. Their training includes, for example, the topography of areas where terrorist threats emerge (both within Israel and in the Palestinian territories), the balance of powers between ethnic and family groups and local customs and speech. Lastly, the “Yammam,” or “Special Police Unit,” which is the elite police counterterrorism unit, goes through the most specialized counterterrorism training. These officers are trained to handle very specific terrorist situations, such as releasing hostages and carrying out special operations.

The central goal of policing terrorism: Allowing the public to live as if terrorism did not exist—The police are well aware that terrorism is an ongoing threat to Israeli society, and that it is likely that terrorism will form a central problem for the INP for the foreseeable future (Fishman, 2005, also see the INP website). The INP, like Israeli leaders more generally, do not view conventional terrorism as an existential–strategic threat (Levi, 2005) like the Iranian nuclear threat, but it is clear to Israeli police leaders that terrorism can undermine the confidence and security of Israeli citizens. And in this sense they see the central goal of the INP’s anti-terrorism efforts as making it possible for the general public to maintain their everyday routines. There is a great deal of emphasis, as we describe below, on preventing terrorism and capturing terrorists in the Israeli counterterrorism model. But this is seen as one part of a larger effort to prevent terrorism from achieving its goal of undermining the morale and security of the public.

This goal is a thread that runs through our discussions with Israeli police officials. It moreover is very much fit to what most scholars have seen as the central purpose of terrorism itself. As Riley and Hoffman (1995, p. 3) argue:

Terrorism is violence, or threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm... terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage they cause, by having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists, for example, may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the importance of their cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.

To understand the INP homeland security model, it is important to recognize at the outset that it entails much more than simply preventing and controlling terrorism, or even managing the consequences of terrorist events. It is part of a much broader strategy that is geared to defeat the goals of terrorism, by strengthening the resolve of the public and providing a context in which terrorism can be placed in the margins of Israeli everyday life. As we describe below, the Israeli police are expected to clear a terrorist scene in 4 h. During the attack, there is a clear protocol on reporting events to news agencies. While the police respond to these events with the goal of tracking perpetrators, aiding victims, and identifying forensic evidence, they are most importantly trying to minimize the long-term effects of the event on the public. The INP organizes its efforts so that the public can go on quickly to their normal

everyday business. This broad overarching goal of the Israeli homeland security model is carried out by the police in terms of three broad types of activities: (1) early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; (2) response activities once the attack has been launched; (3) response activities once the attack has occurred. Below we detail the specific components of each of these areas of activity.

(1) *Early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism*—Clearly, the most effective way to prevent terrorism from affecting the civilian population is by identifying and reacting to terrorist threats before they are actualized. This responsibility includes developing intelligence, establishing operational capabilities that will allow the police to act upon the information obtained, and uprooting terrorist infrastructure. These functions of the police can be classified primarily under the rubric of what has come to be called “high policing” (Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur & Depeyron, 2003).

According to Israeli officials, the key to preventing attacks before they are carried out is the development of quality intelligence and cooperation between intelligence agencies. In this, Israeli officials appear to follow closely the recommendations of American experts who emphasize the importance of collecting and sharing intelligence in the fight against terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006; Loyka et al., 2005). Indeed, the collection of intelligence by the police is carried out in cooperation with a series of other agencies in Israel, including the army and the “Shabak.” This is done at the local and national level and is said to involve a clear division of authority and sharing of intelligence. Clearly, the centralized structure of the INP and its strong military tradition facilitates such intelligence cooperation. Such high policing functions flow more naturally in police agencies that are highly centralized and thus focused on strategic and national rather than local interests.

The mere collection of intelligence, however, is not enough since intelligence without the ability to reach a target or prevent an attack is of little value. These tasks are performed by special operations units, which are trained to enter towns or villages where terrorist actions are being planned. Within the boundaries of the State of Israel, the INP is the only agency authorized to carry out such activities. Special operations in the West Bank fall under the jurisdiction of the Israeli army; however many police units are involved in such activities due to their quasi-military structure and special capabilities. While no hard and fast data are available on these interdiction efforts, the INP now claims that more than 90 % of planned attacks are prevented. Some recent examples of interdiction activities, which are part of routine prevention efforts, include the shooting of Mohamad Ramaha, the Head of the Fatah armed body in Nablus, during an attempted arrest in November 2006 (Greenberg, Hare’l, & Isasharof, 2006); the shooting of a senior member of the Hamas and the arrest of two other Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in November 2006 (Bohbot, 2006); and the attempted arrest of Islamic Jihad activists in the Jenin area in January 2006 (Nahoom, Inbari, & Levi, 2006).

The third aspect of prevention involves attention to the infrastructures that support terrorism. As part of these interdiction efforts, special units of the INP take part in operational attacks in the West Bank directed at places where explosives and

other terrorist devices are manufactured. The police, with the Army and the Shabak, raid these laboratories or lathe-shops, confiscate or destroy the equipment and take the workers in for questioning. Additionally, the police act against organizations and groups that fund terrorism in Israel and elsewhere. In this context, the police play a leadership role in the identification of “charities” that support terrorist organizations and in their prosecution. For instance, in May 2003 the leaders of the Northern Wing of the Israeli Islamic Movement were investigated and arrested for transferring funds from the Islamic Movement to terrorist organizations (see Meiri, Moshkowitz, & Aichner, 2003), and were later convicted of several of the indictments in 2005 (see Rofe-Ofir & Rábad, 2005). Such investigations are often carried out in cooperation with police agencies worldwide, such as in the case of Sami Al-Arian, a college professor who was identified as a fund raiser for the Islamic Jihad and arrested in February 2003, in Tampa, Florida (Amit & Shaked, 2003). Innes (2006, p. 226) calls these “prospective” prevention functions, which include surveillance and other actions against those involved with groups supporting terrorist organizations, including targeting the financing of such groups (Levi & Gilmore, 2002; McCulloch & Pickering, 2005).

In recent years, terrorist organizations have looked to illegal activities, such as drug smuggling or cooperation with organized crime, to gain financial support. There are numerous examples of terrorists utilizing the criminal world for their benefits (such as intelligence or cooperation), and in return they often pay with forged or drug money. An example of the relationship between terrorism and crime in Israel is the case of Elchanan Tennenbaum, an Israeli businessman and former Colonel in the IDF. Tennenbaum, who traveled to Dubai in order to take part in a drug deal, was kidnapped by the Hezbollah in 2000 and released over 3 years later in exchange for Palestinian prisoners (Melman, 2004). Another example is the case of Omer El-Heyb, a Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF from the Bedouin village of Beit-Zarzir, who was accused of spying for the Hezbollah in exchange for smuggling hundreds of kilos of drugs into Israel (Rofe-Ofir, 2004). In April 2006 El-Heyb was convicted of contacts with a foreign agent and dealing drugs (Greenberg, 2006). The police focus specifically on such activities as a long-term prevention strategy, while cooperating with intelligence and law enforcement agencies both in Israel and abroad.

(2) *Response activities once the attack has been launched: Obstacles and delay tactics*—An important function of the INP is to intercept terrorists once an attack has been launched and to make it more difficult to actually carry out the attack. This function has two distinct components. The first is to “slow down” or “capture” terrorists on the way to carry out a specific attack. The second is to educate the public and improve everyday security preparedness.

Because of the small size of the state of Israel, attacks launched in the Palestinian territories can reach Israeli cities in less than half an hour if they are not intercepted or slowed down. The Israeli police have developed a series of strategies to hinder terrorist movement once an attack is underway, including setting up road blocks, creating traffic jams, issuing public warnings, and closing specific public facilities or streets. The goals of these obstacles are twofold. The first objective is to slow

down the terrorists as much as possible and by doing so increase the chances of interdiction before the attack takes place. Second, obstacles compel the terrorist to take counter actions, which may include involving other people or using communication devices. These actions increase opportunities for intelligence collection, both human and signal.

An example of this type of successful interdiction occurred on March 21, 2006. An alert from the Shabak indicated that a suicide bomber carrying an explosives belt was on his way to carry out an attack. The police set up road blocks around Jerusalem and in other designated areas, checking suspicious cars and people and significantly slowing down traffic. Around Shaa'lbim, east of Road Number 1 that connects Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the police identified and stopped a suspicious van with ten Palestinian passengers, one of them later found to be carrying a heavy explosives belt. The bomb was neutralized and the other passengers were taken in for questioning (Diez, 2006).

When terrorists are interdicted, the police try to disarm or capture them with minimal injury to innocent civilians or police. While capture of terrorists is the first goal, there are also procedures that specify when it is permissible to kill a terrorist suspect in order to prevent further injury to civilians or the police. The INP guidelines for the use of lethal force specify that such force may be used in cases where it is the only way to prevent injury to the responding officer, his or her colleagues or innocent civilians. These types of decisions involve important ethical and legal questions (that are sometimes different for terrorist suspects compared with “ordinary” criminals), which are often dealt with by Israeli police commanders and sometimes challenged by the courts.

Apart from the ethical and legal questions that arise in such situations, practical considerations also affect police decision-making. Since the explosives used by Palestinian terrorists are often home-made, they are extremely volatile and can easily be set off. If an officer identifies a terrorist, makes the decision to shoot and hits the device, the device will most likely detonate. Even if the shooter accurately hits the suspect in the head, he or she may fall down and again, the device might explode. Even the use of a taser device may set off the bomb. Recognition of this volatility often leads police officers to exercise significant caution before trying to apprehend a terrorist suspect. For example, following the suicide attack at the entrance to the “Hasharon” mall in Netanya in December, 2005, the police officer who identified the attacker indicated that she could not shoot since the terrorist was surrounded by many people (Azolai, 2005). Accordingly, if a suspect is identified, one of the immediate goals is to isolate and disarm him/her in an area where, if the device goes off, no one apart from the terrorist will be harmed.

The second component of this function—educating the public and improving routine security preparedness—is carried out through a wide array of training and information efforts. The police play a central role in educating the public from an early age to be aware of indications of possible terrorism events and to report their suspicions to the police. For example, police visit elementary schools to meet with children, issue warnings to be alert regarding suspicious objects or people in shopping areas, and request citizens to provide information if they

observe suspicious activities. Additionally, once specific information about a terrorist in a certain area is available, the police immediately make announcements through the media informing the public to stay away from crowded places and to be alert. A similar approach is taken in the UK, where police focus attention on developing public awareness of suspicious behavior (such as suspicious short-term tenants or suspicious people who have bought or rented a car); advancing suitable reporting mechanisms; and creating working relationships with the business community to discuss potential threats and provide guidance on appropriate security measures (Howard, 2004).

One example of public alertness and its importance in preventing terrorism may be found in an incident that took place in Jerusalem on September 4, 2001. A woman approached two Border Guard officers on Nevii'm Street and brought their attention to a man who was dressed as an Ultra-Orthodox Jew. This man raised her suspicion since, despite his clothing, he wore pointy shoes, which are very uncharacteristic of Ultra-Orthodox Jews. The officers approached the man who was indeed a suicide bomber and detonated himself a few minutes later wounding the two officers. However, because of the woman's alertness and the officers' response, a much larger attack was avoided (Shyowitz, 2001).

The success of police education and information activities can be measured in part by the fact that the police bomb squad had responded to over 200,000 calls from citizens in some years. Despite the fact that most of these calls do not lead to the identification of explosives, the police treat each and every call as if it was an actual security threat, both because of the potential damage from a single terrorist attack and to show that they are responsive to the public. Such responsiveness is considered an important method for encouraging the public to continue to cooperate with the police in preventing terrorism. It is also important in increasing public confidence in the police. In turn, at least in the field of counterterrorism, the police are viewed by the public as responding quickly and efficiently to immediate threats (see Fishman, 2005).

General prevention and awareness is also aided by volunteers in the Israeli Civil Guard (CG). As noted earlier, the Civil Guard was established to support policing efforts and is under the direct supervision and control of the police (the CG is located within the "Community Section" of the INP). CG volunteers patrol local communities or business districts with arms provided by the police, and have police powers, responsibilities, and obligations while on duty. The success of the Civil Guard in attracting voluntary participation in law enforcement and terror prevention has been noted in a number of studies (e.g., see Shapira, 2003; Yanay, 1994).

While Civil Guard volunteers support the police in a number of different areas, assisting in counterterrorism is one of the main goals of the Civil Guard and the initial reason for its establishment. Volunteers may join one of several programs, but the largest and most significant focuses on issues of homeland security. In this program volunteers are organized by local "operation centers" and focus on preventing terrorist and criminal activities in their home communities through activities such as patrolling and setting up roadblocks. Volunteers in other Civil Guard programs assist counterterrorism efforts in accordance with the role of the unit to which they

are assigned. For example, they assist the bomb squad by closing down the scene of a suspicious object and by keeping bystanders from crowding after a terrorist attack; they assist the Border Guard by patrolling areas close to the Palestinian territories using jeeps; some assist the police in securing major events such as concerts or protest marches; some focus on securing public transportation by checking bus stops and buses for suspicious objects or people; and lastly, members of “ZAKA” (“Identifying Disaster Victims”), who also operate under the auspices of the Civil Guard, remove human remains from terror attack scenes according to Jewish Law and in ways meant to preserve the dignity of the victims.⁶

(3) *Response activities once the attack has occurred: Controlling the damage*—Beyond general prevention efforts, the police play a critical role in homeland security responses once a terrorist attack has occurred. In this context the police work closely with private security firms and play a central role in supervising private security activities. In Israel, all malls, shopping areas, restaurants, hospitals, office buildings, or any other public facilities have private security guards who check customers entering the facility and conduct other security-related activities. Before licenses for operation are given to such facilities, the police must approve all security procedures. Additionally, once the facility is in operation, the police perform periodic security checks and facilities that do not hold to the security standards set by the INP may be forced to shut down with a court order. For example, in February 2005 the police in Jerusalem sent a suspicious ambulance to the four main hospitals in the city. The license plates were switched so the number in the front did not match the one in the back, and a 9 k dummy bomb was hidden inside. Out of the four, in only one hospital was the ambulance identified as suspicious and stopped by security. As a result of the test, new security procedures were implemented (Ben-David & Zinger, 2005).

To reduce possible damage and injury from terrorist attacks, the police work with private security agencies to ensure that terrorists are unlikely to gain access to and enter public facilities. The underlying principle here is that an explosion that takes place within a closed environment will result in a much more severe outcome than if the same explosion took place outside the facility. A number of terrorist attacks in Israel have caused relatively less damage and fewer injuries because of this approach. For example, in the attack at the entrance to the “Hasharon” mall in Netanya mentioned earlier, a security guard who was standing at the entrance identified the attacker and pushed him against the wall. At that moment the terrorist detonated the bomb, and the security guard, along with four other people, were killed and 65 were injured. The result, however, would have been much worse had the terrorist been successful in gaining access to the mall (Meiri, Mozgovia, Levi, & Shaked, 2005).

The police in Israel are the first responders to any terrorist attack and are responsible for all activities that take place throughout the process, until the scene is cleared. First, the area is divided into two circles, the inner-scene and outer ring. The first responders to the inner-scene are the bomb squad, along with the medics

⁶ See www.zaka.org.il.

who, at this stage, treat and evacuate only the critically injured. The bomb squad closes down the inner-scene and searches for secondary devices or additional terrorists, since it has been common for terrorists to use a series of devices timed so that medics or police who come to respond to the incident are injured by the second device. An example of such a sequence of explosions occurred in Jerusalem on December 1, 2001. Two suicide bombers detonated themselves about a block away, 1 min apart. About 20 min later, while police, medics, and fire fighters were working at the scene, a car bomb exploded in the same area. Six people died in this series of explosions and over 150 were injured, 11 of them critically (Samuel et al., 2001).

At the same time that the inner-scene is closed by the bomb squad, other police units close down the outer ring for the purpose of directing traffic, controlling crowds, and searching for accomplices who might have assisted the attacker and are trying to get away. Once the police have given their permission, medical teams reenter the inner-scene, this time to treat and evacuate all injured. Simultaneously, members of “Zaka” enter the scene along with forensic units. The goal of the forensic units is to collect intelligence and try to identify the type of explosive device for the purpose of linking it to a specific terrorist organization or laboratory.

With regard to organization and hierarchy, the scene commander is the police territorial commander, which is either the District or the Sub-District Commander. He or she is the ultimate and only commander on site, and all organizations involved are subordinated to this commander’s authority, including the medics, “ZAKA,” and even the employees of the local city council who later clean up the area. Within the police each unit has a distinct role that mirrors its day-to-day responsibilities: The bomb squad and the forensic units work within the inner-scene, searching for, identifying, and disarming terrorist devices; the traffic police and patrol officers set up road blocks and direct traffic and crowd within the outer circle; the criminal investigators identify the victims and collect evidence; the intelligence units collect information that may assist in identifying the source of the explosives and the people responsible, while additional teams gather evidence and assist the victims.

All of these activities are expected to be accomplished in no more than 4 h. The police view timing as critical not only to prevent contamination of evidence but also, as noted earlier, to enable the public to continue with their daily routine as quickly as possible. It is expected that this rapid cleanup of the site will minimize the ongoing effect of the attack and the related psychological distress of the public. Another strategy by which the Israeli police attempt to reduce distress and fear after a terrorist attack is through the communication of information to the public during and after the attack, for which standard practices have been developed. From the beginning of the event and throughout the process, the territorial commander and his or her deputy or spokesperson communicate ongoing information to the press and the public. This information includes details such as the description of the event, areas or roads that have been shut down, and alternative routes. The underlying assumption here is that when there is not clear and accurate communication with the public, rumors and panic will fill the void.

The Israeli model for policing terrorism seeks to minimize the impacts of terrorism on the everyday routines of Israeli citizens. Its goal simply stated is to allow

the population to act as if terrorism did not exist, even during periods in which terrorist threats are high. Even when the everyday routines of Israeli citizens are impeded, for example when roadblocks slow traffic, or terrorist attacks have succeeded, the policing strategies employed are developed in ways that are expected to reduce fear and the long-term impacts of terrorist events. Our review of the Israeli model for policing terrorism points to the complex and multifaceted role that police can play in counterterrorism and homeland security. The police are involved in early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; response activities once the attack has been launched; and response activities once the attack has occurred. But the main focus of our book is not on what the police are doing as part of their counterterrorism efforts or how successful they are, but rather on the consequences of policing terrorism for police and the community. We think that such questions are equally important to ones that focus on the “cookbook” of anti-terrorism approaches and operations that have generally dominated discussions of policing terrorism. Below we detail the main research questions we examine, providing an overall summary of the specific themes of our work.

Research Questions and Data

The research questions addressed in our study tap the two main themes discussed by policing scholars and practitioners concerning the potential implications of police involvement in counterterrorism in democratic societies (reviewed above), which also reflect what are perhaps the two core challenges faced by democratic police agencies over the past few decades: crime-control and police-community relationships (see Weisburd & Braga, 2006). Thus, in our specific research questions we address the effects of the INP’s involvement in counterterrorism on this agency’s ability to control crime and on its relationship with the communities that it serves, both majority and minority. Below we detail the six research questions examined in our study:

I. *Do terrorist threats impact police performance in fighting crime?*

Following discussions and speculations on the effects of terrorist threats on traditional police efforts to treat crime and disorder, in the next chapter we provide a systematic quantitative examination of the impacts of terrorist threats on the ability of police to “solve,” or “clear” cases, which is a common measure of police performance (e.g., Alpert & Moore, 1993; Bayley, 1994; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré, Felson, & Quimet, 2007; Reiner, 1998). In doing so, we take advantage of the unusually high terrorist threats in Israeli communities during the Second Intifada in Israel, between 2000 and 2004. Importantly, as we illustrate in this chapter, terrorist threats varied considerably from community to community, and this provides perhaps a unique opportunity to examine how variations in terrorism threat levels impact upon police performance in solving crimes. In this context we also raise the question of whether the impacts

of terrorism on police performance might be expected to differ in majority (Jewish) and minority (Arab) communities, which have ethnic, religious, or national links to groups that are associated with terrorism.

II. *What is the relationship between police involvement in counterterrorism and public evaluations of the police?*

The second question addressed in this book concerns the relationship between terrorism threats and various types of attitudes toward the police, including trust in the police and assessments of their performance and fairness. To date, the policing literature has not provided a coherent framework regarding the effects that extensive police involvement in counterterrorism may have on public attitudes toward the police, and, as reviewed earlier, two apparently contradicting hypotheses can be raised. The model of the “Rally Effect” (see Mueller, 1970, 1973), as observed in research in political science, would suggest that both an improvement and a drop in public support as a result of police focus on counterterrorism can be expected, the first in the short term and the second in the long term. In Chap. 3 we examine the relationship between the levels of terrorism threats in Israel over time and evaluations of the INP among Jewish adults. The analysis compares attitudes across three points in time: 2000 (before the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada), 2002 (the height of the terrorism threat), and 2007 (when terrorism threats returned to pre-Intifada levels).

III. *How are antecedents of police legitimacy affected by situations of acute security threats?*

Our third research question concerns the factors that are important to the public when forming evaluations of police legitimacy, and the way they might change as a result of acute security threats. One of the main findings from studies on police legitimacy is that perceptions of procedural justice, which are concerned with the fairness of police *processes*, are the most important factor in predicting evaluations of police legitimacy. Assessments of police performance, such as their ability to fight crime and “bring results,” while also important, were generally found to play a secondary role (e.g., see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004). It is not clear, however, if procedural justice and performance would play similar roles in predicting police legitimacy under situations of acute crisis or threat, such as terrorism threats. It is reasonable to hypothesize that when faced with acute threats, the public will be more concerned with end results and less worried about fair processes, and this will impact the relative importance of police performance and procedural fairness in forming assessments of police legitimacy. This hypothesis is explored in Chap. 4. A natural experiment is utilized to examine and compare antecedents of police legitimacy across two groups of Israeli citizens, one facing immediate, severe, security threats (missile threats and attacks on the Israeli town of “Sderot”) and the other not facing acute threats at the time. The roles of procedural justice and performance in predicting police legitimacy are examined in each group separately and compared across the two groups.

IV. *How are the potential costs of policing terrorism perceived by majority communities?*

Our fourth research question concerns views of majority communities in Israel regarding the potential, unintended negative outcomes of police involvement in counterterrorism. It is often assumed that majority communities desire harsh counterterrorism responses and protective measures by the state in the face of security threats, and evaluate the police more favorably during high-threat periods (e.g., Fishman, 2005; Friedland & Merari, 1985; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005, 2007). At the same time, it is not clear if they are also aware of the potential costs of extensive police involvement in security matters. In Chap. 5 we address this question utilizing survey data and in-depth interviews, and examine how the non-Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in Israel view the potential negative outcomes of extensive police involvement in counterterrorism. The specific issues examined include the perceived effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and the public; the particular effects on the relationship between the police and Arab minorities; evaluations of the extent to which policing terrorism comes at the expense of “classic” police duties; and perceptions of the use of counterterrorism as a justification for weak performance in fighting crime.

V. *How do minority Arab communities perceive the role of the INP in countering terrorism? How do their attitudes compare to those of the Jewish majority?*

Numerous studies have pointed to the tense relationship that often exists between the police and minority groups (e.g., Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997; Walker, 2000; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). At the same time, the discussion of the relationship between minorities and the police takes a new turn in the context of policing terrorism, particularly with regard to certain kinds of minority groups that are affiliated with the source of the terrorism threat, such as American or British Muslims and Israeli Arabs. Such groups are at risk of being perceived by both the general public and the police as “the enemy within.” This image, in turn, may create significant challenges to the relationship between these groups and the police. But has policing terrorism in Israel indeed affected the relationship between the INP and Arab communities? Have they been affected differently from Jewish communities? How, more generally, do Israeli Arabs view the counterterrorism role of the Israeli police and its outcomes? Our goal in Chap. 6 is to examine the views of Israeli Arabs concerning policing terrorism in Israel, and compare them to the views of Jewish communities. Using survey data, we analyze public attitudes in three main areas: the impact of policing terrorism on “classic” police responsibilities; the effects of police involvement in counterterrorism on police-community relationships; and, finally, the willingness of Israeli Arabs and Jews to collaborate with the police by reporting terrorism threats and criminal activity.

VI. *How have the Israeli police perceived their counterterrorism role and its implications over the years?*

Following our analyses of the way the *public* perceives some of the potential outcomes of policing terrorism, our goal in Chap. 7 is to examine how these

implications are perceived by the *police*, and how more generally the Israeli police experienced and presented their security-related roles over the years. These questions are of particular importance, as the way the police understand the implications of their counterterrorism role may affect policy and strategic choices. To this end, we have examined annual reports issued by the INP in three key time periods that are particularly relevant to policing terrorism: (1) the assignment of the INP with internal security responsibilities, (2) the First Palestinian Intifada, and (3) the Second Palestinian Intifada. In analyzing the reports we searched for statements, arguments, and discussions that would allow us to answer questions such as: have the top leaders of the INP considered the potential costs of the INP's major investment in counterterrorism? Alternatively, have they considered this role to be beneficiary? How, more generally, was this responsibility perceived and presented by the INP over the years?

Each of the six research questions detailed above addresses the implications of policing terrorism in one of the two core themes guiding this research: crime-control and police-community relationships. It should be noted, however, that our choice to focus on these specific questions was influenced, in part, by the data we were able to access and use for the present study. Counterterrorism, and specifically the role of the INP in addressing terrorist threats, is considered a highly sensitive topic in Israel, with little accessible data. The analyses reported in this book are thus based on a community survey and in-depth interviews carried out by the researchers; on data obtained from the INP through the Israeli Freedom of Information Law (such as the number and type of criminal case files opened/closed by the INP in different Israeli communities); and on publicly available data (such as the characteristics of terror attacks in different Israeli cities/towns; community surveys carried out by the Israeli Ministry of Public Security; and annual reports issued by the INP).

Naturally, additional data sources would have enabled us to examine more aspects of the effects of policing terrorism on police-community relationships and crime control. For example, the effects of security threats on the relationship between the police and the public could potentially be examined using observations of police-citizen interactions in different settings and under different threat conditions (see Mastrofski, Parks, & McCluskey, 2010); by analyzing citizen feedback on the service they received from the police; by measuring citizen cooperation with different police initiatives; or by interviewing police officers. Police effectiveness in fighting crime could potentially be assessed by analyzing police use of strategies and tactics that were found to be effective in reducing crime, such as "hotspots policing" (see Telep & Weisburd, 2012). Unfortunately, such opportunities were not available to us. Nevertheless, our databases did allow us to answer key questions in the two core themes guiding this research. More information on our data sets, their advantages and limitations, is available in the individual chapters that follow.

In the next six chapters we report our findings and conclusion for each of the research questions reviewed above. Taken together, our findings raise strong concerns about whether, and to what extent, democratic police agencies should take on a central role in countering terrorism. In the concluding chapter we focus on these concerns and their implications for policy and practice in policing.

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Chapter 2

Terrorist Threats and Police Performance

While there has been much speculation about the effects of terrorism on policing in democratic societies, there has been little actual data brought to bear on how terrorist threats affect everyday policing activities. In this chapter we provide a systematic quantitative examination of the effects of terrorist threats on traditional police efforts to respond to crime and disorder. Our specific interest is in the impacts of terrorist threats on the ability of police to solve cases (as measured by “clearance rates”), which is a common measure of police performance that has been used in a large number of studies across a number of different countries (e.g., Alpert & Moore, 1993; Bayley, 1994; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré, Felson, & Quimet, 2007; Reiner, 1998). To examine the effects of terrorist threats on clearance rates, we take advantage of the unusually high terrorist threats in Israeli communities during the Second Intifada in Israel between 2000 and 2004. Importantly, as we illustrate below, these threats varied considerable from community to community, and this provides perhaps a unique opportunity to examine how variations in terrorism threat levels impact upon police performance in solving crimes.

We find that the effects of terrorism vary by the type of community that is affected. Terrorist threats in primarily Jewish communities lead to lower clearance rates. In contrast, in majority Arab communities in Israel, clearance rates increase as terrorist threats increase. In our discussion we speculate on the reasons for the differing effects, suggesting that the shift to a “high policing” focus changes the nature of police activities in different types of communities.

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Clearance Rates and Police Performance

The ability of police to solve crime is often assessed by measuring the rate of “cleared” or “solved” cases (Alpert & Moore, 1993; Bayley, 1994; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré et al., 2007; Reiner, 1998). Clearance rates are calculated on the basis of crimes rather than offenders. For example, if five offenders are involved in a violent assault toward one victim and are all arrested and charged—this would count as one case cleared. But even if only one of the five is identified and charged while the other four remain unidentified and go free, this would also count as one case cleared. Clearance rates are generally measured by the number of cleared cases divided by the total number of cases opened by the police for a specific time period, and in essence measure the extent to which the police are able to link suspects to the crimes that are investigated by the police.

Clearance rates are generally viewed as providing a more objective and reliable measurement of police performance than alternative indicators, such as crime rates, arrest rates, public attitudes toward the police or fear of crime (Davenport, 1999; Paré et al., 2007; Reiner, 1998). Crime rates summarize all cases opened by the police and are generally seen as a better indicator of “police workload” than “police performance.” Though some recent police innovations such as Compstat have used changes in crime rates as an indicator of police accomplishments (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003), it is generally recognized that crime rates are affected by many social and economic factors outside of the control of the police (Maguire & Uchida, 2000; Mastrofski, 1999). Arrest rates provide a more direct measure of police performance and have been used by several scholars to determine police accomplishments (Black, 1971; Sherman & Smith, 1992; Smith & Visser, 1981). Nonetheless, a simple accounting of arrest rates is likely to be strongly influenced by the number of reported crimes. Higher crime areas may have more arrests in this context, irrespective of the “quality” of police performance. In turn, since single police investigations may lead to one or multiple arrests, arrests as a measure of police performance is confounded by the nature of the crimes investigated. Numerous problems have also been identified with utilizing public perception of the police and fear of crime as an indication of police performance. Naturally, public attitudes are subjective and do not always reflect the “real” picture of police accomplishments. They may, for example, be highly influenced by biased media coverage (Leishman & Mason, 2003).

Clearance rates have an advantage of focusing directly on the activities of the police. Because clearance rates take the ratio of the number of crimes solved to the number of crimes reported, it accounts for the differing rates of crime in different jurisdictions. Also, its focus on “crimes” rather than arrests means that it is linked directly to police investigations rather than specific offenders. At the same time, while clearance rates have many advantages over other indicators of police performance, a number of scholars have raised questions about their reliability and validity (e.g., Bayley, 1993; Brodeur, 1998; Hoover, 1996; Loveday, 1999; Maguire, 1997; Reiner, 1992, 1998). One problem relates to the difficulty of comparing clearance

rates across police agencies. There are often significant differences between jurisdictions in how clearance rates are defined, thus making it difficult to make comparative statements about police performance across jurisdictions. For example, a crime may be defined as cleared if a suspect is charged, if a suspect is arrested even if there is no charge, or if a likely suspect is identified but no charge or arrest is made. In this context clearance rates provide a problematic measure of police performance across police agencies.

But problems have also been noted in using clearance rates within single jurisdictions. The fact that clearance rates are often used by police agencies as a measure of police performance places significant pressure on commanders in specific geographic areas to increase their clearance rates. Not surprisingly, a number of scholars have pointed to manipulation of clearance rates in police agencies by recording offenses in a way that flatters police performance (see Cordner, 1989; Gill, 1987; Loveday, 1999; Maguire, 1997; Reiner, 1992, 1998; Walker, 1992). In this regard, some scholars have distinguished between what they define as primary vs. secondary clearance by the police (Bayley, 1994; Black, 1972; Loveday, 2000). Primary clearance refers to a direct police field activity, while secondary clearance refers to an arrested suspect who helps the police to clear old offenses, not necessary those he or she is currently charged for. Skolnick (1966) noted almost half a century ago that the police could easily manipulate clearance rates by offering reductions in present charged offenses in exchange for help in clearing other cases. Despite these limitations, clearance rates remain one of the most commonly used measures for assessing police performance (Paré et al., 2007). It is a particularly reliable measure when comparing a large number of police jurisdictions that follow similar procedures under a single command structure, as is the case in the analyses below.

The Effects of Policing Terrorism on Clearance Rates: A Study of Israeli Communities

Our analyses focus on Israeli communities during the so-called Second Intifada between 2000 and 2004. While Israel has for many years experienced relatively high threats of terrorism, this period was distinguished by the largest number of attacks and civilian casualties since the founding of Israel in 1948. More than 160 terrorist events were recorded during this period, with over 4,000 casualties and almost 600 deaths. Unlike the USA, where one very large terrorist attack has dominated public perceptions of terrorism, during the Second Intifada terrorism was almost a daily occurrence in Israeli communities.

We examine 257 Israeli communities within the “Green Line,” or Israel’s border before the 1967 Israeli-Arab War. The 257 communities represent the universe of Israeli cities and towns with over 1,000 residents. We chose not to examine jurisdictions smaller than this because we thought that the number of crimes found would likely be too low to allow for robust analysis of clearance rates. We examine only communities within the “Green Line” because the Israel National Police (INP) has

sole jurisdiction for matters of crime and homeland security in these areas. Data on clearance rates in every city/town in Israel for the years 2000–2004 were obtained from the INP. A case was defined as cleared if, by the end of the investigation, at least one suspect was identified as responsible for the crime committed.

Offenses included in police reporting of clearance rates in Israel reflect traditional crime and disorder categories, such as property crimes, sexual offenses, drug offenses, and violent crimes.¹ However, it is important to note that security-related offenses within the Green Line are classified according to traditional crime categories and are not specifically identified. Accordingly, an arrest of suspects involved in a terrorist attack would likely lead to a charge for a traditional violent crime offense. While such events are very rare relative to the incidence of more traditional crimes, and thus unlikely to impact upon the overall number of crime incidents, it may be that certain types of incidents, such as those generated as a result of arrests during violent protests, would have a more meaningful effect on the statistics we examine. In our discussion, we consider in more detail the potential implications of these security-related offenses for our findings.

Figure 2.1 shows a histogram of clearance rates across the 257 communities that were studied. As is apparent, clearance rates vary considerably, with a few communities having clearance rates under 20 %, and some having clearance rates as high as 71–80 %. Not surprisingly, the communities with unusually low clearance rates have very high proportions of reported property crime, while communities with very high clearance rates have few property crimes proportionally and high numbers of violent crimes.² In Israel, only 13 % of property crimes are solved, while the clearance rate is 78 % for violent crimes (see Annual Reports of the INP; for similar findings in the USA, see Cordner, 1989). The mean clearance rate across the communities is 43 %, which is very close to the median reported.

The key question in our study is how threats of terrorism impact upon clearance rates in local communities. We began with the assumption that the key factor in this regard was not the direct impact of terrorist threats on communities but the impact that such threats would have on police jurisdictions with responsibilities for those communities. During the study period, the INP was divided into five large police districts within the Green Line, which were, in turn, divided into local police stations. Allocation of police resources to specific communities is made at the level of these 52 local police stations, which can be seen as analogous to local police departments in the USA or the UK. We thought that the terrorist threats that are faced by these stations provide the best indicator of how terrorism affects the allocation of police resources. When terrorist threats impact a particular community within a

¹For complete list of specific crimes included see the Israel Police Annual Reports, available from http://www.police.gov.il/meida_laezrach/pirsomim/Pages/statistika.aspx.

²For example, in the two communities with the lowest clearance rates, Michmoret and Kfar-Vitkin, property crimes make up over 80 % of all reported crimes to the police. In the two highest clearance rate communities, Bsama and Ajar, property crimes make up less than 20 % of the total opened cases.




Fig. 2.1 Clearance rates in Israeli communities

station, it is the responsibility of the station commander to make the key decisions about how specific resources, such as police officers, will be allocated to the specific community.

Accordingly, we measured threats of terrorism at the station level rather than the community level.³ We defined terrorism at the outset by identifying three main measures: (1) the number of terror attacks targeting civilians; (2) the number of individuals wounded by these attacks; and (3) the number of fatalities. We thought that these three variables assessed both the threat of terrorism as indicated by the frequency of terrorist events, and its impacts, at least as indicated by personal injuries within the stations examined. In discussions with Israeli police officials, they recommended that we add a fourth variable to our measure of terrorism, the proximity of the police station to the border with the Palestinian territories. They argued that proximity to the Palestinian territories was a significant factor in the overall threat that a police station faced, not only because attacks generally originated from those areas, but also because a station close to the border would have to allocate greater resources to prevent infiltrations and ensure the safety of local communities.

Data on the number of attacks, deaths, and injuries was obtained from the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa,⁴ as well as from official

³We also measured threats at the community level and estimated similar models to those reported here. As we expected the impact of threat at the community level on clearance rates was much less stable and weaker than that found below.

⁴See <http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/>.

sources such as the Prime Minister’s Office⁵ and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶ Data on the distance from the border with the Palestinian territories was measured using electronic interactive maps.⁷ A station’s proximity to the border was determined according to the distance between the border and the community closest to the border within the specific station.

Each of the four threat indicators was transformed into an ordinal variable ranging from 0 (no attacks/no deaths/no injured/large distance from the Palestinian territories) to 3 (large number of attacks/large number of deaths/large number of injuries/short distance from the Palestinian territories). The values that fall within each category were determined by examining the distribution of the data and utilizing natural braking points (see Appendix 1). Lastly, for each police station the categories were added up so as to create an overall “terrorism threat” level, ranging from 0 (very low threat) to 12 (very high threat). We assessed the internal consistency of the scale by using Cronbach’s Alpha, a coefficient that measures how well items within a scale measure a single latent construct. Alpha levels of .70 and above are generally considered to represent strong scales (Carmines & Zeller, 1979; DeVillis, 1991; Nunnally, 1978). The Cronbach’s Alpha for our threat scale is 0.86.

The distribution of the terrorist threat variable is presented in Fig. 2.2. As can be seen, there is considerable variability on this measure. As we noted earlier, this provides a unique opportunity to examine how variability in terrorist threats impact upon police performance in case clearance rates in local communities.



Fig. 2.2 Terrorism threat levels faced by police stations

⁵ See <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/IsraelUnderAttack/attlist.htm?Page=1>.

⁶ See <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA>.

⁷ See http://www.mapa.co.il/general/searchresult_locked.asp.

As noted in Chap. 1, we thought at the outset that there may be important differences in the effects of terrorist threats on majority and minority communities, especially when such communities are linked ethnically, religiously, or nationally to groups that are associated with terrorist threats. Israel includes a large Arab minority of almost 20 % of the national population. Though the Israeli-Arab population includes a number of different religious and ethnic groups, including large numbers of Christians and Druze, the dominant ethnic Arab group is Muslims, who make up almost 83 % of the Arab population in Israel. Israeli Arabs are Israeli citizens, but have strong ethnic, national, and religious ties to Arabs in the Palestinian territories from which most terrorist attacks originated.

Data on the number of residents in each community as well as their ethnicity (Arab/Jewish) was obtained from the INP. In part because of the nature of the development of Jewish and Arab settlement before the establishment of the State of Israel, Arab and Jewish communities in Israel are often geographically distinct (Mesch & Talmud, 1998). Development of communities after the State's establishment has followed this pattern, with surveys in Israel showing that both Arabs and Jews have preference for ethnically distinct communities (Smootha, 1989). Only eight cities and towns in our sample included what might be considered mixed populations of Jews and Arabs. All of these communities are predominantly Jewish, with Arab minorities ranging between 4 and 33 %. Given the overall distribution of communities, we divided our sample into predominantly Jewish ($N=165$) and predominantly Arab communities ($N=92$; for a similar approach, see Mesch & Talmud, 1998).

Control Variables

While our main interest is in examining the impacts of terrorism on clearance rates, we recognized at the outset that terrorist threats may be confounded with other measures that have been found to be related to clearance rates. Accordingly, in developing our statistical models we sought to control for factors that have been identified as important in understanding clearance rates in other studies.

Other studies have found that police workload strongly affects clearance rates (Bayley, 1994; Sullivan, 1985; also see review by Paré et al., 2007). The fewer cases the police handle (in relation to the population size), the higher the clearance rate reported. Accordingly, data on the yearly number of criminal cases opened in each community during the years 2000–2004 was obtained from the INP, and the yearly average of criminal cases per 1,000 residents was calculated.

The influence of the number of sworn officers on clearance rates from previous studies is mixed (Cameron, 1987; Eck & Maguire, 2000; Levitt, 1997). Corder's (1989) analysis of police performance in Maryland found that in metropolitan areas, higher numbers of sworn officers increased the clearance rate, while in non-metropolitan areas higher numbers of sworn officers decreased the clearance rate. Consulting with Israeli police officials, we were told that the absolute number of

officers per station has not changed significantly in recent years. To measure police strength, we use data from the most recent year that we could obtain such data, 2007, though we recognize that this measure may not reflect fully police strength during the period examined.

Additionally, the type of case investigated was also found to impact strongly upon clearance rates (Cordner, 1989; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré et al., 2007). The police may be more responsive to some offenses than others, or, alternatively, particular types of crime may be generally easier to solve. Thus, the more “solvable” investigations the police engage in, the more likely we are to witness higher clearance rates (Cordner, 1989; Paré et al., 2007). For example, as we noted above, clearance rates for violent crimes are relatively high, possibly because police emphasize the investigation of such crimes due to their severity, or because the personal interaction involved may ease the identification of the offender (Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré et al., 2007). Additionally, offenses cleared upon detection, such as numerous drug offenses, have high clearance rates. At the same time, property offenses are rarely solved (Cordner, 1989; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré et al., 2007; also see yearly reports of the INP⁸). In this regard, we again obtained data from the INP on the number of investigations opened during the years 2000–2004 in each community, for different types of crime, including property offenses, violence, sex offenses, and drug crimes. We then calculated the percentage of cases opened for each of the four types of crime out of all cases opened, for each community separately.

The sociodemographic characteristics of communities have also been identified as a factor that influences clearance rates (Borg & Parker, 2001; Crank, 1990; Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Litwin, 2004; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Miller & Bryant, 1993; Paré et al., 2007; Smith, 1986; Sullivan, 1985). We considered two main community characteristics in our analysis beyond community type: size and socioeconomic status. With regard to size, it has been argued that clearance rates should be higher in smaller communities where residents are likely to have stronger connections to each other and the police (Cordner, 1989; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré et al., 2007), though the evidence for this hypothesis is mixed (see review by Paré et al., 2007). Similarly, studies of the relationship between socioeconomic status of communities and clearance rates have not provided a clear picture (see Borg & Parker, 2001; Crank, 1990; Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Litwin, 2004; Miller & Bryant, 1993; Paré et al., 2007; Smith, 1986; Sullivan, 1985). Despite the mixed outcomes regarding these factors, we thought it important to consider demographic characteristics in our models.

Data on the population size of each community was obtained from the INP. Information regarding the socioeconomic status of each community was obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The CBS has created a socioeconomic scale, ranging from 1 to 198, which takes into account various community characteristics such as financial resources, living conditions, and level of education. The scale was created by rank-ordering all communities with a

⁸ Available from: http://www.police.gov.il/meida_laezrach/pirsomim/Pages/statistika.aspx.

population of over 2,000 according to their socioeconomic status, and assigning each community a score consistent with its rank. Sixty-four communities in our sample had a population of less than 2,000 and were thus not included in the ranking procedure. As we did not want to lose almost one quarter of the sample because of missing data, we decided to create a score for each of these communities based on the average socioeconomic level of the other communities of the same ethnicity (Jewish/Arab) in the district in which the community was found. Recognizing the possible biases that this approach might bring to our overall models, we also carried out our analyses excluding the socioeconomic variable altogether. The results were found to be very similar for all the main variables (see Appendix 2).

The Findings

In Table 2.1 we present the main findings of our analysis. We use an Ordinary Least Squares Regression in which overall clearance rates for each community is the dependent variable. Each of the control variables is included in both models presented, as is our terrorism threat variable and the community type variable. In model 1 we present the model including the main effects of terrorism threat and community type. In model 2 we include an interaction term for terrorism threat by community type.⁹ This is our main model of interest since it allows us to identify whether the effect of terrorist threats on stations impacts upon predominantly Arab and predominantly Jewish communities differently. Both models evidence very high R^2 values (0.86; 0.87) suggesting that the models overall are doing a good job explaining the variability in clearance of cases across Israeli communities.

While the addition of an interaction term is likely to add model instability because of potential multicollinearity (see Weisburd & Britt, 2007), and this might be expected to be accentuated in a model in which the overall level of variance explained is very high, the indications in this study are that the interaction term increases the overall stability and strength of the model.¹⁰ The effects of the control variables are

⁹The interaction term was created by recoding community type to 1 for predominantly Jewish communities and 2 for predominantly Arab communities, and then multiplying this by level of terrorist threat. We found that this coding better fit the functional form of the data than using a 0 and 1 split of the community type variable.

¹⁰We examined overall multicollinearity for the model using SPSS tolerance statistics. Three measures, community type, percent of property cases, and percent of violence cases all had tolerance levels of between 0.20 and 0.29. While these are relatively low tolerance levels, tolerance levels of 0.20 and above are generally considered acceptable (Weisburd & Britt, 2007). The main issue in this case is whether the coefficients are unstable. We examined the models including and excluding these specific factors and found the coefficients of the variables remained relatively stable across specifications. We also note that the main coefficients have relatively high levels of statistical significance, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a major factor in the models. The addition of an interaction term as noted is likely to increase multicollinearity, but the results here suggest that the term is adding to the correct specification of the model.

Table 2.1 Main findings with and without an interaction term

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
	<i>B</i> (β)	<i>B</i> (β)
Terrorism threat level of police station	-0.03 (-0.01)	-1.02 (-0.24)**
Ethnicity of community (Jewish/Arab)	-1.30 (-0.04)	-4.17 (-0.13)*
Interaction: Ethnicity of community* terrorism threat level of station	-	0.70 (0.24)**
Population size	-0.00 (-0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Percent of property investigations out of all cases opened	-0.79 (-0.80)***	-0.78 (-0.80)***
Percent of violence investigations out of all cases opened	0.13 (0.07)	0.14 (0.07)
Percent of sex investigations out of all cases opened	-2.22 (-0.14)***	-2.22 (-0.14)***
Percent of drugs investigations out of all cases opened	0.50 (0.15)***	0.49 (0.15)***
Socioeconomic status of community	-0.01 (-0.04)	-0.01 (-0.03)
Files opened per 1,000 residents	-0.01 (-0.02)	-0.01 (-0.02)
No. of police officers per 1,000 residents	0.20 (0.01)	-0.03 (-0.00)
<i>R</i> ² (Adjusted <i>R</i> ²)	0.86 (0.86)	0.87 (0.86)
<i>N</i>	257	257

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

very similar in both models, suggesting that the introduction of an interaction term did not create significant instability in the model estimated. The major difference between model 1 and model 2 is that the factors included in the interaction term became stronger and statistically significant.

Model 2 suggests that there is both an overall main effect of terrorism threat and community type in our data, as well as an additional interaction effect. On average, controlling for the other variables in the model, community type has a significant and strong effect on clearance rates. All else being equal, Arab communities in our sample have about a 4 % lower rate of case clearance than predominantly Jewish communities. Terrorism threat in turn has on average a negative and significant effect on clearance rates.¹¹ But these effects cannot be interpreted fully without examining the influence of the interaction term, which is also statistically significant.

¹¹We recognize that the fact that communities are “nested” in the station level threat variable may impact upon estimates of the standard error for this measure. At the same time, the number of communities that are found within any particular police station is relatively small. There is also significant heterogeneity in the specific number of communities found within the stations. In such cases corrections for clustering or nesting of data may lead to misleading results (Nichols & Schaffer, 2007). At the same time, the clustering observed in our data is not considerable and would be expected to have relatively small impacts on the standard errors and thus on significance statistics. The fact that our main measures in model 2 are all strongly significant, suggests that we are not unfairly interpreting these statistics.




Fig. 2.3 Terrorism threats and clearance rates in predominantly Jewish/Arab communities

In Fig. 2.3 we illustrate the relationship suggested by our model between terrorist threats at police stations and crime clearance rates in communities, conditional on the community type. It is not possible to visualize this relationship with actual data because of the confounding of other variables. For example, predominantly Jewish communities in Israel are likely to have relatively high reported rates of property crime, and predominantly Arab communities have a much higher proportion of violent crimes relative to all cases opened. Given the very dominant impact of crime type on clearance rates (see model 2), it would accordingly be misleading to represent the relationships between terrorist threats and clearance rates without taking this factor into account. In Fig. 2.3 we present the relationship between terrorist threats and clearance rates for predominantly Arab and Jewish communities separately, based on parameter estimates in model 2 for terrorist threat, community type, and the interaction term, holding all control variables at their mean value.¹²

The relationship observed is a very interesting one. As indicated by our model, when terrorist threats are very low (and other variables are controlled for) Arab communities have about a 4 % lower rate of solved cases than predominantly Jewish communities. It is important to remember that this estimate takes into account the types of cases that are brought within these communities, suggesting that there is a clearance rate gap that is not explained by the type of cases or other variables we examine. But importantly, as the level of terrorist threats at the stations increase, the rates of cases cleared moves in different directions. For predominantly Jewish

¹²We first estimated the regression equation. We then placed the mean values of all variables in the equation, except for terrorism threat, city type (predominantly Jewish/Arab), and the interaction term. Lastly, we calculated the equation 26 times: 13 times for Jewish communities with all possible threat values (0–12), and 13 times for Arab communities, again with all possible threat values.

communities, there is a general downward spiral consistent with the view that concern with terrorism reduces the effectiveness of the police in responding to ordinary crime. For Arab communities the relationship is reversed, with overall clearance rates increasing strongly as terrorist threats increase.

Discussion

Our data appear to confirm contradictory hypotheses regarding the effects of terrorist threats on police performance, as measured by clearance rates. On the one hand, for the majority of the communities we study, defined as predominantly Jewish communities, heightened terrorist threats lead to declining clearance rates. But we also find that terrorist threats have the opposite impact on Arab communities in Israel. What explains these variant findings and how do they relate to our overall understanding of the relationship between terrorist threats and police performance?

The declining performance of police in predominantly Jewish communities in which stations face heightened terrorist threats seems to us straightforward. There are likely to be significant opportunity costs in police investment of major resources in homeland security functions at the local level. Assuming an unlimited supply of resources for the police, it might be possible to predict little impact of policing terrorism on other police functions. But the INP did not receive any major increase in its budget during the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada (see Atad, 2001; Nahoom-Halevi, 2005, also see the budget of the Ministry of Public Security, Israel, for the year 2007¹³).¹⁴

In turn, Fishman (2005) identifies a direct link between declining police service in Israel and the Second Intifada. Drawing from discussions with ranking police commanders, social-scientists, legal scholars, and representatives from the community, he notes that the diversion of resources to homeland security functions was seen to

¹³ Available online from: <http://www.mof.gov.il/budget2007/docs/302.pdf> [In Hebrew].

¹⁴ In this regard, our finding that police resources (as measured by number of police officers per 1,000 residents) did not have a statistically significant effect in the model is particularly interesting. If resources are a key issue, then why did this measure not have a more meaningful impact? One explanation is simply that a basic level of resources was available in all stations as would be expected in a national policing agency as opposed to locally financed agencies. In turn, studies do not suggest that small increases in police officer strength have important impacts on police effectiveness (see Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Moreover, our argument is focused on the allocation of such resources within stations and not on the absolute level of resources. We hypothesize that police resources within a station were shifted away from traditional crime and disorder functions within primarily Jewish communities during times of high terrorist threats. Such shifting of resources would be expected to negatively impact upon police performance as measured by closed cases. Finally, we think that caution should be used in drawing strong conclusions from our measure of police resources. As we noted earlier, we were only able to gain data from 2007. While police sources told us that police strength in the stations had not changed greatly since the time of the Second Intifada, we have no hard data on this issue and there may have been large short-term changes in police allocations at that time.

inhibit the development of advanced data systems, technologies, and efforts to enhance the professionalism and skills of Israeli police officers. Fishman also reports that limited resources, combined with the numerous tasks of normal and homeland security policing, were seen to result in officer fatigue, degradation in the quality of service provided to the public and ultimately more crime (Fishman, 2005).

How does this reality translate to lower levels of clearance? One example is reviewed in the previous chapter. When responding to a terrorist attack, many officers from different units are called to stop their routine activities and attend the scene. Thus, various police routines, including daily work on crime investigations, are temporarily pushed aside. Solving crime or treating other community problems may not only be postponed, but the lack of continuity in the investigation and significant delays may reduce the likelihood of attending to the problem or solving the case altogether. A similar process, as we noted earlier, was observed in Montgomery County in 2002 when police were trying to identify and capture a sniper responsible for a series of fatal shootings (University of Maryland Symposium, 2003¹⁵). Additionally, as we noted in Chap. 1, the police may devote less attention to crime problems when terrorism becomes a priority because of the attractiveness and “prestige” of “high policing” in contrast to traditional crime control or “low policing” obligations (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009).

While these factors provide an explanation for the decline in police performance in solving crimes in predominantly Jewish communities, the question remains why we find the opposite effect in Arab communities in Israel. We cannot conclude simply that a zero-sum game of resources leads to lower clearance rates if they increase in Arab communities. Nor can we assume that police attentions will be drawn to terrorism as opposed to ordinary crime if we find the reverse in Arab communities, at least as measured by clearance rates. At the same time, if we return to the distinction we made earlier between “high” and “low” policing and its possible relationship to terrorist threats, it is possible to understand the very different effects we observe in our data for predominantly Arab and Jewish communities. We argued earlier that terrorist threats are likely to lead to greater emphasis on high policing strategies and goals. This means as well that low policing may have greater emphasis when terrorist threats are lower.

We think in this regard that it is particularly interesting in our data that police performance in solving crimes is significantly higher in predominantly Jewish communities (as contrasted with predominantly Arab communities) when terrorist threats are low, after controlling for other possible confounding variables. This reality is consistent with other studies in Israel which have noted that police allocation of resources to Arab communities, and police service in those communities is at a lower level on average than in majority Jewish communities (Hasisi, 2005). This “neglect” of minority communities more generally has been noted in a number of studies of policing in other countries (Black, 1976; Hawkins, 1987; LaFree, 1989; Liska & Chamlin, 1984). More generally, we might assume that the relative

¹⁵ This symposium of police executives from the Washington, DC tri-state area took place at the University of Maryland, College Park on May 9, 2003, and was organized by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Police Research Group.

disadvantage of Arab communities regarding clearance rates in ordinary times reflects the status quo when police are focusing on low policing duties.

Why then do clearance rates increase when terrorist threats are high? One way to clarify this impact is by considering the effect of the threat that minorities are perceived to bring toward majority communities (Blalock, 1967; Feagin, 1991; Holmes, 2000; Jackson, 1989; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005). Jacobs and Helms (1999) argue that the majority's threat perception of the minority group plays a very important role in the allocation of police and other governmental social control. When the majority is threatened, it is likely to increase surveillance in minority communities. While surveys have long suggested that Israeli Jews perceive Israeli Arabs as representing a potential threat to the State, it is certainly the case that the majority Jewish community in Israel began to see the threat of Arab minority as growing during the Second Intifada (Smootha, 2004). Such perceptions were reinforced by large-scale Arab rioting in Israel at the beginning of this period (Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007), and isolated examples of Arab citizens who aided Palestinian terrorists (Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009). The response of the police to the riots in October 2000, which led to 12 Israeli Arabs and one Palestinian national being killed, was strongly criticized in a later government report (Or Commission, 2003). Nonetheless, the response itself suggests the extent to which the Israeli police perceived the Arab minority as a threat during this period.

The reality of the physical proximity and social connections between Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the Palestinian territories certainly reinforced these perceptions. It would not be surprising for Israeli police to focus greater attention in Arab towns and villages that might provide cover for Palestinian terrorists infiltrating to areas within the Israeli Green Line. The greater attention in these towns and villages, in turn, likely led to fewer police resources in predominantly Jewish communities. But the allocation of resources itself may not explain the increasing rates of case clearance observed.

One explanation for higher clearance rates may be that the police view ordinary crime investigations as a method of gaining intelligence about terrorism. In this sense, crime investigations become a high policing function where the goal is not necessarily to solve crimes but to identify suspects who can provide information on potential terrorist activities. Such a strategy has been noted by Kelling and Bratton (2006), who argue that the Israeli police see ordinary crime investigations as a means for gaining strategic intelligence on terrorism. We might speculate that heightened surveillance in Arab communities, combined with a police orientation that sees the solving of crime as a method of gaining information on terrorism, is an important part of the explanation of the relatively higher rates of solving cases found as terrorist threats increase in Arab communities.

However, the fact that the Israeli police do not distinguish security-related offenses means as well that some part of the effect we observe may be the result of investigations for offenses that cannot be simply classified as ordinary crimes. Large numbers of arrests in violent protests, for example, would increase clearance rates in communities though such arrests certainly do not suggest that police performance in solving ordinary crimes has improved. We think this is related more broadly to an emphasis on high policing, but we think it is important to note that the higher clearance rates we observe in Arab communities is likely due in part to the prosecution of security-related crimes themselves.

Moreover, one should be cautious in defining a “terrorism dividend” in police performance in minority communities in Israel as a result of heightened terrorist threats. As we noted earlier, increases in surveillance in minority communities have often been viewed by the communities themselves as a case of their being unfairly profiled by the police as “the enemy within” (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Khashu, Busch, Latif, & Levy, 2005; Thacher, 2005). In a survey conducted during the Second Intifada, 43 % of the Arab respondents thought that the police treated them as a “security threat” (Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007). A more recent survey (see subsequent chapters) suggests that both Arab and Jewish Israelis believe that police concern with terrorism impacts negatively on their crime-control function. About half of Arab Israelis, and a similar proportion of Jewish Israelis, agreed that the “police explain failure in handling crime by the fact that they are busy fighting terrorism.” In turn, slightly over half of Israeli Arabs surveyed argued that policing terrorism had a negative effect on police-community relations. This was true for only about a third of Jewish respondents.

In this context, our data suggest a potential problem with distributive justice in Israeli policing. Distributive justice refers to “the fairness and equity of the police delivery of services to persons across social and demographic groups.” Receiving either too little or too much service may constitute unfair distribution of resources (Tyler & Fagan, 2008, p. 239; Sarat, 1977). Our data indicates that under “normal” circumstances, Israeli Arabs receive less policing services than required, at least compared to the Jewish majority. However, when terrorism threats arise, the police devote significantly more resources to these communities to deal with the threat, either directly or indirectly (through crime investigations). In this sense we find what appears to be a swing of a pendulum between the two extremes of under-policing and over-policing in Arab communities, both of which may be perceived by community members as inequality in the distribution of police services. Importantly, citizen perceptions of distributive justice were found to have significant effects on the trust/legitimacy citizens render the police, and, in turn, on the numerous desirable outcomes associated with police legitimacy, such as willingness to comply and cooperate with the police and empower them (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). More on the relationship between policing terrorism and police legitimacy in subsequent chapters.

Conclusions

We find that heightened terrorist threats decrease the performance of police in solving cases in predominantly Jewish communities. This is consistent with the position that a shift in focus of police agencies to strategic threats such as terrorism will naturally lead to a diminution of attention to normal crime fighting. Such high policing draws police attention and resources away from crime investigations. But in predominantly Arab communities high policing led to the opposite effect. Increased terrorist threats in the stations in which Arab communities are found leads to higher clearance rates. In this case, we speculate that this is because police surveillance increased in such communities.

We think our findings have broader implications for understanding the relationship between terrorism and police performance, and suggest some caution as local police agencies are pushed to take on counterterrorism functions. Terrorism is likely overall to reduce police effectiveness in solving crimes. This is a main implication of our finding. But the effect of terrorism is likely to vary, and in communities that are seen as associated religiously, nationally, or ethnically with terrorist groups police effectiveness in solving crimes is likely to increase. Importantly, this is not necessarily an indication of increased police service in such communities, and indeed may develop from heightened surveillance and suspicion regarding people who live in such communities.

Appendix 1: Categories of Threat Variables at the Station Level

	Category	0 (low threat)	1	2	3 (high threat)
No. of attacks	Range	0	1–4	5–10	11 and above
	<i>N</i>	21	19	8	3
No. of injured	Range	0	1–62	63–138	139 and above
	<i>N</i>	25	16	4	6
No. of death	Range	0	1–11	12–42	43 and above
	<i>N</i>	24	17	7	3
Dis. from border (km)	Range	50 and above	21–49	6–20	1–5
	<i>N</i>	8	9	19	15

Appendix 2: Regression Without the SES Variable

Variables	<i>B</i> (β)
Terrorism threat level of police station	-1.05 (-0.24)**
Ethnicity of community (Jewish/Arab)	-3.85 (-0.12)*
Interaction: ethnicity of community* terrorism threat level of station	0.72 (0.25)**
Population size	0.00 (0.01)
Percent of property investigations out of all cases opened	-0.79 (-0.81)***
Percent of violence investigations out of all cases opened	0.16 (0.08)
Percent of sex investigations out of all cases opened	-2.22 (-0.14)***
Percent of drugs investigations out of all cases opened	0.49 (0.15)***
Files opened per 1,000 residents	-0.01 (-0.02)
No. of police officers per 1,000 residents	-0.05 (-0.00)
<i>R</i> ² (Adjusted <i>R</i> ²)	0.87 (0.86)
<i>N</i>	257

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

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Chapter 3

Police Involvement in Counterterrorism and Public Attitudes Toward the Police

Public attitudes toward the police, and particularly perceptions of police legitimacy, are considered one of the most important outcomes of policing (National Research Council, 2004). From the normative perspective, in democratic societies the police are public servants and thus should be viewed as an expression of the public rather than an alien agency acting against the community and its interests (Fleek & Newman, 1969; Marenin, 1989; Percy, 1986). From the practical perspective, the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public is important for instrumental reasons associated with public cooperation and police effectiveness (Tyler, 2004). Studies have demonstrated that if citizens trust the police and view the organization and its conduct as legitimate, they are more likely to comply with the law, accept police decisions, collaborate with the police, provide information, assist in solving crime, and empower the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002; also see review by the National Research Council, 2004).

However, it is not clear how public attitudes toward the police and evaluations of its legitimacy are affected by police involvement in counterterrorism. While police agencies in the democratic world have significantly increased their investment in counterterrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005), the policing literature has not provided a coherent framework regarding the effects that extensive police involvement in counterterrorism may have on public attitudes toward the police. On the one hand, as reviewed in Chap. 1, scholars have argued that policing terrorism may weaken police legitimacy, both as a result of a change in the nature and character of policing and because the preoccupation with homeland security may come at the expense of handling local crime and disorder problems (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; Greene, 2011; Hasisi,

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Alpert, & Flynn, 2009). On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that policing terrorism may actually *improve* public evaluations of the police, because the police may be perceived as responding to the problem that is mostly troubling the community or because they may appear highly efficient and professional in their counterterrorism responses.

The “Rally Effect” (see Mueller, 1970, 1973), as observed in political science research, provides an additional context for examining this question while lending support for both hypotheses. This concept suggests that when faced with an external threat, support for the national leader and public institutions increases in the short term, but returns to previous levels once the crisis has passed. Utilizing this model, it could be hypothesized that in the short term, public support for the police would rise in the face of major terrorism threats, while the long-term consequences would be a decline in general evaluation of effectiveness and legitimacy.

Based on this framework, in this chapter we examine the relationship between policing terrorism in Israel and public attitudes of majority communities toward the Israeli police. We begin by reviewing the two hypotheses raised in the policing literature regarding the relationship between policing terrorism and public attitudes toward the police, while tying the discussion to the concepts of legitimacy and procedural justice. Additionally, we discuss the Rally Effect and its potential contribution to understanding this relationship. We then turn to analyzing survey data on attitudes of majority communities in Israel toward the Israel National Police (INP) between 1998 and 2007, a decade that includes the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada.¹ We find that legitimacy-related evaluations of the police generally rose following the outbreak of the Intifada, reached a peak at the height of the terrorism threat, and declined since along with the decline in terrorism threat levels. In concluding we discuss fluctuations in particular types of attitudes and the general trend identified.

Hypothesis 1: Policing Terrorism May Weaken Public Perceptions of the Police

Bayley and Weisburd (2009) argue that extensive homeland security responsibilities may change the strategies and character of policing. They warn that the police may find themselves emphasizing “high policing,” which, as noted earlier, is characterized by covert tactics such as surveillance and intelligence gathering. Such methods are considered less transparent and accountable, and associated with violations of human rights and procedural justice. Additionally, “high policing” may change the orientation of police from providing service to controlling the public. Indeed, assigning the INP with homeland security responsibilities in 1974 was identified as one of the factors contributing to the militarization of this police agency (Herzog, 2001).

¹This term is further detailed when describing the study context.

The literature on legitimacy clarifies how high policing may undermine public perceptions of the police. Previous studies have consistently demonstrated that the dominant antecedent of legitimacy is *procedural justice*, which refers to the fairness of the *processes* by which legal authorities exercise their power (see reviews by the National Research Council, 2004 and by Tyler, 2004). Procedural justice, in turn, was found to be influenced by several key factors: First, *participation* was identified as a central component: when the individuals involved are given the opportunity to explain their position and communicate their views, the process is viewed as just and fair. *Neutrality* was found to have a similar effect: processes are perceived as fairer when decision-making is viewed as neutral, unbiased and objective. Transparency may encourage such judgments. The third element is *dignity and respect*: when the people involved feel that they are treated with politeness and that their rights are recognized and respected, the process is viewed as fairer. Lastly, when people have *trust in the motives of the decision maker*, perceptions of procedural justice enhance. Trust may be encouraged by clarifying how the organization is giving attention to the needs, concerns, and well-being of the public (National Research Council, 2004; Tyler, 2004). It is clear, therefore, how perceptions of procedural justice, and consequently legitimacy, will be challenged if the police are perceived as less transparent and accountable, associated with violation of human rights, control- rather than service-oriented, militaristic and distant from the public and their needs.

A second reason to suspect a negative relationship between policing terrorism and public support for the police relates to the ability of police to adequately attend to “classic” responsibilities while being highly involved in countering terrorism, which was discussed and examined in Chap. 2. If the police put less emphasis on “classic” police work, effectiveness in fighting crime is expected to decline overall. Consequentially, the public may feel that the police lack capabilities to catch rule-breakers and control crime, and thus evaluations of police *effectiveness and professionalism* may drop. This, in turn, may again impair perceptions of legitimacy, since performance assessments were also found to play an important role in legitimacy evaluations (although secondary to procedural justice—see National Research Council, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001).

Hypothesis 2: Policing Terrorism May Encourage Positive Public Evaluations

At the same time, it is reasonable to hypothesize that extensive police involvement in counterterrorism may actually *improve* public perceptions of the police and police legitimacy. First, if fear of terrorism is high and the threat is perceived as severe and more acute than other threats (such as those posed by crime), the police may be viewed as responding to the salient problem that is mostly troubling the community. Thus, the police may be perceived as attentive to the needs of the

community and its citizens, as expressed by the principles of community policing (Friedmann, 1992; Kelling & Moore, 1988), which were found to encourage police legitimacy (Skogan, 2006).

Second, the unique *type* of responses elicited by terrorism threats may improve perceptions of police effectiveness. The pressing nature of terrorism threats force the police to respond quickly and efficiently, with all available capacity and with no room for compromise. Such full-power reactions may, in turn, improve evaluations of police capabilities and professionalism. It is important to note in this regard that many activities that are part of policing terrorism in Israel, including educational efforts; supervising security at public facilities; setting roadblocks; issuing public warnings; and managing the scene after an attack took place, are highly visible, and may therefore encourage evaluations of police diligence, seriousness, and professionalism. Thus, it is not surprising that scholars and practitioners have noted that during the Second Intifada in Israel, excessive police presence in and around city centers, in addition to well-publicized successes in preventing attacks, significantly improved the image of Israeli police officers and the INP more generally (Fishman, 2005).

As noted above, performance evaluations are strongly associated with police legitimacy and thus positive evaluations of police professionalism in fighting terrorism may improve overall legitimacy. But during periods of severe terrorism threats, assessments of police performance may become even more important in shaping public trust. Some scholars have argued that during times of conflict and difficulty, citizens may be more concerned with police effectiveness and performance than with procedural justice (Deutsch, 1990; Nagata, 1993; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), and indeed Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that while both before and after the September 11 terrorist attack the willingness of New York citizens to empower the police flowed directly from perception of police legitimacy, after September 11 willingness to empower the police was also directly influenced by performance assessments. In the analysis reported in the next chapter, we find that the role of performance in shaping public assessments of police legitimacy under extreme threats in Israel is indeed more substantial (though concern with procedural justice remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy).

Third, some counterterrorism activities directly encourage police-community cooperation. In Israel for example, INP representatives attend schools and educate children about identifying suspicious objects that could be related to terrorism; public reports about suspicious objects or people are treated very seriously in order to encourage such reports; and police involvement in counterterrorism has encouraged Israeli citizens to voluntarily join the Civil Guard. The Civil Guard was originally established to assist counterterrorism efforts; however volunteers quickly became involved in numerous aspects of policing in Israel.² Finally, as we have noted in previous chapters, it is often argued that security-related matters are considered more “high status” and “attractive” (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009), and thus police

² See the INP website: www.police.gov.il.

involvement in counterterrorism may place the police in a more “prestigious” position alongside other security agencies.

In sum, it is not clear how public attitudes and perceptions of police legitimacy will be affected by extensive police involvement in counterterrorism. Scholars have raised concerns and highlighted the factors that may weaken public support, including extensive involvement in “high policing” and neglect of “classic” police responsibilities, which are explicable in light of the literature on legitimacy and procedural justice. At the same time, there are reasons to suspect that, at least under some circumstances, policing terrorism may actually improve public evaluations of the police.

Policing Terrorism and the “Rally Effect”

The relationship between policing terrorism and public perceptions of the police may also be examined within the context of in-group/out-group theories of sociology and the political science concept of the “Rally Effect.” According to the in-group/out-group hypothesis, under certain conditions internal cohesion may increase in the face of an external conflict (see review by Stein, 1976). This hypothesis was first formulated by sociologists (see Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1955), and was evident in the work of Durkheim (1951), who identified that national suicide rates declined during certain crises, such as political wars. Parallel arguments were made by anthropologists, psychologists, and political scientists (see review by Stein, 1976).

Drawing on similar ideas, political scientists have identified the “Rally” or “Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect (Mueller, 1970, 1973), according to which in times of international crises support for the national leader increases. This effect was found for other public institutions as well (Norpoth, 1991; Parker, 1995). Several explanations were offered for the “Rally Effect” (see Baker & Oneal, 2001; Lai & Reiter, 2005), including *patriotism* (Brody, 1991; Mueller, 1970); a one-sided story in the media, resulting from the *opposition muting* its criticism of the leadership, often due to limited access to classified information about the crisis (Baker & Oneal, 2001; Brody, 1991); and *demonstrated competence of the leadership*, which, in turn, increases public support (Lai & Reiter, 2005; Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach, & Young, 1993; Smith, 1996).

It is important to mention that not all external conflicts result in rallies (see reviews by Baker & Oneal, 2001, and by Lai & Reiter, 2005). Rather, Lai and Reiter (2005), for example, found that in the UK rallies are most likely and largest when the public perceives a direct, severe, and unprovoked threat to the national interest and to fundamental national values. Baker and Oneal (2001) found Rally Effects in the USA to be associated with high levels of conflict and prominent media coverage. The largest and longest Rally Effect in the USA was observed after the terror attack of September 11, 2001 (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003), and similar fluctuations in trust in various social institutions were identified in Spain around the 2004 Madrid terrorist attack (Dinesen & Jaeger, 2013).

Importantly, rallies have generally been found to be short-lived (see reviews by Baker & Oneal, 2001, and by Lai & Reiter, 2005). Once the crisis has passed, or alternatively the situation drags on longer than expected, support typically subsides to earlier levels (Mueller, 1973; Sigelman & Conover, 1981; Sorrentino & Vidmar, 1974). Some argue that this is because the opposition, which originally did not pass judgment on the leader, over time returns to original patterns of criticism (Mueller, 1973; Sigelman & Conover, 1981) and thus the public is again exposed to negative views of the leadership.

The model proposed by the “Rally Effect” provides a useful framework for examining the relationship between policing terrorism and public attitudes toward the police. First, periods of intense terrorism threats may generate Rally Effects, since, as stated, rallies are likely when an external threat is severe, the level of conflict is high and fundamental national values are at stake. For example, as mentioned earlier, the terror attack of September 11 was found to generate the largest and longest observed Rally Effect in the USA (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003). If during such crises the police are highly involved in countering terrorism, the public support associated with Rally Effects may be directed at the police, both because rallies were found to be directed at public institutions other than the leadership (Norpoth, 1991; Parker, 1995), and because the police may be viewed as leaders in local aspects of the struggle against terrorism. Indeed, Dinesen and Jaeger (2013) identified a Rally Effect in public trust in the police in Spain (among other social institutions) following the Madrid terrorist attack.

Considered together with the hypotheses formulated in the policing literature, it could be hypothesized that during times of terrorism-related crises, we will observe an improvement in evaluations of the police and its legitimacy, both because of increased internal cohesion under such circumstances (as suggested by the Rally Effect), and due to the additional factors, specifically related to policing terrorism, which may contribute to positive public evaluations (as discussed earlier). However, once the threat subsides, public perceptions of the police are expected to decline due to the temporary nature of Rally Effects, and because of the negative effects that policing terrorism may have on public perceptions of the police.

In this chapter we examine fluctuations in attitudes of the majority Jewish population in Israel toward the Israeli police over the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada.³ In this sense the present study may be viewed as a quasi-experimental time-series design (see Campbell & Ross, 1968; Cook & Campbell, 1979), which allows for a comparison of attitudes before, during, and after the period of intense

³ It is important to clarify that the rally model is hypothesized in relation to *majority* communities only. Surveys of attitudes toward the police in the USA and the UK consistently reveal large differences across race categories, whereby whites have been found to hold more positive attitudes toward the police (Bowling, 1999; Brown & Benedict, 2002; Gallagher, Maguire, Mastrofski, & Reisig, 2001). Similar patterns were identified in Israel, where Arabs were found to be more critical of the police than Jews (Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007). Such differences may be even more pronounced with regard to policing terrorism (Hasisi et al., 2009; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Thacher, 2005), due to ethnic or national links to the source of the terrorism threat, or because Arab minorities may be viewed as the “enemy within” (Hasisi et al., 2009).

terrorism threat. In line with the “Rally Effect,” it is hypothesized that at the beginning of the Intifada, as threat levels arise, public evaluations of the INP will have risen. However, as the threat declines public attitudes toward the police and evaluations of police performance, procedural justice, and legitimacy are expected to drop as well. Further, it is hypothesized that such evaluations may deteriorate to even lower levels than those measured prior to the crisis because of the negative effects of high policing discussed above.

The Data

This analysis focuses on the decade between 1998 and 2007, which includes the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada. The “Second” or “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” which began in September 2000, combined several areas of confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including the military, diplomatic, media, and economic domains (Shay & Schweitzer, 2001). It was also characterized by a wave of multi-casualty suicide bombing attacks (see Fig. 3.1), which is considered the longest and most costly in terms of human lives (Erlich, 2006). The high terrorism threat demanded immense efforts from the INP and major focus on counterterrorism throughout this period. At the same time, as can be seen from Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 below, threat levels varied over time, whereby the number of attacks and casualties began rising in 2000, reached a peak in 2002 and has been declining since. Thus, these data provide an opportunity for a natural experiment examining the




Fig. 3.1 Suicide terror attacks and deaths from suicide attacks in Israel, 1998–2007. *Source:* Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see: www.mfa.gov.il)




Fig. 3.2 Deaths from terror attacks in Israel, 1998–2007. *Source:* Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see: www.mfa.gov.il)

Notes:

- Before the year 2000 only data on the total number of deaths was provided.
- According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this list includes 18 Israelis killed abroad in terror attack directed specifically against Israeli targets, and 3 American diplomatic personnel killed in Gaza

relationship between terrorism threat levels and public attitudes toward the police before the outbreak of the Intifada (2000), at its peak (2002), and after the major wave of terrorism subsided (2007).

Surveys of Public Attitudes Toward the INP

We utilized publicly available survey data for our analyses. The Israeli Ministry of Public Security (MOPS) carries out annual surveys of public attitudes toward the police among approximately 1,500 Israeli citizens each year, which tap issues such as performance, trust, equal treatment, and use of force.⁴ Data were collected from these reports for the years 1998–2004 and 2006–2007 (the report for 2005 is not publicly available). This time frame was chosen for two reasons. First, the Second Intifada began in September 2000 and it was important to examine public attitudes before its outbreak, while on the other end of the time frame we aimed to examine the most recent data available at the time of the study (2007). Second, all surveys within this period were carried out by the same survey institute⁵ and generally follow a similar approach.⁶

⁴For survey periods, methodologies, and other details, see [Appendix](#).

⁵Smith Consulting and Research Inc.

⁶Some procedures have varied over the years (see [Appendix](#) for more details).

Response data was collected for questions that tap public attitudes toward the police. Numerous questions, however, were not asked every year. We therefore decided to exclude questions that were asked in less than eight of the nine available surveys, and/or were not asked in all of the three examined time points (2000, 2002, 2007), unless the question directly asked about policing terrorism and was thus particularly important to the present inquiry. Additionally, numerous questions were asked twice, once about the INP in general and once about the Israeli police officer. In line with previous studies we decided to focus on the first type of questions, unless the question was only asked using the second format. For every chosen question, data was collected on responses of Jewish adults.⁷

Findings

Responses to the analyzed questions are presented below according to the dimensions of legitimacy they comply with. Each dimension is briefly described; related survey questions are detailed; and the percentages of adults who gave the two most positive answers to each question are presented graphically. Then, for every question separately, statistical analyses are used to determine whether significant differences in attitudes exist between three time points: immediately before the outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000),⁸ when terrorism threat levels were relatively low; at the peak of the Intifada (2002), when threat levels were the highest; and once the terrorism threat has declined to its lowest levels post the Intifada (2007). Results for Analyses of Variance are reported in Table 3.1.

Trust

Trust in the police is one of the foundations of legitimacy, and indeed questions assessing trust have been used in previous studies to measure legitimacy (along with obligation to obey and feelings about the police; see National Research Council,

⁷It is important to mention that “Jewish adults” include a small group of “Haredim” (Ultra-Orthodox Jews), who may be viewed as distinct from the majority community in Israel. Because of the way data was reported (this group overlapped with Jewish adults and Jewish teenagers), it was not possible to take this group out of the analysis. However, this group presents a very small portion of the samples (see [Appendix](#)), and thus its effects on overall results are expected to be minimal.

Between the years 2002 and 2007 the distributions of responses provided by Jewish adults were reported separately. Before 2002 this was not the case. These figures were therefore calculated for each question separately, by subtracting the responses of Jewish teenagers and Arab adult from the responses of the total sample. This analysis was possible because Arabs and teenagers did not overlap in the samples: among teenagers, only Jews were sampled. Among Arabs, only adults were sampled.

⁸The Intifada began in September 2000, while the 2000 survey was carried out during April–May (see [Appendix](#)).

Table 3.1 Results for a one-way analysis of variance

Theme	Question	F	df	p	Eta ²	Percentage of variance accounted for by year of survey (%)	2000		2002		2007	
							Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Trust	"To what extent do you have trust in the Israeli Police?"	215.97	2, 3,094	<0.001*	0.123	12.3	3.26	1.06	3.77	1.03	2.84	1.12
Procedural justice: participation	"To what extent, in your view, do the Israeli Police treat seriously those who approach them?"	80.62	2, 2,944	<0.001*	0.052	5.2	2.83	0.91	3.22	0.99	2.71	0.98
Procedural justice: treated with dignity and respect	"To what extent, in your view, does the Israeli Police use excessive force?"	46.79	2, 2,705	<0.001*	0.033	3.3	2.88	0.92	2.66	1.04	3.12	1.15
	"To what extent, in your view, is the Israeli Police officer courteous?"	18.87	2, 2,959	<0.001**	0.013	1.3	2.75	1	2.98	1.05	2.73	1.04
Performance	"Generally, how well in your view does the police perform its duties?"	348.62	2, 3,011	<0.001*	0.188	18.8	2.50	0.77	2.99	0.74	2.15	0.77
	"To what extent, in your view, is the Israeli Police professional?"	160.30	2, 2,963	<0.001**	0.098	9.8	3.12	0.93	3.70	0.93	3.03	0.94

*Significant differences ($p < 0.05$) were found between all three time points

**Significant differences ($p < 0.05$) were found between 2000 and 2002, and between 2002 and 2007, but not between 2000 and 2007




Fig. 3.3 Trust in the Israel National Police, 1998–2007. Source: Israel Ministry of Public Security

2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004). One question in MOPS surveys directly asked about trust: “To what extent do you have trust in the Israeli Police?”⁹ The percentages of Jewish adults who gave the two most trusting answers are reported in Fig. 3.3.

As can be seen from Fig. 3.3, trust in the INP over the past decade closely follows the pattern of terrorism threat shown in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2. Between 1998 and 2000 trust gradually declined, while in 2001, following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, trust evaluations began to rise and reached a peak in 2002, corresponding with the peak in terrorism threat. Since 2003, along with the decline of threat levels, trust in the Israeli police has been dropping. A one-way analysis of variance revealed significant differences between the three examined time points (see Table 3.1).

Procedural Justice

As discussed earlier, procedural justice was identified as the salient determinant of police legitimacy (see reviews by the National Research Council, 2004 and by Tyler, 2004). Procedural justice, in turn, is made up of several components. Questions in MOPS surveys tap two of these factors, as detailed below.

Participation: Procedures that allow input from the citizens involved, and take their views of the situation into account, are perceived as fairer than those that do not.

⁹The five optional responses ranged from “no trust at all” to “complete trust”; in 1998, 1999, and 2001 the exact wording was: “To what extent do you have trust in the police?”




Fig. 3.4 Evaluations of being treated seriously by the Israeli police, 1998–2007. *Source:* Israel Ministry of Public Security

One question in MOPS surveys relates to this issue: “*To what extent, in your view, do the Israeli Police treat seriously those who approach them?*”¹⁰ The percentages of Jewish adults who gave the two most positive answers are reported in Fig. 3.4.

Similar to the pattern of trust, evaluations of being treated seriously by the Israeli police declined between 1998 and 2000, began to gradually rise in 2001, and reached a peak in 2002 (which was, however, lower than levels measured in 1998). Since 2002, along with the decline in terrorism threat levels, treatment evaluations have dropped as well, and seemed to have leveled off in 2006. A one-way analysis of variance showed the differences between the three examined time points to be significant (see Table 3.1).

Being treated with dignity and respect: Another component of procedural justice is the quality of interpersonal treatment by the police. When citizens feel that they are treated with politeness and dignity, and that their rights are recognized and respected, the procedure is perceived as fairer. Two questions in MOPS surveys relate to this issue:

To what extent, in your view, does the INP use excessive force?

*To what extent, in your view, is the Israeli police officer courteous?*¹¹

¹⁰ Five optional answers were provided, ranging from “not at all” to “very much.”

¹¹ In 2000 the exact wording was: “For each of the following topics, state to what extent they are generally compatible with or true with regard to the Israeli police officer: courteous...”; in 1998 the exact wording was: “To what extent is “courteous” true with regard to the Israeli police officer?”




Fig. 3.5 Interpersonal treatment, 1998–2007. Source: Israel Ministry of Public Security

The percentages of Jewish adults who gave the two top answers are reported in Fig. 3.5.¹²

The first question is asked in a reversed manner, that is, the higher the evaluations of the use of excessive force, the lower the evaluations of procedural justice. Unlike previous questions, these responses exhibit a general improvement in public evaluations of procedural justice between 1998 and 2000 (evidenced by less individuals believing that the Israeli police use excessive force to a great extent). However, in line with the pattern identified earlier, at the peak of the Intifada the smallest number of individuals believed that the Israeli police use excessive force. Since 2002, along with the decline in terrorism threat levels, we observe a rise in the number of individuals who hold such attitudes. A one-way analysis of variance revealed significant differences in attitudes between 2000, 2002, and 2007 (see Table 3.1).

The second question exhibits a similar pattern to the one revealed by previous questions: between 1998 and 2000 we view a sharp decline in the number of Jewish adults who believe Israeli police officers to be courteous. Interestingly, the decline continues in 2001, into the period of the Second Intifada. However, in 2002, at the peak of the Intifada, a significant rise in such attitudes is evident (which still are, however, lower than evaluations measured in 1998 and 1999). Since 2002 evaluations of courtesy have generally declined, and returned to pre-Intifada levels.

¹²For both questions, the five optional responses ranged from “not at all” to “very much.”

A one-way analysis of variance revealed significant differences in courtesy evaluations between 2000 and 2002, and between 2002 and 2007, but not between 2000 and 2007 (see Table 3.1).

Performance

As detailed earlier, legitimacy was found to also be influenced by performance evaluations. Two questions in MOPS surveys tapped performance:

*Generally, how well in your view does the INP perform its duties?*¹³

*To what extent, in your view, is the INP professional?*¹⁴

The percentages of Jewish adults who gave the two top answers to each question are reported in Fig. 3.6.

Generally, performance evaluations follow the same pattern exhibited by previously discussed questions, which corresponds with terrorism threat levels. In 2002, at the peak of the Intifada, we view a peak in both performance evaluations. Interestingly, for the first question the rise in public attitudes began in 2000,




Fig. 3.6 Performance evaluations, 1998–2007. Source: Israel Ministry of Public Security

¹³ Four optional answers were provided to this question, ranging from “not well at all” to “very well.”

¹⁴ The five optional responses to this question ranged from “not at all” to “very much”; between 1998 and 2000 the exact wording was: “To what extent, in your view, does the INP hold high professional standards?”

before the outbreak of the Intifada. Both evaluations have been steadily declining since 2002, corresponding with the decline in threat levels. It is interesting to note that performance evaluations seem to be generally higher than procedural justice evaluations, while still following a similar pattern over the years. A one-way analysis of variance carried out on responses to the first question revealed significant differences between all three examined time points. The same analysis carried out on responses to the second question revealed significant differences between 2000 and 2002, and between 2002 and 2007, but not between 2000 and 2007 (see Table 3.1).

Performance in Policing Terrorism

Two questions in MOPS surveys inquire about performance in policing terrorism. Even though these questions did not follow our criteria (they were not asked in a number of years, including 2000), both were analyzed due to their particular relevance to the present inquiry:

*Generally, how in your view does the INP perform its security-related duties (preventing terror attacks, securing public areas etc.)?*¹⁵

*To what extent, in your view, does the INP efficiently handle the prevention of terror attacks?*¹⁶

The percentages of Jewish adults who gave the two top answers to each of the questions are reported in Fig. 3.7.

As can be seen from Fig. 3.7, evaluations of performance in policing terrorism are generally higher than attitudes measured by all questions discussed earlier. At the same time, they seem to follow the same pattern, whereby attitudes were most positive in 2002, at the peak of the terrorism threat, and have been gradually declining since. As/Because both questions were not asked immediately before the outbreak of the Intifada (2000), responses were compared only between 2002 and 2007.

Since responses to both questions were not normally distributed, Mann–Whitney tests were carried out to determine whether the differences in attitudes between 2002 and 2007 are statistically significant. Both analyses revealed significant differences, whereby attitudes in 2002 were significantly higher than in 2007. For the first question, the mean rank in 2002 (1,320.05) was significantly higher than in 2007 (898.90) ($U=390,988.50$, $Z=-17.01$, $p<0.001$). For the second question, the mean rank in 2002 (1,270.92) was again significantly higher than in 2007 (946.35) ($U=441,254$, $Z=-12.72$, $p<0.001$).

¹⁵The four optional responses to this question ranged from “not well” to “very well.”

¹⁶The five possible answers to this question ranged from “not at all” to “very much”; in 1998 the exact wording was: “In your view, to what extent does the police efficiently prevent terror attacks?”




Fig. 3.7 Evaluations of performance in policing terrorism, 1998–2007. *Source:* Israel Ministry of Public Security

Discounting Alternative Explanations to Observed Trends

Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 above all suggest a consistent pattern, whereby legitimacy-related attitudes toward the INP have been generally rising since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, reached a peak in 2002 (the height of the terrorism threat), and have been gradually declining since (along with the decline in terrorism threat levels). Most of the differences in attitudes between 2000, 2002, and 2007 were found to be statistically significant. However, an issue that needs to be examined concerns the possibility of plausible rival explanations—what factors, other than the terrorism threat, may have caused the fluctuations in public attitudes?¹⁷

Numerous factors are known from past research to have an effect on public attitudes toward the police, and could, in theory, account for or contribute to the observed trends. However, as detailed below, after examining these factors in the present context it appears that the level of the terrorism threat remains the salient explanation for the observed fluctuations in public attitudes. First, sociodemographic characteristics including race, age, and socioeconomic status have all been identified as having an effect on attitudes toward the police (see reviews by Brown & Benedict, 2002; by Gallagher et al., 2001; and by the National Research Council, 2004). Thus, in order to control for the effects of race and age, this study only

¹⁷ See Campbell and Ross (1968) and Cook and Campbell (1979) for a discussion on threats to the validity of quasi-experimental interrupted time-series designs.

analyzed attitudes of Jewish adults. Additionally, the yearly samples surveyed by MOPS were representative samples of Israeli population (or were weighted accordingly—see [Appendix](#)), and thus there was no reason to suspect that the socioeconomic makeup of Jewish adults varied substantially from year to year.

Contact with police was also identified as influential in this context, whereby positive encounters tend to improve evaluations of the police, while negative contacts have the opposite effect (Brown & Benedict, 2002; Gallagher et al., 2001). In this case, however, even if more Jewish adults did have more positive encounters with the police during high-threat years, this would assist in explaining the results rather than provide a rival explanation, since, as detailed earlier in this chapter, strategies for policing terrorism in Israel often involve much contact and cooperation with the public, which may indeed improve the image of the police.

The media was also identified as having a significant effect on public attitudes toward the police (see Gallagher et al., 2001), and it may well be the case that the Israeli police was portrayed more positively in the news during the period of the Second Intifada. However, such a trend, if identified, would again assist in explaining rather than challenge our conclusions since, as discussed earlier, the “Rally Effect” is often attributed to unbalanced media reports.

Fighting crime has long been defined as a major component of the police mission (see Gallagher et al., 2001; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Weitzer, 1999). It could therefore be argued that the observed fluctuations in attitudes may be the result of changing crime levels, whereby when there is more crime, more traffic accidents, or the police are less effective in solving crime, support drops, and vice versa. However, an examination of crime statistics reported by the INP reveals that this is not likely to be the case. Total reported crime in Israel, reported violence and reported property offenses (all standardized per 10,000 residents) have generally declined between 1998 and 2007 (INP, 2008a). Similarly, the yearly numbers of traffic accidents in Israel and deaths from these accidents (standardized per 1,000 and 100,000 residents, respectively) have generally and moderately declined as well (INP, 2008b). Additionally, the percentage of cleared cases¹⁸ has been moderately rising since 1998 (from 25.2 % in 1998 to 36.1 % in 2007). Thus, all three patterns do not correspond to fluctuations in public evaluations of the police.

Lastly, it is feasible to assume that exceptional, highly publicized events in which the police are involved, such as major successes in bringing rule-breakers to justice or, on the other hand, “scandals” of police failures or misconduct, would affect public attitudes. It could thus be the case that occurrences such as the publication of the Or Commission’s conclusions in September 2003; the escape of Benny Sela, a convicted serial rapist, from police custody in November 2006; the publication of the Zailer Committee’s conclusions in February, 2007 and more, may have contributed to the decline in public evaluations of the INP since 2002. However, past findings do not necessarily support such assumptions. As reviewed by Gallagher

¹⁸Cleared cases are investigations in which a suspect was identified. This measure has often been used as an indication of police performance (see Alpert & Moore, 1993; Bayley, 1994; Mesch & Talmud, 1998; Paré, Felson, & Quimet, 2007; Reiner, 1998).

et al. (2001), very little is known about the effects of unique events on public attitudes toward the police. These authors conclude that declines in public evaluations overall do not correspond with major events that portray the police negatively, and if such a drop in attitudes is found, it is often short-lived. Similar conclusions were reached by other scholars as well (see Brown & Benedict, 2002; Shaw, Shapiro, Lock, & Jacobs, 1998; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997).

In sum, sociodemographic characteristics that are known from past research to influence public evaluations of the police were controlled for in the present study. Other factors, such as contact with police or media coverage may assist in explaining the results as part of the effects of policing terrorism and the Rally Effect. Trends in other factors, including crime, traffic accidents, and clearance rates, do not correspond with fluctuations in public attitudes. Lastly, while special events may have contributed to the observed trends, their effect is unclear and questionable. Thus, it appears that terrorism threats and the sequential Rally Effect remain a salient explanation to the observed trends in public perceptions of the Israeli police between 1998 and 2007.

Discussion

Legitimacy-related evaluations of the police among Jewish adults in Israel seem to have been influenced by the terrorism threat level. Examination of survey data reveals that public attitudes toward the INP appear to have generally declined over the past decade. This trend, however, was interrupted by the Second Palestinian Intifada. While most attitudes show a decline at the beginning of the time series, we view a rise following the outbreak of the Intifada, and all evaluations show a significant peak in 2002, the height of the terrorism threat. These attitudes, however, have been declining since, many to levels lower than those witnessed at the beginning of the decade.

This pattern closely follows the framework suggested by the “Rally Effect,” whereby when faced with an external threat, support for public institutions increases, but declines to previous levels once the crisis has passed. The Second Intifada in Israel was perceived as a severe threat to the lives and daily routine of Israeli citizens, and has apparently caused a rally around the INP. This “rally” is evidenced by a general rise in positive attitudes toward the INP in many aspects of legitimacy, including trust, procedural justice, general performance, and performance in fighting terrorism. In addition, it may well be that the rise in public evaluations was also the result of perceptions that the police are considerate to the needs of the community; attentive to the most pressing problems; professional and successful in handling terrorism; work in close cooperation with the community; and are generally involved in a “prestigious” domain.

In this regard, it appears that in the face of intense terrorism threats, forces pushing toward positive evaluations of the INP had a stronger effect than forces working in the opposite direction. Thus, evaluations of trust, procedural justice, and

performance increased *despite* the possible use of high policing tactics, police militarization, and fewer resources invested in crime fighting and order maintaining. Additionally, precisely because of their ambiguity and secrecy, militarized and high policing tactics may contribute to the “attractiveness” and “glory” of the police. However, the peak in public attitudes was short-lived. As the terrorism threat began to decline, so did evaluations of the police, possibly due to the short-term nature of rallies. It is also feasible that the public’s priorities and expectations from their police began to change, both in terms of the nature and character of policing, and with regard to the problems the police ought to focus on.

In addition to this general pattern, several interesting trends emerge from the data. First, some attitudes seem to be generally high, while other evaluations appear to be low overall. Additionally, some evaluations seem more sensitive than others to fluctuations in terrorism threats. Evaluations of performance in policing terrorism are clearly the highest: at the peak of the terrorism threat, 92.2 % of Jewish adults thought that the Israeli police perform their security-related duties “pretty well” or “very well,” while 83.2 % thought that the police efficiently prevent terror attacks “to a large extent” or “to a very large extent.” While evaluations of performance in countering terrorism exhibit the same general trend discussed above, these attitudes seem relatively stable, and were fairly high before as well as after the period of the Second Intifada. Such positive attitudes are not surprising given the major focus of the INP on homeland security and impressive successes in preventing and handling terror attacks.

General performance evaluations also seem relatively high (in comparison to procedural justice assessments—see below). At the height of the terrorism threat, 78.4 % of Jewish adults in Israel thought the Israeli police generally perform their duties “successfully” or “very successfully,” while 60.2 % thought the Israeli police are professional “to a large extent” or “to a very large extent.” Interestingly, evaluations of general performance (“*Generally, how well in your view does the police perform its duties?*”) seem to be highly vulnerable to the terrorism threat level, and, among our sample of questions, were affected by the year of the survey to the greatest extent. This finding may be understood in the light of one of the explanations offered in the literature for the Rally Effect. Hetherington and Nelson (2003) argue that when asked to form an opinion about the leadership, during times of crisis people will be primed to evaluate according to the crisis-induced criteria, and over time return to previous patterns of evaluation (i.e., in this case during high-threat years, general performance was evaluated according to performance in fighting terrorism).

On the other hand, evaluations of procedural justice are generally the lowest among our sample of questions. While exhibiting a peak in 2002 and a decline afterward, these evaluations were relatively low before as well as after the Second Intifada. Additionally, they seem to be less affected by fluctuations in terrorism threat levels and remain fairly stable overall. Interestingly, for many procedural justice questions, the peak in attitudes in 2002 was lower than attitudes measured in 1998. Thus, even though the rise in terrorism did lead to an improvement in assessments of fairness, the effect was not strong enough to overcome the drop that took place at the beginning of the decade.

Trust in the Israeli police, which in the present sample is the only question directly representing legitimacy, was influenced to a large extent by the year of the survey. At the peak of the Intifada, 64.5 % of respondents stated that they have “trust” or “complete trust” in the INP. Only three questions in our sample received higher ratings in 2002 (all relate to performance). This figure, however, dropped to 28 % in 2007. Thus, patterns of legitimacy in Israel over the past decade (as evident by trust) seem to reflect performance more than procedural justice evaluations. In this sense our findings are in line with the literature suggesting that conflict will result in more concern with police effectiveness and performance than with procedural justice (see Deutsch, 1990; Nagata, 1993; Sullivan et al., 1982; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), and consequentially legitimacy may be more affected by performance than by procedural justice evaluations. It is important to emphasize, however, that since only one question directly represents legitimacy in the present sample of questions, this conclusion should be viewed cautiously, and indeed the analysis reported in the next chapter shows different results.

Conclusions

The present findings raise important issues that ought to be considered by the police in Israel as well as in other democratic countries that are placing greater emphasis on homeland security. They also bring forth interesting questions about the factors that influence public evaluations of the police. Police officials in Israel are aware of the public support and appreciation the police received during the height of the Intifada, as well as the constant decline in public support since 2002 (see Fishman, 2005). However, the reasons behind this trend are often unclear. Moreover, police and Ministry of Public Security officials frequently raise questions about what the police can do today to receive the same positive evaluations and appreciation they received during the period of the Second Intifada, and how they can encourage the same public cooperation and support in other domains, such as fighting crime.

Our study suggests that the peak in attitudes during high-threat periods may be attributed, at least partially, to a “Rally Effect.” Naturally, it may well be that the way the police handle the threat, their collaboration with the public and successes in managing the situation, all contribute to public evaluations. However, it seems that at least part of the support and favorable evaluations under such circumstance are due to the nature of “us” versus “them”—internal cohesion in the face of external threat. This suggests that part of the public sympathy during such periods is temporary by nature, fragile, and is in large part a result of the situation.

In this regard, while much of the literature on public attitudes and legitimacy emphasizes antecedents that depend, to a large extent, on police conduct (National Research Council, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004), these data remind us that public perceptions of the police may be influenced by social forces outside police control. Indeed, numerous scholars have highlighted the relationship between public attitudes toward the police and support for or general approval of the

government and the political order (Albrecht & Green, 1977; Benson, 1981; Brown & Coulter, 1983; Chackerian & Barrett, 1973), since the police may be perceived as the most visible representation of government authority (Benson, 1981; Hahn, 1971; Sarat, 1977).

At the same time, police emphasis on counterterrorism may entail costs that *are* linked to police conduct, both in terms of the character of policing, including suspicion- rather than service-orientation, and with regard to practical limitations of trying to address numerous issues at the same time with limited resources. If the police do not take such costs into account and prepare adequately to address them, extensive involvement in policing terrorism may contribute to long-term deterioration in public evaluations and perceptions of police legitimacy. In this regard, it appears important to treat the peak in public attitudes during high-threat periods with the appropriate caution, and exercise flexibility and attentiveness to the changing, long-term needs of the community.

Appendix: Ministry of Public Security Surveys

Survey periods, methodologies, and sample sizes

Year of survey	Cite	Survey period	Survey strategy	Total sample	No. of Jewish adults	No. of orthodox from total sample
1998	Smith and Sakal (1998)	August, 1998	Face-to-face interviews	1,148	805	150 ^a
1999	Smith and Sakal (1999)	April–May, 1999	Face-to-face interviews	1,202	816	98
2000	Smith and Sharvit (2000)	April–May, 2000	Telephone survey	1,220	812	51
2001	Smith and Sharvit (2001)	April–June, 2001	Telephone survey	1,301	898	76
2002	Smith and Sharvit (2002)	May–June, 2002	Telephone survey	1,627	1,197	86
2003	Smith and Sharvit (2004)	August, 2003 (92 %); October, 2003 (8 %)	Telephone survey	1,607	1,117	68
2004	Smith, Sharvit, and Raphaeli-Hirsch (2005)	August–September, 2004	Telephone survey	2,042	1,416	108
2006	Smith and Arin (Keren-Paz) (2007)	August 31–October 3, 2006	Telephone survey	1,507	1,148	62
2007	Smith and Yehezkel (2008)	August 12–19, 2007	Telephone survey	1,500	1,101	91

^aThis figure includes religious and orthodox Jews

Sampling strategies

Year	Sampling strategies
1998, 1999	Surveys with Jewish respondents took place in 22 communities, proportionally represented in the sample. In each community respondents were chosen according to sociodemographic sections so as to represent the population in that community
2000	Surveys with Jewish respondents took place in 30 communities, proportionally represented in the sample. In each community households were sampled randomly from a list of telephone numbers
2001	Jewish respondents were sampled randomly from a list of telephone numbers, so as to proportionally represent the size of each dialing area
2002	First, 1,300 individuals were randomly sampled so as to represent the population in Israel. Secondly, the sample was enlarged with Jewish respondents so as to have at least 200 respondents from each of the 6 police districts in Israel. In order to have a representative sample of the state of Israel, the data was weighted so that each group (Jewish adults, Jewish teenagers, and Arab Adults) would be represented in the sample according to its proportion in the population. Jewish adults were weighted according to the police district to which they belong
2003	First, 1,478 individuals were sampled randomly so as to represent the population in Israel, out of which 988 were Jewish adults. Secondly, the sample was enlarged with Jewish respondents in two police districts so as to allow additional analyses in these districts. In order to have a representative sample of the state of Israel, the data was weighted so that each group (Jewish adults, Jewish teenagers, and Arab Adults) would be represented in the sample according to its proportion in the population. Jewish adults were weighted according to the police district to which they belong
2004, 2006, 2007	The sample was designed according to police districts. The sample in each district represented the population in that district. In order to have a representative sample of the state of Israel, the data was weighted so that each group (Jewish adults, Jewish teenagers and Arabs Adults) would be represented in the sample according to its proportion in the population. Jewish adults were weighted according to the police district to which they belong

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Chapter 4

The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy

The legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public is considered one of the most important outcomes of policing in democratic countries (National Research Council, 2004), in part because it was found to be associated with numerous desirable behaviors such as obeying the law, consenting to police decisions, providing information and collaborating with the police more generally (Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002; also see review by the National Research Council, 2004). Given the key place that legitimacy has gained in policing, the antecedents of legitimacy have also become an important focus of research. One of the main findings of such studies is that perceptions of procedural justice, which are concerned with the fairness of police processes, are the most important factor in predicting evaluations of police legitimacy. Assessments of police performance, while also significant as an antecedent of legitimacy, were generally found to play a less important role (e.g., see Murphy et al., 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004). It is not clear, however, if procedural justice and performance evaluations would play similar roles as antecedents of police legitimacy under conditions of acute crisis or threat, such as terrorism threats.

In this analysis we utilize a unique situation in Israel, which allowed for a natural experiment examining antecedents of police legitimacy under conditions of severe

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security threats among majority communities.¹ We use survey data to compare the importance of police performance and procedural justice evaluations as antecedents of police legitimacy in the Israeli town “Sderot,” which has been suffering from severe security threats, to antecedents of legitimacy in other cities and towns in Israel, which were not faced with similar threats in recent years.

We begin this chapter by reviewing the concept of “police legitimacy,” focusing specifically on the interplay between procedural justice and police performance/effectiveness as its antecedents. We then review the literature on the effects of security threats, and particularly the impacts of terrorism threats on policy choices, which give rise to the hypotheses of the present study. Our focus then is on our analysis, the sample selected and the survey methods used to collect our data. Using a quasi-experimental design and a multivariate regression approach to control for possible lack of equivalence in sample characteristics across the sites, we compare the importance of assessments of procedural justice and police performance in Sderot with other Israeli communities, located within five police districts. Consistent with the literature on the effects of security threats, we find that the role of performance evaluations in predicting police legitimacy was significantly stronger under conditions of severe, acute security threats. At the same time, we find that procedural justice *was not* less important, and indeed remained the primary antecedent of legitimacy in both conditions.

Procedural Justice and Performance as Antecedents of Police Legitimacy in Situations of Security Threats

The legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public is generally viewed as one of the most important outcomes of policing in democratic societies (National Research Council, 2004). While there are numerous discussions of “legitimacy” in the literature, here we follow Tom Tyler’s conceptualization (e.g., Tyler, 2004, 2009), which, following ideas set forth by Weber (1968) and others (e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), suggests that police legitimacy is “the belief that the police are entitled to call upon the public to follow the law and help combat crime, and that members of the public have an obligation to engage in cooperative behaviors” (Tyler, 2004, pp. 86–87).

When people perceive the police to be legitimate, cooperation with the police and with the law more generally stems from internal feelings of responsibility and obligation, which are self-regulated and are thus less dependent on sanctions or incentives provided by the authorities (Tyler, 2004, 2009). Indeed, public evaluations of the police as legitimate were found to be associated with numerous positive outcomes, such as compliance with the law and general cooperation with and

¹By “majority communities” we are referring to Jewish adults, not including “Haredim” (Ultra-Orthodox Jews). As discussed in subsequent sections, Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Israeli Arabs are unique groups, which may hold different attitudes toward the police and value determinants of police legitimacy differently, particularly in the context of policing terrorism.

acceptance of police authority (e.g., LaFree, 1998; Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Murphy et al., 2008; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Reisig et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004).

Considering the importance of police legitimacy, it is not surprising that much attention has been given to its antecedents. Previous studies have frequently demonstrated that the primary determinant of police legitimacy is perceptions of *procedural justice*, which refer to the appropriateness and fairness of the *processes* by which the police exercise their authority (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; National Research Council, 2004; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2001, 2004, 2009; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). Evaluations of police *performance/effectiveness*, including, for example, the ability of the police to catch rule-breakers and accomplishments in fighting crime (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), were also found to play a significant, though weaker role than that of procedural justice (Murphy et al., 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004, 2009). While some cross-cultural variations were found in the importance of police effectiveness and fair processes for the public (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tankebe, 2009), there is strong support for the proposition that procedural justice is generally the main predictor of police legitimacy, while perceptions of police performance are also important in this context, albeit to a lesser extent.

However, to date, studies examining antecedents of police legitimacy have not been carried out under extreme conditions of crisis or threat, such as intense terrorism threats or attacks. As detailed below, we might expect that under such circumstances the relative importance of the factors predicting police legitimacy may change, since in the face of threat, when the public is affected by uncertainty and insecurity, citizens may be more concerned with outcomes than with fair processes.

Security Threats and Public Attitudes

Threat, conflict, or acute national crises are known to have numerous and diverse effects on cognitions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Gross & Ní Aoláin, 2006; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985). Specifically, threats that may result in physical harm were found to increase a personal sense of vulnerability, which, in turn, tends to promote *action* intended to reduce the risk. This tendency was found with regard to natural disasters (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Sattler, Kaiser, & Hittner, 2000); crime (Ferraro, 1996; Smith & Uchida, 1988); and, importantly, terrorism (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002).

Terrorism threats, in turn, were found not only to promote protective behaviors on the individual level (such as caution in handling mail and minimizing the use of public transportation and air travel; see Huddy et al., 2002), but also to encourage support for protective measures by the government, such as increased surveillance

and other policies that aim to improve security, but could threaten civil liberties more generally (see review by Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). Such policies were supported despite their potential conflict with important elements of procedural justice, such as transparency, polite and dignified treatment, and citizen participation (see Tyler, 2001, 2004).

For example, Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav (2005) examined the effects of perceptions of threat versus feelings of anxiety concerning terrorism in the USA, and found correlations between perceived terrorism threat and a desire for forceful counterterrorism measures, both domestic and international, such as support for national identification cards, government monitoring of communication, restrictions of civil liberties, military intervention, and overseas involvement. Their conclusions are in line with other studies carried out in the USA and Israel (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001; Davis & Silver, 2004; Friedland & Merari, 1985; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Huddy et al., 2007; Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson & Britton, 1998).

In sum, the literature suggests that there may be a zero-sum game between security and fair processes in public priorities (if one gains—the other loses). When terrorism threats become a priority, vulnerability, uncertainty, and fear appear to bring about a desire to “terminate the threat at all costs,” which may take the form of processes that are highly outcome oriented, but at the same time less careful with respect to procedural fairness. In this context, Maslow (1943) provides additional clarification. In his hierarchy of human needs, the need for safety and security are placed just above basic physiological needs, and below needs such as respect of and by others and morality (also see Inglehart, 1997).

Returning to policing and procedural justice versus performance evaluations as antecedents of police legitimacy, as reviewed earlier, studies have generally found procedural justice to be the primary predictor of legitimacy, while performance assessments were found to be secondary in their importance. However, as a result of the effects of security threats reviewed above, we might expect that in situations of acute terrorism threats, the role of police performance/effectiveness in shaping legitimacy would be enhanced, while the importance of procedural justice would weaken. Further, this trend may result in performance overtaking procedural justice and becoming the main antecedent of police legitimacy. It should be noted in this context that, as noted earlier in this book, police agencies have come to play a major role in handling terrorist threats in many democratic countries (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; IACP, 2005; National Research Council, 2004) and particularly in Israel (see Chap. 1 for more details), and thus we expect that these processes would apply to evaluations of the legitimacy of the *police* (in addition, perhaps, to evaluations of other government agencies that take part in the struggle against terrorism).

Indeed, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that while legitimacy influenced willingness to empower the police both before and after the terror attack of September 11, after the attack empowerment was also directly influenced by performance evaluations. Similarly, in the previous chapter we have identified that fluctuations in public trust in the Israel National Police between 1998 and 2007 (a decade which included the high-threat period of the Second Intifada) appear to reflect performance more than procedural justice evaluations. Moreover, Tyler et al. (2010)

recently identified that while a negative relationship between assessments of police intrusion into citizens' lives and police legitimacy is found among Muslim Americans who *do not* view terrorism as a serious threat, this relationship *is not* found among citizens who *do* consider terrorism to be a major problem. In other words, under perceived terrorism threats citizens appeared to be "more forgiving of police intrusions" (although assessments of police harassment negatively affected police legitimacy in both cases; see Tyler et al., 2010, pp. 384–385).

The Data

In this analysis we set out to compare the impacts of procedural justice and performance assessments on perceptions of police legitimacy across two situations: acute security threats and no specific threats. We have thus conducted a survey of citizens residing within the jurisdictions of nine police stations in Israel.² One of these stations was "Sderot," where, as described below, local residents have a particularly acute history of experience with heightened security threats. Five other stations in the study, where residents did not experience security threats during a similar period, provided an opportunity to compare the influence of perceptions of procedural justice and performance on legitimacy. Both samples, as well as their comparison and the expression of our general hypotheses within this specific context, are described below.

Sderot: A City Under Severe Security Threats

Sderot is a small city of about 19,800 residents, located in the south-west of Israel, approximately one kilometer from the Gaza Strip. It was established in 1951 as a transit camp for new Jewish immigrants, and over the years continued to absorb new immigrants from North Africa, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Ethiopia. The town grew rapidly and was declared a city in 1996. Overall, Sderot is a relatively disadvantaged community (ranked four out of ten on the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics' socioeconomic scale),³ with many of its residents employed as production workers in the numerous factories in the area, retailers, and other service providers.⁴

As a result of its proximity to the Gaza Strip, and the fact that it is the most densely populated community in that area, for years Sderot has been the primary target for missile threats and attacks originating from the Gaza Strip, and since the outbreak of the Second Intifada had suffered more rocket threats and attacks than

²The survey stations included *Afula*, *Ashkelon*, *Be'er-Sheva*, *Natanya*, *Rosh-Ha'ayin*, *Sderot*, *Yarkon*, *Zion*, and *Zvulun*. They were chosen because of their variability in sociodemographic characteristics (crime levels; population size; proportion of Arabs within the population; and socioeconomic levels) and on levels of "classic" terrorism threats.

³See: CBS 2003: http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/local_authorities2003/local_authorities_h.htm.

⁴See review of the history of Sderot, available at: <http://www.e-sderot.org.il/Opening.asp>.

any other Israeli community.⁵ Not surprisingly, studies have revealed high levels of PTSD and other stress-related symptoms among Sderot residents (Dekel & Nuttman-Shwartz, 2009). The threat of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip increased considerably between 2006 and 2008,⁶ and during the survey period (October 27–December 3, 2008) there was a major peak in rocket threats and attacks.⁷

As noted earlier, the Israel National Police plays the lead role in handling terrorist threats and attacks within the pre-1967 border. As part of this responsibility, the INP responds to scenes of missile landings, both in Sderot and in other communities in Israel that have faced similar threats in the past (such as Tel Aviv and Haifa during the Gulf War and communities in the North of Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War). The police do not take part in interdicting the launch of missiles or posing obstacles in their way (as is the case with “classic” terrorism threats); however they are the first responders and hold overall responsibility for handling the scenes of missile landings; their bomb squads treat the remains of the missiles; and police officers are responsible for directing traffic and crowds around the scene and assisting local residents. All responsibilities and activities that apply to the third type of counterterrorism interventions carried out by the INP (see Chap. 1) apply when handling this type of scene as well.⁸ Thus, situations of missile threats and attacks allow us to examine public priorities and expectations from the police under conditions of security threats.

Nevertheless, we recognize that the Sderot context differs from policing other, more common terrorism threats (such as bombings, shootings, or stabbings), where the police presumably have some control over the source of the threat, and thus in trying to prevent attacks may carry out aggressive stopping, searching, and questioning with less concern for fair processes. Nonetheless, given the prior literature in this area, in situations of high threat and insecurity we expect concerns for safety to take priority over issues of fair processes, such as respect, dignity, and participation (e.g., Maslow, 1943).

More specifically, due to the critical role of the INP in handling the aftermath of missile landings, we expect Sderot residents to be highly concerned with adequate police performance, including, for example, rapid responses and sufficient presence at missile landing sites, which would enable efficient handling of the scenes and quick return to routine. At the same time, we expect these citizens to be less worried that such focus may come with the price of impatient treatment of “ordinary” calls for service; officer fatigue, which may hamper overall quality of service; or that in efforts to return life to normal quickly, officers handling the scene may treat bystanders impolitely, with little patience to explain the situation and answer questions, all

⁵ By the end of 2007, Sderot was hit by 803 rockets, which constitute 45 % of rockets hitting inhabited areas in the south of Israel (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2007).

⁶ While the yearly number of identified rocket hits ranged from 4 to 281 between 2000 and 2005, in 2006 there were 946 hits; in 2007 there were 783 hits; and between January and November 2008 there were 1,211 hits (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2007, 2009).

⁷ While between July and October, 2008, 1–8 rocket hits were identified per month, 125 rocket hits were identified in November 2008 (see Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009).

⁸ Information obtained through personal communication with a high ranking, retired Israeli police official.

of which are important elements of the procedural justice model (see Tyler, 2004, 2009). In this context it is important to stress that concerns about “high policing” are not limited to the source of the terrorism threats (e.g., Muslim/Arab communities or terrorist suspects), as this policing style may impact the character of the police, their priorities, and nature of interaction with the public more generally (e.g., Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Mastrofski, 2006).

Comparison Districts

We chose to compare Sderot to five of the eight police districts that were included in the survey. The primary reason for exclusion of three districts was security threats during the time period studied (we wanted to have comparison districts that did not experience any major security threats during that time).⁹ These districts, their central cities and main characteristics are listed in Table 4.1. While these five districts provide a useful comparison in terms of security threats, they are more diverse in social characteristics than Sderot itself (see Table 4.1). Thus, recognizing the possible confounding of average individual characteristics across the comparison sample, we control for sociodemographic and other personal characteristics in our analyses. We also include the districts as dummy variables in order to take into account the specific variability in our data that comes from the stations themselves. In addition to our primary analysis, we conducted a sensitivity analysis in which we compared Sderot to each of the comparison districts, and found results very similar to those reported later for the sample as a whole.

Sampling Within the Districts

Within the districts, respondents were sampled from all communities so as to proportionally represent that district. Within each city/town respondents were selected randomly. It is important to note that in this analysis we focus on majority communities only. Minorities, including Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews, are

⁹The excluded districts were *Ashkelon*, *Be'er-Sheva*, and *Zion* (Jerusalem). With regard to *Ashkelon* and *Be'er-Sheva*, by the end of 2008 the range of rocket attacks from Gaza expanded to include these districts as well (see Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009). This potential threat, therefore, disqualified them from our comparison group of “no threat.” With regard to *Zion* (Jerusalem), several major terror attacks took place in Jerusalem in 2008 (see data reported by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mfa.gov.il). Although threat levels in Jerusalem were low compared to those witnessed in 2002 and 2003, these recent attacks disqualified *Zion* from our comparison group as well. Importantly, however, because we viewed the security situation in these three districts as much closer to the situation in the comparison districts than to the extreme threat in *Sderot*, we initially carried out the analysis *with* these districts as part of the comparison group. Additionally, we compared *Sderot* to each of the comparison districts separately, and in both cases reached similar results. However, in our final model we sought to compare the high-threat status of *Sderot* to a comparison group that is broad and diverse, but also as “clean” from security threats as possible.

Table 4.1 Police districts

Police station	Communities within the jurisdiction of the station ^a		Population size ^b	Socioeconomic levels ^c	Crime levels ^d
Sderot	Sderot		29,917	4.00	106.23
<i>Comparison districts:</i>					
Afula	Achsal	Nin	122,370	3.97	54.50
	Afula	Shabli-a-Ganem			
	Ahuzat-Barak	Sulam			
	Daboria	Taibe-Bae'mek			
	Gan-Ner	Tamra			
	Kfar-Metzer	Tzandela			
	Kfar-Tavor	Yoknea'm-Ilit			
	Makibla	Yoknea'm-Moshava			
	Naora				
Natanya	Aviha'il	Michmoret	245,053	5.13	88.46
	Beit-Itzhak	Natanya			
	Even-Yehuda	Nordia			
	Kfar-Haroe'	Pardesia			
	Kfar-Vitkin	Tzoran-Kadima			
	Kfar-Yona	Tzor-Moshe			
Rosh-Ha'ayin	Ela'ad	Matan	87,644	3.92	52.98
	JalJulia	Nirit			
	Kfar-Bara	Rosh-Ha'ayin			
	Kfar-Kasem				
Yarkon	Tel Aviv-Jaffa		363,400	8.00	159.59
Zvulun	Avtan	Kiryat-Yam	223,481	5.77	66.59
	Basmat-Tivo'n	Nesher			
	Kiryat-Atta	Nofit			
	Kiryat-Byalick	Rechasim			
	Kiryat-Motzkin	Yagor			
	Kiryat-Tivo'n				

^aDue to space limitations, only communities with the population of 2,000 or above are listed

^bData obtained from the Israeli Police, updated to 2004. Includes *all* communities with the jurisdiction

^cSocioeconomic data for communities with the population of 2,000 residents or above was obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (for confidentiality reasons, this information is not available for smaller communities). The scale is based on various factors such as financial resources, residence characteristics and education, and ranges from 1 to 10 (see: CBS 2003: http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/local_authorities2003/local_authorities_h.htm). The socioeconomic level of the jurisdiction as a whole was calculated from information at the community level (using weighted averages)

^dYearly averages of criminal case files opened per 1,000 residents, for the years 2000–2004. Data obtained from the Israeli Police. Includes *all* communities with the jurisdiction

generally found to hold different attitudes toward the police and the processes by which their evaluations are formed may differ, particularly with regard to policing terrorism and other security threats.¹⁰ Additionally, the small percentage of Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Sderot, as well as their minor representation in our Sderot sample,¹¹ did not allow for a comparison of these minority groups across Sderot and our control districts. Thus, Israeli Arabs as well as Ultra-Orthodox Jews were not included in the present analysis.

Accordingly, our final analysis included 2013 individuals from six police districts in Israel (between 210 and 405 from each district), out of which 405 reside in Sderot, and 1,608 reside in five communities in Israel that have not faced similar security threats at the time. Since respondents with missing values for any of the variables utilized for the present analysis were excluded, 312 individuals from Sderot and 1,104 from our comparison communities were included in the final regression models.

Survey of Public Attitudes Toward the Police

The survey questionnaire included 64 questions tapping numerous aspects of attitudes toward the police and perceptions of policing terrorism in Israel. For most items, respondents were asked to rank their agreement with statements on a scale of 1–5 (1=Does not agree at all; 5=Agrees completely). In our design of both the statements and the indexes we tried to follow theoretical constructs of the key concepts, as well as their operational definitions, as used in previous surveys (e.g., Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Some of the

¹⁰ Although evaluations of procedural justice were found to be equally important across ethnic groups (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1994, 2000; Tyler & Huo, 2002), surveys of public attitudes toward the police consistently reveal that whites hold more positive attitudes toward the police than non-whites (Bowling, 1999; Brown & Benedict, 2002; Gallagher, Maguire, Mastrofski, & Reisig, 2001). Similarly, in Israel, Jewish citizens were found to hold more favorable attitudes toward the police than Arab citizens (Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007). Grouping together attitudes and expectations of Jews and Arabs from the police is particularly problematic in the context of policing terrorism (see Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Thacher, 2005), due to ethnic or national links to the source of the terrorism threat, or because Arab minorities may be treated as the “enemy within” (Hasisi et al., 2009).

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2010), in 2009, eight percent of Israeli Jews above the age of 20 defined themselves as “Ultra-Orthodox” [see: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201019101 (in Hebrew)]. Ultra-Orthodox Jews generally perceive the state of Israel as “a very problematic entity with which it has been necessary to come to terms...” (Barzilai, 2005, p. 217), in large part because they view Jewish nationalism as contradicting messianic redemption. This population is characterized by tense relationships with the state and its agents, and it is thus not surprising that Ultra-Orthodox Jews were found to differ from the majority community in Israel in terms of both evaluations of the police and general obligation to obey the law (see Rattner, 2009; Yagil & Rattner, 2002).

¹¹ In our *Sderot* sample, only 6 respondents stated that they are Ultra-Orthodox Jews (1.4 %), and only one respondent stated that he is an Israeli Arab (0.2 %).

statements, however, were modified to fit the local context and language. Additionally, we insisted on Cronbach's Alpha values of 0.70 or higher for all indices (see Nunnally, 1978), and thus several statements were excluded from the final construction of the indices.

Our dependent variable, *police legitimacy* in the eyes of the public was operationalized using four statements tapping trust¹² in the police: "The police are guided by the public's well-being"; "The police carryout their job well"; "If a relative/friend was a victim of a crime I would encourage them to turn to the police"; and "I have trust in the Israeli Police" (Cronbach's Alpha of 0.79; range: 4–20; Sderot: Mean=13.37; SD=4.40; Comparison districts: Mean=12.70; SD=3.87). Our first independent variable, *procedural justice*, focused on the *processes* by which the police interact with citizens, and, in line with past research, included statements that tap evaluations of both fairness of decision-making and fairness of interpersonal treatment (see reviews by Tyler, 2004, 2009): "The police allow citizens to express their opinion before making a decision regarding their case"; "The police explain their activities well to the people they encounter"; and "The police treat all citizens equally"; "Officers treat citizens they encounter with respect" (Cronbach's Alpha of 0.78; range: 4–20; Sderot: Mean=11.44; SD=4.32; Comparison districts: Mean=10.59; SD=3.76).

Our second independent variable, *police performance/efficiency*, was again operationalized in line with previous studies (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) to tap police accomplishments in the field, and was made up of two questions: "The police efficiently handle crime in my area of residence"; and "Police presence in my area of residence is adequate" (Cronbach's Alpha of 0.76; range: 2–10; Sderot: Mean=5.77; SD=2.58; Comparison districts: Mean=5.00; SD=2.41).¹³ As mentioned above, numerous sociodemographic and other factors, as well as past experiences with the police, which are known from past research to influence attitudes toward the police (see reviews by Brown & Benedict, 2002 and by Gallagher et al., 2001), were also

¹² As stated earlier, in this analysis we followed Tyler's conceptualization of "police legitimacy" (e.g., Tyler, 2004, 2009). This concept has often been operationalized in previous studies as a combination of trust in the police, obligation to obey the police and the law, and sometimes affective feelings toward the police (see Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004, 2009; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Because recent research suggests that "trust" and "obligation to obey" may be two distinct concepts, both theoretically and empirically (see Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2009), in our analysis we chose to differentiate between them and focus specifically on "trust." Importantly, however, we also carried out our analysis with an elaborated index of "police legitimacy," which included, in addition to the four "trust" statements, two statements tapping obligation to obey the police and the law, and reached highly similar results. The two additional statements were "I always try to obey the law, even if I find it unfair"; and "The police should be obeyed, even if we are not pleased with the way they treat citizens" (elaborated legitimacy index: Cronbach's Alpha value: 0.71; range: 6–30; Sderot: Mean=22.05; SD=5.07; Comparison districts: Mean=21.40; SD=4.37).

¹³ We did not directly ask about police accomplishments in handling the missile landing sites as this would not be relevant in our comparison districts, and because we tried to follow previous research in our definition of the variables. Importantly, as noted earlier, adequate police presence is highly relevant to this police task, and is, in turn, highly correlated with evaluations of handling crime.

measured by our survey and incorporated into our analysis, so as to control for their confounding effects (see [Appendix](#) for more details).

The survey was conducted between October 27 and December 3, 2008, by the Statistics Counseling Unit at the University of Haifa. It was carried out using a computer software that includes a database of all residents who have a land phone line, covering approximately 85 % of households in Israel.¹⁴ Calls were made between 4 and 8 p.m. Since respondents had to be at least 18 years old in order to participate in the study, surveyors asked to speak to the adult in the house. If there was no answer, the system kept calling the same number 15 more times during the next 7–10 days. If no contact was made despite these efforts, the system dropped the household and randomly selected a new number. Out of 801 calls made to Sderot residents and 3,681 calls made in our comparison districts, complete interviews were obtained from 423 individuals in Sderot and 2,144 in the other five districts, resulting in response rates of 52.81 % and 58.25 % respectively.

Findings

In [Table 4.2](#) we present the results of our analysis. We use an Ordinary Least Squares Regression in which the index of police legitimacy is the dependent variable. Model 1 presents the town of Sderot while model 2 portrays our comparison communities. Both models include the indices of procedural justice and performance as our test variables, as well as an index of risk evaluations, past experiences with the police, and numerous sociodemographic and other control variables (see [Appendix](#) for more details).¹⁵ As mentioned above, we have added the particular stations as dummy variables in order to control for station-level variability (Natanya station as the reference category). Both models are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), and explain a considerable percentage of the variance in legitimacy evaluations (adjusted R squares of 0.62 and 0.55).¹⁶

As in other studies, evaluations of procedural justice and police performance are highly significant in both models, and are indeed the two main predictors of police legitimacy. When comparing the regression coefficients of these two variables across the models, we find that the regression coefficient of performance is much larger in Sderot ($b = 0.61$; $SE = 0.08$) than in our comparison districts ($b = 0.39$; $SE = 0.04$). Utilizing the formula suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and

¹⁴ Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008; see: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200811082.

¹⁵ While the potential effects of these variables on police legitimacy are important and interesting, because our research questions focus on the interplay between procedural justice and performance in situations of security threats, further discussion of the effects of the control variables is beyond the scope of this chapter.

¹⁶ Tolerance levels for all variables were above 0.4 in Sderot and 0.6 in our comparison districts, indicating that there were no multicollinearity problems (see Weisburd & Britt, 2007).

Table 4.2 Main findings for Sderot and comparison communities

Variables	Model 1—Sderot $B(\beta)$	Model 2—comparison communities $B(\beta)$
<i>Test variables</i>		
Procedural justice index	0.51 (0.49)***	0.58 (0.55)***
Performance index	0.61 (0.35)***	0.39 (0.24)***
<i>Control variables</i>		
<i>Attitudes towards the police</i>		
Risk index	0.06 (0.06)	0.12 (0.11)***
<i>Experience with the police</i>		
Negative encounter with police	-0.79 (-0.07)	-0.58 (-0.06)**
Positive encounter with police	-0.28 (-0.02)	0.07 (0.01)
Crime victim	-0.48 (-0.03)	-0.45 (-0.04)
Respondent or close family member serving/served in INP	-0.33 (-0.04)	0.30 (0.03)
Volunteered in Civil Guard	-0.40 (-0.04)	0.12 (0.01)
<i>Sociodemographic characteristics</i>		
Sex	0.93 (0.10)**	0.04 (0.01)
Age	0.03 (0.09)	-0.00 (-0.02)
Education	0.27 (0.07)	0.13 (0.05)*
Income	0.01 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)
Single	-0.08 (-0.01)	-0.11 (-0.01)
Divorced/separated/single-parent	-1.46 (-0.07)*	-0.38 (-0.03)
Widowed	-0.83 (-0.04)	-1.12 (-0.05)**
Born in Africa/Asia	-0.24 (-0.02)	-0.07 (-0.01)
Born in America/Europe	-0.77 (-0.04)	0.31 (0.02)
Born in former Soviet Union	-0.97 (-0.09)*	-0.39 (-0.03)
New immigrant to Israel	n/a	-0.46 (-0.01)
<i>Police districts</i>		
Zvulun station	n/a	-0.78 (-0.09)***
Yarkon station	n/a	-0.63 (-0.07)**
Afula station	n/a	-0.80 (-0.08)***
Rosh-Ha'ayin station	n/a	-0.77 (-0.06)**
R^2 (Adjusted R^2)	0.64 (0.62)***	0.56 (0.55)***
N	312	1,104

*Significant at the 0.05 level
 **Significant at the 0.01 level
 ***Significant at the 0.001 level

Piquero (1998),¹⁷ we find these differences to be statistically significant ($Z=2.46$, $p<0.01$, one-tailed test). Thus, confirming our first hypothesis, we find that under conditions of threat, performance evaluations play a significantly larger role in predicting police legitimacy than when there is no specific threat in the background.

¹⁷ $Z = b_1 - b_2 / \sqrt{(SEb_1^2 + SEb_2^2)}$.

However, although the regression coefficient for procedural justice is somewhat smaller in Sderot ($b=0.51$; $SE=0.05$) than in our comparison group ($b=0.58$; $SE=0.02$), using the same formula we find that, contrary to our second hypotheses, these differences were *not* statistically significant ($Z=1.30$, $p>0.05$). Thus, the role of procedural justice in determining police legitimacy was *not* significantly lower under conditions of security threats.

Lastly, when examining the relative roles of procedural justice and performance within each model, we find that, in line with the literature on antecedents of police legitimacy and contrary to our third hypothesis, procedural justice remains the *strongest* antecedent of legitimacy in *both* models (with a beta value of 0.49 in Sderot and 0.55 in the comparison group), followed by performance evaluations (with a beta value of 0.35 and 0.24, respectively). Thus, despite the growing importance of performance under threat, these evaluations *did not* overtake procedural justice and *did not* become the primary antecedent of legitimacy in our sample.

Discussion

Our findings reveal that in the Israeli town of Sderot, which faced intense security threats, the role of evaluations of police performance in shaping police legitimacy was significantly stronger than in other communities in Israel that were not facing such threats at the time. This finding is in line with our first hypothesis, as well as with the literature on behavior and policy preferences under threat. However, contrary to our second hypothesis, we find that the role of evaluations of procedural justice in predicting police legitimacy *was not* significantly weaker under threat. Moreover, similar to previous studies on antecedents of legitimacy (National Research Council, 2004; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2001, 2004, 2009; Tyler et al., 2010), we found that procedural justice remained the *primary* antecedent of legitimacy in *both* conditions. That is, although performance evaluations did increase in importance under threat, they still remained secondary to procedural justice in determining legitimacy in our samples.¹⁸

Why, contrary to our expectations, did procedural justice *not* decline in importance? Tyler's (2004) discussions about the significance of procedural justice may provide some clarification. Tyler argues that when interacting with the police or with government agencies more generally, people often lack the proficiency to judge whether actions or decisions made by authorities are reasonable and appropriate. Similarly, they seldom know what the "correct" outcome should be. Consequentially, citizens need to feel that the decision makers acted out of true concern for their well-being, and look for evidence that the *process itself* was neutral and fair. Tyler further explains that contact with government agencies carries for the people involved "important messages concerning their social status, their self-worth and their self-respect,"

¹⁸ It is important to note, however, that in our Sderot sample the difference between the betas was smaller than in our control districts.

and thus becomes a key issue, particularly under situations that challenge one's status and position in the community, such as falling victim to a crime or being suspected of committing one (Tyler, 2004, p. 95).

Accordingly, the results of the present study suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable, trait, regardless of the security situation. Under conditions of security threats, individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between performance and procedural justice in public priorities—one does not come at the expense of the other: under threat, while performance increases in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the background. Albeit in a different context, Tyler et al. (2010) recently reached similar results in an analysis of attitudes of Muslim Americans. These authors conclude that "...procedural justice is always important, regardless of views about the magnitude of the terrorist threat or the efficacy of the police. So whatever people feel about the threat of terror or police effectiveness against it, unfair police action consistently leads to less legitimacy and lower levels of cooperation" (p. 385). It is important to acknowledge, however, that at a certain level of threat, perhaps under extreme existential threat, procedural justice may become less important in shaping perceptions of police legitimacy.

Conclusions

Our findings in this chapter raise some important considerations, both theoretical and practical. First, our findings draw attention to the growing significance of police performance under threat. While past research has pointed to performance/efficiency evaluations as the second most important antecedent of police legitimacy, we show that under security threats their impact significantly rises. This finding highlights the importance of considering the *context* when examining public opinions and predictors of attitudes toward the police. Our findings also show, however, that the rise in the importance of police performance in situations of acute security threats does not take away from the central role of procedural justice, which *did not* decline in importance, and, what is more, remained the primary antecedent of legitimacy.

With regard to police practice, the police may be aware of the growing importance of performance under threat and may alter their priorities and strategies accordingly. Emphasizing end results in the face of high security threats may not only seem intuitive, but also appears to be supported by the public. At the same time, it is imperative for decision makers to consider that even under conditions of high security threats, the public still appears to value fair, transparent, respectful processes *more* than they value high performance and end results when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. Indeed, in the face of security threats there seems to be a growing desire for forceful action and end results, but not at the expense of an expectation of high standards of procedural fairness.

Appendix: Control Variables

The variable	Description	Distribution— Sderot	Distribution— comparison districts
<i>Attitudes toward the police</i>			
Risk index	Operationalized by asking respondents to state how likely it is, in their view, to get caught by the police for each of the following behaviors [on a scale ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely (5)]: violating a traffic regulation; breaking and entering; dealing drugs; and vandalizing public property. (Cronbach's Alpha of 0.70)	Range: 4–20	Range: 4–20
		Mean = 11.15	Mean = 9.71
		SD = 4.04	SD = 3.50
		N = 392	N = 1,518
<i>Experience with the police</i>			
Negative encounter with police	Scores of 1–3 on a scale of 1–5, rating an encounter with the police during the year prior to the survey (“no encounter” as the reference category)	Negative encounter: 15.9 %	Negative encounter: 18.2 %
		Positive encounter: 12.7 %	Positive encounter: 9.6 %
Positive encounter with police	Scores of 4 and 5 on a scale of 1–5, rating an encounter with the police during the year prior to the survey (“no encounter” as the reference category)	No encounter: 71.5 %	No encounter: 72.2 %
		N = 403	N = 1,589
Crime victim	Victimization during the year prior to the survey (coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes)	No: 90.6 %	No: 86.8 %
		Yes: 9.4 %	Yes: 13.2 %
		N = 404	N = 1,602
Respondent or close family member serving/served in INP	Coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes	No: 68.6 %	No: 75.0 %
		Yes: 31.4 %	Yes: 25.0 %
		N = 405	N = 1,603
Volunteered in Civil Guard ^a	Coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes	No: 78.0 %	No: 78.5 %
		Yes: 22.0 %	Yes: 21.5 %
		N = 405	N = 1,603
<i>Sociodemographic characteristics</i>			
Sex	Coded as 0 = female; 1 = male	Female: 49.4 %	Female: 51.7 %
		Male: 50.6 %	Male: 48.3 %
		N = 405	N = 1,608

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

The variable	Description	Distribution— Sderot	Distribution— comparison districts
Age		Mean = 43.49	Mean = 45.87
		SD = 15.03	SD = 15.33
		N = 397	N = 1,579
Education	Measured by eight education levels	Min. = No education (1)	Min. = No education (1)
		Max. = Ph.D. (8)	Max. = Ph.D. (8)
		Median = High school with diploma (4)	Median = Nonacademic education beyond high school (5)
		N = 402	N = 1,601
Income	Measured by five income levels	Min. = Much less than average (1)	Min. = Much less than average (1)
		Max. = Much above average (5)	Max. = Much above average (5)
		Median = A little less than average (2)	Median = About average (3)
		N = 381	N = 1,396
Single	("Married" as the reference category)	Married or living with a spouse: 70.2 %	Married or living with a spouse: 68.9 %
Divorced/separated/single-parent		Single: 19.3 %	Single: 17.9 %
Widowed		Divorced/separated/single parent: 6.0 % Widowed: 4.5 %	Divorced/separated/single parent: 8.7 % Widowed: 4.5 %
		N = 399	N = 1,593
Born in Africa/Asia	("Born in Israel" as the reference category)	Born in Israel: 54.3 %	Born in Israel: 69.0 %
Born in America/Europe		Born in former Soviet Union: 21.7 %	Born in former Soviet Union: 11.0 %
Born in former Soviet Union		Born in Africa/Asia: 18.3 % Born in America/Europe: 5.7 %	Born in Africa/Asia: 10.0 % Born in America/Europe: 9.7 %
		N = 405	N = 1,605
New immigrant in Israel	Defined as 7 years or less since immigration to Israel, according to a natural braking point in the distribution (coded as 0=no; 1=yes)	No = 100.00 %	No = 99.3 %
		Yes = 0.00 %	Yes = 0.7 %
		N = 405	N = 1,608

*The Civil Guard is a volunteer organization which assists the Israeli Police in numerous policing duties, and is organized and supported by the police. It has grown out of the special security situation in Israel, and is considered the largest volunteer organization in the country. For more information, see: <http://www.police.gov.il/english/Volunteers/Pages/default.a>

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Chapter 5

How Do Majority Communities View the Potential Costs of Policing Terrorism?

As reviewed earlier in this book, scholars have warned that police involvement in security matters may have negative effects on the relationship between the police and the public. For example, some have argued that focusing on counterterrorism may come at the expense of attending to “regular” problems, such as crime, or that counterterrorism may lead to the militarization of the police and change their focus from “service” to “suspicion” (see review in Chap. 1). At the same time, to date we know little about how majority communities view these potential dilemmas in policing. It has been assumed that these communities desire harsh counterterrorism responses (see Friedland & Merari, 1985; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005) and support the police during times of security threats (see Fishman, 2005, as well as Chap. 3). However, it is not clear if they are also aware of the potential costs of extensive police involvement in security matters. These are critical issues since they address key questions about what the public expects from the police, and how security threats impact expectations. In this chapter we address these questions and present attitudes of majority communities in Israel toward the role of the Israel National Police in fighting terrorism and its consequences. Our data indicates that the general public is very sophisticated, both in its expectations of policing under security threats and in its understanding of the potential costs of policing terrorism.

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The Survey

The attitudes reported in this chapter were measured as part of a large-scale survey tapping public evaluations of the police and perceptions of police legitimacy in Israel. As detailed below, following the completion of the survey, additional in-depth interviews were carried out with a sample of survey respondents. Nine police districts in Israel were chosen as sites for the survey. They were selected for their variability in location, size, crime, and socioeconomic levels, as well as the types and levels of terrorism threats they had faced over the past decade and particularly during the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada. The complete list of districts composing the sample and their main characteristics are reported in Table 5.1. Respondents were equally sampled from all nine districts. Within the districts, respondents were sampled so as to proportionally represent all communities composing the district, resulting in more respondents from larger cities and towns than from smaller villages. Within each community respondents were selected randomly. Data from six of these districts were examined in the previous chapter.

It is important to note that the sample selected for this survey is not statistically representative of the general Israeli population. At the same time, it does provide a broad view of the Israeli-Jewish population, with a sampling frame of over 1.7 million Jewish citizens, covering almost a third of the Jewish population in Israel (31.2 %).¹ Moreover, when examining the characteristics of Jewish responders, we find that they are generally congruent with those of the Jewish population in Israel (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.1 Police stations composing the sample and their characteristics

Station	Location within Israel		Sociodemographic characteristics		
	District	Sub-district	Crime levels: files per 1,000 ^a	Population size ^b	SE level ^c
Afula	North	Amakim	54.50	122,370	3.97
Ashkelon	South	Lachish	79.70	104,972	4.00
Beer-Sheva	South	Negev	123.92	183,799	5.00
Natanya	Central	Sharon	88.46	245,053	5.13
Rosh-Haa'yin	Central	Sharon	52.98	87,644	3.92
Sderot	South	Lachish	106.23	29,917	4.00
Yarkon	Tel Aviv	Yarkon	159.59	363,400	8.00
Zion	Jerusalem	Zion	59.43	693,200	4.13
Zvulun	North	Hof	66.59	223,481	5.77

^aYearly averages (2000–2004) of investigation cases opened in the district. Data obtained from the INP

^bData obtained from the INP, for the year 2004

^cData was obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics for the year 2003 (see, http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/local_authorities2003/local_authorities_h.htm) and was only available for communities with the population of 2,000 residents or above. The scale is based on various factors such as financial resources, residence characteristics, and education, and ranges from 1 to 10. Since the data was only available at the community level, the socioeconomic makeup of police districts was calculated as weighted averages

¹ See: http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/yarhon/b1_h.htm.

Table 5.2 Demographic characteristics of Jewish respondents and the general Jewish population in Israel

	Jewish responders	Jewish population in Israel ^a
Gender	Female: 51.8 %	Female: 51.8 % ^b
	Male: 48.2 %	Male: 48.2 %
Age	Median: 44	Median: 42.3 ^c
Education	Median: “Nonacademic education beyond high school” ^d	Median: 12.8 years of education ^e
Monthly household income	Median: “About average” ^f	Median: within the sixth decile ^g
Country of birth	Israel: 67.1 %	Israel: 69.6 %
	Asia: 3.3 %	Asia: 3.8 %
	Africa: 8.1 %	Africa: 5.6 %
	Europe/America: 21.5 %	Europe/America: 21 %

^aData obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Statistical Abstract of Israel for the year 2008; see www.cbs.gov.il

^bBecause of the way the data was reported by the CBS, these frequencies apply to Jewish citizens who are 20 years old or older

^cBecause of the way the data was reported by the CBS, this figure applies to the population of Jewish citizens who are 20 years old or older. The median was calculated from data reported categorically

^dRespondents were asked to state their education on a scale of 8 levels, ranging from “no education” to “Ph.D.”

^eBecause of the way the data was reported by the CBS, this median applies to the population of Jewish citizens who are 15 years old or older

^fRespondents were told that the average gross monthly income per household in Israel is about 12,000 NIS, and were asked to state their level of income in relation to this figure: much less than average/a little less than average/about average/a little above average/much above average

^gThe CBS reports income data in deciles. The sixth decile ranges from a monthly gross income of 9,441 to 11,736 NIS

As our interest in this chapter is in the attitudes of “majority communities,” we excluded both Arab Israelis and Ultra-Orthodox Jews from our sample. Our decision to exclude Ultra-Orthodox Jews derives from the fact that they have been identified as a unique group, with regard to both evaluations of the police and general obligation to obey the law. Indeed, their attitudes toward the police generally follow those of the minority Arab population in Israel (see Rattner, 2009; Yagil & Rattner, 2002; also see more details in Chap. 4). The views of Israeli Arabs are reported and discussed in the next chapter. Thus, between 210 and 405 responses were obtained from majority communities from each of the districts, adding up to 3,105 individuals composing our final sample. The main characteristics of the sample are detailed in Table 5.3.

As noted in Chap. 4, the survey was carried out between October 27 and December 3, 2008. Out of a total of 6,645 calls, complete interviews were obtained from 3,832 individuals, resulting in an overall response rate of almost 58 %. While the survey questionnaire tapped numerous aspects of police-community relations and policing terrorism in Israel, in this chapter we report on questions that specifically inquired about the potential costs of the homeland security role of the Israel National Police.

Table 5.3 Sample characteristics

Gender	Female: 51.4 %
	Male: 48.6 %
	<i>N</i> = 3,105
Age	Mean = 44.95
	SD = 15.53
	<i>N</i> = 3,050
Education	Min. = No education (1)
	Max. = Ph.D. (8)
	Median = Nonacademic education beyond high school (5)
	<i>N</i> = 3,086
Income	Min. = Much less than average (1)
	Max. = Much above average (5)
	Median = About average (3)
	<i>N</i> = 2,772
Family status	Married or living with a spouse: 67.9 %
	Single: 19 %
	Divorced/separated/single parent: 8.5 %
	Widowed: 4.6 %
	<i>N</i> = 3,075
Country of birth	Israel: 63.8 %
	Former Soviet Union: 13.8 %
	Africa/Asia: 13.2 %
	America/Europe: 8.8 %
	<i>N</i> = 3,099

Respondents were presented with statements such as “dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public,” and were asked to rank their level of agreement with the statements on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”).

In-Depth Interviews

Following the completion of the survey, we sought to gain further understanding of the thoughts, feelings, and views behind the answers provided to our closed-ended questions about the potential, unintended negative outcomes of policing terrorism. We thus carried out additional, in-depth phone interviews with a sample of our original respondents. From the group of respondents who stated in the initial survey that they would be willing to be contacted again and interviewed about these issues,² we identified four subgroups of respondents who initially expressed strong opinions about the implications of policing terrorism. These respondents either strongly

² 1,707 respondents expressed this willingness (44.5 %), between 158 and 212 from each police district.

believed that policing terrorism negatively impacts police-community relationships ($N=113$)³; strongly believed that policing terrorism *does not* negatively impact police-community relationships ($N=129$)⁴; strongly believed that policing terrorism negatively impacts the ability of the police to fight crime ($N=322$)⁵; or strongly believed policing terrorism *does not* negatively impact the ability of the police to fight crime ($N=74$).⁶ From each of the four groups, 13 respondents were randomly selected for our sample of interviewees, proportionally from all districts.

In our interviews we sought to gain better understanding of the interviewees' views on the potential outcomes of policing terrorism they felt strongly about. So, for example, respondents who in the initial survey expressed strong opinions about the effects of policing terrorism on police-community relations were asked if, in their view, the INP is viewed differently by the public when they are busy with fighting terrorism and why, if this effect is long-lasting, and if, in their view, the counterterrorism role of the police impacts the relationship between the police and the Arab citizens of Israel. Respondents who initially expressed strong opinions about the effects of policing terrorism on the ability of the police to fight crime were asked similar questions specifically about this topic. All respondents were also asked general questions about the Israel National Police and its counterterrorism role.

The interviews were carried out between June, 2010 and January, 2011 by Criminology students at the Hebrew University. Calls were generally made on weekdays between 4 and 8 p.m., unless a respondent specifically asked to be interviewed at a different time. If there was no response, interviewers attempted to reach the specific individual 3–4 more times within the following 2 weeks. If there was still no answer, or if the respondent refused to be interviewed, another respondent was selected randomly from the same group, and, where possible, from the same police district. Out of 94 calls made, complete interviews were obtained from 49 respondents (between 12 and 13 from each group), resulting in a response rate of 52 %. Below we supplement our presentation and discussions of survey findings with information obtained from the in-depth interviews. While we tried to translate the quotes as accurately as possible, due to grammatical differences between the languages, minor revisions were sometimes inevitable. Additional words that were inserted for clarification appear in parenthesis.

³These respondents "strongly agreed" that "dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public," and that "police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel."

⁴These respondents "strongly disagreed" that "dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public," and that "police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel."

⁵These respondents "strongly agreed" that "handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic" and that "too often, in my view, the police explain failures in handling crime by the fact that they are busy fighting terrorism."

⁶These respondents "strongly disagreed" that "handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic" and that "too often, in my view, the police explain failures in handling crime by the fact that they are busy fighting terrorism."


Findings

Involvement of the INP in Counterterrorism

Before analyzing specific attitudes about policing terrorism, we thought it was important to examine how aware are Israeli citizens of the extensive involvement of the INP in counterterrorism. We thus asked respondents to rank their agreement with the following statement: “*Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police.*” As can be seen from Fig. 5.1, more than half of the respondents agree with this statement (over 55 %, as indicated by answers 4 and 5—“agree” or “strongly agree”). Only 23 % did not agree (see answers 1 and 2—“strongly disagree” or “disagree”). Clearly the majority community in Israel is well aware of the importance of policing terrorism in Israeli policing.

In our subsequent interviews, respondents were asked to what extent, in their view, fighting terrorism was a major responsibility for the Israeli police. Many interviewees recognized this, as did respondents in our survey. For example, one interviewee stated: “[Policing terrorism] is a major responsibility, the top priority,” and another declared: “Unfortunately, a major responsibility, at least 50 % [of police resources] are devoted to preventing terrorism, including the Border Guard.” A third respondent stated: “A lot. At least half of the police budget goes to that.” Other frequent responses were “A lot” or “A main occupation.”

Importantly, however, other respondents expressed opinions according to which other security agencies play the major counterterrorism role in Israel, or mentioned specific counterterrorism units within the INP. For example, one respondent stated: “It depends how you define terrorism, but I think terrorism is more a matter (responsibility) of the army and less a matter (responsibility) of the police.” Another argued:



N = 3052

Fig. 5.1 Awareness of the significance of the homeland security role to the Israeli police (N=3,052)




Fig. 5.2 The perceived effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and the public (N=2,942)

“Terrorism is more [the responsibility of] the IDF and the Border Guard. The police are almost not [involved in policing terrorism, only] 15 %–20 %.” A third respondent mentioned in this context: *“The special unit, the Yamam. We don’t hear about them, but [they are] an important element [in policing terrorism].”*

The Effects of Policing Terrorism on Police-Community Relationships

With regard to the potential effects of policing terrorism on police-community relationships, our survey results are mixed. For example, over one third of the respondents (34.94 %; see Fig. 5.2) agree that *“Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public.”* But a slightly larger percentage (38.92 %) expressed disagreement with the statement. This suggests that many non-Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel are aware of potential negative consequences of policing terrorism for police-community relations, though equal numbers do not recognize this possible problem.

This dual-effect of policing terrorism on police-community relationships was clearly voiced by our interviewees. In response to the question of whether, in their view, when the INP is busy with terrorism they are viewed differently by the public, respondents expressed mix views. One respondent, for example, clearly articulated why policing terrorism, in his view, *improves* the relationship between the police and citizens: *“Yes, naturally yes. The image citizens have of the police is negative, and this is the only part where they get viewed positively. Many people identify them (the police) with the IDF (the Israeli Army).”* Another respondent stated: *“Yes, definitely, suddenly they (the police) are OK, the heroes that will save us. Always first at*

the place (the scene of a terror attack) *because they are in the field. Like MADA* (the first-aid medical services) *and the fire fighters.”*


A third respondent elaborated in this context: “*Yes, when [the INP] deals with terrorism the views change for the better. Some people are sensitive to that. Usually the police deal with citizens and suddenly terrorism is above that. The police get prestige...*” The unifying impact of policing terrorism as a result of the focus on external threat (see more details in Chap. 3) was clearly voiced by a fourth respondent: “*Everyone likes the war on terrorism and don’t like the war on crime because, you know, it is not pleasant to get citations and tickets... [When the police fight terrorism] then it (the INP) is simply dealing with something that unites everyone.*”

But at the same time, other interviewees clearly recognize the negative, or the more mixed effects of policing terrorism in terms of public perceptions of the police. One interviewee, for example, responded to this question by saying that: “[It] *changes for the worse, because it takes focus [away, and] the crimes on the streets are not treated.*” Another argued: “*Usually yes, because [the INP] neglects another part, there are more negative views. Fighting terrorism is not exposed to many people, unlike the issues of daily life... when feeling [police] incompetence and [daily activities] are not carried out properly, and that’s why working hard in fighting terrorism does not add points in the eyes of the public. Maybe in specific events and in certain times the police manage to prevent an attack or catch a terrorist then they get positive views.*” A third interviewee suggested that: “*On the one hand for the better because when they are successful they are valued. On the other hand there are many complaints that instead of investing in protecting the citizen and giving him personal security, they deal with things (counterterrorism)... I would prefer that they focus on protecting the citizen, and the army will deal with terrorism.*”

The Effects of Policing Terrorism on the Relationship Between the Police and Israeli-Arab Citizens

It is interesting to note that the majority community in Israel is more aware of the potential negative outcomes of policing terrorism on police-community relations when a minority community is involved. When focusing specifically on the Arab population, we find that 43.21 % hold that “*Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel*” (see Fig. 5.3), while about a third disagree.

In our subsequent interviews, we find strong support for the proposition that majority communities in Israel indeed believe that policing terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the Israeli police and the Arab citizens of Israel. For example, one respondent noted: “*Yes, affects negatively. The Arabs in Israel don’t like it that the police deal with terrorism because from their point of view it (the INP) should deal with crime and traffic. Terrorism is closer to them because of their nationality. If it (the INP) would have not dealt with terrorism, the views would have been more positive.*”




N = 2909

Fig. 5.3 The perceived effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and Arabs in Israel (N=2,909)

Another respondent said: *“I believe that yes, and for the worse. Because an Arab is an Arab and it is not pleasant for him that they (the police) are responding harshly toward someone he defines as a relative.”* A third respondent elaborated: *“Of course, when they (the Israeli police) are responsible for policing [terrorism], the borders and roadblocks, automatically every Arab within the country... when he sees a policeman does not think he came to help and provide service but [views him] as a person who tells him what to do and searches in his bags. If there will be a burglary in East Jerusalem they will not complain to the police and neither in Ramle and Lod. Because of the way the police treat minorities...there is no service to the citizen, and especially not to minorities.”* A fourth respondent clearly explained why the dual role of the Israeli police may hinder their relationships with Arab Israeli citizens: *“I suppose it impacts, yes. For the worse because if this body (organization) that is supposed to protect the citizen, including the Arab citizen... on the other hand also [deals with] the issue of terrorism, then there is some duality in treatment. On the one hand I’m being pursued, and on the other hand I’m supposed to be protected [by the police]. I’m trying to get into the “skin” of an Arab citizen [here].”*


The Impact of Policing Terrorism on the Ability of the Police to Handle Crime

When considering the effects of policing terrorism on the ability of the police to attend to “classic” responsibilities, we find that a large majority of 66.3 % expressed agreement with the statement that *“Handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs and traffic”* (see Fig. 5.4).



N = 3030

Fig. 5.4 Evaluations of the extent to which policing terrorism comes at the expense of other police responsibilities (N=3,030)



N = 2991

Fig. 5.5 Evaluations of the use of counterterrorism as a justification (N=2,991)

Less than 20 % did not believe this to be the case. Clearly there is wide recognition of the possible negative consequences of policing terrorism on police effectiveness in handling what are often seen as “low policing” responsibilities.

Additionally, a majority of the respondents (52.06 %) agreed that “*Too often, in my view, the police explain failures in handling crime by the fact that they are busy fighting terrorism*” (see Fig. 5.5). Less than a quarter of the respondents (23.6 %) did not believe this to be the case. These responses strongly suggest that non-Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel are concerned that policing terrorism not only prevents the police from carrying out classic policing responsibilities, but that it provides a solid excuse for weak performance in these domains, even when focusing on crime is possible, or when other factors might be behind failures in handling crime.

Overall, our interviews provide support for the picture drawn from the survey data. Many respondents expressed agreement with the notion that focusing on terrorism comes at the expense of addressing “classic” crime problems, primarily because, in the views of interviewees, the Israel National Police does not have enough resources to do both. One, interviewee, for example, stated: *“Of course, affects for the worst. The police don’t have enough manpower to deal with all the threats... and also because the government must have pressured them to deal with terrorism as a high priority.”* Another respondent, when discussing the “Second Intifada,” argued: *“The police do not have enough manpower to handle all problems. It (the INP) focused on terrorism and neglected everything else. There were many injured by terrorism and that’s why they did not see those injured by the other things. The police do not have enough resources to treat everything.”*

A third respondent summarized: *“Yes, sure. They don’t do anything except deal with those things (terrorism) and then crime increases. At least that’s the feeling.”* Interestingly, one respondent argued that counterterrorism responsibilities negatively affect the ability of the police to fight crime because the “good” officers are assigned with security tasks, leaving the less talented to handle crime: *“I think it affects...because they don’t have trained personnel. The “normal” (competent) manpower goes to deal with terrorism. Those that aren’t stand with a whistle... Catch 22. They take the best of the force and transfer them to deal with terrorism, and for the rest of the crime [problems] there are no “normal” people left...”*

At the same time, some interviewees believed that policing terrorism does not come at the cost of fighting crime, because, in their view, different police units hold different responsibilities. One respondent, for example, stated: *“It is not supposed to impact because there is a part [of the INP] that deals with terrorism and there is a part that deals with internal crime.”* Another argued: *“I think not. I think everyone has their role, some in terrorism and some in crime.”* A third interviewee elaborated: *“If there is crime the police treat crime... it (the INP) treats everything, terrorism and everything else... there are enough policemen... distributed throughout the country. There are many policemen, many units, and that’s why handling terrorism does not affect other things...there are units in the police that deal with terrorism, there are [units] that deal with drugs, there are [units] that fight crime. There are units for everything these days...”*

Discussion

Our survey and interviews indicate that majority communities recognize that policing terrorism is a main responsibility of the Israel National Police. This finding is not surprising considering the highly visible security measures taken by the police (see Chap. 1) and the noticeable presence of police officers in and around city centers during the height of the terrorism threat of the Second Intifada (see Fishman, 2005). Interestingly, however, our interviews also reveal that some Israeli citizens attribute more counterterrorism responsibilities to other security agencies, such as

the army, or do not associate the counterterrorism units of the police, such as the Yamam or the Border Guard, with the INP. In this regard, it should be emphasized that responses to our survey were obtained at the end of 2008 (and the subsequent interviews were carried out approximately 18 months later), when “classic” terrorism threat levels were relatively low, and had been for some time.⁷ It is highly likely that during the peak of the Intifada (2001–2003) we would have witnessed higher levels of awareness of police involvement in counterterrorism.

But the key issue of this chapter is whether majority communities are aware of possible negative consequences of policing terrorism? When considering the possible impacts on police-community relationships, our survey provides mixed findings. While a substantial number of respondents agreed that police involvement in counterterrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public, an equal number disagreed. One explanation for this finding, which is supported by our interviews, may be that public attitudes are influenced by two distinct mechanisms that are operating simultaneously.

On the one hand, it has been argued that different aspects of policing terrorism, such as distributing information to the public; educating children about avoiding security threats; efficiently responding to public calls about suspicious objects or people; and working closely with volunteers, are likely to bring the police and majority communities closer together, and thus contribute to, rather than impede, police-community relationships (see Chap. 3). Additionally, scholars have suggested that counterterrorism responsibilities are perceived as “high status” (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009) and may thus contribute to the prestige of the police in the public eye, perhaps, in part, because this role associates them with other high-status security agencies (Fishman, 2005). Indeed, such views were clearly expressed in our interviews.

On the other hand, scholars have also raised concerns according to which policing terrorism may hamper the service-orientation of the police and the quality of service provided to the public (e.g., see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005; Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastroski, 2006; Murray, 2005). While the potential effects of policing terrorism on the character and service-orientation of the police were not recognized by our interviewees, respondents did emphasize the deterioration in the quality of service provided to the public in times of intense security threats in terms of neglecting crime control, which, in turn, negatively impacts the image of the police and thus police-community relationships. Our mixed results in this context appear to reflect ambivalence among majority communities, who value the police function of responding to terrorism and its contribution to police-community relationships, but also acknowledge some of the negative outcomes that scholars have identified.

Our findings regarding attitudes about the relationship between the police and minority communities reinforce the idea that the majority community recognizes

⁷See data from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm>.

possible negative outcomes of policing terrorism in the area of police-community relationships. In this case we find much less ambivalence with more respondents agreeing that policing terrorism impacts negatively on the relationship between the police and minority communities. This finding was strongly reinforced by our interviews. One explanation for this finding may simply be that the majority community recognizes what has been documented in many studies, that because counterterrorism in Israel and many other Western countries is focused on Islamic terrorism, it may significantly impair the relationship between the police and Muslim or Arab communities (see Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Thacher, 2005; also see next chapter).

When considering the effects of policing terrorism on “classic” police responsibilities, scholars have suggested that if the police make counterterrorism a major part of their mission, this role would come at the expense of attending to other duties, particularly fighting crime (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; also see Chap. 2). Responses to our survey indicate that majority communities in Israel generally agree. They believe that other aspects of the police function such as handling crime or enforcing traffic regulations have suffered as a result of the focus of the INP on counterterrorism. This was also clearly articulated in our in-depth interviews. At the same time, our interviews also revealed that some citizens believe that the INP can manage all of its obligations, including policing terrorism, due to the division of responsibilities between the different police units.

It is interesting to note that our survey was carried out after crime rates and traffic accidents in Israel have been declining for several years. Moreover, clearance rates suggest that police effectiveness in solving crimes has improved during the same period.⁸ We suspect that the responses in our survey, according to which the security responsibilities of the police have had a negative effect on crime control, reflect a more general sense in the Israeli population that they are not getting adequate service from the police, and that this is at least in part due to the focus of the INP on terrorism. Indeed, Israeli police officials have often declared in different forums as well as in the media that crime has been receiving less attention because of security obligations (see for example Bachor-Nir, 2003; Fishman, 2005).

Moreover, our survey suggests that many non-Ultra-Orthodox Israeli Jews believe that the police often use counterterrorism responsibilities *as an excuse* to justify weak performance in classic police domains. This is a particularly interesting finding, as it implies that the public does not accept the argument that the policing of terrorism necessarily means that other police services must decline. As stated above, our interviews reveal that many citizens believe that different police units hold different responsibilities and thus counterterrorism roles should not affect other obligations. Thus, it appears that in the view of majority communities, it is

⁸ See crime rates per 1,000 residents in the Statistical Bulletin of the INP for the year 2008 (in Hebrew); available from: http://www.police.gov.il/mehozot/agafTichnon/Documents/doc_pshia_2008.pdf.

Also see a report of the INP regarding traffic accidents in Israel for the year 2007 (in Hebrew); available from: <http://www.police.gov.il/mehozot/agafTichnon/Documents/traffic2007.pdf>.

time for the police to stop falling back on the issue of terrorism and begin to show results in fighting crime. It could also be the case that the public believes that the difficulties of handling both terrorism and crime are often an *excuse*, rather than the genuine reason, behind failures in fighting crime. That being the case, what might those genuine reasons be? One possible answer may be found in an argument voiced by Bayley and Weisburd (2009), according to which the police may *prefer* to carry out security operations, due to their high status and prestige, rather than “low policing” functions, such as providing general assistance to citizens.

In sum, our survey data and interviews indicate that generally, non-Ultra-Orthodox Jewish adults in Israel are aware of and consider numerous negative implications of police involvement in counterterrorism. These results are particularly interesting when considering previous discussions, according to which the police operate under the assumption that during times of acute security threats they are expected to take forceful protective measures and that counterterrorism responses are the public’s first priority. For example, as reviewed in our introductory chapter, in Israel, once a terror attack has occurred, much of routine policing in the district is stopped and numerous forces are shifted to attend the scene and the surrounding area. This rapid response represents one of the goals of the Israeli police when responding to terror attacks, which is to clear the scene quickly and get life back to normal as soon as possible. By doing so, they believe that they are minimizing the psychological effects of the attack and contributing to national resilience.

Perceptions that in the face of security threats, and particularly terrorism, the public desires forceful responses are indeed supported by numerous studies examining the relationship between terrorism threats, public attitudes, and policy choices (see for example Friedland & Merari, 1985; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). At the same time, our findings suggest that “what the community wants the police to do” in the face of immediate threat may be more complicated than merely providing forceful, rapid responses, since majority communities are also well aware of the costs. It appears that in order to maintain public support and police legitimacy in the long run, these costs will have to be taken into account as well.

It could be argued that majority communities are aware of the consequences of policing terrorism, and still desire forceful responses, despite the costs. Some of the responses to our interviews indeed support this argument. For example, when asked if policing terrorism negatively impacts the relationship between the INP and the Arab citizens of Israel, some respondents agreed, but felt that police activities in this realm should be carried out nevertheless: “*It may be that it (policing terrorism) hurts the relationships, but it is [happening] as part of its (the INP’s) duties...*” A second interviewee argued: “*I think that what should be done should be done, even if they (the Israeli Arab citizens) don’t like it... treatment should be ok (reasonable, fair), but going in [into Arab villages] and carrying out activities is also ok.*” Similar arguments were also made in the context of the potential negative effects of policing terrorism on police performance in other domains: “*When the State of Israel will be a country without terrorism, then the police will deal with other things, but until then there is no choice. What can it (the INP) do, not deal with terrorism?! It is*

obvious that it (the INP) is less efficient in other things. When there is no choice there is no choice. That is my opinion."

Additionally, when asked to what extent, in their view, is fighting terrorism a major role for the Israeli police, some interviewees chose to elaborate on whether or not the INP *ought to* take part in the struggle against terrorism. In this context, some respondents reinforced the importance of police involvement in counterterrorism. For example, one respondent stated: "[The INP] *deals* [with terrorism], *I give it a "10" that it deals with terrorism,*" and another mentioned that "...overall the police do a good job in that they deal with terrorism, in our country it is a role for the police."

But others also raised questions about the role of the police in counterterrorism. For example, one respondent stated that "*It (the INP) deals with it (terrorism) a lot. Internal (local) problems and this (counterterrorism). It should not have to deal with it, but it does...someone else should handle this, not the police...*" Another respondent elaborated: "*I don't think it (counterterrorism) should be the responsibility of the police. The police is designed for other things in the country. [The police] should worry about the safety of citizens in their homes, on the streets; it (the INP) should protect them in their towns from burglaries. It is not their role terrorism, unless it is [as] a small assisting force. Their main occupation should not be terrorism. There are other agencies for that, and if there aren't, they should establish one. The police should be concerned with the citizens, their environment, and their homes...*"

Additionally, results from annual community surveys carried out in Israel by the Ministry of Public Security reveal that many Jewish respondents generally feel that the Israeli police are too focused on security problems and not focused enough on crime. During most years when a question about this issue⁹ was asked (1998; 1999; 2002; 2003; 2004), nearly half of the respondents expressed this view. Interestingly, even in 2002, the height of the terrorism threat of the Second Intifada, 55.2 % of Jewish respondents thought that the police are too focused on terrorism and not focused enough on crime (see Smith & Sakal, 1998, 1999; Smith & Sharvit, 2002, 2004; Smith, Sharvit, & Raphaeli-Hirsch, 2005). Thus, while many Israeli citizens recognize numerous potential costs of policing terrorism, and some indeed believe that the police should focus on counterterrorism all the same, a significant part of the public expresses concerns and is not convinced that the INP should indeed make counterterrorism a priority.

It is important to consider that our results reflect attitudes of Israeli citizens who have suffered from extensive, ongoing terrorism threats for decades. If this population is considering the potential negative outcomes of policing terrorism, it is highly likely that the public in other countries, where the threat of terrorism has been much lower, would consider them as well, perhaps to an even greater extent. In this regard we encourage the replication this analysis under different situations of terrorism threats and extent of police involvement in this domain. We also think it is important

⁹"Which of the following sentences is closer to your opinion: the police are too focused on security problems and not focused enough on crime problems; the police are too focused on crime problems and not focused enough on security problems; the police handle both security and crime appropriately."

to keep in mind that the present survey was carried out at the end of 2008 and the interviews were conducted approximately 18 months later, while the peak in terror attacks in Israel during the past decade was in 2002, and levels of “classic” terrorism threats have been relatively low since 2006. It is reasonable to assume that the costs of policing terrorism would have been perceived differently had the questions been asked under situations of immediate threat.

Conclusions

It has been argued that majority communities support the policing of terrorism and advocate for strong protective measures against security threats more generally (e.g., Friedland & Merari, 1985; Huddy et al., 2005). Our results suggest, however, that citizens are more sophisticated and their desires are complex. Majority communities in Israel do recognize the negative outcomes of having their police extensively involved in security matters: they believe this role has negative effects for both the relationship between the police and the public and the ability of the police to attend to “classic” duties. While the police may presume that by focusing on security threat they are responding to the public’s needs and concerns, they should also consider the potential outcomes of this response, of which the communities are well aware. It appears that in the face of security threats, the police cannot focus solely on providing forceful responses and abandon classic duties and fair processes.

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Chapter 6

Policing Terrorism from the Perspective of the Arab Minority

The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the attitudes of Arabs in Israel toward the involvement of the police in counterterrorism. We have already seen in the previous chapter that non-Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel have strong concerns about policing terrorism. Do Arab Israelis see the necessity and consequences of policing terrorism similarly to Jewish Israelis? Or are there distinct attitudes that typify the Arab minority?

Studies in numerous countries have emphasized the tense relationship that often exists between the police and minority groups, as well as overrepresentation of minorities in the criminal statistics as both offenders and victims. Such studies have shown that racial and ethnic minority groups tend to view the police as less legitimate, especially when they believe that the police profile their own group as high-risk criminals (Tyler, 2004). In the USA, for example, Blacks, and to lesser extent Hispanics, especially young males, view the police less favorably than whites (Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). But the discussion of minority perceptions of the police takes a new turn when we consider police involvement in counterterrorism, and the policing of specific kinds of minority groups whose members are affiliated with the source of the terrorism threat, such as Israeli Arabs. Over the years the involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorism has been quite rare; however, during the Second Intifada a significant rise in their involvement in terrorism was observed. Moreover, Israeli Arabs overall identify themselves as Palestinians (Ghanem, 2001; Smootha, 2004), connecting themselves directly to the source of much of the terrorism in Israel.

In this chapter we examine how Israeli Arabs perceive the role of the Israel National Police (INP) in fighting terrorism, and compare their views to those of Jewish Israelis.

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We focus on three types of attitudes: the impact of policing terrorism on police routine performance; the way police involvement in counterterrorism missions affects police-community relations; and the willingness of Israeli Arabs and Jews to collaborate with the police in two areas: reporting terror threats and reporting crime. We find that, overall, Jewish respondents expressed more support for the INP's counterterrorism function than Arab respondents. At the same time, the differences in attitudes were smaller than expected, and both Jews and Arabs showed much awareness of the social costs of police involvement in counterterrorism.

Police-Minority Relations and Policing Terrorism

Studies in numerous countries have pointed to the tense relations that often exist between the police and minorities, which are often expressed by high rates of minority arrest and incarceration, high rates of police violence toward minorities and negative attitudes toward the police among minority communities (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Walker, 2000; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). Furthermore, stereotypical images of minorities are prevalent among police officers, who in the USA, for example, tend to label young African American males in terms of what Skolnick called the "symbolic assailant" (Skolnick, 1993). Most commonly, police tend to view minority members as a potential criminal threat. In turn, this labeling and the type of treatment it generates increase complaints from minority groups about biased policing and misconduct. The primary complaint of minority groups concerns lack of distributive justice (Sarat, 1977; Tyler & Fagan, 2008): they are simultaneously over-policed as suspects and under-policed as victims. Such feelings, in turn, have reduced their confidence in the police and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement efforts (Hasisi, 2008; Skolnick, 1993; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010; Weisburd, Telep, Hinkel, & Eck, 2010).

But policing terrorism complicates the relationship between the police and minorities even further. The policing of terrorism impacts differently on different kinds of social groups. Specifically, the affiliation of some minority groups with the source of the terrorist threat (e.g., Arab Americans, British Muslims, or Israeli Arabs) adds international complications to local law enforcement. For example, members of Muslim American communities generally express strong allegiance with America and very little support for terrorism or terrorists (Wike & Samaranayake, 2006); at the same time, as expressed by Tyler et al. (2010, p. 366), "...cultural or religious ties between these communities (Muslim American) and contexts from which anti-American terrorism is emerging (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf States, Somalia) mean that Muslim American communities have become a focus for anti-terror policing efforts in the United States." Similarly, in recent years in Israel a number of social surveys have shown that the Jewish majority holds significant negative perceptions of the Arab minority. Specifically, they fear that this minority group might collaborate with the enemy and pose a threat to the security of the state (Hasisi, 2005; Smooha, 2004, 2010; The Israeli Democracy Institute, 2010).

Consequentially, minority groups such as American Muslims or Israeli Arabs may be profiled by the police as “enemies within,” thus justifying the use of oppressive measures against them (Hasisi, 2008; Thacher, 2005; Tyler et al., 2010). This situation, in turn, will likely jeopardize citizens’ trust and confidence in the police and perceptions that the police are legitimate soldiers in the war against terrorism. Community members would deem the police illegitimate and would hesitate to request their services or cooperate with them in fighting and preventing crime. Minorities may also feel that “high policing” practices that are associated with counterterrorism (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur & Depeyron, 2003) are mostly directed at them. This, in turn, raises more general concerns about racial and ethnic profiling.

Indeed, empirical studies have documented that since the terror attack of September 11, Muslim or Arab communities have been especially vulnerable to heightened levels of suspicion, racial profiling, and surveillance by the police (Hasisi, 2005; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Thacher, 2005). For example, Henderson et al. (2006) carried out a large-scale study in 16 sites across the USA, utilizing methods such as telephone surveys, interviews, focus groups, and observations. They found that since September 11, 2001, in all the cities examined, Arab Americans have been experiencing heightened levels of suspicion, often taking the form of policies and practices such as registration requirements, racial profiling, detention, and deportation, which resulted in great concerns among community members.

As mentioned above, prior studies indicate that minority views of the police tend to be negative in comparison to those of the majority. But because of the special circumstances that arise when the police add counterterrorism to their list of responsibilities, we assume that the gap in attitudes between majorities and minority groups that have ethnic or national ties with the source of the threat from terror (e.g., Arab Americans, British Muslims, or Israeli Arabs) would be even more significant on issues of policing terrorism. In this chapter we examine this hypothesis in the Israeli context, focusing on the Israeli-Arab minority.

The Arab Minority in Israel

The Israeli-Arab community is made up of Arabs who stayed in Israel after the 1948 “War of Independence” between Israel its neighboring Arab countries. They constitute about 20 % of the population, and are a native minority who generally view themselves as part of the Palestinian nation (Ghanem, 2001; Smootha, 2004). There are major sociodemographic differences between this minority group and Jews in Israel (Hyder, 2008). For example, Israeli Arabs are much younger, poorer, and less educated on average than Israeli Jews (Weisblay, 2006).¹

¹ See <http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01585.pdf>.

Additionally, and similarly to other minorities in a number of countries (e.g., Blumstein, 1993; Feilzer & Hood, 2004; Fitzgerald, 1993; Frase, 2009; Garland, Spohn, & Wodahl, 2008; Sharp & Budd, 2005; Tonry, 1994), Israeli Arabs are over-represented in different stages of the criminal justice system. Israeli Arabs (age 19 and above) are about three times more likely to be involved in violent crimes in comparison to Jews from the same age group (Rattner & Fishman, 2009). They are also overrepresented in the offense of attacking police officers (more than double), which might reflect the tense relationship between the INP and the Arab community (Hasisi, 2005). Data from the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) reveals that while Israeli Arabs make up about 20 % of the population, they constitute about 45 % of the inmate population in Israeli prisons (Volk, 2011). These figures already suggest that Israeli Arabs have a different relationship with the police than Israeli Jews. But, as noted earlier, security concerns and the policing of terrorism complicate the situation even further.

Immediately upon its establishment, the state of Israel granted citizenship to members of the Arab minority who continued to reside in the country. However, their national Palestinian identity and the specific situation after the war led to concerns about the possible security threat that they might pose (Hasisi, 2005; Ozacy-Lazar, 1998). In retrospect there is little evidence of collaboration between Israeli Arabs and hostile Arab nations at the time.² Nonetheless, between 1948 and 1966 Israeli Arab villages and towns were placed under military rule, including the enforcement of curfews and other restrictions on travel and political activity. And even today the identity of Israeli Arab-Palestinian raises suspicions among the Jewish majority, who are concerned that it entails either dual loyalty (to Israel and to the Palestinian cause) or full loyalty to Israel's enemies. For example, the results of a public survey revealed that an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews believe that Israeli Arabs might assist enemies of the state or launch a popular revolt; fear Israeli Arabs because of their support of the Palestinian cause; and believe that most Israeli Arabs would be more loyal to a Palestinian state than to the state of Israel (Smootha, 2004). It is reasonable to assume that these public views also reflect the approach of the security agencies in Israel (INP, Israel Defense Force and General Security Agency), especially since some Israeli Arabs were indeed suspected of collaborating with Palestinian terrorists during the Second Intifada (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (MLM), 2005).

Thus, in addition to "regular" tensions between the police and the Arab minority in Israel, their relationship developed on a background of suspicion originating from national security concerns, accentuated by the fact that the INP has been the agency with overall responsibility for internal security in Israel for years. These circumstances led us to expect much less support for police involvement in counter-terrorism among Israeli Arabs in comparison to Israeli Jews, and more awareness of the negative outcomes of this police role in terms of both crime control and police-community relations.

² See: nssc.haifa.ac.il/Terror/Graph's.pps.

The Data

The findings in this chapter are based on analyses of the citizen survey described in earlier chapters. However, our main interest here is in Israeli Arabs and the comparison of their attitudes to those of the Jewish community. Additionally, in previous chapters our focus was on the *majority* population, and thus Ultra-Orthodox Jews were excluded from the analyses (see sample description in Chaps. 4 and 5). At the same time, in this chapter we compare the views of Israeli Arabs to those of Israeli Jews overall, based on the major differences that exist between these two groups as a whole in terms of religion, national affiliation, and the extent to which they are perceived to pose a threat to national security (see above).

As noted in Chaps. 4 and 5, in choosing the districts for the sample, we used a sequential sampling method that was based on the threat of terrorism in the districts, ethnic diversity and variability in crime levels, socioeconomic status, and geographic location. Thus, our sample is not statistically representative of the Israeli population. At the same time, it does provide a broad view of Israeli society and the characteristics the sample are generally congruent with those of the population in Israel, for both Jews and Arabs (see [Appendix 1](#)).

In our final sample, 90.6 % of the respondents were Jewish and 9.1 % Arab.³ The percentage of Arabs in our sample is much smaller than in the general population (about 20 %) because our sampling procedures led us to oversample districts with high rates of terrorist attacks, which are more likely to have high percentages of Jewish residents. Additionally, while the Arabs in Israel are not a homogenous group (and are made up of important subgroups, namely Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins), our Arab sample is drawn primarily from the Muslim community (95 %). Thus, attitudes of “Israeli Arabs” in our survey primarily represent the Arab Muslim population in Israel. In recent years, studies in Israel and in other Western countries have concluded that Muslim Arabs have the most sensitive relationship with the police with regard to the mission of policing terrorism. This became even more salient after September 11 and the London attacks (Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Tyler et al., 2010).

In order to analyze public attitudes toward policing terrorism, we used questions in three main areas: police performance, police-citizen relations, and public cooperation with the police. In the area of police performance, we asked our respondents to what extent they agree that: “*Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police*” and “*Handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic.*” In the area of police-citizen relations, we asked our respondents to what degree they agree that: “*When the police fight terrorism they gain more respect*”; “*Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public*”; and “*Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel.*” In the area of public

³The remaining 0.3 % were non-Arab Christians who mainly immigrated from the Former Soviet Union.

collaboration with the police we asked our respondents: “*How likely it is that they would call the police if they encountered a suspicious object*”; and “*How likely it is that they would call the police if they witnessed a crime*.” For all statements, respondents were asked to rank their agreement on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).

Results

We organized our results according to the themes noted above. In each theme we compare the views of Arabs and Jews. It should be noted that we were faced with a statistical problem from the outset: are the relationships observed due to ethnic differences, or might they be the result of differences in social background characteristics of Arabs and Jews in Israel? As we noted earlier, there are significant social and demographic differences between these two populations in characteristics such as age, income, education, gender, and marital status (Hyder, 2008; also see [Appendix 1](#)). Thus, in addition to providing simple tabular findings we use multivariate analysis to examine whether differences observed between Arabs and Jews are persistent after controlling for sociodemographic factors. We control for five main background characteristics: gender, marital status, age, education, and religiosity (see [Tables 6.1](#) and [6.2](#) below; for full regression models, see [Appendix 2](#)).⁴ It is important to emphasize that the goal of the multivariate analysis is to support the descriptive findings and to demonstrate that ethnicity still plays a significant role after controlling for sociodemographic variables.

Policing Terrorism and Police Performance

[Figure 6.1](#) shows that 55 % of the overall sample endorsed the statement that dealing with terrorism is one of the main responsibilities of the Israeli police. These findings show that our Israeli public sample understands the major role that the police play in preventing and responding to terrorism. Comparing the attitudes of Israeli Arabs and Jews, we find a small but significant difference in responses, where Israeli Jews tend to agree more with this statement than Israeli Arabs (56 % and 48 %, respectively). Using Cohen’s D as an indication of the variability—the size was 0.16, which indicates that this is a small effect size.⁵ The multivariate

⁴We report findings from our OLS regression primarily because the intervals in the dependent measures in our analysis can be treated as a ratio scale. Nonetheless, we recognize that they also can be viewed as ordinal measures. Accordingly, we estimated (and report in [Appendix 2](#)) the findings using ordinal regression. As illustrated in the Appendix, the results are very similar to those found in the linear OLS regressions.

⁵ $t(3,721) = 2.512$, $*p < 0.05$, Cohen’s D = 0.160.

Table 6.1 OLS regression model: the effect of ethnicity (Jewish/Arab) on attitudes toward the INP after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police	Handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic	When the police fight terrorism, they gain more respect	Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public	Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel	Willingness to report suspicious objects	Willingness to report crime
Arab (Jew=0)	-0.183 (-0.082)* -0.038	-0.158 (0.080)* -0.034	-0.500 (0.074)*** -0.115	0.576 (0.083)*** 0.120	0.630 (0.085)*** 0.129	-0.546 (0.055)*** -0.162	-0.65 (0.081)*** -0.138

Asterisks denote level of significance: * < 0.05; *** < 0.001

Table 6.2 Ordinal regression models: the effect of ethnicity (Jewish/Arab) on attitudes toward the INP after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
	Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police	Handling terrorism threatens hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic	When the police fight terrorism, they gain more respect	Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public	Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel	Willingness to report suspicious objects	Willingness to report crime
Arab (Jew=0)	-0.195 (0.108)*	-0.224 (0.108)*	-0.644 (-0.108)***	0.816 (0.109)***	0.923 (0.109)***	-1.04 (0.123)***	-0.45 (0.115)***

Asterisks denote level of significance: * <0.05; *** <0.001




Fig. 6.1 Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police

analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta = -0.038$ and the effect size is -0.130 (see Table 6.1).⁶ This finding of a relatively small though significant difference may be explained by the fact that this question reflects an objective evaluation by the respondent that dealing with terror is one of the main responsibilities of the police, without expressing a positive or negative evaluation of the ramifications of police involvement in counterterrorism.

As noted earlier, some police scholars argue that police involvement in fighting terrorism has ramifications in terms of classic police duties (i.e., handling property crimes, violence, drugs, traffic control; in addition to Chap. 2 see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). The findings reported in Fig. 6.2 show that about 65 % of the general Israeli public agrees with the “zero-sum game” (or “short blanket”) hypothesis, according to which one task necessarily comes at the expense of the other—in this case, that policing terrorism hampers the police’s other duties. However, when we compare the attitudes of Arabs and Jews, we find a small but significant difference in our sample.⁷ While 66 % of Israeli Jews endorsed this statement, only 54 % of the Israeli Arabs do. Using Cohen’s D as an indication of the variability—the size was 0.25. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta = -0.034$ and the effect size is -0.117 (see Table 6.1).

This gap might be explained by the nature of policing terrorism and the different effects it has on majority and minority communities in Israel. Several studies in recent years have shown that Israeli Arabs tend to evaluate police performance as

⁶ See: <http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/EffectSizeCalculator/d/standardized-regression-coefficient.html>.

⁷ $t(3,698) = 4.043, p < 0.05$, Cohen’s $D = 0.250$.




Fig. 6.2 Handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic

poor, and frequently accuse the police of neglecting the needs of the Arab community (Abraham Fund Initiative, 2010; Ben-Porat, 2008; Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007). One can argue that given the baseline of low expectations from the police, the Arab minority is less concerned than the Jewish majority that the mobilization of police resources will affect the enforcement of classic crimes. In other words, Israeli Jews are more likely than Israeli Arabs to see the tradeoff between ordinary and counterterrorism policing because the latter receive *ex ante* less policing and do not see much change when mobilization of police resources take place (Hasisi, 2008).

Another explanation might be related to the different consequences of policing terrorism for Arab and Jewish communities that we observed in Chap. 2. We found that while an increased threat of terror in predominantly Jewish communities decreased the performance of the local police station in fighting classic crimes, the opposite effect was detected in Arab communities, meaning that the increased threat of terror in Arab communities respectively improved police performance in fighting classic crimes. Perhaps Arab Israelis in our survey are responding to this reality. For them, classic policing may have increased during periods of high terrorist threat. Of course, as we noted in Chap. 2, this may simply indicate greater surveillance and may not be seen by Arab communities as reflecting greater distributive justice.

Policing Terrorism and Police-Community Relations

We assumed that the involvement of the Israeli police in fighting terrorism would have several effects on the public. One of the questions we were interested in is what happens to police prestige when they handle terrorism. The findings in Fig. 6.3




Fig. 6.3 When the police fight terrorism, they gain more respect

show that about 69 % of our Israeli public sample agrees that when the police fight terrorism they gain more respect. This finding indicates how valuable police work in fighting terrorism is to the Israeli public. Terror events receive wide media coverage and the public is exposed to the role that the police take in handling scenes of terror attacks (see Chap. 1). However, when we compare Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, we find large differences: while 71 % of Israeli Jews endorsed this statement, only 53 % of Israeli Arabs agreed.⁸ Using Cohen's *D* as an indication of the variability—the size was 0.37, which indicates that this is a small-to-moderate effect size. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the *d* from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta = -0.115$ and the effect size is 0.398 (see Table 6.1).

The analysis reported in Chap. 3 has pointed to the fact that the Israeli police gain more respect during periods of intense terrorism threats, although this effect was detected among the Jewish majority. Most of the terror attacks were directed at Israeli Jewish communities, and the INP was viewed by the Israeli public as one of the major first response agencies. In Israel, the Army (IDF) and the General Security Agency (GSA—or the “Shabak”) enjoy significant legitimacy among citizens, especially among the Jewish majority, mainly because of their role in saving lives and protecting the state from serious security threats. Police involvement in counterterrorism may have similar effects. A survey conducted by the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) at the University of Haifa in 2002 showed that while 86 % of Jewish respondents expressed trust in the GSA, only 38 % of Arab respondents

⁸ $t(3,705) = 5.925, p < 0.05$, Cohen's *D* = 0.370.




Fig. 6.4 Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public

expressed the same trust.⁹ One can argue that when the Israeli police act similarly to the GSA, it gains more popularity among the Jewish citizens than among Arabs. The difference between Arabs and Jews might also be due to the fact that Israeli Arabs do not consume only Israeli media (where the police get much coverage during high-threat periods), but are also exposed to intense Arab media coverage (Adoni, Cohen & Caspi, 2002). This might mitigate their perceptions of police prestige during periods of high terrorism threats.

We were also interested in learning how the Israeli public views the effects of policing terrorism on police-community relationship. Figure 6.4 reveals that only 36 % of the Israeli public in our sample thought that policing terrorism negatively affects police-citizen relationships. Again, when we compared Arabs and Jews we found a moderate and statistically significant difference between them: while only 35 % of Israeli Jews endorsed this statement, among Arabs a majority of 51 % expressed agreement.¹⁰ Using Cohen's D as an indication of the variability—the size was -0.36 , which indicates that this is a small-medium effect size. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta=0.120$ and the effect size is 0.415 (see Table 6.1). This gap reflects different perceptions toward the social ramifications of policing terrorism among Jews and Arabs in Israel. The data indicates that Israeli Arabs are more concerned

⁹ See: nssc.haifa.ac.il/files/herzellia2020022a.ppt.

¹⁰ $t(3,585)=-6.08, p<0.05$, Cohen's $D=-0.360$.




Fig. 6.5 Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel

with the negative effects of police involvement in counterterrorism on the relationship between the police and the community. These concerns might be explained by the notion that practices of policing terrorism are much more salient and frequent in Arab communities, which may be perceived by community members as problematic in terms of distributive fairness.

While the former question on the effects of policing terrorism on police-citizen relations was very general, we chose to ask an additional, more specific question on the ramifications of policing terrorism on Israeli Arabs' relationship with the police. Figure 6.5 shows that about 45 % of the Israeli public in our sample endorse the statement that police activities in fighting terrorism impair their relationship with the Israeli-Arab population. It is worthwhile to compare this figure to the results reported in Fig. 6.4, where only 36 % of our sample thought that policing terrorism negatively impacts police-citizen relationships. As expected, a significant disparity is found when comparing the views of Arabs and Jews in the sample: 43 % of Jews endorsed this statement, while a majority of 58 % of Arab respondents agreed.¹¹ Using Cohen's D as an indication of the variability—the size was 0.33, which indicates that this is a small-medium effect size. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta=0.129$ and the effect size is 0.447 (see Table 6.1). As argued in Chap. 5, many Israeli Jews are aware that police involvement in counterterrorism may jeopardize its relationship with Israeli Arab citizens; yet these concerns are much more salient among the Israeli Arab respondents.

¹¹ $t(3,559)=-5.58, p<0.05$, Cohen's D=-0.330.




Fig. 6.6 How likely is it that you would call the police if you encountered a suspicious object/witnessed a severe crime?

Policing Terrorism and Public Cooperation with the Police

A receptive relationship between the community and the police is crucial for police performance. Police forces need the help of the public in order to carry out their missions, and this is also true in the case of counterterrorism. Since terrorist attacks generally target civilians, and the police are the first and principal responders, citizens and the police are brought together as stakeholders and the major actors in the policing of terrorism. Police legitimacy was found to play a critical role in predicting the level of public collaboration with the police in this context (Tyler et al., 2010).

We asked our survey respondents to report how likely it is that they would call the police if they witnessed a terrorism threat or a severe crime threat. Hasisi et al. (2009) have shown that the Israeli public is very attentive to terror threats and citizens are inclined to report such threats by calling the police emergency number. The public usually reports suspicious persons, objects, and cars to the police. In our survey we asked respondents about their willingness to call the police if they encountered a suspicious object. We also asked them how likely it was that they would call the police if they “witnessed a severe crime.”

Figure 6.6 represents public willingness to report terrorism and severe crime threats to the police in Israel. Our results show that about 89 % of the Israeli public in our sample would call the police if they encountered a suspicious object, compared with 72 % that would call the police if they encountered a severe crime threat. This finding shows that the Israeli public in our sample is more attentive to terrorism threats than to “severe crime” threats. We might speculate as well that the public is more confident that their call will be taken seriously by the police in the case of a terror threat than when reporting a severe crime. However, our interest in this analysis mainly concerns the comparison between Jewish and Arab respondents. A recent study shows that Israeli Arabs are more cautious in contacting the police, all the

more so in the case of threats from terror (Hasisi et al., 2009). Our data shows that the Jewish respondents in our sample are more willing than the Arab respondents to report suspicious objects to the police (90.5 % and 72 %, respectively).¹² But the difference is surprisingly small, especially when considering the tension between the police and Arabs reported in public surveys (Abraham Fund Initiative, 2010; Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007) and the fact that there are among Israeli Arabs many salient political barriers to contacting the police on issues related to terror and homeland security (Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009). Figure 6.6 also shows a gap between Arabs and Jews with regard to reporting severe crime threats: Israeli Arabs expressed less willingness to report a severe crime compared to Israeli Jews (50.6 % and 74.1 %, respectively).¹³

Conclusions

The main hypothesis of the present analysis was that Jewish respondents will hold more positive attitudes than Arab respondents on issues related to the involvement of the Israeli police in counterterrorism. This hypothesis was supported by our analyses. Indeed, Israeli Jews tend to recognize more directly the importance of the role of the INP in handling terrorism, and are more willing to attribute social prestige to the police for their work in the area of homeland security. As for the Arab respondents, our study showed that they are more concerned with the impact of police involvement in counterterrorism on police-citizen relations, and, more specifically, on police-Arab relations. As we would expect, there are statistically significant differences between the views of the two groups.

While these differences are noteworthy, they were in general smaller than we expected at the outset. Overall, both Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs in our sample recognized the central role that the Israeli police play in dealing with terrorism and express high levels of willingness to cooperate with the police. While there are differences, these differences are often not large. Jews and Arabs share many common beliefs about terrorism and its implications. There is, in this sense, more consensus than would be expected given the fundamental differences that are often identified in attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Israel (Smootha, 2004). The question is why?

Perhaps one reason is that the problem of terrorism affects everyone. Despite much residential segregation in Israel, with Jews and Arabs often living in primarily Jewish or Arab communities, there is also much more integration than many people realize. Jews and Arabs use many of the same public facilities (e.g., transportation,

¹² $t(3,795)=7.97, p<0.05$, Cohen's $D=0.530$. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta=-0.162$ and the effect size is -0.564 (see Table 6.1).

¹³ $t(3,771)=8.48, p<0.05$, Cohen's $D=0.511$. The multivariate analysis showed similar results. We used effect size calculator to estimate the d from a standardized regression coefficient. The unstandardized coefficient of ethnicity is $\beta=-0.138$ and the effect size is -0.479 (see Table 6.1).

malls, cinemas) and accordingly are both subject to potential attacks. Another reason might be the Arab awareness that terror attacks jeopardize their social status and harm their relationship with the state and, more precisely, with the police.

Our study indicates that the Israeli public is aware of the social costs of police involvement in counterterrorism. One third of the respondents in our sample thought that police involvement in counterterrorism negatively affects police-citizen relations. These concerns may be understood in light of Bayley and Weisburd's argument that when the police increase their involvement in counterterrorism missions, their orientation might change from being service oriented to "Big Brother," who regards citizens as suspects to be watched (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). These concerns become more salient when comparing Jewish and Arab attitudes. We find that Arabs are much more concerned than Jews about police-citizen relations following the involvement of the police in counterterrorism. Part of this concern might be explained by the fact that the immediate "targets" of policing terrorism are often the Arab minority. But these concerns become even clearer when specifically examining views regarding the effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and Israeli Arabs. Our findings show that a significant part of the Israeli public in our sample is aware of the sensitive relationship between Israeli Arabs and the police, especially when the latter are involved in counterterror assignments. At the same time, as expected, these concerns were more salient among the Arab respondents.

The implications of policing terrorism are different for Jews and Arabs, especially in terms of the likelihood of having contacts with the police as suspects, and thus it is not surprising that there are significant differences between the groups with regard to the ramifications of policing terrorism in terms of police-community relations. Our study suggests, however, that despite these differences, there is a significant degree of consensus among both Arabs and Jews regarding the importance of the policing function and its possible negative implications for police-minority relations and traditional service and crime-control functions of the police.

Appendix 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample and the Population in Israel, by Ethnicity (Jewish/Arab)^a

	Jewish respondents	Jewish population in Israel	Arab respondents	Arab population in Israel ^b
Gender	Female: 51.8 %	Female: 51.8% ^c	Female: 56 %	Female: 49.4 %
	Male: 48.2 %	Male: 48.2 %	Male: 44 %	Male: 50.6.2 %
Age	Median: 44	Median: 42.3 ^d	Median: 36	Median: 32.3
Education	Median: “nonacademic education beyond high school” ^e	Median: 12.8 years of education ^f	Median: “nonacademic education beyond high school”	Median: 11.1 years of education
Income	Median: “about average” ^g	Median: within the sixth decile ^h	Median: “less than average”	Median: within the fourth decile

^aData obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the Statistical Abstract of Israel for the year 2008; see www.cbs.gov.il

^bWe focused on Muslim Arabs when possible

^cBecause of the way the data were reported by the CBS, these frequencies apply to Israeli citizens who are 20 years old or older

^dBecause of the way the data were reported by the CBS, this figure applies to the population of Jewish citizens who are 20 years old or older. The median was calculated from data reported categorically

^eRespondents were asked to state their education on a scale of 8 levels, ranging from “no education” to “Ph.D.”

^fBecause of the way the data were reported by the CBS, this median applies to the population of Jewish citizens who are 15 years old or older

^gRespondents were told that the average gross monthly income per household in Israel is about 12,000 NIS and were asked to state their level of income in relation to this figure: much less than average/a little less than average/about average/a little above average/much above average

^hThe CBS reports income data in deciles

Appendix 2: OLS Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Policing Terrorism

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
	Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police	Handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic	When the police fight terrorism, they gain more respect	Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public	Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel	Willingness to report suspicious objects	Willingness to report crime
Constant	3.14***	3.31***	3.62***	2.68***	2.57***	4.52***	3.59***
Arab (Jew=0)	-0.183 (-0.082)*	-0.158 (0.080)*	-0.500 (0.074)***	0.576 (0.083)***	0.630 (0.085)***	-0.546 (0.055)***	-0.655 (0.081)***
Male (Female=0)	-0.091 (0.046)	0.117 (0.045)**	-0.016 (0.042)	0.044 (0.047)	-0.177 (0.049)*	-0.025 (0.031)	-0.155 (0.045)**
Marital status: single	-0.017 (0.071)	-0.306 (0.069)***	-0.177 (0.064)**	0.060 (0.073)	0.249 (0.074)**	-0.386 (0.048)***	-0.148 (0.070)*
Age	0.012 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)**	0.008 (0.002)***	0.009 (0.002)***	0.011 (0.002)***	0.007 (0.001)***	-0.002 (0.002)
Education	-0.035 (0.016)*	0.069 (0.016)***	-0.025 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.017)	0.037 (0.017)*	-0.019 (0.011)	0.142 (0.016)***
Religiosity	0.065 (0.027)*	-0.055 (0.026)*	0.067 (0.024)**	0.042 (0.027)**	-0.094 (0.028)**	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.026)
<i>N</i>	3,596	3,576	3,581	3,467	3,453	3,644	3,644
<i>R</i> ²	0.024	0.032	0.034	0.021	0.029	0.088	0.055

Asterisks denote level of significance: * <0.05, ** <0.01, *** <0.001

Ordinal regression models predicting attitudes toward policing terrorism

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>b</i> (SE)
	Handling terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Israeli police	Handling terrorism threatens hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs, and traffic	When the police fight terrorism, they gain more respect	Dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public	Police activities in fighting terrorism hamper their relationship with Arabs in Israel	Willingness to report suspicious objects	Willingness to report crime
Arab (Jew=0)	-0.195 (0.108)*	-0.224 (0.108)*	-0.644 (0.108)***	0.816 (0.109)***	0.923 (0.109)***	-1.048 (-0.123)***	-0.831 (0.108)***
Male (Female=0)	0.090 (0.061)	0.220 (0.062)***	-0.018 (0.062)	0.059 (0.061)	-0.144 (0.062)*	-0.200 (0.085)*	-0.236 (0.065)***
Marital Status: single	-0.036 (0.093)	-0.446 (0.095)***	-0.248 (0.095)**	0.059 (0.094)	0.311 (0.094)**	-0.825 (0.118)***	-0.272 (0.098)**
Age	0.016 (0.021)**	0.007 (0.002)**	0.011 (0.002)***	0.011 (0.002)***	0.014 (0.002)***	0.021 (0.004)***	-0.003 (0.003)
Education	-0.061 (0.021)**	0.074 (0.022)**	-0.067 (0.022)**	-0.039 (0.022)	0.037 (0.022)	-0.100 (0.031)**	0.151 (0.023)***
Religiosity	0.096 (0.035)**	-0.078 (0.036)*	0.137 (0.036)***	-0.059 (0.036)	-0.123 (0.036)**	-0.051 (0.049)	-0.041 (0.037)
<i>N</i>	3,596	3,576	3,581	3,467	3,453	3,644	3,644
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.025	0.031	0.032	0.023	0.031	0.079	0.043

Asterisks denote level of significance: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

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Chapter 7

How Has the Israel National Police Perceived Its Role in Counterterrorism and the Potential Outcomes?

Over the past decade, policing scholars and practitioners have begun to debate and speculate on the effects that policing terrorism may have on the performance of the police, their role in society and their relationship with the public (e.g., Fishman, 2005; Lyons, 2002; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005; Weisburd, Feucht, Hakimi, Mock, & Perry, 2009). In Chaps. 5 and 6 we have reported on the views of citizens, both the Jewish majority and the Arab minority, concerning the role of the Israel National Police (INP) in counterterrorism and its implications. We have shown, for example, that the Jewish majority recognizes the significance of counterterrorism in Israeli policing and many of its negative, unintended consequences. We have also identified that the gap between the attitudes of Jews and Arabs is surprisingly small. But what are the views of the *police*? Do they consider counterterrorism as a natural extension of their “classic” duties, or, alternatively, as a major diversion? How do they perceive the effects of policing terrorism on their crime control and order maintenance responsibilities? Do they believe that involvement in counterterrorism impacts their relationship with the public, and, if so, how? In this chapter we address these questions.

Why is it important to learn what the police think? Police officers’ views concerning their work and its outcomes may affect their “internal legitimacy” (or “self-legitimacy”), that is their belief in their moral right to rule or exercise power. For example, if counterterrorism plays a major role in police mission, and officers believe that such activities contribute to their public image or to their crime-fighting capabilities—it is expected that their self-legitimacy will strengthen, and vice versa.

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Self-legitimacy, in turn, is expected to have important effects on officers' future claims for legitimacy and ultimately on their "external legitimacy," that is their entitlement to exercise power in the eyes of citizen (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2010; also see Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014). As reviewed in Chap. 4, the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public was found to be strongly correlated with citizens' willingness to comply and cooperate with police officers, accept their decisions, empower the police, and even obey the law more generally (e.g., Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Moreover, the perspective of the police is particularly important in the context of the views of citizens. The police and the public may share similar views regarding policing terrorism and its implications, or may see things differently. If, for example, citizens experience, or at least recognize, potential negative outcomes that the police do not, this may suggest incongruity in police-public perceptions, priorities, or expectations, which may hinder the legitimacy citizens render the police. Finally, the way the police understand their role in counterterrorism and its implications is expected to impact strategic planning, prioritization, allocation of internal resources, and daily activities. For example, it is highly unlikely that steps will be taken to address potential negative outcomes of policing terrorism that the police are *not* aware of. Thus, from the outset we found it important to consider the perspective of the police in our study of the implications of policing terrorism.

We begin this chapter with a description of our data source: the Annual Reports issued every year by the INP, their advantages and limitations. We also describe the analytic approach we have taken and detail our preliminary hypotheses. We then present our analysis, in which we focus on three specific time periods in the history of the INP that are particularly relevant to policing terrorism: the assignment of the INP with "internal security" responsibilities, the "First Palestinian Intifada" and the "Second Palestinian Intifada." Our analysis suggests that despite ongoing involvement in security matters, focusing on counterterrorism was perceived as a major reform and shift in priorities, both when the INP was officially assigned with internal security responsibilities, and following the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada. In these two time periods we also find indications that counterterrorism became the top priority for the police, often at the expense of "classic" policing. However, we did not find similar remarks in the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada, where the Annual Reports suggest reconciliation with the dual role and confidence that adequate performance in both crime control and counterterrorism is feasible. Additionally, while in all three periods the INP appears to acknowledge the positive impacts of policing terrorism on police-community relationships, we found limited evidence suggesting that the potential negative outcomes were also considered.

Data and Hypotheses

The INP issues an annual report at the end of each year. These reports are publicly available (online¹ or in libraries), and provide a description of the objectives and activities of the INP in the year of the report. They are generally made up of an introduction by the Police Commissioner, chapters describing the activities of different police units and aggregated statistics. These reports formed the primary data source for the present analysis.

It is important to note at the outset that while these reports provide a good data source for our purposes (see below), we recognize their limitations. First, the reports are publicly available. While accessibility is one of their advantages, we expect that for this reason they do not include sensitive or classified information, and that police officials have considered their potential effects on public opinion and have thus taken steps to portray the INP favorably. We also acknowledge that these reports, in all likelihood, provide a better representation of the views of the acting Commissioner and top leaders of the INP (or the “official” position of this organization) than of views of lower-ranking officers, and in this sense should be viewed as organizational presentations (Manning, 1997). In our discussion we consider how these limitations may have influenced specific findings. Nevertheless, we view these reports as an important and useful data source: publicly available information about policing terrorism in Israel is scarce, and these reports provide a unique opportunity to study this area. These reports also allow us to examine changes in the perceptions of the police over time and in relation to varying threat levels, which would have been difficult to accomplish using a single wave of surveys or interviews.

In our analysis we focus on three specific time periods in the history of the INP, when counterterrorism had become particularly salient: First, in 1974 the INP was officially assigned with counterterrorism (or “internal security”) responsibilities. Thus, in order to examine how this new role and its implications were perceived by the police, we began analyzing police reports 2 years prior to the official assignment (1972) and ended 2 years afterwards (1976). The second period was that of the First Palestinian Intifada (or uprising), which began in December 1987 and officially ended in 1993 following the “Declaration of Principles.” In order to identify potential changes in how the INP perceived its counterterrorism role during this high-threat period, we again analyzed reports starting 2 years before the outbreak of Intifada (1985) and ending 2 years after its conclusion (1995). Our final period of analysis was that of the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000–2006), when the INP has had to face the longest and most fatal wave of suicide bombing attacks within Israeli communities (Erlich, 2006). As in previous periods, we began our analysis 2 years prior to the outbreak of the Intifada (1998) and completed the examination 2 years after terrorism threats returned to pre-Intifada levels (2008).

¹ See: http://www.police.gov.il/meida_laezrach/pirsomim/Pages/statistika.aspx.

Our approach in analyzing these 27 reports was to thoroughly read all chapters and extract any type of information related to counterterrorism, such as descriptions of strategies, activities, quantitative data, or general discussions. This information included, for example, descriptions of the activities of the Border Guard,² data on terror attacks and general discussions about prioritization and allocation of resources. At the second stage we re-read and assessed the extracted sections, searching specifically for narratives or descriptions that concerned either the perceived *implications* of counterterrorism obligations or *general perceptions* of this role. The relevant sections were then organized according to the themes emerging from the data, for each time period separately. This process was carried out by two researchers separately and any disagreements were discussed and resolved.³

What did we expect to find in the reports? Our preliminary hypotheses derive from the unique characteristics and history of the INP. As reviewed in Chap. 1, the INP was assigned with “internal security” responsibilities as early as 1974. But this police agency has been involved in general security much earlier, a feature that can be traced back to several sources including the foundation of the INP as a corps in the IDF (the Israeli Army) during the War of Independence in 1948; the strong link between security and crime problems in Israel at the time; and the ongoing security threats faced by the State of Israel since its establishment (Gimshi, 2007; Hod, 2004; Shadmi & Hod, 1996). Thus, we expected that the INP would perceive its counterterrorism role as a natural police responsibility. Second, we suspected that the INP would show little consideration for the possible implications of extensive involvement in counterterrorism, because the fear, vulnerability, and urgency associated with terrorism threats, along with a strong sense of mission in an ongoing fight for a “righteous cause,” were expected to push aside long-term considerations of potential, unintended outcomes. Below we present our findings for each of the three periods separately, followed by an integrative discussion.

Period I: The Assignment of the INP with Counterterrorism Responsibilities

Assignment with “Internal Security” Responsibilities as a Major Reform

As reviewed in Chap. 1, the INP has always been involved in security-oriented tasks to some degree. This feature of Israeli policing is clearly articulated in the Annual Police Reports from 1972 and 1973. In 1974, following a particularly horrific terror

²The operational and professional arm of the INP in matters of internal security and combating terrorism; see: <http://www.police.gov.il/mehozot/mishmarHagvol/Pages/default.aspx>.

³While special efforts were taken to translate the Hebrew quotes as accurately as possible, minor revisions were inevitable. In some quotes additional words were inserted for clarification.

attack in the town of “Ma’alot” and a more general rise in terrorism subsequent to the “Yom Kipur” war, the Israeli government formally assigned the INP with “internal security” responsibilities within the “Green Line” (the pre-1967 border). Despite the familiarity of the INP with security tasks, scholars have argued that this assignment demanded major reforms from the police on the conceptual, organizational, and strategic levels (Gimshi, 2007; Hod, 2004). Importantly, similar arguments were raised in the context of the potential effects of the September 11 terror attack on local police agencies in the USA (see for example Weisburd et al., 2009).

The Annual Police Reports from the years following this new assignment indeed reveal that the Israeli police perceived their new role in counterterrorism as a major transformation, which goes beyond technical or organizational changes:

Such reorganization of the [police] system requires changes that are above and beyond shifting the boundaries between units, moving tasks from department to department, or changing the administrative structure and positions. This reorganization required transformations in patterns of thinking and evaluating on all the working levels—on the operational and administrative, and even on the personal level (INP Annual Report, 1974, p. 7).

These reports also reveal that the INP was required to begin carrying out its new task immediately, before the organizational and technical changes were completed and prior to the allocation of the necessary resources, which, not surprisingly, made the transition period even more difficult:

Following the government decision to assign the INP the responsibility for internal security in the country, the police was required to handle this matter before the problems of shifting authority and defining the roles in detail were solved—and even before the budgets associated with this [responsibility] were allocated and received. What is more, the actual activities of the INP in the realm of internal security preceded the formation of the organizational and operational frameworks for this task. This was the situation because of the urgency of events in the realm of internal security, which demanded immediate action. (INP Annual Report, 1975, p. 42)

Counterterrorism as the Top Priority, at the Expense of Other Obligations

One of the themes clearly emerging from the reports that follow the assignment of the INP with counterterrorism responsibilities is the significance of this role for the police and its conceptualization as the top priority, often at the expense of other obligations. This finding is very much in line with concerns raised by policing scholars and practitioners (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005), as well as with the findings reported in Chap. 2. For example, in the report from 1974 the Commissioner states:

The immediate effect of the change was felt to a great extent in the breadth of its (the INP’s) activities and the nature of the roles performed. Internal security received the top priority, sometimes at the expense of other important duties in the realm of police services that are provided to the public (INP Annual Report, 1974, p. 3).

This development was also clearly articulated in the report from 1975, for example, when discussing the activities of the Investigations Division:

Four factors have particularly influenced the Investigations Division in 1975... [one of which was that] activities in the realm of criminal investigations were pushed aside due to the investigation of terrorist acts, which demanded immediate responses, while they were evolving (INP Annual Report, 1975, p. 25).

In 1976 this trend was particularly evidenced in the context of responses to calls for service:

Public calls regarding suspicious objects or people received first priority by policing units. Even though the percentage of calls that were futile was substantial, we prefer to respond to each call and [do so] immediately, because when it comes to public security the police is not willing to take risks (INP Annual Report, 1976, p. 29).

Acceptance and Perception of Capabilities

It is important to point out, however, that although the Annual Reports clearly articulate the difficulties experienced by the Israeli police as a result of their new role in internal security, by 1975 there are also indications that they have reconciled with the new reality:

On the conceptual level, the establishment of the dual-purpose police organization continued, which is required to respond to the needs of fighting crime and the needs of public security, which are two aspects of the basic mission of securing the lives and peace of the public in a country like Israel (INP Annual Report, 1975, p. 3).

Moreover, it appears that the Israeli police felt that they have been handling this new task successfully thus far and were indeed proud of their accomplishments:

By the end of this year the organizational, functional and logistic structures [of the police] were functioning at full capacity and with substantial successes in achieving these two goals (fighting crime and internal security) (INP Annual Report, 1975, p. 7).

The Civil Guard as an Important Vehicle for Fostering Police-Community Relationships

As detailed in previous chapters, there may be important effects of police involvement in counterterrorism on the relationship between the police and the public, in both the positive and negative directions. When considering these effects in the Israeli context, scholars have devoted much attention to the Civil Guard, the largest voluntary organization in Israel, officially established by the Israeli government under the auspice of the INP in 1974 in an attempt to institutionalize private

initiatives to patrol and secure local neighborhoods.⁴ Scholars have suggested that in addition to substantial support in terms of manpower, over the years the Civil Guard has made important contributions to the relationship between the police and the public (Friedmann, 1992; Weisburd, Shalev, & Amir, 2002). The reports from this period suggest that the Israeli police have indeed recognized these positive outcomes:

In addition to the regular-statutory tasks the police (INP) has handled over the year, its responsibility was extended to [include] the issue of internal security, following the increased activities of terrorist organizations. In the background of this activity, a new, important communication channel between the police and the public was born, through which the public got to know the police organization up-close, its roles, its problems and even its dilemmas. Thus, positive contacts with numerous citizens increased, including with teenagers who volunteer in the Civil Guard (INP Annual Report, 1974, p. 96).

Working together [with Civil Guard Volunteers] toward a mutual goal clarifies to thousands of citizens—perhaps for the first time in their lives—the essence of police work, and has brought them closer to understanding its (the INP’s) roles and activities (INP Annual Report, 1975, p. 11).

Period II: The First Palestinian Intifada

The Transition to Focusing on Counterterrorism as a Major Reform and Shift in Priorities (1988–1989)

The first Palestinian uprising (or “First Intifada”) began toward the end of 1987 in the Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria, and officially ended in 1993 with the Oslo Accords. Although the IDF played the major role in responding to the uprising in the Palestinian territories, the INP placed much emphasis on internal security within the pre-1967 borders, particularly in Jerusalem and in Israeli-Arab communities (mainly in the north of Israel) that were considered sensitive areas, in risk of mass disturbances and violent protests as a result of solidarity with the Palestinian uprising (Hod, 2004; Shalev, 1990; also see the website of the INP⁵).

In the reports from the 2 years preceding the outbreak of the First Intifada (1985–1986), we found evidence of police involvement in counterterrorism (see, for example, INP Annual Report, 1986, p. 12). However, we also found strong indications that *other* issues, and particularly fighting crime, were often the focus of Israeli policing at the time (see, for example, INP Annual Report, 1985, p. 5). It is interesting to note in this context that even the special unit of the police for fighting terrorism (the

⁴See website of the Civil Guard: <http://www.police.gov.il/mehozot/agafKehila/Pages/historia.aspx#2>.

⁵http://www.police.gov.il/mehozot/agafAME/education/_history_legacy/history/Pages/history1985-1990.aspx.

“Yammam”) played a role in fighting crime in 1985 (see INP Annual Report, 1985, p. 14). Thus, it is not surprising that following the outbreak of the “First Intifada” in late 1987, the INP again experienced the renewed emphasis on security matters as a major transition. The Annual Police report from 1988 reveals a sharp transition from focusing primarily on crime to focusing primarily on security, a change highlighted in the Commissioner’s comments:

This reality, which forced the INP to focus its attention on maintaining public order and internal security, suggests a major shift in police activities in comparison to previous years. While up to this year the police had carried out its mission of maintaining public safety and internal security while carrying out its main task—fighting crime, starting from this year (1988) it had to invest its resources first and foremost in carrying out tasks of public safety and internal security, and only while doing so, it also dealt with its main role—fighting crime (INP Annual Report, 1988, p. 8).

Moreover, similar to our first period of examination, immediately following the outbreak of the First Intifada (1988–1989) we again find indications that not only did the INP place counterterrorism at the top of its priorities, but that this focus impacted the ability of the police to perform other duties. Limited resources are also mentioned in this context. These notions were clearly and repeatedly voiced in the Annual Reports from 1988 and 1989:

The recent events in the realm of mass public disturbances and internal security forced the INP to devote special attention to the matter, and place it at the top of the priorities list... Under this framework, police presence in centers of mass disturbances were reinforced by thousands of policemen who were allocated to these tasks, at the expense of their critical activities in fighting crime (INP Annual Report, 1988, p. 8).

The mass disturbances events... forced the police to place the maintenance of internal security at the top of the priorities list. The cut in the ongoing budget of the police and partial funding of the expenses resulting from the events of the Intifada, forced the police to absorb part of these expenses at the cost of its regular budget, and prepare without an increase in resources to providing adequate response to the needs of the field, while hampering the level of service [provided] to the citizen (INP Annual Report, 1989, p. 7).

Reconciliation with the Dual Responsibility (1990–1995)

Despite the major difficulties in the years immediately following the outbreak of the First Intifada, in subsequent years (1990–1995) it appears that the INP had reconciled with its dual role. Counterterrorism tasks are now being mentioned alongside crime control, and, what is more, it appears that the police are gradually beginning to argue that they are capable of performing well in both domains. For example, when detailing the plans for the coming year, the Annual Report from 1990 states:

Preparations for the year 1991 should address the extensive activities in the realm of internal security and preserving the public order, and do so in conjunction with activities in the realm of fighting crime and preventing offenses. (INP Annual Report, 1990, p. 9)

Additionally, when describing the activities of the Border Guard, which is assigned with and specializes in internal security, it is mentioned that this year it had

also played a role in “classic” policing. It is important to clarify that not only did security threats *not* decline in 1990 (which could have explained the renewed investment in crime control), but 1990 was actually the *peak* of terrorism threats of the First Intifada⁶:

Increased efforts to maintain internal security were once again the top priority, while, at the same time, the force (the Border Guard) carried out various activities in the area of conventional police work (INP Annual Report, 1990, p. 29).

The reconciliation with the dual role continued to be voiced in subsequent years:

Fighting crime is the essence of the classic police, as defined in section 3 of the Police Command... the present situation in Israel, [which] cannot be ignored, demands diverting the attention of the police from its classic tasks to internal security tasks. The Investigations Division is obligated today to maintain the balance and the efficient and professional division of resources between classic policing and security needs. (INP Annual Report, 1995, p. 7)

The Significance of the Civil Guard to Police-Community Relationships

Within this time period, the only identifiable link between policing terrorism (or “internal security”) and police-community relations can be found in discussions about the Civil Guard. As mentioned above, the Civil Guard was established for the purpose of organizing citizen efforts to assist in internal security, and indeed the reports confirm that volunteers mostly operated in this realm (e.g., INP Annual Report, 1985, p. 15). The reports also stress the importance of the Civil Guard in developing and nurturing the relationship between the police and the public. For example, in the 1985 report, when discussing police-community relationships, the major contribution of the Civil Guard to these partnerships is highlighted:

Operating volunteers and utilizing their assistance is one of the important foundations of police-community relations, since volunteers are a link in the relationship between the police and the community, and together with the police they form a unified frontier for fighting “shoulder to shoulder” toward a mutual goal—improving the quality of life in the community (INP Annual Report, 1985, p. 28).

Period III: The Second Palestinian Intifada

The second Palestinian uprising (or “Second Intifada”) began in September 2000, and terrorism threats generally returned to pre-Intifada levels by 2006.⁷ While this confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Authorities took numerous forms

⁶See the Global Terrorism Database of the START Center: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

⁷See terrorism data on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/>; and the Global Terrorism Database of the START Center: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>. Also see Chap. 4.

(Shay & Schweitzer, 2001), it was mostly characterized by an unprecedented wave of multi-casualty suicide bombing attacks within the pre-1967 border, which is considered the longest and most costly in terms of human lives (Erlich, 2006). Thus, this period demanded significant responses from the INP, including major efforts in thwarting terror attacks and handling scenes of attacks that had already occurred.

Ongoing Reconciliation with and Acceptance of the Dual Role

Following our findings in the previous periods, we expected to find indications of police focus on crime control in the years preceding the outbreak of the Second Intifada, followed by a major shift toward placing counterterrorism at the center of police attention once terrorism threats became a priority. However, as detailed below, in this time period we find what appears to be long-term reconciliation with the two roles, both before and after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

In the years *preceding* the outbreak of the Second Intifada (1998–1999), similarly to the previous period, we find clear indications that the INP had focused on crime control:

In 1998 the Border Guard was faced with new challenges in the organizational and practical domains. These challenges originated from placing the goal of fighting crime at the top of the priorities list... (INP Annual Report, 1998, p. 65).

Main emphases [this year]—on the one hand, narrowing down reported crime, mainly property crime, and on the other, broader and larger exposure of drug cases, extortion and violence... (INP Annual Report, 1999, p. 3).

However, these reports also clarify that not only was counterterrorism not neglected, but that *both* crime control and counterterrorism were perceived as inherent police responsibilities. Unlike the previous periods, where this acceptance seemed to have emerged only *after* terrorism threats became a priority, here we find what appears to be a long-term internalization of this dual role:

The main objective that the INP has set for itself for the year of 1998 was to create a new organizational balance between the two realms of its responsibility—“classic” police tasks on the one hand, and its responsibility for internal security on the other (INP Annual Report, 1998, p. 3).

This full acceptance of both responsibilities is also clearly articulated in the reports that *followed* the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Interestingly, unlike previous periods, here we did *not* find statements suggesting that the high-threat situation resulted in a major shift in focus or priorities, or that focusing on counterterrorism hampered efforts to control crime. What is more, it is frequently claimed that *despite* the severe security situation, and through special efforts, the police were able to perform well in both domains. For example, in 2001, when discussing the realm of crime control, it is stated:

Much effort was invested in the realm of fighting crime, despite the security situation. There has been an increase in violence offenses, and alongside was an increase in clearance rates (INP Annual Report, 2001, p. 6).

Interestingly, the title of the Commissioner's introduction to the Annual Report of 2003 is "*Law Enforcement in an Age of Terrorism*" (see p. 3). In this introduction he emphasizes the commitment of the INP to both internal security and crime control, despite the difficulties of handling the two:

Despite the numerous difficulties, we have made special efforts and accelerated the war against crime, particularly the war against organized crime...The uncompromising war against terrorism, alongside the persistent war on crime, and particularly organized crime, were handled with devotion and determination... We did not give up on training the units, on operational preparedness, on strategic thinking and on service to the citizen... The personal security of the citizen and providing quality service were a main component in our activities, and we insisted on upholding this objective, regardless of other difficulties (INP Annual Report, 2003, p. 3).

Lack of Resources

Although we did *not* find explicit statements that focusing on counterterrorism came at the expense of fighting crime, we did find frequent mentions that the Israeli police perceived their budget to be insufficient. While it appears that the INP did receive some additional resources in the period of the Second Intifada⁸ (see Annual Police Report from 2001 and from 2003), the reports suggest that they were not perceived to be enough for the numerous tasks:

Today we are in the process of political developments and major decisions, which concern our very existence. These are accompanied by a wave of terrorism and violence, which generate a cloudy and painful atmosphere. Alongside these, the INP is in a constant state of lack of resources and means in relation to the tasks it is required to perform (INP Annual Report, 2000, p. 4).

Similar arguments were again made in subsequent years. For example, in 2003 the Commissioner argued:

The year 2003 was characterized by cruel and deadly Palestinian terrorism, which crossed all red lines, alongside a rise in violent crime... In the background of the persistent war in these two frontiers were budget cuts, which were forced on the police one after the other... (INP Annual Report, 2003, p. 3).

Pride and Grief

Another consistent theme emerging from the reports of the years of the Second Intifada is *pride and satisfaction* with accomplishments in the realm of counterterrorism, often in conjunction with *grief* over colleagues who have lost their lives while trying to prevent terrorist attacks:

⁸For the budgets of the INP between 2000 and 2010 see the website of the Israeli Ministry of Public Security (in Hebrew): <http://www.mops.gov.il/BP/About+MOPS/Budget/>.

The year 2001 has proven that the INP can extend its “organs” (units, resources) up to the peak of its capabilities, and has handled situations where police officers have become a live barrier in the face of terrorism (INP Annual Report, 2001, p. 6).

The uncompromising war on terrorism has collected a heavy and unprecedented toll this year... police officers have stopped terrorists at the price of their lives, like the officer, who by stopping a booby-trapped car with a terrorist in it has prevented a terror attack in Jerusalem and paid with his life, or the patrol policewomen, who was called to a scene of a shootings terror attack and was shot by the terrorist. The alertness of the traffic policeman has brought about the identification of the booby-trapped car. For stopping the vehicle he paid with his life. Another patrol officer hit a terrorist, but was eventually stabbed and died (INP Annual Report, 2002, p. 3).

Positive Impact on the Relationships Between the Police and the Public

The Annual Police Reports from the years of the Second Intifada indicate two perceived effects of the security situation on the relationship between the police and the public. First, the high level of threat seemed to have encouraged many citizens to volunteer and join the Civil Guard:

The security situation, together with publicity efforts and the professional preparation of the Division of Community and Civil Guard, have conveyed public assistance to the police. Over the passing year 38,243 volunteers were recruited, which is an unprecedented increase (INP Annual Report, 2002, p. 3).

Interestingly, and unlike previous periods, here the Civil Guard is not portrayed as a vehicle for strengthening police-community relationships, but rather as an end in and of itself, as it provided massive support to the police in terms of manpower and other resources:

In Israel, due to its unique problems, particularly in the security domain, integrating volunteers in policing duties gives the police legitimacy and freedom of action, and allows it (the INP) to use, in times of need, the resources of the community (buildings, equipment, budgets, volunteers) (INP Annual Report, 2001, p. 52).

The second effect of the terrorism threats on police-community relations mentioned in these reports takes the form of public sympathy toward the police as a result of appreciation of their extremely difficult working conditions and extensive efforts to protect human lives. Such sympathy has been recognized by scholars and practitioners (e.g., Fishman, 2005), and may be understood in light of overall unity and support for public institutions in the face of severe external threats (see Chap. 3). This impact is clearly articulated in the Annual Report from 2002:

Stretching of the “organs” (units, resources) was almost to the edge of our abilities, in the difficult security, social and economic reality. A situation where traffic police fight terrorists; a situation where working excessive shifts has become a daily routine; a situation where [police] stations are having a hard time operating without the assistance of volunteers, have brought about wide public sympathy and fruitful cooperation with institutions

and authorities who volunteered to assist. The unified frontier of the police and the public contributed to firm standing and social strength, which enable [living] a normal life in an abnormal reality (INP Annual Report, 2002, p. 3).

Discussion

How have police leaders in the INP perceived (and presented) their counterterrorism role and its implications over the years? To begin with, in line with historical accounts (e.g., Gimshi, 2007), the reports reveal that the INP has always been involved in security tasks, even prior to its official assignment with internal security responsibilities, and even in years when terrorism threats were relatively low. This feature of Israeli policing was recognized by both majority and minority communities in Israel (see Chaps. 5 and 6), and is perhaps not surprising given the diverse and ongoing security threats faced by the state of Israel since its establishment. Nevertheless, the reports also reveal variability in the extent of police investment in counterterrorism: when terrorism threats were relatively low, “classic” policing became the focus of police work.

Interestingly, the analysis of the first two periods reveals that despite ongoing occupation with security problems, both the official assignment of the INP with internal security responsibilities and the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada were perceived as major transitions, which, in addition to organizational and other technical or logistic adjustments, required changes in the nature and state-of-mind of the INP, from an organization that is mostly focused on crime control to one that is highly security oriented. This finding, which is in contrast with our preliminary hypothesis, suggests that even in the Israeli context, counterterrorism (at least as defined since 1974) was not always perceived as a “natural” role for the police. As argued by Bayley and Weisburd (2009) in the context of American policing, although the police have traditionally been first responders to emergencies such as natural disasters or major accidents, it was not initially obvious that they ought to take part in covert activities such as intelligence collection or interdiction of terrorist plots.

In these two time periods we also find repeated arguments suggesting that as terrorism threats increased, counterterrorism became the top priority for the police, often at the expense of classic responsibilities. This change in priorities is particularly salient in the second period, where there are clear statements revealing that crime control was the top priority before the outbreak of the First Intifada. This finding is not surprising, and is indeed in line with concerns voiced by policing scholars and practitioners and findings reported in previous chapters (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Weisburd et al., 2009; also see Chap. 2). Importantly, as noted earlier, officers’ belief that their crime-fighting capabilities have deteriorated may weaken their self-legitimacy and, in turn, their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens (see Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012).

Interestingly, these issues appear to have been perceived and presented somewhat differently in the reports from our third time period. In line with our preliminary hypotheses, in the years of the Second Palestinian Intifada we did *not* find indications that the Israeli police perceived the high-threat period as a major transition in their overall outlook or priorities. We were not surprised by this, as the reports from the 2 years preceding the outbreak of the Second Intifada clarify that despite the focus on crime control, the INP had accepted the notion that it is a dual-purpose police force, charged with both classic policing and counterterrorism. Notably, such acknowledgement and reconciliation were also found in earlier periods, however they appear to have developed only *after* the INP was forced to make counterterrorism a priority. In the third time period this acceptance seems to have already been there when the Second Intifada erupted. It may be the case that over the years, and particularly after the First Palestinian Intifada, the Israeli police developed long-term reconciliation with their dual role, perhaps as a result of a tradition that had gradually evolved since 1974, resources received particularly for this task, or perceived public/government expectations.

Along the same lines, and unlike earlier periods, in the reports from the years of the Second Intifada we did *not* find arguments suggesting that crime control could not be handled properly due to extensive investments in counterterrorism. Internal security is *not* mentioned as the top priority, and, what is more, efforts are taken to argue that the police are performing well in both domains.⁹ Importantly, these perceptions are in sharp contrast with the views of both majority and minority communities in Israel. As detailed in Chaps. 5 and 6, over 66 % of Jewish responders to our survey and 54 % of Arabs “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that “*handling terrorism threats hampers other police duties, such as property crimes, violence, drugs and traffic.*” As noted earlier, such incongruity in police-citizen understandings may impede the legitimacy citizens render the police and, in turn, the numerous desirable outcomes of police legitimacy such as compliance, cooperation, and empowerment (e.g., Tyler, 2004).

Notably, the reports from this period *do* include complaints about shortage of resources in relation to the extent of tasks required, which may be a different way of stating that it is not feasible to perform well in both counterterrorism and crime control during periods of intense terrorism threats, at least not without a major increase in budget. Indeed, other sources (e.g., Fishman, 2005) indicate that the Israeli police were aware of the price paid in the realm of crime control during this period.¹⁰ If INP leaders were aware of this negative outcome, why not state it clearly in the reports, as they did in earlier periods?

We suspect that not only did INP leaders view it as their responsibility to address both crime and security problems regardless of the intense terrorist threats, but that, in their view, the public and perhaps the government expected them to do so.

⁹Similar, though somewhat weaker trends were also found in the later years of our second period of examination.

¹⁰Public statements about this issue were also made by the Police Commissioner at the time of the Intifada; see: <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3305187,00.html> [in Hebrew].

Consequently, arguing that crime control was inevitably neglected was expected to result in harsh public criticism, especially in an era where the annual reports were not only publicly available but easily accessible online. This potential explanation is supported by a speech made by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2004, who, in response to requests for additional resources made by the Minister of Public Security and the Police Commissioner, stated: “*No crying and no wailing and no arguments that it can't be done.*”¹¹ In his speech he emphasized that the requirements from the police are not about to change, and they are expected to be creative and perform well in all their areas of responsibility within the existing budget.

Despite the lack of resources, it appears that the top command of the INP did believe, in all three time periods, that police officers have done everything in their power to handle terrorism threats to the greatest extent possible, even if it required improvising, working long shifts or attempting to stop terrorists without the appropriate training. In this context, a sense of pride and accomplishment appears from the reports, which is expected to reinforce police self-legitimacy. In the period of the Second Intifada, this pride and satisfaction is interwoven with grief due to the particularly difficult situation and the loss of police officers' lives.

With regard to police-community relations, positive outcomes of policing terrorism are explicitly mentioned in the reports. In the first two time periods they are linked to the Civil Guard, as a result of its major role in bringing the police and the community closer together, increasing positive interactions, opening mutual communication channels, and helping the public better understand the police. This finding supports observations made by police scholars (Friedmann, 1992; Weisburd et al., 2002), and suggests potential positive effects on police legitimacy, both internal and external. Interestingly, in the third period, the cost-effective benefits of the Civil Guard, rather than its contribution to police-community relations, are emphasized. We suspect that the different perspective may be the result of difficulties the INP encountered in the years of the Second Intifada in terms of lack of resources, and the significant contribution made by the Civil Guard in this regard. Nevertheless, the positive effects of policing terrorism on police-community relationships are not lacking from this time period, and are mentioned in the context of public sympathy toward the police as a result of their efforts and sacrifices in handling terrorism threats.

Notably, and in line with our preliminary hypotheses, we did *not* find explicit statements, in any of the three periods, suggesting acknowledgement of the potential *negative* effects of policing terrorism on police-community relations. In the first and second time periods, when declaring that focusing on internal security impeded performance in crime control, it may be understood that the police are considering a potential loss of public trust as a result of inadequate performance. However, we found no evidence to suggest that the top leaders of the INP have considered potential changes in their nature and character in the direction of “high policing,” which may distance them from the public and impede efforts to implement community-policing programs or a broad service-oriented approach more generally, as argued

¹¹ See: <http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=106337> [In Hebrew].

by policing scholars (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Hasisi et al., 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005).

This finding could perhaps be attributed to the military culture that is firmly rooted in the organization and philosophy of the INP (e.g., Ben-Porat, 1988; Gamson & Yuchtman, 1977; Herzog, 2001; Hovav & Amir, 1979; Shadmi & Hod, 1996; Weisburd et al., 2002; also see review by Shalev, 2003). Thus, it may be that these potential implications were not contemplated because the INP already considered itself a semimilitary organization, or because a change in that direction was not necessarily perceived as negative or undesirable. Importantly, as discussed in Chap. 3, public evaluations of the Israeli police have been dropping steadily for about a decade, while police performance in numerous domains has improved. We suspect that disregard for the potential negative effects of policing terrorism on police-community relations may provide partial explanation for this deterioration. It is important to mention in this context that over one third (34.94 %) of Jewish and over 50 % of Arab respondents to the survey reported in Chaps. 5 and 6, “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that “*dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public,*” which again points to a gap between the understanding of the police and that of the public.

Additionally, while clearly recognized by both Jews and Arabs in Israel (see Chaps. 5 and 6), we did not find evidence suggesting that the Israeli police considered the potential negative effects of their counterterrorism roles on their relationship with Israeli-Arab communities. Scholars have often argued that the majority community in Israel perceives Israeli Arabs as a potential security threat, particularly in periods of increased terrorism threats and tension around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009; Hasisi & Weitzer, 2007; Smootha, 2004), which may explain why relationships with Arab communities were not contemplated. It may also be the case that the acuteness and urgency associated with terrorism threats resulted in police focus on short-term goals, i.e., eliminating the threat and minimizing damage, while considerations of long-term relationships with Arab communities were temporarily postponed. Lastly, it may be that these potential outcomes were indeed considered by police officials, but not mentioned in the reports due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Conclusions

The annual reports issued by the INP suggest that the top leaders of this agency have recognized (and chose to present) some implications of the INP’s role in counterterrorism. The reports express concern about the effects of extensive investment in internal security on their ability to handle crime problems, although more so in earlier than in later years. Israeli police officials also believe that counterterrorism tasks improve their relationship with the public, particularly through working together with Civil Guard volunteers (in earlier periods), or as a result of public sympathy for their efforts (in more recent periods). Importantly, they did not appear

to acknowledge that “internal security” tasks may contribute to a more militaristic style of policing, which may, in turn, distance the police from the public and impede public support. Moreover, the potential effects of policing terrorism on the relationships between the police and Israeli-Arab communities did not appear to be considered. The findings that, in our view, require particular attention are those that reveal incongruity in police-citizen understandings or suggest lack of awareness of important potential outcomes, as they may eventually jeopardize public trust and both internal and external police legitimacy. While focusing on counterterrorism may not always be a matter of choice for the police, considering and acknowledging the potential implications of this unique role is a necessary first step in maximizing the positive outcomes, minimizing the negative, and preserving police legitimacy.

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Chapter 8

Summary and Conclusions

What are the implications of having local police in a democratic country take on security or counterterrorism responsibilities? What are the effects of this unique role on the ability of the police to attend to its classic obligations and on the relationship between the police and the public? These issues have become critical ones for Western democratic police agencies over the last decade. Can policing terrorism be added to the responsibilities of the police without affecting their traditional roles in fighting crime and serving the community? Is there a price to be paid for policing terrorism, or, conversely, will terrorism add to the prestige and status of policing, and bond citizenry even more strongly to the police?

Scholars and practitioners have spoken a good deal about the potential implications of policing terrorism (e.g., Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005; Greene, 2011; Hasisi, Alpert, & Flynn, 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005; Weisburd, Feucht, Hakimi, Mock, & Perry, 2009), but, to date, there has been little empirical evidence to guide practitioners and policy makers. In this multi-method study we capitalized on the Israeli context, in which policing has been concerned with terrorism for decades, and in which the police carry out their task within a democratic context and a multicultural society. We believe that the case of the Israeli police can provide an important example for Western police agencies to consider as they reorganize and retool to deal with terrorism and its consequences. As reviewed in Chap. 1, there are unquestionable differences between the Israeli setting for policing terrorism and that found in the USA, for example (as would be the case with any national setting used as a case-study for other countries to draw lessons from). At the same time, and not surprisingly, Israel is frequently used as a case-study in counterterrorism inquiries, because it is both a Western democratic country and one with tremendous experience in counterterrorism. Nevertheless, we are clearly not suggesting that the results and conclusions of the analyses reported in this book should be simply transferred to other countries. Researchers, practitioners, and policy makers are encouraged to consider the individual findings and assess if, and in what way, they can be transferred to their own national or local setting.

We hope that the present study would encourage future replications in different settings, and would more generally highlight the need to go beyond theoretical debates and speculations in the field of policing terrorism, and empirically examine the implications of having local police agencies in democratic societies take on counterterrorism functions.

We also want to note at the outset that we were not able to assess the effectiveness of the Israel National Police in its anti-terrorism responsibilities. This was not the key concern of the present project, in good part because we could not gain access directly to field activities of the police or to police data that might have allowed such evaluation. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that the Israeli police have been successful both in their efforts to reduce the consequences of terrorism and in preventing terrorism, as discussed in Chap. 1. While we do not have data on this question, other scholars have often praised the cooperation of security agencies, including the police, in effectively combating terrorism.

Our study is about the impacts of policing terrorism on the police, traditional crime fighting, and the community. And our findings, overall, suggest that whatever the successes of the Israel National Police in fighting terrorism, there is a “price to pay” for shifting policing responsibilities to counterterrorism functions. Part of that price is simply a result of the reality of limited resources. When resources are shifted to counterterrorism functions, they are no longer available for traditional policing duties. Even if the zero-sum game is altered by adding additional resources, what we have seen in Israel is that the prioritization of policing terrorism will naturally affect the focus and intensity of police efforts in domains such as crime fighting or community engagement. But just as important as the reality of limited resources and the prioritization of the use of resources, is the culture of policing and the relationship of the police to the public. A finding that continues throughout much of our work is that the public continues to expect the police to act with fairness and justice when they interact with citizens, whether majority or minority. Our study suggests the enduring salience of the concern with “how the police behave” even in times of emergency. The public is not only concerned with outcomes, and indeed expects the police to be not only effective but fair. Policing terrorism is different from policing other community problems, and naturally draws the police to a more military and less community-oriented approach. The public recognizes this, though the police in Israel seem to be concerned primarily with the resource problem.

In the next section of this chapter we review our main findings. We then examine the policy implications of our work, focusing on implications for policing in Israel, as well as on potential considerations for other Western democracies where local police are pushed to taking on more security-oriented responsibilities. Our work emphasizes that anti-terrorism is not necessarily natural to the police function, and points to possible negative outcomes of a shift of policing from traditional crime fighting and community engagement to a core concern with homeland security.

Main Findings

Our findings cover six main questions: (1) Do terrorist threats impact police performance in fighting crime? (2) What is the relationship between police involvement in counterterrorism and public attitudes toward the police? (3) How are antecedents of police legitimacy affected by situations of acute security threats? (4) How are the potential costs of policing terrorism perceived by majority communities? (5) How do Arab minority communities perceive the counterterrorism function of the police and its outcomes in comparison to the Jewish majority? and finally (6) How have the Israeli police perceived their counterterrorism role and its implications over the years? Our main findings are summarized below.

The Effects of Terrorism Threats on Police Performance in Solving Crime

One of the main concerns raised in the context of policing terrorism relates to resource allocation, and the ability of police to adequately attend to “classic” responsibilities while being extensively involved in countering terrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009). In Chap. 2 we examined how different levels of security threats in Israeli communities impact the ability of the police to solve crime, or “clear cases,” that is identify the offender in a particular case. In this analysis we also paid special attention to the type of community, as we expected terrorism threats to have different effects on police performance in clearing crime in predominantly Jewish versus Arab communities.

Our analyses of the relationship between terrorism threat levels and police clearance rates in Israeli communities suggests that terrorist threats indeed have a significant impact on police performance. Overall, as threat levels rise clearance rates decline. However, the effect varies strongly by type of community. Higher levels of threat are associated with lower proportions of cleared cases in the majority Jewish communities and higher proportions in the minority Arab communities. In line with the hypotheses raised by policing scholars, we attribute the negative effect on Jewish communities to the decline in police services that comes with a concentration on terrorism. The positive effect in Arab communities is attributed to the increased surveillance that is brought to communities that have ethnic, religious, and national relationships with groups that are associated with terrorism. Importantly, this “improvement” is not necessarily an indication of increased police service in these communities, and indeed may develop from heightened surveillance and suspicion regarding minorities.

The Effects of Terrorism Threats on Public Evaluations of the Police Over Time

The second question examined concerns the effects of police involvement in counterterrorism on public perceptions of the police. The scholarly literature has raised mixed hypotheses in this context, according to which it is unclear if public evaluations of the police are expected to weaken, or alternatively improve, as a result of policing terrorism (see for example Fishman, 2005). Importantly, public attitudes toward the police may also be influenced by forces external to the police, such as the threat itself, as suggested by the “Rally Effect” (Mueller, 1970, 1973).

The results reported in Chap. 3 reveal that terrorism threats in Israel impacted public evaluations of the police in numerous areas including trust, procedural justice, general performance, and performance in counterterrorism, in a way consistent with the framework of the “Rally Effect.” Following the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada, public evaluations of the Israel National Police rose and reached a peak in 2002, corresponding with the peak in threat levels. However, once the threat began to weaken so did evaluations of the police, often to levels lower than those measured at the beginning of the decade, prior to the outbreak of the Intifada. These findings suggest that part of the sympathy and support for the police during high-threat periods are the result of the *threat itself* and the tendency for internal cohesion under such circumstances (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1955). Thus, the “grace period” that comes with heightened terrorist threats should be viewed cautiously by the police, with full recognition that in the long run public evaluations may well decline.

The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy

Previous studies have consistently demonstrated that the most important factor predicting perceptions of police legitimacy are evaluations of procedural justice, followed by assessments of police performance (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004). In other words, when making judgments about police legitimacy, fair treatment was found to be more important to the public than police successes in fighting crime. However, it is reasonable to hypothesize that in situations of acute threat, when the public is affected by uncertainty and fear, citizens will be more concerned with outcomes and less worried about fair processes.

The results reported in Chap. 4 indicate that when faced with acute missile threats, majority communities in the town of “Sderot” did value police performance more than in other Israeli communities, where there was no specific threat in the background. At the same time, under threat procedural justice *did not* decline in importance for the public. Moreover, in line with previous studies, in both situations procedural justice remained the primary predictor of police legitimacy. These results highlight that procedural justice is an enduring, stable trait that does not depend on

the security situation. Thus, in order to maintain their legitimacy, the police cannot merely focus on end results and abandon fair processes, even in the face of severe security threats.

Majority Communities' Perceptions of the Potential Costs of Policing Terrorism

How do majority communities in Israel perceive the potential, unintended negative outcomes of policing terrorism? This question is particularly interesting because it is often assumed that these communities desire and support harsh responses to terrorism threats (see for example Friedland & Merari, 1985; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). But at the same time, do they also consider the costs?

Our analyses indicate that generally, majority communities in Israel are well aware of and indeed consider at least some negative outcomes of extensive police involvement in counterterrorism. Many respondents believe that policing terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the Israeli police and the public, particularly with Arab citizens. Respondents also expressed strong agreement with the notion that policing terrorism in Israel comes at the expense of other police responsibilities such as fighting crime and enforcing traffic regulations. Moreover, many hold that counterterrorism is often used by the police as an excuse for weak performance in fighting crime. These results suggest that majority communities are more sophisticated in their expectations from the police than is often assumed. While supporting harsh counterterrorism responses, the public is also well aware of the potential, unintended negative outcomes. Thus, it appears that in order to maintain public support, even in the face of security threats the police cannot focus solely on providing rapid, forceful responses and abandon adequate performance in “classic” domains and fair treatment.

Views of Israeli Arabs (in Comparison to Israeli Jews) Regarding the Counterterrorism Function of the INP

While tense relationships often exist between police and minority groups, such relationships become even more vulnerable in situations where the police engage in counterterrorism and the minority group has ethnic, cultural, or national affiliation with the source of the terrorism threat. Thus, our goal in Chap. 6 was to examine how Israeli Arabs, who are affiliated with the Palestinian nation and neighboring Arab countries, perceive the counterterrorism function of the INP and its potential outcomes, and compare their responses to those of the majority Jewish population.

The comparison indicates that, as expected, Jewish respondents expressed more support for the INP's counterterrorism function overall. They showed more recognition of the centrality of this task for the police; were more likely to think that when the police engage in counterterrorism they gain more respect; were less likely to think that the policing of terrorism negatively impacts police-community relationships; and expressed more willingness to cooperate with the INP in both the counterterrorism and crime-fighting domains. At the same time, the differences in attitudes between Jews and Arabs were smaller than expected given the fundamental differences between the two groups (e.g., Smootha, 2004). This analysis also reveals that, similar to the results of the analysis reported in Chap. 5, both Jews and Arabs are well aware of the social costs of police investment in counterterrorism. Many believe that dealing with terrorism negatively affects the relationship between the police and the public, generally as well as specifically with the Arab sector, and most think that handling terrorism threats reduce the ability of the police to attend to "ordinary" crime control.

Perceptions of the Israeli Police Regarding Their Role in Counterterrorism and Its Implications

The goal of Chap. 7 was to try and gain the perspective of the *police* regarding the questions at the heart of this research. Having learned that the public acknowledges at least some of the potential costs of policing terrorism, we were interested in whether the police recognize them as well, and how, more generally, security roles and their implications have been perceived by the Israel National Police over the years.

Our analysis of the Annual Reports issued by the INP in three key time periods reveals that, despite ongoing involvement in security matters, the transition to policing terrorism was perceived as a major change and shift in priorities, both when the INP was officially assigned with internal security responsibilities and following the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada. In these two time periods we also found indications that counterterrorism became the top priority for the police, often at the expense of "classic" obligations such as crime control. We did not, however, find similar remarks during the period of the Second Palestinian Intifada, where the Annual Reports suggest reconciliation with the dual role of the INP and beliefs that adequate performance in both crime control and counterterrorism is feasible. Additionally, in all three periods the INP identifies the positive impacts of policing terrorism on police-community relationships, particularly in the context of the Civil Guard. At the same time, we did not find evidence that the potential negative outcomes were also considered in this context.

What Are the Implications of Policing Terrorism?

As noted earlier, our study does not consider the effectiveness of police activities to prevent terrorism. It has focused instead on the impacts of policing terrorism on police, on crime fighting, and on the relationship between the police and the public. Practitioners and policy makers, in Israel and in other countries, have often considered the adoption of counterterrorism functions by the police to be an inevitable necessity, and have not considered what impacts this would have. In our study, for example, the INP appears to recognize and tout the positive contributions of the anti-terrorism role to their relationships with the public. However, they appear to have little recognition of the possible negative impacts of this approach. In turn, in the wake of the Second Intifada, the Israel National Police accepted the increased role in counterterrorism without raising questions about its impact on traditional policing duties. This is in contrast to earlier periods, when the police saw the counterterrorism function as raising important concerns regarding their ability to provide classic policing service to the public.

We find the early discussions of counterterrorism in the Israel National Police particularly interesting because they raise the question of whether the police are the most appropriate agency to carry out proactive counterterrorism functions. No police force in a democracy can avoid playing a key role as first responders to terrorist incidents or aid in the apprehension of terrorists in their jurisdictions. However, the Israeli case represents a different decision that is now one that must be contemplated in the USA and other Western democracies that have, until the terror attack of September 11, generally considered the police function within classic anti-crime and community engagement activities. Should the police take on a central role in counterterrorism, rather than simply a supportive one? In 1974 that was the decision made in Israel. The police were given the key responsibility for counterterrorism within Israel's borders. Our analysis of the police yearly reports suggests that this was a dramatic change for the police. Only in the Second Intifada, a quarter of a century later, did the INP appear to fully accept this role as a natural part of the policing function. Our question in this research has been: What are the implications, often unintended, of the police taking on this function as a key responsibility? What may be expected in other Western democracies that are placing greater emphasis on homeland security?

First, and not surprisingly, greater investment in counterterrorism will likely bring about weaker performance in fighting crime in communities that are not perceived as associated with the origin of the threat. This outcome was previously suggested by policing scholars (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009), and was identified in our analysis of clearance rates in Israeli communities. This unintended, negative outcome was also mentioned by many community members in our survey and interviews, as well as by the Israeli police, at least in earlier periods.

We have learned from the Police Annual Reports that budgets are often not increased when new assignments are given to the police, or not increased enough or in a timely fashion. Additionally, counterterrorism tasks often appear to take priority over “classic” duties due to the urgency associated with this type of threat, or perhaps as well because of the prestige and status that come with the counterterrorism function (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). Thus, the police, and sequentially the public, inevitably pay a price in terms of the ability of the police to attend to classic roles such as crime control. Importantly, we do not think this is simply a zero-sum game—one comes at the expense of the other. As emphasized in our review of the yearly police reports, even if more resources are brought, in a period of terrorism threats it will be natural for the police to focus on counterterrorism rather than crime or other classic policing concerns.

The Israeli experience also suggests that the police may be severely criticized in this context, both by the public (see Chaps. 5 and 6) and by the government (see Chap. 7), which may bring about much pressure to perform well in both counterterrorism and crime control. Such pressure, in turn, may result in exceptionally difficult workload, involvement of police personnel in tasks they are not trained for, and much improvization. Additionally, such criticism may pressure the police to present a public image as if both responsibilities are handled appropriately, even when that is not necessarily the case.

Crime control does not appear from our study to be negatively affected in communities that are perceived to be ethnically or nationally associated with the source of the terrorism threat, such as Muslim or Arab communities. In such communities, performance in fighting crime may actually *improve* as a result of additional presence and surveillance of the police, however, again, probably not without cost. As suggested by our community survey and interviews, as well as in other studies from Israel and the USA, excessive surveillance, accompanied by a tendency to over-police these community members as suspects while under-police them as clients, may significantly impair the relationship between these minority communities and the police (Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Thacher, 2005). Weak relationships, in turn, are not only a cost in their own right, but will likely make it more difficult for the police to gain assistance and cooperation from these communities, generally as well as specifically in the realm of counterterrorism (see examples in Hasisi et al., 2009).

The potential negative effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and minority Muslim or Arab communities are not surprising, and have been discussed in length by policing scholars (Hasisi, 2005; Hasisi et al., 2009; Henderson et al., 2006; Thacher, 2005). But what about the effects of policing terrorism on the relationship between the police and *majority* communities? It appears that a probable, immediate outcome of policing terrorism in situations of acute security threats would be an *improvement* in public evaluations of the police. We found such improvement in numerous types of attitudes in Israel, while surveys from the USA and Europe suggest similar trends (Dinesen & Jaeger, 2013; Shaw & Brannan, 2009). This short-term peak in public support is largely attributed to the tendency for internal cohesion when faced with a threat from an external source,

and the “Rally Effect” (Coser, 1956; Mueller, 1970, 1973; Simmel, 1955). As suggested by our interviews and in the police reports, this wave of support may also be the result of police involvement in a “prestigious” and righteous task, public appreciation of exceptional police efforts and successes in such a critical responsibility, and collaborative work with citizens, who are encouraged to volunteer and assist the police as a result of the crisis situation.

It appears, however, that a sequential drop in public support once the security situation improves should also be expected. Such a trend was indeed identified in Israel and may be attributed to the short-term nature of unity under threat. We also found indication, both in our interviews and in the police reports, that the neglect of crime control mentioned above resulted in deterioration in the quality of service provided to the public, and, ultimately, in weaker public evaluations. Such arguments have also been made in the past by Israeli scholars and practitioners (see Fishman, 2005).

Importantly, policing scholars have also argued that since policing terrorism entails much “high policing” (see Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Greene, 2011), this role may contribute to the militarization of the police (Mijares & Jamieson, 2011), change their character and the way they perceive and treat citizens, bring about growing distance between the police and the public, and ultimately result in loss of public trust and legitimacy (Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Fishman, 2005; Greene, 2011; Hasisi et al., 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005). Interestingly, the public in Israel, as well as the Israeli police, did not appear to recognize such effects. We suspect that this may be the case because military elements have always played an important role in Israeli policing (e.g., Ben-Porat, 1988; Gamson & Yuchtman, 1977; Herzog, 2001; Hovav & Amir, 1979; Shadmi & Hod, 1996; Weisburd, Shalev, & Amir, 2002; also see review by Shalev, 2003), and thus high policing roles and a semi-military character may not be perceived as abnormal in Israeli policing, by either the police or the public. We do suspect, however, that in the USA, where there is a strong tradition of localized policing and community policing is very much a priority (e.g., Skogan, 2006), these implications of policing terrorism would be much more prevalent.

While these potential negative consequences of policing terrorism were often not acknowledged, our survey of Israeli communities does highlight the importance of procedural justice to evaluations of police legitimacy, even in situations of extreme security threats. A local police agency handling terrorism or other security threats should consider that while the public does value police accomplishments to a greater extent under such conditions, fair processes remain equally important to community members. Moreover, perceptions of procedural justice remain the most important predictor of police legitimacy, even in high-threat situations. In this sense findings from Israel confirm previous findings from other places regarding the importance of procedural justice (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; National Research Council, 2004; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004, 2009; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010), but reveal that this indeed remains the case even under extreme security threats. We expect that in the USA, because of recent emphases on police legitimacy and fair processes (see National Research Council, 2004), procedural justice would be equally, if not more important in such situations as well.

Local police agencies that are placing greater emphasis on homeland security should also consider that the public, including both majority and minority communities, appears to be well aware of many negative outcomes of policing terrorism. This finding suggests that it would be unreasonable to expect that the costs of focusing on counterterrorism would go unnoticed. Further, it indicates public priorities concerning police activities. While the public desires to be safe from terrorism, many citizens also consider the costs, and want to be equally safe from crime. Some may support harsh counterterrorism responses. However, our interviews, as well as previous surveys carried out in Israel, suggest that views according to which the police *should not* focus on terrorism to the extent that they do, or should not take part in the struggle against terrorism at all, are not uncommon.

Some of the implications of policing terrorism that were suggested by policing scholars and practitioners were acknowledged by the Israeli police. This provides additional support for the proposition that such potential outcomes are indeed probable, and suggests that the police have given consideration to the matter. However, it appears that other potential implications, particularly in the context of police-community relations, were not considered. We suspect that disregard for some of these outcomes may have contributed to the ongoing drop in public trust in the INP.

Researchers and policy makers that are considering the implications of our findings to other settings should view them as a strong warning to local police agencies in the Western world that have begun to place counterterrorism as a key function. Dahl (2011) identified that over 70 % of foiled terrorist plots in the USA failed due to the efforts of law enforcement, security, and intelligence officers, and LaFree (2012, p. 10) recently concluded that "...an effective national strategy for preventing terrorism and responding to its aftermath absolutely depends on the hundreds of thousands of sworn police officers that serve the United States." But whatever the benefits of efficiency and effectiveness that are brought by having the police focus on counterterrorism, our study suggests significant costs. The police cannot do everything equally well, and expanding the police function by adding proactive counterterrorism will inevitably lead to less effectiveness and less focus on the traditional "low policing" that have dominated American and other democratic policing cultures. The American public has come to expect that its police will engage with the community, and that it will take responsibility for dealing with local problems of crime and disorder. The Israel National Police has come to accept its dual function. But in a situation of high security threat such as the Second Intifada, it was naturally drawn away from its classic duties. Crime fighting became less effective in majority communities in Israel when threats were high. They became more effective in minority communities in the same period. Clearly, police resources and focus were shifted from the ordinary problems of communities more generally, to surveillance in minority communities that were seen as potential sources of threat.

Is it necessary to give the proactive counterterrorism authority to local police agencies? Was it necessary to give that authority in the Israeli case? We think that scholars and policy makers have often jumped too quickly to that assumption. In the USA, key police functions are often divided between State and Federal agencies. In Israel, such division of labor is held when it comes to prosecution, where,

for example, the police deal with local prosecution functions for minor crimes, but more serious crimes are prosecuted by a national prosecution office. The inclusion of the Border Guard in the Israel National Police in this context makes good sense for purposes of efficiency. But the inclusion in a public police of a large force that wears military uniform and often carries weapons appropriate for the military and not local police, changes the character of the police and its relationship to the public. Israel is not the only country that does this; there are numerous examples in Europe of such quasi-military police agencies. But nonetheless, if the Israel National Police wishes to be seen by majorities and minorities as a civilian policing agency within a democracy, it is unhelpful that a large proportion of its force looks similar to a military force. In turn, it is difficult to enter a minority community one day calling for police-community interaction, and the next week enter with an armed force in army uniform to try to identify terrorist suspects.

In our survey and interviews it is clear that Israeli citizens are looking for police to attend to classic responsibilities. While today Israeli practitioners, scholars, and policy makers accept the role of the Israel National Police in counterterrorism as natural and inevitable, the yearly police reports suggest that it was a change that was not accepted or enacted quickly. We think given the negative consequences of the police taking a central proactive role in counterterrorism that the INP role be reassessed. While it is not clear whether the organization of counterterrorism can be efficiently and effectively redesigned, we think our study suggests that it is time to seriously reconsider the “internal security” roles of the INP. We do not think it is inevitable that the police be given this task as a central responsibility, and our data suggest that the INP may not be able to succeed in its classic policing responsibilities, and in gaining the trust and support of the public, if such reorganization of roles is not considered.

Whatever the Israeli situation and its necessities, our data suggest caution in the simple assumption that counterterrorism can be added to the police task without a serious price to be paid. We cannot say whether and to what extent the negative consequences we observe would manifest themselves in the American or other contexts. However, we think it is important to consider that similar patterns may emerge, and to that extent our study suggests that careful consideration of such consequences should be part of the thinking of scholars, practitioners, and policy makers as they contemplate what policing will be like over the next few decades.

Irrespective of the organizational character of counterterrorism functions, our data are clear in what they say about what the public expects from the police (and we assume other agencies) when they carry out their task. Our study provides an unambiguous portrait of the public’s concern with fair and just procedures even in times of security threat. We think that the police and policy makers often assume that the public is concerned simply about the outcomes of policing. Work more generally in the area of procedural justice suggests that this is simply not the case (e.g., Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004, 2009). The public is very concerned with how the police carry out their task, and they expect that fairness and justice will be part of how the police do their job.

Our work provides a cautionary statement for police leaders who think that they can abandon such concerns during periods of serious security threats. The Israeli case is certainly an extreme one in recent years. Israel has faced perhaps the most constant and intense barrage of terrorism on its citizens of any Western democracy. Yet the Israeli public, according to our data, continues to call for fair and effective policing. Indeed, even when faced with extreme security threats, as compared with other Israelis, Sderot residents in our study showed a continued concern with procedural justice. While performance concerns also heighten in times of security stress, procedural justice remains the primary determinant of police legitimacy.

These findings reinforce the importance in democracies of how the police treat citizens. Procedural justice in our study is an enduring trait. It is expected of the police irrespective of the difficulty of the circumstances faced. We think it is an encouraging prospect that the public, even faced with difficult threats, still expects the police to use fair and just processes in carrying out its task. We suspect that the public would also expect such processes from other agencies that might be tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities.

Conclusions

Our findings do not allow us to comment on whether, after taking all costs and benefits into account, local police *should* become involved in counterterrorism, and, if so, in which ways and to what extent. These questions are being debated by policing scholars (e.g., Bayley & Weisburd, 2009), and their examination should be an important focus of future research. Our study has focused on the impacts of policing terrorism on the police, traditional crime fighting, and the community. Our data suggest that there is a “price to pay” for shifting policing responsibilities to counterterrorism functions. Part of that price is simply a result of the reality that adding responsibilities is likely to spread resources thinly and reduce the focus of the police on classic policing duties. But part of that price comes from the change in the police function and its effect on the long-term relationships between the police and the public. Whatever the costs of policing terrorism, our study shows that the public expects the police to remain committed to fair processes and procedures, even when faced with serious security threats.

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Index

A

- Annual police reports, 36, 139, 142, 143, 146, 149, 150, 164
- Antecedents of police legitimacy, 23, 79–94, 160–161

C

- Classic police obligations, 88, 157, 162
- Clearance rates, 33–47, 70, 111, 148, 159, 163
- Community survey, 25, 99, 113, 164
- Costs of policing terrorism, 24, 99–114, 159, 161, 162, 168
- Counterterrorism responsibilities, 6, 9, 24, 54, 99, 109–112, 142–145, 157, 161, 166, 168
- Crime-control, 2, 4–6, 9, 22, 25, 45, 47, 55, 110, 111, 120, 132, 139, 140, 146–149, 151–153, 162, 164, 165

E

- Effects of policing terrorism on crime control, 4–9, 24, 25, 35–41, 70, 103, 105–107, 110–112, 128, 129, 132, 139, 153–155, 164

F

- First Palestinian Intifada, 25, 140, 141, 145–147, 151, 152, 162

H

- History of INP, 140–142

I

- Implications of policing terrorism, 2–4, 9, 25, 102, 132, 140, 163–168
- In-depth interviews, 24, 25, 100, 102–103, 111
- INP. *See* Israel National Police (INP)
- INP model for policing terrorism, 12–22, 24, 25, 103–106, 112, 113, 162
- Internal/self police legitimacy, 80, 139, 140, 151, 153, 155
- Israel, 3–5, 8–17, 20, 22–25, 33, 35, 36, 39, 43–47, 54, 56, 58–61, 69–72, 79, 80, 82–84, 87, 89, 91, 99–101, 103–108, 111–114, 117–122, 125, 127–131, 141, 142, 145, 147, 150–152, 154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163–168
- Israeli Arabs, 6, 8, 24, 35, 39, 46, 47, 79, 85, 87, 101, 106–107, 112, 117–122, 125–132, 145, 154, 155, 161–162
- Israeli communities, 22, 25, 33, 35–41, 80, 84, 141, 159, 160, 165
- Israeli Jews, 46, 87, 100, 111, 119–122, 125–129, 131, 161–162
- Israeli town of Sderot, 23, 80, 83–85, 87–91, 160, 168
- Israel National Police (INP), 3, 5, 7–25, 35, 36, 39, 40, 44, 54, 56, 59–61, 63, 64, 66–72, 82, 84, 99–101, 103–106, 109–113, 117, 118, 120, 123, 124, 127, 131, 139–155, 158, 160–163, 166, 167

M

- Main findings, 23, 41, 42, 79, 90, 158–162
- Majority Jewish communities, 23, 24, 45, 46, 126, 159

Majority Jewish population, 100, 101, 161
 Minority Arab communities, 23, 24, 159, 164

N

Natural experiment, 23, 59, 79

P

Police

attitudes, 4, 45, 47, 48
 involvement in counterterrorism, 3, 4, 6–9,
 22–24, 53–74, 110, 112, 113, 117,
 118, 120, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132,
 145, 160, 161
 legitimacy, 2, 23, 47, 53, 55–57, 63, 73,
 79–94, 100, 112, 130, 150, 152, 153,
 155, 159–161, 165, 168
 performance, 20, 22–23, 33–48, 56, 59, 69,
 71, 79–82, 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 112,
 121–126, 130, 154, 159, 160

Police-community relations, 2, 6–9, 13, 22, 24,
 25, 47, 101, 103, 105–106, 110, 111,
 118, 120, 126–130, 132, 140, 144–145,
 147, 150, 153, 154, 162, 166, 167

Police-minority relations, 118–119, 132

Policy implications, 158

Procedural justice, 7, 23, 54–57, 59, 63–67,
 70–72, 79–83, 85, 87–89, 91, 92, 160,
 165, 167, 168

Public attitudes, 24, 34, 81–83, 110, 112
 Public attitude toward the police, 34, 53–74,
 87–89, 159, 160

Public cooperation with the police, 6, 53,
 130–131

R

Rally Effect/ Rally Round the Flag Effect, 23,
 54, 57–59, 69–72, 160, 165

Research questions, 4, 12, 22–25, 89

S

Second Palestinian Intifada, 4, 5, 8, 23, 25, 44,
 54, 58, 59, 70, 100, 140, 141, 147–152,
 160, 162

Security threats, 3, 19, 23–25, 47, 79–94, 99,
 110, 112, 114, 120, 127, 142, 147, 151,
 154, 159–161, 164–168

Survey, 24, 25, 39, 46, 47, 54, 58, 61, 63, 64,
 66, 67, 69–74, 79, 80, 83–85, 100–105,
 109–114, 118–121, 126, 127, 130, 131,
 141, 152, 154, 163–167

Surveys of public attitudes, 24, 60–61,
 87–89, 110

T

Terrorist threat levels, 2–5, 7, 9, 23, 100