INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO POLICE REFORM

MANAGING PEACEBUILDING

Steffen Eckhard

International Assistance to Police Reform

Steffen Eckhard

International Assistance to Police Reform

Managing Peacebuilding

palgrave
macmillan

Steffen Eckhard
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Germany

ISBN 978-1-137-59511-9 ISBN 978-1-137-59512-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016943269

Cover illustration: © A. T. Willett / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London.

Preface and Acknowledgments

In the summer of 2015, hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived at the German borders in Bavaria within a matter of weeks. Fleeing political oppression and widespread violence in their home countries, they sought asylum in Europe. The majority of refugees originated from Iraq or Syria. They had spent the past months or, in some cases even years, in overcrowded refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey and now sought safety and better prospects for their families. In addition to these war refugees, however, 40 % of all refugees that applied for asylum in Germany came from Afghanistan and the Balkans, in particular Kosovo.[1] Both countries have seen major peace operations throughout the past fifteen to twenty years. Spending many billions of Euros to sustain their military operations, deploy conflict experts, and finance development assistance projects, Western governments and numerous international and nongovernmental organizations have attempted to assist state-building processes in these countries and provide the conditions for stability, peace, and economic growth. The current exodus from these countries begs the question: what happened to the original goal of bringing peace to these societies?

Answering this question is an undertaking beyond the scope of any single book. There is a whole discipline in political science research devoted to the study of how conflict-ridden societies can re-establish stability. One set of scholars examines the techniques and strategies applied by actors from afar, while others ask about the motives of those working on the ground. There is a critical literature questioning whether peace and stability can be imposed from the outside at all. This book adds its voice to the

debate by examining peacebuilding interventions from an organizational perspective. Peace operations are implemented by international or foreign policy bureaucracies, yet we have paid little attention to how these entities organize and manage these often massive undertakings. To what extent do their structures and processes align with the complex and dynamic environment in which they must act? And how do they empower and delimit the actors operating at various levels? Addressing these questions, this book offers an organization-centric glance into the Western peacebuilding machinery. It investigates how the system can be improved from an organizational perspective. But this is only half the answer. The other half is political. Though the findings of this book focus specifically on the administrative realm, they cannot help but highlight at the same time those moments and machinations through which politics impinge on peace operations. It is clear we must scrutinize our own (foreign policy) objectives more critically. Are we really on the ground to make a difference, or are peace operations—staffed and funded with taxpayers' money—merely figures on the chessboard of foreign policy? This book offers no definite answer—but it provides readers interested in the larger picture with valuable information to help inform their opinion.

Research for this book began in 2009, when I travelled to Kosovo for the first time, together with a group of students from Konstanz University. Without the generous seed funding provided by the Center of Excellence at Konstanz University both at this point and in later years, as well as funding by the German Research Foundation and a scholarship from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, research for this book would have been impossible. Numerous individuals working in Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as various research institutes, organizations, and ministries in Germany, Brussels, Vienna, London, New York, Washington, and other places have helped me to compile the research presented in this book. Every one of these individuals was hard-pressed for time, yet they generously took the time to assist me. I thank the over one hundred interviewees who met me with open doors, gave me their trust as they answered my questions, and helped to provide documentation and further contacts. On the academic front, I am indebted to my doctoral father Wolfgang Seibel, as well as Richard Caplan and Dirk Leuffen, all of whom assessed the thesis that built the foundation for this book. For their substantial comments at various stages of the research project, my gratitude goes also to Illir Deda from the Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED); Philipp Rotmann, Thorsten Benner, and Alexander Gaus

from the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin; Peter Schumann, Timo Noetzel, Martin Zapfe, and Florian Roth all of whom worked at the time at Konstanz University; Christoph Knill and Ronny Patz from the University of Munich (LMU), as well as one anonymous Palgrave reviewer. For further assistance during the research and writing process I thank Frances Foley, Claudia Katzl, Sebastian Kupferschmid, and Laura Krämer. Kim Greenwell provided excellent editing assistance and advice on the manuscript. Finally, I am indebted to Palgrave's Commissioning Editor for International Relations and Security Studies, Sara Roughly, whose advice during the final stages of the production process was of great help. This book is dedicated to my wife Melanie.

Note

1. Among the 330,000 asylum applicants between January and October 2015, 31.5 % came from the Balkans (Serbia 4.6 %, Albania 14.8 %, Macedonia 2.4 %, and Kosovo 9.4 %) and 6.2 % from Afghanistan. Data according to the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, www.bamf.de (accessed 01 November 2015).

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AG IPM	Working Group for International Police Missions (Germany)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CID	Criminal Investigations Training (EUPOL)
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU Council)
CMC	Crisis Management Concept (EU Council)
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorates (EEAS)
CONOPS	Concept of Operations for EU Crisis Management Missions
COREPER	Permanent Representatives Committee (EU Council)
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center (OSCE)
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EEAS)
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
DG DEVCO	EU Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation
DG NEAR	EU Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG RELEX	EU Directorate-General for External Political Affairs (before Treaty of Lisbon)
DPED	OECS Mission in Kosovo Department of Police Education and Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (EU, before Treaty of Lisbon)

EU	European Union
EULEX	EU Police Mission in Kosovo
EUPOL	EU Rule of Law Mission in Afghanistan
EUPT	EU Planning Team Kosovo
FDD	Focused District Development (Afghanistan)
FPI	Foreign Policy Instruments Service (EEAS)
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPPO	German Police Project Office in Afghanistan
ICITAP	US Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IO	International Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KPSS	Kosovo Police Service School
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE)
MMA	Mentoring, Monitoring, and Advising (EULEX)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Co-operation Directorate
OEF	US Operation Enduring Freedom
OPLAN	Operational Plan for EU Crisis Management Missions
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU Council)
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit (OSCE)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
UN	United Nations
UN Civpol	UN Civilian Police in Kosovo
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
USA	United States of America
USD	US Dollar

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Peace operations work to enable lasting peace in countries torn by conflict. For decades, the United Nations (UN) and others have been sending soldiers, police officers, and civilian staff to conflict-ravaged societies around the globe. In early 2015, almost 200,000 such individuals served in seventy-five peace operations. Their assignment: to monitor cease-fires, moderate between warring parties, and reduce the risk of renewed violence by addressing key issues that affect the functioning of society.

The chances for effective peacebuilding differ from country to country. It is much easier to work in a small and relatively well-developed state than in a large country that has been torn apart by violent conflict for decades. Yet the very nature of peacebuilding operations means that peacebuilders rarely get to choose 'ideal' locations. But while they cannot change the conflicts or the people they face, there is a whole range of other factors that peacebuilding organizations can control: in addition to deciding on personnel, resources, and strategy, they choose their own institutional design. How quickly to deploy personnel, how flexible to be in adapting to new operational challenges, and whether and how to alter strategies when they falter—all these questions affect whether peacebuilders achieve their goals or not. This book thus turns to an often overlooked yet critical tension in modern peacebuilding: the disjuncture between what peacebuilders desire to do and what they can do, given the organizational structures, rules, and resources that enable or constrain their activities. Peace operations will always face complex conditions and limited odds, but their design and management is one thing that can be changed.

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_1

The aim of this book is to study how bureaucratic dynamics and variation in institutional designs affect peacebuilding outcomes—irrespective of the operational environment. Unraveling the trajectories that pertain to the management of peacebuilding matters for several reasons. Peace operations provide a rare chance for conflict-ridden societies to break vicious cycles of violence and desperation. Toward this end, peacebuilding, 'especially in its liberal guise, focuses on external support for liberally oriented, rights-based institutions with a focus on norms, civil society, and a social contract via representative institutions embedded in a rule of law' (Richmond 2014, p. 383). Institution-building within liberal peacebuilding addresses those parts of the local state system that are key to a stable, peaceful, and sustainable society: good governance, basic public administration, economic development, education, health, energy, water, rule of law, and security (USIP 2009). Learning how peace operations actually work promises to raise their odds for success. With their critical impact on the lives of those living in conflict societies and the billions of Euros of public money funding peace operations, there is a democratic imperative to see that these funds are invested effectively. This book's title, *Managing Peacebuilding*, not only refers to its research agenda, but should also be understood as an imperative for policy-makers to question and seek to improve the design of peace operations, rather than simply operating per 'business as usual.'

Theoretically, the book is part of a broader empirically driven research agenda in the context of global security governance. Traditionally, most studies on international peacebuilding have fallen into one of three broad camps. The first asks about the causes, actors, and goals of interventions, finding explanations in domestic politics, public opinion, and ideology (Fukuyama 2004; Paris 2000, 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009; Stedman et al. 2002). A second camp of scholars has begun to challenge the core assumptions of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm (Chandler 2006; Richmond 2014). These scholars question peacebuilding strategy at a very fundamental level, criticizing, for example, the incommensurateness of the normative universe from which peacebuilders operate with the context where peacebuilding interventions are actually applied (Richmond 2014, p. 379). Studies in the third camp take the goals and shape of an intervention as given and focus on operation effectiveness and consequences. Observing daunting gaps between ambition and reality in peacebuilding operations in places such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, among others, researchers have identified critical dilemmas such

as liberal paternalism and mismatches between ends and means (Aoi et al. 2007; Caplan 2005; Daase and Friesendorf 2010; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Schneckener 2008; Seibel 2012). Recent studies have also begun to consider what happens 'inside peacebuilding,' raising questions regarding institutional designs and peacebuilding performance (Allen and Yuen 2014; Autesserre 2010, 2014; Benner and Bossong 2010; Benner et al. 2011; Breakey and Dekker 2014; de Coning 2009; Dijkstra 2012; Junk 2012; Karlsrud 2013; Lundgren 2015; Winckler 2015). Although these studies are empirically rich, many lack theoretical grounding and comparative perspectives remain exceptional.

To advance the scholarly debate, this book applies a public administration perspective to peace operations. With international organizations such as the UN, European Union (EU), or the Organization for Security and Co-Operation (OSCE) dominating the field, this approach presents an opportunity to advance theory on international public administration more generally. As such, the book is part of a broader academic literature cutting across international relations and public administration that explores the inner working of international organizations as bureaucracies. Around a decade ago, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999, 2004) were instrumental in shaping this agenda. A first wave of studies treated international bureaucracies as dependent variables, asking about their organizational styles and cultures (Knill et al. 2016; Momani 2007), preferences (Bauer 2012; Trondal 2010; Weaver 2008), autonomy (Ege and Bauer 2013), learning ability (Benner et al. 2013; Benner et al. 2011), reform processes (Knill and Balint 2008), cooperation with other actors (Liese 2010), and diffusion of international organization (IO) policies and institutions (Börzel and Risse 2011; Schimmelfennig 2012). A second generation of studies now addresses the nexus between administrative features of international organizations and their effects on policy-making and implementation (Dijkstra 2013, 2015; Hawkins et al. 2006a; Larsson and Trondal 2006; Trondal 2010). This is precisely the kind of question approached here.

This book identifies policy determinants rooted in peacebuilding operations' institutional design—in other words, their structures, rules, and the decision-making routines of the peacebuilding bureaucracy. There is growing acknowledgment that bureaucratic organizations exert autonomous influence on global public policy (for an overview see Eckhard and Ege 2016). Unpacking the black box of international secretariats responds to a key question raised by Darren G. Hawkins and colleagues (2006b, p. 4) regarding the nature of international public administrations as actors:

Are they best understood as agents that merely attempt to manage imperfection—that is, entities whose member states deprive them of the authority and capacity to act? Or should we consider them as independent actors who have slipped their masters' chains, lack democratic legitimacy, and terrorize the global countryside as institutional 'Frankensteins'? Hawkins and colleagues focused on delegation contracts and interests at the nexus of member state principals and their agents. By contrast, this book applies a public administration perspective. Its analytical attention to institutional designs and performance better captures the processes actually taking place *within* these peacebuilding bureaucracies.

Subsequent sections address two other ways in which the book's focus is defined. The first explains why this book focuses at international assistance to police reform as one dimension of peacebuilding. And the second section elaborates why the case studies address the work carried out by the OSCE, the EU and Germany in Kosovo and Afghanistan since 1999 and 2001, respectively. Subsequent sections briefly elaborate on my key findings and the outline of the book.

1.1 Police Reform as one dimension of peacebuilding

From the large number of tasks and activities involved in postconflict peacebuilding, this book focuses on institution-building in the security sector. Even more specifically, the book looks at international assistance to domestic police establishment or reform. Practically speaking, it was necessary to restrict the empirical scope of the study. Assistance to police reform lends itself well to comparison as the challenges for external peacebuilders are fairly similar across countries: establishing a new police force on the basis of existing traditions, building or refurbishing facilities, training of staff, and developing policies, among other tasks. Empirical evidence in the academic peacebuilding literature suggests that 'without a secure environment and a security system that ensures security even after the departure of international peace operations, political, economic, and cultural rebuilding are impossible' (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2006, p. 1). Similarly, the World Bank's recent World Development Report (2011, p. 2) underlines 'that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence.' Reform of the security sector, therefore, is a peacebuilding priority as a democratically controlled police service that protects the rights of the citizens in everyday life is crucial for the long-term stability of a society.

Findings on the design of police reform assistance operations thus are representative for the management of peacebuilding interventions in general.

Police reform in peacebuilding follows a security sector reform model carved out by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), among others (OECD-DAC 2005; 2007, p. 13). The model has three key elements: first, 'developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors'; second, 'strengthening the governance of the security institutions'; and third, 'building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities.'

The normative framework of security sector reform is highly ambitious and it is far from clear whether a democratically governed security sector is something that can be achieved at all in any postconflict context—at least within a moderate time frame. However, all more or less stable societies rely on a security apparatus. Influencing the design of security agencies during the crucial phase of their foundation is certainly a worthwhile endeavor with long-term impact on conflict societies. But expectations must remain modest. The ambitious notion of a democratically governed and efficient police apparatus modeled on Western examples is not the criteria for success applied in this book. In fact, the book does not even aim at independently assessing the outcome of police reform. Instead, it relies on policy literature published by various governmental and nongovernmental sources as well as the opinions of domestic police experts. The broad range of sources allows us to ponder ambition and realism in postconflict police reform. With this goal in mind, external support to police reform must show some results over time. This book assesses this progress and explains, with a focus on peace operations' design and performance, the associated causes for variation.

1.2 Most-Likely and Least-Likely Cases: Police Reform Assistance in Kosovo and Afghanistan

Around a decade ago, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000, 2006) published the hitherto most comprehensive study on the determinants of peacebuilding outcomes. In a cross-country analysis, they compared the relevance of three major factors: the degree of hostility before peacebuilding interventions, the degree of local capacity in terms of infrastructure development and the local economy, and the scope of international peacebuilding in terms of investments in funds and personnel.

Analysis of a dataset of 121 postconflict settings supported the authors' initial hypothesis that 'higher levels of *International Capacities* and *Local Capacities* compensate for increasing levels of *Hostility*' (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 125, emphasis original). In other words, peacebuilding resource investments predict peacebuilding outcomes.

With its public administration focus, this book clearly offers a different perspective, one that assumes that institutional design matters. In order to transcend the idiosyncrasies of individual contextual constellations, the book contrasts how four police reform operations performed in two different contexts (see Table 1.1). Keeping Doyle and Sambanis' findings in mind, Kosovo represents a 'most-likely' case for successful peacebuilding. It is small, relatively well-developed, and violence had almost fully ceased after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in 1999. Afghanistan, in contrast, constitutes a 'least-likely' case for successful peacebuilding. It is large, scores low in development statistics, and a violent insurgency has undermined peacebuilding efforts there since the US intervention in 2001.

In Kosovo, police reform was led first by the OSCE (in collaboration with the UN),[1] then later by the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). In Afghanistan, international assistance to police reform began under the German Police Project Office, but later transferred to the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). Selecting Afghanistan and Kosovo offers several methodological advantages. First, both countries are similar with respect to the police reform challenge. In both countries, international actors met a

Table 1.1 Overview of the four case studies

	Time/duration	
	1999–2007/2008	*Since 2007/2008*
Kosovo (most-likely)	Chapter 3: OSCE mission for institution-building and police reform in Kosovo; 1999–2008	Chapter 4: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); since 2008
Afghanistan (least-likely)	Chapter 5: German Police Project Office in Afghanistan; 2001–2007	Chapter 6: European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL); since 2007

Source: Author's compilation

scenario without a preexisting police force (or only scattered remains), thus necessitating the building of institutions from scratch and the training of new recruits. Obviously, the scale of the challenge was much more demanding in Afghanistan (hence its status as the 'least-likely' case). Second, over time both countries saw different international actors as lead agents for external assistance to police reform. This allows comparing the effect of different institutional designs in the same country context—while recognizing, of course, that two temporally consecutive case studies are not independent from one another. Third, the European Union has acted as a lead actor for police reform assistance both in Afghanistan and Kosovo. This allows assessing whether findings on the link between institutional designs and performance remain constant despite different environments. Overall, Kosovo and Afghanistan provide a maximum in contextual variance. It bolsters the validity (and generalizability) of the explanation if similar linkages between peace operations' institutional designs and outcomes can be observed *despite* contextual differences.

1.3 The Argument and Findings

To recap: According to existing predictors of operation success, Afghanistan represents a least-likely case for meaningful peacebuilding work. It is large, scores extremely low in development statistics, and a violent insurgency has undermined peacebuilding efforts there since the US intervention in 2001. Although international investments skyrocketed since the USA launched their comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy around 2007, the finding of limited advancements in Afghanistan, both in terms of peacebuilding and police reform around 2015, is not particularly puzzling. Kosovo, however, is something altogether different. Given its limited size, relatively high development scores, and the low levels of violence since the Western military intervention in 1999, Kosovo represents a most-likely case for operation success. The project of police reform there began as a joint venture led by the UN and the OSCE. By 2007, this partnership had successfully established a local police force. Observers at the time agreed that 'the Kosovo Police Service was an example of a successful campaign by the international community to create a multiethnic and gender-inclusive police force in a polarized, post-conflict state' (Bennet et al. 2011, p. 17).

As such, expectations were naturally high when EULEX set out after Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 to carry on the work of its predecessor. EULEX arrived with an unprecedented budget of over one billion Euros until 2016 and a staff size of up to 2500 rule of law experts. It

was, in short, Europe's flagship peacebuilding operation. And yet, counter to all expectations, the picture drawn by policy experts and the media of the situation in Kosovo today is close to a disaster. *The Guardian* (05 November 2014) reported in 2014 that '[d]uring Eulex's six-year tenure … corruption and organised crime in the political system since independence in 2008 has worsened.' There are cases of alleged corruption against EULEX officials (Jacqué 2015) and one former official previously associated with the EU has published a withering critique of the mission's work (Capussela 2015). Overall, observers agree that the EU's flagship mission did not deliver, despite its wealth of favorable conditions. Even a report by the EU's own Court of Auditors (2012, para. 29) concluded that 'EU assistance to the police audited by the Court did not lead to significant improvements.' This embarrassingly public report is arguably the most withering testimony an official EU body is able to make.

The puzzle, then, is: what happened? How, despite all the factors that should have tipped the scales toward operational success in Kosovo, were the actual results so disappointing? In explaining this puzzle, one might ask whether police reform in Kosovo has become more challenging over time. Indeed, Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, thereby slipping off the chains of the previous UN protectorate. The room for international influence on the Kosovo police has probably declined since then. In addition, there is the diminishing utility function of police reform: New capacities are easily developed, whereas more long-term tasks such as advancing management skills, reducing corruption, and preventing political interference are more challenging. At the same time, however, Kosovo clearly pursued a pro-European course from 2008 onward, striving for EU membership and attempting to fulfill the pre-membership Copenhagen criteria. This includes good governance requirements for the Kosovo police. Given the concurrency of local political interest in police reform and the presence of an extremely well-equipped international reform mission, the most obvious explanations fail to convince.

This book offers a different explanation—one that reveals the EU's flagship peace operation as cumbersome and politically inapt. I demonstrate that the EU's centralized and highly regulated institutional design and management processes are largely responsible for EULEX's limited impact on police reform. First, complex bureaucratic rules slowed down mission establishment and caused red tape within the mission's administration. Simply launching the mission took nearly one and a half years, effectively rendering it a 'paper tiger' with little credibility in the eyes of locals.

Second, EULEX was not (only) managed by mission leadership in Pristina. Instead, as one interviewee put it, 'the EU conducts crisis management by committees,'[2] allowing member states' political rationalities to interfere with the mission's work on a regular basis. Some rejected the mission altogether, while other members co-opted it for their larger geopolitical agenda in the region. Such cross-purposes hamstrung mission management and prevented those in the field from using the mission's significant resources in a way that matched the interests of those the operation was supposed to assist: the people of Kosovo and their police.

Findings from the other case studies in the book confirm the shortcomings associated with the EU's institutional design and demonstrate that alternatives do indeed exist that allow organizations to perform more effectively (see Table 1.2). Analysis of the performance of EUPOL Afghanistan in Chap. 6 reveals striking similarities such as sluggish mission establishment, failure to cooperate with other police reform actors such as NATO, and an inability to adjust mission strategy. Again, centralized planning routines and member state influence on mandate implementation were the chief factors that limited success. The only difference between EUPOL and EULEX pertains to mission leadership. While EUPOL Afghanistan saw head of missions replaced with high frequency—sometimes more than once a year—EULEX Kosovo exhibited more stability and was less affected by micromanagement from Brussels.

Table 1.2 Four mechanisms through which institutional design affects performance

Policy phase	*Hypothesized mechanism*	*Positive evidence*	*Negative evidence*
Planning	H1: Bottom-up planning enables rapid mission installation	OSCE, Germany	EULEX, EUPOL
Implementation	H2: Decentralized implementation enhances flexibility, adjustability, and local ownership	OSCE, Germany	EULEX, EUPOL
Implementation	H3: Leadership furthers mission autonomy, cooperation, and continuity	OSCE, EULEX, Germany	EUPOL
Review	H4: Strategy review in international organizations facilitates mission politicization	OSCE, EULEX, EUPOL	–

Source: Author's compilation

In contrast, the OSCE's Kosovo mission, analyzed in Chap. 3, stands as a best practice example. In terms of leadership, its police reform department was led by the same individual for seven consecutive years. This allowed the head of this department to become extremely well-networked among both locals and internationals in Kosovo and to become the go-to contact for police-related matters. Because the OSCE mission was also highly decentralized from headquarters in Vienna and had a surprisingly flexible financial management framework, bilateral partners increasingly implemented their own police reform contributions as voluntary financial contributions through the mission. Overall, the mission made good progress in assisting the establishment of the Kosovo police and had a very favorable reputation among Kosovar and international partners. The key factors, I argue, were decentralized management competencies, dedicated staff, and highly flexible operational and budget rules.

German support to police reform in Afghanistan, outlined in Chap. 5, sits in between the OSCE and EU, both in terms of institutional design and its impact on performance. The German Police Project Office in Kabul was equipped with significant management leeway and flexible budget rules. And, as I show, its starting point was highly promising. The German team that arrived in Kabul in 2001 was well-received and conceived a reform strategy aligned with the preferences of their Afghan partners. However, with only two dozen officers and 12 Mio Euro per year, the German program was hopelessly under-resourced from the outset. Germany then failed to adjust its police reform strategy for two interlinked reasons. Ownership in Berlin was split between the German Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior, each of which thought very differently about police reform in Afghanistan. Without one joint responsible strategic center, the bureaucracy was consistently unable to attract sufficient attention among the German political elite to enhance the program's budget and staff resources.

Table 1.2 summarizes four hypothesized mechanisms through which distinct institutional design constellations impact the performance of peace operations—irrespective of the context in which they operate. These mechanisms were identified inductively on the basis of the four cases researched in the book. The cases are outlined and examined in Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6, then systematically compared in Chap. 7. I discuss the mechanisms as hypotheses relating to all four case studies and demonstrate their ability to stand up to scrutiny. Following the analytical framework presented in Chap. 2, the mechanisms refer to peace operations' performance in three policy phases: (1) the planning and launching of missions, in recognition of the fact that

peacebuilding requires rapid action; (2) the implementation of the mandate, in recognition of the importance of adjusting to local political dynamics and coordinating with local and international partners; (3) and mandate review, in recognition of the fact that missions need to assess their actual effectiveness.

1.4 Contribution to the Peacebuilding Literature

This book aims to address the substantial question of how institutional designs affect peacebuilding outcomes. First, comparison of the four missions shows that EU peace operations—characterized by centralization and a high degree of headquarters supervision—perform worse than the two non-EU missions with relatively decentralized and more autonomous operations. Given Afghanistan's status as a least-likely case for successful peacebuilding, explaining the failure of operations in this context is a less compelling 'puzzle' per se. Kosovo, however, clearly demonstrates the potential negative impact of institutional designs. As the case of EULEX Kosovo demonstrates, *even when all external conditions are ostensibly ideal, poor organizational design and performance can still prevent meaningful progress in police reform assistance*. This means that institutional designs do not only affect mission performance, but that there are situations in which unwieldy institutional designs determine outcomes, in the sense of a lack of peacebuilding progress.

The reverse argument, however, does not pertain. Positive organizational performance can only be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for peacebuilding success. Put differently, while a poorly managed peace organization can spoil peacebuilding processes, well-managed organizations do not automatically guarantee success. Local political will and sufficient resources are also required, among other factors. But there are ways to raise the odds—and institutional design is an important one.

This book concludes that peacebuilding theory can no longer be mute to questions of institutional design and bureaucracy. Previous research has already produced ample evidence that peacebuilding missions face numerous dilemmas (Paris and Sisk 2009). There is a clash in values between those running peace operations and the cultures, traditions, and interests of those receiving assistance. Richmond (2014) rightly asks whether liberal peacebuilding can ever induce change in such a context. Looking inside peace operations, Autesserre (2010, 2014) shows that the habits of those working in missions simultaneously enable them to work in extreme conditions, but also erode their relation with locals. And at

the headquarters level, Dijkstra (2013, p. 203) highlights the 'dilemma between the prospects of efficiency gains and sovereignty costs.'

To this list of dilemmas, this book adds the tension between the rationalities of those shaping peacebuilding efforts from a distance in multilateral steering committees and the operational constraints of those implementing peace operations on the ground. Member state conflicts regarding peace operations are a natural part of international politics. Such controversies should end, one might argue, once a policy or mandate has been agreed, adopted, and passed on to the bureaucracy for implementation. Yet this is rarely, if ever, the reality. Political actors exert continued influence on bureaucratic actions even *during policy implementation* and irrespective of the damage this may cause for peace operations. Whether they do this because they secretly oppose a mission or because the mission is simply a convenient bargaining chip is almost beside the point. The key is that institutional designs can mediate this unwieldy effect, albeit never fully. Functional decentralization ensures that mission leadership can adjust strategy to operational context, as this book's OSCE chapter demonstrates (see also studies on the UN, including da Costa and Karlsrud 2013; Karlsrud 2013; Winckler 2015). Conversely, there is also a need, from time to time, to link missions to their political principals. Without political support, mission leadership is unlikely to enact robust action (Breakey and Dekker 2014; Guéhenno 2009) and/or adjust a wanting peacebuilding strategy when needed.

Reconciling these demands through the development and revision of institutional design is not a magic bullet. It is not asserted here as a foolproof means of solving the manifold dilemmas that peacebuilding operations confront. But the feasibility and ameliorative potential of focusing on institutional design even raises the chance that the system might enact critical self-evaluation of liberal peacebuilding on its own terms.

1.5 Contribution to the Literature on International Public Administration

As summarized in Table 1.2, the case studies yield four institutional design constellations that are conducive to better or worse performance. They confirm what we know from public administration theory: creative policy tasks—such as postconflict police reform assistance—require creative adjustments to ambiguous environments and are better implemented by decentralized units on the basis of flexible rules (Matland 1995; Perrow

1970). Relativizing this statement, I observe an inherent tension between functional decentralization to improve performance on the one hand, and a need to ensure that politicians (are compelled to) address policy failure on the other hand.

This dilemma played out differently in the German-led operation case versus the three international organization cases. In the German case, the failure to adjust police reform policy in Afghanistan could be attributed to a structural weakness in the institutional design: German police reform was led by two ministries and lacked a joint responsible strategic center that ensured evaluation (see Chap. 5). By contrast, the OSCE and EU both had effective review mechanisms in place. In the case of the OSCE mission in Kosovo, these were limited to the annual budget review (see Chap. 3). In the case of the EU, member states evaluate their peace operations constantly (see Chaps. 4 and 6). Yet, instead of ensuring that missions achieve their objectives, member states' diverging political interests frequently interfered with missions' mandated goals. This had, as the case studies demonstrate, withering results for mission's performance.

Advancing the state of the art in public administration, I argue that the number of principals has to be included into the equation. International public administration is governed by complex principals (Lyne et al. 2006). The processes of aggregating their political preferences in multilateral committees can become consequential. Once they decided on a peacebuilding mandate for instance, member states' aggregated political will rarely remains constant. Instead, they have diverging geopolitical interests that are highly dynamic. As new geopolitical challenges emerge, states use their veto on missions they deem less relevant as bargaining chips vis-à-vis different policy dossiers. This affects peace operations not only during mandate formulation, but throughout the whole cycle of planning, implementing, and reviewing mission mandates.

Institutional designs, as this book concludes, have the potential to mediate this effect. The comparison of the OSCE and EU cases shows that member states' ability to use their influence and vetoes in this way depends on structural and procedural decentralization. The more autonomy an operation has, the less vulnerable it is to being derailed by such political machinations; conversely, less autonomous operations run a higher risk of falling victim to these negotiations. That being said, there is always the need to ensure effective policy review. Full autonomy is not an option. Thus, finding ways to reconcile these conflicting goals—increasing decision-making lati-

tude and leadership autonomy to improve performance versus retaining sufficient control to ensure proper evaluation of that performance—should be high on the agenda of future research on peace operations and the design of international bureaucracies more generally.

Policy implementation by international organizations rarely goes without political conflict and invariably takes place in ambiguous environments. Adding to the literature on international public administration, this book thus puts forth the thesis that *the dynamic nature of complex principals' political preferences correlates negatively with bureaucratic performance during policy implementation. Institutional designs, in particular decentralization and bureaucratic autonomy, mediate this unwieldy effect.*

What does this tell us about the trajectories of international public administration more generally (Hawkins et al. 2006a)? Should we consider them 'managers of global change' who do their best to serve their organizations' founding mandate (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009)? Or are international secretariats self-inverted, rule-obsessed bureaucracies whose powers allow them to 'run roughshod over the interests of states and citizens they are supposed to further' (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 173)? The book does not systematically address this question, but it does implicitly challenge the understanding that peacebuilding dysfunctions are the result of pathological behavior by international bureaucrats. Instead, to the extent that blame can be directed to any actors in particular, the findings here shift our critical gaze to international organizations' member states—whose informal and hidden influence on policy implementation constitutes the most significant cause for poor performance identified by this book.

1.6 Reforming EU Crisis Management

Overall, my findings speak to the urgent need for peacebuilding organizations to review and potentially reform their institutional settings. The UN, as the world's principal agent of peace operations, seems to have understood the relevance of these aspects long ago. In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a panel to review reasons for the failure of the UN's peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica. As Monk (2012, p. 2) writes, 'this was a courageous thing to do because Annan had been (…) responsible for peacekeeping at the time of these atrocities.' Named after the panel's chairman, the Brahimi Report (UN Security Council 2000) not only identified decision-making processes within the UN bureaucracy as key elements in the dysfunction and ineffectiveness

of their peace operations but also recommended extensive reforms of the organization (UN General Assembly 2006).[3]

A Brahimi Report is urgently required for the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, in particular. 'Crisis management by committees' is a failed model. Instead, member states should recognize that political quarrels constitute a significant source of performance failure. If they intend their peace operations to have more impact in future scenarios, they should significantly upgrade the competencies of heads of missions and provide them with sufficient latitude to actually lead. At the moment, there seems little likelihood of successful mission performance without a strong and coherent political will among member states. Confirming this, Keohane (2011, p. 202) notes that 'EU operations have been most effective when there has been a clear convergence of Member State interests.' At the time of this writing, the chances for coherent political will among EU member states appear depressingly limited—demonstrated most recently and vividly by the Union's inability to speak with one voice during the management of two major crises in 2015: the financial crisis in Greece and the refugee crisis. In the absence of such political convergence, member states should at least bolster their peace operations' managerial autonomy as the second best option.

1.7 Methodology and Organization of the Book

This book applies a public administration perspective to the study of peacebuilding organizations. This does not mean, however, that a public administration approach provides detailed theories on which institutional designs have what effect on policy outcomes. There are bits and pieces in the literature that, at best, lend themselves to conceptualizing an analytical framework aimed at explorative and inductive research. This is carried out in Chap. 2. Bringing together research on public management and administrative performance, the chapter subdivides my research question into two consecutive steps: First, I establish the link between institutional designs and peace operations' performance, the latter being understood as an indicator of the quality of the work carried out by an organization. This, in turn, involves looking at three phases of performance: planning and initial mission launch, implementation (resource allocation, cooperation, smaller adjustments), and mandate review and evaluation. Second, findings on performance then become the independent variable when I ask about the impact on peacebuilding outcomes.

These two research questions require different methodological approaches. The first question is one of tracing the causal processes by which variation in institutional designs affects performance in each of the three policy phases. Conducting this analysis on each of the four peace operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan constitutes the bulk of this book's content. Each of the four peace operations analyzed is dedicated one chapter, each of which begins with an introduction of the organization in focus. While continuously considering the conflict context, each chapter further analyzes in detail the performance of the respective mission, measured against the baseline outlined for each policy phase: a rapid launch of operations, flexibility and cooperation during implementation, and the ability to adjust a peacebuilding strategy as needed based on impact evaluation.

Interviews with 109 experts are the main data source; these were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire designed to identify institutional determinants related to performance. Instead of relying on experts' abstract statements about the linkages between design variables and performance, as is often the case in public administration research, this study pairs interview data with in-depth case studies that illustrate the actual mechanisms in an exemplary fashion, based on observable historical processes. The findings are presented through a combination of historical and analytical narrative in Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Each chapter tells the organization-centered story of one organization's police reform mission—how it was decided, planned, executed, and adjusted.

These findings then provide the basis for the second layer of the analysis, namely, answering how peace operations' process performance affects the outcome of police reform. By definition, causal mechanisms lent themselves for generalization. However, this implies that a mechanism can be fully assessed, including the identification of *all* intermediate steps between condition and outcome. This is hardly possible in the context of a comparative case study that cuts across two countries and four peace operations—even in a comprehensive volume. In recognition of this, my conclusions on the causal relevance of organizational performance rely on a combination of counterfactual reasoning and the comparative method. On the one hand, each case study ends with a concluding section that offers a counterfactual discussion of the relevance of a peace operation's performance vis-à-vis other factors. On the other hand, based on the selection of Kosovo and Afghanistan, cases with diverse conflict-related context constellations were selected into the sample. Observing similar linkages between institutional designs, performance, and outcomes *despite* these

contextual differences bolsters the validity of the process-based explanation. The final comparison of all four case studies in Chap. 7 summarizes my findings. A concluding chapter summarizes the findings, critically discusses the potential for generalization, and suggests the main academic takeaway and areas for further research. This includes a list of recommendations for each of the three organizations studied.

Notes

1. The United Nations could easily have been selected as an actor for the Kosovo study as the UN shared police reform responsibility with the OSCE until 2008. However, because relatively little research has examined peacebuilding operations by the OSCE compared to the wealth of studies on UN-led interventions, the Vienna-based organization seemed the more promising case study.
2. Interview with EULEX official (Interview No. 039/B, 19 July, 2011/27 April, 2012).
3. There is a substantial body of literature dealing with the Brahimi report and its implications (Bellamy and Williams 2007; Durch 2004; Durch et al. 2003; Gray 2001; Kühne 2001; Peou 2004).

References

Allen, S. H., & Yuen, A. T. (2014). The politics of peacekeeping: UN Security Council oversight across peacekeeping missions. *International Studies Quarterly, 58*(3), 621–632.

Aoi, C., De Coning, C., & Thakur, R. C. (2007). *Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations*. Tokyo/New York: United Nations University Press.

Autesserre, S. (2010). *The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland. Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization, 53*(4), 699–732.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bauer, M. W. (2012). Tolerant, if personal goals remain unharmed: Explaining supranational bureaucrats' attitudes to organisational change. *Governance, 25*(3), 485–510.

Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2007). Contemporary peace operations: Four challenges for the Brahimi paradigm. In H. Langholtz, B. Kondoch, & A. Wells (Eds.), *International peacekeeping: The yearbook of international peace operations* (Vol. 11, pp. 1–28). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Benner, T., & Bossong, R. (2010). The case for a public administration turn in the study of the EU's civilian crisis management. *Journal of European Public Policy, 17*(7), 1074–1086.

Benner, T., Mergenthaler, S., & Rotmann, P. (2011). *The new world of UN peace operations: Learning to build peace?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benner, T., Eckhard, S., & Rotmann, P. (2013). Learning in international organizations. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of international organizations* (pp. 361–373). London: Routledge.

Bennet, R., Greene, M., & Friedman, J. (2011). *Building the police service in a security vacuum: International efforts in Kosovo, 1999–2011.* Princeton: Princeton University, Innovations for Successful Societies.

Biermann, F., & Siebenhüner, B. (Eds.). (2009). *Managers of global change. The influence of international environmental bureaucracies.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2011). From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction. *West European Politics, 35*(1), 1–19.

Breakey, H., & Dekker, S. (2014). Weak links in the chain of authority: The challenges of intervention decisions to protect civilians. *International Peacekeeping, 21*(3), 307–323.

Caplan, R. (2005). *International governance of war-torn territories: Rule and reconstruction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Capussela, A. L. (2015). *State-building in Kosovo: Democracy, corruption and the EU in the Balkans.* London: I.B.Tauris.

Chandler, D. (2006). *Empire in denial: The politics of state-building.* London: Pluto Press.

da Costa, D. F., & Karlsrud, J. (2013). 'Bending the rules': The space between HQ policy and local action in UN civilian peacekeeping. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17*(3–4), 293–312.

Daase, C., & Friesendorf, C. (2010). *Rethinking security governance: The problem of unintended consequences.* New York: Routledge.

de Coning, C. (2009). Planning for success. In C. Clement & A. C. Smith (Eds.), *Managing complexity: Political and managerial challenges in United Nations peace operations* (pp. 24–27). New York: International Peace Institute.

Dijkstra, H. (2012). Efficiency versus sovereignty: Delegation to the UN Secretariat in peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping, 19*(5), 581–596.

Dijkstra, H. (2013). *Policy-making in EU security and defense: An institutional perspective.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dijkstra, H. (2015). Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping. *The Review of International Organizations, 10*(1), 23–41.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political Science Review, 94*(4), 779–801.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Durch, W. J. (2004). *Building a better peace operation: Lessons from the Brahimi report process* (Expert policy brief to the secretary-general's high level panel on threats, challenges and change). New York: United Nations Foundation.

Durch, W. J., Holt, V. K., Earle, C. R., & Shanahan, M. K. (2003). *The Brahimi report and the future of U.N. peace operations.* Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Eckhard, S., & Ege, J. (2016). International bureaucracies and their influence on policy-making: A review of empirical evidence. *Journal of European Public Policy.* Published online: 19 Apr 2016. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1162837.

Ege, J., & Bauer, M. W. (2013). International bureaucracies from a public administration and international relations perspective. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of international organization* (pp. 135–148). London: Routledge.

European Court of Auditors. (2012). *European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law* (Special report no. 18/2012). Brussels: European Court of Auditors.

Fukuyama, F. (2004). *State-building: Governance and world order in the 21st century.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gray, C. (2001). Peacekeeping after the Brahimi report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN? *Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 6*(2), 267–288.

Guéhenno, J.-M. (2009). *Robust peacekeeping: Building political consensus and strengthening command and control.* New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D., & Tierney, M. J. (Eds.). (2006a). *Delegation and agency in international organizations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006b). Delegation under Anarchy—States, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and agency in international organizations* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Jacqué, J.-P. (2015). *Review of the EULEX Kosovo Mission's implementation of its mandate with a particular focus on the handeling of the recent allegations.* Brussels: Council of the European Union.

Junk, J. (2012). Function follows form: The organizational design of peace operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6*(3), 299.

Karlsrud, J. (2013). Special representatives of the Secretary-General as norm arbitrators? Understanding bottom-up authority in UN peacekeeping. *Global Governance, 19*(4), 525.

Keohane, D. (2011). Lessons from EU peace operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15*(1–2), 200–217.

Knill, C., & Balint, T. (2008). Explaining variation in organizational change: The reform of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD. *Journal of European Public Policy, 15*(5), 669–690.

Knill, C., Eckhard, S., & Grohs, S. (2016). Administrative styles in the European Commission and the OSCE-Secretariat: Striking similarities despite different organisational settings. *Journal of European Public Policy*.

Kühne, W. (2001). *UN Friedenseinsätze verbessern—Die Empfehlungen der Brahimi-Kommission*. Berlin: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

Larsson, T., & Trondal, J. (2006). Agenda setting in the European Commission. How the European Commission structures and influences the EU agenda. In H. C. H. Hofman & A. Tuerk (Eds.), *EU administrative governance*. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Liese, A. (2010). Explaining varying degrees of openness in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In C. Jönsson & J. Tallberg (Eds.), *Transnational actors in global governance. Patterns, explanations and implications* (pp. 88–108). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lundgren, M. (2015). Conflict management capabilities of peace-brokering international organizations, 1945–2010: A new dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33*, 198–223.

Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and agency in international organizations* (pp. 41–76). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 5*(2), 145–174.

Momani, B. (2007). IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals. *The Review of International Organizations, 2*(1), 39–57.

Monk, R. (2012). *Policing world disorder* (Durham Global Security Institute Bi-Annual Lecture, 30 May 2012). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

OECD-DAC. (2005). *Security system reform and governance*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

OECD-DAC. (2007). *OECD-DAC handbook on security system reform: Supporting security and justice*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Paris, R. (2000). Broadening the study of peace operations. *International Studies Review, 2*(3), 27–44.

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R., & Sisk, T. D. (Eds.). (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. New York/London: Routledge.

Peou, S. (2004). The UN, peacekeeping and collective human security: From An agenda for peace to the Brahimi Report. *International Peacekeeping, 11*(1), 51–68.

Perrow, C. (1970). *Organizational analysis: A sociological view*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Richmond, O. (2014). *Failed statebuilding: Intervention, the state, and the dynamics of peace formation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Europeanization beyond Europe. *Living Reviews in European Governance, 7*(1).

Schnabel, A., & Ehrhart, H.-G. (2006). Post-conflict societies and the military: Challenges and problems of security sector reform. In A. Schnabel & H.-G. Ehrhart (Eds.), *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding* (pp. 1–15). Tokyo: UNU Press.

Schneckener, U. (2008). Adressing fragile statehood: Dilemmas and strategies of international statebuilding. In V. Rittberger & M. Fischer (Eds.), *Strategies for peace: Contributions of international organizations, states, and non-state actors*. Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich.

Seibel, W. (2012). Peace operations and modern protectorates: The logic of successful failure. In J. Mayall & R. S. de Oliveira (Eds.), *The new protectorates. International tutelage and the making of liberal states* (pp. 163–182). London: Hurst & Company.

Stedman, S. J., Rothchild, D. S., & Cousens, E. M. (2002). *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

The Guardian. (05 November 2014). *EU's biggest foreign mission in turmoil over corruption row* (Online Edition (article by Julian Borger)). London: The Guardian.

Trondal, J. (2010). *Unpacking international organisations: The dynamics of compound bureaucracies*. Manchester: Manchester Universty Press.

UN General Assembly. (2006). *Report of the Secretary-General: Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: Budget performance for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*. A/60/696 (24 February 2006). New York: United Nations General Assembly.

UN Security Council. (2000). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*. New York: United Nations Security Council.

USIP. (2009). *Guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Weaver, C. (2008). *Hypocrisy trap: The world bank and the poverty of reform*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Winckler, J. G. (2015). Exceeding limitations of the United Nations peacekeeping bureaucracy: Strategies of officials to influence peacekeeping activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping, 22*(1), 43–64.
World Bank. (2011). *World development report*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

CHAPTER 2

From Institutional Designs to Peacebuilding Outcomes

Conceptually, this book addresses a classic question at the interface of political science and public administration research: the relevance of bureaucracy and its design for the realization of public policy (Kaufman 1960; Page 1985). Though research in this area originally focused on the (nation) state, more recent work has examined this question in relation to global governance, where international organizations (IO) play an ever-increasing role in the delivery of global public goods (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Haas 1964; Reinalda 2009). This book investigates the impact that different institutional designs have on bureaucratic organizations' ability to realize *global* public policy. The inconclusive state-of-the-art on this question requires an inductive approach, aiming at the generation of theory rather than testing theory-derived hypotheses. This chapter lays out the necessary analytical tools. Section 2.1 argues that institutional designs in public organizations cannot only be assessed from a functionalist perspective as they also need to reconcile the needs of politicians to exert control. Although implementation research has extensively addressed questions of institutional designs, Sect. 2.2 finds that findings about institutional designs' impact on policy outcomes remained inconclusive. On international organization, only little previous research exists. Overall, this demonstrates the need for conceptualization and inductive research. Section 2.3 then introduces the framework used for this research project, which focuses on the analytical triad between institutional designs, process performance, and policy

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_2

outcomes. Last, Sect. 2.4 introduces the methodology and elaborates on the case selection.

2.1 Institutional Designs in the Public Sector: Between Control and Effectiveness

Studying the link between institutional designs and public policy outcomes has been one of the primary goals of public administration and public policy research in the context of 'new institutionalist' thought in political science (Hammond 1993; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971). In fact, it is the key disciplinary assumption of this branch of political science research that the structures and rules of political and administrative institutions have an independent effect on the outcome of political processes. Since Max Weber, the bureaucracy that dominates public and private organizations around the globe has been seen as the result of an effort to design evermore efficient administrative institutions to carry out tasks related to modern society. This ought to explain the striking similarities in the way many of these organizations were designed (Dobbin 1994). While there are alternative ways to look at institutions and explain how they came to be, change, and matter in political life,[1] a rationalist–functionalist logic is frequently implicit in mainstream public administration theory. Organizational reforms, as outlined next, are mostly conceptualized as means to improve administrative performance.

Over the course of the second half of the mid-twentieth century, the classical 'Weberian' conception of bureaucracy increasingly came under pressure. Faced with the growing complexity and interconnectedness of social problems, as well as individualization, demographic change, changing values, mobility, flexibility, and new technologies, most existing administrations suffered from overstrain (Hill 1997, p. 21f.). Previous core principles, such as the consistency of law enforcement, application, standardization, centralization, and top-down regulation were increasingly seen as features of an anachronistic and overstretched system (Budäus and Grüning 1998, p. 4f.) that had produced path dependencies and inflated agencies (Parkinson 1957). More and more organizational scholars at this time pointed to the numerous dysfunctions and paradoxes within the public sector. Building on Simon (1947), who established the seminal concept of 'bounded rationality' emphasizing the fallibility of organizations, scholars turned their attention to the 'unintended consequences of

purposive action' (Merton 1957), the 'dilemmas of bureaucracy' (Blau 1955) designed to solve problems while creating new ones such as red tape, and the 'Janus-faced' nature of organizations as systems of consent and coercion (Gouldner 1954).

On a societal level, as Coombes (1998, p. 20ff.) later wrote, the modern state faced three crises: a crisis in legitimacy due to a deficit in effective steering and control; a crisis of interdependence due to the increasing transnationalism of societal problems; and a crisis in performance due to the above-mentioned mismatch between demand and proficiency. Tensions culminated when the 1970s oil crisis and economic downturn accelerated pressure on public finances and the budgets of many public agencies. The ensuing crisis set in motion a reform process that, with varying intensity and speed, affected most Western public administration systems (Barzelay and Füchtner 2003).

Pressure for administrative reforms revealed a clash of two core principles immanent to public administrations that—unlike private organizations—operate in a constitutional context. Their purpose is not only the efficient delivery of public service, but also the prevention of arbitrary power by means of legal democratic rule and accountability. Ideal-typically, the legitimacy of the state's executive action could be grounded in the Weberian ideal of rational–legal rule, executed by professional and objective civil servants. In reality, however, administration researchers pointed out that bureaucratic organizations rarely resemble such a Weberian ideal. Instead, economic theories of individual behavior (public choice) see civil servants as self-interested utility-maximizers who cause inflated agencies and red tape (Dunleavy 1991; Niskanen 1971), and that their ideological or political beliefs (Mayntz and Derlien 1989) or demographic characteristics (race, gender) (Kingsley 1944) can lead them to 'drift' from their politically prescribed mandate (Eckhard 2014a; Kam 2000). In short, authors have described bureaucracy 'as one of the worst (and one of the most inevitable) sources of potential failure in any system of modern governance' (Behn 1998, p. 210). In response to this 'fear of bureaucracy' (Kaufman 1981), political principals establish precautions to ensure that their agents will act within the democratically legitimized parameters of their mandate (McCubbins et al. 1987).

In contrast, managerialism, dating back to early 'Taylorist' administration theory (Fayol 1929; Gulick 1937), prioritizes effective management over bureaucracy (Pollitt 1990). Proponents argue that it is 'managers

and management that make institutions perform' (Drucker 1974, p. ix). They view private sector management as essentially superior to public sector management: indeed, the 'term "management" derives from private sector experience, denoting (…) a concern for the use of resources to achieve results in contrast to the presumed focus of "administration" as the adherence to formalized processes and procedures' (Aucoin 1990, p. 118). Since political and bureaucratic actors operate under different institutional incentives, the two realms should be kept at a distance. This, as Pollitt (1990, p. 3) argues, will ensure that public servants can become public managers who have 'reasonable "room to manoeuvre"' to achieve the best possible outcome. Managerialism follows the credo that a 'deconcentration of power is (…) essential to good management; it is the antithesis of the bureaucratic ideal' (Aucoin 1990, p. 122).

Institutional designs of administrative systems navigate between these two poles. One the one hand, efficient public managerialism requires administrative procedures that suppress democratic, legislative oversight mechanisms and grant more autonomy to the bureaucracy, which, it is argued, will act more efficiently as a result (Thom and Ritz 2006, p. 27ff.). Proponents of public choice, on the other hand, point to the dysfunctions inherent to bureaucratic decision-making and the associated 'threat that the "neo-managerialist" philosophy (…) poses to traditional public administration values such as equity, fairness and the need for accountability' (Geri 2001, p. 445).

The tension between efficiency and accountability (or democratic legitimacy) has consequences for administrative reforms. For instance new public management, the reform paradigm popular around the end of the twentieth century, intellectually derives from public choice theories and focuses on new ways of ensuring political control (not hierarchy but results-based). Although many researchers initially saw new public management as dominating twenty-first-century public administration reform (Kickert 2008; Pollitt 1990), recent research has become more skeptical. In Germany, for instance, new public management reform efforts have been applied primarily at local and state levels, while the federal administration has remained virtually unchanged (Bogumil et al. 2006; Proeller and Siegel 2009). The same eclecticism appears true for other Western states (Lynn 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). With respect to *international* (governmental) organizations, studies have found only fragmented elements of the structures and processes associated with new public management to have been implemented (Bauer

2008; Geri 2001; Knill and Balint 2008). While there are also political, societal, and cultural factors accounting for the uneven implementation of new public management reforms (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, p. 250f.), the ambiguity of causal relations between specific institutional designs and the efficiency of public service delivery is certainly another important reason. There is simply no clear normative theory on which line of reasoning to follow.

2.2 Public Administration Research and the Design–Performance Link

In the absence of a meta-theory, two more empirical strands of public administration research have addressed questions of institutional design and policy outcomes. First, implementation research starts from a broad perspective and asks about 'what happens between policy expectations and (perceived) policy results' (deLeon 1999, p. 314f.). This literature broadly falls in two camps. Top-down approaches assume that implementation begins with policy objectives and implementation will follow in a linear fashion (e.g., Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Bottom-up approaches, by contrast, focus on the motives and actions of actors involved in implementation, including their impact on policy formulation (e.g., Lipsky 1980). Matland (1995) attempted to reconcile both perspectives, suggesting that we need to consider the degree of (technological) ambiguity and (political) conflict inherent to the policy process. He introduced a typology of four implementation approaches, depending on the combination of high or low levels of conflict and ambiguity. In essence, low-conflict/low-ambiguity policies (called administrative) are prone to top-down implementation with outcomes being determined by resource investments. High-conflict/high-ambiguity policies (called symbolic), by contrast, are more dependent on the character of local actor coalitions and thus prone to bottom-up style implementation. The model reinforces this book's assumption that we cannot look at resources alone when it comes to understanding policy effects, in particular in a highly conflicting and ambiguous policy field such as peacebuilding. Unfortunately, Matland's model has little to say about more specific institutional design constellations and how they affect performance.

Second, looking in more detail about the effects specific institutional design factors have on agency performance is at the heart of a managerialist approach to public administration research, as opposed to the 'political'

perspective referred to above (Rosenbloom et al. 2015). In their review article on strategic management in the public sector, Poister and colleagues (2010) identify only few studies that were able to conclusively link individual institutional design factors to better performance. Although individual factors associated with new public management, such as strategic planning, have been found to positively affect the performance of public agencies, researchers note that these observations 'are likely contingent on a number of environmental factors that cannot necessarily be included in a parsimonious quantitative model' (Poister et al. 2010, p. 538). Overall, researchers have identified myriad design variables with impact on policy outcomes, without being able to specify a general implementation theory. As Matland (1995, p. 146) rightly criticized, a 'literature with three hundred critical variables doesn't need more variables; it needs structure.'

The considerably smaller body of research on international public administration has not yet even begun addressing linkages between institutional designs and policy outcomes in a systematic fashion. Though scholars increasingly began to unpack the 'black box' of international secretariats (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004), most studies treat their bureaucratic settings and institutional designs as dependent variables. Among other features, such research projects studied the organizational styles and culture of IOs (Knill et al. 2016; Momani 2007), preferences (Bauer 2012; Trondal 2010; Weaver 2008), autonomy (Ege and Bauer 2013), learning ability (Benner et al. 2011), reform processes (Knill and Balint 2008), their cooperation with other actors (Liese 2010), or the diffusion of IO policies and institutions (Börzel and Risse 2011; Schimmelfennig 2012). This literature treats international secretariats as 'bureaucracies.' But there is still no clarity about whether the specific peculiarities of these organizations' *international* environment have systematic effects on their internal working, let alone questions of policy implementation and outcomes.

In the absence of a 'grand theory' on the implementation of (global) public policy, unraveling the black box of institutional designs, administrative action, and policy outcomes, thus, at best requires explorative and inductive research. Because of this research gap, this chapter aims to introduce a framework developed precisely for the present research purpose: How do institutional designs affect policy outcomes? While empirical findings are scarce, I can build on significant previous conceptual work conducted in the context of domestic public administration and international organization research.

2.3 Institutional Designs and Policy Results: A Framework for Analysis

It is one of the founding observations of implementation research in public administration that differences in how public agencies are made up internally can lead to differences in policy outcomes (Gulick 1937; Page 1985). In this context, the term 'institution' refers to formal or informal procedures, routines, and conventions in the organizational structure of a polity that affect individual behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 938).[2] In contrast to the term 'organizational' design, an institutional perspective thus allows considering both structural and processual features of public administrations. The question, then, is 'how institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics' (Martin and Simmons 1998, p. 729). More precisely, this book asks how variation in institutional designs, that is, administrative structures and processes, affects how bureaucrats go about planning and implementing a given policy task and how these actions qualify for reaching the policy objective. Because the causal chain between institutional designs and societal effects is so complex and, arguably, infinitely variable, I next introduce the concept of process performance that allows disaggregating the question into two separate causal trajectories: one linking institutional designs and process performance; and another linking process performance and policy outcomes.

Between Design and Outcomes: The Concept of Process Performance

Given the difficulty of directly observing the link between institutional designs and outcomes, public administration researchers introduced an intermediate concept to compare the effects of variation in institutional designs: *organizational performance*. In colloquial language, the term performance refers to 'a task or operation seen in terms of how successfully it is performed.'[3] Essentially, performance is an assessment of the quality of the work carried out by an organization. This implies a relation between how a task is conducted and whether an organization is able to achieve agreed-upon objectives. As a result, observers often evaluate performance based on the outcome (such as financial success).

However, a more detailed assessment of public administration literature, where the concept is applied most extensively, demonstrates that performance can be measured at different levels (Heinrich 2012).

Elaborating on this, Gutner and Thompson (2010) argue that two meanings are attached to the term performance. On the one hand, the verb 'to perform' means to complete a task. On the other hand, the noun 'performance' refers to the *manner* in which a task is completed. Thus, to address performance in the social world means both to address an outcome and the process by which it is pursued. This is what differentiates performance from effectiveness. According to Gutner and Thompson (2010, p. 231), the *process dimension* of performance captures the expectation that: '[w]e should expect highly capable and efficient individuals and organizations to complete tasks and attain goals more effectively.' Hence, studying performance at the process level of an organization allows drawing causal conclusions regarding the output[4] and outcome levels of organizational action. Gutner and Thompson illustrated this by use of the performance pyramid (see Fig. 2.1). Elucidating the pyramid, they wrote: 'We expect good performance to "trickle up," with success at each lower stage serving as building blocks for success as we are moving up the pyramid' (ibid., p. 236).

The Gutner and Thompson framework provides a micro-level framework that allows studying the causal relation between institutional designs and policy outcomes by addressing the performance of organizations at the level of administrative processes. However, observing this link empirically has been challenging for public administration and public policy researchers. Ultimately, the problem is the impossibility of controlling all the other factors that also have an influence on the behavior of citizens,



Fig. 2.1 The performance pyramid (*Source:* Author's compilation, adjusted from Gutner and Thompson (2010, p. 236))

organizations, or states. Fortna (2008), for example, measured the result of peacekeeping operations in a large-n study on the basis of whether a reduction of violence was achieved; and Vreeland (2003) measured the performance of the International Monetary Fund based on an assessment of economic growth in the countries where the fund was active. Both authors had to acknowledge, however, that factors rooted in the social–political environment might also have contributed to the observed outcomes. Accounting for this, Gutner and Thompson (2010, p. 236) were careful when discussing the potential explanatory power of performance: 'At best, process performance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for favorable outcomes.'

Because of these methodological challenges, several studies have deliberately limited their focus to the level of outputs. In the context of research on domestic agencies' outputs, indicators for improved performance at the output level have been 'more efficient operations, higher levels of productivity, improved service quality, more cost-effective programs, and increased customer satisfaction in addition to more effective programs in terms of alleviating problems or improving conditions in clientele groups, target communities, or entire populations' (Poister et al. 2010, p. 528). Tallberg et al. (2015) measure the five defining features of international organizations' policy outputs suggested by Rittberger et al. (2012): the number of acts, policy instruments, policy activities, policy targets, and target audiences. The advantage of such kinds of research is the possibility of gaining quantifiable information on organizational performance at a level that is relatively close to the actual administrative processes taking place within bureaucratic bodies. This allows one to compare performance across (international) organizations in order to, for instance, explore their institutional determinants. At the same time, the dual downside of this strategy is that administrative processes remain a black box and the inability to speak about policy outcomes.

Scholars interested in linking performance at the level of administrative processes with the real-world effects of public policy thus have to take a different approach. It is necessary to split the analysis into two research steps that analyze, first, the (institutional design) determinants of process performance and, second, the relevance of process performance for organizational outcomes. As I will discuss in Sect. 2.4 in more detail, both require different methodological approaches. Before turning to this issue, however, the next sections elaborate on the two steps and how they can be operationalized.

Measuring Designs and Process Performance: A Baseline for Comparison

As the above literature discussion has shown, it is impossible to explain the link between institutional designs and IOs' process performance deductively, that is, based on a theory-informed typology of institutional designs. Public choice and managerialism, the two paradigms outlined in Sect. 2.1, offer two broad theoretical frameworks for institutional designs, but have had less relevance as guidelines for structures and processes in (international) public organizations in the real world. The little evidence available suggests that administrations both at the domestic and international levels do not follow mainstream managerialist reforms, or at least not coherently so. From all we know, actual institutional designs resemble a mixture of traditional Weberian and managerialist perspectives, both at the domestic (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) and the international levels (Bauer 2008; Geri 2001; Knill and Balint 2008), including peace operations (Breakey and Dekker 2014; da Costa and Karlsrud 2013; Junk 2012; Karlsrud 2013). As a result, it is necessary to proceed inductively. This requires a broad analytical grid to identify relevant aspects of institutional designs.

Indexing the design of public organizations—whether a mayoral office at the street level or the secretariat of an international organization—must start by identifying the relevant factors. What are the aspects of institutional designs that affect process performance? Public administration and public policy researchers are far from united in how they have answered this. Some scholars primarily address structural factors, such as size, the number of hierarchical levels, or the legal rules governing what organizations do (e.g., Egeberg 2003; Hammond 1986). Others see more value in a procedural approach that focuses on differences in the management tasks an administration performs (e.g., Gulick 1937; Howlett et al. 2009). A third approach targets the level of individual decision-making by examining the interests and socialization of individuals (e.g., Kaufman 1960; Simon 1947). Which (combination of) factors to take into account is primarily a question of theoretical origin and research interest.

Because of my present focus on process performance, I opt for a combination of the first two dimensions: structures and processes. To study process performance, I follow a seminal policy cycle concept provided by Howlett et al. (2009, p. 14): as part of the policy cycle, they differentiate three generic phases of administrative activities that apply to 'all socio-

legal or spatial levels of policy-making, from that of local governments to those operating in the international sphere.' These phases are, first, the *formulation and planning* of administrative activities or policy programs; second, the *implementation* of said programs; and third, the *assessment or review* of whether a policy produces the intended impact.

For each of the three phases, a review of public management literature provides starting points for analyzing the structural features of institutional designs that may account for differences in performance (see Table 2.1). In addition, an analysis of process performance requires a baseline for 'good performance.' This can be derived from existing peacebuilding literature. Together, this analytical baseline and a preliminary understanding of variance in institutional designs provide a solid starting point for assessing peace operations and exploring which combinations of institutional factors account for good or weak performance. This is discussed next for each of the three policy phases.

The Planning of Peacebuilding Missions: Strategic or Incremental?

Planning is the natural task of strategic management and there is ample research on private business organizations. Findings, in principle, support the notion that those engaging in strategic planning in the longer run are more successful than their competitors (Andrews 1980; Glueck 1980). Still, despite these findings, there is heated debate in the public sector as to whether these findings apply to public policy and bureaucracies as well (see Wildavsky 1979). Proponents of the planning perspective (sometimes called 'synoptic') argue that goals can be reached best if based on a purposeful triangulation between objectives, resources, and the environment.

Table 2.1 Determinants and indicators for process performance

Policy phase	*Institutional design*	*Indicator for good performance*
Planning	Strategic vs. incremental planning	Is the mission able to launch operations quickly after the mandate gets passed?
Implementation	Allocation of decision-making competencies	Is the mission able to coordinate its activities with key partners and adjust flexibly to their short-term preferences?
Review	Structures and processes to link field and political level	Is the mission able to adjust its strategy in case it lacks impact?

Source: Author's compilation

This should result in a plan that allows political objectives to cascade down into single activities. Or, as Rubin (1988, p. 88) described it, 'a pattern of action through which [organizations] propose to achieve desired goals, modify current circumstances and/or realize latent opportunities.' The lack of empirical evidence supporting this view has fueled much criticism. Most prominently, Lindblom (1959) argued that due to the complexity of the social world, the planning of public policy implementation does not lead to successful goal attainment. By contrast, public organizations should 'muddle through' on the basis of short-term goals and practices, which should only be altered incrementally on the basis of which alternative appears better.

In peacebuilding, there is always a critical window of opportunity at the beginning of any international intervention. Locals have often suffered tremendously from conflict and expect assistance and aid to manifest quickly. If the delivery of aid takes too long, local partners lose trust and the political momentum for change runs dry (de Coning 2009; IPI 2012; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). Consequently, the first indicator for good performance in peacebuilding planning must assess whether existing rules and structural frameworks enable peacebuilders to get 'boots on the ground' quickly and effectively in order to launch operations.

Project Management and Cooperation During Implementation: Rigid or Flexible?

Since Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) famous treatment of the challenges related to policy implementation, the field of public administration studies has had a rather pessimistic view about the extent to which we can expect policies to be implemented in the way they are conceived. Bardach (1977, 1998) describes in detail the 'games' played by bureaucratic actors involved in policy implementation and points out the relevance of the 'rules of the game' (or institutional design). Management researchers long ago found that firms that achieve a fit between their 'rules,' their tasks, and the environment, perform better (Mintzberg 1978). Routine tasks in structured environments are well-suited for centralization, formalization, and control, while flexible and creative tasks are better suited to decentralized, informal, and autonomous subsystems (Perrow 1970). In line with this, a more recent literature on bureaucratic crisis management argues that such complex tasks are better implemented based on decentralized structures (Boin 2005).

To compare the centralization or decentralization of organizations, practitioners in (public) management generally differentiate between three levels of decisions, depending on their temporal and budgetary scope. First, the general policy, mandate, and budget for administrative tasks are usually agreed upon by politicians or member state representatives in an IO. Second, bureaucrats at the top-management level of a ministry or at an IO's headquarters define the basic strategic direction the organization will take to implement the mandate and budget. Third, the actual implementation of said strategy and budget takes place in street-level agencies or peace operations (Bea and Haas 2009; Krems 2012).

For the performance of peace operations, the allocation of management competencies needs to allow for effective mandate implementation. In the peacebuilding literature, two factors are consistently mentioned as indicators of good performance during mandate implementation. First, coordination with international and local partners is of utmost importance. In peacebuilding and crisis management, there are often multiple donor organizations on the ground, sharing more or less the same objectives. Coordination is vital to integrate measures and avoid duplication (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012). This pertains not only to other peacebuilders and donors, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to the host state government—the recipient of international assistance. It is one of the core findings of the past decade of research into peacebuilding that without local ownership capacity- and institution-building are likely to fail (Bendix and Stanley 2008; Donais 2008; Narten 2008).

Second, sudden changes in environmental dynamics or said partners' preferences might necessitate adjustments to a peacebuilding strategy. The question then is whether implementation frameworks and budget rules allow for such adjustments (Honig 2014; IPI 2012; Jones 2002; Natsios 2010; Schori 2009). Most organizations use some form of project management system to streamline budget spending and facilitate mandate implementation. In order to implement a plan, it can be translated into broader programs that encompass a set of comprehensive activities and actors. These are synchronized to reach the defined set of strategic objectives. Programs often represent a budget line. A project is a building block of such a program. It relates to one or a few activities, is more limited in terms of time and scope, and is often linked to single organizational units. Different professional communities use different tools to structure the program–project relation and to implement

single activities, such as results-based management or budgeting, logistical frameworks, balanced scorecards, and others (see Meharg 2009, p. 89ff.; Niven 2003). Some researchers warn that overly rigid budget rules and implementation frameworks are likely to constrain field-level staff in their ability to react flexibly to changes in the operational environment (Natsios 2010).

Policy Review and Monitoring: Learning or Control?

Policy review is a key element of the policy cycle (Howlett et al. 2009). Organizations use quasi-scientific methods of evaluation to assess the impact, effectiveness, and efficiency of programs or policies (Clarke and Dawson 1999). The findings of said reviews can be used to enable incremental learning processes or to adjust an ineffective implementation strategy. In public organizations, the bureaucracy alone usually lacks the power and means to initiate major policy changes. Review processes connect the bureaucracy and political decision-makers. The organizational level at which review processes are allocated (headquarters vs. field) affects the extent to which political decision-makers are involved in reviewing the outcomes of public policies on a regular basis. Public administration literature is fairly pessimistic regarding the likelihood of effective policy review. Wildavsky (1972, p. 509), for instance, asserts that 'the needs of the organization and the people within it conflict with the desire to continuously monitor activities and change policies when they are found wanting.' Although this does not disprove the usefulness of review and monitoring, it indicates a dilemma between the interests of the people executing tasks within an organization and those who engage in strategic steering. The latter are interested in exerting control, both to gain knowledge and to prevent those involved in implementation from deviating from their mandate (McCubbins et al. 1987). Staff, by contrast, might be antagonistic to too much monitoring, which leads to a climate of distrust. In addition, extensive formal monitoring requirements (reporting schedules, etc.) might obstruct them from their primary tasks.

These difficulties notwithstanding, peacebuilding outcomes critically depend on effective review processes. From the perspective of process performance, it is vital that processes and structures are in place that effectively connect implementing peacebuilders in the field with political decision-makers, in order to facilitate strategy adjustments when and if needed (Meharg 2009; OSCE 2007; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). Recognition of this has fueled a steadily increasing number of conceptual

studies on evaluation in conflict zones and several practice-related manuals on evaluation in peacebuilding (Church and Rogers 2006; OECD-DAC 2008, 2010).

Process Performance as an Explanatory Condition for Policy Outcomes

The aim of this chapter is to develop a framework to analyze the link between organizations' institutional design and policy outcomes. Because of the multitude of external factors that potentially affect policy outcomes, I have separated the research question into two parts. The previous section suggested an operationalization to study how institutional designs affect process performance. This section turns to the second research question: What impact does the process performance of peace operations have on the outcome of peacebuilding policy? And how can we measure that?

Comparing peace operations in terms of their ability to achieve policy objectives is challenging. The difficulties begin on the side of the outcome (dependent variable). Previous research projects have generally traced whether peace settlements lasted for a defined number of years (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). However, there are numerous unresolved questions: What constitutes peace (Galtung 1985)? What is the (violence) threshold for breaking the peace? How many years warrant an assessment? And how can one parse out the (limited) influence peacebuilders have on this outcome? Doyle and Sambanis (2006) provide the hitherto most far-reaching theory of peacebuilding outcomes. They argue that lasting peace can be explained as a function of local development, local violence, and international resource investments. According to their theory, Afghanistan would count as a peacebuilding failure, while Kosovo would constitute a success.

This book looks at police reform within the overall setting of peacebuilding. And while Kosovo might be a success case in the eyes of the unaspiring definition implicit to the work of Doyle and Sambanis, there is still the possibility that police reform has been unsuccessful, despite the generally peaceful environment in Kosovo since the war. Analogously, the Afghan police could be highly effective but still unable to ensure safety and stability in the country. Findings of this would be counterintuitive and thus worth further exploration. In terms of the outcome, it is thus important to consider police reform separately. Furthermore, assessments of police reform in both countries must remain inconclusive: peacebuilding processes are still ongoing and it will require a few more decades before

satisfying answers will be possible. Nonetheless, though this book cannot provide a final assessment of the outcome of police reform in these two countries, it can take into consideration the progress achieved due to the intervention of one or several international organizations. This offers an intermediate and still valuable adjudication—one that takes into consideration also the assessments made by other academics, policy analysts, and media reports.

When attempting to explain police reform outcomes, two sets of factors (independent variables) have to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, there are the factors related to the performance of peace operations, as noted above. On the other hand, one must also consider the universe of alternative explanations that could arguably have affected peacebuilding outcomes. There is, of course, a wealth of research dealing with these questions. Some have been mentioned above. Most importantly, there is Doyle and Sambanis' (2006) comprehensive study of peacebuilding outcomes. In a cross-country comparative study, they compared the influence of three major variables, which they construct based on indices. First, the hostility in a given country was measured in terms of casualties and refugees. Second, the degree of local capacity was measured by the development of the infrastructure and economy of a country. Third, the degree of international (peacebuilding) capacity was measured in terms of the resources invested, including foreign aid and international peacekeepers on the ground. A quantitative analysis of a dataset with 121 postconflict settings supported their hypothesis that 'higher levels of *International Capacities* and *Local Capacities* compensate for increasing levels of *Hostility*' (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 125, emphasis original). From a causal point of view, these are the key explanatory factors with which a bureaucratic explanation must compete.

2.4 Case Selection, Methodology, and Data Sources

In explaining how institutional designs affect peacebuilding outcomes, the book takes an inductive approach aiming to generate theory. This requires a rather dense level of empirical analysis, combined with a method that facilitates abstraction. The analytical framework has already specified a grid of relevant explanatory factors that will be assessed on the basis of process-tracing methodology. Two methodological twists further assist in

assessing the causal relevance of individual factors. The first is to compare cases that differ as much as possible with respect to potential alternative explanatory conditions. Observing similar causal mechanisms in the link between performance and outcomes *despite* differences in the other key explanatory variables would strengthen the external validity of findings (Lijphart 1971). The second strategy combines process-based analysis with the assessment of counterfactuals (George and Bennett 2005). This is also what Gutner and Thompson (2010, p. 240) suggest to ensure the validity of an explanation based on process performance: 'What would the outcome have been absent the IO or with a different institutional arrangement?' The two strategies are discussed next, followed by a presentation of the main data sources used for this study.

Selecting Most-Likely and Least-Likely Cases for Police Reform

In line with the comparative method, the aim was to select cases that provide a maximum in contextual variance (Lijphart 1971). With police reform in Kosovo and Afghanistan, I identified a scenario that matches this criterion. With their differences in conflict intensity and local development (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), Kosovo and Afghanistan represent a most-likely and a least-likely case for positive peacebuilding outcomes, respectively (see Fig. 2.2).

At the time of the intervention, Kosovo was a fairly well-developed country, the population had a fairly high average life expectancy of 67 years (1999), and there was a moderate degree of conflict (1382 battle-related deaths in 1999 in Serbia). Afghanistan was (and still is) fairly underdeveloped; at the time of the intervention, life expectancy was as low as 45 years, and there were several thousand battle-related deaths.[5] Police reform was a priority task for peacebuilding in both countries.

There were several relevant organizations for police reform in the two countries: in Kosovo, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ran a police reform mission (1999–2008) that cooperated with the United Nations interim administration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and its civilian police. In 2008, police reform responsibilities were taken over by a newly established EU rule of law mission (EULEX), which is still operating today. In Afghanistan, the German Police Project Office led international assistance to police reform from 2001 to 2007, at which point a new EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) took



Fig. 2.2 Peacebuilding investments in Kosovo and Afghanistan in perspective (*Source:* Author's compilation. Data according to Dobbins et al. (2005). Annual per capita assistance refers to the first two years after the intervention, military presence to the first year)

Table 2.2 Overview of the four case studies

	Time/duration	
	1999–2007/08	*Since 2007/08*
Kosovo (most-likely)	OSCE mission for institution-building and police reform in Kosovo; 1999–2008	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); since 2008
Afghanistan (least-likely)	German Police Project Office in Afghanistan; 2001–2007	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL); since 2007

Source: Author's compilation

over. Shortly after, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also deployed a mission. Among those actors, I selected for the Kosovo case studies the OSCE and the EU mission EULEX and for Afghanistan the German project and the EU mission EUPOL (see Table 2.2).

Selecting these cases has three methodological reasons. First, with two different organizations per country I can compare the effect of different institutional designs in the same country context. Second, with the EU, I can compare the performance of one organization in different country contexts. And finally, selecting the OSCE, EU, and Germany, includes the leading organizations for police reform in each country in the sample. It also allows studying the course of assistance to police reform over time. The UN in Kosovo would also have been an option as it has shared police reform leadership with the OSCE. However, because of its status as interim administration mission it appears as an extreme case rather than the norm in international peacebuilding and thus was ruled out. Although the EU and OSCE are *international* organizations, Germany represents an additional form of variance in terms of institutional design.

Process-Tracing and Counterfactuals in Each Case Study

Section 2.3 developed a conceptual framework to study how institutional designs affect the process performance of peace operations in three policy phases (planning, implementation, and review). By means of qualitative case study techniques, this framework can be applied to systematize empirical data. Terms such as 'causal reconstruction' (Mayntz 2002), the 'analytical narrative' (Gerring 2007a), or 'analytical process-tracing' (George and Bennett 2005), all refer to examining 'by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions' (Mayntz 2004, p. 241). Expressed in a less convoluted way this means that 'process tracing invokes a (…) complex logic, one analogous to detective work, legal briefs, journalism, and traditional historical accounts. The analyst seeks to make sense of a congeries of disparate evidence, each of which sheds light on a single outcome or set of related outcomes' (Gerring 2007b, p. 178). The cause–effect relationship, often called causal mechanism in this context (Mayntz 2004), then must be assessed along a temporal dimension. However, in contrast to historical singular narratives, process-tracing of causal mechanisms ontologically refers to *recurring processes*, which is why we can generalize from them: 'Statements of mechanisms are accordingly *generalizing*

causal propositions' (Mayntz 2004, p. 241, emphasis original). Focusing on mechanisms requires dense empirical information as can be obtained through expert interviews. However, instead of relying on experts' abstract statements about the linkages between design variables and performance as often the case in public administration research, the case studies will trace these mechanisms in an exemplary fashion, based on observable historical processes that took place in peace operations.

In the present book, process-tracing is utilized in four case studies (Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6), each of which traces the link between institutional designs and peace operations performance at the level of processes. The analysis follows the framework introduced above: It splits into three phases of the policy cycle and assesses performance in relation to the baseline outlined for each phase: rapid launch of operations, flexibility and cooperation, and the ability to adjust a peacebuilding strategy. Expert interviews are the main data source; they have been conducted on the basis of a semi-structured questionnaire geared toward identifying institutional determinants related to performance. This part of the study consumed the most analytical resources during the field research carried out for this book. The findings are presented through a combination of historical and analytical narrative in Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Each chapter tells the organization-centered story of one organization's police reform mission—how it was decided, planned, executed, and adjusted.

The findings then provide the basis for the second layer of the analysis, namely, the assessment of the link between peace operations' process performance and the outcome of police reform. Social mechanisms as defined by Mayntz ontologically lend themselves for generalization. However, this implies that a mechanism can be fully assessed, including the identification of *all* intermediate steps between condition and outcome. This is hardly possible in the context of a comparative case study that cuts across two countries and four peace operations. In response to this problem, the assessment of how peace operations' performance relates to the outcome of police reform relies on counterfactual reasoning.[6] This implies counterfactual reasoning how peace operations' performance relates to other conditions that possibly could explain a given outcome. Each case study thus ends with a section that offers such a counterfactual discussion of the relevance of a peace operation's performance vis-à-vis other factors. Based on the logic of case selection as outlined above, a comparison of all four case studies then summarizes my findings in Chap. 7.

Data Sources

The main data sources are policy documents and 109 experts' interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014 (see Appendix I for a list). I approached interviewees in my capacity as independent researcher with university affiliation. Field trips took place without governmental institutional affiliation. In most cases, I identified individual respondents via Internet search and approached them via e-mail. I then used a snowball system to access others in their organization. In terms of access, field research in Afghanistan was more challenging than in the other countries and cities due to security restrictions. This prevented an interview with the Afghan ministry of interior, for which reason my findings rely only on the opinion of international experts and Afghan policy experts working in nongovernmental organizations in Kabul. Access to EUPOL Afghanistan was also restricted because mission leadership, after learning of my presence, limited the number of interviews I could conduct. This demonstrates the delicate nature of research on intra-organizational processes. Limited access to EUPOL Afghanistan could eventually be circumvented by conducting interviews outside the mission's premises. However, the delicacy of the information provided by interviewees is the reason why respondents are given pseudonyms in the case studies.

Respondents were selected to represent different national and organizational perspectives, including locals and internationals as well as police officers, project managers, and administrative staff (see Table 2.3). I also consulted a number of independent policy experts in both countries to gain an outside perspective. Each respondent answered semi-structured questions regarding how they perceived an organization's performance in each of the three policy phases (see Sect. 2.2 above) and which (institutional) factors were particularly relevant for this assessment. When analyzing the data, I used three kinds of information. First, factual information on internal structures, processes, and rules. Second, information on historical incidents, which I used as examples in the case studies to demonstrate the mechanisms between institutional designs and mission performance. And third, personal assessments on the state of police reform in the two countries or/and on missions' performance in the three policy phases. Not being a police officer myself and knowing little about what makes a good police organization in a postconflict context, assessments of the outcome of police reform also relied heavily on existing assessments by subject matter experts

Table 2.3 Overview of expert interviews

Place	*Date of field trip*	*# Interviews*			
		Police	*Admin*	*Project*	*External*
Afghanistan: Kabul	June 2011, Feb 2012	5	4	11	10
Kosovo: Pristina, Mitrovica	January 2011, November 2012, June 2013	8	3	12	7
Germany: Berlin, other	Several between 2011 and 2013	4	3	11	0
Austria: Vienna (OSCE)	January 2012	0	4	5	0
Belgium: Brussels (EU)	July 2011, April 2012	0	6	12	4

Source: Author's compilation

Notes

1. New institutionalism is a body of social science theory that emphasizes the relevance of institutions in political life. Two strands can be differentiated, depending on their individual-level assumptions: Rational-choice institutionalism (implicit here) emphasizes the relevance of consequentialism, utility, and effectiveness in individual action; and sociological institutionalism emphasizes that individuals also act according to a logic of shared sense of appropriateness. Finally, historical institutionalism cuts across the two others in that it emphasizes the relevance of time and power in explaining societal outcomes (Goodin 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996).
2. There is also a sociological perspective on institutions that also sees cognitive scripts, moral templates, and symbol systems as part of institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 947). In line with this, authors have also studied the effects of different organizational cultures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) or the effects of the socialization of individual bureaucrats (Kaufman 1960). While this perspective certainly has its value, the present research endeavor benefits from a narrower perspective on institutions.
3. See the Oxford Dictionary, online edition: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed 01 November, 2015).
4. The terminology of outputs and outcomes goes back to system-theoretical thinker such as Easton (1967). *Output* refers to the actual administrative action an agency performs. Depending on the mandate, these outputs can take diverse forms, such as citizen services (e.g., issuing a passport, collecting trash, or providing public security), or services to the parliament (e.g.,

preparing a law or legal document). In any case, they serve a larger purpose formulated in an agency's mandate. The *outcome* then captures whether administrative actions have the desired societal effects.

5. The number of battle-related deaths and life expectancy rates according to the World Bank's World Development Indicators available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (accessed 01 November, 2015).
6. The counterfactual understanding of causation is borrowed from Bayesian logic (Gerring 2005, p. 167). Assume you know that a condition (X) can be treated as sufficient for an outcome (Y) when the condition always precedes and leads to the outcome (formal logic: $X \rightarrow Y$; no case allowed where the condition is present but not the outcome). By contrast, a condition can be treated as necessary when no case exists in which the outcome is present but not the condition (formal logic: $X \leftarrow Y$). The difference is that necessity allows other (unknown) triggering factors besides those included in the mechanism, while a sufficient condition is of singular causal relevance for an outcome. If a condition is both sufficient and necessary, the condition and the outcome have to simultaneously be present in all cases (formal logic: $X \leftrightarrow Y$). See also (Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2007).

References

Andrews, K. R. (1980). *The concept of corporate strategy* (Rev. ed.). Homewood: R. D. Irwin.

Aucoin, P. (1990). Administrative reform in public management: Paradigms, principles, paradoxes and pendulums. *Governance, 3*(2), 115–137.

Bardach, E. (1977). *The implementation game: What happens after a bill becomes a law*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bardach, E. (1998). *Getting agencies to work together: The practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization, 53*(4), 699–732.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barzelay, M., & Füchtner, N. (2003). Explaining public management policy change: Germany in comparative perspective. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 5*(1), 7–27.

Bauer, M. W. (2008). Introduction: Organizational change, management reform and EU policy-making. *Journal of European Public Policy, 15*(5), 627–647.

Bauer, M. W. (2012). Tolerant, if personal goals remain unharmed: Explaining supranational bureaucrats' attitudes to organisational change. *Governance, 25*(3), 485–510.

Bea, F. X., & Haas, J. (2009). *Strategisches management*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.

Behn, R. D. (1998). What right do public managers have to lead? *Public Administration Review, 58*(3), 209–224.

Bendix, D., & Stanley, R. (2008). Deconstructing local ownership of security sector reform: A review of the literature. *African Security Review, 17*(2), 93–104.

Benner, T., Mergenthaler, S., & Rotmann, P. (2011). *The new world of UN peace operations: Learning to build peace?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blau, P. M. (1955). *The dynamics of bureaucracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bogumil, J., Grohs, S., & Kuhlmann, S. (2006). Ergebnisse und Wirkungen kommunaler Verwaltungsmodernisierung in Deutschland—Eine Evaluation nach zehn Jahren Praxiserfahrung. *Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift, Special Issue, 37*, 151–184.

Boin, A. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2011). From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction. *West European Politics, 35*(1), 1–19.

Breakey, H., & Dekker, S. (2014). Weak links in the chain of authority: The challenges of intervention decisions to protect civilians. *International Peacekeeping, 21*(3), 307–323.

Budäus, D., & Grüning, G. (1998). New public management—Entwicklung und Grundlagen einer »Revolution« des öffentlichen Sektors. *Zeitschrift Führung + Organisation (zfo), 67*(1), 4–9.

Church, C., & Rogers, M. M. (2006). *Designing for results: Integrating monitoring and evaluation in conflict transformation programs*. Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground.

Clarke, A., & Dawson, R. (1999). *Evaluation research. An introduction to principles, methods and practice*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Coombes, D. L. (1998). The place of public management in the modern European state. In T. Verheijen & D. L. Coombes (Eds.), *Innovations in public management: Perspectives from East and West Europe* (pp. 8–38). Cheltenham: Elgar.

da Costa, D. F., & Karlsrud, J. (2013). 'Bending the rules': The space between HQ policy and local action in UN civilian peacekeeping. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17*(3–4), 293–312.

de Coning, C. (2009). Planning for success. In C. Clement & A. C. Smith (Eds.), *Managing complexity: Political and managerial challenges in United Nations peace operations* (pp. 24–27). New York: International Peace Institute.

deLeon, P. (1999). The missing link revisited: Contemporary implementation research. *Policy Studies Review, 16*(3–4), 311.

DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review, 48*(2), 147–160.

Dobbin, F. (1994). Cultural models of organization: The social construction of rational organizing principles. In D. Crane (Ed.), *The sociology of culture* (pp. 117–153). Oxford: Blackwell.

Dobbins, J., Jones, S. G., Crane, K., Rathmell, A., Steele, B., Teltschik, R., et al. (2005). *The UN's role in nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Donais, T. (Ed.). (2008). *Local ownership and security sector reform*. Münster: Lit Verlag.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Drucker, P. F. (1974). *Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices*. London: Heinemann.

Dunleavy, P. (1991). *Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice economic explanations in political science* (1. publ. ed.). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Dursun-Ozkanca, O., & Crossley-Frolick, K. (2012). Security sector reform in Kosovo: The complex division of labor between the EU and other multilateral institutions in building Kosovo's police force. *European Security, 4*, 1–21.

Easton, D. (1967). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.

Eckhard, S. (2014a). Bureaucratic representation and ethnic bureaucratic drift: A case study of United Nations Minority Policy Implementation in Kosovo. *American Review of Public Administration, 44*(5), 600–621.

Ege, J., & Bauer, M. W. (2013). International bureaucracies from a public administration and international relations perspective. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of international organization* (pp. 135–148). London: Routledge.

Egeberg, M. (2003). How bureaucratic structure matters: An organizational perspective. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), *Handbook of public administration* (pp. 116–126). London/Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Fayol, H. (1929). *Allgemeine und industrielle Verwaltung*. München/Berlin: Oldenbourg.

Fortna, V. P. (2008). *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' Choices after civil war*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Galtung, J. (1985). Twenty-five years of peace research: Ten challenges and some responses. *Journal of Peace Research, 22*(2), 141–158.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Geri, L. R. (2001). New public management and the reform of international organizations. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 67*(3), 445–460.

Gerring, J. (2005). Causation. A unified framework for the social science. *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17*(2), 163–198.

Gerring, J. (2007a). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gerring, J. (2007b). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Glueck, W. F. (1980). *Strategic management and business policy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Goodin, R. E. (1996). *The theory of institutional design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gouldner, A. W. (1954). *Patterns of industrial bureaucracy*. Glencoe: Free Press.
Gulick, L. (1937). Notes on the theory of organization. With special reference to government. In L. Gulick & L. Urwick (Eds.), *Papers on the science of administration*. New York: Columbia University.
Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. *Review of International Organizations, 5*(3), 227–248.
Haas, E. B. (1964). *Beyond the nation-state: Functionalism and international organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies, 44*(5), 936–957.
Hammond, T. H. (1986). Agenda control, organizational structure and bureaumetric politics. *American Journal of Political Science, 30*(3), 379–420.
Hammond, T. H. (1993). Toward a general theory of hierarchy: Books, bureaucrats, basketball tournaments, and the administrative structure of the nation-state. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3*(1), 120–145.
Heinrich, C. J. (2012). Measuring public sector performance and effectiveness. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), *Handbook of public administration* (2nd ed., pp. 32–49). London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Hill, H. (1997). Strategische Erfolgsfaktoren in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. In H. Hill & H. Klages (Eds.), *Qualitäts- und erfolgsorientiertes Verwaltungsmanagement* (Vol. 2, pp. 19–38). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Honig, D. (2014). *Navigation by judgment: Organizational autonomy in the delivery of foreign aid* (Dissertation project). Camebridge: Harvard University.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., & Perl, A. (2009). *Studying public policy: Policy cycles & policy subsystems* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
IPI. (2012). *The management handbook for UN field missions*. New York: International Peace Institute.
Jones, B. D. (2002). The challenges of strategic coordination. In S. J. Stedman, D. S. Rothchild, & E. M. Cousens (Eds.), *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements* (pp. 89–116). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Junk, J. (2012). Function follows form: The organizational design of peace operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6*(3), 299.

Kam, C. (2000). Not just parliamentary " Cowboys and Indians": Ministerial responsibility and bureaucratic drift. *Governance-an International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13*(3), 365–392.

Karlsrud, J. (2013). Special representatives of the Secretary-General as norm arbitrators? Understanding bottom-up authority in UN peacekeeping. *Global Governance, 19*(4), 525.

Kaufman, H. (1960). *The forest ranger, a study in administrative behavior*. Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by Johns Hopkins Press.

Kaufman, H. (1981). *Fear of bureaucracy: A raging pandemic* (Vol. 41, pp. 1–9). Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration.

Kickert, W. (Ed.). (2008). *The study of public management in Europe and the US: A comparative analysis of national distinctiveness*. London: Routledge.

Kingsley, J. D. (1944). *Representative bureaucracy: An interpretation of the British civil service*. Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press.

Knill, C., & Balint, T. (2008). Explaining variation in organizational change: The reform of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD. *Journal of European Public Policy, 15*(5), 669–690.

Knill, C., Eckhard, S., & Grohs, S. (2016). Administrative styles in the European Commission and the OSCE-Secretariat: Striking similarities despite different organisational settings. *Journal of European Public Policy*.

Krems, B. (2012). Online-Verwaltungslexikon olev.de [Management-Ebenen: Operativ—taktisch—strategisch]. Retrieved January 01, 2012, from http://www.olev.de/o/operativ_usw.htm

Kuhlmann, S., & Wollmann, H. (2013). *Verwaltung und Verwaltungsreformen in Europa: Einführung in die vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft* (Vol. 51). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Liese, A. (2010). Explaining varying degrees of openness in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In C. Jönsson & J. Tallberg (Eds.), *Transnational actors in global governance. Patterns, explanations and implications* (pp. 88–108). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. *American Political Science Review, 65*, 682–693.

Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. *Public Administration Review, 19*(2), 79–88.

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lynn, L. E. (1996). The new public management as an international phenomenon: A skeptical view. *International Public Management Journal, 1*(3).

Martin, L. L., & Simmons, B. A. (1998). Theories and empirical studies of international institutions. *International Organization, 52*(4), 729–757.

Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 5*(2), 145–174.

Mayntz, R. (2002). Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen. In R. Mayntz (Ed.), *Akteure-Mechanismen-Modelle. Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen* (pp. 7–43). Frankfurt/Main: Campus.

Mayntz, R. (2004). Mechanisms in the analysis of social macro-phenomena. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34*(2), 237–259.

Mayntz, R., & Derlien, H.-U. (1989). Party patronage and politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970–1987. Toward hybridization? *Governance, 2*(4), 384–404.

McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3*, 243–277.

Meharg, S. J. (2009). *Measuring what matters in peace operations and crisis management*. Kingston: Queen's University Press.

Merton, R. K. (1957). *Social theory and social structure* (Rev. and enl. ed.). Glencoe: Free Press.

Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. *Management Science, 24*(9), 934–948.

Momani, B. (2007). IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals. *The Review of International Organizations, 2*(1), 39–57.

Narten, J. (2008). Post-conflict peacebuilding and local ownership: Dynamics of external-local interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2*(3), 369–390.

Natsios, A. (2010). *The clash of the counter-bureaucracy and development*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Niskanen, W. A. (1971). *Bureaucracy and representative government* (1. publ. ed.). Chicago: Aldine Atherton.

Niven, P. R. (2003). *Balanced scorecard step-by-step for government and nonprofit agencies*. Hoboken: Wiley.

OECD-DAC. (2008). *Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: Working draft*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

OECD-DAC. (2010). *Supporting statebuilding in situations of conflict and fragility: Policy guidance*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

OSCE. (2007). *OSCE handbook*. Vienna: Press and Public Information Section, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Ostrom, V., & Ostrom, E. (1971). Public choice: A different approach to the study of public administration. *Public Administration Review, 31*(2), 203–216.

Paffenholz, T., & Reychler, L. (2007). *Aid for peace. A guide to planning and evaluation for conflict zones.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Page, E. C. (1985). *Political authority and bureaucratic power: A comparative analysis.* Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Parkinson, C. N. (1957). *Parkinson's law, and other studies in administration.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Perrow, C. (1970). *Organizational analysis: A sociological view*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Poister, T. H., Pitts, D. W., & Hamilton, E. L. (2010). Strategic management research in the public sector: A review, synthesis, and future directions. *The American Review of Public Administration, 40*(5), 522–545.

Pollitt, C. (1990). *Managerialism and the public services: The Anglo-American experience*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public management reform. A comparative analysis* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, Why it's amazing that Federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Proeller, I., & Siegel, J. P. (2009). Performance Management in der deutschen verwaltung—Eine explorative Einschätzung. *Dms—der moderne staat—Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 2*(2009), 455–474.

Ragin, C. C. (2000). *Fuzzy-set social science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reinalda, B. (2009). *Routledge history of international organizations: from 1815 to the present day.* London [u.a.]: Routledge.

Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., & Kruck, A. (2012). *International organization* (2nd ed.). London: Pallgrave Macmillan.

Rosenbloom, D. H., Kravchuck, R., & Clerkin, R. M. (2015). *Public administration: Understanding management, politics, and law in the public sector* (8th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Rubin, M. (1988). Sagas, ventures quests and parlays: A typology of strategies in the public sector. In J. Bryson & R. Einsweiler (Eds.), *Strategic planning* (pp. 84–105). Chicago: Planners Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Europeanization beyond Europe. *Living Reviews in European Governance, 7*(1).

Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2007). *Qualitative comparative analysis und fuzzy sets—Ein Lehrbuch für Anwender und jene, die es werden wollen*. Opladen/ Farmington Hills: Barbera Budrich.

Schori, P. (2009). Leadership on the line: Managing field complexity. In C. Clement & A. C. Smith (Eds.), *Managing complexity: Political and manage-*

rial challenges in United Nations peace operations (pp. 28–31). New York: International Peace Institute.

Simon, H. A. (1947). *Administrative behavior*. New York: Macmillan Co.

Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., & Lundgren, M. (2015). *The performance of international organizations: An output-based approach*. Paper presented at the general conference of the ECPR, 26–29 August 2015, Montreal, Canada.

Thom, N., & Ritz, A. (2006). *Public management. Innovative Konzepte zur Führung im öffentlichen Sektor* (Vol. 3). Wiesbaden: Gabler.

Trondal, J. (2010). *Unpacking international organisations: The dynamics of compound bureaucracies*. Manchester: Manchester Universty Press.

Vreeland, J. R. (2003). *The IMF and economic development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weaver, C. (2008). *Hypocrisy trap: The world bank and the poverty of reform*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wildavsky, A. B. (1972). The self-evaluating organization. *Public Administration Review, 32*(5), 509–520.

Wildavsky, A. B. (1979). *Speaking truth to power. The art and craft of policy analysis*. Boston/Torronto: Little.

CHAPTER 3

The OSCE's Contribution to Police Reform in Kosovo

Ethnic tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs date back to the disintegration of Yugoslavia following the death of its long-time leader Tito in 1980.[1] The Serbian politician Slobodan Milosevic, who by the end of the 1980s dominated the political scene within the succeeding Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, made it his personal quest to curb the gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia. This included revoking the autonomous status of some of the Yugoslavian provinces in 1989, including Kosovo where ethnic Albanians had long struggled for political self-determination. Gradually, Albanian suppression triggered a bloody civil war between Serbian forces and the Kosovo liberation army, which eventually was decided by NATO's intervention in March 1999 leading to Serbian surrender. Although Russia's pending veto had prevented the United Nations (UN) Security Council to sanction the intervention, the Council subsequently agreed to place Kosovo under transitional UN administration. Police reform in Kosovo took place within this context. Under the UN interim administration mission's (UNMIK) umbrella, a large number of international organizations and governmental agencies entered Kosovo to support growing full-fledged state institutions. For the police, the OSCE deployed a mission to select and train police officers who were then integrated into the UN's own peacebuilding police force (UN Civpol) that gradually transformed itself into the new Kosovo Police Service.

Covering the OSCE mission until 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and the EU took over (see Chap. 4), this chapter demonstrates that, from the outset, the OSCE was fast, lean, and

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_3

flexible in the way it worked and interacted with its international and local partners. As such, it acquired a remarkably positive reputation for its work in supporting police reform in Kosovo. These results, were facilitated by dedicated staff, who had received a high degree of decision-making autonomy, as well as highly flexible operational and budget rules. In contrast to some of the other cases outlined in this book, the OSCE's structures and rules actually *enabled* peacebuilding. After providing an overview of the OSCE's institutional experience in peacebuilding and police reform (Sect. 3.1), and the political developments that led to its mandate in Kosovo (Sect. 3.2), the chapter addresses how the mission performed in terms of planning (Sect. 3.3), implementation (Sect. 3.4), and review (Sect. 3.5). Section 3.6 finally summarizes how the OSCE's good performance relates to positive police reform outcomes.

3.1 The OSCE as Actor in Peacebuilding and Police Reform

Like all the organizations examined in this book, the OSCE was essentially a newcomer to peacebuilding and police reform. In fact, the organization's entire peacebuilding framework evolved more or less in parallel to the Kosovo mission. The OSCE is a multilateral organization without yet the official status of an international organization. It evolved out of a series of conferences in Helsinki and Geneva between 1973 and 1975 and was originally called the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The initial conference provided an opportunity to open diplomatic exchange and discussion outside military structures during the Cold War. It remained a conference with a chairmanship that rotated among the thirty-five participating states until the 1990s, when a Committee of Senior Officials (since 1994 the Permanent Council) was established.

The organization as a whole comprised a number of small, decentralized support bodies, including a Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna, staffed by a handful of seconded national officials. The CSCE's CPC became one of the primary instruments for European efforts to resolve the Yugoslav wars—an objective that drove much of the organization's institutionalization. In 1992 and 1993, member states appointed the first Secretary-General and finally renamed the conference the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In addition, a number of new rules, authorities and instruments were instituted to achieve a more rigorous and

efficient response to the Balkan conflict. Within the OSCE Secretariat, the CPC became the main body for the operational activities of the OSCE. With the consent of member states, it could launch and dispatch fact-finding and monitoring missions as an instrument of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and crisis management (CSCE 1992, Chap. VI). The first missions were quickly dispatched to some Balkan regions (including Kosovo) and to Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova, while other field offices were opened in Central Asia.

The real booster for the operational capacities of the OSCE, however, was the Kosovo conflict. In 1998, at a time when the OSCE Secretariat was staffed with only 150 people (Vollebaek 1999, p. 5), member states established the Kosovo Verification Mission with a mandated strength of 2000 monitoring experts, which was converted after the war into the slightly smaller OSCE mission in Kosovo. These responsibilities and the increased administrative burden that came with them were met by a growing number of staff in Vienna. But, while the Balkan conflicts accelerated the OSCE's institutionalization in the 1990s and early 2000s, the overall political mood changed. Most importantly, European states in the OSCE increasingly turned to the EU with its regional foreign and security policy in the making. As one observer at the time pointed out, 'the Western countries (…) have deliberately given up the spheres of competence of the Organization to NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe, thus marginalizing the OSCE' (Milinkovic 2004, p. 201). Despite this setback and the erosion of its regional political relevance, the OSCE had gained a strong organizational basis and continued to extend eastward, with several central Asian countries as new member states. These states still request the expertise in institution-building and democratization that the OSCE gained in the Balkans.

At the 2006 Ministerial Council in Ljubljana (OSCE 2006), member states initiated a series of organizational reforms to adjust to decreased funding while still maintaining several field offices in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In short, they sought to rationalize the organization's structures. The OSCE is now organized along three levels of decision-making competences. The OSCE Summit (head of state and government) remains the highest governing body but it convenes only irregularly. The Ministerial Council constitutes the second level; it convenes annually and defines the strategic direction of the organization. The Permanent Council, finally, is the standing organ for regular consultation and for governing the

day-to-day operational activities of the OSCE. It is based at the Hofburg in Vienna and comprises the ambassadors of member states' permanent delegations. As with all other OSCE bodies, decisions are consensus-based. To coordinate and consult on current OSCE business, the Ministerial Council selects from its members the Chairmanship in Office (the Foreign Minister and his/her staff) for one year. Together with the preceding and subsequent Chairmanship, the current Chairmanship forms the Troika. Finally, the Rules of Procedure briefly add that 'the decision-making bodies may establish or dissolve (…) specific [executive] structures for the implementation of decisions taken and tasks set by the participating States' (OSCE 2006, para. II(A)-13). These executive structures are the Secretariat, field operations, and a few regional offices.

The goal of the OSCE is to enhance regional security. Initially, it operated on the basis of confidence and security-building measures that had little to do with peacebuilding and crisis management. But after the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts and civil war suddenly became major threats to European security and the OSCE responded by developing its own framework of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and postconflict rehabilitation. Operational activities, such as field missions, correspond to each of these phases. Postconflict rehabilitation refers to institution- and capacity-building, covering a broad range of tasks such as human rights training, election reform, educational reform, protecting the rights of minorities, economic reconstruction, judicial reform, and police training and reform (OSCE 2011a).[2] At the November 1999 Istanbul Summit, participating states explicitly expressed that 'the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation' (OSCE 1999b, para. 52). This happened in parallel with the deployment of the OSCE Missions to Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro and Macedonia, which were assigned 'to train multi-ethnic police services (…) and to further reform the national police service towards democratic law enforcement institutions' (Stodiek 2009, p. 302). To guide its activities in police reform the OSCE established the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) at the Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Center in 2002. In 2006, the unit published the 'Guidebook on Democratic Policing,' a summary of the OSCE community's normative view on the principles and functioning of a democratic, accountable, and multiethnic police organization. As the first document of its kind worldwide, it is

intended to 'serve as a reference to good policing practice and internationally adopted standards' (OSCE 2008, p. 7) for the OSCE's police reform activities.

The OSCE is now a field-heavy organization with a lean secretariat in Vienna. In 2007, it operated with a 126.7 Mio Euro budget, compared to 21 Mio Euro in 1994. That same year, 71% of its 3523 staff worked in the field, which left around 400 employees in Vienna. Because of strong competition mainly from NATO and the EU, the OSCE recently extended eastward to Central Asia. One of its main areas of expertise is the promotion of norms and practices in democratic policing through training and institutional reform.

3.2 The Political Context of the OSCE Mission's Mandate

In order to assess the linkages between the OSCE's institutional design and its performance in police reform in Kosovo, it is also important to understand the general political dynamics characterizing its main decision-making organ: the Permanent Council. According to insiders,[3] OSCE member states tend to form three relatively stable blocks: EU member states attempt to speak with one voice, the USA and Canada form a single influential block, and Russia, buttressed by changing coalitions of Eastern European and Central Asian states, forms a third block.

Ever since the OSCE was founded, Russia attempted to emphasize the organization's original role as an intergovernmental arena for political exchange and negotiation, while decreasing its involvement in peacekeeping. Russia rejected the idea that the organization should 'perform as a watchdog obsessed by human dimension matters' (quoted in Ghebali 2004, p. 217). This opinion remained unchanged even after the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, the US position during the 1990s was fairly similar, albeit for different reasons. According to one observer, the USA had an 'obsession with NATO and its enlargement' (Mlyn 2002, p. 55) and the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations saw the OSCE as a potential rival. Therefore, the USA tended to thwart any attempts to strengthen the Secretariat of the OSCE. EU member states, for their part, were initially fairly supportive of OSCE involvement in operational crisis management, but this changed when the EU began developing its own capabilities in foreign and security policy.

It was US President Clinton's envoy to the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, who radically altered his government's OSCE policy in the light of the Kosovo war.[4] Following reports that Serbian regular forces had destroyed 300 Albanian villages in the territory of Kosovo between April and September 1998 (Malcolm 2006, p. 147), the UN Security Council increased its pressure, passing two resolutions (UN Security Council 1998a, b). When these had little effect, the US State Department sent its most experienced diplomat vis-à-vis the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, to Belgrade, where he managed to negotiate a ceasefire with the Serb President Milosevic on 15 October 1998. Both sides agreed to deploy an OSCE mission to observe the ceasefire (UN Security Council 1998c). Analyzing US policy at the time, Mlyn (1996, 2002, p. 55f.) concludes that the USA saw the OSCE's operational expertise as better aligning with the presence of NATO in the region (as compared to the UN). Holbrooke himself said in an interview that in 'Bosnia and Kosovo, through the collaboration of these two organizations, we are witnessing the birth of a new post-Cold War approach to conflict resolution' (Holbrooke 1999, p. 46).

The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) deployed in the winter of 1998/99 with a US diplomat as head of the mission (Bellamy and Griffin 2002). Ambassador Walker eventually played a critical role in the events leading up to NATO's eventual intervention—a role that arguably deprived the OSCE of a more comprehensive role in Kosovo. During the first months, the KVM seemed to succeed when violence between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) subsided and refugees began returning. But there were still occasional violations of the ceasefire by both sides. In January 1999, Serb forces killed several dozen people in a small Kosovo village named Racak. Although it was never clarified whether these were civilians or members of the KLA, Ambassador Walker gave on-the-spot interviews that accused Serbian forces of having slaughtered civilians in cold blood. Internationally, the statement stirred up great media attention. In fact, it constituted a turning point, after which France—who traditionally supported Serbia—moved closer toward the position of the USA and Britain, who had argued all along for a more robust approach (Stahl and Harnisch 2009, p. 66).[5]

Immediately after the Racak event, the French government invited Albanian and Serb representatives to peace talks in the French castle of Rambouillet in February 1999. When these talks yielded no compromise and fighting in Kosovo intensified, the OSCE Chairmanship decided to withdraw the KVM for security reasons (Maisonneuve 2000, p. 52).

Around the same time, NATO began sending unmistakable signals that it was ready to intervene militarily if the situation on the ground did not improve. After Holbrooke failed to convince Milosevic to yield in a final meeting, NATO leaders authorized air strikes against a series of strategic targets in Kosovo and Serbia. Operation Allied Forces—notably, not mandated by the UN Security Council—began on 24 March 1999.

At around the same time, preparations for the postconflict settlement began. In Rambouillet, leading states had opted for the OSCE to assume a leading role in postconflict peacebuilding. OSCE staff in Vienna and Macedonia thus initiated planning for significant institution-building in the areas of police, rule of law, and civilian administration (ICG 1998, 1999, p. 8; Perito 2004). Eventually, however, negotiations took an unexpected turn. During two G8 meetings in May and June 1999 Western states and Russia agreed to draft a joint UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo to legitimize the international military and civilian presence there. Part of the deal struck during the meetings was to bring in the UN instead of the OSCE (Dahrendorf et al. 2003, p. 137). Given the KVM's ambiguous role during the Kosovo war, Russia opposed the involvement of the OSCE and wanted the UN to act as lead organization in Kosovo (Perito 2004, p. 183). Informed more or less out of the blue, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations consequently planned for a new peacekeeping mission with one of the most extensive mandates thus far—to be implemented in less than two weeks' time. A few days later, on 10 June 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), which authorized UNMIK to take over the governance of the territory of Kosovo.

In two reports to the Security Council (dated 12 June and 12 July 1999), UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined his crisis management strategy for Kosovo. Based on the acknowledgment[6] that 'the United Nations does not have the capacity to solely undertake the task of nation building and is therefore obliged to work with other organisations,' the document established a division of labor that effectively brought the OSCE back in.

Usually, when deciding on an OSCE field mission, the host state government has to give its consent. Regarding Kosovo, this would have brought Serbia in as an important veto player. However, when the Security Council transferred political authority for the territory of Kosovo to an 'international civilian presence,' UNMIK replaced Serbia as 'host country' and became the principal point of reference for the OSCE's mandate

negotiations. On 12 June 1999, two days after the Security Council had adopted Resolution 1244, a meeting took place[7] between the Norwegian Chairman-in-office, represented by the Norwegian Ambassador Kim Traavik, and a representative of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Under Secretary-General Bernard Miyet. They struck a deal that outlined, inter alia, a shared assistance operation to establish a new police force in Kosovo.

The content of the undisclosed letter of cooperation is much more detailed than any other official document on the OSCE activities in Kosovo, including the actual mission mandate adopted by the OSCE Permanent Council on 01 July 1999 (P.DEC/305). And for many in the new OSCE mission, the letter actually constituted the more relevant document.[8] It stated that the mission 'will lead UNMIK's efforts in the institution-building area' and it listed the tasks associated with this responsibility. In the area of the rule of law, these included to establish and administer a police school in Kosovo:

> The police school shall provide basic and more advanced training to members of the Kosovo Police Service, who shall be recruited (…) jointly by UNMIK police leadership and personnel responsible for the police school (…) [and] to develop mechanisms to ensure that the police (…) are operating in accordance with international standards of criminal justice and human rights.[9]

In sum, the chapter demonstrates the extent of political turmoil during the time of political decision-making on the postconflict setting for Kosovo. Operationally, the new OSCE mission gained a specific mandate with a precise specification of tasks. Politically, however, the situation remained tense. Russia and Serbia never forgot that the OSCE had allowed its Kosovo Verification Mission to become hijacked by the West and serve as justification for NATO intervention. To this day, both sides have not settled their differences, which remain a source of tension in not only the Permanent Council but also the UN Security Council.

3.3 Planning and Mission Deployment: Fast and Along Local Preferences

From the perspective of peacebuilding performance, it is important that peace operations are able to rapidly launch their operations after the mandate

gets passed and that they are able to adjust to local preferences (local ownership). As this chapter shows, this was one of the strengths of the OSCE's Kosovo mission. By the time the UN Security Council passed the Kosovo peacebuilding mandate (Resolution 1244) in June 1999, forty-two OSCE officers were already working in Kosovo. Less than a year later, the OSCE mission's police reform branch had between 150 and 230 international trainers on spot at the new police school in Vushtrri, supported by around 240 local staff.[10] The main reason for this tremendous progress was the bottom-up nature of the planning process, which was carried out by experts in the field, instead of the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. Field-driven planning yielded two advantages: first, when larger strategy shifts were effected, they did not affect operational planning for police reform, as preparations for recruitment and training were relatively independent from long-range strategies; second, OSCE staff could directly negotiate a needs-driven division of labor with multilateral and bilateral partners.

In 1999, international police experts faced a challenging scenario in Kosovo. As is the case with most areas of governance in Kosovo, its security sector and law enforcement structures needed to be rebuilt from scratch after 1999. Virtually all Kosovo Albanians had been dismissed from the Yugoslav police (Javna Bezbednost)[11] and other security forces after Belgrade revoked Kosovo's status as an autonomous province in 1989. The same situation prevailed within the larger judicial system, with all provincial-level judicial institutions shut down after 1989 and most Kosovo Albanian personnel gradually removed from central-state law-related offices. Thus, when Serbian authorities left Kosovo after NATO's bombing campaign in 1999, all courts, prisons, and police stations were abandoned. This is not to say that no security structures remained: during the years of Kosovar resistance, groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army established an effective parallel security regime that attempted to fill the security vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the intervention and challenged UNMIK's authority. These groups contained Kosovo Albanians with policing experience prior to 1989 (Bennet et al. 2011). In addition, there were the remainders of Serbian paramilitary structures, controlled from Belgrade, in those areas primarily populated by Serbs (Brand 2003).

This was the situation the OSCE faced when it began planning for a postconflict presence after the Rambouillet negotiations in February 1999. Usually when the Permanent Council initiates a new OSCE field operation, the Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Center begins to develop

various strategic-level policy and budgetary scenarios in parallel. This was not the case, however, with the Kosovo mission. Because several staff remaining from the Kosovo Verification Mission got dislocated to Macedonia and were still available on the ground, two planning processes took place in parallel,[12] coinciding with NATO's seventy-eight-day air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia. In Vienna, the Secretariat planned for an extensive OSCE postconflict management mission that would administrate the entire territory of Kosovo. Meanwhile, the roughly 125 OSCE staff in Macedonia began operational planning for institution-building activities to be launched immediately upon the end of fighting (OSCE 1999a, p. 23). Ultimately, it was the Vienna plans that became obsolete when the Security Council opted for a UN presence instead in June 1999.

At the operational level, OSCE staff were able to collaborate directly with bilateral and multilateral partners. For instance, the US Department of Justice had sent a team from its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)[13] to prepare a police and justice sector reform program. OSCE and ICITAP officials jointly screened Albanian refugee camps outside Kosovo to identify former police officers, law experts, and judges who could be appointed immediately after a Serb withdrawal (Hartmann 2003, p. 8). The seventy-eight days of the NATO bombing campaign were long enough to prepare a police training program. ICITAP experts had just gained significant experience during a police reform program in Haiti in 1995. Together with OSCE staff, they began adapting curricula, recruitment procedures, and rank-and-file plans to the context of Kosovo.[14] As the then acting head of ICITAP Robert Perito recalls:

> We had developed applications, we developed recruiting posters, ads for newspapers, ads for radio, broadcast, and posters to go up on walls in villages. We worked out a set of criteria for new applicants. We developed the plans and actually identified participants to be on review committees. (…) This all required a great deal of work in the beginning, everything from working out what would be the physical requirements and identifying doctors, working out a sheet the doctors could use in giving the physical exam, down to figuring out what we would do in order to determine identities.[15]

With these plans up their sleeves, an OSCE assessment team entered Kosovo as early as 14 June 1999, only forty-eight hours after NATO ground

forces. With five vehicles and thirteen staff, the first task was to secure the previous KVM premises in Pristina. The former headquarters had been comprehensively looted but not destroyed. By the time the Permanent Council adopted the OSCE mission mandate on 01 July; forty-two personnel were already working in Kosovo (OSCE 1999c). Fortunately, the new mission could use the remaining equipment of the KVM to launch operations. This was a huge advantage because the lengthy procurement period had lapsed.

After the UN Security Council's decision to install an interim administration in Kosovo, UNMIK became the principal international organization and, at the same time, represented the host state government. This required OSCE staff to work directly with UNMIK to devise a division of labor in the area of the rule of law. Although it had come as a surprise that the OSCE would have to share its peacebuilding responsibilities, it soon became clear that UNMIK would build on the original OSCE and ICITAP ideas (Wilson 2006, p. 159). The details of the division of work was brokered, as mentioned above, in the course of two meetings between the OSCE Chairmanship and UN representatives in New York on 12 June and 13/14 July.[16]

The details of this strategy were presented by UNMIK's interim leader Sergio De Mello in his July 1999 report, in which he divided the strategy for police reform into three phases (UN Secretary-General 1999, para. 60). In the first phase, UN civilian police, together with NATO forces, should establish law and order. To mobilize manpower quickly, the UN transferred some emergency civilian police officers and equipment from its mission in Bosnia to Kosovo. The first command of twenty-seven police officers arrived from Bosnia by the end of June and on 03 July they were deployed to five field police stations around Kosovo. The UN Police Commissioner and his UN Civilian Police (UN Civpol) arrived shortly later on 09 July (UNMIK 2000, p. 11). The second and third phases of the police reform strategy focused on institution-building. UN and OSCE should establish a credible, professional and impartial police service (Phase 2) and then gradually transfer law enforcement authority from UN Civpol to the new Kosovo police (Phase 3). UN Civpol and the OSCE should work together on this task along the following lines.[17] In Phase 2, UN Civpol should establish itself as a fully fledged police organization, initially staffed exclusively by international police officers. At the same time, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo should set up a police training school and begin recruiting and training police cadets. Once they concluded the basic theoretical training,

cadets would be assigned a UN police mentor to receive field training. Later on, cadets should return to the police school as needed to get certified and receive additional training. Eventually, cadets would be assigned a long-term position in the slowly growing Kosovo Police Service under the command of UN Civpol. Once enough police officers had been trained that way, Phase 3 should be initiated with the gradual transfer of responsibilities. This meant that the Kosovo police would grow from being an organizational unit within UN Civpol into an independent organization. During this phase, the OSCE should also assist with drafting the legal documents required and assume oversight and human rights monitoring functions.

Owing to their extensive preparations, OSCE staff were quick to establish the new Kosovo Police Service School and training was ready to begin with a first cohort of 200 cadets by 06 September 1999. It was important to increase numbers quickly in order to reduce the burden on the UN police, who were strangers to the country with only limited ability to interact with the population. Right away, as one former OSCE employee recalls,[18] there was a six-week basic policing training simply to get police out on the street. After completion of in-class training, 200 cadets were assigned to a police station every week to complete nineteen weeks of in-field training under the supervision of UN Civpol officers (UN DPKO 2011, p. 6).

Overall, the OSCE mission's planning procedures effected a rapid launch of operations and a police training approach that reflected needs in Kosovo. The crux, again, was the fact that bottom-up planning was conducted by staff in the field. This also facilitated a realistic division of tasks that remained largely untouched for several years. A final facilitating factor was that the OSCE Permanent Council adopted the mission's final budget only *after* planning processes had been concluded on 07 October 1999 (OSCE 1999e). This ensured that the financial resources matched the tasks actually assigned to and subsequently executed by the mission over the next eight years.

3.4 Implementation and Project Management: Flexible and Cooperative

According to theory, there is a close link between a peace operation's structures and rules and its ability to flexibly adjust to peacebuilding

challenges and cooperate with partners. Confirming this, one observer who compared the OSCE mission in Kosovo to the UN mission's settings concluded that 'the work of [the OSCE mission], with predominantly mission-based and decentralized planning and implementation structures, proved to be much more capable of readapting itself to the quickly changing political environment in post-war Kosovo' (Narten 2006, p. 158). There are two reasons for this. First, field managers were empowered with a great deal of decision-making discretion. After adopting the annual budget, member states in Vienna had no formal means to interfere in operational matters and interaction with the secretariat remained limited to a minimum.[19] Second, budget administration took place within the mission itself. In the event of operations and budget considerations conflicting, administrative staff were instructed to maintain the 'primacy of the political.' Elaborating on these findings, I turn, next, to providing an overview of the OSCE's allocation of management competencies, and then examining the mission's performance in implementation in more detail.

When the OSCE's first permanent field missions were deployed in the 1990s, the OSCE began developing a management authority framework that found its final codification in a system called 'Integrated Resource Management Administration.'[20] Figure 3.1 illustrates the division of



Fig. 3.1 Management structure for OSCE field missions (*Source:* Author's compilation based on a figure in the OSCE handbook of project management [OSCE 2011b, p. 15])

managerial authorities into an administrative chain of command and a parallel programmatic/policy chain of command. A key element of this system is the differentiation between program and project levels—a distinction that correlates with the strategic and operational levels of strategic management.

Ultimate administrative responsibility for the OSCE's implementation work is vested in the Secretary-General. He maintains a distinct chain of command with administrative departments in the Secretariat and in field missions. The key tool for steering the organization is the budget. The OSCE's Conflict Prevention Center prepares budgetary options that specify, for each field operation, a distinct set of programs. In Kosovo, police reform was one such program. When discussing the OSCE budget in Vienna with member states, this is the maximum of information provided. At the field level, each of these programs has a program manager who works under the authority of the head of mission. It is within the program manager's discretion to subdivide a program budget into projects or activities.[21] This is usually carried out in close collaboration with the host government. To then implement single projects, the program manager appoints project managers who engage in the day-to-day execution and implementation of said projects. Depending on the complexity of a project, project managers may use additional staff.[22]

In line with this structure, the newly appointed head of the OSCE Mission, Daan Everts, subdivided the mission into five major departments. The Department of Police Education and Development (DPED) received program-level authority over the OSCE's police reform activities. As its head, Evert appointed former US police officer Steve Bennett, who also headed the US Department of Justice's police reform office in Kosovo, which was already the OSCE's partner during planning.

Parallel to this policy chain of command is a second, administrative chain of command. In the Secretariat in Vienna, the Department of Management and Finance provides centralized guidance on the management of OSCE financial and material assets.[23] At the field level, respective heads of department for administration and support oversee the actual budget implementation, which is carried out by program managers (OSCE 2003b). The OSCE maintains what is called a dual authority principle, meaning that budget implementation and staff decisions always have to be signed by both the respective program manager and the head of the mission's administrative department.

Adjustment and Flexibility

It became evident over subsequent years that this organizational structure was highly effective with regard to the adjustment of operational activities. The head of the OSCE mission's police department, Steve Bennett, chose to set up the new Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) at the grounds of a former Yugoslav Police training camp in Vushtrri, a village halfway between Pristina and Mitrovica. The facility was severely rundown and the first few weeks were spent refurbishing and equipping it. After the first year, DPED had between 150 and 230 international trainers working at the school, supported by around 240 local staff.[24] Due to the extensive preparations during the Kosovo war, recruitment plans and curricula were already available when the school became operational. The recruitment process was conducted jointly by DPED and UN Civpol staff. By 06 September 1999, they had selected the first class of cadets of almost 20,000 Kosovar applicants who then began their five-week training curriculum. After only one year, about 2000 recruits had graduated from the school and the length of initial training was extended to nine weeks. A year later, the numbers had doubled to 4000 police officers and in-class training was extended again to twelve weeks (Stodiek 2006, p. 20f.).

Throughout the years, objectives regarding the Kosovo police service were adjusted several times. For instance, the staff target figure grew from initially 3000 police officers to 7300 police officers in 2004. The tasks of the Police School and training activities also evolved. As the ranks of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) increased, the school began classes for police supervisors and managers. In addition, after two years several KPS officers returned to the school to be trained as police trainers themselves. The school also offered mentoring classes for incoming UN Civpol officers.[25]

Below the level of rather far-reaching, strategic decisions that had to be cleared with UN Civpol and international donors such as the USA, the head of the police reform program, Steve Bennett, had much decision-making leeway. There were two reasons for this. As one observer pointed out, the OSCE's 'overall organizational culture (…) is largely characterized by a much lower degree of formalization and informal procedures and decision making' (Narten 2006, p. 157). Furthermore, the structural setup authorized Bennett to adjust the training activities within the school as needed. In this way, whenever UN Civpol asked for specific training classes, DPED could use its network to recruit an appropriate trainer who would be in mission within weeks to deliver specific lectures.[26] The head of department was not

significantly hampered by predefined OSCE budget allocations that were only loosely linked to actual project-level activities. The only link between a budget line and the related activity was a short project description in an e-mail.[27] The mission budget itself only specified the number of posts to be filled by the mission and provided an overall budget for each program area.

Financial administration took place at mission level in parallel with project implementation. In line with the principle of dual authority, as mentioned earlier, the spending of unified budget funds in projects required double approval by the program manager (DPED's head) and the head of the mission's Administration and Support Department. In the case of a clash between operative and financial considerations, OSCE administrative staff had to give primacy to operational considerations related to the mandate; one interviewee called this the 'primacy of the political.'[28] In line with this regulation, one former Head of Mission said that during the early days of OSCE field missions, administrative staff were willing to turn a blind eye to gaps in budget accounting in cases where money up to 10,000 Euros was spent without receipts to prove designated use. This is sometimes necessary when equipment needs to be bought on short notice at local shops or markets.[29] Due to allegations of fraud within field missions, more rigorous financial instructions are now in place, but administrative officers can still file a so-called 'exception report' if and when operational need arises. The resulting financial flexibility during mission implementation was mentioned as an important factor for smooth mandate implementation within the OSCE, especially when compared to the often quite rigid procedures in other international organizations.[30]

To sum up: mandate implementation in the OSCE mission was not structured by the kind of rigid project management framework that, ironically, management literature suggests will enhance performance. In the case of the OSCE mission, the absence of such a framework was no disadvantage; quite the contrary, without a rigid link between the unified budget and project activities, DPED could direct funds into areas perceived as priorities at any point in time. In addition, exception reports and a culture that emphasized the supremacy of the political ensured that sufficient efforts were made to prevent financial management considerations from restricting project delivery.

Cooperation with Partners

In addition to flexibility during mandate implementation, the ability to cooperate with other actors on the ground is a second indicator for good

process performance. In Kosovo, two important groups of actors were present: the host government (represented by UNMIK and UN Civpol) and the group of other donors also working in Kosovo to support, inter alia, police reform.

With the launch of UNMIK in Kosovo, it was a priority for both organizations to maximize cooperation between the field offices. As outlined in the initial exchange of letters between the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the OSCE,[31] it was expected that each organization would 'cooperate with other international organisations in implementing their tasks as appropriate.' In line with this prescription, the OSCE mission's head, Daan Everts, became deputy head of the UN mission. Cooperation agreements also addressed more specialized areas of mission administration. In their exchange of letters, the OSCE and DPKO agreed to 'harmonise salaries and other benefits for local staff in order to avoid competition between the organisations for scarce resources.' The international community also established cross-organizational agreement on a common five-region plan for their activities in Kosovo. This allowed for a joint operational language, a significant improvement over missions in Bosnia, where civilian and military organizations used different geographical frameworks (Cockell 2002, p. 486).

Nonetheless, without an integrated headquarters, there was still a structural gap between UN Civpol and OSCE staff that did affect operational activities. Although respective areas of responsibility had been defined in the exchange of letters, some ambiguity remained. As Steve Bennett explained at a hearing before a US Congress Commission (US Congress 2001, p. 7):

> It was clear from the beginning that the UN civilian police would be responsible for operational development and deployment of the KPS [Kosovo Police Service]. It was also clear and understood that OSCE would be responsible for the school. It was less clear, however, how the two operational functions would interact in making choices regarding policy for KPS development and the responsibility of continuing education after the initial graduation.

Other sources have referred to this ambiguity as an initial turf war between the two organizations over key areas of shared responsibility—namely, the recruitment of cadets for the KPS and decisions regarding the design of training curricula (Bennet et al. 2011, p. 4). But though some rivalry between agencies certainly existed, a 2005 staff survey among seventy-five UN Civpol and DPED officers showed a more positive picture

(Stodiek 2006, Annex II). Asked how they rated cooperation in the areas of recruitment and training, only OSCE staff answered negatively with regard to recruitment. The latter could be attributed to the fact that UN Civpol did eventually oust OSCE staff from the recruitment process, as one former OSCE employee put it. This became necessary due to conflicting objectives: while the OSCE recruitment process used exclusively merit-based selection for the first cohorts of cadets for the KPS, UNMIK leadership later imposed a 30% quota for former KLA fighters in order to accommodate local Kosovar powerbrokers and demilitarize the KLA (Janser 2008).

Yet, despite such occasional conflicting objectives and turf wars, sources assess the overall cooperation between UN Civpol and OSCE as effective. The reason was a clear hierarchy between UN Civpol and the OSCE's DPED, with UN staff bearing responsibility for the overall success of police reform. Top-down decisions, such as the exclusion of OSCE staff from recruitment, were made but also accepted by OSCE staff. Confirming this, Narten (2006, p. 158) finds that the 'hierarchical nature of the inter-agency relationship often led to disrupted consultation and co-ordination' but that the OSCE, due to its decentralized organizational structure and decision-making autonomy, was well-equipped to meet the demands of the UN Police Commissioner and his staff.

Finally, cooperation with bilateral partners outside the UNMIK framework was a key element of DPED's work. Within only a few months, DPED turned itself into a coordination hub for all donor activities related to police training. Most importantly, this happened by means of external budget allocations. It is one of the more interesting features of the OSCE that a mission's program components are allowed to accept third-party funds to support the mandate. Consequently, bilateral donors were able to support the OSCE police component with large sums. Unfortunately, there are no detailed statistics regarding such funding, but interviewees suggest that these external contributions far exceeded the official OSCE budget.[32] In 1999, the department operated with 8.6 Mio Euro and 11.8 Mio Euro in 2000.[33] By contrast, in 2009, long after high noon in Kosovo, the USA alone spent 22.5 Mio Euro bilaterally on police reform (GAO 2011). As one OSCE employee later said, bilateral funding was so important that, without it, the mission would not have been able to implement its mandate (Janser 2008). To channel all these eternal contributions, the police reform component installed an extra-budgetary operations office in 2003 (OMIK 2004). The main donors were the US ICITAP (also headed

by Steve Bennett), various European states, and the EU Commission's delegation, which, under its pre-accession policy, also funded rule of law-related projects.

Mandate-related conflict was thus not entirely absent between DPED and UN Civpol and, indeed, one should note that some conflict is normal in any working environment where responsibilities are not specified in minute detail. But once again, the managerial freedom afforded to DPED made possible the mission's still positive performance. In cases when requests were voiced by UN Civpol, DPED could react swiftly without having to first climb up the chain of command for headquarters' approval. DPED also stressed local ownership through its early integration of local staff with the management of KPSS. In addition, by channeling other donor's contributions, the OSCE mission was able to fulfill two objectives at once: First, multiplying the impact possible with its own resources; and second, integrating external donors into a coherent police reform strategy. As the chapters on Afghanistan will demonstrate, inability to meet precisely these objectives was one of the main reasons for the relatively weak performance there.

3.5 Strategy Review and Monitoring: Effective Until Political Conflict Stirred

Public management literature has repeatedly argued that review, evaluation, and monitoring are vital parts of the policy process. Applied peacebuilding research has confirmed that good performance depends on the existence of processes and structures that effectively connect peacebuilders in the field with the political actors who determine resource provisions and mandate objectives (see Sect. 2.3). At the same time, however, these very processes imply a conflict of interests between those who monitor and those who are monitored, which renders effective review unlikely per se (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). In the case of the OSCE's Kosovo mission, the degree of structural and processual linkages between Pristina and Vienna was extremely limited, but there was also no situation that required major policy adjustments. Because of the mission's independence, minor unexpected challenges could be solved based on resources provided by partners on a case-by-case basis.

However, the smooth execution of the mandate changed rapidly when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. At this point, conflict about

the mission's future direction escalated in the Permanent Council. The USA and Western allies wanted the mission to be replaced by the EU, but for Russia and Serbia—both of whom opposed Kosovo's independence—the mission reflected the 'old legal reality' and should thus remain. The mission's budget process became a battleground, with both sides trying to influence the planning process to shrink or maintain the mission's budget and size. Although the OSCE mission was well-positioned to continue supporting police reform in Kosovo, the politicization of the budget effectively obstructed such a pathway.

In the fourth year after the Kosovo war, internationals working in Kosovo had to realize that the protectorate could not last forever. Kosovars themselves demanded more and more competencies over their maturing institutions and over the fate of their country. To win time, Michael Steiner, the head of UNMIK at the time, invented a policy gambit called the 'Standards for Kosovo' or 'Standards before Status' (UNMIK 2003). This required the new Kosovo institutions to fulfill certain quality standards before talks about Kosovo's future would begin. In 2004, violent riots broke out throughout Kosovo, mainly directed against the Serbian minority population. For most observers the 2004 riots were an indicator that the Standards plan had failed and that Kosovo should be provided with more political and legislative rights. In subsequent years, diplomats scrambled to broker a compromise between Western supporters of Kosovo's independence on the one hand, while Russia and Serbia on the other hand continued to reject independence. In parallel, international peacebuilders on the ground were forced to appease Kosovo Albanians, hoping to maintain control of the situation.

The new Kosovo police was an important player in the Kosovo government's attempts to gain independence. That is why the UN police commissioner hesitated to hand over too much control over the police force. At first, all Kosovar police cadets graduating from the OSCE's police school were simply integrated into the UN Civpol organizational structure, where they worked alongside and under the authority of their international mentors. The graduates returned regularly to the police school for additional training. But eventually, the development of the Kosovo police 'reached a turning-point,' as a UN report later found, 'as individual capacities from training began to outpace the institutional capacity for self-management' (UN DPKO 2011, p. 3). In 2003, UN Civpol thus initiated a step-by-step transition process. This was done bottom-up, beginning with single police

stations without yet establishing a coherent chain of command or sound police headquarters. Seeing that the Kosovo police played a positive and deescalating role in the 2004 riots (Stodiek 2006, p. 33), UNMIK accelerated the pace of transitions. In 2005, UN Civpol and OSCE officials designed organizational charts for the Kosovo police, including a chain of command, a policy and procedure manual, and other essential operational documents.[34] This led to UNMIK passing 'The Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service' (UNMIK Regulation 2005/54). With this framework, Kosovo finally received a Ministry of Interior and the police school was established as a new legal entity. Overall, the transition process was smooth and the Kosovo police soon acquired a positive reputation. A 2005 evaluation of the UN protectorate (UN Secretary-General 2005, para. 34) referred to the police as 'the most multi-ethnic of the Kosovo institutions.' A 200-page security sector assessment conducted by external consultants warned that more remained to be done:

> [T]here is a danger that the early success of the KPS may have served to mask some problems. The population of Kosovo's reservations, regarding the KPS, centre on their perceived failure to ensure the rule of law, creeping politicisation of the service, and corruption. (…) Similarly, the lack of effective parliamentary oversight from the Assembly contributes to issues such as creeping politicisation of the Police Service, which should be addressed. (UNDP 2006, p. XVIII)

But the report also found that, overall, 'the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo' (ibid. 2006, p. XVIII).

Contrary to progress in institution-building, the political process on Kosovo's future remained deadlocked. Several high-level diplomatic initiatives failed, including the 2007 Troika talks facilitated by the German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger and earlier negotiations led by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari. In his report to the UN Secretary-General, Ahtisaari argued that the UN had done what it could:

> Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo's current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo's democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. (UN Secretary-General 2007a, para. 4)

Fortunately, prior to 2008, the OSCE mission's operational work had not been affected by these political quarrels about Kosovo's status. This was in large part due to its operational autonomy. As several staff mentioned with reference to their experience in various OSCE field missions,[35] there is never much interest from member states or even mission leadership in what happens below the program level of an OSCE field mission. They also did not perceive the extent of monitoring being executed by Vienna as being too intrusive or restrictive.[36] This includes various types of routine reports (weekly, six-monthly, and irregular spot reports) sent by mission leadership to Vienna. Every two years the OSCE Office for Internal Oversight conducts a mission audit, reviewing all financial transactions and assessing their effectiveness in the light of the mandate. Also, as Bennet et al. (2011, p. 6f.) report, project-level self-evaluations were regularly employed to review the length and impact of the various training seminars at the police school.

Without much interest in mission activities, there was also little political guidance. This became a significant problem when Kosovo finally declared its independence in 2008. As several interviewees indicated, the international division about Kosovo's status had also split the OSCE's Permanent Council, thwarting its ability to respond to the mission's requests for guidance. Without such direction, mission managers made decisions based on their own perceptions or, arguably, in accordance with their respective governments' agenda. This ambiguity manifested during the upcoming budget process. As reported above, the OSCE drafts its budget bottom-up: project managers determine their financial requirements and program managers define their budget figures. What delegations eventually see in the OSCE Advisory Committee on Management and Finance is only the program-level budget. After 2008, various mission managers had different opinions regarding the OSCE mission's future direction. The new head of mission, Swiss ambassador Tim Guldiman, intended to carry on with operations, acknowledging that the mission's mandate had not changed. By contrast, several program managers considered their task as being fulfilled and did not put forth a budget or staff positions.[37] Illustrating this general struggle over the mission's budget, a US code cable[38] refers to a situation in which an OSCE official told a US diplomat that if the USA and its like-minded allies 'do not now show coordinated and firm support for reductions during upcoming budget negotiations, Serbia and Russia will dominate the discussion and walk the reductions back'—something Serbia and Russia sought to do given their view of the OSCE mission

as representing the 'old legal reality' of Kosovo as belonging to Serbia. When the OSCE budget proposal was discussed in the OSCE Advisory Committee on Management and Finance, the Russian and Serbian delegations objected and revoked the bulk of budget and staff reduction.[39] To then maintain direct control over the budget, Russia and Serbia introduced a motion in January 2008 to henceforth review the budget on a monthly basis (OSCE 2013, p. 17). Because of the mission's unclear future, many qualified experts resigned, long-term planning became impossible, and the mission was left in limbo.[40]

In sum, the OSCE employed a broad array of review and monitoring instruments, such as regular reporting to the Secretariat and the Permanent Council. For most of the time, member states showed little interest in the mission's operational activities. This changed once the future role of the OSCE in Kosovo became a political symbol for or against independence. Western allies wanted to close the mission but could not do so because of Russia's veto. With this unclear fate and despite the Kosovo police's continuous demand for external assistance, the mission slowly bled dry and ceased to play a significant role in the country's police reform. In terms of the mission's overall performance in review, the results are ambivalent. On the one hand, decentralized settings allowed the mission to review and adjust its work in line with operational requirements. Only with the developments of 2008 did review instruments, such as the budget, become politicized along member states' diverging political interests. This then negatively impacted the mission's work. On the other hand, the political context in Kosovo never required major adjustments in terms of resources or peacebuilding strategy. It is thus unclear whether the mission, with its decentralized settings, would have been able to countersteer.

3.6 Summary: Smooth Operations, High Impact on Police Reform

In 1999, the OSCE and UN Civpol began developing the Kosovo police from scratch. As noted above, a 2006 International Security Sector Review concluded that 'the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo' (UNDP 2006, p. XVIII). Shortly after that report, Scheye described the Kosovo Police as a multiethnic organization with a comparatively high proportion of females, capable of 'dealing with everyday incidents such as traffic accidents, minor crimes

and disputes between neighbours' (2008, p. 180) and whose strength lies in its middle-rank station managers—'an excellent foundation upon which further achievements may be grounded.' Bennet et al. (2011, p. 17) similarly concluded that 'the Kosovo Police Service was an example of a successful campaign by the international community to create a multiethnic and gender-inclusive police force in a polarized, post-conflict state.' With this general assessment of the state of the Kosovo police in mind, this section discusses the main explanatory factors for this outcome and assesses, counterfactually, the relevance of the OSCE's institutional system and the mission's associated performance.

The OSCE and UN police certainly did a good job in Kosovo. However, there are several other factors that contributed to these positive assessments after the first few years. First, it is important to note the generally positive climate during the first few critical years after the conflict. The majority of people in Kosovo perceived the external intervention as liberation, rather than occupation. NATO forces enjoyed a highly positive public attitude in Kosovo (UNDP 2013, p. 21) and police reform operations benefitted from this positive mood. Second, the Kosovo police could choose its recruits from the best. This was due to the comparatively high salaries of the Kosovo police in combination with a generally high unemployment rate.[41] Although former fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army also had to be integrated, the majority of police officers were employed on the basis of merit.[42] Third, progress in police reform always follows an exponential growth rate; progress in early stages (new buildings, equipment, staff numbers, etc.) is more visible than progress in later stages (investigation skills, management capabilities, etc.). Given this pattern, external observers were prone to respond positively to the very fact that there was a police force and that it was capable of walking the beat without exacting bribe money on a regular basis. Fourth, other influential factors mentioned in peacebuilding literature, such as local capacities in terms of education and development, the level of conflict and the level of international development also facilitated a positive outcome in Kosovo (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

But to be clear: the OSCE and UN Civpol *had* delivered a successful police reform program (see Table 3.1). First, the OSCE, in particular, had begun its operations in a bottom-up fashion that addressed operational questions of police reform first. This allowed a rapid launch of police reform training, executed in accordance with actual needs in Kosovo. Second, decisions regarding the Kosovo police were handled by the OSCE

Table 3.1 OSCE institutional design and its impact on performance

Policy phase	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
Planning	Bottom-up, incremental planning	Fast and flexible mission installation, responsive to local preferences	High
Implementation	Decentralized, flexible budget systems, autonomous leadership	Flexible, successful adjustment to political context and partner preferences	High
Review	Decentralized annual strategy review	Politicization of mandate implementation when political conflict high	Intermediate

Source: Author's compilation

mission, UN Civpol management, and senior Kosovar police officers without having to consult Vienna. The OSCE's institutional devolution of management competencies reflected the urgent and dynamic nature of tasks at hand. It also enabled OSCE managers to adjust both to spontaneous training demands and UN Civpol preferences. In addition, because of its flexible and unbureaucratic financial framework, the OSCE mission became a financial hub for other donors working to support the reform of the Kosovo police. Third, what became clear when Kosovo declared independence in 2008, however, was the extent to which this smooth running of operations depended on member states' political support. When the Council could not agree on the mission's mandate any longer, individual states used their influence on the budget review process to manipulate operations. They acted informally and were able to co-opt precisely those structures and processes originally installed to enable mandate adjustments (such as reporting and the budget). This has significantly hampered the mission's operations ever since and demonstrates—as a sort of counterfactual—how things could have gone differently with less autonomy at the mission level.

Overall, the positive outcome of police reform in Kosovo is not surprising given all we know about influential explanatory factors. Although the OSCE mission's process performance was certainly not the sole reason for positive outcomes in 2007/2008, it was a positive factor that promoted operational success instead of undermining it. Bottom-up planning,

decentralization, and flexible financial rules were the key factors contributing to the mission's smooth performance.

Notes

1. On the history of Kosovo and the Western intervention see also Malcolm (1998) and Ker-Lindsay (2009).
2. The OSCE traditionally operates on the basis of three dimensions of security, each with its own set of instruments meant to enhance transparency and promote mutual understanding: the economic and environmental dimension, the human dimension, and the politico-military dimension. Peacebuilding and crisis management is a crosscutting theme that draws on instruments within the OSCE's three dimensions of security.
3. Interview with officials at the OSCE secretariat (Interview No. 003/V, 01 February 2012, 018/V, 30 January 2012).
4. Holbrooke himself had been responsible for maintaining the anti-expansionist OSCE policy during the 1990s when he was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in the US State Department between 1994 and 1996.
5. There are some who argue that the KVM was never meant to succeed as a peacekeeping mission. As Bellamy and Griffin (2002, p. 2) argue: 'the mission should be seen as part of a wider nexus of policy instruments used by states, one that acted as a tripwire for the instigation of enforcement measures by other organisations.'
6. The quote is taken from an internal DPKO evaluation of UNMIK's performance in Kosovo that is available to the author (UN DPKO/ USG, 2001).
7. A report on the collaboration between the OSCE and the UN refers to this meeting (UN General Assembly 1999, para. 32).
8. Interview with official at the OSCE secretariat (Interview No. 020/V, 31 January, 2012).
9. Exchange of letter between Ambassador Kim Traavik, Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the OSCE Chairmanship and Bernard Miyet, USG UN Department for Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) dated 19 July 1999. A copy of the document is available to the author. Quotes refer to para. 2.
10. Figures vary depending on the sources. Interview with OSCE official (Interview No. 014/K, 21 November 2011), see also Stodiek (2006, p. 18).
11. For a detailed study of policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see Monk (2001).

12. Interview with official at the OSCE Secretariat (Interview No. 021/V, 01 February 2012). On 08 June 1999, the KVM was dissolved and replaced by the transitional Kosovo Task Force, with the mandate to prepare the redeployment of the OSCE in Kosovo (OSCE 1999d).
13. ICITAP belongs to the US Department of Justice's Criminal Division; its activities are primarily funded by the US State Department. ICITAP is the US' primary bilateral technical assistance organization in the area of law and order.
14. Interview with official at the OSCE Secretariat who referred to internal records on the KVM (Interview No. 021/V, 01 February 2012).
15. Transcripted interview in the context of the research project 'Innovations for Successful Societies' (Interview conducted on 19 November 2007). Princeton University: Bobst Center for Peace and Justice: http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu// (accessed 01 November 2015).
16. These meetings are mentioned in a Secretary General report to the Assembly (UN General Assembly 1999).
17. The division of labor was defined in an Exchange of Letter between Ambassador Kim Traavik, Head of OSCE Department, Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bernard Miyet, USG UN Department for Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) 19 July 1999.
18. According to an interview with Oliver Janser (25 July, 2008) in the context of the research project 'Innovations for Successful Societies' by the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University. The transcript is available online at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties (accessed 01 November 2015).
19. Interviews with three officials in the OSCE secretariat (Interview No. 004/D, 26 June 2012, 020/V, 31 January 2012, 005/V, 31 January 2012).
20. More details on this process and the resources provided to develop the IRMA system can be found in the OSCE Financial Report for the year 2002 (OSCE 2003a, p. 4ff.).
21. According to interviews with (former) OSCE officials (Interview No. 021/V, 01 February, 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012). This system has changed slightly after the organization-wide introduction of the OSCE Project Management system in Kosovo in 2007 (OSCE 2011b).
22. According to interviews with OSCE officials (Interview No. 003/V, 01 February 2012, 005/V, 31 January 2012). See also the OSCE Project Management Manual (OSCE 2011b).
23. The department issues guidance on managing the OSCE financial and material resources. The details are laid down in 17 Financial and Administrative Instructions (OSCE 2010, appendix 1).

24. Figures vary depending on the sources. It is nearly impossible to track the number of trainers on the basis of official records as only a few of them were funded by the official OSCE budget. A former OSCE official who refers to unpublished OSCE records mentions around 190 international trainers and 240 local staff (Interview No. 014/K, 21 November 2011), Stodiek refers to 150 internationals (2006, p. 18) and Harris (2009, p. 19) to 230 international experts.
25. This evolution of the mandate can be seen in the annual reports filed by the OSCE mission. The OSCE Annual Reports are published around November each year; they are available on the OSCE website: www.osce.de (accessed 01 November 2015).
26. Interviews with OSCE officials (Interview No. 014/K, 21 November 2011, 013/K, 22 November 2011).
27. According to a long-standing employee with the OSCE who worked both in missions and the Secretariat (Interview No. 019/V, 30 January 2012). This changed after the introduction of the OSCE project management system in Kosovo in 2007.
28. Interview with a former administrative officer within OSCE (Interview No. 004/D, 26 June 2012).
29. Interviews with two senior OSCE officials (Interview No. 021/V, 01 February 2012, 006/D, 04 June 2012).
30. Interview with a former OSCE employee who worked at the Police School in 2004 (Interview No. 019/V, 30 January 2012).
31. Exchange of Letters between Ambassador Kim Traavik, Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the OSCE Chairmanship and Bernard Miyet, USG UN Department for Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) dated 19 July 1999. A copy of the document is available to the author.
32. Interview with senior OSCE official in Pristina (Interview No. 013/K, 22 November 2011).
33. See the OSCE budgets for 1999 and 2000 (OSCE 1999e, 2000).
34. Interview with former OSCE employee (Interview No. 014/K, 21 November 2011).
35. Interviews with several OSCE officials working in mission or at the secretariat (Interview No. 022/K, 15 November 2011, 007/K, 15 November 2011, 013/K, 22 November 2011, 018/V, 30 January 2012, 020/V, 005/V, 31 January 2012).
36. This information was obtained during interviews with several OSCE officials at the Secretariat and in the Kosovo mission (Interview No. 021/V, 01 February 2012, 007/K, 15 November 2011)

37. Interviews with OSCE officials in Vienna and Kosovo (Interview No. 007/K, 15 November 2011, 041/K, 17 November 2011, 020/V, 31 January 2012).
38. US Code Cable from 22 October 2009. Subject 'OSCE Weekly Highlights: October 13–16, 2009,' para 12. The text can be accessed at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/ (accessed 01 November 2015).
39. According to interviews with OSCE officials (Interview No. 007/K, 15 November 2011, 013/K, 22 November 2011).
40. Interviews with two senior OSCE officials who worked in Kosovo after independence (Interview No. 006/D, 04 June 2012, 013/K, 22 November 2011).
41. Interview with Atifete Jahgaga, former Deputy Director of Operations of the KPS (Pristina, 27 January 2011).
42. Interview with official from the Kosovo Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 023/K, 24 November 2011); see also Stodiek (2006, p. 19).

References

Bellamy, A. J., & Griffin, S. (2002). OSCE peacekeeping: Lessons from the Kosovo Verification Mission. *European Security, 11*(1), 1–26.

Bennet, R., Greene, M., & Friedman, J. (2011). *Building the police service in a security vacuum: International efforts in Kosovo, 1999–2011.* Princeton: Princeton University, Innovations for Successful Societies.

Brand, M. (2003). *The development of Kosovo institutions and the transition of authority from UNMIK to local self-government.* Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations.

Cockell, J. G. (2002). Civil-military responses to security challenges in peace operations: Ten lessons from Kosovo. *Global Governance, 8*(4), 483–502.

CSCE. (1992). *First meeting of the CSCE council in Prague in January 1992. Summary of conclusions.* 2PRAG92.e. Prague: Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

Dahrendorf, N., Dalton, M., Herrero, J. L., Judah, T., Rumin, S., & Thompson, M. (2003). Kosovo report. In N. Dahrendorf (Ed.), *A review of peace operations: A case for change* (pp. 129–213). London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College London.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

GAO. (2011). *Multiple U.S. agencies provided billions of dollars to train and equip foreign police forces* (GAO-11-402R Foreign Police Assistance). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

Ghebali, V.-I. (2004). The OSCE long-term missions: A creative tool under challenge. *Helsinki Monitor, 15*(3), 202–202.

Harris, F. (2009). *Police reform in Kosovo—A case study* (Unpublished paper: Submitted as part of the research project entitled, 'Reforming the Afghan Police Service' to the Royal United States Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI)). Pristina.

Hartmann, M. E. (2003). *International judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. A new model for post-conflict peacekeeping* (Special report 112). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Holbrooke, R. (1999). OSCE and NATO in Kosovo: Embryo of European Security. *New Perspectives Quarterly, 16*(1), 45–46.

ICG. (1998). *To build a peace—Recommendations for the Madrid peace implementation council meeting* (ICG Balkans report no 52). Sarajevo: International Crisis Group.

ICG. (1999). *Kosovo: Lets learn from Bosnia. Models and methods of international administration* (ICG Balkans report no 66). Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Janser, O. (2008). *Transcripted interview in the context of the research project 'innovations for successful societies'* (Interview conducted on 25 July 2008). Princeton University: Bobst Center for Peace and Justice.

Ker-Lindsay, J. (2009). *Kosovo: The path to contested statehood in the Balkans.* London/New York: I.B. Tauris.

Maisonneuve, J. R. M. (2000). The Kosovo Verification Mission. *Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2000*, 49–54.

Malcolm, N. (1998). *Kosovo: A short history.* New York: New York University Press.

Malcolm, N. (2006). The war over Kosovo. In B. K. Blitz (Ed.), *War and change in the Balkans: Nationalism, conflict and cooperation* (pp. 143–155). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Milinkovic, B. (2004). OSCE peacekeeping: Still waiting to perform! *Helsinki Monitor, 15*(3), 193–201.

Mlyn, E. (1996). The OSCE, the United States and European security. *European Security, 5*(3), 426–447.

Mlyn, E. (2002). The United States, Russia and the OSCE in 21st Century European security. In Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (Ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2002* (pp. 49–57). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Monk, R. (2001). *Study on policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.* Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Narten, J. (2006). Building local institutions and parliamentarianism in post-war Kosovo: A review of joint efforts by the UN and OSCE from 1999–2006. *Helsinki Monitor, 17*(2), 144–144.

OMIK. (2004). *Pillar III (OSCE) programmatic priorities for 2004 (08 January 2004)*. Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK).

OSCE. (1999a). *Annual report 1999 on OSCE activties (1 December 1998–31 October 1999)*. SEC.DOC/2/99 (17 November 1999). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (1999b). *Istanbul Summit declaration: Istanbul document 1999*. PCOEW389 (19 November 1999, corrected version dated January 2000). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (1999c). *The OSCE moves back into Kosovo* (OSCE Newsletter Vol 6. no. 6). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (1999d). *Permanent council decision no. 296/Corrected reissue*. PC.DEC/296/Corr. (08 June 1999). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (1999e). *Permanent council decision: OMiK budget for 1999*. PC.DEC/317 (07 October 1999). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2000). *Permanent council decision: OMiK budget for 2000*. PC.DEC/341 (10 February 2000). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2003a). *OSCE financial report and financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2002*. Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2003b). *Staff regulation and staff rules*. DOC.SEC/3/03 (updated 13 July 2010). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2006). *Ministerial council: Rules of procedure of the OSCE*. MC.DOC/1/06 (1 November 2006). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2008). *Guidebook on democratic policing* (2nd ed.). Vienna: OSCE, Strategic Police Matters Unit.

OSCE. (2010). *Administration and maintenance of Financial/Administrative Instructions*. FAI 16 (effective since 18 May 2010). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2011a). *Background brief: OSCE activities and advantages in the field of post-conflict rehabilitation*. SEC.GAL/76/11 (28 April 2011). Vienna: Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2011b). *Project management in the OSCE. A manual for programme and project managers* (authored by Sebnem Lust, Laura Vai, and Sean McGreevy). Vienna: Organization for Seurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

OSCE. (2013). *Survey of OSCE field operations*. SEC.GAL/84/13 (7 May 2013). Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Perito, R. M. (2004). *Where is the Lone Ranger when we need him? America's search for a post-conflict stability force*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, Why it's amazing that Federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Scheye, E. (2008). UNMIK and the significance of effective programme management: The case of Kosovo. In H. Hänggi & V. Scherrer (Eds.), *Security sector reform and UN integrated missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo* (pp. 169–226). Vienna: LIT.

Stahl, B., & Harnisch, S. (2009). *Vergleichende Außenpolitikforschung und nationale Identitäten: die Europäische Union im Kosovo-Konflikt* 1996–2008. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Stodiek, T. (2006). *The OSCE and the creation of multi-ethnic police forces in the balkans. CORE working paper 14*. Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research.

Stodiek, T. (2009). OSCE's police-related activities: Lessons-learned during the last decade. *Security and Human Rights, 20*(3), 201–211.

UN DPKO. (2011). *Lessons learned in Kosovo: Transition from UNMIK police*. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

UN General Assembly. (1999). *Report of the Secretary General: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Corrigendum on paragraph 32)*. A/54/537/Corr.1 (2 December 1999). New York: United Nations General Assembly.

UN Secretary-General. (1999). *Report of the secretary-general on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*. S/1999/779 (12 July 1999). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2005). *Letter dated 07 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ('Eide Report')*. S/2005/635 (05 October 2005). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2007a). *Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ('Ahtisaari Plan')*. S/2007/168 (26 March 2007). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (1998a). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160*. S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998). United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (1998b). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199*. S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998). United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (1998c). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1203*. S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998). United Nations Security Council.

UNDP. (2006). *Internal Security Sector Review Kosovo*. Pristina: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

UNDP. (2013). *Public pulse report 6* (No. 6, August 2013). Pristina: UNDP Kosovo.

UNMIK. (2000). *UNMIK police annual report 2002*. Pristina: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

UNMIK. (2003). *Standards for Kosovo* (Presented 10 Decewmber 2003). Pristhina: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

US Congress. (2001). *Transcript of hearing: Civilian police and police training in post-conflict OSCE areas*. CSCE 107-1-4 (05 September 2001). Washington, DC: US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Vollebaek, K. (1999). The OSCE agenda: Crisis management and long-term conflict prevention. *Helsinki Monitor, 10*(3), 5–7.

Wilson, J. M. (2006). Law and order in an emerging democracy: Lessons from the reconstruction of Kosovo's police and justice systems. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605*, 152–177.

CHAPTER 4

The EU's Contribution to Police Reform in Kosovo

The European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was the flagship endeavor of the EU's common security and defense policy. Following up on the work carried out by the UN and OSCE, member states tasked the mission to investigate high-profile cases of war crimes, corruption, and organized crime, and continue assistance to Kosovo's police and judicial reform process. But despite being the largest and most expensive EU peacebuilding mission to date, this chapter finds that EULEX never managed to live up to its expectations. The mission was cumbersome, highly politicized and unable to deliver police reform services useful to the Kosovo police. Different results might have been possible had Brussels equipped the mission with more managerial leeway, but this was not the case. Instead, member states prevented the mission to fulfill its ambitious mandate in fear that this would impinge negatively on EU relations with Serbia, among other reasons. Grounded between geopolitics and local expectations, the mission failed to attain its ends and attracted significant criticism, including from the EU's own Court of Auditors. After providing an overview of how the EU came to work in the area of peacebuilding and crisis management (Sect. 4.1) and the political context of its operations in Kosovo (Sect. 4.2), these findings are substantiated by an analysis of EULEX's performance in terms of planning (Sect. 4.3), implementation (Sect. 4.4), and review (Sect. 4.5). Ultimately, section 4.6 argues that the EU's institutional structures and rules did not facilitate police reform in Kosovo. Instead, they prevented those working in the field from using the mission's significant resources in a way that matched Kosovo's actual needs.

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_4

4.1 The EU as Actor in Peacebuilding and Police Reform

The European Union became involved in foreign policy and peacebuilding only after the end of the Cold War. Apart from its expansionist influence in the European periphery, there was a mismatch between its internal political relevance and its ability to act politically in the outside world. As the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, conceded in 1991, 'Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm' (quoted in Whitney 1991). In an effort to redress this situation, the EU entered into a phase of institutional metamorphosis between 1992 and 2007, with a series of major organizational and political reforms. As the subsequent paragraphs demonstrate, as in the OSCE, the EU's institutional framework for peacebuilding was still in the making when member states deployed first peace operations. In contrast to the OSCE, however, the EU institutional system as a whole involves more actors and is much more complex.

As first landmark, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second of the three pillars of the Union, in addition to the European Community (Pillar 1) and Police and Justice Cooperation (Pillar III). Member states sought not only to speak to the world via one voice as a Union, but also to create foreign policy instruments to preserve peace and strengthen international security, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law (cp. Hix 2005, p. 388f.). To set its own approach apart from the UN and others, the EU used the terminology of crisis management when referring to peacebuilding activities.

For the first few years, the EU's foreign and security policy was characterized by a parallel structure. On the one hand, most of the tasks within the CFSP remained under the responsibility of the multilateral Council of the European Union (later EU Council). The EU Council Secretariat helped preparing and executing decisions taken under the framework of the CFSP. On the other hand, supranational policy areas such as trade, development, humanitarian aid, and enlargement which had been assigned to the European Commission. In line with the EU's general political framework, the Commission had the power to propose new laws and regulations in these areas which were adopted by the EU Parliament and EU Council. In the area of the CFSP, the Commission's tasks were less comprehensive. In fact, its main responsibility was to ensure that budget spending followed the EU's general rules and regulations. This was done by the Directorate-General for External Political Affairs (DG RELEX).

The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty (signed 1997, entered into force 1999) specified the content and instruments of the CFSP and introduced an organizational structure. Regarding peacebuilding and crisis management, this treaty has to be seen in the context of the looming Balkan crisis and European states' desire to have available means to intervene in violent conflict in close proximity to Europe but outside the US-dominated NATO arena. In addition to establishing the position of High Representative for CFSP, the treaty also introduced the foundations for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with a focus on humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management—the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' from 1992 (see Pagani 1998). The December 2000 Council in Nice (which came into force in 2003) added more flesh to the bones of the ESDP by installing the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as the member states' permanent intergovernmental decision-making body for both the CFSP and the ESDP. The PSC still exists today, with regular meetings of the heads of member states' permanent representations in Brussels (EU Council 2001b, c, d). Shortly after the PSC was established, the Council launched its first ever civilian ESDP mission, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003. More missions followed shortly in Macedonia (2003), Georgia (2004), and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2005.

The Lisbon treaty in 2007 constitutes the latest critical juncture in the development of the EU's crisis management structures. Politically, little changed. Member states in the multilateral EU Council retained authority over most of the EU's foreign policy, including the entire area of crisis management, which was renamed as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The Council further extended its committee structure and added bodies under the PSC to meet on an almost daily basis to take decisions on the EU's crisis management operations. The supranational Commission, by contrast, retained jurisdiction over the foreign policy areas of trade, development, humanitarian aid, and enlargement.

What member states did attempt to abolish, however, were the parallel administrative structures. These had long been dogged by controversy about respective prerogatives and competencies which had seriously hampered the effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy as a whole (Grevi et al. 2009; Korski and Gowan 2009). In crisis management, all operational and content-related decisions were prepared and taken in the EU Council Secretariat, whereas financial administrative matters for crisis management missions were dealt with by the EU Commission's DG RELEX Directorate

A. In addition to this, on the field level, the Council was running its crisis management missions while the Commission had established a set of 136 EU Delegation Offices in countries around the world to work in its own foreign policy areas.

The solution was a compromise, as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS), which took over all of the Council Secretariat's operational responsibilities in foreign policy, and transferred from the Commission those functions in DG RELEX to do with the budget administration of crisis management. All of these functions were now squeezed into one office within the EEAS, the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI).[1] The EU Delegation offices on the ground were administratively subordinate to the EEAS but its staff kept their affiliation with either the EEAS or one of the Commission's Directorates General, such as the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) or the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). To head the EEAS, member states converted the position of the High Representative for CFSP into the joint position of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy, who is simultaneously vice-president of the European Commission. The EEAS is structured



Fig. 4.1 The EU crisis management system (*Source:* Author's compilation)

similar to traditional foreign offices. But in addition to numerous geographic and thematic desks, there are also the headquarters sections that administer the EU's crisis management missions. These sections consist of the strategic-level Crisis Management Planning Directorates (CMPD) and a more operational Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is headed by the Civilian Operations Commander.

The right-hand side of Fig. 4.1 illustrates the political component of the EU's peacebuilding and crisis management system: the EU Council in its foreign affairs constellation manned by the twenty-eight Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[2] It meets at different working levels. The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee both meet at the level of the head of permanent representations of the twenty-eight member states. Decisions must be unanimous but abstentions are possible. The PSC acts as a conveyor belt between Brussels and national capitals and is the main strategic body for the EU's foreign policy. Its decision-making competencies vis-à-vis CSDP missions are vast, as Grevi et al. (2009, p. 30) note: '[T]he PSC disposes of considerable powers of policy advice and recommendation in the run-up to formal decisions as well as political direction, monitoring and evaluation in the implementation phase.' At the working level, the PSC is assisted by the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), and the Working Party of the Foreign Relations Counselors (RELEX). The two bodies are made up of diplomats from the permanent representations who, together with experts in the EEAS, prepare operational decisions in CIVCOM and financial decisions and mission budgets in RELEX.

In terms of defining the EU's political objectives in crisis management, the early treaties in the 1990s had remained largely silent. It was not until 2001 and the Swedish presidency that the Council defined its own programmatic approach to crisis management, called the 'EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts' (also known as the 2001 Gothenburg Programme). EU member states proclaimed that they were endowed with the 'moral responsibility' to prevent human suffering caused by violent conflict and that the prevention of conflict by addressing its 'root causes' was the 'highest priority' in foreign policy. Concrete measures included targeted action in support of democracy, support for electoral processes, the rule of law, and improving police services and human rights training for the whole security sector (see EU Council 2001a, e). In the same vein, the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that 'the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed states' (EU Council, December

2003, p. 10). For the EU, this applied most to its direct neighbors: 'Out task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean' (ibid., p. 8).

Within only one decade, the EU had developed a complex civilian crisis management system that, by 2011, had an operational budget of 335 Mio Euro. Although the Lisbon Treaty has tackled many of its initial weaknesses, it has not abolished the parallel administrative structure but simply incorporated it into one organizational frame—the EEAS. Politically, the EU's foreign policy, including crisis management missions, is run exclusively by the member states who have upgraded their committee structure to the point that it is now a continuous decision-making body. It meets on an almost daily basis not only to define the direction of the EU's actions in crisis management but also to shape operations (see also Morillas 2011, p. 250). The idea of EU civilian crisis management is preventive in the sense that postconflict institution-building prevents relapse into violence. Operations can tackle all sectors of public governance, but most previous and existing missions focus on the justice and security sector. The EU also expressed a clear priority in applying these instruments primarily in its direct neighborhood.

4.2 The Political Context of EULEX's Mandate

Ever since the end of the Kosovo war, the EU has played an important role in postconflict management in Kosovo. Within the UN's interim administration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the EU Commission had been responsible for economic reconstruction (Pillar IV) and established an EU delegation office in Pristina. Until 2008, when the Commission decided to close Pillar IV, the delegation funded activities aimed at turning Kosovo's economy into a market economy fit for European integration. When the UN began screening options for its own exit strategy, the EU was an obvious candidate to take over. A 2005 report, named after its author, the Norwegian Ambassador Karl Eide, stated this clearly: 'Kosovo is located in Europe, where strong regional organizations exist. In the future, they—and in particular the European Union (EU)—will have to play the most prominent role in Kosovo' (UN Secretary-General 2005, p. 5). Eide also wrote that in 'the light of the limitations of the police and judicial system, there will be a need for a continued presence of international police with executive powers in sensitive areas' (ibid., p. 3). This suggestion was fairly uncontroversial among Kosovo's Western allies.

After all, the EU had already established first police reform missions, such as in Bosnia. Where if not in Kosovo should the EU successfully work also with executive police?

This call found a receptive audience in the EU Council, in particular with Javier Solana who was High Representative for the EU's foreign policy and had also served as NATO Secretary-General at the time of the Kosovo war. Solana saw an EU crisis management mission in Kosovo as a paramount opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of the EU's crisis management system (Dijkstra 2011). A 2005 report jointly published with the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, thereafter constitutes the first official EU statement referring to a future police and rule of law mission in Kosovo (EU High Representative for CFSP 2005). In December 2005, when the EU's multiannual financial framework (2007–2013) was discussed, the budget for CSDP missions provided for a substantial annual increase that anticipated, inter alia, a new peace operation in Kosovo.[3]

However, despite the vague intention to use the EU's CSDP instruments in Kosovo, member states' positions on the issue varied substantially, mostly because of different perspectives on Kosovo's status. While most EU members were supportive of Kosovo's independence or at least neutral, five member states in particular had fundamental objections. Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Romania were all struggling with separatist movements in their own backyards and were afraid of creating a precedent that might impact their domestic politics. They consequently ruled out any support for Kosovo's independence as a matter of principle (ICG 2006, p. 14). The opposing faction formed around Kosovo's most important supporters in the EU: Germany, France, Britain, and Italy. They argued that the only stable solution for Kosovo was its independence from Serbia. Although disunited on what the solution should be, both sides in the EU Council agreed that an EU crisis management mission should assume a key role in the new Kosovo. To prepare options for such a role, they deployed an EU Planning Team (EUPT) in 2006, which set out to draft proposals for such a mission.[4] Politically, however, negotiations about Kosovo's future status were conducted outside the EU Council, which avoided dealing with the matter in its committees (Dijkstra 2011, p. 197).

Despite two years of negotiations between Belgrade, New York, Moscow, and Brussels, numerous meetings, delays, and initiatives, the UN chief negotiator Martti Ahtisaari failed to strike a deal. In his 'Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement'—also known as the 'Ahtisaari

Plan'—Ahtisaari finally made clear that UNMIK had done what it could but that the 'uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo's democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation' (UN Secretary-General 2007a, para. 4). Any solution leading to mutual agreement between the Serbian and Kosovar parties still seemed impossible. Belgrade offered autonomy for Kosovo but only within the Republic of Serbia, while Pristina was not willing to accept anything short of independence. In late 2007, the Council sent the German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger in what was to be the final attempt to find a solution based on compromise between the European Union, the USA, and Russia. However, the so-called Troika talks failed, reinforcing the deep rift not only between Russia and the USA, but also within the EU Council (ICG 2007a).

Everything moved quickly after Ischinger announced the failure of the Troika talks in December, 2007.[5] Encouraged by the US embassy, the Kosovo government took concrete steps toward declaring independence. A decision needed to be taken in the EU Council for a mission to replace UNMIK. There must have been dramatic scenes during the night sessions of the various Council formations leading up to the eventual 'loophole coup' of February, 2008. The loophole involved adopting the EULEX mandate a few days earlier than Kosovo's declaration of independence, thereby extending the legal framework of Resolution 1244 to retain Kosovo under international administration. The mandate simply ignored the political reality on the ground and made no mention of the status question, stating the following as a mission statement:

> EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices. (EU Council 2008c, Art. 1)

Only a few days after the EU Council decision, on 17 February, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia. In so doing, Kosovar leaders agreed to implement a long list of institutional provisions specified in the Ahtisaari Plan and accept a soft form of international supervision. While under a general Kosovo-compromise EULEX would

have performed this task, Western allies now established a new office, the International Civilian Office, to politically oversee Kosovo's first few years of independence.

From the start, observers were critical of the way the EU deployed a mission that ignored part of the new reality in Kosovo. Although the Council was united on Kosovo's long-term perspective as part of the European Union, it could not agree on the path that would lead to this end—that is, Kosovo as an autonomous member of the EU or as part of Serbia. Consequently, as Dijkstra (2011, p. 198) concluded, to 'avoid endless discussions over status amongst the member states' the Council attempted to design EULEX as 'a technical, status neutral, mission.' During an interview for this study, the head of EULEX's program office was more frank in his choice of words: 'in the absence of any policy, the EU deployed its mission.' This lack of policy, masked by an emphasis on the more technical aspects of police reform in crisis management, became a significant obstacle to EULEX's performance in Kosovo. Nonetheless, political ambiguity did not prevent member states from equipping the mission with an unprecedented budget of 250 Mio Euro for the first sixteen months of the mandate and a staff body of around 3200, including international (1950) and local (1250) employees (European Court of Auditors 2012).

4.3 Planning and Mission Deployment: Slow and Cumbersome

As noted in the previous chapters, it is crucial that peace operations are able to rapidly launch their operations after the mandate gets passed and that they are able to adjust to local preferences (local ownership). Compared to the OSCE, EULEX had a rough start. Planning took place in two phases: strategic planning leading up to the mandate before Kosovo's independence (2006–2008) and operational planning after the mandate had been passed (2008–2009). At the strategic level, planning processes for CSDP missions are highly formalized. They include a cascade of documents that define the EU's overall peacebuilding strategy (crisis management concept) and the mission's exact role within this strategy (mandate, concept of operations, and operational plan). Because even EU member states could not find a common position on Kosovo's status, they mandated a technical mission based on the outdated needs assessment conducted in 2006. In the area of police reform—which was only one among several

mission focal points—concrete plans for strengthening the Kosovo Police had not been prepared. Whereas the OSCE had begun with operational planning first, it took EULEX almost two years (until November 2009) to develop a police reform methodology, get it approved by Brussels, and begin implementation. This had two reasons related to the EU's institutional design: First, the EU's centralized and top-down planning procedure was extremely vulnerable to the political quarrels around the Kosovo dossier and incapable of effectively adjusting to the local context. Second, although an advance team was on the ground, it did not engage in technical preparations with the Kosovo police, as the OSCE team had done. Together, these factors cost the EU much time and credit among their local partners.

The first planning phase for the EU's Kosovo mission began in April 2006, with the deployment of the EU Planning Team. Taking the conclusions from the OSCE chapter as a starting point, it appears the EU did everything right. The planning team was tasked to develop evidence-based strategic options for a civilian CSDP mission. Based on its assessment report, submitted in December 2006, the Political and Security Committee endorsed a principal crisis management concept (CMC), tasking the Council Secretariat (the EEAS had not yet been established) with drafting a strategic-level concept of operations (EU Council 2006a). The concept of operations (CONOPS) defines the EU's larger strategic interests in a country and provides a statement on the mission's objectives and desired end-state. It also provides tactical-level guidance on how the head of mission should implement a mandate, for instance, by specifying the exact tasks the mission should perform. Options for EULEX ranged from a light footprint (around 450 staff) to a heavy one (around 1100 staff) and from a focus on the rule of law to a broader one that included other governmental activities such as civilian administration.[6] In January, 2007, EUPT leadership traveled to Brussels to consult on the options with the EU Council's Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. In the meeting it became clear that member states' positions on Kosovo's status had not changed. The Council still wanted to see an EU mission in Kosovo. It opted for a heavy footprint but a strict focus on the rule of law option and endorsed the CONOPS in February 2007 (EU Council 2007c para. II). But adoption of this plan was made conditional on the mandate, which could only be passed once the question of status had been concluded by the UN Security Council, based on a mutually acceptable compromise.

However, as we know, Ahtisaari found no compromise and negotiations ended in March 2007 with his status proposal. He opted, inter alia, for an EU rule of law mission to replace UNMIK. This was in line with the EU Council's agenda and for a moment it seemed as if a mission was imminent. As such, EU member states in May 2007 designated the French general Yves de Kermabon as future head of mission for EULEX (Dijkstra 2011, p. 200). Upon his arrival in Brussels, he began drafting the operational plan (OPLAN), based on the existing CONOPS. In the EU's peacebuilding system, the OPLAN defines precisely how the mission intends to implement the mandate. It outlines the mission structures, suggests a staff deployment plan, and provides information on all operational activities and projects. However, as it turned out, the Serbs rejected the Ahtisaari Plan and the Troika negotiations under Wolfgang Ischinger dragged on through 2007. Throughout this process, EU member states in the Council were aware that they would not find a common position on Kosovo's status. They could, however, easily agree on a long-term perspective that saw Kosovo—as part of Serbia—moving closer to the EU. They could also agree on the utility of a technical crisis management mission to improve rule of law institutions. In order to preserve this fragile compromise, the Kosovo dossier remained largely untouched in Brussels while Ischinger's Troika talks went on.[7]

In Kosovo, the EU Planning Team was also affected by the international stalemate. It had completed its planning mandate but was instructed to remain in Pristina to facilitate the eventual transition from UNMIK. EUPT staff consequently canvassed UN Civpol and OSCE offices to strike a deal on how exactly transition should proceed. EUPT and UNMIK stipulated a 120-day transition period, during which remaining executive authorities should be transferred. There was also the idea that EULEX could take over buildings, cars, and other equipment from the UN mission.[8]

After a year it was finally clear that Kosovo would move on unilaterally. To precede the declaration of independence, the Council adopted EULEX's mandate finally on 4 February, 2008. Yves de Kermabon's OPLAN was adopted a few days later. The agreed transition period with UNMIK began and was slated to end in June 2008 when a new constitution for Kosovo would be adopted. At that time, the EUPT had already expanded to 120 staff, complete with office facilities; in principle everything was ready for EULEX to begin working right away. Yet, a number of factors prevented this and led to almost two years passing before the mission finally launched its activities in the area of police reform (executive tasks were launched

earlier). The two main reasons were: First, with Kosovo institutions unilaterally declaring their independence, most previous arrangements presuming a mutually acceptable compromise had become obsolete and required new solutions. Most notably, without a new Security Council Resolution, UNMIK could not be fully withdrawn. As a result, EULEX could not take over their buildings and was suddenly forced to initiate procurement procedures to purchase its own equipment.[9] This was, of course, a major task given the mission's intended size of almost 2000 international staff. It also slowed down EULEX's staff deployment; by June 2008 only 256 international personnel were on the ground, most of them remaining from the EUPT (UN Secretary-General 2009a, Annex I). In addition, as de Wet (2009, p. 86) reports, the EU opponents of Kosovo's independence managed to temporarily suspend recruitment procedures for EULEX in summer 2008, leading to announcements of delays in getting the mission operational.[10]

The second reason for delays was related to a planning bias. The EU had never before conducted a crisis management mission with comparable tasks to those of EULEX. De Kermabon, a career officer of the French army, and his team had devoted most of their attention to planning the executive part of the mission. There was little else to explain the fact that after more than a year of planning in Brussels and Kosovo, the OPLAN contained little concrete information on how to continue reforming the Kosovo police. Planning on this operative level was done only after the mission had been deployed, and even then it was done without any sense of urgency. The mission first established a Program Office to develop a methodology. According to the mission mandate, EULEX was expected to improve the Kosovo police by conducting mentoring, monitoring, and advising (MMA). Yet, no one knew what exactly was meant by MMA or how MMA was to produce the end result defined in the CONOPS.[11] By late 2008, the Program Office came up with its own methodology, which it called the 'Programmatic Approach' (see EULEX 2009). This approach foresaw an initial measurement of the state of Kosovo's rule of law institutions in order to identify training demand and serve as a baseline for all MMA activities. The assessment began in September 2008 and lasted six months until June, 2009. The Program Office subsequently drafted a long list of individual MMA actions for those areas found to require attention. With this list available by November 2009, EULEX finally began implementing its mandate in police professionalization—exactly three years

after the EU planning team had sent its assessment report to Brussels and almost two years after the EU Council had adopted the EULEX mandate.

According to peacebuilding literature, planning processes should facilitate a rapid deployment of peacebuilding operations. Clearly EULEX failed to do this. Although at the time of Kosovo's independence, the country was not in a situation with a small postconflict window of opportunity, the cumbersome deployment process left a negative impression among local and international partners. In diplomatic cables from April and July 2009,[12] the US ambassador to Kosovo, Tina Kaidonow, stated (caustically): '[W]e find ourselves generally praising EULEX's modest accomplishments and waiting impatiently for more monumental achievements.'

Certainly, the political climate in the EU Council and internationally was the root cause for the complex political dynamics around the EULEX mandate. However, the EU's institutionalized planning process did not mitigate the situation. Despite a planning mission that provided evidence-based strategic options, engaged in cooperation at the operational level, and prepared the infrastructure for later mission deployment, it took EULEX twenty-one months to move from mandate to implementation. In contrast, the OSCE mission began its training activities after three months. Two further points should be made here. First, the fact that the CONOPS had not been updated after January, 2007 meant that the mission started in 2008 on the basis of an outdated analysis and strategy. For instance, as one member of the EUPT noted, the EULEX mandate still included capacity-building for the rank-and-file level of the Kosovo police even though the latest analyses indicated this was no longer necessary.[13] And second, despite there being sufficient time and staff available to develop a methodology for the implementation of police professionalization prior to mission deployment, this was only done after the EULEX Program Office had been installed. This added another year of in-mission planning to an already tedious planning process. Thus, by the time the mission began working, it had already lost much of its political credibility.

4.4 Implementation and Project Management: Centralized and Lacking Local Ownership

As outlined in Chap. 2, there is a close link between a peace operation's allocation of decision-making competencies and its ability to flexibly adjust to peacebuilding challenges and cooperate with partners, both locals and

internationals. While analyzing how EULEX went about implementing its mandate, this section comes to four conclusions. First, EULEX was unable to implement projects alongside its mentoring work. Second, EU missions run on basis of a complex financial management framework that severely stifles its advisory and mentoring work. Third, although mission leadership prevented micromanagement, the restrictive operational plan prevented adjustments to local police reform preferences. And finally, cooperation with the EU Commission worked well, despite all other limitations. Overall, the EU Court of Auditors summarized the internal affairs of the mission well when they concluded that 'there were significant areas where better management (…) could have made EU assistance more effective' (European Court of Auditors 2012, p. 5f.). EULEX's poor performance in mandate implementation generally relates to Brussels' overbearing involvement in operational matters, which is why this section begins with an overview of the structural relation between EU missions and headquarters.

As argued in Sect. 4.1, the EU foreign policy system is characterized by a parallel structure: the EU Commission exerts financial control over crisis management missions and the EU Council steers politically (see Fig. 4.1). First, the EU Commission alone is responsible for implementing the Community's budget.[14] Traditionally, however, the EU Commission does not directly implement foreign policy activities. Be it enlargement or development assistance, EU Delegations award contracts to implementing agencies who then act in the Commission's strategic interest. The EU's financial and administrative instruments are therefore geared to this, specifying ex-post requirements and conducting ex-ante control and auditing to ensure accountable spending of the budget. This is no different with CSDP missions. With no legal personality vested in these organizations, they exist merely as a Commission project. This project is based on a special advisor contract that a mission's head determines with the Commission after his appointment. In line with this, a draft of the EULEX mandate states:

> The project will be implemented by a Head of Mission (HoM), who will sign a Special Adviser contract with the Commission for the specific purpose of managing expenditure related to the mandate. This contract makes him directly accountable to the Commission for the funds with which he is entrusted. (EU Council 2008b, Annex I, para. 5.3)

For example, when the Council mounted EULEX, the first head of mission Yves de Kermabon signed such a contract worth 205 Mio Euro (EU

Council 2008c, Art. 8(5)). Once the contract was signed, he alone was responsible for its financial implementation in accordance with the EU's rules of procedure (EU Council 2008b, Annex I, para. 5.3). To ensure compliance and efficiency during the implementation of CSDP missions, the EU Commission maintains 125 treasury staff within the EEAS, the Foreign Policy Instrument section (see Sect. 4.1).

Second, in principle, this system should allow for a high degree of operational flexibility within the frame of these financial restrictions, yet, in practice, the opposite is true. During mandate implementation, the head of mission acts under the authority of the Brussels-based Civilian Operation Commander, who heads the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. According to the EULEX mandate, the head of CPCC should 'ensure proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions at the strategic level as required to the head of mission and providing him with advice and technical support' (EU Council 2008c, Art. 7(3)). Obviously this formulation leaves room for interpretation and, in practice, it is up to the two individuals—the head of CPCC and the head of mission—to find a workable solution. However, it is clear that the head of CPCC can exert decisive influence over mandate implementation. He again acts under the prerogative of the EU Council. Whenever a mission deviates from the original operational plan or whenever member states deem it appropriate for other reasons, the Council may use his right to 'exercise (…) political control and strategic direction' (EU Council 2008c, Art. 12(1)). These decisions are taken in the Political and Security Committee, which meets at the level of heads of member state representations, and prepared in the working-level civilian committee (CIVCOM) which meets almost on a daily basis. As the next sections show, in practice the EU Council did not only issue strategic guidance but its working-level committee CIVCOM was involved in EULEX's operational processes on a continuous basis.

Project Management Framework and the Adjustment of Activities

Taking over from UNMIK, EULEX organized its own activities in relation to the three professional communities working in the mission: Police, justice, and customs. On the secondary level, each of these departments was subdivided into two main areas: executive tasks and capacity-building. In 2009, the majority of international staff were employed to implement the executive mandate (1241) and only one out of four (410) worked in the area of capacity-building.[15]

When it came to strengthening the Kosovo police, EULEX explicitly attempted to pursue a strategic approach. Mission managers were determined not to repeat what they perceived as a mistake made by UNMIK. As Spernbauer (2010, p. 18) explains, '(p)reviously, the involvement of the international community (…) had been considered as extremely reactive to the immediate necessities on the ground, lacking strategic over- and foresight.' In consequence, the mission's Program Office drafted the so-called 'programmatic approach' (EULEX 2009, p. 5ff.). It outlined a cascade of activities. At the top was a program implementation document. Based on the initial baseline assessment published in June 2009, eleven Project Implementation Documents were produced. Each included a list of mentoring, monitoring, and advising (MMA) activities, called MMA actions. For example, one MMA action was to draft, together with the Kosovo police, a crime reduction strategy. Another was to rationalize the Kosovo police's structure. An August 2011 document refers to forty-five MMA actions—thirty-one pertaining to the police, ten to the justice system, and four to customs.[16] Each MMA action was linked to performance indicators and a reporting scheme. Overall, this cascade was intended to 'ensure specific and focused connections between MMA outputs on the ground and the mission strategic aims and objectives' (EULEX 2009, p. 8).

MMA actions focused on four key areas in which the 2009 baseline assessment had found shortcomings in the Kosovo police: tackling crime effectively, conducting effective patrolling and ensuring public order, providing secure borders, and strategic policing leadership and management (EULEX 2010, p. 7). One other important topic was maintaining a high level of integration of Serb police officers and convincing those who had left the service after the declaration of independence to return. Finally, EULEX also intended to establish some policing capabilities from scratch, such as the protection of religious sites and monuments, a border police at the 'green' border with Macedonia, and an anticorruption task force.[17] At the end of each year, the EULEX program office published a program report that indicated the progress made in each of the four areas compared to the previous year and the 2009 baseline assessment. According to these reports, there was almost always progress in each of the four areas (Table 4.1).

Looking in from the outside, the mission certainly made some progress, most notably in the area of customs and border control, which had been assumed by NATO's Kosovo Force prior to Kosovo's independence. By 2011, the new Kosovo border police took over responsibility for Kosovo's

Table 4.1 EULEX indicators for progress in police reform (2009–2012)

Area of police reform	*2009*	*→2010*	*→2011*	*→2012*
Tackling crime effectively		B	A	A
Tackling patrol issues and ensuring public order		B	A	A
Providing secure borders		A	A	A
Providing a stable organization		B	A	B

Source: Author's compilation based on EULEX program reports (EULEX 2010, 2011, 2012). Progress was indicated by means of four levels: A = progress; B = slow progress/need more impetus; C = problematic/very limited or no progress; and D = serious concern/regression

borders with Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro (EULEX 2011, 2012). Apart from that, however, other independent assessments were more critical. An evaluation conducted by the EU's own Court of Auditors was particularly disappointing. In their report, the auditors wrote:

> Despite some modest successes, notably in the transfer of responsibilities for border and boundary control from KFOR to Kosovo authorities, EU assistance to the police audited by the Court did not lead to significant improvements. (European Court of Auditors 2012, p. 18)

Asked about one successful area of EULEX MMA activities, one interviewee referred to information processing systems such as a new case management system or the updating of the KPS incidents log data system. This latter system is important for intelligence-led policing; it enables the tracking and identifying of patterns in crime.[18] However, it was exactly this area of MMA action that was also assessed by the EU Audit, which concluded that the impact of MMA actions on intelligence-led policing and strategic planning remained weak at best (European Court of Auditors 2012, p. 17).

In the light of such a massive disjuncture between the mission's self-assessment as published in its progress reports, and external assessments, it must be concluded that EULEX's programmatic approach failed as a strategic tool to structure the EU's strengthening work in Kosovo. Instead of guiding the reform work and highlighting policing areas in need of more attention, the tracking tool misled the public and arguably also police officers working in the strengthening component. For them, as several EULEX officers said, the programmatic approach was an administrative burden with little practical relevance. They saw it mainly as an instrument

used by mission leadership to appease Brussels.[19] Overall, the framework prevented necessary adjustments of EULEX's strengthening approach rather than facilitating them.

Budgetary Rules and Their Impact on Operational Flexibility

In the EU, as noted above, there are separate chains of command in crisis management for operational and financial matters. It is the task of the EU Commission's treasury within the EEAS, the Foreign Policy Instrument service, to exert financial control over mission spending. A complex regulatory framework governs the EU's spending and procurement procedures; even the synoptic overview is 400 pages long. For EULEX, several ex-post oversight instruments were in place, including an external audit every four months, a certification of the special advisors' contract at the end of an assignment and regular audits conducted by FPI as part of its annual control plan.[20]

The EU financial regulations in external action were not originally written for EU crisis management operations but for the activities of EU Delegation offices. They were written to ensure accountability in budget spending, especially because subcontracting in external action is a frequent practice. Most delegation offices are comparatively small; they operate within a three-year strategic framework to subcontract activities without implementing them themselves. In terms of budget regulations, EU crisis management missions such as EULEX with its almost 3000 personnel are treated in the same way as one such subcontractor. However, for a mission of this size, many procedures are simply too lengthy and complicated. For instance, when in October 2011, at the end of the EU financial year, the EULEX budget was not entirely spent and was extended for two months,[21] the head of mission had to personally extend hundreds of contracts for staff employment, leasing, facilities, and so on.[22] In addition, police officers working in mission components complained of a confusing flood of administrative directives and operating procedures with a tendency to evermore regulation and documentation.[23]

In contrast to the OSCE, the EU does not have the tool of exception reports to ensure the 'primacy of the political' in cases where financial regulations conflict with operational activities. According to interviewees, this affects smooth mandate implementation by EULEX. Asked for an example, one interviewee said that in an investigation into organized crime the mission was required to trade information for money with a whistleblower,

a common practice in crime investigations. However, EULEX financial rules and regulations, not tailored for such situations, required three independent quotations before money could be handed over. Although a way around was found, finding solutions to such problems is lengthy and extremely dependent upon individual willingness to bend the rules.[24]

Cooperation and Local Ownership

Cooperation is a key performance indicator in peacebuilding, and has local and international dimensions. Locally, EULEX emphasized from the outset that 'there would be total ownership of the reform process by the relevant Kosovo institutions' and that the mission 'would fully recognize the capacity-building efforts of the European Commission, other international organizations and bilateral donors' (EULEX 2009, p. 9). In order to ensure ownership of the reform process, EULEX, together with the Kosovar government established the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board. Apart from the relevant Kosovar legal institutions, the board also contained all other relevant EU bodies. Arguably, its most relevant contribution was the common adoption of the forty-five MMA Actions after the initial six-month assessment phase. Apart from that, meetings of the Board are reported to be confrontational and lacking an agreement on the Kosovar agenda (Derks and Price 2010, p. 24). When Kosovar interviewees were asked about the extent of ownership they had over the EULEX strengthening strategy, they were generally satisfied with the Coordination Board.[25] However, they also said that there was a growing sense of 'mentoring fatigue' spreading among Kosovar police officers—officers who had received training by internationals for almost a decade were simply tired of receiving advice by police mentors who changed every 6–12 months. As a result, Kosovo's Ministry of Interior suggested downscaling EULEX and transferring the capacity-building mandate to the EU Commission's Delegation office.[26] As of 2011, local preferences for alternative methods in strengthening had not been adopted by EULEX.[27] Coordination Board meetings have also lost their relevance, taking place only once or twice a year since 2012. Overall, this indicates a declining commitment to local ownership.

Cooperation with International Partners

In addition to ensuring local ownership, cooperation with international partners was of utmost importance for the success of EULEX. This had

two reasons. On the one hand, the mission itself had no political teeth to enforce police reforms against the will of political spoilers. In contrast, the EU as a whole had that political leverage because most political powerbrokers in Kosovo were convinced that as a small, economically weak state, Kosovo could only benefit from keeping its own borders open and eventually joining the EU. The path toward European integration, however, bristles with accession requirements—namely, the Copenhagen criteria—that require governance reforms.[28] Every year, the EU Delegation office in Kosovo publishes the Progress report on the advancement of Kosovo along these lines (e.g., EU Commission 2011). These criteria also cover the police and ensure that Kosovar institutions have an interest in improving as specified in EULEX's mandate.

On the other hand, EULEX lacked resources to conduct project work beyond mentoring work alone. EULEX is purely a capacity-building mission; its main asset is expertise contributed by experts seconded or contracted from member states, such as judges or police officers. The mission budget provides no funds for 'hardware' such as equipment deliveries and refurbishment or constructing Kosovar police infrastructure. Recognizing this limitation, EULEX wrote in its first program report that 'the support of external donors and agencies will be required for certain actions (i.e., those that will require certain types of technical assistance, infrastructure development and more formal capacity building measures)' (EULEX 2009, p. 11). With the Instrument for Pre-Accession, a funding scheme of the EU's neighborhood policy, the Commission had the funds EULEX needed.

In order both to back its political influence vis-à-vis Kosovo authorities and to complement its strengthening work, EULEX needed to work hand-in-hand with the EU Commission's Office in Kosovo. According to interviewees at both ends, cooperation worked reasonably well. Both EU actors capably coordinated the drafting of the annual EU Progress reports, which were repeatedly used to back the EULEX reform agenda in cases where local opposition within the police existed, such as against the conduct of joint border operations between Serbian and Kosovo police officers.[29] In terms of joint project work, however, the coexistence of different financial administrations had a negative impact. The EU Delegation's own financial framework runs on the basis of three-year plans, while the Council extended EULEX's mandate every two years.[30] The EU Delegation was thus unable to respond to short-term requests formulated by the mission. More long-term projects, however, could sometimes be attuned.[31]

Summary

This section reveals deficits in all indicators of process performance. Most importantly, the strategic management framework used by EULEX did not serve to incrementally adjust activities, but rather, was used to misinform the public and the EU Council. Financial rules used by the Commission to oversee EULEX's work turned out to be a significant administrative burden. Exceptions reports, such as employed by the OSCE, did not exist. On a positive note, although previous research (e.g., Keohane 2011) and interviewees in Brussels[32] complained about turf wars between EU Commission and EEAS, cooperation in Kosovo worked reasonably well. However, there were deficits in the mission's readiness to adjust its reform approach to local preferences. Overall, these deficits were caused by the EU's highly centralized management system. Although micromanagement by the Brussels bureaucracy remained limited, mission leadership had only limited room to decide on its own work, which was to a large extent predefined by the OPLAN. Adjustments of this plan were contingent on the EU Council and its working-level body, CIVCOM. However, member states were highly divided on the Kosovo dossier, resulting in the committee's inability to collaborate constructively on EULEX requests. As a consequence, EULEX managers stuck to existing plans rather than fighting an uphill battle for alterations. The next section, which focuses on the linkages between field level and headquarters, will outline these dynamics in more detail.

4.5 Strategy Review and Monitoring: A Catalyst for Politicization

Effective peacebuilding depends on the ability of peace operations to analyze their impact and take countermeasures if necessary. Because these measures often link to the original mandate formulated by political decisions-makers, it is vital that structure and processes are in place that effectively link the two levels. In the sections above, I demonstrated that the implementation of the EULEX strengthening mandate did not match expectations. EULEX staff interviewed for this book shared this perception of disjuncture, though they would never say so in public.[33] This raises two questions: Why was the EULEX strategy never adjusted despite a coherent understanding of the mission's lack of impact? And second, why was there such a discrepancy between the mission's weak

performance and its communication to the public? The answer lies in the structural and processual linkages between Pristina and Brussels related to reviewing and adjusting the mission's activities. I argue, first, that the mission structurally lacked of managerial leeway; and second, that it was politically vulnerable, both to the Council's quarrels over Kosovo's status and the lack of interest among diplomats in the technical details of the EULEX mandate.

As mentioned above, EULEX's mandate allocates operational control of its program activities to the EEAS' head of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in Brussels, the EU Civilian Operations Commander. Member states in the EU Council's committees, the ambassador-level Political and Security Committee and the working-level CIVCOM, simultaneously provide strategic and political guidance. Whenever the mission needs to deviate from the original planning documents or operational activities are politically relevant, Brussels must be consulted for approval. And as interviewees indicated, in Kosovo *every* relevant operational decision has a political component. During past years, CIVCOM consequently had to be involved almost on a daily basis.[34]

For instance, EULEX's presence in North Kosovo is a political question because Serbs in North Kosovo do not recognize the mission's legal prerogative. In addition, the conflict in North Kosovo is the key to a political deal about Kosovo's status and the fate of the region. For these reasons, every move of EULEX police in the North has to be carefully coordinated with Brussels.[35] To do this, member state representatives convene in CIVCOM, where they review EULEX reports, discuss complaints, prepare political guidance issued by the PSC, and prepare all formal decisions taken by the PSC.[36] The meetings are chaired by a representative from the EEAS who has to facilitate decision-making by exploring potential compromises each time representatives disagree.

This structure had two effects in Kosovo. First, delegations of countries that reject Kosovo's claim to independence could use their influence in the committees to subvert EULEX's work. This was done, for example, by co-opting the reports EULEX sent on a regular basis as updates (weekly, monthly, and six-monthly reports). In studying these reports, certain member states watched closely to see whether EULEX was maintaining its prescribed status-neutrality. A US Embassy cable illustrates[37]:

> Madrid and the other four non-recognizing capitals complain to Brussels each time a routine report even suggests that EULEX is venturing beyond

the bounds of status-neutrality and straying from its mandate under UNSCR 1244, and Brussels, in turn, notifies EULEX headquarters of its offense.

Each time such a complaint reached the mission, management needed to appease ambassadors, often by installing administrative directions as precautions. Apart from adding layers of bureaucracy that strained program managers,[38] strategic reporting from Kosovo to Brussels became an extremely sensitive matter, with reports formulated in a generic and vacuous language that allowed only limited insights regarding the mission's actual advancements and the political situation on the ground (see also Sect. 4.4).[39]

The second effect had to do with diverging professional priorities. While the mission was mandated to conduct capacity-building and to strengthen Kosovo's rule of law, EU member state representatives acting in CIVCOM are mainly diplomats by profession, with a diplomatic agenda. And sometimes there was a conflict of goals between diplomatic objectives and the mission's technical work. For instance, in autumn 2011, tensions stirred in North Kosovo leading to Kosovo Serbs blocking all public access roads between Pristina and the border gates to Serbia. These gates were previously manned by EULEX and Kosovo police officers together. Conducting border controls there was one indicator of improving Serb–Kosovar relations, a prerequisite for Serbia receiving the status of candidacy for EU membership. For a majority of member states in the Council, this was a political priority.[40] When the roads were blocked, the PSC tasked EULEX with using their helicopters to transport Kosovar Police officers to the gates. Kosovo Serbs reacted immediately and blocked remaining access routes to the North and in the city of Mitrovica. This prevented EULEX judges and police officers from reaching the court building and police station they had just opened in north Mitrovica. Clearly, the decision to fly Kosovar police officers to the gates was taken against the interest of the mission mandate. The result was that EULEX's entire set of capacity-building activities in North Kosovo came to an end.[41] In addition, concerns that high-profile investigations against member of the Kosovo elite would undermine the peace process with Serbia also meant that EULEX could not use available evidence to take action against several cases of corruption within government and police.[42]

Centralized managerial authorities not only prevented EULEX from adjusting its strategy when needed, but also furthered the politicization of the mission. Member states used their influence in two ways: some

obstructed the mission because they opposed Kosovo's independence, while others sought to pursue larger geopolitical interests regarding Serbia—interests that sometimes conflicted with the police reform mandate. Such conflicts of interests and agendas are not nefarious, but in Kosovo they did have a negative effect on the mission's reputation and strengthening work.

4.6 Summary: Weak Performance Despite Favorable Context

Analyzing the Kosovo police at the time when EULEX's mandate was formulated, observers noted that democratic oversight, political influence, high-level corruption, border policing capabilities, and capacities in management and logistics were still weak areas (Scheye 2008; UNDP 2006). Several years later, progress was made in those areas where the Kosovo police had to develop new skills and capacities. For instance, NATO forces had executed Kosovo's border policing functions until independence. With EULEX assistance, new capacities in border policing grew fast, allowing NATO in 2011 to hand over responsibility for borders with Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro to the Kosovo border police (EULEX 2011, 2012). However, more recent sources note the continuation of problems mentioned in 2008 (EU Commission, October 2014). Some even argue that political interference in police matters, corruption, and organized crime have worsened.[43] The EU's Court of Auditors wrote that EULEX's work had done little to improve the Kosovo Police (European Court of Auditors 2012, p. 18). In addition, little to no progress was achieved in fighting corruption during the time of EULEX's work in Kosovo (Martini 2014). Overall, this reflects poorly on progress in police reform since Kosovo's independence. How to explain this outcome? What role did the EU's institutional system and the mission's performance play? This section discusses the main explanatory factors for this outcome and assesses, counterfactually, the relevance of the OSCE's institutional system and the mission's associated performance.

First, the general operational context (cp. Doyle and Sambanis 2006) in Kosovo can be discarded as explanation. Local capacities and international investments remained high and, apart from a few exceptions in North Kosovo, the overall environment remained free of conflict-related violence. Second, there is the diminishing utility function of police reform:

New capacities are easily developed, whereas more long-term tasks such as advancing management skills, reducing corruption, and preventing political interference are more challenging. Arguably, EULEX faced a more challenging task in this sense than its predecessors by virtue of taking over police reform after the initial gains had already been made. Third, police reform is always contingent on the willingness of local partners to transform. Having gained independence, there is the possibility that the Kosovo government's willingness to accept interference from the outside had decreased. Responding to this question, interviewees from Kosovo's Ministry of Interior expressed the country's continuous interest to join the European Union and its willingness to achieve the associated Copenhagen standards (in policing). However, they also said that the mentoring strategy applied by EULEX was ineffective (see Sect. 4.5) and that the police leadership's influence on corruption and organized crime was limited.[44] Other observers pointed to the government and ruling political parties when explaining political corruption in Kosovo's institutional system[45]—an opinion that, if taken seriously, would have required a different strategy than employed by EULEX.

Overall, the room for progress in police reform in Kosovo had definitely declined as compared to 1999—albeit not entirely. EULEX faced a challenging task, but one that could have been solved. EULEX had been deployed precisely because the Security Council saw a lack of credible interest among some parts of the Kosovar elite and the police to fight corruption (among themselves). EULEX was there to ensure that improvements occurred nonetheless. Overall, Kosovo's political leadership repeatedly expressed their willingness to improve along the accession criteria, but they preferred alternative methods. A reform strategy *other* than mentoring, monitoring, and advising likely would have wielded more impact, both in terms of management capacities and reducing corruption and political interference. In particular, with its executive component EULEX had sufficient resources to establish credible pressure against corrupt individuals within the Kosovo government and police. Thus, when explaining the EU mission's inability to achieve meaningful progress in police reform in Kosovo, two deficits stick out: First, the failure to adjust the ineffective mentoring strategy and the waste of resources associated with keeping the mentoring machinery running; and second, the inability to alternatively use its executive powers as a political lever in the reform process.

I argue that, ultimately, both deficits can be attributed to the EU mission's institutional design and performance (see Table 4.2). First, equipped with vast competencies and resources, EULEX was a flagship mission facing high local expectations. There was more than only a sense of disappointment when locals in Pristina became aware of the EU's ponderousness. As explained, EULEX took a year and a half from the moment that its mandate was passed before it actually began implementing MMA actions. This was mainly due to the EU's synoptic planning framework that prevented the mission (and its preceding planning team) to collaborate more closely with the Kosovo police on the actual police reform strategy. Second, during implementation, complex financial rules not originally designed for crisis management missions created a complex layer of bureaucratic rules that slowed down operations. Although there were tendencies by the Brussels bureaucracy to micromanage EULEX, mission leadership for most of the time maintained a functional level of distance. But this does not mean that EULEX was flexible. Mission leadership had only limited room to decide on its own work, which was to a large extent predefined by the OPLAN. When locals complained about a growing 'mentoring fatigue,' the mission was unable to adjust its methodology. Third, the mission's limited autonomy was further restricted each time political tensions stirred. As one interviewee put it, 'the EU conducts crisis management by committees.'[46] In the EU Council's working level commitees, some EU members rejected the mission altogether, others were only interested in solving the crisis in North Kosovo. These geopolitical differences, in association with the ability to directly influence decision-making by senior management, had significant effects on mission operations. They obstructed, for instance, the mission's work in North Kosovo and in criminal investigations more generally as reported in Sect. 4.5. The general political contentiousness associated to EULEX Kosovo also undermined strategy reviews and prevented constructive discussions about the mission's effectiveness. It is understandable, against this backdrop, why EULEX never managed to appear as a unitary political player in Kosovo. As mentioned at the beginning if this section, the EU Court of Auditors frankly concluded that 'EU assistance to the police audited by the Court did not lead to significant improvements' (European Court of Auditors 2012, p. 18). A more outspoken critique from an official EU source is unlikely.

The limited impact reached by EULEX is all the more striking given the mission's positive operational context. It was the best resourced EU peace operation to date, operating with up to 2500 rule of law experts and a budget of over one billion Euros between 2008 and 2015. This renders

Table 4.2 EULEX institutional design and its impact on performance

Policy phase	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
Planning	Top-down, synoptic planning	Slow launch of operations (1.5 years), replanning necessary	Poor
Implementation	Centralized decision-making competencies, autonomous leadership	Cumbersome and bureaucratic, failure to adjust to local preferences, effective cooperation with international partners	Intermediate
Review	Highly centralized annual mandate review	Continuous politicization of mandate implementation, clash of political and operational rationalities	Poor

Sources: Author's compilation

the overall outcome of police reform in Kosovo counterintuitive: surely more progress could have been expected of the EU's most expensive mission. This chapter concludes that the EULEX's process performance (or lack thereof) explains this lack of progress to a large extent. Centralized planning and management competencies slowed down operations and facilitated political interference. Assuming as a counterfactual that the EU had used the OSCE's institutional design instead, it is reasonable to expect that better outcomes would have resulted. In particular, the mission would have been able to offer those reform services actually needed by the Kosovo police. It would also have been able to build up credible threats to overcome resistance from individual reform spoilers in Kosovo's political elite. With more autonomy from Brussels, member state interference would not have been eliminated altogether, but a more independent head of mission could have pushed through his or her own agenda more effectively. In the case of the OSCE, it took a major political dispute to paralyze operational activities, but in the EU the structural threshold for interference is very low. In sum, the EU's institutional structures and rules did not facilitate police reform in Kosovo. Instead, they hamstrung mission management and prevented those working in the field from using the mission's significant resources in a way that matched the political context in Kosovo.

Notes

1. Despite transferring some foreign policy responsibilities to the EEAS, the Commission maintained separate DGs for the EU's supranational policy areas trade, development, humanitarian aid, and enlargement.
2. The EU Council maintains a committee structure of over 150 committees and working groups under the nine main council configurations. For an overview see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/council-configurations/list-of-council-preparatory-bodies?lang=en (accessed 01 November 2015).
3. Interview with an EU Commission official working within the Foreign Policy Instruments Section of the EEAS (Interview No. 025/B, 23 April 2012).
4. Interview with a former member of the EU Planning Team and an EULEX official (Interview No. 011/K, 16 November 2011, 012/K, 17 November 2011).
5. See, for instance, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7133892.stm (accessed 01 November 2015).
6. Interview with official from the EUPT (Interview No. 012/K, 17 November 2011).
7. According to one EULEX senior manager and one former employee of the EU Planning Team interview with (Interview No. 012/K, 17 November 2011, 026/D, 30 November 2011); see also Dijkstra (2011, p. 200).
8. Interview with two former EUPT officials (Interview No. 011/K, 16 November 2011, 012/K, 17 November 2011).
9. The new technical agreement for handover of UNMIK assets to EULEX was signed on 20 August 2008, between the head of UNMIK and the EULEX head of mission. The eventual transfer of authority ('flipping the switch') was concluded on 9 December 2008. According to a UN lessons learned study (UN DPKO 2011, p. 4f.) and media reports: http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?view=story&id=1241&sectionId=1 (accessed 01 November 2015).
10. US code cable from 08 July 2008, subject 'EULEX KOSOVO Committee of Contributors discusses reconfiguration and deployment' para 1. The text can be accessed at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/ (accessed 01 November 2015).
11. The CONOPS states that EULEX should achieve '[s]ustainable progress towards a transparent and accountable multiethnic (…) police service (…) operating within a sound legal framework (…) with the capacity to consistently deliver an effective service responsive to the needs of society, without international intervention or substitution' (EU Council 2008b, para. 1.5).

12. US code cable from 08 April 2009, subject 'Kosovo/EULEX: At full operational capability, but not without problems.' And code cable from 04 July 2009, subject 'Kosovo: EULEX at the six months point.' The text can be accessed at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/ (accessed 01 November 2015).
13. Interview with former member of the EUPT (Interview No. 026/D, 30 November 2011).
14. See Art. 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (European Union 2008). Compare further Council Regulation (EC) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, in particular Article 75(2) thereof.
15. These numbers are adopted from three reports, the September UN Secretary General report (UN Secretary-General 2009b), a document by the German parliament that indicates the number of police personnel in international peace operations (Bundesregierung 2009 b) and EULEX's first Program Report published in July 2009 (EULEX 2009).
16. According to information provided on the EULEX website: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/2011-08-ACTION-FICHES-PUBLIC-new.pdf (accessed 01 November 2015). The document, dated August 2011, specifies the rationale, objectives, envisioned outputs, and context of each MMA action. According to a note, half of the MMA activities in the justice component were halted. The publicly available MMA tracking mechanism was updated four times, last in December 2011; between then and 2013, there was no further activity. By 2014, the EULEX website contained no references to the tracking system at all.
17. The quarterly reports by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council contain an Annex drafted by the EULEX. It provides a regularly updated overview of activities.
18. Interview with EULEX official (Interview No. 014/K, 21 November 2011).
19. Interview with police officer working in EULEX (Interview No. 041/K, 17 November 2011) and two senior members of the EULEX management team (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 012/K, 17 November 2011).
20. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/syn_pub_rf _modex_en.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the rules applying to contract procedures associated with EU external action, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/20practical_guide/previous_versions/index_en.htm (both accessed 01 November 2015).
21. See the two respective Council Joint Actions (EU Council 2010, 2011).

22. Interview with officials from EULEX and other EU field missions (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 004/D, 26 June 2012).
23. For instance, in 2011, EULEX implemented a protocol requiring all mission personnel to conduct a driving test and a system was installed allowing all EULEX vehicles to be tracked by GPS. According to interviews with two police officers working within EULEX (Interview No. 002/K, 17 November 2011, 041/K, 17 November 2011). Although not on such a level of detail, other interviewees confirm that there is a tendency for continuous regulation due to the head of mission's budget responsibility (Interview No. 004/D, 26 June 2012).
24. Interview with member of the EULEX senior management team (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011).
25. Interview with representatives of the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 033/K, 22 November 2011, 023/K, 24 November 2011).
26. Interview with officials from the Kosovo Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 033/K, 22 November 2011, 023/K, 24 November 2011, 034/K, 27 January 2011); the draft strategy document by the Kosovo government, titled 'Strategy for the Transition of EULEX Competencies to Government of Kosovo Institutions' is available to the author.
27. Interview with official at the Kosovo Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 002/K, 17 November 2011, 023/K, 24 November 2011).
28. The 1993 Copenhagen criteria for membership in the EU require that the candidate country must have achieved 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union' (EU Council 1993).
29. Interview with officials working in EU delegations in Pristina (Interview No. 036/B, 23 April 2012, 037/K, 24 November 2011) and in the EEAS (Interview No. 016/B, 24 April 2012, 017/B, 24 April 2012).
30. Delegation activities are planned and implemented on the basis of a three-year implementation program, called the Multiannual Indicative Programme. Once the program runs no additional projects can be launched. According to interview with EU Commission official in Brussels (Interview No. 036/B, 23 April 2012).
31. For instance, in mid-2011, the EU Office committed 8.5 Mio Euro to building a high-security prison in Kosovo that is also aligned to EULEX MMA activities addressing the Kosovo Police corrections service. See

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110720_en.htm (accessed 01 November 2015).

32. Interview with officials working within the EEAS and EU Commission (Interview No. 036/B, 23 April 2012, 027/B, 27 April 2012).
33. Interview with EU staff in Brussels (Interview No. 027/B, 27 April 2012) and EULEX police officers and civilian managers (Interview No. 011/K, 16 November 2011, 032/K, 16 November 2011, 041/K, 17 November 2011, 012/K, 17 November 2011).
34. Interview with several EULEX officials (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 014/K, 21 November 2011).
35. Interview with a KFOR official (Interview No. 038/K, 15 November 2011) and with two EULEX officials working within the police and the justice component (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011).
36. Interview with two Brussels-based officials who participated on regular basis in CIVCOM meetings (Interview No. 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012, 040/B, 26 April 2012).
37. US code cable from 08 April 2009, subject 'Kosovo/EULEX: At full operational capability, but not without problems.' And code cable from 04 July 2009, subject 'Kosovo: EULEX at the six months point.' The text can be accessed at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/ (accessed 01 November 2015).
38. Interviews with EUPOL police and administrative staff (Interview No. 002/K, 17 November 2011, 041/K, 17 November 2011, 004/D, 26 June 2012).
39. Interviews with EUPOL managers and EU officials in Brussels (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 044/B, 26 April 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012, 027/B, 27 April 2012).
40. Serbia eventually received the status for candidacy to the EU in March 2012. One position paper by the German delegation supports the principal notion about Germany's political priorities as an example (Auswärtiges Amt 2012). The political relevance of Serbian EU membership was reaffirmed during interviews with EU officials in Kosovo and Brussels (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 041/K, 17 November 2011, 016/B, 24 April 2012, 096/K, 26 January 2011, 027/B, 27 April 2012).
41. As confirmed by one interviewee, EULEX had managed to open the Mitrovica court building in 2010, which had been looted during protests on 17 March 2008. Since 2011, however, the Mitrovica court building remained closed and the court was relocated to the neighboring city of Vushtrii (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011).
42. Interview with EUPOL manager (Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011).

43. *The Guardian* 'EU's biggest foreign mission in turmoil over corruption row,' 05 November 2014. See: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/05/eu-facing-questions-dismissal-prosecutor-alleged-corruption (accessed 01 November 2015).
44. Interview with two officials in the Kosovo Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 033/K, 22 November 2011, 023/K, 24 November 2011).
45. Interview with two independent experts working in Kosovo on democratization and security policy (Interview No. 092/K, 15 November 2011, 095/K, 18 November 2011).
46. Interview with EULEX official (Interview No. 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012).

References

Auswärtiges Amt. (2012). *Sachstand Kosovo—Serbien/ Dialogprozess/ Nordkosovo*. Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt.

Bundesregierung. (2009b). *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Wolfgang Gehrcke, Heike Hänsel, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE*. Drucksache 16/13897 (14 August 2009). Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.

de Wet, E. (2009). The governance of Kosovo: Security Council resolution 1244 and the establishment and functioning of EULEX. *American Journal of International Law, 103*(1), 83–96.

Derks, M., & Price, M. (2010). *The EU and rule of law reform in Kosovo*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Dijkstra, H. (2011). The planning and implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5*(2), 193–210.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

EU Commission. (2011). *Commission staff working paper—Kosovo 2011 progress report. Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2011–2012*. SEC(2011)1207 (12 October 2011). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (1993). *European Council in Copenhagen 21–23 June 1993: Conclusions of the presidency*. Council Document: 93/3 (22 June 1993). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (2001a). *Approval of draft European Union programme for the prevention of violent conflicts*. Council Document 9712/01 (07 June 2001). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2001b). *Council decision on establishing the military staff of the European Union*. 2001/80/CFSP (22 January 2001). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (2001c). *Council decision setting up the military committee of the European Union*. 2001/79/CFSP (22 January 2001). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (2001d). *Council decision setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC)*. 2001/78/CFSP (22 January 2001). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (2001e). *Draft European Union programme for the prevention of violent conflicts*. Council Document 9537/1/01 (07 June 2001). Brussels: European Union.

EU Council. (2006a). *Council document. Approval of the crisis management concept concerning the future crisis management operation in Kosovo*. 16145/06 (01 December 2006). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2007c). *Council document. Outcome of proceedings of committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (31 January 2007)*. 6091/07 (22 March 2007). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2008b). *Council document. Council joint action on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO—Adoption of text*. 5453/1/08 (31 January 2008). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2008c). *Council document. Draft CONOPS for the European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (31 January 2008)*. 5978/08 (27 March 2008). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2010). *Council decision amending joint action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO*. Council Decision 2010/619/CFSP (15 October 2010). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2011). *Council decision amending joint action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO*. Council Decision 2011/687/CFSP (14 October 2011). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world, European security strategy*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU High Representative for CFSP. (2005). *Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo*. S412/05 (9 December 2005). Brussels: European Union Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP.

EULEX. (2009). *EULEX programme report 2009*. Pristina: European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo.

EULEX. (2010). *EULEX programme report 2010 Building sustainable change together*. Pristina: European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo.

EULEX. (2011). *EULEX programme report 2011. Bolstering the Rule of Law in Kosovo: A stock take*. Pristina: European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), in Kosovo.

EULEX. (2012). *EULEX programme report 2012. Rule of law beyond the headlines.* Pristina: European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

European Court of Auditors. (2012). *European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law* (Special report no. 18/2012). Brussels: European Court of Auditors.

European Union. (2008). *Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union.* C 115/47 (09 May 2008). Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union.

Grevi, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (Eds.). (2009). *European security and defense policy. The first ten years (1999–2009).* Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Hix, S. (2005). *The political system of the European Union* (2nd ed.). Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

ICG. (2006). *Kosovo: The challenge of transition* (Europe report no. 170 (17 February 2006)). Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

ICG. (2007a). *Kosovo: No good alternatives to the Ahtisaari plan* (Europe report no. 182). Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Keohane, D. (2011). Lessons from EU peace operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15*(1–2), 200–217.

Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). *Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe's civilian capacity.* London: European Council on Foreign Relations.

Martini, M. (2014). *Kosovo: Overview of political corruption.* Berlin: Transparency International.

Morillas, P. (2011). Institutionalization or intergovernmental decision-taking in foreign policy: The implementation of the Lisbon treaty. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 16*, 243–257.

Pagani, F. (1998). A new gear in the CFSP machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the treaty on European Union. *European Journal of International Law, 9*(4), 737–749.

Scheye, E. (2008). UNMIK and the significance of effective programme management: The case of Kosovo. In H. Hänggi & V. Scherrer (Eds.), *Security sector reform and UN integrated missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo* (pp. 169–226). Vienna: LIT.

Spernbauer, M. (2010). *EULEX Kosovo—Mandate, structures and implementation: Essential clarifications for an unprecedented EU mission* (CLEER working papers 2010/2). The Hague: Center for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER).

UN DPKO. (2011). *Lessons learned in Kosovo: Transition from UNMIK police.* New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

UN Secretary-General. (2005). *Letter dated 07 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ('Eide Report')*. S/2005/635 (05 October 2005). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2007a). *Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ('Ahtisaari Plan')*. S/2007/168 (26 March 2007). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2009a). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*. S/2009/149 (17 March 2009). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2009b). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*. S/2009/497 (30 September 2009). New York: United Nations.

UNDP. (2006). *Internal Security Sector Review Kosovo*. Pristina: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Whitney, C. R. (1991, 25 January). War in the Gulf: Europe; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity. *The New York Times*. Retrieved 08 August 2012 from: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html?pagewanted=1

CHAPTER 5

The German Contribution to Police Reform in Afghanistan

This chapter assesses the German project of Afghan police reform assistance between 2001 and 2007. Apart from being larger, less well developed and culturally more distant from the West than Kosovo, Afghanistan was also the site of a new peacebuilding strategy. At the 2001 peace conference at the Petersberg in Bonn, Germany, the USA, and Western allies opted against peacebuilding on the basis of a major peace operation like that operated by the United Nations in Kosovo. Instead, they decided to pursue a 'light footprint' approach that assigned individual states as 'lead nations' for certain state-building tasks. Within this strategy, the Afghan government asked Germany to take the lead in assisting police reform. Germany agreed both to send a team of police officers to assist the Afghan police directly and to coordinate the efforts of other donors providing assistance.

As the chapter shows, the start of the project was highly promising. The German police team that arrived in Kabul in early 2002 found peaceful conditions and was well received. Together with their Afghan partners, the team soon presented a police reform strategy. However, with only two dozen German officers and a budget of only 12 Mio Euro per year, the German program was significantly under-resourced. Unable to lead by example, other Western donors, in particular the USA, were unwilling to subordinate to the German coordination mandate.[1] In subsequent years, armed opposition groups in South Afghanistan exploited the unattended security void and regrouped. As the window for effective police reform narrowed, the German government should have adjusted its assistance

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_5

strategy, but this did not happen. The decentralized design of the German mission provided valuable leeway for operational adjustments, but did not include the ability to significantly increase resources. Strategy review processes existed, but German policy-makers were unwilling to invest politically in the unpopular Afghanistan dossier.

In investigating the reasons for this state of affairs, this chapter begins by introducing the institutional and political background of Germany as an actor in peacebuilding and police reform (Sect. 5.1) and the political context leading up to its Afghanistan engagement (Sect. 5.2). Given the book's focus on institutional designs and performance, sections on mission planning (Sect. 5.3), implementation (Sect. 5.4), and review (Sect. 5.5) follow. They are summarized by a counterfactual discussion in Sect. 5.6 that suggests that German police reform assistance without these performance shortcomings would likely have led to a different Afghan police force. Yet, even this would have had only limited impact on the course of political developments in Afghanistan, as Germany was not the only actor who failed there.

5.1 Germany in Peacebuilding and Police Reform

Germany is a nation-state and not an international organization founded for a specific policy purpose. As a democracy, German foreign policy priorities are geared toward ensuring the physical security and material wealth of its people. There is, therefore, an emphasis on foreign trade, in particular the steady supply of natural resources and the unobstructed export of domestically manufactured goods. To secure both its economic interests and physical security, postwar Germany has operated cautiously in international relations, maintaining good relations with as many states and potential markets as possible and seeking to advance bi- or multilateral free trade agreements and open markets. Integration in the Western security architecture, in particular NATO, and good transatlantic relations with the USA have also been part of that policy (Rudzio 2003). There is also one value-based pillar of German foreign policy that derives from the country's role in World War II: German foreign policy has always promoted the policy of peace. Until the end of the Cold War, Germany implemented this mantra by investing a share of its gross domestic product in international development assistance and by supporting multilateral peacebuilding by organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), and the European Union (EU). After the end of

the Cold War, Germany also began developing its own instruments for bilateral crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution.[2] This included, most notably, the 2004 'Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building' (Bundesregierung 2004). Incrementally and partially driven by operational demands arising from its engagement in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Germany developed new instruments and strategies for bilateral engagements in stabilization and peace support operations, culminating in 2014 in the founding of a new directorate-general for crisis prevention, stabilization, and postconflict reconstruction in the German Foreign Office.

Largely independent from this foreign policy agenda, Germany also draws on a wealth of experience in assisting police reform processes in third countries, harkening back as far as the pre-World War I German Empire. Germany's more recent police assistance projects date back to the 1960s and were mainly driven by and aligned to operational interests of German security agencies (e.g., transborder threats). This included mainly equipment deliveries or training of foreign police officers at German police education facilities. In March 1988, the federal government adopted binding guidelines for foreign police assistance that restricted the independence of the security apparatus by explicitly subordinating foreign police assistance projects to Germany's foreign policy interests. This meant that from then on the Ministry of the Interior was required to share dossiers on foreign police cooperation with the Foreign Office. In addition, the guidelines explicitly excluded delivery of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment usable for 'immediate force' (see Bundesregierung 1989, 1995). In the 1990s, a reunified Germany began broadening its police assistance portfolio. In 1989/90, the first contingent of fifty German police officers participated in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.[3] Other UN and later EU missions followed in Africa and the Balkans, the mandates of which evolved from monitoring to reform and training and, later, even to performing executive tasks. Between 2000 and 2014, an average of around 300 German police officers were deployed at any one time to bilateral police reform projects or to peace operations run by the UN, OSCE, or EU (Eckhard 2015).

Politically, the federal government determines the deployment of German police officers in third countries. Unlike the deployment of the German military, the parliament only has to be informed of the government's police-related decisions—it has no formal right of appeal.[4] Administratively, foreign police deployments involve several ministries. It

is important to keep in mind that German ministers govern their ministries autonomously (*Ressortprinzip*). The coordinative body is the federal cabinet, which meets once a week. This autonomy is restricted by the Chancellor's right to define the principle direction of the government's policy (*Richtlinienkompetenz*). Thus, while the Chancellor cannot govern a ministry directly, he or she can still compel a minister to follow the Chancellor's policy lead (Rudzio 2003, p. 283ff.). The Chancellor's office (Chancellery) executes this and ensures consistency in the way German ministries implement their tasks. This is highly significant in operational peace support, which naturally stretches across several ministerial jurisdictions.

Four government units are relevant for police reform. First, the Federal Ministry of the Interior coordinates the recruitment of police officers from the various police agencies in Germany, for both multilateral and bilateral peace operations. The ministry's Department for the Federal Police (Unit B4) exerts operational supervision over German police officers in bilateral and multilateral police reform missions. Second, the Foreign Office cosigns foreign police projects and, in the case of Afghanistan, administers the operational funds for police reform. It should also link to other country's police reform contributions. Until 2009, when the Foreign Office pooled all Afghanistan-related activities under the responsibility of one special ambassador, responsibility for police reform was located in the Department for Global Issues and the United Nations (Department GF), where the portfolio never received a separate desk but was first part of the desk for crisis prevention (GF 02-9) and later became part of the desk on organized crime (GF 11-9). All other Afghanistan-related activities were coordinated by a task force in the Political Department (Unit 3-12). Third, the German Ministry of Defense oversees the German military (*Bundeswehr*). In Afghanistan, the *Bundeswehr* was involved, inter alia, in ensuring German police officers' physical safety. Fourth, the Ministry of Development Cooperation oversees Germany's development agencies, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) and the *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KFW), which both hold the funds and expertise for some activities relevant in bilateral police reform (such as refurbishing police stations).

The default mode of ministerial cooperation is to achieve consensus on decisions on the working level.[5] Discussions take place either informally, by circulating files or, as happened over time for the Afghanistan dossier, in regular interagency meetings (*Ressortkreis Afghanistan*). Whenever

consensus on single decisions cannot be reached, the issue is then sent up through the hierarchy to the weekly meeting of permanent secretaries or even to the Cabinet. With time for only around 800 agenda items per year, however, the capacity of the latter is limited.[6]

The bulk of Germany's 250,000 police officers operate at the federate level of the sixteen German federate states (*Bundesländer*).[7] The federal government alone cannot decide to send police officers abroad, because the federal police services it controls (federal police and federal criminal police) do not hold the specific policing skill set required by many peace operations. Policemen on the beat or classical traffic police are only found at the federate level in Germany. This means that, politically, the heads of the federate governments (*Ministerpresidenten*) must give their consent to foreign deployments. Administratively, the Federal Ministry of the Interior established a working group for international police missions (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Internationale Polizeimissionen*, AG IPM) in 1993/94[8] to facilitate the selection of police officers and coordinate remuneration, lines of authority, and training.[9] The AG IPM has a small secretariat that is located within the Federal Ministry of the Interior's Unit B4. Another part of this secretariat, called the Mission Support Office (*Missionsbetreuungsstelle*), is located at the headquarters of the German Federal Police in Potsdam. This office of around eleven staff is responsible for classical operational support functions associated with deploying German police in multilateral or bilateral peace support operations, such as recruiting staff from federate police agencies, organizing training, facilitating visa processes, and so on.

Finally, Fig. 5.1 also covers the field level in situations where Germany implements bilateral police reform projects. To date, two such projects have been conducted: the first in Afghanistan, the other in Saudi Arabia, where German police officers have, since 2009, provided border police training in association with a security infrastructure deal involving Airbus Defense and Space (Bundesregierung 2014; Eckhard 2015). In Afghanistan, the German Police Project Office collaborated closely with the German embassy and the semi-governmental German agency for development cooperation, GIZ.

To sum up, competencies for police reform in the German system are highly fragmented at the central level but otherwise decentralized in a subsidiary way. Technically, the system works well, with key support functions (staff recruitment, provision of guidance, etc.) being provided by the federal Ministry of the Interior's AG IPM. However, with responsibilities for



Fig. 5.1 The German institutional system for peace support operations (*Source:* Author's compilation)

staff recruitment split across federal government and sixteen *Bundesländer*, the system is saddled with too many veto players. It has always been challenging for the federal government to generate sufficient police officers for foreign police missions and the police reform project in Afghanistan was no exception (Eckhard 2015). Furthermore, the organizational separation between actual police assistance on the ground (Ministry of the Interior and Police Project Office) and the task of coordination (Foreign Office and Embassy) resulted in neither ministry being fully responsible for overall success.

5.2 The Political Context of the German Police Reform Mandate

Although Germany and Afghanistan share a history of police cooperation that dates back to the nineteenth century, Germany was never a major political player in Central Asia. The 'great game,' as Rudyard Kipling (1901) labeled the battle for supremacy between Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia in the nineteenth century, was played by others. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1978 and 1988, the socialist German Democratic Republic maintained police-related links with Afghanistan. These ended when Afghan mujahedeen groups, armed and

supported by Pakistan, refused to accept the terms of the Geneva Accord, the peace agreement that settled the terms of the Soviet Union's retreat. The remaining Communist regime collapsed under the mujahedeen onslaught in 1992. Yet none of the factions in the slowly disintegrating mujahedeen movement could gain political or military supremacy for the next couple of years. Rather, the in-fighting plunged Afghanistan into a phase of anarchy and ferocious violence.

In the midst of this chaos, a new political movement appeared on the scene. Though primarily confined to Kandahar in south-west Afghanistan in 1994, the movement soon spread across the country. The Taliban ('seekers of knowledge') are a politico-religious force with roots in Pakistani religious schools for Afghan refugees. With Islam forming the core of their group identity, the Taliban have found support across existing mujahedeen groups and ethnic communities. Seizing upon this to forge new alliances, the Taliban soon gained military supremacy and seized Kabul in late 1996. Under their leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and imposed a strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. Although this led to massive human rights violations and the complete expulsion of women from public life,[10] the Taliban also brought internal stability and public order to Afghanistan. After decades of anarchy, this created sufficient legitimacy for the regime to consolidate its power base.

Germany reappeared on the scene after the USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the official term used by the Bush government for their global war on terror, on 7 October 2001 in retaliation for the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The Taliban had allowed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to set up camps to train his multinational army for the global Jihad in Afghanistan. After a decade of civil war in the Balkans, this was about the time when Afghanistan appeared on the radar of most Western foreign policy experts, including those in the German government. Only one day after 09/11, before it was even clear what political action President Bush would take, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised Germany's 'unrestricted solidarity' with the USA, a virtual blank check of German support.[11] Eventually, this support for OEF meant that the German military, for the second time after the Kosovo war, participated in military action not sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Anticipating that such action would be highly contested in the German public, Schröder argued that a reunited Germany was a fully sovereign and economically strong

democracy that must live up to its growing responsibility for international security. This required, as Schröder put it,[12] that Germany acknowledge that 'taking on international responsibility while avoiding any direct risk cannot and must not be the guiding principle of German foreign and security policy.' Nonetheless, Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer eagerly looked for opportunities to emphasize the civilian dimension of Germany's Afghanistan policy over its military engagement. Both the US request to host a peace conference at the Petersberg in Bonn (27 November–05 December 2001) and the subsequent Afghan request to lead international assistance to police reform matched that agenda.[13]

The objective of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom was to defeat Al Qaeda and to overthrow the Taliban regime, thus making room for a new regime in Afghanistan. The USA had hoped, as its special envoy for Afghanistan later reported, that the new regime would be 'broadly based, moderate (…), [and would] unify the country, reassure its neighbors, and cooperate with the United States in stamping out any residual terrorist threat' (Dobbins 2008, p. 20; see also Powell 2002). Yet it was far from clear how this was to be effected. In stark contrast to the earlier Clinton administration, newly elected President Bush openly opposed state-building as a means of peacebuilding (Kitfield 2000, p. 3936f.). Accordingly, while the military battle in Afghanistan was still ongoing, the USA sought to avoid an outcome that would commit them to the military occupation of Afghanistan. On the one hand, they were aware and afraid of the country's historical record of resistance to military occupation and, on the other hand, they were anxious that military occupation would entail responsibilities for peacebuilding.

The USA, thus, opted for an open-ended political process that aimed for a power-sharing deal among the various Afghan political groups.[14] Multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, did not object. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, agreed that a large-scale UN presence was 'not necessary and not possible' (L. Brahimi, as quoted in Chesterman, 2002, p. 4). Brahimi feared that an additional large-scale peacebuilding mission would overstretch his organization's capacity, as the UN was already running two large-scale missions in Kosovo and East Timor. Instead, the agreement taken at the Petersberg hotel in Bonn on 05 December 2001 proposed an Afghan interim authority, made up of thirty members and headed by Hamid Karzai as chairman, to be installed for a six-month period. After six months, a grand assembly of representatives from all Afghan areas—a Loya

Jirga—would convene to decide upon a two-year transitional government. Following this, an election would be held and a constitution adopted.[15]

Without a major international peacekeeping mission, the Bonn agreement left the Afghans with the responsibility of organizing the reconstruction of their country and ensuring public security. To support the implementation of the Bonn agreement, the UN Security Council deployed the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a political mission headed by Brahimi (UN Security Council 2002b). Against the wishes of the Afghan government, the mission came without a larger international police peacekeeping force. Instead, the Security Council mandated an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on 20 December 2001, manned by bilateral military contingents (UN Security Council 2001). But the ISAF mandate explicitly limited the operational area to Kabul, in order to maintain a secure environment for the work of the Afghan interim authority and the international community in that area. In the absence of an Afghan army or police, security throughout the rest of Afghanistan was instead supposed to be maintained by those local warlords and militias who had supported the US intervention and now controlled roughly 75 % of the Afghan state territory.

The security sector was the only area where the international community agreed on a systematic division of labor in assisting the Afghan government. This came to be known as the lead nation approach (see Sedra 2006). In addition to Germany, which accepted the Afghan request voiced at the Bonn conference and became lead nation for police reform, the USA assumed responsibility for reforming the Afghan army, Britain became lead nation for counternarcotics, Italy took on the task of reforming the justice sector, and Japan pledged to launch a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate fighters from the numerous Afghan militias. To organize international assistance for the recovery of all remaining state sectors, such as infrastructure, the economy, education, and so on, representatives of sixty-one states and twenty-one international organizations met for an aid conference in Tokyo on 21–22 January 2002. They opted to rely on classical instruments of bilateral international aid, coordinated jointly by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. The main instrument of coordination was to be a reconstruction fund managed by the four organizations and financed by the sixty-one represented states.[16] Although states made combined pledges of 1.8 Bn USD for 2002—which, with some multiyear commitments, added up to

4.5 Bn USD in total—this was only a fraction of the aid delivered in other contemporary peacebuilding efforts (Dobbins et al. 2005).

Initially, the Afghan population in Kabul and most provinces welcomed the arrival of international assistance with great enthusiasm and local actors were united by a determination to improve the country's political and social structures. During the first few months, as the German Minister of Defence at the time, Peter Struck, recalls (2010, p. 105ff.), international decision-makers generally assumed that the international community would get the job done quickly and leave Afghanistan after only a couple of years. Actual conditions in Afghanistan, however, hardly supported such an optimistic outlook. In fact, as US foreign policy analyst Robert Perito (2009, p. 3) would later write, given its size and terrain, several decades of civil war, widespread illiteracy and xenophobia, and the lack of preexisting functional security institutions, Afghanistan 'represented a far greater challenge than anything the international community had attempted in peace operations in Haiti and the Balkans.' When President Bush likened US aid efforts in postwar Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan after World War II, the average American may have deemed this a sensible analogy.[17] But with international resources limited and the country's strategic attention already moving toward Iraq, this comparison was hopelessly exaggerated. The 'light footprint' approach to peacebuilding—a term invented by Brahimi to emphasize that the international community's limited role should enhance Afghan local ownership (UN Security Council 2002a, p. 6)—soon became an euphemism for the international community's approach in Afghanistan in general, with 'light' meaning the bare minimum of international personnel and money.

5.3 Mission Planning and Deployment: Fast and Under Afghan Ownership

From the perspective of peacebuilding performance, it is important that peace operations are able to launch rapidly once the mandate is passed and that, during planning, they are able to adjust to local preferences (local ownership). As this section shows, Germany planned incrementally and effectively took the Afghan government's preferences into account. This allowed Germany to swiftly launch its office in Kabul. But the German police reform assistance strategy was essentially driven by a scarcity of

resources, the budget having already been delimited before German police experts even set foot on Afghan territory. The plan the German police eventually presented was, in fact, the only plausible course of action given these restricting factors. In retrospect, one might also criticize police planners at the German Ministry of the Interior and Foreign Office, who largely worked in silos. Their lack of collaboration, as this section shows, deprived the German assistance strategy of realistic provisions for integrating—or at least coordinating with—other countries' police reform contributions.

The conditions international police assistance planners faced in Afghanistan were much more complex than those in Kosovo. A national police force that had existed under the pre-Communist regime before 1978 had been in hiding for decades, with some senior officials maintaining links with the German police. The Communist and later Taliban regime gave rise to a tribal system with local community militias and warlords. In 2001, it was unclear how many militia fighters were actually operating in Afghanistan's thirty-four provinces and districts. Some sources refer to more than 100,000 men; others estimate only half that number.[18] Reports did agree that those who were armed in Afghanistan lacked training, were ill-equipped and mostly illiterate (70–90 %). Moreover, two decades of civil war had created a culture of perceived impunity (USIP 2004). After Germany accepted the police reform assistance mandate in the course of the Bonn peace conference, several Afghan pre-Communist police officers reappeared, presenting documents, records, and training schedules from the old police, including the Afghan Law of Police and Gendarmes from 1973.[19] These documents and officers were Germany's natural point of contact during the first planning months.

Although a needs assessment for police reform in Afghanistan was conducted, this did not define the resources the German government provided. Experts from the UN Development Program presented their needs assessment at the January 2002 Tokyo donor conference. They suggested an Afghan police force of 30,000 uniformed officers that would cost 320 Mio USD (UNDP 2002). At the same conference, German Minister of Development Cooperation Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul announced that Germany would provide a total of 80 Mio Euro for bilateral assistance in 2002 and a total of 320 Mio Euro until 2005.[20] Despite the match, however, these funds were by no means meant for police reform alone. Rather, as several German officials recall, a fierce dispute took place between the German Foreign Office and the German Ministry of Development

Cooperation about who should administer and implement the funds. Eventually, the German Parliament's Committee for Development Assistance suggested a formula assigning the financial responsibility for 50 Mio Euro to the Development Ministry and 30 Mio Euro to the Foreign Office. Out of this share, the Foreign Office earmarked 12 Mio Euro per annum for police reform and decided to use the rest to fund various projects in other areas of institutional and political reform in Afghanistan.[21]

This figure informed operational police reform planning, which the German Ministry of the Interior launched while discussions in Tokyo were still ongoing. A team of eight experts traveled to Afghanistan to conduct a needs assessment (20–24 January 2002). The team presented its findings at an international donor conference for police reform hosted by the German Foreign Office in Berlin on 13 February 2002. In Kabul, the assessment team had found the Afghan Ministry of the Interior occupied by a group of pre-Taliban area police officers who had already launched police training of some 200 recruits. These officers—some of whom had received their own police training in Germany during the 1960s and 1970s—strongly preferred a training system modeled on the German system. This was, at least, how German officials justified dropping the idea discussed at the Tokyo conference to train 30,000 patrolmen and endorsing instead the Afghan reform vision.[22] Needless to say, with a budget of 12 Mio Euro per year and a projected staff strength of twelve to fifteen police officers Germany would not have been able to implement the Tokyo program anyways.[23]

The new police reform strategy outlined a top-down approach. German police experts were to provide (re)orientation classes to the eighty Afghan police trainers working at the National Police Academy in Kabul and help with selecting and enrolling the first classes of recruits for a three-year (higher ranks) and one-year (mid-level ranks) training program. The lower levels of the Afghan police, regular patrolmen, were to be recruited from demobilized militias and trained by Afghans themselves. On 13 March, the German Government Cabinet formally decided to install the German police project in Afghanistan. Two days later, Hamid Karzai and the German Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, signed the bilateral agreement formalizing this and outlined the structure of the police reform strategy.[24] As such, Germany committed itself to:

> Establish on short notice a police project office (…) which shall be tasked with the coordination of international assistance and with advising the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. Their main task is assisting with the installation of a police academy and the training of Afghan police officers.[25]

Accordingly, the German assistance strategy involved not only the delivery of its own bilateral project, but also the coordination of other donors whose contribution German officials saw as vital. At the Berlin conference, several partners—namely Japan, Italy, Great Britain, the USA, France, Norway, the Netherlands, China, India, and Iran—pledged to provide vehicles, uniforms, weapons, and other equipment for Afghan police reform, as well as police trainers.[26] This was going to be provided bilaterally,[27] or financed through direct bilateral contributions and by means of the Law and Order Trust Fund that was set up by UNDP to administrate the pledges made by the international community in Tokyo and Berlin for security sector reform.[28]

Overall, the German reform program had weaknesses and strengths. On the positive side, the flexible and decentralized nature of the German institutional system allowed the assistance strategy to be modeled along Afghan preferences and to rapidly gain traction there. Afghan police officers were enthusiastic about the German program and the entire reform process. Recalling their impressions from this period, a member of the project team said that the Germans were relieved to find the Afghans pushing the agenda forward. This was what the German police saw as one of the key prerequisites for successful postconflict police reform: a locally owned and locally driven agenda.[29] On the negative side, the German program was hopelessly under-resourced given the task at hand. This provoked criticism among Germany's partners. As one interviewee recalls, a Canadian ISAF General burst out laughing when he learned that Germany's 12 Mio Euro were for the entire police reform program and not just for the refurbishing of the National Police Academy.[30] The Germans also focused only on the capital, ignoring more or less what was going on in the rest of the country. Internally, there was an artificial rift between the two pillars of the German program. The Ministry of the Interior and police experts implemented the operational pillar of police reform, while the Foreign Office and its embassy in Kabul were responsible for coordinating other donors. As the next section shows, coordination was to become a major weakness of international assistance to police reform in Afghanistan.

5.4 Implementation and Project Management: Coordination Failure

In terms of its institutional design, the German police project resembled the OSCE mission in Kosovo much more closely than the EU setting. Decision-making competencies rested mainly in the hands of police officers and diplomats in Kabul (decentralization) and budgetary rules did not impair flexible mandate implementation. Although this allowed for a generally well-performing police reform project, limitations remained. In particular, German police officers and diplomats in Kabul failed to coordinate other donors in a way that could compensate for the limited resources provided by the German government.

But this was far from clear in 2002, when chances for successful peacebuilding in Afghanistan still looked promising. The German team that arrived in Kabul in 2002 was well received and worked effectively with the Afghan government to develop a comprehensive police reform strategy. The exact shape and functions of the Afghan National Police were supposed to be defined by the fifteen-member National Commission on Police Reform, appointed by President Karzai in March 2002. After an intense period of drafting and negotiations, the president presented an ambitious five-year reform framework in early 2003. It outlined details of the reform process, envisioning a police force of 62,000 officers, double the size of the original projections (Innenministerium & Auswärtiges Amt 2004; UN Secretary-General 2003).

As lead nation, Germany should have used this plan to work out an updated assistance strategy, identifying which donor should provide exactly what contribution to meet the targets. However, interviews and publications provide no evidence that such an analysis was conducted. Instead, donors coordinated negatively through monthly meetings and by identifying gaps. This meant that assistance for the implementation of the Afghan police reform strategy—with internationals providing equipment, supporting structural and policy reforms, and training policemen—remained highly fragmented.

First, in the area of equipment deliveries, several countries provided in-kind supplies in a disordered fashion, such as Germany (vehicles), Japan (a broadcasting system), and Britain (uniforms and basic communication) (UN Secretary-General 2002, p. 11).[31] Coordination of equipment deliveries was supposed to be carried out via the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund, but the latter constantly struggled with a lack of

funding and barely managed to pay the basic salaries of the Afghan security forces (police and army).[32] Second, in the absence of adequate outside pressure, structural reforms protracted as a result of internal rivalries among ethno-political factions in the Ministry of the Interior. This stalled the development of urgently required documents, such as a pay-and-rank system. Third, police training was the most active area of reform, driven mainly by Germany and later the USA, but the two countries seemed to compete, rather than collaborate with one another. During the first year, only Germany was active in helping to refurbish the National Police Academy in Kabul and in supporting curricula and recruitment of cadets for high- and mid-level officers for the civilian and border police. The USA had one advisor embedded in the German team, who, after assessing the German approach at the end of 2002, recommended to the US State Department that the USA should launch its own program to train police officers at the patrolman level and also at training facilities across the country. Soon thereafter, experts from the US security firm DynCorp arrived with a 110 Mio USD contract with the US State Department in their pocket to operate eight training camps at the national and regional level (cf. Office of Inspector General 2006, Annex B; USIP 2004, p. 12). This had become possible because ISAF expanded beyond Kabul in 2003 and began establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) throughout the country (Zapfe 2011). Until the end of 2005, 251 high-level officers, 2299 mid-level officers, and 752 border police officers had graduated from the Kabul Police Academy (Innenministerium & Auswärtiges Amt 2005). In addition, more than 62,000 patrolmen had graduated from training seminars at the DynCorp training centers (Office of Inspector General 2006, p. 15).

Despite some achievements, the operational capacity of the Afghan police remained critically weak. Large numbers of patrolmen trained by DynCorp deserted after graduation. In addition, neither the pay-and-rank reform (*Taskhil*)[33] finally implemented in 2005 nor international equipment deliveries improved organizational cohesion within the police. The chain of command was not intact. Salaries paid by the UNDP Law and Order Trust Fund did not trickle down to individual police officers but went instead into the pockets of their superiors. Furthermore, senior police officers at the provincial and district level also maintained loyalties to local warlords. Providing a snapshot, a 2008 report by the US Department of Defense and the State Department stated that, by 2007, none of the police units trained by Germany and the USA were fully capable of performing

their duties: 3 % were capable with coalition support, 4 % were partially capable, 77 % were not capable at all, and 16 % were not communicating with Kabul (GAO 2008, p. 32). After five years of police reform this was a truly disappointing result. It was also critical with respect to the peacebuilding process as the phase of relative stability and relatively low violence in Afghanistan was over.

Assessing this, Germany's partners by 2005/06 did not hold back with their criticism. They argued that Germany had failed to deliver sufficient resources for the task and had been unable to provide a coherent assistance strategy. Several German diplomats vividly remember dozens of meetings where US diplomats engaged in what one diplomat frankly called 'German-bashing.'[34] The policy literature at the time was also highly critical of Germany's role as lead nation (Murray 2007; Perito 2009; Sedra 2006; Wilder 2007). As one US military official wrote in an evaluation, '[w]e are starting from ground zero. The Germans who have lead nation responsibility have not been much help' (McCaffrey 2006, p. 7). Even though various actors had produced significant outputs in police reform by 2006, police reform had still fallen short of what was required. Put simply, an Afghan police force did not exist beyond Kabul in most provinces. While this was of limited consequence during the first years, the rapidly deteriorating security situation made clear that a historic chance for peacebuilding in Afghanistan had lapsed.

To provide further analysis into the reasons for this state of affairs, the next sections look into the details of how Germany and its partners organized their efforts in Afghanistan. For the performance of peace operations, as outlined in Chap. 2, the allocation of decision-making competencies needs to allow for effective mandate implementation. In the peacebuilding literature two factors are consistently mentioned. First, sudden changes in environmental dynamics or partners' preferences might necessitate adjustments to a peacebuilding strategy. The question is thus whether implementation frameworks and budget rules allow for such adjustments. Second, coordination with international and local partners is of utmost importance. The next sections show that while the German Police Project Office worked on a decentralized and subsidiary basis without many formal requirements or bureaucratic obstacles, Germany failed in coordinating its partners. However, the reasons are only partly due to Germany's institutional design for police reform missions.

Smooth Project Management with Few Bureaucratic Restrictions

When the German Ministry of the Interior sent its police team to Kabul, there was no structured implementation framework in place to help these police officers conduct proper project management or sequence their tasks in a strategic fashion. Providing such a framework was not part of the administrative culture at the federal governmental level. A debate about applying such concepts, and specifically about making explicit the politico-strategic objectives of bilateral police assistance, had already taken place among experts in Germany in the 1980s. At that time, German Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble (who held that position a second time between 2005 and 2009) rejected a request by the German Court of Auditors for guidelines, stating that 'defining the objectives of bilateral police assistance, which would allow assessing the adequacy and success of administrative action in this area (…) is not feasible' (Bundesregierung 1989, p. 3).[35] Similar statements were also voiced by officials in the Foreign Office, who questioned the utility of formal strategic management concepts, such as benchmarking and project management, for connecting long-term objectives with short-term activities in the field. They argued that such concepts would require long-term planning, which was not appropriate given the volatile nature of developments on the ground.[36] Consequently, when the German police team deployed in Kabul, their work was not subject to any predefined procedure and they lacked even a clear definition of the politically desired end-state. As a result, in order to assist the Afghan government with reforming the police, the police project team worked on the basis of an ad hoc sequencing of tasks and activities, thereby attempting to find a balance between pushing the Afghans and being responsive to their ideas and desires.

The German police project was seriously underfunded, as mentioned earlier. However, with respect to the spending of its budget—a problematic area in particular for EU missions—the German project team faced few bureaucratic obstructions. Whenever German police officers identified areas where they deemed financial assistance appropriate (equipment deliveries, refurbishing buildings, etc.), they suggested them to the German Ministry of the Interior, which then consulted the Foreign Office. Most assistance was provided in-kind, meaning that cars, motorbikes, or uniforms were shipped to Kabul and very little real money went directly into the local economy. Where German money was spent in Kabul—for

instance, in the area of construction works commissioned to local firms—the Foreign Office contracted the German implementing agency for technical cooperation (GIZ). As a result, the police project team itself was not responsible for administrating project funds, a move that definitely lightened the administrative burden of the office. The downside was that contracting GIZ as interlocutor created another layer of overhead costs that could have been saved had the police team implemented the funds directly. Nonetheless, interagency cooperation during the planning and implementation of these technical projects worked particularly well according to police officers, diplomats, and development experts.[37]

Internal and External Reasons for the Failure to Coordinate Other Donors

Germany never intended to implement police reform in Afghanistan without the help of international partners. From the outset, they interpreted their lead nation role as one of coordinating other actors' contributions. While the police project was responsible for the technical parts of the mandate, coordination was to be executed by the German embassy in Kabul and the Foreign Office, which facilitated a set of international donor conferences. The analysis points to three reasons why a coherent assistance strategy in Afghanistan did not emerge within this setting.

The first reason becomes apparent when considering how the USA—Germany's most important and financially most potent partner—organized its own assistance to police reform. Following Karzai's announcement of the police reform strategy in early 2003, Washington declared that a US contribution to train police officers at the patrolmen level was necessary to cover gaps left by the Germans. Although most of the literature[38] claims that the USA had to first 'realize' the limits of German assistance before they 'reacted' accordingly, interviewees claimed that the US launch of patrolmen training was in fact the direct result of cooperation between these two countries.[39] This continued well into the months that followed, during which the USA and Germany implemented two parallel training programs and the extent of official interaction remained high. Initially there were monthly meetings, which became more frequent as time went on.[40] However, despite these frequent meetings, trainers at the Afghan Police Academy and the seven Regional Training Centers failed to teach according to one coherent police training curriculum: 'Whereas the German vision focused on the police as a civilian law and order force,

the US regarded police as a [paramilitary] security force' (Gross 2009, p. 28). The reason for the divergence is further to be found in the USA's external contractor policy. In Afghanistan, the State Department worked with the private contractor DynCorp International (Office of Inspector General 2006, p. 7). By mid-2003, DynCorp had opened one training center in Kabul and seven regional centers attached to the US PRTs.[41] The problem was not the link between German and US diplomats, but the communication between German police officers and DynCorp trainers. Several German police officers indicated that they experienced severe problems in establishing any form of communication with DynCorp staff in Afghanistan, who showed little to no interest in cooperating with the Afghan Ministry of Interior.[42] The reason, as one official US report noted, was that the DynCorp contract did 'not provide any specific information regarding what type of training is required or any measurement of acceptability' (Office of Inspector General 2010, p. 7). Consequently, DynCorp simply applied the curricula and training schemes they used elsewhere, such as in Iraq. Of course, cooperation and interaction with other donors also would have increased DynCorp's workload. As this was not part of the contract, the organization had no incentive to pursue such collaboration. As the example shows, the complexity of various actors' internal structures made meaningful cooperation difficult, as different hierarchical levels did not feel bound by agreements that had been secured by another unit or level. And judging by information provided in interviews, it appears that the example of DynCorp constitutes only the tip of a very large iceberg.[43]

The second reason for the cooperation failure was the relatively low level of morale and commitment among international donors to contribute substantially to police reform in Afghanistan. Some states were quite active. Great Britain trained antinarcotics police, Japan initiated demobilization programs and installed a long-range radio network for the police, and other countries such as the Netherlands and Norway sent experts to assist training at the National Police Academy.[44] But major gaps remained, particularly at the provincial and district levels. Instead of identifying these, German diplomats at the time concluded that they should focus instead on ways to increase overall contributions so that remaining gaps could be closed by volume. Apart from asking the Ministry of Interior to increase the German bilateral contribution, the Foreign Office's unit for police reform organized a set of 'fund-raising' conferences on police reform, as one German official called it. Three such conferences took place: in Berlin in 2002, in Berlin and Doha in 2004, and in Doha in 2006. According to

participants, delegates at each of these conferences were well aware of the limited reach of their measures so far. Two main explanations were usually offered: first, the lack of effective coordination among participants; and second, the lack of resources. The latter, unsurprisingly, fueled calls for more resources, both in terms of staff and funds.[45] Yet, as one German diplomat said, the willingness to help, particularly among regional Arab states, was extremely disappointing.[46]

Finally, Germany's cooperation failure was partially 'homemade.' Without Germany itself assuming a more significant leadership role, none of the other states investing in Afghanistan felt compelled to accept a German lead. Recognizing difficulties with the coordination mandate, the Foreign Office did attempt to improve its leadership ability by shifting responsibility for police reform to a more senior level. In 2005, a special envoy for police reform coordination with the rank of ambassador arrived at the Kabul embassy. However, this failed to address the actual problem. 'Leading by example' is a well-established principle in management theory (Hermalin 1998) and to some extent also commonsense. Germany could have led by example by scaling up its police reform office to a realistic figure—something around several hundred police officers and several hundred million Euro budget. Because Germany failed to do this, its leadership was not taken seriously (recall the laughter of the Canadian ISAF General described earlier). Instead, the German police reform project muddled through, with diplomats in the embassy and Foreign Office increasingly aware that the efforts were failing. But were they also powerless to change things? This will be discussed in the next section on strategy review.

5.5 Strategy Review: No Strategic Center and Political Support Prevent Leadership by Example

The above analysis of the implementation of police reform leaves one major question unanswered: Why did Germany not respond to the impending failure in Afghanistan? One dimension of positive performance in peacebuilding is employing sufficient review mechanisms to allow for adjustments of the currently applied strategy. Did the Foreign Policy bureaucracy fail to inform its political leaders? Quite the contrary, as interviews indicate. Officials in Berlin seem to have been well aware of the

looming failure in Afghanistan.[47] The Ministry of the Interior received weekly and monthly updates on developments on the ground, as well as a more analytical/strategic-level report every six months. The Foreign Office also had its special envoy for police reform at the embassy in Kabul who provided regular updates, focusing more on the international community's overall contribution to police reform and the links with overall crisis management. Similarly, the other main ministries received regular reports and the German Federal Intelligence Service conducted analyses that were partially shared with the other ministries in Berlin. It is, therefore, relatively indisputable that officials at the working level in Berlin were aware of what was going on in Afghanistan. Despite this awareness, however, significant resource adjustments were not made. The problem emerged due to a combination of structural and political reasons.

Structurally, with the division of labor between the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office there was no functioning strategic center forced to take responsibility for the *overall* success of assistance to police reform in Afghanistan. There was also no formalized strategy that would have illustrated the growing gap between projections and achievements. As discussed in previous sections, the mandate formulated by the federal cabinet did not spell out the targeted end-state of assistance to police reform. In addition, the police project team did not work on the basis of an outlined strategy and did not apply formal implementation techniques. Thus, there were no benchmarking or performance measurement tools available at the operational or the strategic level. In sum, there were no built-in mechanisms that would have entailed a routine matching between intended and actual outcomes. Without such built-in mechanisms, efforts for strategy review depended on the initiative of the two ministries involved.

On the one hand, bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior's unit B4 only felt responsible for the implementation of the direct bilateral contribution, which was actually performing well within the scope of its narrow goals. Any attempts to look at Afghan police reform more globally were choked off by the ministry's bureaucratic leadership, which saw police reform in Afghanistan as a necessary evil rather than a political priority. This becomes clear when considering the number of police officers deployed to Afghanistan. Even when external partners became more critical and diplomats were urging the Interior Ministry to deploy more police officers, 40 staff was the maximum number of officers working in the Police Project Office until 2007. Given an overall number of around

250,000 police officers in Germany, such a small staff bordered on the ludicrous.[48] On the other hand, diplomats in the Foreign Office did feel the burden of ensuring the success of *overall* police reform in Afghanistan more closely. Over time, external criticism became immense (see discussion of 'German-bashing' above), but the Foreign Office had no means to directly influence what the Ministry of the Interior or any of the other contributors in Afghanistan were doing. As mentioned above, one attempt was to send a more senior official to coordinate police reform; another attempt was to invite Arab neighbors to assist. When neither effort had an impact, diplomats working on police reform knew by 2005/06 that a more fundamental change was required (Auswärtiges Amt 2006).

In addition to being structurally able to identify shortcomings and communicate them up the chain of command, the second necessary condition for a strategic shift is the political will to do so. The threshold in this case was a government cabinet decision to significantly increase police deployments or a parliament decision to increase the budget. But Berlin's political class—including both ministers and members of parliament—saw little to gain from supporting an Afghanistan dossier that was fairly unpopular among the electorate.[49] Although this goes beyond the analytical focus of this chapter, developments in 2008/09 serve as a counterfactual example to validate that argument. That year, media reporting increasingly featured the topic of Afghanistan, with most stories highly critical of governmental policy (for instance, Von Hammerstein et al. 2006). Afghanistan also became an issue in political campaigns for the upcoming national election. Responding to the political costs associated with a potential failure in Afghanistan, the newly elected government increased the Foreign Office's annual Afghanistan budget from the initial 30 Mio Euro to 121.2 Mio Euro in 2009 and further to 190 Mio Euro in 2010 (see Bundestag 2012, p. 4ff). Similarly, political pressure from the federal cabinet also managed to achieve what half a decade of working-level negotiations between the Foreign Office and the Ministry had not: a significant increase in the number of actual German police officers to be deployed in Afghanistan. The numbers went from 40 staff serving in 2007 to up to 200 police officers serving in 2010.[50] However, the change was effected only when support from the highest political echelons rose above the inertia inherent in the Ministry of the Interior's bureaucracy.[51] Finally, in 2009, the German government took another step in order to learn from previous shortcomings. In an attempt to streamline internal decision-making and finally establish a strategic center, the cabinet created

the position of a federal government special representative for Afghanistan policy, whose mandate was to bring together the various Afghanistan dossiers in German ministries (Bundesregierung 2009b).

Overall, this chapter has shown that the necessary strategic adjustments to German police reform assistance were not made for two reasons. The first is the absence of a single strategic center for police reform and the lack of meaningful strategy review mechanisms. Such strategic planning and policy evaluations seem to contradict bureaucratic culture in German foreign policy. The second, more important reason was the absence of political will to raise German resource provision. In the absence of political support, the German Foreign Office—the only actor with some sense of responsibility for overall developments in Afghanistan—did what was within its reach. Smaller bureaucratic adjustments (such as the police reform ambassador) were a first step. When this did not help, German diplomats turned to the EU, in the rightful hope that a joint EU effort would have more impact.

5.6 Summary: Germany Cannot Be Blamed Alone

Similar to the tasks the OSCE mission in Kosovo faced, the German Police Project Office in Afghanistan was essentially asked to reform the Afghan police from scratch. This involved negotiating with the Afghan government to develop a reform strategy, implementing Germany's own bilateral contribution, and providing lead nation coordination of assistance delivered by third countries. With respect to the first task, Germany was successful in the sense that the Afghan government announced a full-fledged reform strategy in early 2003. That reform strategy was not drafted by outside consultants, as is often the case in police peacebuilding (Eckhard 2014b), but was in fact a product of Afghan preferences and ownership. Second, the German Ministry of the Interior successfully implemented a bilateral police reform project that was lean and efficient in the eyes of most observers.[52] The police academy in Kabul, the main focus of German assistance, operated well and produced over 3000 graduates by the end of 2005 who were supposed to fill mid- and high-level ranks of the Afghan police (Innenministerium & Auswärtiges Amt 2005). But third, Germany failed to produce an integrated assistance strategy or to coordinate its international partners in Afghanistan. Although the USA filled the largest remaining gap, training 62,000 patrolmen until 2006, the two actors used different training methods. The curriculum taught by the

US training program (implemented by DynCorp) enacted a paramilitary policing vision that might have been appropriate for Afghanistan but was not in line with the civilian policing philosophy taught at the national police academy. In addition, Germany failed to raise more donor funds and equipment deliveries from third donor countries and allocate them to areas of need. Although some partners provided aid, the lack of a general needs assessment led to eclectic projects benefiting isolated units or regions while many other fell by the wayside. Overall, it is no surprise that, after a 2006 field visit, Barry McCaffey, Professor at the US West Point Military Academy, wrote of the Afghan police: 'They are in disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of national police infrastructure' (McCaffrey 2006, p. 7). Similarly, even the traditionally rosy UN reports by the Secretary-General were exceptionally frank:

> [S]erious problems remain with the performance of the police, many of whose members are involved in the sale of commissions and other forms of corruption, including direct involvement in narcotics trafficking. On the ground, respect for authority and elementary discipline have not yet been instilled, and the actions of the police within communities often inspire more fear than confidence (…). (UN Secretary-General 2007b, p. 8)

But was US security expert Antony Cordesman[53] right when he testified in a US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing that the 'German effort to create a police force was a disaster that wasted years'? Certainly Germany failed to coordinate other nations and certainly the German project was hopelessly under-resourced. But even with better performance, it is difficult to imagine that the 2006 outcome could have been that different. This has three main contextual reasons:

First of all, Germany was not the only actor who operated with insufficient resources in Afghanistan. The 'light footprint' strategy the international community applied in Afghanistan meant that international assistance came to 57 USD per capita in foreign assistance during the first two years; a modest amount compared to 536 USD in Kosovo, 233 USD in East Timor, or 679 USD in Bosnia (Dobbins et al. 2005). As Mark Sedra (2006) found, other lead nations were not much more successful with their approaches. Despite British counternarcotic operations, the opium trade was equivalent to 52 % of Afghanistan's legal gross domestic product in 2005 (ibid. 2006, p. 89). And despite a Japanese

demilitarization program, there were still some 1800 illegal armed groups in Afghanistan comprising up to 129,000 militiamen. Overall, as Sedra (2006, p. 99; referring to Thier 2004) concluded, international assistance 'consisted of band-aid solutions meant to cover gaping holes in a decrepit system' and remained 'largely dysfunctional.' Such institutional faults were exacerbated by the US State Department, which outsourced police training to a private firm without demanding an integrated approach. Secondly, it was also beyond Germany's reach that the Afghan government, and in particular the Afghan interior ministry, failed to push the reform agenda ahead. As Sedra (2004, p. 10) and others (Murray 2007; Wilder 2007) report, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior was soon paralyzed by internal power (and ethnic) conflicts that forced the Minister of the Interior, Ali Ahman Jalali, to resign in 2005. Thirdly, it was also beyond the reach of the German police reform project that the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated rapidly. The Taliban movement managed to regroup in the mountainous border area with Pakistan in southern Afghanistan and from there they increasingly launched attacks on international coalition forces and representatives of the Afghan government. Acting as the first line of defense for the Afghan state, the police paid the highest toll. Poorly trained and sitting in badly equipped checkpoints, they were highly vulnerable and exposed to Taliban attacks. A 2006 US report stated, 'the police themselves are often the targets of well-armed and well-organized insurgents; more than 400 police were killed in 2005' (Office of Inspector General 2006, p. 61).

Nonetheless, although the 2006 outcome of police reform in Afghanistan was not Germany's fault alone, the way Germany implemented the lead nation approach was crucial. This has institutional and political reasons. Institutionally, the decentralized German Police Project Office ran smoothly (see Table 5.1). But with its implementation decentralized and split up among the German Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office, the program lacked a strategic center responsible for its overall success. Without such a center, no single actor was in charge of German police reform assistance. As a result, during planning, resources were distributed among ministries based on political considerations rather than allocated strategically to areas of need. And during review, no single actor warned emphatically about the looming failure of the program. Arguably, a better integration of police officers and diplomats might also have allowed for a comprehensive needs assessment and more coherent coordination of other donors.

Table 5.1 Germany's institutional design and its impact on performance

Policy phase	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
Planning	Bottom-up, incremental planning	Fast and flexible mission installation, responsive to local preferences	High
Implementation	Decentralized, flexible budget systems, separated leadership	Flexible, successful adjustment to political context, failure to coordinate international community	Intermediate
Review	No strategic center, no formalized strategy review	No strategy adjustments despite mission failure	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

Politically, even if the demand for resources had been more emphatic, it still likely would have been ineffective in the absence of any political will to do something about it. Afghan police reform was not a topic German policy-makers felt they could use to win elections, so they preferred to keep a distance from the dossier. The situation after the 2008 elections demonstrates, counterfactually, how things might have been different. Once aid to Afghanistan *did* become a political priority, German official development aid to Afghanistan increased from 102 Mio USD in 2005 to 344 Mio USD in 2008 and even further to 748 Mio USD in 2014, making Germany the third largest bilateral donor after the USA and Japan.[54] In the absence of such will in 2006 and without the opportunity to 'lead by example,' German diplomats did the best they could within their power and handed over the function of lead actor in assistance to police reform to the European Union, rightfully hoping that a concerted European approach could gain more traction.

Overall, an institutionally more coherent German police reform in association with the (more important) necessary political will to provide required resources could have produced different results in Afghanistan. It is beyond any doubt that there was a real window of opportunity at the outset of peacebuilding in Afghanistan. But by 2006 that window had closed and the inability of the Afghan government and its partners to fill the security void in the country was both one of the causes and an exacerbated result. A different German assistance strategy might have

changed that, but it is unlikely that this would have altered the overall course of political and military developments in Afghanistan.

Notes

1. Another factor was US contracts with private security firms that did not force them to participate in an integrated approach.
2. The 1998 coalition agreement of Gerhard Schröder's government states: '[Die Bundesregierung] wird sich mit aller Kraft um die Entwicklung und Anwendung von wirksamen Strategien und Instrumenten der Krisenprävention und der friedlichen Konfliktregelung bemühen' (SPD & Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 20 Oktober 1998, p. 43). The previous CDU/CSU-FDP government's coalition agreement only had expressed determination to promote peace by participating in multilateral stabilization efforts within the UN, NATO, or the OSCE (CDU/CSU & FDP, 11 November 1994, p. 48).
3. Interview with former Foreign Office official (Interview No. 050/A, 01 June 2011).
4. The provisions on the deployment of German police officers abroad are defined in the Law on the Federal Police (BPolG), see specifically §8 and §65.
5. See *Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung* (GGO), §16. The GGO is published on the webpage of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), see http://www.bmi.bund.de (accessed 01 November 2015).
6. Interview with former Foreign Office official who worked at the level of the minister's office (Interview No. 050/A, 01 June 2011).
7. Statistical Office of the European Union: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim_plce&lang=en (accessed 01 November 2015).
8. The decision was made at a meeting between the German Federal Minister of the Interior and his sixteen ministerial colleagues at the federate state level on 25 November 1994 (AG IPM 2010, para. 3).
9. Interviews with several German police officers working at the federal and federate state levels (Interview No. 056/D, 02 July 2012, 048/D, 03 December 2012, 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 057/D, 27 July 2011).
10. See, for instance, the UN Commission on Human Rights report on 30 April 1999 (Economic and Social Council; E/1999/23; Supplement No. 3).
11. Statement of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the German Parliament on 12 September 2001: 'Abgabe einer Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu den Anschlägen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.' Plenarprotokoll 14/186.

12. Statement of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the German Parliament on 11 October 2001: 'Aktuelle Lage nach Beginn der Operation gegen den internationalen Terrorismus in Afghanistan.' Plenarprotokoll 14/192.
13. Interviews with several previous and still serving officials from German ministries who worked on Afghanistan at the time (Interview No. 053/V, 01 February 2012, 050/A, 01 June 2011, 051/A, 04 June 2011, 055/D, 12 June 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
14. Information in this paragraph, if not cited otherwise, is based on interviews with several German officials who participated in the conference or held functions in the German Foreign Ministry of the Ministry of Development Cooperation (Interview No. 050/A, 01 June 2011, 051/A, 04 June 2011, 055/D, 12 June 2012, 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
15. The agreement can be retrieved from the website of the UNAMA: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf (accessed 01 November 2015).
16. See Cochairs' summary of conclusions 'The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan' (21–22 January 2002). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf (accessed 01 November 2015).
17. The speech was given on 17 April 2002 at the Virginia Military Academy. A transcript is provided by the *Washington Post*: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_041702.html (accessed 01 November 2015).
18. Plank (2003), who worked with the German government at the time, refers to 100,000 police officers; Sedra (2003), in reference to Afghan officials, states there are 85,000 police and border police; and Amnesty International (2003) refers to 50,000 police.
19. Interview with a former police officer in the German federal police (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012).
20. Speech at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo (21 January 2002). Retrieved from: http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/volltext/anzeige.php?zaehler=522 (accessed 01 November 2015).
21. Interview with several officials from the Foreign Office and BMZ who worked on Afghanistan at the time (Interview No. 053/V, 01 February 2012, 050/A, 01 June 2011, 051/A, 04 June 2011, 055/D, 12 June 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
22. A document visualizing this pillar approach was made available to the author during one interview (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012).

23. At the time, German officials could not imagine that Germany could ever send more than just a dozen officers to Afghanistan at any one time. Interview with Foreign Office official (Interview No. 049/D, 19 May 2011).
24. Press release by the German Ministry of the Interior 'Schily und Karsai vereinbaren Zusammenarbeit beim Wiederaufbau der afghanischen Polizei' (15 March 2002), retrieved from the online archive on German foreign policy: www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de (accessed 01 November 2014).
25. Author's translation of press release by the German Ministry of the Interior 'Deutschland übernimmt führende Rolle beim Aufbau der Polizei in Afghanistan' (14 February 2002), retrieved from the online archive on German foreign policy: www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de (accessed 01 November 2014).
26. Interview with police officer who worked for the German federal police (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012). Further information in this section is based on interviews with Foreign Office officials who worked on Afghanistan at the time (Interview No. 053/V, 01 February 2012, 052/D, 17 May 2011, 049/D, 19 May 2011). See also a report by the UN (UN Secretary-General 2002, p. 11).
27. Germany provided several hundred vehicles, uniforms, and other equipment during the first years (see Innenministerium & Auswärtiges Amt 2004).
28. It is relevant to note that 20 Mio Euro out of the share of the German Ministry of Development were channeled into the Law and Order Trust Fund, which also benefited police reform. Interview with one official from the Foreign Office and one official from the Ministry of Development Cooperation (Interview No. 055/D, 12 June 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
29. Interview with German police officer who worked in the first team sent to Afghanistan (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012).
30. Interview with German police officer who worked in Afghanistan (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012).
31. This was confirmed by a GPPO member (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012).
32. Until July 2003, of the 120 Mio USD requested, donors have pledged only 40 Mio USD, and the amount actually paid into the fund was even lower. Interview with a manager of the fund (Interview No. 074/A, 05 June 2011).
33. Arab term for 'organization' or 'structure'; in this context it refers to the table of organization, structure, and personnel.

34. Interview with several officials who work, or used to work, in the German Foreign Office (Interview No. 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
35. Author's own translation.
36. Interview with two German officials from the Foreign Office who both worked on the Afghanistan dossier (Interview No. 059/A, 01 June 2011, 051/A, 04 June 2011).
37. Interview with officials from the GIZ and German police officers (Interview No. 061/A, 02 June 2011, 062/A, 02 June 2011, 063/A, 04 June 2011/14 February 2012, 064/A, 16 February 2012, 065/A, 16 February 2012).
38. Examples of this can be found in most of the writing on security sector reform in Afghanistan. Thruelsen (2010, p. 83) can be quoted here as one example: 'When US authorities realized that the lower ranks of the police were not included in the programme, a four-to-eight-week tactical training programme was implemented.'
39. Interviews with several German officials from GPPO and the Foreign Office (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012, 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
40. Interview with German officials from GPPO and the Foreign Office (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012, 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012).
41. By June 2004, six centres in Kabul, Paktia, Jalalabad, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar were operating, while two more in Bamyian and Herat were scheduled to begin operating by the end of 2004 (Sedra 2004, p. 7).
42. Interview with German officials from the Foreign Office (Interview No. 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012).
43. Interview with senior German diplomat who worked in Afghanistan at the time (Interview No. 054/D, 18 April 2012).
44. Interview with police officer who worked for the German federal police (Interview No. 048/D, 03 December 2012).
45. Interviews with Foreign Office officials (Interview No. 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
46. Interview with German official from the Foreign Office (Interview No. 054/D, 18 April 2012).
47. Interview with officials at the BMI, Ministry for Development Cooperation, and the Foreign Office: (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 066/D, 13 July 2012, 070/D, 13 July 2012, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 049/D, 19 May 2011).

48. In 2012, Germany had 243,982 police officers according to the European Union statisticaloffice http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de (accessed 01 November 2015).
49. Interviews with German diplomats (Interview No. 052/D, 17 May 2011, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012) and personal notes on parliamentary control of international police missions by a former member of parliament (Nachtwei 2013).
50. According to information provided by the BMI upon request (e-mail dated 11 September 2012).
51. According to one police officer with detailed knowledge on processes within the BMI (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012). Interior Minister Schäuble and Foreign Minister Steinmeier even published an op-ed announcing a German staff increase to force the ministry to act. The op-ed was published on 24 February 2008 in the *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung*, a copy can be retrieved from Wolfgang Schäuble's personal webpage http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/index.php?id=36&textid=1121&page=3 (accessed 01 November 2015).
52. Interview with several officials in the BMI and Foreign Office who worked on police reform during the first couple of years (Interview No. 059/A, 01 June 2011, 048/D, 03 December 2012, 051/A, 04 June 2011, 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 052/D, 17 May 2011, 049/D, 19 May 2011).
53. Testimony by Antony H. Cordesman to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Winning in Afghanistan: Challenges and Response' (15 February 2007). Retrieved from http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings/view/?765 (accessed 01 November 2015).
54. Data according to the OECD Creditor Reporting System, accessed via http://stats.oecd.org (accessed 01 November 2015).

References

Amnesty International. (2003). *Afghanistan: Police reconstruction essential for the protection of human rights* (ASA 11/003/2003/ 12 March 2003). London: Amnesty International.

Auswärtiges Amt. (2006). *Die Sicherheitssektorreform am Beispiel des Polizeiaufbaus—ein deutscher Beitrag* (AAintern (by Helmut Frick)). Berlin: German Foreign Office.

Bundesregierung. (1989). *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Such und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN—Drucksache 11/5657—Mißstände in der polizeilichen Ausstattungshilfe*. Drucksache 11/5941 (30 November 1989). Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag.

Bundesregierung. (1995). *Antwort der Bundesregierung: Ausbildungs- und Ausstattungshilfe für Drittstaaten*. Drucksache 13/1047 (04 March 1995). Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag.

Bundesregierung. (2004). *Action plan "civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building"*. Berlin: German Federal Government.

Bundesregierung. (2009a). *Afghanistan. Auf dem Weg zur „Übergabe in Verantwortung". Ressortübergreifende Entscheidungsgrundlage zur Mandatsverlängerung und vor der internationalen Afghanistan Konferenz*. Berlin: Bundesregierung.

Bundesregierung. (2014). *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Jan Korte, Jan van Aken, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Polizei- und Zolleinsätze im Ausland (Stand: drittes Quartal 2014)*. Drucksache 18/2986 (27 Oktober 2014). Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.

Bundestag. (2012). *Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 23. Januar 2012 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung*. Drucksache 17/8509 (27 January 2012). Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.

Chesterman, S. (2002). *Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: The future of UN state-building* (An International Peace Academy report). New York: International Peace Academy.

Dobbins, J. (2008). *After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan* (1st ed.). Washington, DC: Potomac Books.

Dobbins, J., Jones, S. G., Crane, K., Rathmell, A., Steele, B., Teltschik, R., et al. (2005). *The UN's role in nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Eckhard, S. (2014b). *Zwischen Ertüchtigung und Wertewandel. Internationale Erfahrungen bei der Unterstützung von Sicherheitssektorreform*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Global Public Policy Institute.

Eckhard, S. (2015). Zwischen Sicherheits- und Außenpolitik. Deutsche Polizeikräfte im internationalen Kriseneinsatz. *Vereinte Nationen, 2/2015*, 59–64.

GAO. (2008). *Afghanistan security: Further congressional action may be needed to ensure completion of a detailed plan to develop and sustain capable Afghan National Security Forces* (Doc. no. GAO-08-661). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

Gross, E. (2009). *Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The EU's contribution* (Occasional paper 78). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Hermalin, B. E. (1998). Toward an economic theory of leadership: Leading by example. *The American Economic Review, 88*(5), 1188–1206.

Innenministerium, & Auswärtiges Amt. (2004). *Polizeiliche Aufbauhilfe in Afghanistan* (2nd ed., April 2004). Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), BMI Projektgruppe "Polizeiliche Aufbauhilfe Afghanistan".

Innenministerium, & Auswärtiges Amt. (2005). *Polizeiliche Aufbauhilfe in Afghanistan* (2nd ed., December 2005). Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), BMI Projektgruppe "Polizeiliche Aufbauhilfe Afghanistan".

Kipling, R. (1901). *Kim*. Lonon: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

Kitfield, J. (2000). Lessons from Kosovo. *National Journal, 32*(52/53), 3936–3943.

McCaffrey, B. R. (2006). Academic report-trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from May 19 through May 26. In Hearing before the Committee on armed services on 28 June 2006 (Ed.), *Status of security and stability in Afghanistan* (pp. 89ff.). Washinton, DC: US Congress, House of Representatives.

Murray, T. (2007). Police-building in Afghanistan: A case study of civil security reform. *International Peacekeeping, 14*(1), 19.

Nachtwei, W. (2013). *Parlamentarische Beteiligung und Kontrolle bei Internationalen Polizeimissionen* (Extended version of a presentation at the conference "Schutzleute als Freidensmacht" at the Evangelischen Akademie Loccum on 30 October–01 November 2011). Berlin: Unpublished Personal Notes (available to author).

Office of Inspector General. (2006). *Interagency assessment of Afghanistan police training and readiness* (Report no. IE-2007-001, ISP-IQO-07-07). Washington, DC: US Department of State, US Department of Defense.

Office of Inspector General. (2010). *DOD obligations and expenditures of funds provided to the department of state for the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police* (Report no. D-2010-042, MERO-A-10-06). Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, US Department of State.

Perito, R. M. (2009). *Afghanistan's police: The weak link in security sector reform* (Special report no. 227 (August 2009)). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Plank, I. M. (2003). Einsatz im Ausland. Mission in Afghanistan. *Deutsche Polizei. Zeitschrift der Gewerkschaft der Polizei, 52*(4), 6–8.

Powell, C. (2002). 20 November 2001 Remarks at a State Department Working Session on Afghanistan Reconstruction. *Foreign Policy Bulletin, 12*(2002), 232–244.

Rudzio, W. (2003). *Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (6th ed.). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Sedra, M. (2003). *Police reform in Afghanistan: An overview*. Paper presented at the Afghanistan: Assessing the progress of security sector reform, one year after the Geneva conference, 4–11 June 2003. Retrieved December 01, 2012, from: http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/10868/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/0a10b059-797a-4b0f-a446-8b0fa8fada7f/en/doc_10899_290_en.pdf#page=32

Sedra, M. (2004). *Security sector transformation in Afghanistan*. Paper presented at the challenges of security sector governance in the Middle East, Geneva, 12–13 July 2004.

Sedra, M. (2006). Sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency. *International Peacekeeping, 13*(1), 94–111.

SPD & Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (20 Oktober 1998). *Aufbruch und Erneuerung—Deutschland's Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*. Bonn: Boell Striftung.

Struck, P. (2010). *So läuft das. Politik mit Ecken und Kanten*. Berlin: Propyläen Verlag.

Thruelsen, P. D. (2010). Striking the right balance: How to rebuild the Afghan National Police. *International Peacekeeping, 17*(1), 80–92.

UN Secretary-General. (2002). *Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*. S/2002/278 (18 March 2002). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2003). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*. S/2003/754 (23 July 2003). New York United Nations Security Council.

UN Secretary-General. (2007b). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*. S/2007/555 (21 September 2007). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (2001). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386*. S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (2002a). *Proceedings of 4469th meeting*. S/PV.4469 (06 February 2002). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UN Security Council. (2002b). *United Nations Security CouncilResolution 1401*. S/2002/1401 (28 March 2002). New York: United Nations Security Council.

UNDP. (2002). *Afghanistan: Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction* (For Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on 21–22 January). New York: UNDP, Asia Development Bank, Worldbank.

USIP. (2004). *Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan* (Special report 117/March 2004). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Von Hammerstein, K., Hoyng, H., Schlamp, H.-J., & Szandar, A. (2006). *Das Afghanistan-Abenteuer* (Issue 47/2006, dated 26 November 2006). Hamburg: Der Spiegel.

Wilder, A. (2007). *Cops or robbers? The struggle to reform the Afghan National Police*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Zapfe, M. (2011). *Sicherheitskultur und Strategiefähigkeit: die ressortgemeinsame Kooperation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Afghanistan*. Konstanz: KOPS.

CHAPTER 6

The EU's Contribution to Police Reform in Afghanistan

By 2006, the security situation in Afghanistan had worsened significantly, rendering the starting point for meaningful police reforms less optimistic. The EU Council deployed its new mission in mid-2007. However, because EU regulations entailed a complex planning procedure, it took many months before the mission actually opened its doors in Kabul. Security issues and complex negotiations with international partners further protracted the launch of operations. By the time EUPOL Afghanistan finally set its 400 international police officers in motion in 2009, member states had already lost their patience and instructed NATO to deploy a much larger police and military training program (NTM-A). Although EUPOL eventually ran at a maximum capacity of 400 mandated staff and with an overall budget of around 450 Mio Euro (2007-2015), its performance and impact in Afghanistan remained limited. The chapter shows that member states' unwillingness to provide more adequate resources and a growing militarization of international assistance in Afghanistan hampered the mission. However, there were also in-house reasons. First, due to leadership difficulties, complex procurement procedures, and limited resources, the launch of the mission protracted over two to three years. This severely damaged the mission's reputation and deprived it of the opportunity to grow into a civilian entity that could counterbalance the militarized US/NATO police reform in Afghanistan (Sect. 6.2). Second, the EU's centralized decision-making system jeopardized collaborative actions and prevented EUPOL from keeping pace with decision-making by (military) partners in Afghanistan. Requests for guidance were continually answered

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_6

too late (Sect. 6.3) and when answers did arrive, they were often biased by political rationalities linked to member state geopolitical interests and unrelated to police reform in Afghanistan (Sect. 6.4).

The chapter begins by reviewing the political context of the EU's Afghanistan engagement (Sect. 6.1), having already introduced the structures and background of the EU's peacebuilding work in Sect. 4.1. Again, sections on planning, implementation, and review follow. They are concluded in Sect. 6.5 by a counterfactual discussion suggesting that better design and performance on the part of EUPOL probably would have changed the face of the Afghan police today, though issues relating to the stability and integrity of the Afghanistan state would likely remain the same.

6.1 The Political Context of EUPOL's Police Reform Mandate

In the absence of a strong impartial peacekeeping force deployed across Afghanistan, various Afghan warlords and their militias began gaining ground in 2002 (Giustozzi 2003). To fund their militias, warlords used drug trafficking and set up roadblocks to extract tolls from individuals, effectively undermining the appearance of centralized public order and the rule of law in Afghanistan. As Rubin (2002, p. 5f) wrote, 'some of these commanders used the money and arms they received to invest in drug production and engage in land grabs, predation, political intimidation, and ethnic cleansing—a major source of insecurity for Afghans.' In contrast to the warlords' decentralized, de facto political power, the emerging Afghan state system was highly centralized, with all political, administrative and fiscal decisions de jure made in Kabul. Critical voices complained that Karzai had established 'an extreme form of centralized government that protects the interests of an elite group of strongmen with whom Karzai maintains allegiances' (Edwards 2010, p. 978). In the eyes of the rural population, however, it was the failure to provide security throughout the country that most undermined Karzai's legitimacy outside Kabul.

Responding to this fragile security situation, NATO eventually took over command of the international stability assistance force (ISAF) on 11 August 2003, thereby releasing contributing states from the rotating mandate that had thus far been passed from one to the other like a hot potato. Under NATO command, ISAF eventually transformed from the 'Kabul

Police Force' to a more robust troop that soon began expanding throughout the entire country. At first, its 18,500 soldiers deployed to the calmer areas in the north, but by 2006 they expanded to include territories south and south-west of Kabul. This area of the Pashtun heartlands bordering Pakistan had seen little international peacebuilding during the previous five years. Their only regular contact with foreigners was with US Special Forces who showed little concern for Afghan culture or the belongings of the civilian population. The US military's primary interest was to track down and eliminate those believed to belong to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Night raids and misguided attacks with civilian fatalities alienated and angered large parts of the population, who became, in turn, increasingly resistant to the international military presence (ICG 2008, p. 5). After the winter of 2006, when the melting of the snow on the Hindu Kush passes made travel possible once again, and the ISAF finally extended its presence into the unstable south, the troops were immediately met with fierce combat resistance by Taliban fighters. While the summer of 2005 had already cost the lives of dozens of coalition soldiers, the subsequent years were far worse. Until the summer of 2009, ISAF registered an average of 30 attacks per day (GAO 2009, p. 11). While in 2005, 131 international forces died during their service in Afghanistan, 521 soldiers were killed in 2009 and 711 in the peak year of 2010.[1]

The reactions were twofold. First and on the ground, the US military changed its strategy from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency (McCaffrey 2006). Already in 2005, the White House had transferred responsibilities for US policy in Afghanistan from the State Department to the Department of Defence (Bowman and Dale 2010). As in Iraq, this provided the military with full control over the civilian reconstruction delivered by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The new strategy aimed to clear an area of insurgents, hold it with the assistance of local security forces, and then (re)build infrastructure and public services so the population would, theoretically, no longer turn to insurgency groups for such needs (see Kilcullen 2006, 2009). Second and politically, because the new counterinsurgency strategy required far more resources, the USA, Great Britain, and Canada ramped up pressure on their European partners to share the burden and increase own contributions. This became most apparent at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006, where a deep rift cutting through the transatlantic security community was palpable and remained unconcealed until at least the US elections in 2008.[2] On the one

hand, this was due to political differences between the Bush administration and several European governments not only in relation to Afghanistan but also related to the Iraq war. On the other hand, Afghanistan simply was not a domestic political priority in Europe. For instance, German development assistance to Afghanistan in 2006 remained low with only around 138 Mio USD as compared to Kosovo, which received 278 Mio USD the same year.[3]

It was in this context that German diplomats began lobbying for an EU mission to reinforce police reform in Afghanistan. At the same time, the EU Council Secretariat in Brussels—whose head Javier Solana was one of the main architects of EU foreign and security policy—was actively looking for opportunities to put the new instrument of civilian crisis management operations into practice. Several missions were already running and the EU's flagship-to-be, EULEX Kosovo, was also in the making. But the EU's multiannual financial framework for 2007–2013 still provided resources for additional missions. In preparing the Finnish presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2006, Finnish diplomats identified ailing Italian support for justice reform within Afghanistan as one area ripe for a major policy initiative. Together with Javier Solana, who primarily saw this as an opportunity for an additional mission, the Finnish diplomats began exploring options for a rule of law mission in Afghanistan. The other European 'lead nations,' Germany and Great Britain—both of whom struggled with their respective lead nation mandates—also saw this as a welcome opportunity to pool resources and delegate their engagement to a more powerful agent.[4] In July 2006, the Council initiated planning for an assessment mission that left for Kabul on 10 September. Its report was discussed in the Council Committees in October 2006. It outlined several options for a mission to work with varying intensities in the areas of justice, police, prisons, and governance on both the central and provincial levels (see EU Council 2006b).

The transatlantic divide felt at the NATO Riga summit, pitting the USA, Britain, Canada, and some Eastern European states against Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, perpetuated itself in the EU Council. In addition to the discussion about burden sharing and more resources (troops and funding) for Afghanistan, the US side also demanded a more robust engagement in police reform. Furthermore, the USA wanted this engagement to be channeled through NATO instead of the EU.[5] Germany, Italy, and Spain shared the objective of levering their assistance in rule of law and police reform to the international level, but they wanted the EU to

take the lead instead of NATO.[6] France was hesitant. On the one hand, Paris saw the main focus of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy more in the immediate European proximity. On the other hand, France was reluctant to accept a mission they 'considered as inserted on behest of the US [and Britain] and thus as a threat to EU autonomy' (Pohl 2014, p. 154). Eventually, France reluctantly gave in and Germany, which superseded Finland as presidency of the Council in the first half of 2007, played the pivotal role in forging a consensus to launch an EU mission. On the basis of a second fact-finding mission (27 November–14 December 2006), German diplomats altered the shape of the mission to focus almost exclusively on police reform.[7] To seal the deal, German diplomats threw in a commitment to lead the mission and to provide the bulk of police officers. This was to be achieved primarily by reassigning those officers already working in the German police project and sending additional ones. On the basis of this shaky compromise, consisting mainly of German pledges, the Council decided on 02 February 2007, that formal planning for an EU crisis management mission should begin (EU Council 2007a).

In late February, the German Ministry of Interior's permanent secretary called one of his most distinguished senior police officers and asked him to transfer the German Police Project Office to the new EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, EUPOL. Police Commissioner Friedrich Eichele and a team of three to four experts from Solana's team in the Council secretariat subsequently began preparing the new mission's mandate. Following standard EU protocol, this included drafting the two key planning documents, the concept of operations and the operational plan. With Germany and Britain pushing the planning process ahead and immense operational pressure on the ground, these documents were produced very quickly. On 23 April, the Council adopted the concept of operations, and by early May, the operational plan and the mandate were ready to be adopted.[8] There were a few more delays while the Afghan government prepared the letter of invitation for the mission, which arrived by 16 May 2007. The Council then installed the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) on 30 May 2007 with the mandate to:

> significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements (…) [based on four tasks:] (a) work on strategy development, while placing an emphasis on work towards a joint overall strategy of the international community in police

> reform (…); (b) support the Government of Afghanistan in coherently implementing their strategy; (c) improve cohesion and coordination among international actors; and (d) support linkages between the police and the wider rule of law. (EU Council 2007e, Art. 3, 4)

For many observers the mandate was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it fell far short of what was required on the ground—namely, the provision of significant European training capacities.[9] The mandate provided only limited resources for a large-scale training mission. On the other hand, the mandate was a clear response to the previous German police project's failure to coordinate bilateral contributions.[10] Elaborating on this, a senior official in the European External Action Service (EEAS) later explained that EUPOL's 'role should be mainly to give strategic advice and co-ordination.'[11] Member states provided the mission with a budget of 43.6 Mio Euro for operational needs for the next 17 months. As to the size, the mandate did not specify how large the team should be, but a press release on the day of the launching ceremony in Kabul stated that roughly 160 staff 'will monitor, mentor, advise and train at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces' (EU Council 2007d).

6.2 Mission Planning and Mission Deployment: Fast but Politicized and Noncooperative

As noted in Chap. 2, peacebuilding performance hinges to a large extent on how quickly peace operations are able to launch, and how well they can adjust to local preferences (local ownership). Assessing EUPOL's respective performance is the aim of this section. It finds that planning for EUPOL Afghanistan took place as foreseen by EU protocol: In parallel to member states' efforts to agree on a mandate, the soon-to-be head of mission ran the strategic and tactical-level planning process. Thanks to British and German pressure, the process concluded within only six months, allowing the head of mission, police commissioner Eichele, and his team to quickly install themselves in Kabul. However, the team's attention during the planning process was consumed by navigating diplomatic pitfalls, as some member states insisted on caveats to restrict EUPOL's operational liberty. In addition, because the EU at the time had no 'warehouse' with equipment ready to support mission deployment, much attention during planning focused on circumventing the EU's complex procurement procedures. Yet, despite their best efforts, the mission still had no headquarters and only limited

equipment at the time of deployment. In addition, Eichele and his team were unable to coordinate substantially with any of the major partners on the ground, including the Afghan government, the German Police Project Office, and the US military. After deployment, EUPOL realized that the mission's strategic orientation was not particularly welcome in Afghanistan. Only the third head of mission finally managed to find a working niche for EUPOL. This was, however, already two years after deployment, way too late, as this section will conclude.

In principle, the involvement of the future head of mission already during operational planning should have ensured a high coherence between political objectives, the mission's strategy and the resources made available by member states. However, interviewees working in the EU Council secretariat at the time[12] (the European External Action Service was still in the making) recalled that diplomatic frictions among member states provided a severe obstacle to strategic planning, and that navigating such frictions consumed most of the planning team's attention. In addition to geopolitical differences among mainly Britain, Germany, and France, some states had reservations about the precarious security situation in Afghanistan. With Taliban fighters increasingly carrying the insurgency into Afghanistan's urban centers, EUPOL was going to deploy in one of the world's most dangerous security environments. Member states accordingly added caveats to the operational plan and it became clear that the security protocol was going to become a major restrictive factor for EUPOL's operational activities in Afghanistan.

Apart from money—France appeared determined to keep the mission's expenses to a minimum—staffing became the most controversial subject.[13] Firstly, there was direct competition with the EU's mission in Kosovo, which was tipped to contain around 2000 European police officers (and was far less risky). Secondly, member states were simply unwilling to send police officers to Afghanistan. As a consequence, while some EU officials, such as the EU's Special Representative in Kabul, Francesc Vendrell, claimed that the task to be carried out in Afghanistan required at least 2000 police trainers (Sattler 2007), the first official number published by the Council on 15 June 2007, mentioned only 160 police and civilian experts, including the 40 German officers already on the ground (EU Council 2007d).

Apart from the open questions around the eventual size of the mission, Eichele and his team were occupied with all the practical–operational questions associated with launching a peace operation in an increasingly

violent country. Unlike EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL could not be launched on the basis of a planning mission that had already completed the most foundational steps. There was, of course, the German Police Project Office, which had just inaugurated its new headquarters facility, but in spring 2007 the details of a potential transfer from the German project to EUPOL were yet to be agreed on (inter alia, Germany seemed inclined to maintain a small bilateral police presence in Afghanistan).[14] In addition, procurement for additional IT equipment, cars, and so on had to be conducted on the basis of the same complex EU procurement regulations that also slowed down the deployment of EULEX Kosovo. All these tasks were under the auspices of Eichele and his team.

When Commissioner Eichele and his advance team finally traveled to Kabul in June 2007, there was still no agreement with the Germans regarding how to proceed with the German project and its headquarters building. For the first few weeks, EUPOL staff resided and worked at a hotel in Kabul. When Eichele then sent his advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the consequences of not having coordinated better with other actors prior to mission deployment became clear. The ministry was crowded with US military advisors who appeared entirely unwilling to make room for the EU mission. The US military, which was working with around 500 contracted police trainers and mentors at the time (ICG 2008, p. 10), also had reservations against being 'coordinated' by a European mission that brought only a few staff, no project funds for equipment, and so on to support its operations,[15] and could not move freely due to security restrictions. EUPOL's operational plan also included a caveat that prevented the mission from conducting activities on Afghanistan's district level (US Government, 15 November 2007). This effectively foreclosed any opportunity to take part in the latest US innovation in police training, the Focused District Development (FDD) approach. As the name indicates, FDD takes place at Afghanistan's district level. Consequently, US officials were quite pessimistic about EUPOL's additional value. A 2007 code cable to the US State Department made reference to the US ambassador's misgivings (US Government, 12 July 2007):

> The Ambassador cautioned against half-hearted and poorly planned adventures. He described the EU's police training program which had made no preparations to house itself or set up communications. The EU was working out of its headquarters rather than in the field. It was unclear how the program was going to be a net gain.

On top of its problems with the US, EUPOL failed to deploy at the major provincial capitals where it planned to mentor senior leadership of the Afghan National Police. With the EU mission being too small to install its own logistical infrastructure, the idea was to deploy around 100 police experts within ISAF's 16 Provincial Reconstruction Teams. This would have brought them under the ISAF security umbrella, similar to other civilian assistance organizations working in the area. The problem, however, was that EUPOL's superiors in Brussels failed to establish a formal interorganizational cooperation agreement with NATO.[16]

Commissioner Eichele turned out to be the wrong man to navigate a path through this complex diplomatic minefield. He fell out with the US military and US embassy and, after only two months, was pulled out of Afghanistan by the German Ministry of Interior. His replacement as head of mission was another German senior police officer, Jürgen Scholz, who had just successfully finished his tour with the EU police mission in Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima). In his year in Kabul, Scholz managed to deploy EUPOL within the 16 PRTs. He also failed, however, to facilitate an EU-NATO agreement and thus had to sign individual agreements with each country running the PRT. This took up most of his time and once his year had passed, EUPOL was still not contributing in any meaningful way to police reform.

Eventually, what one might call substantial police reform planning was conducted only under the third head of mission, the Dane Kai Vittrup. Although the security situation escalated dramatically in summer 2008, Vittrup had a better starting position. Realizing that the mission was not going to have any significant impact with its current numbers, the Council equipped Vittrup with more personnel by doubling EUPOL's size to 400 in May 2008 (EU Council 2008a). In the following months, EUPOL senior management started from scratch by defining the footprint the mission should leave in Afghanistan. As the British police officer Nigel Thomas, who was EUPOL's deputy head of mission at the time, said,[17] it was decided that unlike the militarized US policing training 'our role was to develop the civilian policing element.' Once this niche was found, the mission used the first half of 2009 to operationalize this approach and develop program objectives and activities. EUPOL's competitive advantage was its ability to offer leadership and high-quality training and mentoring, rather than mass training at the patrolmen level.[18] Overall, as interviews with officials in Kabul indicate,[19] by defining and defending this niche approach, the mission finally found some acceptance among

the police reform community in Afghanistan. The community came to see EUPOL as the civilian policing counterpart to US police training, the latter of which focused mainly on the paramilitary skills necessary for the Afghan police to fulfill its role of first line of defense in the US counterinsurgency campaign.

6.3 Implementation and Project Management: Too Ponderous to Adjust and Cooperate

According to theory, there is a close link between a peace operation's structures, standard operating procedures, and internal rules, on the one hand, and its ability to flexibly adjust to peacebuilding challenges and to cooperate with partners, on the other hand. In none of the four case studies was this more obvious than in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan. Even police commissioner Vittrup, the man who successfully reconsolidated the stumbling mission, eventually became fed up with Brussels' never-ending interference and the resulting restrictions of his leadership. In March 2010, just weeks after having accepted to lead the mission for a second term, he resigned on short notice. He never publicly explained his motivations, but internally it was clear that he had become frustrated by the bureaucratic obstacles and micromanagement from Brussels.[20] This was confirmed by his deputy and later acting head of mission, Nigel Thomas,[21] who said that Vittrup had 'described the bureaucracy of the system as stifling' and that he had 'urged the EU to provide the Head of Mission with the autonomy needed to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances on the ground.' For Thomas, this was one of the main reasons why Vittrup had stepped down. However, instead of taking this as a warning sign, headquarters bureaucrats and the EU Council further tightened their grip on the mission and exerted full operational control directly from Brussels.[22] This leadership turnover kept EUPOL in internal turmoil just as the international community finally initiated a full-fledged strategy shift in Afghanistan and their engagement reached its peak, both in terms of open war with the Taliban and the amount of resources being poured into the country. Paralyzed by bureaucratic obstacles, micromanagement, and security caveats, EUPOL was unable to provide any significant assistance to police reform during that critical phase as this section will argue.

The first signs of a broader strategic shift in Afghanistan had already loomed on the horizon when the USA initiated counterinsurgency

protocol in 2005. In 2006, donors then met for a major Afghanistan conference in London.[23] The 'Afghanistan Compact,' as the outcome document was titled, was supposed to initiate a strategic turn in Afghanistan. However, its impact was outweighed by the response following the US elections in 2008. Early that year, two major Taliban attacks on Kabul's most prominent hotel and against President Karzai's palace had demonstrated, yet again, how bold and effective the Taliban insurgency had become. After assuming office, US President Obama requested an assessment of his country's Afghanistan policy. At the NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009, NATO heads of state endorsed the new US led strategy (US Government 2009). They explicitly recognized that 'security is the essential first step; without it, all else fails' (Cook 2009). To establish a secure environment and defeat the Taliban insurgency, Obama deployed additional troops to Afghanistan: 17,000 in 2008 and 25,000 in 2010. They were accompanied by more efforts in the area of police and military training. NATO launched its own training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) with a mandated strength of 2800 trainers and mentors for both police and military reform (NTM-A 2010), while the USA increased the number of private contractors working in Afghanistan by 400% from 3689 to 18,971 individuals between December 2008 and March 2011 (Schwartz 2011, p. 8). According to the new strategy, ISAF troops should defeat the Taliban insurgents, while accelerated efforts in security sector training should enable the Afghan army and police to ensure public safety themselves. The strategy was spurred by the growing realization that creating functional and effective security forces in Afghanistan was the only viable exit strategy for Western powers to leave the country.[24] The October 2008 ISAF Joint Campaign Plan, a classified document guiding the alliance, stated that ISAF's 'primary goal is the "transfer of lead security responsibility" to the Afghans' (cited in Bowman and Dale 2010, p. 11). Toward this end, the US administration used the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit to secure European capitals' commitment to enhance their own efforts (see Fig. 6.1). In response, the German government, for instance, increased the Foreign Office's budget for crisis management measures in Afghanistan from 32.5 Mio Euro in 2006 to 190 Mio Euro in 2010.

While increasing resources for military operations and reconstruction, Obama had also confirmed his predecessor's principle decision to put the military in the driver's seat in Afghanistan. This included police reform, which became, due to the sheer dominance of the US contribution, part of the counterinsurgency campaign. As a first step, the US military had



Fig. 6.1 Financial assistance and military personnel in Afghanistan (2001–2011) (*Source*: Author's compilation. Official development assistance (ODA) numbers retrieved from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) website (http://stats.oecd.org). ISAF and OEF figures for 2002–2007 from the Brookings Afghanistan Index (O'Hanlon and de Albuquerque 2005) and for the years 2007–2011 from IASF datasheets (ISAF 02 January 2007, 03 June 2008, 22 December 2009, 25 October 2010)

already in 2006/07 increased their training capacities to over 100 army staff working on police reform and 500 DynCorp contracted trainers (Perito 2009, p. 5). This came alongside announcements by the Afghan government that the cap on the Afghan police would be raised first to around 80,000 officers, then to 109,000 in October 2010 and even up to 157,000 by October 2012 (ICG 2007b, p. 10). The bulk of the remaining training activities targeted the patrolmen level and was conducted at the regional training centers attached to the PRTs. For instance, Germany—which had operated the PRTs in Kundus and Mazar-e-Sharif in North Afghanistan since 2005—also began providing basic training to rank-and-file police officers. Even in the German camp, the focus of training shifted to weapons handling and tactical training (road blocks, conducting searches, house raids, etc.), rather than literacy and democratic policing.

Although shared commitments and more resources ultimately meant that police training gained much more traction, the downside of this development was a clear overemphasis on the quantity and military skills of the police at the expense of a civilian and community policing model. For instance, as Sedra (2006, p. 95) wrote at the time, '[p]rogrammes to advance the transparency and democratic accountability of the [security] sector, while situating it in a clear legal framework have been superseded by a singular focus on training and equipping the country's fledgling security forces.' Similarly, Perito (2009, p. 1), another long-term observer, later stated that '[p]utting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the [Afghan Police] and its use as a counterinsurgency force.' With the arrival of the NATO training mission, this development only accelerated. At the same time, the Afghan population saw the police as 'a failed case' and perceived it as Afghanistan's most corrupt public organization.[25] Perito (2009, p. 1) confirmed that the police were 'riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.' It is, thus, at least questionable whether the international emphasis on paramilitary skills and producing large numbers quickly was appropriate, even given the Taliban threat.

Aware of the looming US counterinsurgency policy, European policymakers had originally designed EUPOL as a counterbalance and entrusted the mission with carrying on—at best, with more success—the German coordination efforts. It was hoped that this would leave, even to limited degree, a civilian policing imprint on the Afghan police. However, EUPOL failed altogether to meet this challenge. To be sure, there were factors such as individual leadership capability and being outmatched by a much more potent partner, but the problem was also deeply systemic, as further analysis shows.

Micromanagement Restricted Leadership and Prompted Cooperation Failures

Cooperation failure among the international community was one of the main reasons why the lead nation approach to police reform was ineffective. Acknowledging this fact, international donors in 2006 installed the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board,[26] charged with the coordination of all bi- and multilateral donors working in Afghanistan. The Board is comprised of several secondary boards for individual sectors, including

the International Police Coordination Board for police reform. Chairing and running the secretariat of the police board and thereby ensuring more coherence among police supporters was one of EUPOL's major tasks. However, this was easier said than done.

In the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, much more than in the example of EULEX Kosovo, the EU's centralized style of decision-making added up to full-fledged micromanagement by Brussels. EUPOL's various heads of missions felt this most acutely in two situations. One, when considering options to respond to immanent crises (such as a security incidence), one head of mission complained of often being 'overtaken by a situation.' In other words, while the team on the ground was still considering potential responses to suggest to Brussels, member states in the Council were already aware of the situation (due to their own intelligence resources) and instructed the mission accordingly, not even considering local suggestions.[27] Two, micromanagement also paralyzed heads of missions' ability to collaborate with external partners. In particular, the EU's centralized style diametrically opposed military leadership culture. NATO, for instance, argued that its own mission NTM-A 'required self-reliant subordinate commands able to act semi-autonomously' (NTM-A 2010, p. 24). The effect of these different cultures were felt whenever EUPOL needed to collaborate with NTM-A. As EUPOL's acting head of mission recalled in 2010,[28] in their coordination meetings, NTM-A officials often asked whether EUPOL could take on a specific task. EUPOL then had to consult with Brussels. Describing what happened next, he said, '[o]ften you would put papers in very quickly; it would take weeks if not months, and sometimes you would get no reply at all and you have lost the moment then.' These delays made it very difficult to conduct common projects with military partners in Afghanistan, as the EU official further explained: 'if things did not fit their timeline—if you were not there to explain, to deal with the issues and to manage expectations—there is a danger of being left behind and marginalized.'

In addition to undermining EUPOL's ability to coordinate its international partners, the centralized style of decision-making in the EU crisis management system also jeopardized locally driven initiatives. As in the case of EULEX Kosovo, the EU Council originally deployed the mission without a budget to pay for equipment deliveries for the Afghan police or to refurbish police stations. Strictly speaking, Afghan police officers were even supposed to return the pencils used in training

classes delivered by EUPOL. The mission's only asset was the expertise of its trainers. This forced EUPOL to collaborate with an external partner every time Afghan police officers had to be supplied with equipment during or after a training class. One natural partner was the EU Commission. In 2009, Kai Vittrup and his staff were looking for new activities under EUPOL's consolidated strategy. Although Kabul already had a National Police Academy at which new recruits could be enrolled, it lacked a distinct college to provide advanced training for the existing police. To remedy this and to maintain the suggested focus on civilian policing training for senior police officers, the proposal of a separately located Police Staff College was made. There were also plans for a regional training center in Bamyan and a new faculty building for criminal investigations training (CID faculty) at the Afghan National Police Academy. In spring 2010,[29] the issue was agreed upon with NTM-A and discussed with the EU delegation's office in Kabul, which was to provide the funding.[30] The delegation drafted an information fiche (planning document), which was sent to the Commission's Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) for consideration.[31] The delegation's three-year financial implementation program for 2011–2013 (Multiannual Indicative Program) had just been agreed upon and the dossier for the construction projects had arrived in good time to earmark funds. However, the dossier was then passed on to the EU Council. EUPOL intended to carry out training at the staff college and the CID faculty, but because this had not been part of the original operational plan the Council needed to give its approval. As three officials recall,[32] member states subsequently approved the staff college and the training center in Bamyan but for nonapparent reasons some member states at the same time vetoed the CID faculty building for criminal investigation training. As the delegation does not implement construction works itself, a tender was subsequently published on 18 October 2011. Construction works finally kicked off in June 2012, two years after the first discussions on the project.[33] On the one hand, this shows how the EU's decentralized decision-making system can cripple local initiatives. The Council is always there as a veto player and it must be extremely frustrating for EUPOL staff to have their projects rejected for no apparent reason. On the other hand, administrative procedures take a long time. More than two years from the inception to the launch of the building project is much too long in crisis management.

Bureaucratic Obstacles and Security Caveats

In addition to micromanagement and the associated coordination and collaboration shortcomings, bureaucratic obstacles were another continuous source of friction that hampered the mission. In part, this was due to the security context. But there were also more systemic reasons as the below sections show. First and as explained in Chap. 4, EU missions have no legal personality. Therefore, no one knew what the exact legal consequences would be if any seconded or contracted mission staff were killed in Afghanistan. To prevent such an incident from the outset, member states equipped the mission with a strict safety regime. An assessment report by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly elaborated on operational consequences: 'additional concerns included EUPOL's strict rules of engagement, which (…) deprived EUPOL of the necessary flexibility to move around, especially out of Kabul where they were needed' (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2008). In practice, EUPOL staff were required to wear bullet-proof vests outside the EUPOL security compounds where they lived and worked and they were not allowed to leave the compound in their leisure time, the only exceptions being a small list of restaurants. Due to intelligence warnings or after security incidents, mentoring activities were usually suspended entirely. Furthermore, some nations provided their staff with additional caveats. German police officers, for example, had to remain within the operational area of the German military (Regional Command North) and the territory of Kabul and thus could not travel to EUPOL's regional centers.[34]

A second problem was more in-house. As mentioned in Chap. 4, EU crisis management missions are governed by a complex bundle of financial rules that were originally written for projects being implemented by entirely autonomous partners of the EU Commission. As interviewees explained, these rules restricted EUPOL not only during procurement procedures around the time of mission launch, but they also affected mandate implementation more generally. One example: EUPOL's 2009/10 budget for the first time contained a project cell with a budget line of around 200,000 Euro for money to be spent on projects alongside mentoring or training. The absence of such a project cell had been a persistent criticism voiced by EUPOL's partners. The budget could be used to provide Afghan police officers with equipment or to refurbish rooms in police stations. The budget line for such projects grew to 1.9 Mio Euro in the 2011/12 budget and the mission established a project cell to administrate

the fund. The installation of the project cell could have been a major improvement of EUPOL's flexibility. However, complex procurement rules neutralized this positive effect. In principle, projects (e.g., providing training materials such as books) should have been implemented alongside an activity (e.g., training class) and at the beginning of the mission's financial and mandate cycle, both were approved by the Council together. However, due to demanding and time-consuming procurement regulations, tender processes were often aborted altogether—around 40% of all cases in 2012 (European Court of Auditors 2015, p. 28)—or the procured equipment could only be provided much later in the budget year, often only after seven to ten months. By this time, it had often lost its original purpose of supporting a training curriculum.[35]

6.4 Strategy Review and Monitoring: Political Bargaining Instead of Strategic Reasoning

Protracted decision-making, collaboration failure, and the associated loss of reputation were only partly due to the transaction costs associated with Brussels' overbearing involvement in operational matters. There were also political factors. This becomes apparent when considering how Brussels monitored and reviewed missions. In addition to standard reporting issued by EUPOL on a weekly and monthly basis, there is an annual strategic review conducted by a team of headquarters experts who assess whether EUPOL is contributing as expected to the EU's crisis management strategy. A strategic review is a mini-evaluation of a crisis management mission's activities and impact in its area of operation. This includes analyzing all available documentation by and on the mission and conducting a field visit. According to one interviewee who referred to such a review in December 2011, there were no formal guidelines structuring the assessment.[36] Once the review team had compiled the draft report, it was shared with member states in the Council, together with suggestions on how to update the operational plan. In line with the EU's rules and regulations, member states in the EU Council's committees provide strategic and political guidance. According to one interviewee who was involved in such a review process several times, the negotiations in the Council's operational and financial committees usually led to several rounds of redrafting the suggestions made by the review team. By the end, as two officials recalled, eventual strategic adjustments usually had little relation to the original recommendations.[37]

It is hard to come by the details of these changes and the motives behind them. In general, four European political motives guide EU Council decision-making with respect to crises: first, balancing US hegemony in world politics; second, projecting the EU's norms and values into its environment; third, expressing the Union's ability to collectively act in foreign policy; and fourth, as a means for member states to demonstrate (at home) that they are 'doing something' in response to a (humanitarian) crisis (Pohl 2014, p. 4). In addition to these joint motives, analysis of EUPOL Afghanistan indicates that member states' domestic geopolitical agendas also matter significantly. As demonstrated above, EUPOL's raison d'être can be closely linked to Germany, Britain, and Italy's desire to replace the lead nation approach to Afghan reconstruction. In addition, as one diplomat explained with respect to EUPOL's 2012 strategic review process, France used its Council veto on the mandate review to gain approval for a new EU training mission in Mali—a mission that some states did not want to see.[38] Other respondents in Brussels confirmed more generally that member states often used their veto power vis-à-vis one mission as a bargaining chip in negotiations for different dossiers, usually because of their own geopolitical considerations.[39] While serving a greater geopolitical purpose, such politicization of crisis management results in political guidance that appears—from a mission's perspective—erratic and arbitrary and is, at times, actually obstructive (as with the above example of the criminal training faculty building).

Overall, the EU's institutional setting enabled member states to adjust the EUPOL mandate on a regular basis to reflect changes in the situation on the ground. The staff increase in 2008 marks one such instance (see above). Nonetheless, such adjustments usually came too late, fell short of what was required, and/or were influenced by motives unrelated to the mission mandate. In addition to jeopardizing collaborative actions and police reform coordination, this meant that EUPOL was unable to maintain pace with the operational development and decision-making by (military) partners in Afghanistan, thus limiting its ability to influence them or the Afghan police.

6.5 Summary: Poor Performance but Limited Consequences

At least since 2008, as ISAF strategy documents demonstrate, coalition military leaders considered the success of police and military reform in

Afghanistan as key to their own exit strategy (Bowman and Dale 2010, p. 11). To provide the conditions necessary to transfer public safety to Afghan security forces, Western governments pursued a threefold strategy. First, by increasing the presence of coalition forces to up to 132,000 soldiers,[40] international forces aimed to defeat the Taliban insurgency and provide public security for an interim period. Second, at the same time, the massive increase in training capacities for both the Afghan military and police aimed to train around 350,000 soldiers and police officers. After a transition period between 2012 and 2014, Afghan security forces replaced ISAF (which withdrew its combat forces until the end of 2014) in ensuring security throughout Afghanistan. And third, by means of an immense investment program, delivered through billions of US dollars invested in aid projects, Western donors sought to convince the Afghan population of the benefit of a post-Taliban governance arrangement in the sense of a peace dividend. It was hoped that economic gains and infrastructure development projects would bolster the legitimacy of the existing government and eliminate support for the Taliban insurgency. With this general strategic background in mind, this section discusses how EUPOL contributed to the second objective—training the Afghan police and providing it with the responsibility for public safety. After a general assessment of the state of police reform in Afghanistan, the section considers the main explanatory factors for this outcome and considers, counterfactually, the relevance of the EU's institutional system and the mission's consequent performance.

Early 2016 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the Bonn agreement that laid the foundation for international assistance to institution building in Afghanistan. In this time, the international community has managed to train from scratch a police force of around 150,000 officers structured along six major components. The Afghan Uniformed Police is the largest component (around 80,000 officers) and is controlled by Kabul. It is responsible for maintaining public order at all levels of the Afghan state and has received training since the early days of the German police project. The Afghan Border Police, the second largest component (around 22,000 officers), and the smaller Anti-Crime Police have also received international assistance since early on. In 2006, the USA founded a new police unit, called the Afghan National Civil Order Police. This is a specialized gendarmerie force that participates in counterinsurgency operations alongside coalition forces. It has also been used to replace local police forces on a temporary basis as part of the US Focused District Development (FDD)

approach. Finally, and only loosely tied to the Afghan police command structure, is the Afghan Local Police. These are local militias controlled through traditional structures at villages or individual communities.

Various sources draw different pictures of the capabilities of the Afghan police. On the one hand, official US military sources emphasize that Afghan security forces 'are on track to take full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan by 2015' (US Department of Defense 2014, p. 25). Indicators quoted are initial achievements such as ensuring public safety during the 2014 national elections and the presidential runoff. Individual units have also successfully planned and executed counterinsurgency operations (the report does not specify whether this refers to the military or police). In addition, contrary to some skeptics' arguments, the police has not fractionalized according to ethnicity and other power dividers since the withdrawal of international troops, but remains indeed a source of national cohesion.[41]

Independent sources, on the other hand, are more skeptical about the Afghan police. '[B]ecause of its configuration as a militarized counterinsurgency force in the fight against the Taliban,' as a report by the United States Institute for Peace states, '[t]he Afghan National Police appears unlikely to be able to enforce the rule of law following the [ISAF] withdrawal' (Planty and Perito 2014, p. 1). Similarly, an independent report by the Asia Foundation (2014, p. 31) found that 'the ability of the [Afghan security forces] to maintain security throughout the country, especially in rural areas, remains weak.' The main remaining problems cited are a lack of operational capabilities, corruption, a high attrition rate, and double loyalties emerging because some police units still receive salaries not only form the central government, but also from regional power brokers. A joke circulated in Karzai's cabinet around 2012 reflects how the government perceived its own police force[42]:

> Individual police officers must possess three virtues to apply for the Afghan police: they must be thieves, because police officers with tiny salaries have to steal from the people; they need to be patriots, because there is a high chance they will die for their country; and they need to be mad, otherwise they wouldn't apply for to be in the police in the first place.

Since 2006, there has been a constant rise in the percentage of the population that fears for its personal safety. After a drop in 2012, the transition phase came along and brought that percentage back up to 65% (The

Asia Foundation 2014, p. 32). The Taliban has lost much ground during the intensified military operations since 2010. However, since ISAF withdrawal completed in 2014, armed opposition groups have been regaining ground not only in the southeast, but also in the north of Afghanistan. Major terrorist attacks convulsed Kabul, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif in the summer of 2015.[43] All this suggests that the Afghan police and army are far from capable of ensuring public safety throughout the country, despite Western governmental assurances to the contrary.

How can we explain this outcome? And what role did the EU's institutional system and the mission's performance play? With a maximum of 400 staff and a budget of 450 Mio Euro between 2007 and 2014 (European Court of Auditors 2015, p. 12), EUPOL's chances to leave a major footprint in Afghan police reform were limited given that the mission was dwarfed by US and NATO efforts. Shortly after EUPOL, a new NATO mission arrived with 2800 trainers in 2009. US police reform efforts at the same time involved up to 3400 contractors plus several hundred US military and police personnel and cost US tax payers around 14 Bn USD between 2005 and 2013 (Planty and Perito 2014, p. 1). The war with the Taliban, the US counterinsurgency strategy and the associated militarization of international assistance to police reform are the most prominent factors affecting the outcome of Afghan police reform.

Similar to EUPOL, the Afghan government also had little impact on the shape of the police in 2015/16. With the Afghan Ministry of Interior being dominated by US advisors,[44] there is little doubt that the police reform strategy and its individual products were much more US authored than Afghan owned. In 2006, just as the US military assumed leadership over international assistance to Afghanistan, a US report self-critically found: 'A pitfall in the American style of assistance, which applies to the police training program, is the urge to move quickly and to take over if things do not move quickly enough' (Office of Inspector General 2006, p. 54). However, other sources argued that the Afghan government was entirely unwilling, or unable, to drive the police reform process by themselves:

> [G]etting the Afghans at times to take ownership has been a challenge because they were often—frequently and probably consistently for many years, with the budgets and resources that were available from the international community—quite happy to sit in the background and let everything

> be pushed for them rather than grasping it and pushing it forward themselves and taking ownership for a lot of the issues. (United Kingdom 2011)

How can we explain EUPOL's failure to play a more dominant role in Afghanistan, despite initial plans to make EUPOL a 'major ISAF component' (Planty and Perito 2014, p. 10)? Limited resources were a factor but far from the only reason. Instead, the analysis conducted in this chapter points to the mission's performance (see Table 6.1): First, due to complex planning procedures and leadership capacity restrictions, the launch of the mission protracted over two to three years. This severely harmed the mission's reputation and arguably deprived it of the opportunity to grow into a civilian counterbalance to militarized police reform in Afghanistan. While some factors are situational, such as leadership deficits, the EU's bureaucratic procurement rules constantly hampered the mission's work (for instance, the work carried out by the project cell). Second, the EU's centralized decision-making system jeopardized collaborative actions and prevented EUPOL from keeping pace with decision-making by (military) partners in Afghanistan. Third, this was not just about transaction costs, such as the time that passed between requests for guidance being sent to Brussels and a response arriving in Kabul. Instead, political motives not linked to police reform in Afghanistan led to decisions that, at times, obstructed mandate implementation. In terms of institutional-designs,

Table 6.1 EUPOL institutional design and its impact on performance

Policy phase	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
Planning	Top-down, synoptic planning	Slow launch of operations (two to three years), several phases of replanning	Poor
Implementation	Centralized decision-making competencies, lack of leadership	Cumbersome and bureaucratic, failure to adjust to local preferences, failure to cooperate with international partners	Poor
Review	Highly centralized annual mandate review	Continuous politicization of mandate implementation, clash of political and operational rationalities	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

it must be concluded that the EU's centralized decision-making system constitutes the single-most relevant obstacle to better performance and a more pronounced footprint.

Assuming for a moment that the EU mission had a better start, it is indeed reasonable to expect that a strategic-level agreement with ISAF could have yielded a more prominent role for EUPOL. In addition to more flexibility in negotiations, coupled with the Council's political support, however, this also would have required member states to provide more resources and to swiftly launch training activities at the provincial level. In such a scenario, EUPOL could have gained much more room to implement police reform along a civilian policing model that teaches de-escalation tactics and emphasizes community relations. Of course, in a country with an illiteracy rate of around 70%, such an approach also would have had its limits. But with the chosen strategy, as international observers rightfully criticize, the international community failed 'to meet Afghanistan's need for a national police service capable of enforcing the rule of law, controlling crime, and protecting Afghan citizens' (Planty and Perito 2014, p. 1). Given the resources that were poured into Afghanistan for over a decade, a faster, more autonomous, more flexible and well-led EUPOL could have set the stage for such an end. But would this have changed the overall outcome? US military planners were arguably acting in their own best intention when arranging for a paramilitary Afghan police force that could participate in the fight against the Taliban. For them, the counterinsurgency campaign would have been less successful without the participation of the Afghan police. Whichever logic may be right, should the Afghan government eventually strike a deal with its armed opposition groups, it will definitely require significant additional aid to turn its militarized police force into a civilian one.

Afghanistan has been selected for this book because it constitutes a least-likely case for successful police reform. In the light of this selection criterion, the outcome sketched in the above paragraphs on EUPOL Afghanistan is by no means counterintuitive. Afghanistan operated in an unconducive environment and it performed poorly. However, as will be discussed in the next section in more detail, the case study is valuable in terms of confirming findings observed in the case of Kosovo. Despite the different contexts of the two countries,' the institutional dynamics of the EU are strikingly similar in both cases, proving themselves to be unwieldy in *both* ideal and less than ideal conditions.

Notes

1. The website http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx (accessed 01 November 2015) tracks fatality developments in Afghanistan based on news reporting and official sources. Note that the figure only refers to international forces who died in Afghanistan: The actual numbers including Afghanistan police and army were much higher.
2. Although the Summit document is a good example of diplomatic restraint, commentaries and media coverage around the summit vividly mirror the prevailing atmosphere. See, for instance, Schwarz (2006).
3. According to Official Development Assistance (ODA) statistics by the OECD. See http://stats.oecd.org (accessed 01 November 2015).
4. Interview with EU official who worked in the Council Secretariat at the time, a German official from the Ministry of Interior and a German diplomat who worked in Afghanistan at the time (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 054/D, 18 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012).
5. This is expressed in a code cable that was distributed among US embassies as a scene setter for the USA's objectives on Afghanistan at the Riga NATO summit in November 2006. Code Cable sent on 09 November 2006. Subject: 'Our Take On Afghanistan Objectives At The Riga Summit.' The text can be accessed at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06KABUL5414.html (accessed 01 November 2015).
6. Interviews with officials from EU, German Foreign Office, and German Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012).
7. Interviews with officials from EU, German Foreign Office, and German Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012).
8. The Operational Plan was adopted on 14 May 2006; see EU Council (2007b).
9. Interview with EUPOL official (Interview No. 075/A, 27 March 2012).
10. Interview with official from the German Foreign Office (Interview No. 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012).
11. Testimony by Klees Klompenhouwer before the UK Parliament Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee-C 'Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development Policy' on 04 November 2010 (see United Kingdom 2011).
12. Information on this and the subsequent paragraph taken from interviews with officials from the EU, EUPOL, German Foreign Office, and the German Ministry of Interior (Interview No. 059/A, 01 June 2011, 056/D, 02 July 2012, 058/D, 07/12 June 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012).

13. France eventually contributed only a few staff to EUPOL. In 2008, for instance, only one to three French police officers served in EUPOL (see EUPOL 2008).
14. According to a joint publication by the German Ministry of Interior and the German Foreign Office, the renamed German Police Project Team (GPPT) should remain to implement equipment delivery and police infrastructure projects (Bundesregierung 2007, p. 38).
15. EU regulations at the time provided no ground for such funds, see Sect. 4.4.
16. The main reason for this appeared to be Turkey's refusal to negotiate with the EU as a whole, because such negotiations would have brought Cyprus to the table. According to media reports, Turkey officially said that both Cyprus and Malta were not part of NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, which meant that they had no security clearance for working-level cooperation. For more details see Dempsey (2007), a report by a UK parliament committee (United Kingdom 2011, p. 26), and an ICG report (ICG 2007b, p. 8).
17. Testimony before the UK Parliament Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee-C 'Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development Policy' on 21 October 2010 (see United Kingdom 2011).
18. Interview with EUPOL staff (Interview No. 076/A, 14 February 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012).
19. The niche-narrative was confirmed by several interviewees at EUPOL, the German Foreign Office, two embassies in Kabul, and NTM-A (Interview No. 077/A, 01 June 2011, 078/A, 04 June 2011, 076/A, 14 February 2012, 071/A, 16 February 2012, 087/A, 21 February 2012).
20. Interview with two EUPOL officials (Interview No. 081/A, 06 June 2011/15 February 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012).
21. Testimony before the UK Parliament Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee-C 'Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development Policy' on 21 October 2010 (see United Kingdom 2011).
22. Interview with two EUPOL officials (Interview No. 081/A, 06 June 2011/15 February 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012).
23. See the final agreement of the London Conference, titled the Afghan Compact. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf (accessed 01 November 2015).
24. See, for instance, a committee report prepared for the 2008 Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: 'NATO Operations: Current Priorities and Lessons Learned' (158 DSC 08 E BIS), retrieved from http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1476 (accessed 01 November 2015).

25. Interviews with analysts at two think tanks in Kabul (Interview No. 073/A, 02 June 2011/19 February 2012, 067/A, 20 February 2012).
26. See the final agreement of the London Conference, titled the Afghanistan Compact, Annex III. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf (accessed 01 November 2015).
27. Interview with a former head of an EU mission (Interview No. 056/D, 02 July 2012).
28. Testimony by Nigel Thomas before the UK Parliament Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee-C 'Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development Policy' on 04 November 2010 (see United Kingdom 2011).
29. The date is mentioned by Klees Klompenhouwer in a hearing by the UK parliament (United Kingdom 2011).
30. Interview with two officials (Interview No. 080/A, 05 June 2011, 036/B, 23 April 2012).
31. While the Commission's reconstruction policy for Kosovo falls under the auspices of DG ELARG (Kosovo is, after all, an enlargement candidate and thus eligible for funding by means of the instrument for pre-accession), Afghanistan is part of the portfolio of DG DEVCO and funding is provided out of the instrument for stability.
32. Interview with one EUPOL official and one diplomat who knows about CIVCOM proceedings (Interview No. 040/B, 26 April 2012, 075/A, 27 March 2012).
33. Dates retrieved from EUPOL's website. Page screenshots can be provided by the author.
34. Interview with German official who worked within EUPOL (Interview No. 076/A, 14 February 2012).
35. Information according to two officials with detailed knowledge about EUPOL mission administration and two police officers who worked in training programs (Interview No. 082/A, 15 February 2012, 083/A, 15 February 2012, 084/A, 15 February 2012, 004/D, 26 June 2012).
36. Interview with one diplomat in Kabul (Interview No. 071/A, 16 February 2012).
37. Interview with one EU official (Interview No. 045/B, 26 April 2012).
38. Interviews No. 089/D, 14 January 2013, 040/B, 26 April 2012.
39. Interviews No. 029/B, 19 July 2011/13 April 2012, 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012, 040/B, 26 April 2012.
40. See NATO's ISAF placement archive: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm (accessed 01 November 2015).
41. Interview with two Afghan policy analysts and several diplomats (Interview No. 059/A, 01 June 2011, 072/A, 02 June 2011, 073/A, 02 June 2011/19 February 2012, 071/A, 16 February 2012, 067/A, 20 February 2012, 087/A, 21 February 2012).

42. Interview with an Afghan analyst of police reform who worked in a non-governmental organization (Interview No. 073/A, 02 June 2011/19 February 2012).
43. See, for example, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/taliban-attack-parliament-kabul-suicide-car-bomber-rpgs, and http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33841724 (accessed 01 November 2015).
44. In 2011, NTM-A already had 160 mentors at the ministry, a number that was set to increase up to over 300 by 2012. According to interviews with NTM-A and EUPOL officials (Interview No. 098/A, 02 June 2011, 088/A, 21 February 2012).

References

Bowman, S., & Dale, C. (2010). *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, military operations, and issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Bundesregierung. (2007). *Das Afghanistan Konzept der Bundesregierung*. Berlin: German Federal Government.

Cook, F. (2009). *Afghanistan: A turning point?* (NATO Parliamentary Assembly annual session report). Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Dempsey, J. (2007). *Letter from Germany: Bickering between NATO and EU hampers training of Afghan police*. New York: The New York Times.

Edwards, L. M. (2010). State-building in Afghanistan: A case showing the limits? *International Review of the Red Cross, 92*(880), 967–991.

EU Council. (2006b). *Council document. Report following the joint EU assessment mission on the rule of law in Afghanistan between 10–21 September 2006*. 13967/06 (13 October 2006). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2007a). *Council document. Approval of the crisis management concept concerning the future crisis management operation in Afghanistan*. 5947/07 (02 February 2007). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2007b). *Council document. Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)*. 9404/07 (14 May 2007). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2007d). *Council document. Press release: EU police mission in Afghanistan starts*. 10939/07 (15 June 2007). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2007e). *Council Joint Action on establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan* (EUPOL AFGANISTAN), 2007/369/CFSP (30 May 2007). Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EU Council. (2008a). *Council Document. Council Conclusions on Afghanistan. 2870th External Relations Council meeting. 26 and 27 May 2008*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

EUPOL. (2008). *Serving Afghanistan. Online Bi-weekly newsletter*. Kabul: EUPOL.

European Court of Auditors. (2015). *The EU police mission in Afghanistan: Mixed results* (Special report no. 07/2015). Brussels: European Court of Auditors.

GAO. (2009). *Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, economic, and governance challenges to rebuilding efforts should be addressed in U.S. strategies* (Testimony by Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

Giustozzi, A. (2003). *Respectable warlords? The politics of state-building in post-Taleban Afghanistan* (Working paper no 33). London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

ICG. (2007b). *Reforming Afghanistan's police* (Asia Briefing). Kabul/Washington, DC: International Crisis Group.

ICG. (2008). *Afghanistan: The need for international resolve* (Asia report). Kabul/Brussels.

ISAF. (2007). *ISAF: Key facts and figures*. Kabul: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

ISAF. (2008). *ISAF: Key facts and figures*. Kabul: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

ISAF. (2009). *ISAF: Key facts and figures*. Kabul: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

ISAF. (2010). *ISAF: Key facts and figures*. Kabul: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Kilcullen, D. J. (2006). Counter-insurgency Redux. *Survival, 48*(4), 111–130.

Kilcullen, D. J. (2009). *The accidental Guerilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McCaffrey, B. R. (2006). Academic report-trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from May 19 through May 26. In Hearing before the Committee on armed services on 28 June 2006 (Ed.), *Status of security and stability in Afghanistan* (pp. 89ff.). Washinton, DC: US Congress, House of Representatives.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. (2008). *NATO operations: Current priorities and lessons learned (by General Rapporteur Frank Cook)*. 158 DSC 08 E bis (2008 Annual session, Commitee report). Valencia: NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

NTM-A. (2010). *Year in review: November 2009 to November 2010*. Kabul: NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A).

O'Hanlon, M. E., & de Albuquerque, A. L. (2005). *Afghanistan index: Tracking variables of reconstruction & security in post-Taliban Afghanistan* (Updated 25 February 2005). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Office of Inspector General. (2006). *Interagency assessment of Afghanistan police training and readiness* (Report no. IE-2007-001, ISP-IQO-07-07). Washington, DC: US Department of State, US Department of Defense.

Perito, R. M. (2009). *Afghanistan's police: The weak link in security sector reform* (Special report no. 227 (August 2009)). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Planty, D. J., & Perito, R. M. (2014). *Police transition in Afghanistan* (Special report no. 322 (February 2013)). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Pohl, B. (2014). *EU foreign policy and crisis management operations. Power, purpose and domestic politics*. New York: Routledge.

Rubin, B. R. (2002). *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system* (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sattler, U. (2007). *Mit GSG-9-Erfahrung nach Afghanistan. EU-Polizeimission unter deutscher Führung/Hilfsdienste für Besatzungstruppen?* Berlin: Neues Deutschland.

Schwartz, M. (2011). *The department of defense's use of private security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, analysis, and options for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Schwarz, P. (2006). *NATO summit in Riga: Sharp conflicts over Afghanistan* (World Socialist Web Site (1 December 2006).)

Sedra, M. (2006). Sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency. *International Peacekeeping, 13*(1), 94–111.

The Asia Foundation. (2014). Afghanistan in. (2014). *A survey of the Afghan People*. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.

United Kingdom. (2011). *The EU's Afghan police mission: Report with evidence* (Vol. 8) (Report of session). London: House of Lords: European Union Committee.

US Department of Defense. (2014). *Report on progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense.

US Government. (12 July 2007). *Subject: 'OSCE interest in Afghanistan'*. (US code cable published as part of the "Wikileaks Affair": http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07KABUL2250.html. Accessed 01 Nov 2014. Kabul: US Embassy.

US Government. (15 November 2007). *Subject: 'Afghan police training: Shift to focused district development'* (US code cable published as part of the "Wikileaks Affair": http://www.cablegatesearch.net/. Accessed 01 Nov 2014. Kabul: US Embassy.

US Government. (2009). *White paper of the interagency policy group's report on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*. US Government.

CHAPTER 7

Comparison: Managing Institutions to Raise Peacebuilding Odds

Executives in peacebuilding headquarters and peace operations around the world make critical decisions on a daily basis. They negotiate with conflict parties, broker peace strategies, and design concepts to assist local actors in reforming state institutions. While these decisions are important in their own right, they depend—and this is the core thrust of this book's argument—on institutional designs. How quickly can peacebuilding organizations provide assistance on the ground? How flexible and adjustable are they in negotiations with local power brokers and international partners? To what extent can they reflect on their achievements and learn from success or failure?

Shifting back to a broader perspective, this chapter compares the answers the book's four case studies provide for the research question motivating this book: How does variation in institutional designs affect peacebuilding outcomes? As elaborated in Chap. 2, the research question falls into two parts. The first addresses how institutional designs determine the performance of peace operations at the level of administrative processes, assessed by taking the example of police reform support in Kosovo (by the OSCE and the EU mission EULEX) and in Afghanistan (by Germany and the EU mission EUPOL). Building on 109 expert interviews, the book's four case studies each provides an empirically dense account of how the four police reform missions' institutional designs affect their performance. Responding to the inconclusive state-of-the-art on these questions in contemporary peacebuilding and public administration literature, the analysis was carried out in an inductive manner, aiming at the theory-generation

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_7

rather than testing. The findings are summarized next in Sect. 7.1: Based on evidence from all four case studies, four causal mechanisms could be identified, which are presented in the form of hypotheses.

The second subquestion asks how missions' process performance in turn affects their ability to execute peacebuilding mandates. In answering this question, each of the book's four chapters resulted in a counterfactual discussion on the impact mission performance has on police reform outcomes. Sect. 7.2 compares these findings, also taking into consideration alternative explanations.

7.1 How Variation in Institutional Designs Affects Mission Performance

Building on the conceptual work suggested by Gutner and Thompson (2010), Chap. 2 developed an analytical framework geared toward assessing the performance of peacebuilding bureaucracies at the level of administrative processes. Process performance can be measured along three phases of an ideal-typical policy process: The planning of operations, the implementation of the mandate, and the review processes that link implementation results with policy adjustments. As a baseline, peace operations were assessed against one performance indicator per policy phase: On planning, the pace of mission deployment; on implementation, the ability to coordinate with partners and to adjust to associated arrangements; and on review, the execution, if necessary, of policy adjustments. This section compares the case studies' findings. I identify four mechanisms on the link between institutional designs and performance (see Table 7.1). Each mechanism is supported both by positive evidence with case studies exhibiting the respective institutional design constellation and by negative evidence with case studies where the lack of the respective constellation affected performance negatively. Below, I discuss these mechanisms as hypotheses relating to all four case studies and demonstrate their ability to stand up to scrutiny.

The findings were strikingly consistent across all cases and irrespective of the tremendous differences characterizing the peacebuilding environment in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Comparison of the two EU missions is particularly valuable here. Despite the missions'. contextual differences, the institutional dynamics of the EU were constant. This indicates stability

Table 7.1 Four hypothesized mechanisms through which institutional design affects performance

Policy phase	*Hypothesized mechanism*	*Positive evidence*	*Negative evidence*
Planning	H1: Bottom-up planning enables rapid mission installation	OSCE, Germany	EULEX, EUPOL
Implementation	H2: Decentralized implementation enhances flexibility, adjustability, and local ownership	OSCE, Germany	EULEX, EUPOL
Implementation	H3: Leadership furthers mission autonomy, cooperation, and continuity	OSCE, EULEX, Germany	EUPOL
Review	H4: Strategy review in international organizations facilitates mission politicization	OSCE, EULEX, EUPOL	–

Source: Author's compilation

in the effect that the EU's institutional design has on mission performance, irrespective of where a mission is carried out. The one exception to this rule was variation in the degree to which Brussels micromanaged its two missions: Respondents in EUPOL Afghanistan consistently complained of massive interferences in mission management. This affected EULEX Kosovo to lesser degree. In explaining this variance in micromanagement, I suggest an additional hypothesis on leadership, a category that was not part of the original analytical framework.

Planning

In peacebuilding, there is always a critical window of opportunity at the beginning of any intervention or a new actor's arrival. The first indicator of good performance in peacebuilding planning is thus whether institutional designs enable peacebuilders to get 'boots on the ground' quickly and effectively. Table 7.2 summarizes the four case studies with respect to each mission's institutional design and the observed performance implications. After explaining the table in more detail, I suggest a concluding hypothesis.

Table 7.2 Comparison of institutional designs and performance during planning

Mission	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
OSCE	Bottom-up, incremental planning	Fast and flexible mission installation, responsive to local preferences	High
EULEX	Top-down, synoptic planning	Slow launch of operations (1.5 years), replanning necessary	Poor
Germany	Bottom-up, incremental planning	Fast and flexible mission installation, responsive to local preferences	High
EUPOL	Top-down, synoptic planning	Slow launch of operations (two to three years), several phases of replanning	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

While both EU missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo had difficulties in launching their operations, Germany and the OSCE mission were much faster. The OSCE mission in Kosovo, in particular, already began working on police reform even as the overall peacebuilding strategy was still being negotiated (Sect. 3.3). Dealing with hands-on operational questions first—such as identifying local partners, clarifying their demands, looking for training facilities, and so on—allowed OSCE mission managers to rapidly launch operations. Such an incremental approach to planning does not mean that a long-term strategy is impossible. However, the priorities are adjusted to the context: Boots on the ground for visible peacebuilding outputs first, strategy development next. Germany pursued a similar approach of developing first a hands-on police reform strategy jointly with Afghan representative, which also raised the acceptance by local police officials (Sect. 5.3).

This incremental approach to planning is diametrically opposed to that of the EU (Sects. 4.3 and 6.2). In the EU's External Action Service, a synoptic culture of strategic planning prevails that entails a cascade of documents, including, among others, an overall crisis management concept, the mandate, a concept of operations, and the operational plan. This top-down planning culture emphasizes intelligence gathering from the field to be sure (in Kosovo, an entire planning team mission was present before EULEX was launched); however, in both missions planning of the procedural details of police reform began only *after* the mission

became operational. Whatever plans or ideas existed prior to establishing the EU mission in both cases required significant adjustments due to short-term changes in the local political context or in partners' preferences. It is understandable that the EU relies on a synoptic planning culture, taking into consideration that CSDP missions must be coordinated within the whole EU system, in particular with relevant EU Commission departments. However, evidence gathered here suggests that the drawbacks on mission deployment outweigh potential advantages in internal consistency. Instead, aligning the EU's policy instruments is something that should best be done by actors on the ground, that is, the leadership of crisis management missions and the EU delegation offices. This implies, of course, a certain degree of autonomy in implementation, as the next section puts forth.

A second advantage of the planning approach taken by the OSCE in Kosovo was that the OSCE Permanent Council waited for two to three months after deploying its new mission in Kosovo until it adopted a mission budget. This allowed the mission to supplement its incremental mission deployment with a more strategic, long-term plan and come up with realistic budget figures that reflected both actual needs on the ground and its main partner's (the UN mission) overall police reform assistance strategy. All other missions had to work on the basis of a politically predetermined budget. In the case of Germany and EUPOL Afghanistan, available resources remained far behind the actual needs on the ground. In the German case, this was the most important reason for subsequent performance deficits. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, resources matched the task at hand. However, as has been mentioned, this did not help the fact that the top-down planning process had been largely blind to local preferences.

H1: Incremental, bottom-up planning processes at the same time allow being responsive to local preferences and rapidly launching operations. Both are important factors for a mission's credibility and local acceptance. Centralized and synoptic planning processes, by contrast, are cumbersome and risk missing the political context in crisis countries.

Implementation

Peacebuilding takes place in a highly fluid and politically dynamic environment. Although a certain level of stability and a peace agreement usually

are prerequisites for any peace operation, things can change quickly when warring parties take up arms again or when new peacebuilding actors enter the scene. This is why the second performance indicator assessed whether peace operations are able to cooperate with their partners and adjust to their changing preferences or other political dynamics (IPI 2012; Jones 2002; Natsios 2010). Table 7.3 summarizes the four case studies with respect to each mission's institutional design and the observed performance implications. Other than in planning, the two EU missions did not perform similarly. Rather than attributing this to the context, I suggest that differences in leadership among the two missions are the chief reason. This is something not accounted for in the analytical framework. This section on implementation thus contains two hypotheses: one on implementation and one on leadership.

Again, the four case studies reveal that the institutional designs of the two EU missions differed from those of the other two organizations, and had similar effects on the performance of the EU missions, despite different context constellations. In terms of design, Brussels is part of the daily

Table 7.3 Comparison of institutional designs and performance during implementation

Mission	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
OSCE	Decentralized, flexible budget systems, autonomous leadership	Flexible, successful adjustment to political context and partner preferences	High
EULEX	Centralized decision-making competencies, autonomous leadership	Cumbersome and bureaucratic, failure to adjust to local preferences, effective cooperation with international partners	Intermediate
Germany	Decentralized, flexible budget systems, separated leadership	Flexible, successful adjustment to political context, failure to coordinate international community	Intermediate
EUPOL	Centralized decision-making competencies, lack of leadership	Cumbersome and bureaucratic, failure to adjust to local preferences, failure to cooperate with international partners	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

management of EU police reform. Mission staff have to seek headquarters' approval whenever unforeseen operative developments arise—something that happens frequently. Because 28 member states consult on such questions, decisions take a long time. On the ground, time is always critical and most decisions need to be immediate or near immediate to have effect. In Afghanistan, the EU's centralized decision-making system jeopardized collaborative actions and prevented EUPOL from keeping pace with decision-making by its (military) partners (Sect. 6.3). This was not just about transaction costs, such as the time that passed between requests for guidance being sent to Brussels and a response arriving in Kabul. Instead, political motives not linked to police reform in Afghanistan led to decisions that, at times, obstructed mandate implementation. Given this unwieldy form of micromanagement, EUPOL soon acquired a reputation as being slow and unreliable (less so EULEX, see next conclusion). Such points of criticism did not apply to the OSCE and Germany (Sects. 3.4 and 5.4). Because their managers, by contrast, were vested with significant decision-making leeway and management autonomy; field officers in both these missions were sufficiently free to engage in cooperative agreements and to interpret their mandates along their own conception of what was required by their local and international partners.

A second, recurring problem concerned the bureaucratic complexity of peacebuilding organizations. Again, both EU operations revealed shortcomings. EU crisis management missions are based on an idiosyncratic and path-dependent system that reflects the EU's dual nature as both a supranational and intergovernmental organization. While the EU Commission maintains exclusive authority over some policy portfolios, this is not the case with respect to the Union's foreign and security policy. Instead, the EU Council and its bureaucracy (since 2011 the EU External Action Service) oversee and guide the implementation of crisis management missions. The EU Commission nonetheless remains in charge of overseeing the implementation of the budget and its adherence to the EU's financial rules and regulations. The EU has not yet developed financial rules matching the operational demands of crisis management missions. Instead, missions' are treated similar to any project the Commission has tendered and contracted out to an implementing partner. In this case, the head of mission is the implementing partner (legally, the head of mission *is* the mission). Although the Commission showed some flexibility in deploying financial staff alongside the EU mission in Kosovo (Sect. 4.4), this system is still notoriously complex and slow. For example, EUPOL

Afghanistan regularly failed to spend project funds within the budgetary year because the EU's ambitious procurement rules were inconceivable with the complex environment of Afghanistan (Sect. 6.3).

By contrast, the German police reform project benefited from the absence of a similarly restrictive accountability framework. After a few years, the German development agency GIZ even established a police implementation unit devoted to assisting the police mission with infrastructure projects (Sect. 5.4). And in the case of the OSCE, there was an integrated resource management system in each mission. Decisions with budgetary impact, such as contracts and equipment procurements, were taken jointly by administrative and operative managers. In addition, a culture of the 'primacy of the political' ensured that restrictive financial rules could be bypassed in case of operational demand. In addition to not hamstringing implementation, the OSCE's smooth financial management attracted external budgetary contributions from other, mainly bilateral donors in Kosovo. They increasingly began using the OSCE mission as a platform through which their own funds for police reform could be processed. In addition to upgrading the work of the mission, this tremendously helped to enhance overall project coordination of police reform support in Kosovo (see Sect. 3.4). The example is truly best practice given that agency coordination is a major challenge for peacebuilding work carried out in any crisis context.

H2: Mandate implementation by decentralized and autonomous peace operations enhances mission flexibility and adjustability, including missions' ability to respond to local partners' preferences. This furthers acceptance and credibility among partners. Centralized and highly regulated peacebuilding systems, by contrast, fail to adjust to the complex and politically dynamic environment of peacebuilding.

Leadership has not been a separate indicator for positive performance in peacebuilding. Although this has not constituted a separate analytical category, leadership repeatedly appeared as an important performance determinant in police reform by the EU, OSCE, and Germany in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Three examples illustrate this point.

First, although structures and processes in EU crisis management provide the EU Council with ample opportunities to micromanage missions on a continuous basis, comparison reveals that this happened to varying degrees in Kosovo and Afghanistan. EULEX's mandate implementation

was never micromanaged to the same extent as that of EUPOL Afghanistan. Compared to their counterparts in Afghanistan, interviewees in Kosovo did not complain about micromanagement on a daily basis.[1] Arguably, the kind of leadership provided by the head of missions—either senior diplomats or high-ranking military officers—serves as an explanation here. For example, with his Kosovo expertise and contacts with local diplomats, EULEX's first head of mission, Yves de Kermabon (previously head of NATO's Kosovo force KFOR), managed to attain more latitude from Brussels, where Javier Solana—previously Secretary General at NATO—was the leading bureaucrat at the time. Micromanagement and decision-making delays in operational procedures, as reported from EUPOL, consequently did not affect EULEX to the same degree (Sect. 4.4).

The consequences of lacking leadership becomes clear when considering the first few years of EUPOL Afghanistan and the problems head of missions there—exclusively police officers with mostly limited experience in crisis management—had circumventing the diplomatic minefield both in Brussels and in Afghanistan (Sects. 6.2 and 6.3). Specifically, it is questionable whether police officers with only limited previous exposure to international crisis management make for the best head of missions. This does not necessarily have to do with their skill set as police officers or mission leaders per se. But a lack of experience in diplomacy is problematic in a multilateral context beset with politicized pitfalls. Many police officers interviewed for this study showed little appreciation for the need to sometimes consider political sensitivities instead of addressing a problem outspokenly and frankly. It is possible to develop such peacebuilding skills over time. However, in the case of the two EU missions and of Germany, police reform mission leadership rotated regularly, usually every year.

Second, the frequent rotation of senior staff is generally associated to a tremendous loss of information. In the two EU missions, even senior managers rarely have the opportunity to properly handover to their successor. In the German case, overlaps between senior managers were envisaged. Yet, the frequent staff rotation still implies that personal relations must be established anew and that there is a certain discontinuity in leadership. A frequently observable pattern is that senior managers who stay in mission for one year foster smaller pet-projects they can successfully complete in their term, which is at the expense of consistent strategy implementation. By contrast, the head of the OSCE police reform portfolio, US police expert Steve Bennett, led his department for seven consecutive years. Such a long time on the ground enabled him to develop a strong

diplomatic record and a broad network that opened many doors, both locally and among international partners (Sect. 3.4). OSCE Kosovo was the only truly well-performing mission in the sample. While I am not suggesting that leadership is the sole reason, individual leadership strength and a sound diplomatic skill set must be considered relevant indicators for peacebuilding performance.

Finally, a structural problem prevented effective leadership in the case of Germany. As outlined in Sect. 5.4, the government followed the German *Ressortprinzip* and spilt the police reform mandate along traditional jurisdictions in the German governmental system: The Ministry of Interior is responsible for overseeing the police and thus was in charge for the actual police project in Kabul. The German Foreign Office is in charge of international relations and thus for coordinating the German police support with Germany's partners in Afghanistan. On the ground, this division of labor continued with the police project office, on the one hand, and the German embassy, on the other hand, which received a special ambassador for police reform coordination. Without one leader for the whole project, however, Germany never managed to provide an overall reform strategy for the Afghan police that other partners could align to. Instead, the first years of police reform in Afghanistan were characterized by selective and incoherent reform measures by individual states, not following a general strategy.

H3: Skillful and experienced leadership furthers mission autonomy and continuity. In particular, strong heads of mission can counterbalance member state micromanagement. This facilitates, in line with the previous hypothesis, mission flexibility and cooperation. A lack of leadership, by contrast, leads to knowledge losses, discontinuity, and lack of strategy in mandate implementation.

Review

Peacebuilding outcomes critically depend on effective review processes. From the perspective of process performance, it is vital that processes and structures are in place that effectively connect peacebuilders in the field with political decision-makers, in order to facilitate strategy adjustments when and if needed (Meharg 2009; OSCE 2007; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). Review processes and evaluation are also principal elements for organizational learning, which facilitates, in turn, improvements

to the mid- and long-term performance of peace operations (Benner et al. 2011). While the case studies confirmed these postulates, they also found that strategy review is a double-edged sword: Review processes ought to provide valuable assessment but the case studies demonstrate that they primarily provide opportunities for politicization. Table 7.4 summarizes the four case studies with respect to each mission's institutional design and the observed performance implications. After explaining the table in more detail, I suggest a concluding hypothesis.

Evidence of the dual-edged dynamic of mandate review was found in all three cases that involved international organizations. In particular, the EU case studies demonstrate that member states often attempt to manipulate review processes to confirm their preexisting policy positions, or they use their veto in review processes as a bargaining chip to influence negotiations for different policy dossiers. France, for example, vetoed a EUPOL Afghanistan review process to gain Germany's concession to a new mission in Mali in 2012 (Sect. 6.4). In Kosovo, some member states were only interested in solving the crisis in North Kosovo, others rejected EULEX altogether. These internal inconsistencies prevented constructive discussions about the mission's effectiveness and EULEX could never appear as a unitary political player in Kosovo (Sect. 4.5). Overall, EU member

Table 7.4 Comparison of institutional designs and performance during review

Mission	*Institutional design*	*Indicator*	*Performance*
OSCE	Decentralized annual strategy review	Politicization of mandate implementation only when political conflict high	Intermediate
EULEX	Highly centralized annual mandate review	Continuous politicization of mandate implementation, clash of political and operational rationalities	Poor
Germany	No strategic center, no formalized strategy review	No strategy adjustments despite mission failure	Poor
EUPOL	Highly centralized annual mandate review	Continuous politicization of mandate implementation, clash of political and operational rationalities	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

states' geopolitical rationalities obstruct their peace operations' work on a regular basis.

There is one key difference between the two EU cases and the OSCE, however. Because of the centralized design and the tight entanglement between operational mission management and Council decision-making, EU peace operations are *continuously* politicized. Even minor operational decisions can suddenly become subject to diplomatic package deals, depending on the politics of the day, whereas in the case of the OSCE mission, member states have far fewer opportunities to influence operational decision-making. Apart from influencing a head of mission through their embassies on the ground, the only internal entry point for OSCE member states is the annual budgetary process. This raises the bar to enact geopolitical strategies. As the OSCE Kosovo case study showed (Sect. 3.5), major political tensions between Russia and the USA were necessary to provoke a politicization of the budget process. In the EU, centralized decision-making and review processes mean that the threshold is much lower.

Here, the German case differs fundamentally from the international organizations. Political decision-making in a nation-state does not involve the same kind of committee negotiations. Although this could be an advantage, the case study revealed that Germany still lacked an effective strategy review mechanism for two reasons (Sect. 5.5). First, and structurally, two ministries oversaw different parts of the German mandate. No joint 'strategic center' was in charge of German police reform assistance. During planning, resources were distributed among ministries on (party) political considerations rather than strategically allocated to areas of need. Likewise, during review, no single actor voiced warnings about the looming failure of the program. Second, and arguably, a joint responsible strategic center could have surmounted the challenge of political disinterest in the Afghanistan dossier at the time. Without such lobbyism, necessary adjustments were only taken after Afghanistan had become an issue in German elections around 2009 and thus climbed up the federal political agenda.

Although Berlin reacted late, the German government eventually adjusted its Afghanistan strategy when political costs rose. But international organizations lack such easy adaptability. When and if major strategy shifts are necessary, several member states need to agree. And because negotiations among several member states have their own dynamic, they sometimes result in decisions that make little sense from an operative

perspective or even contradict mission objectives. While for Germany the question of strategy adjustment was one of political will, strategy adjustments in international organizations depend on complex political processes that bear a high risk of unintended consequences. Arguably, this is what the designers of the decentralized OSCE system considered, recognizing the political gulf running through the organization. Also arguably, designers of the EU crisis management system saw the EU as a like-minded club and deemed such institutional precautions unnecessary. The findings of this study suggest they were wrong.

With respect to effective review processes, none of the four case studies displayed high performance in mandate review. In Germany, the lack of a joint strategic center and the lack of political will were the chief reasons. Theoretically, there is little to gain from this case. If a government is not interested in effective peace operations, even well designed review can have little impact. The outlook is more promising regarding international organizations. Often member states delegate peacebuilding tasks to the international level because they lack either will or resources to carry out such tasks alone. Then the question of review becomes much more relevant. Decentralized systems with limited review opportunities appear more resilient to geopolitics, but only as long as member state conflict on a mission remains at least on a moderate level.

H4: Strategy review processes in international organizations facilitate politicization and between geopolitical rationalities and mission objectives. This has dysfunctional effects for mandate implementation, such as arbitrary operational decisions. Decentralized systems appear more resilient to geopolitics, albeit never fully.

Summary: Variation in Institutional Designs and the Impact on Performance

Table 7.5 shows that variation in institutional designs affected mission performance differently. Germany and the OSCE mission with their decentralized and incremental institutional systems performed rather well with respect to the three indicators. By contrast, the EU system is highly centralized and synoptic, which links to poor performance both in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Remaining differences in performance during implementation could be attributed to the lack of leadership in the case

Table 7.5 Summary: comparison of institutional designs and performance across all missions

Mission	*Institutional design*	*Planning*	*Implementation*	*Review*
OSCE	Decentralized, incremental, long-term leadership	High	High	Intermediate
EULEX	Centralized, synoptic, autonomous leadership	Poor	Intermediate	Poor
Germany	Decentralized, incremental, lack of leadership	High	Intermediate	Poor
EUPOL	Centralized, synoptic, lack of leadership	Poor	Poor	Poor

Source: Author's compilation

of EUPOL Afghanistan. Overall, thus, only the OSCE mission performed well. Both EU missions performed consistently poorly, while Germany sits in between.

There is a systematic pattern in the linkages between institutional designs and performance as outlined in Table 7.5. Overall, the decentralized systems by Germany and the OSCE, with bottom-up and incremental planning, perform better than the centralized system offered by the EU. This is not something that can be attributed to the peacebuilding context, as both EU missions operated in highly different environments. This finding confirms previous studies in public administration and public management (Matland 1995; Perrow 1970). Conflict-prone policies require creative adjustments to ambiguous environments and are better implemented by decentralized units on the basis of flexible rules.

However, this overlooks one inherent tension. Even decentralized policy implementation from time to time requires review by political masters. Without such linkages, as the case of the decentralized German system shows, urgently required policy adjustments cannot be taken. In the EU's centralized systems, by contrast, member states were continuously able to influence missions. Yet, instead of ensuring that missions reach their original objective, some member states repeatedly defected along their respective geopolitical interests. As a conclusion, I assert that *there is an inherent tension between functional decentralization to improve performance, on the one hand, and a need to ensure that politicians (are compelled to) address policy failure, on the other hand*. Increasing the degree of functional decen-

tralization, as comparison of the OSCE and the two EU cases demonstrates, to some extent can reconcile this tension. But when member state conflict escalates, such as in the OSCE after Kosovo's independence, performance suffers no matter how autonomously missions are designed.

7.2 Mission Performance and the Explanation of Police Reform in Afghanistan and Kosovo

What explains the outcome of police reform in Kosovo and Afghanistan? Each chapter in this book has concluded by reflecting, in a counterfactual manner, on the causal process linking institutional designs, process performance, and police reform outcomes. Looking at it from a macro perspective, only the case of EULEX Kosovo constitutes a 'puzzle' per se. The cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo present least-likely and most-likely scenarios, respectively, for successful peacebuilding work. The poor performance of Germany and the EU mission EUPOL in inaccessible Afghanistan therefore is rather intuitive. And so is the positive performance of the OSCE in accessible Kosovo. EULEX Kosovo, by contrast, performed poorly despite the ostensibly ideal peacebuilding environment. This is counterintuitive and it will be particularly relevant to see how this affected the outcome of police reform support. Beginning with the two Afghanistan missions, this section first reviews the performance-outcome linkage of all four missions.

The German Police Project Office in Afghanistan

The German Police Project in Afghanistan discussed in Chap. 5 operated in a highly demanding environment. Although the country was still largely peaceful when German police officers set foot on Kabul's soil, the German project was greatly outmatched by the scope of the challenge it faced. The miniscule police reform project with its maximum of 40 officers and its 12 Mio Euro budget was fast in deployment and flexible in implementation, but had only limited impact on overall police reform. Moreover, Germany failed to implement the second part of its mandate, namely, the coordination of other actors. Although police officers and diplomats knew the reasons for their failure—resource shortages kept the project from leading by example, to name just one—the project's strategy review phase was ineffective. By 2006, the end of the lead-nation strategy to peacebuilding

in Afghanistan, the Afghan national police force was far from operational, vested with corruption, and lacking institutional coherence and integrity.

Although shortcomings in the design of the German project were partly to blame, the lack of effective reform could also be attributed to the international community's overall 'light footprint' approach to peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Few of Afghanistan's international partners followed-up on their initial peacebuilding pledges in the first few years. With this general failure in assistance and the country's status as a least-likely case for successful police reform, the macro-level view on police reform outcomes in Afghanistan is hardly surprising. And though it remains debatable whether even a successful police reform project could have prevented the return of the Taliban in 2005/06, the point is that Germany and its international partners failed to seize upon the critical window of opportunity for more and better police reform assistance. This is not only a question of mission performance, but even more so of peacebuilding resources and political will. It is unsurprising, thus, that the rather positively performing German mission had no better impact on police reform (Sect. 5.6).

The EU Mission EUPOL in Afghanistan

By the time EUPOL arrived in Afghanistan to replace the German project with more resources, the tide in Afghanistan had turned dramatically (Chap. 6). With the resurgence of the Taliban, Afghan and coalition forces were increasingly entangled in open war. For the USA, the Afghan police had become a line of first defense in its counterinsurgency strategy. In such a context, space for successful civilian police reform work was limited from the outset. However, with up to 400 staff and a 450 Mio Euro budget between 2007 and 2014, EUPOL was by no means insignificant. Despite a major surge in police training capacities under the auspices of the US military and NATO, EUPOL still had space to act. US policy-makers welcomed an effective civilian counterbalance to their own militarized police training.

However, EUPOL failed thoroughly in filling this gap. At first, a combination of complex bureaucracy, security risks and difficulties with mission leadership meant that the mission's starting phase protracted over more than two years. At the same time and thereafter, the EU's centralized decision-making system jeopardized collaborative actions and prevented EUPOL from keeping pace with decision-making by its (military) partners in Afghanistan. Struggling with its poor reputation and failing to

carve out a niche for itself, EUPOL left little imprint on the Afghan police. This is a profoundly embarrassing result for EU crisis management, but because Afghanistan had presented the least-likely for success scenario, the outcome is intuitive at the same time (Sect. 6.5).

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Turning to OSCE's police reform mission in Kosovo, we find a case that a priori was much more conducive to effective peacebuilding (Chap. 3). Kosovo is small, its population relatively well-educated, it had experienced functional statehood before, and conflict-related violence had remained limited. In this operational context, there were few external impediments for the performance of the OSCE mission. Accordingly, the analysis revealed a medium-sized and effective mission of around 150–200 staff. Internally, the organization's structures and organizational rules facilitated performance for several reasons. First, bottom-up planning enabled the mission to launch operations rapidly. Second, a decentralized structure afforded mission executives the flexibility to autonomously decide operational matters and adjust to the police reform needs of the day. Third, because of its flexible and unbureaucratic financial framework, the OSCE mission became a financial hub for other donors working to support the reform of the Kosovo police. This enabled the coordination of bi- and multilateral assistance, including with the UN mission in Kosovo. Both the external context, the successful collaboration with the UN, and the OSCE mission's good performance thus produced positive assessments of the state of the Kosovo police around the time the EU arrived to replace the previous setting of international assistance (Sect. 3.6).

The EU Mission EULEX in Kosovo

Nonetheless, the task of police reform in Kosovo had hardly become easier by the time EULEX Kosovo arrived (Chap. 4). The OSCE mission had satisfied the initial training demand, but daunting tasks remained, including the need to strengthen the police's institutional integrity, improve collaboration with the legal sector more generally, counterbalance politicization, and fight corruption. As the EU's largest-ever peace operation—with over 2500 staff and a budget of more than 1 billion Euro until 2015—EULEX seemed well-equipped to meet these challenges. Yet the picture drawn by policy experts and the media of the situation in Kosovo today is close to a disaster. A report

by the EU's Court of Auditors (2012, para. 29) found that 'EU assistance to the police audited by the Court did not lead to significant improvements.' Likewise, *The Guardian* (05 November 2014) reported in 2014 that '[d]uring Eulex's six-year tenure … corruption and organised crime in the political system since independence in 2008 has worsened.' There are cases of alleged corruption against EULEX judges (Jacqué 2015) and withering critique of the mission's work published by a former official who was associated to the EU until 2011 (Capussela 2015). Overall, observers agree that the EU's flagship mission did not deliver as expected.

This result cannot be explained by existing theories alone that link peacebuilding outcomes to resource investments (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; see also Chap. 2). Other explanations pertaining to local politics and the task of police reform as such could also be ruled out (Sect. 4.6). Instead, we must turn to institutional designs for an explanation. Specifically, this book argues that the EU's centralized and highly regulated institutional design and management processes were the chief causes of EULEX's poor performance. First, complex bureaucratic rules slowed down mission establishment and caused red tape within the mission's administration. Second, EULEX was not (only) managed by those actually on the ground in Pristina. Instead, as one interviewee put it, 'the EU conducts crisis management by committees.'[2] Similar to EUPOL, this caused member states' political rationalities to obstruct the mission's work on a regular basis. Overall, the mission's centralized design hamstrung mission management and prevented those working in the field from using the mission's significant resources in a way that matched the political context.

Summary: Peace Operations' Process Performance and Peacebuilding Outcomes

The four case studies examined in this book can be summarized at two levels. On the organizational level, the analysis reveals institutional design factors that either negatively or positively affected mission performance. The effect was predominantly positive in the case of the OSCE mission, slightly more balanced in the case of Germany, and predominantly negative in the case of the two EU missions (see Table 7.5). By means of causal process tracing, each case study has demonstrated how these institutional design factors affected performance and contributed to the outcome of police reform.

Looking at this from a macro perspective, as summarized by Table 7.6, only the case of EULEX Kosovo is particularly puzzling. First, limited performance by the two missions in Afghanistan is not particularly striking given the plethora of unfavorable conditions there. The positive interim conclusion at the end of the OSCE mission in Kosovo is similarly in line with the favorable constellation of conditions there. Only EULEX Kosovo contradicts the trend: The mission performed poorly despite its positive context. Its influence on police reform support was high, as the mission was the only significant international actor to provide international assistance.

This combination of factors indicates that the performance of peace operations can have an independent causal effect on the outcome of peacebuilding work, at least regarding international assistance to institution-building. In situations in which all external conditions are

Table 7.6 Determinants of police reform outcomes in Afghanistan and Kosovo

Context	*Mission*	*Performance*	*Outcome*
Kosovo (most-likely)	OSCE 1999–2008	Positive	'[T]he Kosovo Police Service was an example of a successful campaign by the international community to create a multiethnic and gender-inclusive police force in a polarized, post-conflict state' (Bennet et al. 2011)
	EULEX since 2008	Weak	'During Eulex's six-year tenure (…) corruption and organised crime in the political system since independence in 2008 has worsened'(The Guardian, 05 November 2014)
Afghanistan (least-likely)	Germany 2001–2007	Intermediate	'[The Afghan police is] in disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of national police infrastructure' (McCaffrey 2006)
	EUPOL since 2007	Weak	'[T]he ability of the [Afghan security forces] to maintain security throughout the country, especially in rural areas, remains weak' (The Asia Foundation, 2014)

Source: Author's compilation

ostensibly ideal, internal performance deficits can still prevent missions from having any meaningful impact on police reform outcomes. This implies that *poor process performance can become a sufficient condition for peacebuilding failure;* assuming, of course, that only one actor is responsible for (coordinating) international peacebuilding assistance and that without external assistance local institutions cannot thrive.[3]

But what about the reverse argument? Can positive performance become a sufficient condition for peacebuilding success—possibly even in unconducive situations? Unfortunately, none of the cases studied here constituted a scenario in which a mission's positive performance outweighed a problematic operational context. Such a scenario would have been helpful to critically evaluate my findings. However, it might help to reflect hypothetically upon the effect a positively performing organization, such as the OSCE, might have had in a difficult context such as Afghanistan. With all other factors being equal, we must first assume that an OSCE mission in Afghanistan would still have been limited in its impact given the international community's overall light footprint approach to Afghan peacebuilding. Even with several contributors pooling resources, it is unreasonable to expect that such a mission would have had much more than 200 staff at the outset. This is more than Germany was able to provide, but it still constitutes a drop in the bucket of Afghanistan's actual resource requirements. However, with its hands-on culture of planning and the flexible nature of operational decision-making at the level of portfolio managers, an OSCE mission would have been much more capable of attuning itself to strategy shifts by bilateral donors, such as the US government. Like Germany, a financially limited OSCE mission would not have been able to 'lead by example,' but it could have at least become an effective coordination hub for police reform.

Overall, then, with respect to mission planning and implementation, there are few doubts that OSCE-led police reform in Afghanistan would have produced better results. However, consideration of member state politics in the Permanent Council impairs this conclusion. Russia certainly shared an interest in a stable Afghanistan, but the years following the US intervention in Afghanistan saw deteriorating relations between Russia and most Western governments. As with the divisive effect of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence on the Permanent Council, it is possible

that such geopolitical frictions would have eventually also obstructed the implementation of an OSCE mission in Afghanistan.

Reflecting on the relative relevance of organizational performance on peacebuilding outcomes provides two conclusions. On the one hand, poor mission performance can undermine peacebuilding success even in situations where all other factors are conducive and a mission has a high influence on local police reform. On the other hand, and by contrast, performance is not the only factor relevant to peacebuilding success. When looking at those who come to assist (member state) governments' political will to equip missions adequately and provide political support is certainly decisive. Yet peacebuilding executives rarely operate with this kind of political backing; quite the opposite. The decision to deploy a peace operation in many cases expresses the maximum of political willingness. After that, conflict states rarely remain a political priority for long. As soon as geopolitical priorities change, there is even the risk that individual missions will fall victim to geopolitical tensions or diplomatic package deals. Far from taking away from the significance of mission performance, this fact makes it all the more important that one get at least the management right and attune peace operations to the limitations they face, both with respect to their own political principals and the contexts in which they have to operate.

Notes

1. Interview No. 032/K, 16 November 2011, 012/K, 17 November 2011, 027/B, 27 April 2012.
2. Interview with EULEX official (Interview No. 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012).
3. This assumption is at the core of liberal peacebuilding as pursued by major peacebuilding organizations, such as the EU und UN, since the end of the Cold War. There is, of course, a major debate about the validity of this assumption and, in consequence, about the kind of peace support that should be carried out by the international community (Chandler 2006; Richmond 2014). While the author is not uncritical, the purpose of this book did not specifically apply to this kind of discussion. It might be noted though that any kind of substantial external assistance to crisis situations, irrespective its objective, must necessarily be carried out by bureaucratic organizations and thus benefits from the findings discussed here.

References

Benner, T., Mergenthaler, S., & Rotmann, P. (2011). *The new world of UN peace operations: Learning to build peace?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bennet, R., Greene, M., & Friedman, J. (2011). *Building the police service in a security vacuum: International efforts in Kosovo, 1999–2011.* Princeton: Princeton University, Innovations for Successful Societies.

Capussela, A. L. (2015). *State-building in Kosovo: Democracy, corruption and the EU in the Balkans.* London: I.B.Tauris.

Chandler, D. (2006). *Empire in denial: The politics of state-building.* London: Pluto Press.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political Science Review, 94*(4), 779–801.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

European Court of Auditors. (2012). *European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law* (Special report no. 18/2012). Brussels: European Court of Auditors.

Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. *Review of International Organizations, 5*(3), 227–248.

IPI. (2012). *The management handbook for UN field missions.* New York: International Peace Institute.

Jacqué, J.-P. (2015). *Review of the EULEX Kosovo Mission's implementation of its mandate with a particular focus on the handeling of the recent allegations.* Brussels: Council of the European Union.

Jones, B. D. (2002). The challenges of strategic coordination. In S. J. Stedman, D. S. Rothchild, & E. M. Cousens (Eds.), *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements* (pp. 89–116). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 5*(2), 145–174.

McCaffrey, B. R. (2006). Academic report-trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from May 19 through May 26. In Hearing before the Committee on armed services on 28 June 2006 (Ed.), *Status of security and stability in Afghanistan* (pp. 89ff.). Washinton, DC: US Congress, House of Representatives.

Meharg, S. J. (2009). *Measuring what matters in peace operations and crisis management.* Kingston: Queen's University Press.

Natsios, A. (2010). *The clash of the counter-bureaucracy and development.* Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

OSCE. (2007). *OSCE handbook.* Vienna: Press and Public Information Section, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Paffenholz, T., & Reychler, L. (2007). *Aid for peace. A guide to planning and evaluation for conflict zones.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Perrow, C. (1970). *Organizational analysis: A sociological view*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Richmond, O. (2014). *Failed statebuilding: Intervention, the state, and the dynamics of peace formation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

The Asia Foundation. (2014). Afghanistan in. (2014). *A survey of the Afghan People*. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.

The Guardian. (05 November 2014). *EU's biggest foreign mission in turmoil over corruption row* (Online Edition (article by Julian Borger)). London: The Guardian.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

About a decade ago, peace researchers demonstrated that the chances for successful peacebuilding depend critically on the availability of sufficient staff and funding for peacekeeping, conflict work, and development projects. Simply put, the more the resources, the higher the chances for success (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Unfortunately, sufficient resources are rarely, if ever, available. Instead, when planning a peace operation and implementing its mandate, peacebuilding executives manage shortage and work with imperfection. By unpacking the 'black box' of peace operations, this book provides new insights regarding one of the major tensions in modern peacebuilding: the tension between what peacekeepers *desire* to do and what they *can* do, based on the organizational structures and rules that enable or constrain their actions. Peacebuilding and police reform will always face complex conditions and limited odds, but institutional design and management are perhaps the only things that peacebuilding executives are able to fully control and change. Exploring this insight has been the central objective of this book. Building on 109 expert interviews and empirical research conducted in Kosovo and Afghanistan, I have focused on what is going on—or, more accurately, what is going *wrong*—on the ground. The four case studies were selected to provide a glimpse into the complex causal mechanisms that link institutional designs, mission performance, and peacebuilding outcomes.

This chapter has four objectives. The first section summarizes the key findings of this book as outlined in the comparative Chap. 7. The next section outlines recommendations for the three organizations under scrutiny.

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6_8

In particular, peace operations led by the EU urgently require institutional adjustments to become more effective. The last two sections address how this book's findings can be generalized. There are limitations with respect to the research design underpinning the analysis. After discussing these in the third section, the fourth section elaborates how this book contributes to the literature on peacebuilding and international public administration, respectively.

8.1 Findings of This Book

Peacebuilding missions operate in a political environment, both at headquarters and on the ground. They manage crises. They need to be fast, flexible, adjustable, and at the same time resilient to political interference. These characteristics are nothing traditional public bureaucracies are built to deal with. Instead of dynamic responses, they are designed to deal with routine problems that emerge in known ways (Boin 2005; Wilson 1989). This poses tremendous challenges for bureaucracy both at the domestic and the international levels.

The comparison of the four case studies in police reform in Afghanistan and Kosovo carried out in Chap. 7 informs two key arguments. The first argument pertains to the relevance of peace operations' institutional designs when it comes to explaining peacebuilding outcomes. Comparison of the four missions' performance shows that EU peace operations—characterized by centralization and a high degree of headquarters supervision—perform worse than the two other missions with relatively decentralized and more autonomous operations (Sect. 7.2). Given Afghanistan's status as a least-likely case for successful peacebuilding, explaining the failure of operations in this context is a less compelling 'puzzle' per se. In Kosovo, however, the negative impact of institutional design becomes more clear. As the case of EULEX Kosovo demonstrates, *even when all external conditions are ostensibly ideal, poor organizational design and performance can still prevent meaningful progress in police reform.* Empirical evidence of this book confirms the original assumption that institutional designs and performance are relevant factors for explaining peacebuilding outcomes. Lack of progress in peacebuilding can occur exclusively because of a peace operation's poor performance (sufficient condition). The situation is different when we want to explain peacebuilding success. Here multiple other factors have to be conducive as well. Positive performance can only be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for positive outcomes. Put

differently, while a poorly managed peace operation can spoil peacebuilding processes, well-managed organizations do not automatically guarantee success. But there are ways to raise the odds.

The second argument pertains to the performance of differently designed bureaucracies. The case studies' inductive analysis yielded four hypotheses (Sect. 7.1): Three mechanisms are conducive to better performance: (H1) bottom-up planning enables rapid mission installation; (H2) decentralized implementation enhances flexibility, adjustability, and local ownership; and (H3) leadership furthers mission autonomy, cooperation, and continuity. The fourth mechanism on policy review is less encouraging, stating that (H4) strategy review in international organizations facilitates mission politicization. Overall, the four hypotheses are well in line with existing public administration theory (Chap. 2): Creative policy tasks—such as postconflict crisis management—require creative adjustments to ambiguous environments and are better implemented by decentralized units on the basis of flexible rules (Boin 2005; Matland 1995; Perrow 1970). This finding seems to take sides with the proponents of bottom-up policy implementation (e.g., Lipsky 1980). But there is a second side to the same coin: Even decentralized policy implementation from time to time requires review by political masters. I observed an inherent tension between functional decentralization to improve performance, on the one hand, and a need to ensure that politicians (are compelled to) address policy failure, on the other hand. Because of the differences in the way the two institutional systems are governed, this dilemma played out differently in the national case and the three IO cases.

Domestic public administration literature is traditionally pessimistic about the chances for effective policy review: '[T]he needs of the organization and the people within it conflict with the desire to continuously monitor activities and change policies when they are found wanting' (Wildavsky 1972, p. 509). However, none of this book's case studies identified such prejudices among mission personnel. Quite the contrary, German interviewees consistently argued that effective evaluation instruments (coinciding with a joint evaluating strategic center) could have helped in raising awareness among political masters and improving police reform performance (Sect. 5.5). It is questionable, in the light of this finding, whether Wildavsky's downbeat proposition on evaluation also applies to the implementation of peacebuilding policy by ministerial bureaucracies. Nationally carried peacebuilding might even benefit from more centralization and political surveillance than executed in the German case.

International organizations, by contrast, have complex principals (Lyne et al. 2006). Multiple states simultaneously hold a contract with one agent. To aggregate their political preferences, member states convene in multilateral committees. The political controversies taking place within these committees can become consequential not only when mandates are negotiated (as one could expect) but throughout the whole cycle of planning, implementing, and reviewing mission mandates. A centralized institutional design allows member state diplomats to influence peace operations at any time. For instance in the EU Council, member state delegates convene on the working level on almost daily basis to discuss the EU's field operations. This creates ample opportunities to influence them politically. And member state delegations have manifold reasons to exploit such opportunities. International politics are highly dynamic and individual peace operations rarely remain a political priority for long. As new geopolitical challenges emerge, states reprioritize. EUPOL Afghanistan, for instance, drifted into irrelevance when member states deployed a NATO police reform mission shortly after. In Kosovo, member states instructed EULEX to not trial members of the Kosovo government to avoid backlashes on the EU's regional appeasement policy. States can even use their veto on missions they deem less relevant as bargaining chips vis-à-vis different policy dossiers. This happened when France attempted to establish a new EU mission in Mali. Several such examples are outlined in the EU and OSCE case studies' section on policy implementation and review. They all hampered, in one way or another, missions' attempts to achieve their mandated objectives.

The comparison of the OSCE and EU cases shows that member states' ability to use their influence and vetoes in this way depends on structural and procedural decentralization. The more autonomy an operation has, the less vulnerable it is to being derailed by such political machinations; conversely, less autonomous operations run a higher risk of falling victim to these negotiations. In the OSCE mission, member state interference formally was limited to the annual budget review (see Sect. 3.5). In the case of the EU, member states review their missions constantly; almost on daily basis (see Sects. 4.5 and 6.4). I conclude that *the performance of bureaucracies mandated to implement creative policy tasks in ambiguous environments varies depending on whether higher numbers of principals coincide with functional decentralization*. Functional decentralization refers to decision-making competencies, the density of institutionalized rules imposed by the principal, such as reporting schemes, as well as the

installation of proficient leadership. That being said, there is still the need to ensure effective policy review. Finding institutional designs that enable effective review while still maintaining a high degree of functional decentralization should be high on the agenda of future research on international public administration.

8.2 Managing to Improve: The Future Shape of Peace Operations

The findings outlined above have implications for the institutional design of the three organizations studied in this book. Summarizing those in the sense of policy recommendations (see Table 8.1) is the objective of subsequent three paragraphs

Recommendations for the OSCE The OSCE should maintain the existing design of peace operations as applied in the Kosovo mission. The OSCE's hands-on planning, the decentralized allocation of management competencies, and the flexible and relatively unbureaucratic financial framework were all factors that contributed to success in Kosovo. However, this flexible character is at risk. Interviewees reported that the OSCE's

Table 8.1 Summary of recommendations for police reform organizations

Organization	*Recommendation*
OSCE	R1: Maintain decentralized and flexible character
	R2: OSCE management reforms have role model implications for other organizations
EU	R3: Crisis management by committees is failed model; upgrade competencies of head of missions instead
	R4: Experienced conflict experts should lead missions even if they have a technical mandate
	R5: Develop separate financial management system for CSDP missions
	R6: Bottom-up planning to enhance rapid launch of operations
Germany	R7: Work toward a culture of strategic management to bridge policy review gap
	R8: Unite diplomatic and police reform functions under one organizational roof (PRT model)
	R9: Explore ways how to enhance political costs in case of peacebuilding failure

Source: Author's compilation

loose financial rules have led to cases of fraud and financial misappropriation.[1] In response, the OSCE began tightening its system of financial regulations. It is unclear whether internal policies such as the 'primacy of the political' and instruments for financial flexibility such as the 'exception report' are still operable in the organization's most recent missions. In addition, it is noticeable that, compared to the EU, there appears to have been significant management professionalization in the OSCE. New project management systems and evaluation concepts have been established in recent years (OSCE 2011b), aimed at enhancing the organization's effectiveness. In addition, every interviewee addressed during the research for this book was able to respond on questions about the OSCE's competitive advantage. This all seems to be propelled by the OSCE's institutional environment, which has been marked by growing competition with other security organizations such as NATO and the EU: 'Western countries which set the agenda have deliberately given up the spheres of competence of the Organization to NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe, thus marginalizing the OSCE' (Milinkovic 2004, p. 201). This kind of competition could constitute an effective driver for organizational change, which might, in turn, be of relevance for policy-makers elsewhere.

Recommendations for the EU: With respect to the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, this book's findings speak to the urgent need to initiate a process of organizational review and reform. There is currently little hope for effective peacebuilding work in *any* of the EU's missions. The interviewees addressed for this book were unsure which missions to name when asked about success cases.[2] There are certainly more ingredients in successful peacebuilding than organizational performance alone, but the latitude of the problems outlined in the above chapters is immense and requires action.

First, the most important recommendation concerns the high degree of institutional entanglements between mission and member state representations in the EU Council. 'Crisis management by committees' is a failed model. Instead, member states should recognize that political quarrels constitute a significant source of performance failure. If they intend their peace operations to have any impact in future scenarios, they should significantly upgrade the competencies of heads of missions and provide them with sufficient latitude to actually lead. At the moment, there seems little

likelihood of successful mission performance without a strong and coherent political will among member states. Confirming this, Keohane (2011, p. 202) notes that 'EU operations have been most effective when there has been a clear convergence of Member State interests.' In the absence of such a convergence, member states should bolster mission autonomy.

Second and related, the selection of senior managers and mission leadership in particular is critical. Although having an experienced police officer leading an EU crisis management mission has its merits (mostly due to improved communication with local police officials), a lack of experience on diplomatic terrain can undermine mandate objectives. Internationally experienced police officers do exist, but they are scarce. Instead, having a diplomat or conflict expert lead a mission, such as in the UN or OSCE, constitutes a viable alternative. This also reduces the need to rotate missions' senior staff every 12 months, as with seconded police officers. More recent choices regarding EULEX Kosovo leadership, with diplomats now leading the mission, indicates such a learning process.

Third, the EU Council and Commission need to work toward a financial management system that fits the task at hand. The current practice of having mission expenditures exceeding 10,000 Euro cleared by financial staff in Brussels prior to spending (an ex ante regime) prevents rapid decisions.[3] In addition, procurement rules and the demand for several quotations for individual purchases further delays project work. Mission budgets are structured along five categories: personnel (contracts, allowances for seconded staff), mission (travel costs, per diems), running costs (office supplies, maintenance), capital costs (larger investments, cars), and representation (receptions, flags, etc.).[4] The OSCE, by contrast, works with a project-based budget that links to operational planning. Such an approach could help the EU to better link budget figures with police reform activities.

Finally, and related to this, the EU should learn from the OSCE's bottom-up planning. The failure to launch police reform upfront work was a major shortcoming both in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Bottom-up planning means that actual police reform tasks are given priority over the development of a long-term crisis management strategy. Again, project-based budgeting constitutes a viable strategy to get there.

Recommendations for Germany: Germany is not a peacebuilding organization. It is likely that projects such as the one in Afghanistan will

remain the exception rather than the rule. However, with its growing footprint in stabilization and peace support operations (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014), Germany would still do well to learn from its experience in Afghanistan. With respect to institutional designs, there are three main recommendations. These recommendations address the most critical performance deficits, namely, the inability to provide coherent leadership and the inability to adjust failing strategy. The first suggestion concerns the lack of a culture of strategy and strategic planning in German foreign policy. During interviews for this book, Foreign Office officials consistently questioned the utility of strategic management concepts that connect long-term policy objectives (on assistance to police reform) with short-term operations (in Afghanistan). They argued that this would require long-term planning, which was not appropriate given the volatile nature of developments on the ground.[5] Such views seem to reflect a general culture of incrementalism among German federal ministries. In the 1980s, then Minister of Interior Wolfgang Schäuble (who held that position a second time between 2005 and 2009) rejected a request for more strategic planning on foreign police assistance by the German Court of Auditors. He argued that 'defining the objectives of bilateral police assistance, which would allow assessing the adequacy and success of administrative action in this area (…) is not feasible' (Bundesregierung 1989, p. 3).[6] Although findings from the four case studies suggest the value of incremental decision-making for peacebuilding, the lack of a desired end-state for police reform activities in Afghanistan became a problem for assessing the performance of the German police project. Without a strategic plan, it was difficult for German diplomats to come up with compelling arguments forcing the government to increase resources. While a less formalized planning culture would be desirable for the EU, German foreign policy would certainly benefit from a more strategic approach with concisely defined operational goals.

Second, it has been argued that the lack of a joint strategic center hampered the performance of the police reform project. Accordingly, Germany would benefit from a solution allowing a unification of diplomatic and police resources under one organizational roof. At later stages of German Afghanistan policy, more coherent ministerial action was achieved by upgrading the Afghanistan portfolio along the ministerial hierarchy. A government special representative was in charge from 2010

onward. This solution required high levels of political capital and would be difficult to reproduce in similar future scenarios. A more sustainable solution might be the mission model. Similar to the approach taken by the EU and OSCE, Germany could establish separate organizational entities in a crisis country and second diplomats, police officers, and development experts into these structures. A similar model has already been tested in Afghanistan with some success. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were co-led by the German military and a diplomat, and also included development and police experts. There is a general sense among German bureaucrats in all ministries who worked in and on Afghanistan that this model has been successful.

The third recommendation takes up the problem of political will—arguably the critical missing link in upgrading Germany's Afghanistan policy for many years. Here, Germany would be well-advised to consider using review or evaluation instruments that raise political costs early in the event of looming policy failure. In the example of Afghanistan, massive media attention followed a growing death toll among German soldiers. Clearly, less repugnant triggers are needed to motivate policy review and innovative. Public evaluations or a greater involvement of the parliament in peace support operations could be starting points.[7] So far, however, the German government has eluded repeated demands to publically assess its Afghanistan policy by neutral experts (Tettweiler 2010, 2011).

8.3 Critical Reflection on Generalizability of Findings

The findings presented above have been shaped by several methodological features of this study. Their implications for the generalizability of my findings are discussed next, addressing the validity and reliability of the explanation.

Without doubt, the method applied—process-tracing at the level of administrative actions—ensures a high degree of internal validity of the explanation. One remaining aspect could challenge the validity of the explanation nonetheless: The two police reform case studies of Kosovo and Afghanistan, respectively, are not independent from one another. In both countries the EU missions came second, facing a situation where the critical window of opportunity directly after a conflict had already

lapsed. In addition, the utility function of police reform decreases over time, rendering the task for the second actor more challenging. In both cases, however, the lack of progress achieved by EULEX and EUPOL cannot be explained by these two factors alone, as discussed in Sects. 4.6 and 6.5. Furthermore, the counterfactual discussion in these sections found that another actor but the EU would likely have yielded more promising outcomes.

Addressing next the reliability of the explanation, three methodological choices must stand the test: The selection of organizations out of the universe of peacebuilding organizations, the choice to look at police reform as a proxy for peacebuilding more generally, and the decision to flag Kosovo and Afghanistan as case studies. First of all, because of its positive performance, the OSCE constitutes an important building block of the explanation put forth in this book. However, there is the chance that these findings cannot be reproduced in different counties. Kosovo can be seen as a sui generis case of international peacebuilding because for the first time internationals took over the full range of local government functions. The UN special representative was the quasi-president of Kosovo until 2007. In the area of police reform, the UN police shared a common organizational chart with the slowly growing Kosovo police. By contrast, lessons learned exercises on police reform elsewhere indicate that the will of local governments to actually change—or the lack thereof in many cases—is a critical factor for reform success (Eckhard 2014b). It is possible that Kosovo's particular situation at the time, with no real local government, constituted an extraordinary conducive environment for successful police reform. Findings on OSCE performance during the first few years, therefore, could be biased, which limits generalization on the link between institutional designs and performance. Further research on OSCE missions elsewhere would be worthwhile to strengthen the external validity of findings on OSCE performance.

The second challenge to generalization refers to the use of police reform as a proxy for peacebuilding. Police reform represents a particular subtask of peacebuilding, falling in the area of institution-building support. Of course, peace operations perform many functions other than institutional assistance. These include political mediation in peace processes, support for conflict resolution both at societal and grass-roots levels, humanitarian relief, the preventions of human rights violations (protection of civilians) with or without the use of force, cease-fire monitoring and classical

peacekeeping, processes of disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants, just to name a few. Support for police reform is by no means representative of *all* the strands in this vast bundle of activities. Still, there is no reason to assume that my conclusions regarding institutional designs and performance should not be valid for peace operations in general. Quite the contrary, the more political a task, the more leeway mission managers require (da Costa and Karlsrud 2013; Karlsrud 2013).

Finally, this book's case studies are restricted to Afghanistan and Kosovo. Given the wide range of conflict-ridden societies around the globe, there is a certain likelihood that these cases are not representative in the sense of most-likely and least-likely scenarios for successful peacebuilding. In fact, both countries saw a military intervention with Western ground forces, something that can be considered exceptional (as compared to many African conflicts, for instance). In addition, Western peacebuilding norms drove the peacebuilding strategy in both cases, including the decision to build police organizations and reform the institutional system along a Western institutional model. This approach to peacebuilding is probably not representative of the way peacebuilding is carried out everywhere and at any times. Indeed, some researchers criticize the liberal peacebuilding model altogether and call for new ways to think about peacebuilding (Chandler 2006; Richmond 2014). And instead of advancing holistic peacebuilding frameworks, many states now restrict their conflict-related foreign policy to stabilization (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014). However, as long as these activities continue to be directed and carried out by bureaucratic actors, the conclusions drawn here remain relevant. Bureaucracies work in institutional systems. If deployed in a dynamic and political context such as the one of crisis countries, these systems need to enable flexibility, coordination, and adjustability, irrespective of the specific conflict management strategy that is pursued.

Overall, thus, while a few doubts remain, the book's empirically dense account of four police reform missions speaks for itself. The case studies report not only on abstract interviewee statements but pair with illustrations of the actual mechanisms in an exemplary fashion, based on observable historical processes. The comparative Chap. 7 systematically set these cases in relation to one another, with the case selection ensuring variation in existing predictors of operation success. All in all, these methodological features make for a strong case underlying this book's findings.

8.4 Implications for Research on Peacebuilding

There is a growing debate about institutional designs and peacebuilding performance, which has seen a number of studies published in recent years (Allen and Yuen 2014; Breakey and Dekker 2014; Dijkstra 2012; Junk 2012; Karlsrud 2013; Lundgren 2015; Winckler 2015). While most of this literature focuses on United Nations peace operations, questions of managerial leeway and decentralization are also identified as relevant there. However, the literature is divided in its recommendations. Two perspectives can be differentiated. One (Karlsrud 2013, p. 539) represents those who caution against 'a too fine-grained and detailed normative framework that limits the freedom of action of special representatives and envoys.' Instead, as Karlsrud further argues, 'there is need for considerable leeway for senior leaders in the field' (ibid.). Junk (2012) supports this view, noting that political dynamics at headquarters often propel dysfunctional organizational structures. Strategies to counter these dysfunctions, as Winckler (2015) agrees, are best found by peacebuilders at the local, field level.

The other perspective is prominently represented by former head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who argues that similar to bureaucrats in the domestic context, peacebuilders require political authority for their actions. Merely adopting a mandate and leaving autonomous bureaucrats to do their job would be insufficient. Rather, member states must back the political risks of those taking decisions operationally: 'the key to credible, implementable "robust" peacekeeping mandates lies in building political unity among member states through broader participation in both decision-making and operational implementation (…)' (Guéhenno 2009, p. 8). This view finds backing by peacebuilding researchers such as Breakey and Dekker (2014, p. 319), who argue that ambiguity in peacebuilding mandates—a potential source of operational latitude—'may induce low-level actors [in the chain of command] to interpret their mandate conservatively.' Instead of using force when needed to protect civilians, field-level commanders and heads of mission fear the legal and political consequences of such actions and instead do nothing.

My own findings on the link between institutional designs and performance seem to take side with the former perspective raised by Karlsrud and colleagues. However, this is only true because international organiza-

tions have complex principals who rarely seem to converge in terms of political will. The decisive issue thus is the politics behind institutional designs. Confirming this, Junk (2012) shows how member state politics influence institutional design. And Allen and Yuen (2014, p. 630) found that provisions for peace operations' managerial latitude in mission mandates varies systematically depending on the intrinsic interests of the permanent members of the Security Council in a conflict state: 'Greater apathy toward a civil war state elicits greater restrictions, both in time limits and tasks.' While this says more about resources than about managerial leeway during actual operations, it is clear that member state politics do influence missions' ability to contribute to solving crises. This influence is not restricted to mandate negotiations, as this book shows, but takes place throughout the policy cycle. All cases yield evidence that member state influence can be informed by policy considerations unrelated to the actual mandate, thus undermining mission objectives. Although emanating from the same actors that launch peace operations, these politics of member states constitute the single greatest performance impediment to mission success identified in this book. On a more positive note, decentralized institutional designs can shield missions from these politics to some extent—although this entails new dilemmas related to strategy review and evaluation.

8.5 Implications for Research on International Public Administration

A classic question at the interface of political science and public administration research asks about the relevance of bureaucracy and its institutional design for the realization of public policy (Kaufman 1960; Page 1985). Though research in this area originally focused on the (nation) state, more recent work has examined this question in relation to global governance, where international organizations play an ever-increasing role in the delivery of global public goods (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Haas 1964). Based on these first findings on the makeup of international public administrations, a second generation of studies now address the nexus between administrative features of international organizations and their effects on policy-making and implementation (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009; Dijkstra 2013, 2015; Hawkins et al. 2006a; Larsson and Trondal 2006; Trondal 2010).

Advancing this debate, my findings show how institutional designs relate to the formal and informal politics behind policy-making and implementation. Confirming renowned studies in public administration (e.g., Selznick 1949, 1957) at the level of international organizations, this study demonstrated that administrative architectures affect bureaucratic performance during policy implementation. Other than Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004), however, the cases examined here suggest that poor performance is not a consequence of pathological behavior by international bureaucrats. Instead, member state principals do not restrict their political controversies to negotiations about policy content alone. Their attempts to find an aggregate political will should end, one could think, once a policy or mandate has been agreed, adopted, and passed on to the bureaucracy for implementation. This is not the case. Political actors' continued influence on bureaucratic actions during policy implementation is the main source of dysfunction identified by this study. Powerful member states habitually exploit international organizations' institutional rules to benefit their own political agendas, irrespective of the damage this may cause for the implementation of an international organization's mandate. Such observations were also made by Wolfgang Seibel (2012) on UN peace operations and Randall Stone (2011) on global economic governance. Institutional designs, as this book indicates, can mediate this unwieldy effect.

Policy implementation by international organizations rarely goes without political conflict and invariably takes place in ambiguous environments. Adding to the literature on international public administration, this book thus puts forth the thesis that *the dynamic nature of complex principals' political preferences correlates negatively with bureaucratic performance during policy implementation. Institutional designs, in particular decentralization and bureaucratic autonomy, mediate this unwieldy effect.*

The findings of this book imply that ill-directed political influence during policy implementation is a constant evil with which international bureaucrats must deal. Even peacebuilding carried out by the EU—the supposed club of 'like-minded' members and bearer of the Nobel Peace Prize—can fall victim to member states' short-sighted self-interests. National interests are not going anywhere. But there is increasing bureaucracy in world politics today and we would do well to learn as much as possible about how it can offset national politics' unfortunate side effects.

Notes

1. Interviews with OSCE officials (Interview No. 007/K, 15 November 2011, 013/K, 22 November 2011, 019/V, 30 January 2012).
2. Interviews with EU officials (Interview No. 039/B, 19 July 2011/27 April 2012, 108/B, 23 April 2012).
3. In 2011, EULEX Kosovo was the first CSDP mission to be entrusted with decision-making on all expenditures, dropping the ex ante regime. For the mission, this meant a significant facilitation of administrative processes as the amount of lengthy communication with Brussels could be reduced. See EULEX briefing, provided by the Budget Committee of the European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/cont/dv/205_briefing_on_eulex_/5_briefing_on_eulex_en.pdf(accessed 01 November 2015).
4. Interview with EU Commission official who works on financial administration of EU missions (Interview No. 025/B, 23 April 2012).
5. Interview with two German officials from the Foreign Office who both worked on the Afghanistan dossier (Interview No. 059/A, 01 June 2011, 051/A, 04 June 2011).
6. Author's own translation.
7. Since 2010, the Foreign Office regularly publishes update reports on the situation in Afghanistan. This instrument is a valuable example for other cases with significant German engagement. See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Fortschrittsbericht-node.html (accessed 01 November 2015).

References

Allen, S. H., & Yuen, A. T. (2014). The politics of peacekeeping: UN Security Council oversight across peacekeeping missions. *International Studies Quarterly, 58*(3), 621–632.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization, 53*(4), 699–732.

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Biermann, F., & Siebenhüner, B. (Eds.). (2009). *Managers of global change. The influence of international environmental bureaucracies*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Boin, A. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Breakey, H., & Dekker, S. (2014). Weak links in the chain of authority: The challenges of intervention decisions to protect civilians. *International Peacekeeping, 21*(3), 307–323.

Bundesregierung. (1989). *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Such und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN—Drucksache 11/5657—Mißstände in der polizeilichen Ausstattungshilfe*. Drucksache 11/5941 (30 November 1989). Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag.

Chandler, D. (2006). *Empire in denial: The politics of state-building*. London: Pluto Press.

da Costa, D. F., & Karlsrud, J. (2013). 'Bending the rules': The space between HQ policy and local action in UN civilian peacekeeping. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17*(3–4), 293–312.

Dijkstra, H. (2012). Efficiency versus sovereignty: Delegation to the UN Secretariat in peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping, 19*(5), 581–596.

Dijkstra, H. (2013). *Policy-making in EU security and defense: An institutional perspective*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dijkstra, H. (2015). Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping. *The Review of International Organizations, 10*(1), 23–41.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eckhard, S. (2014b). *Zwischen Ertüchtigung und Wertewandel. Internationale Erfahrungen bei der Unterstützung von Sicherheitssektorreform*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Global Public Policy Institute.

Guéhenno, J.-M. (2009). *Robust peacekeeping: Building political consensus and strengthening command and control*. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

Haas, E. B. (1964). *Beyond the nation-state: Functionalism and international organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D., & Tierney, M. J. (Eds.). (2006a). *Delegation and agency in international organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Junk, J. (2012). Function follows form: The organizational design of peace operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6*(3), 299.

Karlsrud, J. (2013). Special representatives of the Secretary-General as norm arbitrators? Understanding bottom-up authority in UN peacekeeping. *Global Governance, 19*(4), 525.

Kaufman, H. (1960). *The forest ranger, a study in administrative behavior*. Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by Johns Hopkins Press.

Keohane, D. (2011). Lessons from EU peace operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15*(1–2), 200–217.

Larsson, T., & Trondal, J. (2006). Agenda setting in the European Commission. How the European Commission structures and influences the EU agenda. In H. C. H. Hofman & A. Tuerk (Eds.), *EU administrative governance*. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lundgren, M. (2015). Conflict management capabilities of peace-brokering international organizations, 1945–2010: A new dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33*, 198–223.

Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and agency in international organizations* (pp. 41–76). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 5*(2), 145–174.

Milinkovic, B. (2004). OSCE peacekeeping: Still waiting to perform! *Helsinki Monitor, 15*(3), 193–201.

OSCE. (2011b). *Project management in the OSCE. A manual for programme and project managers* (authored by Sebnem Lust, Laura Vai, and Sean McGreevy). Vienna: Organization for Seurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Page, E. C. (1985). *Political authority and bureaucratic power: A comparative analysis*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Perrow, C. (1970). *Organizational analysis: A sociological view*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Richmond, O. (2014). *Failed statebuilding: Intervention, the state, and the dynamics of peace formation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rotmann, P., & Steinacker, L. (2014). *Stabilization: Doctrine, organization and practice. Lessons for Germany from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States*. Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute.

Seibel, W. (2012). Peace operations and modern protectorates: The logic of successful failure. In J. Mayall & R. S. de Oliveira (Eds.), *The new protectorates. International tutelage and the making of liberal states* (pp. 163–182). London: Hurst & Company.

Selznick, P. (1949). *TVA and the grass roots: A study of politics and organization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Selznick, P. (1957). *Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation*. New York: Row-Peterson.

Stone, R. W. (2011). *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tettweiler, F. (2010). *Afghanistanstrategie auf dem Prüfstand: Die aktuelle Evaluationsdebatte greift zu kurz* (Arbeitspapier Nr. 6, Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Tettweiler, F. (2011). *Lernen in interventionen? Evaluation am Beispiel der deutschen Afghanistan-Mission* (SWP Studie S22, September 2011). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Trondal, J. (2010). *Unpacking international organisations: The dynamics of compound bureaucracies*. Manchester: Manchester Universty Press.

Wildavsky, A. B. (1972). The self-evaluating organization. *Public Administration Review, 32*(5), 509–520.

Wilson, J. Q. (1989). *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*. New York: Basic Books.

Winckler, J. G. (2015). Exceeding limitations of the United Nations peacekeeping bureaucracy: Strategies of officials to influence peacekeeping activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping, 22*(1), 43–64.

Appendix I: List of Interviewees

Table A1 List of interviewees

Alias	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date of interview*
001/K	Embassy of Germany to Kosovo	Pristina	18.11.2011
002/K	EULEX	Pristina	17.11.2011
003/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	01.02.2012
004/D	EUPOL	Berlin	02.06.2011
005/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	31.01.2012
006/D	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Berlin	15.11.2011
007/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Pristina	15.11.2011
008/K	GIZ	Pristina	29.01.2011
009/K	KfW	Pristina	29.01.2011
010/D	UNMIK	Berlin	12.11.2009
011/K	EU Planning Team (EUPT)	Pristina	30.11.2011
012/K	EULEX	Pristina	27.04.2012
013/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Pristina	23.11.2011
014/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Pristina	22.11.2011
015/D	UNMIK Civil Police	Berlin	01.11.2012
016/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	24.04.2012
017/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	24.04.2012
018/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	30.01.2012
019/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	30.01.2012
020/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	31.01.2012
021/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	01.02.2012
022/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Pristina	21.11.2011
023/K	Kosovo Ministry of Interior	Pristina	24.11.2011

(*continued*)

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6

Table A1 (continued)

Alias	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date of interview*
024/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Pristina	15.11.2011
025/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	23.04.2012
026/D	EU Planning Team (EUPT)	Berlin	16.11.2011
027/B	EULEX	Brussels	24.01.2011
028/K	EULEX	Pristina	26.01.2011
029/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	19.07.2011/ 13.04.2012
030/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	23.04.2012
031/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	25.04.2012
032/K	EULEX	Pristina	17.11.2011
033/K	Kosovo Ministry of Interior	Pristina	22.11.2011
034/K	Kosovo Police Service	Pristina	27.01.2011
035/I	EU Delegation Islamabad	Islamabad	10.06.2011
036/B	EU Delegation Kabul	Brussels	23.04.2012
037/K	EU Delegation Pristina	Pristina	24.11.2011
038/K	NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Pristina	15.11.2011
039/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	19.07.2011/ 27.04.2012
040/B	Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU	Brussels	26.04.2012
041/K	EULEX	Pristina	17.11.2011
042/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	25.04.2012
043/K	EULEX	Pristina	26.01.2011
044/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	26.04.2012
045/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	26.04.2012
046/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	25.04.2012
047/K	Kosovo Foreign Ministry	Pristina	28.01.2011
048/D	German Police Project Office (GPPO)	Berlin	03.12.2012
049/D	German Foreign Office	Berlin	19.05.2011
050/A	UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	Kabul	01.06.2011
051/A	Embassy of Germany to Afghanistan	Kabul	16.02.2012
052/D	Embassy of Germany to Afghanistan	Berlin	17.05.2011
053/V	Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE	Vienna	01.02.2012
054/D	Embassy of Germany to Afghanistan	Berlin	01.06.2011
055/D	German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ)	Berlin	12.06.2012
056/D	EUPOL	Berlin	02.06.2011

(*continued*)

Table A1 (continued)

Alias	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date of interview*
057/D	Ministry of Interior of North-Rhine Westphalia	Düsseldorf	27.07.2011
058/D	German Ministry of Interior (BMI)	Berlin	05.06.2012
059/A	Embassy of Germany to Afghanistan	Kabul	04.06.2011
060/I	Sub-Contractor to GIZ	Istanbul	13.02.2012
061/A	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Kabul	02.06.2011
062/A	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Kabul	02.06.2011
063/A	German Police Training Team (GPPT)	Kabul	04.06.2011/ 14.02.2012
064/A	German Police Training Team (GPPT)	Kabul	16.02.2012
065/A	German Police Training Team (GPPT)	Kabul	16.02.2012
066/D	German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ)	Berlin	13.07.2012
067/A	International Crisis Group	Kabul	20.02.2012
068/D	German Ministry of Interior (BMI)	Potsdam	05.06.2012
069/D	German Ministry of Interior (BMI)	Potsdam	07/12.06.2012
070/D	German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ)	Berlin	13.07.2012
071/A	Embassy of Germany to Afghanistan	Kabul	18.04.2012
072/A	The Liaison Office (TLO)	Kabul	02.06.2011
073/A	The Liaison Office (TLO)	Kabul	02.06.2011/ 19.02.2012
074/A	UNDP Office in Kabul	Kabul	05.06.2011
075/A	EUPOL	Kabul	02.07.2012
076/A	EUPOL	Kabul	15.02.2012
077/A	NATO Training Mission (NTM-A)	Kabul	01.06.2011
078/A	Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan	Kabul	04.06.2011
079/A	EUPOL	Kabul	15.02.2012
080/A	EU Delegation Afghanistan	Kabul	05.06.2011
081/A	EUPOL	Kabul	06.06.2011/ 15.02.2012
082/A	EUPOL	Kabul	15.02.2012
083/A	EUPOL	Kabul	18.02.2012
084/A	EUPOL	Kabul	27.03.2012
085/A	EUPOL	Kabul	26.06.2012
086/A	Office of the EU Special Representative	Kabul	20.02.2012

(*continued*)

Table A1 (continued)

Alias	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date of interview*
087/A	Embassy of France to Afghanistan	Kabul	21.02.2012
088/A	NATO Training Mission (NTM-A)	Kabul	21.02.2012
089/D	German Foreign Office	Berlin	14.01.2013
090/V	OSCE Secretariat	Vienna	31.01.2012
091/V	Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE	Vienna	01.02.2012
092/K	Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES)	Pristina	15.11.2011
093/K	International Civilian Office (ICO)	Pristina	23.11.2011
094/K	Embassy of Germany to Kosovo	Pristina	18.11.2011
095/K	Kosovo Government	Pristina	18.11.2011
096/K	Embassy of Germany to Kosovo	Pristina	26.01.2011
097/K	EULEX	Pristina	16.11.2011
098/A	EUPOL	Kabul	14.02.2012
099/B	Permanent Representation of Germany to NATO	Brussels	19.07.2011
100/B	Permanent Representation of Germany to NATO	Brussels	19.07.2011
101/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	20.07.2011
102/B	EU Commission, DG DEVCO	Brussels	20.07.2011
103/K	International Civilian Office (ICO)	Mitrovica	17.11.2011
104/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Vushtri	23.11.2011
105/K	OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK)	Vushtri	04.06.2012
106/B	NATO	Brussels	16.05.2012
107/B	NATO	Brussels	30.05.2012
108/B	EU External Action Service	Brussels	03.12.2013
109/K	EU Delegation Kosovo	Pristina	11.06.2013

Index

Note: Page number followed by 'n' refers to endnotes.

S. Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59512-6