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INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR ROLE IN
FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINATION IN SIERRA LEONE

*

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty
of the Graduate School
of

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

by

EMERSON ADU KROMA

*

Washington, D. C.

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P R E F A C E

The author's hypothesis is that interest groups and political parties in Sierra Leone evolved in many unique ways and that they play a direct or indirect role in varying degrees in the determination of the state's foreign policy. Whereas the traditional interest groups defined in the study are multipurpose ritualistic organizations, the members of which take an oath of secrecy under pain of severe punishment, Western-oriented interest groups are generally single purpose, mixed membership open non-ritualistic or non-secret organizations. The major political parties are, as a rule, incohesive coalitions of interest groups.

Sierra Leone, which means "Lion Mountains," was so named by Pedro da Cintra, a Portuguese Navigator who sailed along its western peninsula in 1462. The country remained uncolonized by any foreign power until over three hundred years had elapsed after da Cintra's visit. Different groups of freed slaves from Britain, North America, and the Caribbean, and a number of recaptives en route to the Western slave marts were domiciled in the Province of Freedom in the western part of Sierra Leone between 1787 and 1807. This was made possible through the 1788 Treaty of Settlement concluded between the British and King Naimbana of Sierra Leone. The British Government took over the administration of the Crown Colony from an English philanthropic

Trading Company in 1808 and the Protectorate in the hinterland in 1896. Sierra Leone remained under the British until 1961 when it became an independent country.

The present territory of Sierra Leone has an area of 27,925 square miles and an estimated population of under four million. The world position of the state, which is defined in the 1971 Republican Constitution, is found along the Atlantic seaboard in West Africa, between latitudes 6° and 10° North and longitudes 10° and 14° West. Sierra Leone has boundaries with the Republic of Guinea settled under the Anglo-French Conventions of 1882, 1895 and 1911, and with Liberia under the Anglo-Liberian Conventions of 1885 and 1911. Sierra Leoneans were not permitted to participate in these important negotiations.

This dissertation is the product of over three years of research, handicapped to some extent by the dearth or non-availability of certain pertinent and important historical documents and the general unwillingness of government officials, as well as members of the general public, to respond positively to interviews and questionnaires for fear of political reprisal. The author's patience was, however, amply rewarded in the end through the generous financial support of the Ford Foundation, some close friends who prefer to remain anonymous, and advisors who expertly guided him from the very beginning to the conclusion of his research and writing. Many thanks go to Dr. Babalola Cole, dissertation director, Dr. Vincent Browne, an inspiring teacher who always

challenged the author to aim at academic excellence and clarity of thought, Dr. Julius E. Okolo, an accomplished scholar and good Samaritan, who never tired of giving him the benefit of his experience and scholarship, and without whose help, in conjunction with Dr. Cole, his liberal principal advisor, this work could possibly have foundered or seen the light of day only at a much later date, and Dr. Maurice Woodard for his endless patience and devoted attention. Appreciation is expressed also to Dr. William Kallon of Bowie State College, who served on the dissertation committee, despite his heavy teaching and administrative schedule.

The author can never fully thank the Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Dr. Charles W. Harris, his former graduate teacher, for giving him assistance and hope beyond description on a continuing basis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose, Scope, Methodology and Problems Studied

Purpose and Scope

The central purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a study of the evolution and characteristics of the political parties and interest or pressure groups of the Republic of Sierra Leone and to explore the manner and extent to which such groupings influence the determination of that state's foreign policy. The dissertation will also examine the Republic's other official and unofficial or informal institutions and their impact on the formulation and administration of foreign policy. The nature and functions of Sierra Leone's traditional interest groups in this decision-making process will be highlighted as much as possible.

This dissertation is presented as a trilateral study dealing as it does with political structures and behavior in the (a) pre-colonial, (b) colonial and (c) post-colonial eras of Sierra Leone.

The thesis of this study is that Sierra Leone's interest or pressure groups and political parties play a significant role, directly or indirectly in the modernization of the country and the determination of its foreign policy. These political groupings are

seen as having certain clearly discernible features about them, some of which are peculiar to Sierra Leone, for example, the organization and administration of its traditional male and female "secret" societies. In examining the chief features of these political groups, reference will be made to their fragility or structural weakness, Western orientation and dearth of essential resources.

Questions

In order to study adequately the various types of interest groups and political parties in the Republic of Sierra Leone, it will be imperative to answer the following questions:

1. Why were political parties non-existent in the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone before 1950?
2. What is unique about most of the interest groups of the Republic?
3. To what degree did Western political ideas influence pre-colonial political structures and institutions, and how do these ideas influence the structure and behavior of political parties?
4. Why was the constitutional development of Sierra Leone so slow prior to 1950?
5. Why is there no viable two-party system in Sierra Leone?
6. What are the basic characteristics of the political party system of the Republic?

7. How does geopolitics affect foreign relations and how do political parties and interest groups influence the formulation of Sierra Leone's foreign policy?
8. To what extent does the dearth of trained diplomats and foreign service officers affect Sierra Leone's standing in international affairs?
9. What is the significance of the apparent conversion of Sierra Leone to a one-party state?

Importance of the Study

This study is important because, firstly, it is novel among the currently available meager political literature on the Republic of Sierra Leone. Secondly, it provides for the first time a modern critical analysis of the Republic's complex political processes. Thirdly, it establishes in an analytical form the function of interest groups and political parties in determining the foreign policies of this country.

Limits of the Study

The dissertation is concerned with the study of linkages between Sierra Leone's interest groups and political parties, their role in the determination of its foreign policies and modernization as well as the other political processes in the State.

Western style interest groups are examined during the period that stretches from 1808, when the African Institution was founded, to 1974. Traditional interest groups studied in this work naturally predate the colonial period, that is before 1787. The section on political parties begins with their evolution from 1950 when the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) was founded, with the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) following close on its heels in 1951. Finally, the section on independence, foreign policy, diplomats and diplomacy covers the shortest period in this work, that is, from 1961 when Sierra Leone became an independent state, to date.

Neither a study of interest group theories nor that of political culture is central to the purpose of this work, but it will be inevitable to refer to such topics from time to time.

Methodology and Sources of Information

In terms of methodology and relevant sources of information, the following approaches are used in this dissertation:

- a. A developmental history of Sierra Leone's party system and constitutions,
- b. Interviews,
- c. Letters from Sierra Leonean correspondents,
- d. Statutory Instruments, Orders, Bills and Acts of the House of Representatives (Parliament) and the British Parliament,

- e. Press Reports,
- f. Parliamentary and local government election results
and petitions arising therefrom,
- g. Reports from Commissions of Inquiries,
- h. Sample opinions of Sierra Leoneans presently living
in the U.S.A.

Interest Group Format

In examining political culture, reference will be made to the works of many authors. Among the most notable are Pye, Prewitt, Verba, Almond, Powell and Kousoulas. The author wishes it to be remembered that political parties and interest groups, as much as individual citizens, are essentially products of their particular community and its civic culture. It is suggested here, however, that man's extra-societal or international environment does contribute to the molding of his overall system of interests, values and beliefs. International relations are indeed dynamic factors in the life of every state.

In studying interest groups and political parties in Sierra Leone, reference will be made to such works as those of Easton, Wootton, Eckstein, Truman, Zeigler, Froman, Castles, Young, Dowling, LaPalombara, and Ehrman. Political parties, on the other hand, will be examined with the help of the works of such authors as Almond, Coleman, Powell, Verba, Prewitt, Dawson, Cartwright, Deutsch, Dahl, Finer, Kilson, Cartey, Kousoulas, McKay, Markovitz, Miller, Post,

First, Milikan, and Seasholes. Primary sources used are the Constitutions of Sierra Leone 1863, 1924, 1951, 1957, 1961, and 1971, respectively; Sierra Leone Administration: Provincial Report, 1948; Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Working of Tribal Administrations; Report of the Sierra Leone Constitutional London Conference, 1960; the Sierra Leone Gazette, and the Hansard, that is, debates of the House of Representatives (Parliament); Reports of the Sierra Leone Company (1791-1807) and the 1787/88 Treaty of Settlement.

In discussing foreign policy, specific works of reference include those of Wirth, Nicolson, Satow, Wood and Serres, Kennan, Dyke, Spykman, Kalijavri, Dallin, Moore, Acheson, Frankel, Palmer, Perkins, Ikle, Emerson, Heady, Brierly, Braibanti, and various official publications by the governments of the United States and the Republic of Sierra Leone.

Group Theory

The author looks at the study of interest or pressure groups as the best way of understanding the political system of Sierra Leone and the way in which it operates. After all, groups form the fundamental units or raw materials of the political processes of every state. The study of group theory in this dissertation is marginal only, but it will include the description of various interest groups and political parties, their organizations, resources, access to the policy makers and the different ways in which they influence the determination and implementation of public decisions.

Whereas there are some political scientists who use the term "interest group" as a generic concept to embrace all non-political party organizations, there are others who prefer to distinguish it from the term "pressure group". Those scholars who stress the distinction between these two terms or concepts hold that an interest group is an apolitical body of people with a shared interest and that a pressure group is a body of people who, similarly, have a shared interest or attitude, but use one or more political pressure strategies to achieve their common objectives. Pressure groups actually and deliberately apply pressure methods in order to compel policy-makers to translate their interests or aspirations into public policy. These groups may engage in organized violent or non-violent demonstrations; they may stage boycotts, lobby legislators, file petitions for redress of grievances or press the government to set up hearings or inquiries into the conduct of public officials or agencies. Governments the whole world over are aware that influential pressure groups cannot be summarily dismissed with impunity. This may also hold true for so-called apolitical interest groups.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the writer prefers to and will use the terms "interest" and "pressure" groups interchangeably. He conceives both groups as associational or non-associational groupings of individuals, other than as political parties, which are bound together by shared attitudes or common

interests. Further, he holds that driven to the extreme by a government which persistently turns deaf ears to popular requests for certain things to be done or not to be done, aggrieved groups, whether they may be "interest" or "pressure" groups, may ultimately develop strategies to make their voices heard. By nature, however, the leaders of interest or pressure groups do not aspire to political office.

Interest groups and political parties in Sierra Leone, as well as in all other political systems have certain similar and dissimilar characteristics. Both groups aggregate, articulate and transmit their political demands to the power wielders of their states. Each group also seeks the support of other groups through the processes of advocacy, compromise or compulsion. All groups try their best to influence the recruitment of political personnel, to the end that these may ultimately formulate and execute policies favorable to them. Finally, all groups require resources and the cooperation of the political community at large to enable them to accomplish their purposes. Given a fair choice, most groups, if not all of them, would prefer to act in accordance with their country's constitution and ethos.

Distinctions

Political parties and interest groups vary in a few fundamental ways as is shown in the accumulating works on this subject, since the publication of Bentley's classic work.¹

It is generally agreed that political parties, unlike interest groups, tend to be more highly aggregative and far less ideologically rigid in character. According to Kousoulas, "Political parties normally play an integrative role, as they cut across economic, social, religious, or ethnic lines."²

¹Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (San Antonio, Texas: Principia Press of Trinity University, 1949); S. E. Finer, Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain, 2d ed., (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966); S. E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain," in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., Interest Groups in Four Continents (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1958); S. E. Finer, Comparative Government (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971); E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and Tariff (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1935); David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 4th ed., (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1958); Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960); Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964); Graham Wootton, Interest Groups (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967); D. George Kousoulas, On Government and Politics, 2d ed., (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971).

²George Kousoulas, *Ibid.*, p. 12.

A few definitions of the term pressure groups help to provide a general frame of reference for the analysis and categorization of past and present groups in the Republic of Sierra Leone.

For Graham Wootton, an interest group is a part of a cluster of terms "that includes a pressure group and lobby at the center and organized group, private organization and catalytic group at the circumference."³ He defines an interest group in terms of a private actor (other than a political party) who ventures influence upon a public target so as to accomplish some goal. He uses the following acronym or device to express this statement:

P A (not pol.p) Pub. T; G⁴

(P A = Private Actor not political party - Public Target;
Goal)

Kousoulas apparently accepts Harmon Zeigler's distinction that, unlike interest groups per se, pressure groups are organized aggregates which attempt to influence the content of public policy without, at the same time, trying to place their members in public offices.⁵

³Graham Wootton, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁴Ibid., pp. 1-5, 20-27.

⁵D. George Kousoulas, op. cit., p. 122.

V. O. Key also recognizes the fact that pressure groups do try to influence the exercise of public power and that they play a significant role in the political system. For him pressure groups "supplement the party system and the formal instruments of governments by serving as spokesmen for the special interests within the society."⁶

Froman observes that interest groups direct communications to political authorities, help these authorities to formulate alternative policies, and act as brokers or buffers between the government and members of the political system. He notes further that these groups moderate or regulate demands made by other people, provide functional representation, compartmentalize access to decision-makers and ensure that there is a system of rule by minorities, as well as one which provides an emotional outlet for participants.⁷ Finer defines interest groups as associations which seek to influence public policy in their own chosen direction, while declining to accept direct responsibility for ruling the country.⁸

Although Truman's definition of interest group is useful, it is also troublesome in some respect. To begin with, he is very

⁶V. O. Key, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," Political Science Review, 60 (December 1966), p. 954.

⁸S. E. Finer, in Ehrmann, ed., Groups in Four Continents, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

critical of the term "pressure group" and would rather use the term "interest group". He refers to interest group as any group that enjoys one or more shared attitudes and makes claims on other groups in the community for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of certain types of behavior.⁹ His particular definition is predicated on formal or informal interactions. Because of this emphasis on the idea of interactions, Truman would like us to believe that wherever we have interactions and relationships, we automatically have interest groups also.

La Palombara criticizes Truman's definition as being too inclusive and vague. He states that according to Truman, interest groups mean everything, forgetting that if "everything is too much, it is close to being nothing."¹⁰ As a matter of fact, Truman does not recognize organization as an all important group characteristic. As far as he is concerned, organization is just a stage or degree of interaction. For him an interest group becomes a "political interest group" if and when it makes its demands upon or through any governmental structure or institution. He argues unconvincingly that the term "pressure group" presupposes such emotional connotations as selfish, irresponsible preoccupation with special privileges. This need not be so.

⁹David Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. 33-34.

¹⁰Joseph La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 16.

For the purpose of this author, and within the special context of the political culture of the Republic of Sierra Leone, the expression "interest group" is defined as a formal or informal conglomeration of individuals bound together by common attitudes and interests, whether fully or just barely aware of this, and who use one type of behavior or another to realize their purpose.

Typology of Interest Groups

Different political scientists classify interest groups in different ways. Broadly, however, by interest groups, this author also means pressure groups. Seasholes subdivides interest groups into two major divisions, namely, interactional and categorical groups. In turn, he subdivides the first main group into formal and informal groups and the second into identificational and analytical groups. Interactional groups represent groups whose members are in communication with each other either by face to face contacts or by written or verbal correspondence. Interactional groups are formal if they abide by a formal constitution or informal if they do not interact in this manner.

Categorical groups are by definition non-interactional. They are identificational if their members have a sense of membership. These groups do not really communicate with each other. Analytical groups consist of members who are not normally aware of the existence of their group, but who nevertheless, because of a characteristic

trait or common history, seem nearly always to respond to the same political stimuli in the same way.¹¹

In a more simple way, interest groups may be categorized generally as organized and unorganized groups. The interest groups of Sierra Leone may be classified as (a) associational and (b) non-associational or attitudinal groups. Associational groups, in Sierra Leone, include the Sierra Leone Mine Workers Union, the Sierra Leone Teachers Union, the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, the Sierra Leone Bar Association, the Medical Practitioners Union and the United Christian Council (U.C.C.). Each of these groups, among others, is so organized as to ensure the promotion of the common interests of its members and to function in accordance with definite procedural rules. On the other hand, the Organization of Sierra Leone Pilgrims to Mecca, the Uppun Orjeh Society and the Upper Section of Yoruba Society, Kissy, may be classified as attitudinal organizations since they are organized around a special principle about which members show great concern, often for impersonal reasons. For example, the Sierra Leone Pilgrims to Mecca is particularly interested in the organization of annual pilgrimages to the Islamic holy land and, thus seeks the perpetuation of Islam. No member's personal interests are, however, strictly undermined if annual pilgrimages to Mecca were

¹¹Bradbury Seasholes, Voting, Interest Groups and Parties (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1966), pp. 46-47.

temporarily suspended, or even permanently abolished. Impersonality is the hallmark of this category of interest groups.

It is very peculiar that Sierra Leone under colonial rule had more political pressure groups than there are now in the post-colonial era. Today, nearly all the pre-independence pressure groups have merged with the new political parties, and thus lost their individual identities. The exceptions are the Sierra Leone Secret Societies mainly operational in the Provinces. This phenomenon will be examined fully in Chapter II.

Typology of Political Parties

Not surprisingly, political parties were non-existent in Sierra Leone during its British colonial tutelage (1788-1950), that is just a decade before its independence. The period of 1951-1961 may be regarded as the intensive time of preparation for the advent of independence. However, when political parties finally emerged, they were far more in the shape of tenuous or amorphous mass movements than in the form of the more competitive typology ordinarily found in the so-called liberal democracies of the West.

The major political parties which have ruled Sierra Leone since it was granted internal self-government in 1957 and since it became independent in 1961 have been major or mass-based democratic parties. The author's reference is to the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) founded in 1951, and the All People's Congress (APC)

founded in 1960. The first Republican general parliamentary elections held in the Republic in May 1973, resulted in the establishment of a single mass party without any opposition member being elected to the House of Representatives.

The APC, which has been in power since April 1968, achieved this unique position in the equally unique history of Sierra Leone. By this it is meant that for the first time since the political system came into being in Sierra Leone only one party was represented in Parliament after the last general elections held in 1973. This party won 84 out of 85 seats for ordinary Members of Parliament. An independent APC party member won one seat. The only legal opposition party, that is, the Sierra Leone People's Party, did not win any seat; in fact, it did not even contest a seat in the House, hence, 84 APC candidates were duly elected without opposition. Twelve paramount Chiefs, who conventionally vote with the majority party in the House of Representatives, were also returned unopposed.¹²

The National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) was like the SLPP and the APC. a fusion of associational and non-associational political interest or pressure groups. These coalition parties were similar to the United People's Party (UPP), another

¹²Newsletter of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Vol. No.2, 31st May, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: The Information Division of the Embassy of the Republic of Sierra Leone), p. 1; The Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CIV, 30th April, 1973, No. 28, 3rd, 4th, 10th, 16th, 24th and 31st May, 1973, Nos. 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 36, respectively.

party formed in Sierra Leone in 1954. It is this writer's view that what is termed a totalitarian party has never developed in Sierra Leone.

By a totalitarian party the writer means a political party chiefly composed of carefully chosen dedicated militant or revolutionary members, similar to Hitler's Nazi party and Mussolini's fascist monolithic organization, as yet non-existent in Sierra Leone. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski the totalitarian dictatorship model includes the following six features: "an official ideology, a single mass party led typically by one man, a system of terroristic police controls, a technologically conditioned monopoly of communications, a similar monopoly of all means of effective armed combat, central control of and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic coordination."¹³

Outline of Contents

Earlier in this Chapter the author described the purpose and scope of his dissertation, its importance, the methodology adopted and the main thesis of the study. It was stated that the main purpose of this dissertation is to study the evolution and characteristics of interest groups and political parties of Sierra Leone and their

¹³Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 9-10.

role in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy, as well as the other political processes of the state.

Chapter II studies the developing constitutional framework of Sierra Leone at its earliest stage. It focuses on the country's earliest social structures, and interest groups, mainly traditional male and female secret societies, and their influence on foreign policy and the changes in the governmental process brought about by the establishment of Company Rule. By Company Rule, the writer means the administration of the Province of Freedom carved out of the Western peninsula of Sierra Leone for the resettlement of freed slaves effective from 1787. Company Rule was an experiment in politics, economics and philanthropism or welfare that never paid off. It lasted from 1787 - 1807; at the end of the period the British Crown took over the government of the Colony.

The phase of the dissertation covered by the writer in this chapter is the pre-colonial period. The traditional interest groups studied are shown to be multi-dimensional in their essential characteristics and functions.

Chapter III is chiefly concerned with both the colonial and post-colonial periods, that is, 1808 - 1974. The main thrust of this chapter is a careful analysis of the six written constitutions, the last two of which cover the post-independence period, commencing from 1961.

Step by step the writer attempts to show the progression made by Sierra Leone towards full sovereignty by detailing the provisions contained in each colonial constitution introduced in the territory. The constitutions studied are those of 1863, 1924, 1951, 1957, 1961 and 1971. The writer highlights in this chapter the role and characteristics of the colony and the protectorate interest or pressure groups and their impact on the determination of foreign policy. The problems and opportunities of nation-building are discussed in some depth. It is in this chapter that the writer also studies the politics of confrontation and cooperation engaged in by the Crown Colony and the Protectorate which made up colonial Sierra Leone.

The writer gets into the heart of the subject matter of his work when he describes the evolution, characteristics and functions of the political parties of Sierra Leone in Chapter IV. He draws a profile of the party system of the state, classifying each according to its organizational structure, strategy, objectives and composition. The fifteen parties which comprise the political system (1950-1974) are shown to be either conservative, sectarian, elitist, constituent, cadre or mass-based.

In Chapter IV the writer explains why political parties evolved late in Sierra Leone, albeit reluctantly, that is from 1950. An interesting feature is the emergence and impact of a number of independence movements, namely, the Sierra Leone Independence Movement, the Kono Progressive Movement, the Kono Progressive Independence

Movement and the Elections Before Independence Movement. In his concluding section the writer weighs the pros and cons of the one-party state as compared to a pluralist or multi-party state. It is his thesis that a one-party state is not necessarily the antithesis of democracy. The fundamental question in this context really turns on the concept of diffusion of political power: who actually decides on who has what, when and how with respect to the allocation of societal values and economic goods?

Chapter V studies the institutions, processes, and structures that generally influence the determination of foreign policy in Sierra Leone. Subtopics dealt with here include public opinion, Creole influence, the Chamber of Commerce, Trade Unions, the Civil Service, the United Christian Council (UCC), Interest Groups and political parties. The role of the All People's Congress will be given greater emphasis than other political organizations. Reference will be made to Cohen's osmosis hypothesis which appears to be utilized in developing Sierra Leone's foreign policy.

Included in Chapter VI is an examination of the meaning of diplomacy and the functions of Sierra Leone's diplomatic personnel. Some of the details dealt with are the hierarchy, privileges and immunities of diplomats, the establishment and termination of foreign missions, recognition and non-recognition of new states, and the methods and problems of negotiation.

Chapter VII generally takes a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy. To be specific, it deals with the determination of foreign policy, with special reference to the factors, models, and techniques used in the process. The organization of Sierra Leone's Ministry of External Affairs is presented as a case study. The writer also seeks to demonstrate the manner in which this Ministry applies the theories he has propounded.

Subtopics discussed in this chapter include such foreign policy determinants as Sierra Leone's geographical position, effective manpower, natural resource endowment, industrial and agricultural productive capacity, national morale, and the processes of collecting and analyzing intelligence data, and the recommendation and administration of foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

TRADITIONAL INTEREST GROUPS AND SIERRA LEONE'S

DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The emphasis in this chapter is the study of traditional and non-traditional or Western-type interest groups and other institutions in Sierra Leone up to the end of the period of the British Trading Company rule. Specific topics dealt with include the pre-colonial and colonial interest or pressure groups, and the role and ambivalence of certain elite structures. An interest or pressure group is generally defined by this writer as an associational, non-associational or attitudinal body of men and women who act corporately in pursuit of agreed objectives and who use certain viable strategies to gain their ends. An interest or pressure group seeks to influence public policy in its direction but does not wish to contest for or hold public office. A political party on the other hand is a collectivity of men and women who desire to hold public office so as to control the governmental machinery of the state.

This writer classifies the African traditional secret and non-secret societies and other socio-cultural, economic groups as important interest groups in Sierra Leone. As V. O. Key holds, an interest group or pressure group is an organized body other than a political

party that tries to influence the exercise of public power, doing whatever it can to play a significant role in the political system of which it is a part. Traditional interest groups in Sierra Leone are regarded as multi- or one-dimensional organizations which play a vital role in the decision-making process of the state. For example, the heads of male and female secret societies like porro, orjeh, wonde, bondo, njayee and yase often make suggestions to the political authorities about public policy. Often these leaders are consulted before and after public decisions are made. It was impossible in traditional Sierra Leone to go to war or negotiate a peace treaty without consulting with the male secret organized interest groups. Indeed, porro had the power to declare war independently and to make peace.¹

In contemporary times, both "secret" and "open" societies influence public policy-making and are also used extensively by politicians, especially during election times, and in moments of national or regional crisis. In reality the importance of these groups diminished only gradually since the old repressive colonial days.

Uniqueness

Sierra Leone is historically unique in West Africa in many ways. The following may be offered as unique characteristics.

¹G. Max Gorvie, Old and New in Sierra Leone (London and Redhill; Lutterworth Press, 1945), Chs. 6, 7 & 8.

(1) The country, as presently delimited, appears to have been outside the full impact of the civilization of the grassland kingdoms of Western Sudan. It is however, conceded by Mitchell that a relatively small amount of business did take place between pre-colonial Sierra Leone and the empires of (Old) Ghana, Mali and Songhai.² (2) Although Sierra Leone was one of the substantial slave marts along the Guinea Coast, it ultimately became the largest slave asylum for the reclaimed slaves. A British Admiralty Court was established in Freetown for the purpose of trying and sentencing European offenders against the law forbidding the slave trade.³ (3) The first college in all colonial Africa, that is, Fourah Bay College, was founded in this country in 1827. (4) The British Colonial Office made Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, an administrative center for its entire West African possessions. Incidentally, it was also the only colony to which the British Government did not intend to grant sovereignty, a point to be explained later. (5) Agitation for autonomy in state and church matters occurred first in this territory. (6) Sierra Leone is the first independent state in tropical Africa where the opposition party, that is, the All People's Congress (APC), constitutionally replaced

²P. K. Mitchell, "Early Trade Routes of Sierra Leone Protectorate," in Sierra Leone Studies (N.S.), 16 (June, 1962), 204-217.

³E. W. Blyden, "European Imperialism in Africa," North American Review, 1895, pp. 327-336, republished by Hollis Lynch, ed., Black Spokesman (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 317-321.

the hegemonic regime of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). In 1967, the APC was able to defeat the SLPP which had been the majority or ruling party in the country since 1951.

Many associations or organizations contributed to both the uniqueness of Sierra Leone as well as its future development as a free country. A short analysis of these associations or organizations indicates the role they played in shaping the modern Sierra Leone.

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Groups

By pre-colonial groups is meant associational and non-associational interest groups or societies which existed in Sierra Leone before its colonization. It should be noted that some of these indigenous groups still exist, performing much the same functions as before. On the other hand, by colonial organizations or groups, reference is made to those associational, non-associational and anomic that is, episodic or spontaneously violent groups which evolved in colonial times to protect the rights and interests of their members against European imperialism. But it is interesting to know also that most of these groups were inspired by strong Western political ideas and later flowered, first, into parapolitical pressure groups or par-national parties, and finally, into full fledged political parties.

In the former protectorate of Sierra Leone, there were and still are institutions, structures and groups which are quite peculiar to the idigenes of that part of the country. These interest groups

contain all the elements required to make them appropriately classified as socio economic-cultural organizations or parapolitical organizations. The best, apparently, the most functional and important of these typically traditional organizations, are the "secret" societies in which all initiates take secrecy oaths under pain of severe sanctions including the death penalty. Cartey and Kilson recognize these secret institutions among others as "the foundation of African society ... the seedbed and justification for self-rule, for independence, for non-intrusion of European influences and institutions."⁴

Lowie refers to these institutions as "simple cultures." It is not very clear what is meant by Lowie's "simple cultures," but one would agree that in Sierra Leone and other traditional African societies, members of each of these societies are not categorized entirely according to kinship or localities, but that they enter associations according to sex, age, religious persuasions and socio-political interests.⁵ Indeed, these functional groupings were established in ancient times for specific purposes. As Wallerstein puts it:

⁴Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, eds., The African Reader: Independent Africa (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. XV-XVI. See also Max Gorvie, Old and New in Sierra Leone (London and Redhill: United Society for Christian Literature, Lutterworth Press, 1945), Chs. 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8.

⁵Robert H. Lowie, "Social Organization," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XLV, 146.

The associations were few in number, and in theory, were fixed entities. The individual did not in principle choose to enter; rather, he was assigned a certain association. The associations operated on the same basis as the overall political structure: the acceptance of traditional ways as the only legitimate activities of individuals within the society.⁶

Traditional voluntary associations or interest groups were essentially non-innovative or conservative institutions. They did not, as a rule, consciously seek to modify the social structure in which they existed. No doubt this is why Rose calls them "extensions of the government."⁷

The most important traditional Sierra Leonean secret societies for male citizens are "porro," "ghamgbanee," "wonde" and "bethe". The all-female secret society is "bondoe." These societies are, generally speaking, indigenous to the Northern, Eastern and South-Western Provinces, i.e., the former Protectorate.

In the Western Area, i.e., the former British Crown Colony, the two principal secret societies are "Orjeh" and "Hunting" Societies. Unlike the provincial secret societies, these societies are more uni-dimensional, concentrating mostly on mutual welfare and cultural programs for their individual members. The counter-part of these Western area organizations in the Eastern, Northern, and South-Western

⁶Immanuel Wallerstein, "Voluntary Associations," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Roseberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1970), p. 318.

⁷A. Rose, Sociology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), p. 307. See also D. Forde, "The Governmental Role of Association Among the Yaks," Africa XXX (October 1961), 309-323.

Provinces are the "Thoma," "Yase," "Himoi," "Manewoe," "Njayee," "Tenreh," and "Ayogbo" societies.

Many of these cultural mutual-aid societies are as integrative as they are regionalized. For example, Himoi, Manewoe, Yase and Thoma (also Tomei) and Njayee are conventionally associated with, and located in the Kailahun, Kono and Moyamba districts in the Eastern and Southwestern provinces, respectively.

Landei and Nyangbei societies are based in the Kailahun districts and the Ngafei in the Kenema district, Eastern province. Tenreh and Ayogbo are mainly in the Port Loko and Kambia districts in the Northern province. Some of these societies were founded in the early colonial era; but they are nevertheless traditional cultural societies.

This means that these institutions or societies have over the years molded the general behavior patterns of the Kissi, Kono, Mende, Sherbro (Bolome) Limba, Timni and other tribes in the various regions of the country. It should be noted that from time immemorial each of these so-called tribes had always recognized itself as a nation, until fairly recently when the concept of a Sierra Leone nationhood started to dawn vaguely upon them.

Cartwright, Kilson, Kenneth Little, Banting, Max Gorvie and many other scholars on the social and political institutions of Sierra Leone recognize secret societies as mechanisms which have tended to

give people a common tribal identity.⁸ Kenneth Little particularly, notes that the Porro Society "seems to have been the indirect means by which uniformity both in government and social customs was made possible among the congeries of widely scattered and relatively independent communities."⁹

Apart from ceremonial functions, secret societies were formerly institutions for training young citizens in civic and military arts, mothercraft, housecraft, science, ethics, philosophy, economics, politics and agriculture.

Today, these functions have been largely taken over and reinforced by such modern institutions as Western oriented schools, health clinics, and cultural centers. But most people of provincial origin still find it either inevitable or expedient to undergo at least symbolic initiation in one or more of these traditional institutions. A large number of politicians in nearly every constituency in Sierra Leone tap the enormous influence of all the local secret or open societies likely to favor them;¹⁰ and they may do all this although such a practice constitutes the offense of undue influence, or unlaw-

⁸John R. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone: 1947-1967 (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 13.

⁹Kenneth Little, "Mende Political Institutions in Transition," Africa, XVII (January 1947), 12.

¹⁰John Cartwright, op. cit., pp. 247-249, 260-261.

unlawful administration of oaths under the prevailing Electoral Provisions Act.

The introduction or super-imposition of British colonial administrative structures upon the existing traditional socio-political structures of Sierra Leone significantly affected the development of this country. Of particular interest is the effect of the introduction of Western style political organizational patterns on the indigenous institutions discussed above and the foundation these new structures laid for the later development of Sierra Leone's ultimate achievement of sovereignty.

It has been noted by Wallerstein that British colonial rule in Africa gave rise to "urbanization and participation in the world market economy, modern technology, particularly in the fields of transportation and communications, and a modern educational system."¹¹ One should hasten to add also that westernization or British colonial administrative practice brought in its train alien institutions and the adulteration of the value systems and mores of the many ethnic groupings in Sierra Leone. In fact, the impact of this change synthesized into the flowering of a number of para-political organizations or new interest group types.

¹¹Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 319.

Western Style Political Organizations

A number of socio-cultural and quasi-political organizations flourished in Sierra Leone long before independence. Martin Kilson is quite correct in observing that Sierra Leone was clearly in the lead of political organization development in colonial Africa, long before the Second World War.¹² Careful analysis of pre-independence organizations results in our dividing these roughly into two classes, namely, the informal or non-associational and the formal or associational groups.

The former groups were composed mainly of and led by illiterate or semi-literate Sierra Leoneans of Protectorate origin (the "country-people") and the former groups by the European-oriented Creoles of the former Crown Colony. As may be recalled, Great Britain obtained the colony on the West Atlantic Coast of Sierra Leone in 1788 from King Nembana for the settlement or resettlement of various groups of freed slaves from England, North America and the West Indies, chiefly from Jamaica. It is the descendants of these various groups who constitute the ethnic group called Creoles, also "Krio," in Sierra Leone.

Creole Led Parapolitical Organizations

Some of the associational or parapolitical organizations led and constituted primarily by Creoles were founded either on the

¹²Martin Kilson, Political Change in a Western African State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 219.

initiative of these people or that of the local British government officials, seemingly acting in an unofficial capacity. It must, however, be observed that whereas French administrators in North, West and Central Africa were more prominent in inspiring voluntary associations or interest groups in their colonies, their British counterparts played a much more subdued role. According to Hodgkin, French government officials in West Africa, for example, initiated Groupes d'Etudes Communites, a veritable pro-French training ground for politicized and socialized African leaders who later inevitably founded and administrated the monolithic Rassemblement Democratique Africaine.¹³

The British-inspired voluntary associations in Sierra Leone include such organizations as the United Christian Council (UCC), the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides Associations, the Sierra Leone Ex-Servicemen's Association, the YMCA, YWCA, and so on.

If any of the voluntary associations founded in Sierra Leone had not been intended to be pacification mechanisms for Africans, their British promoters would not have promoted them in the first instance. The indispensability of these so-called voluntary organizations to British colonial administration was openly admitted,

¹³Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Frederick Muller Press, 1956), pp. 128 ff.; George Fischer, "Trade Union and Decolonization," Presence Africaine (English edition), Vol. VI-VII (1961), 121-169.

perhaps for the first time, at a Colonial Office Conference in 1948.

A portion of the report of this conference states that:

This association of Africans with voluntary work of all kinds might indeed provide the key to securing the active cooperation of the educated classes in government policy and in programmes for social and economic betterment.

In Siberia the Russians have obtained the support of the educated people by associating them closely with the work of the local Communist Party. The lighting of the spark which may destroy inertia and secure wholehearted cooperation is a far more difficult task in Africa; but if it can be lighted many of the obstacles to political and social development would be removed.¹⁴

Without doubt, the British desperately needed voluntary associations for the purpose of importing, spreading and perpetuating Western values in Sierra Leone. This process of indoctrination tended to produce many hybrids or marginal men and women in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, it brought about social and political cleavages between the ethnic groups in the Provinces and the Western Area Creoles. But there were other and more indigenous Creole controlled organizations.

In the mid 1850's, Creole merchants formed the Sierra Leone Mercantile Association (SLMA). In actuality, this organization was a quasi-political interest group founded for the declared purpose of promoting the interests of the entire local trading community. The

¹⁴Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, African No. 1174 (London: H.M.S.O., 1948), 122.

SLMA from time to time employed political pressure tactics in order to influence public policy to its advantage. John Ezzidio, a prominent member of this group, was appointed to the Legislative Council by the colonial governor in 1863, to represent commercial interests. He was in fact the first Sierra Leonean to enter the legislature.¹⁵ It is possible to see how the divide-and-rule colonial strategy of the British was used in this non-elective token appointment. In later years, however, the educated elite of the relatively backward protectorate protested the political dominance of the minority Creole ethnic group. As will be shown later, the British colonial government supported the contention of the protectorate leaders and reversed the existing situation as the years went by, especially beginning from 1924, when a new Constitution was introduced.

After only ten years of active existence, the SLMA became inoperative. In 1872 its place was taken over by the Sierra Leone Natives Association (SLNA) (1872-1882). This was another elitist pressure group. In its own turn, the SLNA was superseded by the Sierra Leone Association in 1884. This group which operated up to 1888, was far more pluralistic than the conservative and elitist SLNA. At least, it appealed to the poorer Creoles and non-Creoles in the

¹⁵Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 319-320. See also Martin Kilson, "Sierra Leone," in Coleman and Rosberg, Jr., op. cit., pp. 93-94, and Sierra Leone Government Blue Book, 1963 (Freetown, 1864).

colony. SLA actually began as the Improvement of Defence of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry Association (IDCAIA). It is interesting to learn that the SLA included some European businessmen. As a matter of fact, one Herr Ernst Vohsen, the then German Consul in Freetown, was appointed the first President of the association.¹⁶ Another striking feature of this organization was that it held frequent public meetings in Freetown, very much in the manner of political parties. A reporter in a newspaper of that time wrote about one of the SLA's mass meetings and stated that "the Susus, Madingoes, and Timinees Mustered Strong; the boatmen ... the labourers, and porters, the hawkers and petty traders ... all were present."¹⁷

The SLA hardly ever lost an opportunity to address petitions and letters of complaints regarding official and non-official trade inhibiting activities by Chiefs and Warriors in the hinterland. The pressure exerted on government by this group eventually led to the British Government's declaration of a Protectorate over the apparently menacing hinterland of Sierra Leone.

The SLA flourished for only a short while. It became passive in 1888, and thus arrested the political development of the colony for some time, actually until 1909 when mercantilist pressure groups gave way to a new phenomenon in the form of real protopolitical organizations.

¹⁶Martin Kilson, op. cit., p. 212, also, Sierra Leone Weekly News, January 24, 1885, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷Sierra Leone Weekly News, October 10, 1885, p. 2.

Ratepayers Associations

Ratepayers Associations were founded in Freetown, one in each of its three wards, in 1909. These associations were established in response to the limited electoral franchise granted to propertied citizens by the colonial government. Ratepayers Associations were not political parties in the true sense of the word. It was never the intention of the members of the Ratepayers Associations to form a Government in the Colony or to establish a formal political party. These organizations were nevertheless politically active. As a matter of fact, so politically motivated were these interest groups that one Mayor of Freetown is on record for tersely commenting as follows:

I must severely condemn the party-spirit and antagonism for purposes ... which have manifested themselves during the year in Council meetings It is like a desire to secure the personal ends rather than the interests of the city.¹⁸

Qualified electors in the Ratepayers Associations did not elect members to the Legislative Council until 1924. Meanwhile, it is to be noted that associations also performed social services generally concerned with local public health and child welfare programs.

With the introduction of national party organizations in Sierra Leone by the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone in

¹⁸Fifteenth Annual Minute of the Mayor of the City (Freetown, 1910), p. 22.

1950, and the Sierra Leone People's Party in 1951, the Ratepayers Associations ceased to be active.

Nationalist Movements

From 1920, two protonationalist organizations came into being contemporaneously with the Ratepayers Associations. These two organizations were the Sierra Leone branches of the National Congress of British West Africa (SLNCBWA), and the Youth League (SLYL). Both of these branch organizations originated in the Crown Colony in 1920 and 1938, respectively. The nearest or comparable provincial organizations to the SLNC and SLYL were the Protectorate Educational Progressive Union (PEPU) and the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS).¹⁹

In the section on old and new elites in the politics of Sierra Leone which follows, the nature and leadership of the protonational structures referred to above will be discussed in more detail. Suffice it to note that like the Ratepayers Associations, the SLNC, PEPU, and SOS were organized along similar lines as those in Western countries. The main ideas borrowed from foreign sources were in any case adapted as far as possible to suit local conditions.

Associations for Migrant Tribesmen

The Creoles, due to their longer and more profound exposure to Western political education, had set up organizations designed to

¹⁹Martin Kilson, "Sierra Leone" in Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., pp. 94-99.

promote their economic, political, and social interests with relative ease since the 1800's. The people of the Protectorate inevitably had a very late start. They only began to establish their own modern European style non-secret interest groups after World War II. With the influx of Protectorate tribesmen in and around Freetown a new type of association evolved to provide for these largely uneducated and unskilled displaced persons. This was a big problem for both the bewildered migrants and the government which was not able to provide for most of them.

In reference to the special multi-purpose voluntary welfare associations which emerged in Sierra Leone, Banton comments that they "developed partly in response to the need for role differentiation - for statuses...."²⁰ In these ad hoc organizations Banton maintains that "migrants learn the principles of conduct in an achievement-oriented society."²¹

The associations of relevance to this study are (a) the externally inspired and administered or early paternal colonial organization and (b) the indigenous early credit and thrift or mutual aid societies and their influence in the determination of Sierra Leone's foreign policy. The universality of this class of organizations is

²⁰M. P. Banton, West African City (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 182, and Banton, "The Ethnography of the Protectorate," in Sierra Leone Studies, 4 (1955), 240-249.

²¹M.P. Banton, West African City, *ibid.*, p. 181.

striking in Africa. In order to give the foundation on which Sierra Leone's present day voluntary associations and friendly societies have been built, it is necessary to make at least a passing reference to two examples of each of these two colonial prototypes.

Of the earliest externally inspired colonial foundation organizations, reference should be made to the African Institution and the Friendly Society of Sierra Leone. In category two, that is, the indigenously inspired specific benefit organizations, reference is made to Potts' Benefit Society and ex-servicemen's benefit companies. All the organizations in both categories were designed to enhance the welfare of the new colonists or settlers of Sierra Leone who included both freed slaves, recaptives and disbanded soldiers in the West Indian Regiment based in Freetown in the 19th century.

Category 1

(a) The African Institution -- This society or interest group was founded by the sponsors of the Sierra Leone Company (SLC) soon after it handed over the administration of its colony to the British Government at the end of 1807. The aims of the African Institution were to watch over the administration of the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act, 1807, to give general advice to the British colonial administrators on the management of affairs in the New Colony and to "promote civilization and development of West African people."²²

²²Sierra Leone Studies, New Series, No. 12 (December 1959), 197-200.

This paternal ambitious interest group existed until 1833. It influenced the making and execution of British foreign policy in Sierra Leone to a remarkable degree although only indirectly since it had no official standing in the colony. It played its role in the decision making process and foreign policy administration in Sierra Leone by offering expert advice on overseas trade to the government. The members of the African Institution, it should be noted, had considerable knowledge of Euro-African commerce and politics which it drew upon from time to time to influence the colony's foreign policy determination process.

(b) The Friendly Society of Sierra Leone -- In 1811, one Paul Cuffe, an enterprising Afro-American, visited Sierra Leone, where he founded the Friendly Society of Sierra Leone, in order to advance the general interests of the Colony. Cuffee contacted the Directors of the African Institution in England and with their concurrence he brought to Sierra Leone some Afro-Americans who taught their native kinsmen agriculture and mechanics.²³ The Friendly Society expressly made an impact on the development of foreign policy by giving the government pertinent advice on Afro-American Relations and international trade.

²³Ibid.

Category 2

(a) Potts' Benefit Society -- One Abram Potts, a retired army sergeant in the 4th West Indian Regiment, organized a benefit society in 1824. Potts made membership available to disbanded soldiers in particular and to the general public.

Two characteristics of Potts' society welfare organization were as follows. First, it made provisions for both former soldiers and recaptives who faced the awesome problem of resettlement in a strange land. Second, the laws of the society gave it the appearance of a non-voluntary or government administered organization. Perhaps a recital of the seven laws of this society will help to give an insight into its nature and administration. Certainly, the society had more than a military flavor to it.

After invoking King George the Fourth "by the grace of God" the preamble to the society's legal code states that "This Society is to be made with law and the law shall be read to the whole of the Brethren of the said society understanding this society is made for the purpose of helping each other in trouble and in death, to bury each other, to behave and keep ourselves from the trouble of this world by the help of God."²⁴ The laws governing the society are enumerated in one of Fyfe's works.²⁵

²⁴C.O. 267/82. Enclosures in Governor Campbell's Confidential Dispatch of 30 July, 1827, Freetown Cited in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, op. cit., p. 140.

²⁵Fyfe, *ibid.*

Abraham Potts was no doubt barely literate, but he certainly rose to the needs of the one thousand or so disbanded black soldiers then resident in the colony in 1819 and the growing number of slaves recaptured or seized from slave ships bound for Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean. Potts' contribution to the development of interest groups in pre-independence times in Sierra Leone is remarkable. In the opinion of this writer, cooperative societies in Sierra Leone stem from Potts' society and the companies. Potts' interest group influenced that part of European foreign policy which related to the emancipation and resettlement of freed slaves in Sierra Leone.

(b) Recaptives Companies -- Most probably, the lessons learned from the organization and administration of Potts' society made it possible for recaptives or liberated slaves domiciled in Sierra Leone to establish their own benefit societies. For one reason or the other, recaptives preferred to call their benefit societies "Big Companies" or "Little Companies." The original information source of these companies is an article written by W. Hamilton, a retired naval officer, also a Manager in the colony, 1834-37. Hamilton states that titles assumed by important men in the company were the names of notable men in the Colony. Reference is made to such dignitaries as Kenneth Macauley, the leading merchant in Freetown in the 1920's, Joseph Reffell in charge of the Liberated African

Department, Robert Dougan, an Afro-West Indian business man and lawyer, and W. H. Savage, a popular Afro-European trader.²⁶

According to Hamilton:

... Immediately the newly-located African can procure a little money, he generally becomes a member of one of those associations which the good sense of the captured-Negro population has taught them the advantage of. While belonging to one of these societies, he is secure against such misfortunes as the foresight and attention of semi-barbarous people can be expected to protect him.²⁷

Friendly Societies

In present day Sierra Leone, the law requires friendly societies to be officially registered. Although many such organizations do not comply with this legal requirement, those which did so and those that do not seem to have similar aims and objectives. Generally, they all seek to promote or foster friendly relations among their members and to assist each other financially and otherwise in the event of death in the family or some other distress. There is no doubt that everyone can see the similarity in structure and function between Sierra Leone's present day friendly societies and the associations of recaptives described above.²⁸

²⁶W. Hamilton, "Sierra Leone and the Liberated Africans," in The Colonial Magazine and Commercial Maritime Journal, Vol. VII (1841), 34-36.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Gazette, Government Notice No. 1202, 16th December, 1971.

The patterns of interest groups referred to so far in this chapter may be classified under five categories within the context of the definition of interest group in Chapter I. These categories are the (i) traditional African institutions or secret societies, (ii) economic or commercial pressure groups, (iii) localized parapolitical pressure groups, i.e., the City of Freetown Ratepayers Association, (iv) Paranational pressure groups, i.e., the Sierra Leone chapter of the National Council of British West Africa, the Sierra Leone Youth League etc., and (v) non-political voluntary associations. Some of these voluntary associations were the creations of local British colonial officials, acting discreetly. Other associations were created by the leaders of the migrant mass urban dwellers to provide for the psychological and economic needs of this uprooted category of Sierra Leoneans. The officially registered friendly societies, as well as unregistered ones, found everywhere in Sierra Leone, may be classified under this category.

Thus, it is clear that these different interest or pressure groups assume a variety of forms: political, economic, mutual aid, cultural and social. Whereas some serve only one particular purpose there are those which serve many purposes.

It is an assumption in this study that almost all of the interest groups in Sierra Leone are being carefully watched by the government for any anti-nationalist behavior patterns or anti-

government attitudes. In a catch-all political party structure, such as the ruling All People's Congress now appears to be, the process of keeping voluntary organizations under control or actually converting them into party substructures is a fact individuals and groups have to contend with. Not unlike other independent states in Africa, Sierra Leone possibly feels that it has a commitment to nation-building and modernization, hence the need to politicize and consolidate all institutions and social groups within its borders. If this sense of commitment becomes a political dogma, the writer sees a one-party political system evolving. Eisenstadt saw this happening to the Third World in the mid 1950's. On this topic he writes prophetically as follows:

With the transition to independence and growing emphasis on wider administrative and power relations, there may arise a tendency to gear all new developments to the symbols of national identification. Autonomous development of various parties and social groups, therefore, may sometimes be viewed as interfering with the stabilization of the basic institutional framework.²⁹

It is this writer's view that although voluntary associations and other associational interest groups may retain their original organizational structure in an independent Third World state, there is every possibility of their being more rigorously manipulated by the

²⁹S. Eisenstadt, "Approaches to the Problem of Political Development in Non-Western Societies," in World Politics, IX (April, 1957), 452-453. Also refer to Immanuel Wallerstein's analysis of the reciprocal pressures on voluntary associations in his "How Seven States Were Born in Former French West Africa," in Africa Report, VI (March, 1961).

political party in power. Non-cooperation with the government may be subject to disbandment or proscription. In a one-party state this is even more likely the case. The role of Sierra Leone's pre-independence pressure groups in developing the constitutional framework will be discussed in Chapter III and that of its political parties in Chapter IV.

Old and New Elite Structures

This section concerns itself with different kinds of elite structures in Sierra Leone at the various stages of its development. Particular reference is made to the relatively small groups of influential people who gave direction and momentum to the long struggle with the British Government for Sierra Leone's ultimate sovereignty. In this study, old and new elite structures are broken down into three subgroups, namely, traditional or precolonial, colonial and post-colonial structures.

In the group of traditional elite structures this writer includes the Kugba or Warrior class, the Chieftaincy class and the leaders of the initiation or secret societies. The colonial elite structures include the local British bureaucracy, the educated Africans (mainly Creoles, or the "intelligentsias"), the Sierra Leone Mercantile Association, the Sierra Leone Natives Association, the Sierra Leone Association, the Protectorate Education Association, the Sierra Leone Organization Society and the Protectorate Educational

Progressive Union. The post-colonial political groups are comprised of the new political party leadership, the bureaucracy, the military, the chieftaincies and the Sierra Leone People's Party which Kilson terms a "traditio-modern elite" structure and the other political parties which emerged after 1951.

Coleman and Roseberg describe the phrase "elite political culture" as a cluster of "attitudes, beliefs, values, orientation toward authority and self-image of leaders of new states regarding their political roles and capacities."³⁰ Kilson in turn defines the new elite in Africa as "the more advanced elements among the new African social categories arising under colonialism."³¹ The traditional elites in Sierra Leone may be said to fit in with these two definitions. By way of comparison, however, whereas traditional elites were generally speaking not aristocratic, ascriptive and restrictive in their elitism, those in the colonial era were. Coleman and Rosberg maintain that traditional elitism was not "an arrogant, condescending elitism crudely flaunted before the people. On the contrary, political leaders are fortified in their elitist proclivities by the deference accorded them by the masses."³²

³⁰Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 662.

³¹Kilson, op. cit., p. 68.

³²Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 662.

The educated class, top civil servants and the military officer corps, were mainly British citizens until just before independence. These foreign administrators demonstrated an arrogant form of elitism not known in Sierra Leone before it was colonized and they influenced the determination and administration of colonial foreign policy in the territory.

Many African scholars and politicians registered their protest against the mis-education and negative socialization of Africans by the British, French, Belgian and other European metropolitan powers. In his Without Bitterness, Orizu denounces the part played by Western education and Christianity in robbing the people of Nigeria of their militancy, of destroying the original influence of Nigerian kings, and of creating an arrogant educated class or "intelligentsia" in Africa.

Western educated Africans according to Orizu, generally regard their ancestral culture with great contempt, obeying no laws and observing no rules but the Englishman's. This contempt for culture and institutions of their own people, then became the sign of education. This educated class, Orizu maintains, became a new privileged class--privileged because they felt themselves above the chiefs, above the elders, above the Nigerian diet, above the Nigerian attire, above the Nigerian form of marriage, above the people's ceremonies, in fact, above Nigeria.³³ What Orizu has said here about Nigeria is true of

³³Nwafor Orizu, "The Corrupting Influence of the West," excerpted from his Without Bitterness (New York, 1944) and published in Cartey and Kilson, The Africa Reader: Independent Africa, op. cit., pp. 63-68.

Sierra Leone, if not more so.

There were other Africans who made vehement denouncements of European social influences and imperialism in the colonial period. Among them is Nnamdi Azikiwe, later Governor General of the Federation of Nigeria, 1963-66. In his speech before the British Peace Congress in October, 1949, he lashed out at the hypocrisy of the British in their colonies. Patrice Lumumba decried the heartless exploitation of his country, Congo Leopoldville, now Zaire, by its Belgian colonizers. Ramatoulaye and Penda of Senegal opposed French interference in their country.³⁴

In Sierra Leone, the attitude and aspirations of the Creole elites were different. Horton, a Sierra Leonean physician trained in Scotland, pleaded for the inculcation of English manners and influences in the Crown Colony. He believed that that colony was the best place on the coast for the British government "to carry out their laudable intentions for Africa ...". He insisted that "the language of self-government, when formed, must of necessity be English, and all official and private business must be done in it. It comes readily to all those born in the colony. There will be no spirit of native language counter-acting, modifying, and balancing it, because it is now the universal language of the Colony."³⁵ Dr. Blyden as well as Horton, wanted self-government for Sierra Leone in the long

³⁴ Cartey and Kilson, *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

³⁵ James Africanus B. Horton, "Education and Self-Government for Sierra Leone," in Cartey and Kilson, *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

run, but he also made a strong plea for insuring the permanence of British cultural and political influences in the colony. There is an unmistakable irony about the attitude of these two men in regard to their ideal development of a nation state in Sierra Leone.

Ambivalence of the Educated Elite

Although many scholars and politicians have been critical of the role of the intellectual elite in Africa, others have emphasized their role in obtaining freedom for Africa and termed them "articulators of freedoms." Among the critics of African intellectuals is Frantz Fanon who regrets that the educated elite's mind has been subverted by a colonial education that has made him unfit to give greater momentum to the thrust toward total independence.³⁶ Asika is stunned by the omnipresence of those Nigerians referred to as "intellectuals." He is struck not merely by their prominence, but also by their opportunism, parochialism, and the negativity of their performance.³⁷ Wole Soyinka deplores the failure of the African writer, while Chinua Achebe pleads for the duty and involvement of his fellow Nigerian and

³⁶Frantz Fanon excerpted from the Wretched of the Earth (1966) and reprinted in Cartey and Kilson, *Ibid.*, pp. 126-142. See also Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks and A Dying Colonialism.

³⁷Ukpabi Asika, "A Social Definition of the African Intellectual," in Nigerian Opinion, January 1967 and February 1967, pp. 3-6.

other African writers in the struggle for freedom. Aime Cesaire asks the intellectual and the artist, not only to agitate for decolonization but also to prepare a good decolonization.

What does come out clearly from this study of the role of the intellectual elite in Sierra Leone and other African states is evidence of their ambivalence. In Sierra Leone it was, and still is, not uncommon to refer to some people as "Watemán," meaning "Whitemán" in Creole, or as "White-blackman" because of their habitual aping of Europeans, particularly Englishmen. The ambivalence of such eminent men as Horton and Blyden referred to above is very eloquent.

There is, however, need to stress the positive role of the intellectual elite in the political education of the Sierra Leone masses and the achievement of independence. This reference is to the colonial and post-colonial elite, essentially as one dynamic group. As may be readily seen, the activities of the colonial elite merge almost imperceptibly with those of their post-colonial counterparts. Indeed, in some cases, the writer will be talking about the same people or organizations and not two separate groups of people.

The pre-independence elite was chiefly made up of civil servants, well-to-do businessmen, African Managers in European-owned firms, politicians and members of the liberal professions, education, law and medicine. Most of the people in the elite categories were, until very recently, Creoles in the Western Area, that is the former

Crown Colony. This is not entirely surprising. As Dr. Easmon notes, the Creole elements had disproportionate educational opportunities over their counterparts in the Protectorate. Arising from this is the fact that, up to 1950, there was a preponderance of Creole lawyers and doctors in Sierra Leone. The first three Protectorate-born lawyers qualified only in 1948, 1949 and 1950; one in each of these years. The Creoles had, at least, seventy medical doctors by 1950, as compared to only four physicians of Protectorate origin who qualified between 1927 and 1952.³⁸

Between 1951 and 1956, the records show that 97 candidates, nearly all Creoles, from the Colony and only 39 candidates from the Protectorate, were granted scholarships to study in institutions of higher learning overseas.³⁹ This disparity in opportunities between the Creole community and the aborigenes in the Protectorate constituted a fundamental problem in effecting mutual relations between the two units of Sierra Leone. As will be shown in this author's analysis of the development of the constitutional framework for Sierra Leone in Chapter III, pressure groups were formed in the Protectorate with the aim of getting a more equitable distribution of social, economic and political opportunities. Also, in that chapter, there will be

³⁸M.C.F. Easmon, "Sierra Leone Doctors," in Sierra Leone Studies, (June 1956,)pp. 81-96.

³⁹Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, VIII, Session 1955-1956 (September 27, 1956), 12-14.

highlighted the ideological or doctrinal quarrels between the Colony and Protectorate leaders as matters came to a head during the 1947-1950 constitutional crisis.

The importance of the intellectual elite cannot in any case be overemphasized. Without some of Africa's more nationally minded intellectuals, all those mass political parties and movements which evolved in the early 1950's, that is, a few years before independence, in Sierra Leone and other countries in Africa, would not have been formed. It seems clear that without these mass parties and movements, Sierra Leone's nationalism would have been nothing but an ever receding horizon or a wild dream, at best. Edward Shils assesses the political significance of African intellectuals in the nationalist movements in the following manner:

This gestation, birth, and continuing life of the new states of Asia and Africa, through all their vicissitudes, are in large measures, the work of intellectuals. In no state formations in all human history have intellectuals played such a role as they have in these events of the present century.⁴⁰

Why did the intellectuals become political agitators for, and articulators of independence, in Sierra Leone, particularly at the end of World War II? The answer apparently is that there was no politically oriented interest group both willing and capable of

⁴⁰Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in World Politics, XII (April, 1966), 329-368.

articulating, aggregating and communicating the interests of the masses other than the intellectual elite. No other group was competent enough to bargain with imperial Britain from some position of influence and strength. The educated elite themselves, for strategic reasons, originally only agitated for reforms or fair treatment and not for outright independence. The British were not in the mood to negotiate independence before World War II, in any case.

Company Rule, 1787-1807

When the Sierra Leone Peninsula was converted to British ownership in 1787, through a somewhat dubious "purchase", the territory was then used as a settlement for recaptives, freed slaves and a trading post. The new colony developed around Freetown, initially as a combined private enterprise and a humanitarian colonization experiment and was administered along these lines for about twenty years. One might recognize here a paradoxical mixture of philanthropism and private business tinged with a profit motive. A group of anti-slavery English humanitarians, under the leadership of Granville Sharp, administered the "Province of Freedom" from 1787-1792 and handed its power over this area in 1792 to the Sierra Leone Company, a British chartered corporation.⁴¹

⁴¹Ronald Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 155-159; Christopher Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 108-165; Substance of the Report of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to the General Court; held in London on Wednesday the 19th of October, 1791 (London: James Philips, 1791), pp. 50-54; and Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (Oxford University Press, 1962).

The Treaty of Resettlement, that Thompson and King Tom signed, formed the basis of the early administration of Sierra Leone. All the earlier and later Creole political leaders also used the substance of this treaty in making their case for preferential treatment over the natives of the hinterland. The treaty is quoted in part below as it speaks for itself.

Know all men by these presents, that I King Tom, chief of Sierra Leone on the Grain Coast of Africa, by and with the consent of the other Kings, Chiefs and Potentates subscribing hereto, in consideration of these presents, as by a list annexed, now made me by Captain Boulden Thompson of His Britanic Majesty's Ship Nautilus, Joseph Irwin Esqre and Rev. Patrick Frazer on and behalf of and for the sole benefit of the free community of settlers their heirs and successors not lately arrived from England and under the protection of the British Government, have granted and by these presents do grant and for ever quit claim to a certain district land for the settling of the said free community to be theirs, their Heirs and Successors forever, that is to say, All the land, wood and water which is contained from the bay commonly called Freeman's Bay but by these presents changed to that of St. George's Bay, coastwise up the river Sierra Leone to Gambia Island and southerly or inland twenty miles ... and I do hereby bind myself, my Heirs and Successors, to grant the said Free Settlers continuance of a quiet and peaceable possession of the Lands granted their Heirs and Successors forever.⁴²

⁴²Treaty of 11 June, 1787. Note: This Treaty was repudiated by King Kpana (Naimabana) on the ground that his subordinate local chief, Tom, had no authority to execute such a Treaty. In view of this, a new Treaty was signed by the King on 22nd August, 1788. (King Tom is not included.) See A. Montague, The Ordinance of Sierra Leone (London, 1875-1881).

The annexed list of presents, which were the consideration for the land, included: 8 muskets, 1 barrel gunpowder, 2 bags of lead balls 1 cwt, 3 dozen of hangars with red scabbards, 24 laced hats, 5 small niconees, 4 cotton romalds, 1 cask of rum containing 10 gallons, 34 lbs. of tobacco manufactured, 25 iron bars, 10 yards of scarlet cloth, 117 bunches of beads, 13 pieces of Britannias, 1 puncheon of rum containing 120 gallons.⁴³

Sierra Leone Company Administration

In addition to the initial heavy mortality among the Granville Sharp settlers, the problems of cultivation, personal rivalries among these settlers, and their expulsion from the Province of Freedom in 1789 by King Jimmy, King Tom's successor, aggravated the miseries of Richard Weaver and James Reid, the first two administrators of the settlement. In 1791 the Sierra Leone Company took over the government and commercial enterprise of the colony. In a rare blend of business and humanitarianism, the new company expressed the objective of its function in the following declaration:

For the sake of acquainting the Princes and Chiefs, as well as the natives in general, with the real views of the Company, and for the sake of counteracting misrep⁴⁴resentation that might be made concerning them ...

⁴³Ibid. See also citation in Fyfe's Sierra Leone Inheritance, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

⁴⁴Fyfe, op. cit., p. 116.

The substance of the company's reports for 1791, 1794 and 1796 is cited below:

The Sierra Leone Company established by the British Parliament do hereby declare, that they will send out goods from England and take all kinds of African produce in exchange; that they will not deal in slaves themselves, nor allow any slave trade on their ground.

They will always have a large store of European goods for sale, and a force sufficient to defend it.

Black and White settlers will all be equally governed, and will have their persons and property secured, according to the laws of Great Britain.

Schools for reading, writing and accounts will be set up by the Company, which will be ready to receive and instruct the children of such natives as shall be willing to put them under their care.⁴⁵

In the 1794 report of the Board of Directors, the 1791 assurance of the equal application of the law was repeated. The Directors again undertook "that the civil, military, personal, and commercial rights and duties of blacks and whites shall be the same and secured in the same manner."⁴⁶

The terms on which free blacks were granted citizenship in the colony included the possession and submission of satisfactory testimonials of character and certificate of approbation. Evidence of "honesty, and sobriety and industry" were clearly to be shown."⁴⁷

⁴⁵Substance of the Report of the Court of Directors, etc., 1791, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

⁴⁶Substance of the Report of the Court of Directors to the General Court of the Sierra Leone Company, Thursday, 27th March, 1794 (London, 1794), p. 6.

⁴⁷Ibid.

The administration of the Colony was vested in a London based Board of Directors who operated through a local governor, who was in turn assisted by a council composed of the representatives of the settlers. The Board represented thousands of British shareholders.

In 1791, and for many years thereafter, the Board consisted of:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Henry Thornton, Chairman | 8. Joseph Hardcastle |
| 2. Philip Sanfour, Deputy Chairman | 9. Thomas Clarkson |
| 3. Charles Middleton | 10. Vickers Taylor |
| 4. William Wilberforce | 11. William Sandford |
| 5. Granville Sharp | 12. Thomas Eldred |
| 6. John Kinston | 13. George Wolff |
| 7. Samuel Parker | |

The Council contained "tything" men and "hundredors", i. e. representatives of households and groups of ten and one hundred citizens, respectively. The Council was essentially advisory in character and function.

End of Company Rule

Company rule in Sierra Leone seemed to have been ill-fated from the beginning and was punctuated throughout its own decades by a series of crises. The SLC which succeeded Sharp's organization started from almost nothing, for in 1791, King Jimmy had gone back on the 1788 Treaty referred to above by expelling the settlers from the

Colony. Company Governor Clarkson, still well remembered by the Creole Community in Freetown and its environs, did a marvelous rehabilitative job. But even he had to recognize finally the insurmountable problem faced by the young colony. Here the author refers to constant wars waged against the puny Colony by the neighbouring Timni warrior chieftains and the French, the inadequacy of supplies from Britain, the unrelenting illnesses and daily deaths among the colonists, the incorrigibility of the Nova Scotian settlers in particular, the poor and inadequate housing and the insufficiency of land. As if to make matters worse, the SLC itself conceded that it had many incompetent and dishonest servants in its Trade Department in the Colony.⁴⁸

The SLC Directors' annual reports, with undisturbed monotony, gave an account of their administrative, social, economic, political and psychological setbacks.

The Company's 1796 report admits a severe trade recession it faced during the year due to the invasion of the colony by the French and misunderstandings it had with the Chiefs and people of the surrounding country. The report also records a short period of Nova Scotian support of the government, a fact which was the big surprise of the period, i.e. 1794-1796. In one of the concluding paragraphs of their report (1796) the Directors loudly complained that:

⁴⁸Ibid.

The disadvantages under which the Sierra Leone Company has laboured have been in many respects, peculiarly great; and the expenses attending its institution have been proportionally considerable; nevertheless, every year's probability of its establishment and future prosperity, and to have afforded fresh proof of the practicability of cultivating and civilizing the Continent of Africa.⁴⁹

The 1801 report of the Company was more emphatic than ever in its complaints about the problems of the colony. The report embodies complaints about the unruly spirit of the settlers, the 1794 insurrection, the attack on the colony by the French squadron in October, 1794, and the 1796 crisis over the issue of paying quit rent.

The 1801 report opens with the following complaint:

It appears from the accounts that the unruly spirit of the settlers which for some time before had been encroaching on the limits of the Company's authority, had at length broken forth into open revolt. This was a manifestation of a very ungovernable and refractory disposition, as well as a degree of jealousy and suspicion and their intercourse with the Company's European servants, which was utterly unreasonable.⁵⁰

The settlers complained bitterly that the payment of quit rent was tantamount to acquiescing in slavery and the slave trade. For

⁴⁹Substance of the Report of the Board of Directors delivered by the Board of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to the General Court of Proprietors, on Wednesday of the 30th March, 1796 (London: James Philips, 1796), pp. 14-15.

⁵⁰Substance of the Report delivered by the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to the General Court of Proprietors on Thursday the 26th March, 1801, etc. (London: James Philips, 1801), pp. 1-2.

them, quit rent was a "badge of slavery."⁵¹ So aggrieved were they that they repudiated the power of the Directors to legislate for them through their governor from thenceforward. They denied subjection to the laws of England, or to any laws which they themselves had not enacted.

The 1801 report of the SLC contains a code of laws made by the rebellious settlers, a code designed to replace the foreign imposed one since 1791.⁵²

As might be expected, Governor Ludlam of the Colony, condemned the laws of the hundredors and tythings as an act of defiance and an illegal assumption of authority. The Governor ordered the arrest and trial of the ringleaders of the insurrection. The settlers who signed the code of laws were accordingly punished. One Isaac Anderson was hanged, a James Robertson was banished to Goree, while Ansel Zizer and Abraham Smith, in whose house the code was displayed, were banished to the Bollome (Bullom) shore. One Mr. Nathaniel Wansey, who had escaped was later captured.⁵³ The Timni attack on the Colony on 18 November, 1801, reportedly on the instigation of Wansey, pointed to the fast approaching end of the Company's rule.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 4. Note: The payment of quit rent was conditional on the grant of land to the settlers by the SLC.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, op. cit., p. 124.

Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty with the Timni Kings and Princes, precisely on 31st December, 1807, the Sierra Leone Company surrendered its rule over the Colony to the Government of King George III of Great Britain.⁵⁴ This means that through a series of bad luck, misjudgment and mismanagement, the SLC found itself unable to maintain its charter rights over Sierra Leone, which is why the territory formally became a British Crown Colony effective from 1st January, 1808.

It is remarkable that the British Parliament enacted a law in 1807 which made slavery unlawful in its empire. This event was of great significance in the political history of Sierra Leone as already shown earlier in this chapter. The writer will return to the impact made by British anti-slavery Act in the succeeding chapter.

The importance of this Chapter is that it has described (a) the process by which one of the colonial powers of the 18th century that is Great Britain, colonized an African territory, namely Sierra Leone, (b) the successes and failures of the experiment of administering a colony by a philanthropic private trading company, and (c) the role of traditional and Western-type interest or pressure groups and para-statal institutions in the policy-making process of the country and its general political development. The period covered in

⁵⁴A. Montague, op. cit., Vol. II, 272-73 cited in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, op. cit., pp. 127-130.

this chapter ended on 31st December, 1807, that is, with the cessation of company government.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF THE SIX CONSTITUTIONS, INDEPENDENCE AND MODERNIZATION

The period from 1808 to 1971, and the events which took place in the intervening years may be considered to be the pivot and the most important area of this study. As will be shown, Sierra Leone developed its present parliamentary form of government during this formative and dynamic period. The provisions in each of the six constitutions to be studied took the country further and further on the road to ultimate independence. Each constitution gave more constitutional leverage to legislators and wider scope to administrators, particularly after the introduction of the 1951 (Hubert Stevenson) Constitution.

The evolution of new Western-type local pressure groups and, later, political parties, is a significant development of the period under review. These pressure groups evolved expressly for the purpose of insisting that the British government effect reforms in the civil service and that the legislature enact more liberal trade policies. The establishment of the British Protectorate in the hinterland of Sierra Leone in 1896 and its administration receive due attention in this chapter. The characteristics and functions of the political party system will be dealt with more fully in Chapter IV.

Taking the developmental approach, that is studying relevant events in the chronological order in which they occurred, it is the purpose of this chapter to analyze the constitutional development of Sierra Leone, its surge to sovereignty and the government's commitment to modernize the state.

Crown Colony Rule

By saying that the territory secured in Sierra Leone in 1787 by British abolitionists for the settlement of all classes of freed slaves and recaptives became a "Crown Colony" in 1808, it is meant that the British monarch assumed full legal legislative and administrative control over that part of the country formerly administered by the philanthropic Sierra Leone Trading Company. A Crown Colony is legally different from a Protectorate. The question is: how did the British Government fuse the Colony and the Protectorate into one country as time went by, and in the face of constant protestations from the Creoles of the Colony?

A Crown Colony presupposes that even if the territory in question previously had a constitution and representative government of its own, these indigenous institutions will now be considered to be superseded by those of the new foreign sovereign power. This was exactly the case in Sierra Leone.

When the British Government accepted full legislative and administrative responsibility for the Colony previously owned by the

Sierra Leone Colony, it exercised its jurisdiction through a Governor, with the assistance of a Council of ex-officio members who held their advisory positions at his pleasure. The all-British government political machinery remained virtually the same until 1863. In this year, the colonial council was split into two bodies, viz, a Legislative Council and an Executive Council, each functioning as its name suggests. In this year, also, history was made with the appointment of the first black man, Mr. John Ezzidio, a liberated Creole, to the Legislative Council. He was the first "unofficial," i.e., non-government official member of the legislature, elected at a meeting of Creole and white merchants in the Colony. The Governor, at whose pleasure the unofficial member of the Legislative Council served, made his appointment on the clear understanding that the unofficial representative did not subject himself to the control of his electors. In other words, the unofficial member was in the legislature purely at the pleasure of the British Monarch.¹

It seems easy and valid to posit that the first sixty-three years of Crown Colony rule were a period of stagnation, as far as African participation in the making of public policy was concerned. As pointed out above, the colonial government was a non-elective one

¹Christopher Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 319-320 and John R. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, 1947-67 (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 18.

of British officials, who laid down policy and administered it themselves. What difference did the 1863 Constitution of Sierra Leone make to its further political development and progress towards self-government? A review of the 1863, 1924, 1951, 1957, 1961, 1971 Constitutions will answer the question.

The Six Constitutions

The 1863 Constitution -- This limited Constitution remained in operation until 1924. Even with the expansion of the membership of the Legislative Council in 1913, political control still remained firmly in the hands of the Governor and his official majority. In 1922, and up to 1924, the composition of the Legislative Council was as follows:

President

The Governor

Official Members

The Officer Commanding the Troops

The Colonial Secretary

The Attorney General

The Colonial Treasurer

The Principal Medical Officer

Unofficial Members

Three African Members

One European Member²

The official reason given for the introduction of the new constitution was to provide for the government of an expanding Colony in a more efficient form. But it was clearly obvious that the idea of the British Crown was not to permit its subjects in Sierra Leone to govern themselves at that time, which explains why no far-reaching constitutional development was proposed by Westminster. It was still the much esteemed colonial policy of paternal benevolence. The metropolitan power always chose how far on the road to national self-determination its subjects should venture. The lapse of sixty-one years (1863-1924) is a terrible commentary on colonial rule and the powerlessness of the colonized.

What may be said favorably for the 1863 constitution is that, at least, it contained the potential for a future elective legislature and cabinet government. Even so, the intellectual and political elite of Sierra Leone were still reasonably dissatisfied with the progress of their country. In 1920, the National Congress of British West Africa addressed a "Humble petition to His Most Gracious Majesty George the Fifth, King of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Dominions beyond the Seas in Council," in which it outlined its grievances,

²Address by His Excellency the Governor on the Occasion of the Opening of the Legislative Council of Sierra Leone on 25th November, 1924. Note: The three African Members were the Honourable A. J. Shorunkeh Sawyerr, E. H. Cummings and Cornelius May, all Creoles.

chiefly, the denial of the right to self-determination, racial discrimination and the failure of the imperial powers to consult with African leaders in respect to the partitioning of Africa. Among the matters to which the petitioners addressed themselves was the 1863 Constitution which provided for an Executive Council composed entirely of Government Officials. In the opinion of the petitioners, the few African nominated members did not really represent their people. Regarding discrimination in the civil service, the petitioners had this to say:

That your Majesty's Petitioners would respectfully submit that the people of British West Africa suffer at present from the disability of invidious distinctions to appointments to offices in Your Majesty's British West African civil service.³

Maybe, at that point in time, and having full regard to their lack of fully qualified political and administrative experience, all the elites in the Crown Colony could hope to do beneficially was to exert some gentle pressure on the British government to enact a more favorable constitution and accept some of the reforms proposed by them in the interest of the African business elite and the professional class.

³Petition of the National Congress of British West Africa, 19th October, 1920 printed in the then Gold Coast Colony (Ghana), as Sessional Paper No. 7, Session 1919-1920; Paragraph 21. See also citation in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, op, cit., pp. 316-19.

The years 1863-1924 were, in a way, a period of gestation and great political ferment in Sierra Leone. Beside the fact that a new constitution had been enacted in 1863, and another new and more liberal one in 1924, the founding of a new West African pressure group, namely, the National Congress of British West Africa, was also of great historical and political importance. This group constantly prodded the British government for reforms in the electoral and administrative processes.

During this period of gestation one sees the ascendancy of the intellectual elite over the commercial interest. Sir Samuel Lewis Queen's Counsel, the first African to be knighted by the Crown, was appointed to the Legislative Council in 1882 and served until his death in 1903. Two lawyers, Messrs. Shorunkeh Sawyerr and May, and Dr. E. H. Taylor Cummings, a medical doctor, also became unofficial members of the Legislative Council under the 1863 Constitution. Apparently, even more significant than all the new developments in this period were, firstly, the establishment in 1896 of the Protectorate over the hinterland of the Colony by the British government, and secondly, the emergence of modern or Western types of interest groups in the Protectorate. These new types of interest groups (which developed in the Protectorate) inevitably challenged the predominance of their counterparts in the Crown Colony.

The Protectorate Administration

As long as the British Crown chose to extend its jurisdiction to the hinterland, it was inevitable that it should also develop domestic and foreign policies for its administration. Earlier in this chapter it was explained that the Protectorate administration was structured on the colonial doctrine of "Indirect Rule" and that it consisted of Provincial and District Commissioners served by a small corps of Court Messengers which replaced the Frontier Police embodied in 1889.⁴

The creation of the Protectorate, vigorously advocated by many Creole politicians and merchants, raised fundamental questions of international law when it became a fact in 1896 and thereafter. For example, many interest groups in the Colony asked the British government whether the Protectorate was not a foreign country, and, if so, how could representatives from it sit in the same legislature with British subjects in the Colony. Were not the people of the Protectorate aliens and the Creoles in the Colony British subjects? Could the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, be made applicable to the Colony? These questions in one form or another were posed constantly by the African (Creole) members of the Legislative Council. In 1922, it was first proposed by the Government to provide for Protectorate representation in the legislature. The debates of the Legislative Council

⁴Sierra Leone: C.O. 271/5 fol. 22, Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, January, 1889.

between 1922 and 1924, and 1947 and 1961 record the vigorous opposition of the Creoles to the idea of Protectorate men, not only being admitted to membership of the colonial legislature, but ultimately being preponderant in it, and finally, being welded into one nation with them.

In the 1923-24 session of the Legislative Council, the Honourable Shorunkeh Sawyerr, who was persistently critical of the nomination of Paramount Chiefs and Provincial Commissioners to this Chamber, asked the Governor the following questions:

1. Whether because the natives of the Protectorate are British protected persons (emphasis added) under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise, and may take the Oath of Allegiance to His Majesty the King, they cease to be aliens.
2. Whether legislation in which Paramount Chiefs may take part on the reconstitution of this Council will be confined to Protectorate matters or will be inclusive also of matters affecting the Colony.⁵

The Governor informed the Council in answer to the questions posed that he would need some time to consider their legal

⁵Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Colony: Legislative Council Debates, Session 1923-24 (Ref. No. 103/150/81/125), p. 151.

implications. He was quick to add that throughout his short time in Sierra Leone his impression of the public trend was in the direction of considering the interest of the Protectorate and Colony as one.

Subsequently, the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of the government, offered the following answers for the information of the Honourable Shorunkeh Sawyerr.

- (a) The Government is advised that a native of the Protectorate is not a British subject and does not become such by taking the Oath of Allegiance to His Majesty the King.⁶
- (b) It is not proposed to limit the rights of the Protectorate members in any way.⁷

As the constitutions between 1924 and 1972 will show, the former Crown Colony and Protectorate were forced into a legal marriage which was finally consummated in 1961, when Britain made Sierra Leone a monarchy. Fyfe notes that by 1911 "government had ceased to pay much needed attention to Creole members' speeches ... almost all vestige of real partnership faded away."⁸ Some students of the period 1900-1924 regard it as the highwater mark of British autocratic rule in Sierra Leone, whereas others view it as Britain's finest hour in

⁶Ibid., p. 151.

⁷Ibid., p. 161.

⁸Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 617.

laying the foundation for the present republican constitution of the country. Possibly, Britain did evil that good might come. By supporting the Protectorate, the British Government was no doubt laying the foundation for today's Republic of Sierra Leone.

The fact is, however, crystal clear that the British officials did use the principle of "divide and rule." Even the Bo Government School prospectus prepared by James Proudfoot, the first Principal of the School, confirms the anti-Creole and pro-natives policy of the British administration in Sierra Leone.⁹ Fyfe describes the prospectus as:

a curious amalgam of educational theories applied in the context of Indirect Rule. Through it runs the implicit determination to prevent the boys from getting the kind of education the Colony schools provided: they are not to become like Creoles ...¹⁰

The provincial administration was no doubt different from that of the Crown Colony, but through various legislative and administrative devices, the British government was able to technically rule Sierra Leone as if it were one country. The next five constitutions explain how this was made possible over the years. Up to the end of World War I the records studied do not reflect any significant interest

⁹Sierra Leone: Bo School Prospectus published as C.O. 271/11 Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 29 September, 1905.

¹⁰Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, op. cit., p. 304.

group politics. However, the Sierra Leone Branch of the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) founded in 1920 soon made its mark on the constitutional development of the country. It pressed officialdom for political reforms.

The 1924 Constitution

This constitution, debated in the Sierra Leone Legislative Council since 1923, is sometimes called the Slater Constitution since the then governor of the Colony, Sir Ransford Slater, was chiefly responsible for materializing it. It is of cardinal importance to Sierra Leone, firstly, because it extended the jurisdiction of both the Legislative and Executive Councils to the Protectorate, as was noted earlier. By its enactment, this constitution laid the foundation for the future political unification of the present Republic of Sierra Leone as well as providing a precedent for a wider common electoral franchise.

The 1924 constitution introduced direct popular elections in the Crown Colony, although the right to vote and to be voted for to the legislature was based on property qualification, among other requirements. The introduction of the principle of popular election is considered as equally important as the inclusion, for the first time, of ten unofficial members in the Executive Council.

In his Address to the Legislative Council in November, 1924, Governor Slater made one telling confession. In his address he admitted inter alia:

I soon discovered that many people, both unofficials and officials, were dissatisfied with the 1863 constitution of the Council. Provincial Commissioners and Paramount Chiefs had represented the anomaly presented by a Council which legislated for the Protectorate having on it no direct representative of the Protectorate; the Chamber of Commerce asked for more direct representation of commercial interests, and lastly, the local branch of the National Congress of British West Africa in an address of welcome presented to me on 10th May, 1922, urged the introduction of the elective franchise.¹¹

The appeal for the introduction of the elective franchise was politely postponed since it raised "more delicate issues." The SLNC of the NCBWA had asked for five directly elected African members to represent the Colony, four from Freetown and one from all the villages. The Governor was also empowered to nominate two members. He recommended and the Duke of Devonshire, the then Secretary of State, gave approval for the enlarged reconstituted Legislative Council. This Council consisted of:

The Governor, President

Eleven Official Members

The Officer Commanding the Troops

The Colonial Secretary

The Attorney General

The Colonial Treasurer

¹¹Sierra Leone, Address by His Excellency on the Occasion of the Opening on 25th November, 1924 of the Legislative Council of Sierra Leone, 1924.

The Director of Medical and Sanitary Services

The Provincial Commissioners of the Northern, the
Central and the Southern Provinces (3 members).

The Comptroller of Customs

The Director of Public Works, and

The Commissioner of Lands and Forests

Ten Unofficial Members

Three members to be elected by qualified voters in the
Colony of whom two shall be elected by the City of
Freetown, and one by the remainder of the Colony.

Seven members to be appointed by the governor in pur-
suance of instructions received from His Majesty
through the Secretary of State.¹²

It was explained that the seven nominated members were to
include two representatives of commercial, banking, shipping and
general European interests, one of these being appointed on the
recommendation of the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce. Two Africans
were to represent the Colony "on the understanding that at least one
Chief of the Mendi race is selected, and at least, one representative
of the Timnis."¹³ The elections (in the Colony only) were to be
conducted by secret ballot.

¹²Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1923-1924.

¹³Ibid.

It took Sierra Leone approximately sixty years to experiment with the 1863 constitution, and it took this country another twenty-seven years to establish whether or not the precarious political relationship between the Colony and Protectorate was a viable proposition in all its dimensions. It can be said that Sierra Leone's constitutional development was hastened by the post-war British Labour Government's commitment to full sovereignty for all its colonies. Secretary of State for Colonies, the Honourable George Hall, stated in the House of Commons on 9th July, 1946, that without hesitation:

... it is our policy to develop the Colonies and all their resources so as to enable their people speedily and substantially to improve their economic, and social conditions, and as soon as possible, to attain responsible self-government. To my Honourable Friends on this side of the Committee, the idea of one people dominating or exploiting another is always repugnant... To us the Colonies are a great trust, and their progress to self-government is a goal toward which His Majesty's Government will assist them with all means in their power. They shall go as fast as they show themselves capable of going.¹⁴

It may be validly said that the affirmation of Britain's colonial policy by the Honourable George Hall, as well as the aspirations of various interest groups in Sierra Leone, accelerated the movement toward eventual self-government. Indeed, the constitutional period between 1900 and 1949 may be properly regarded as the era of the great

¹⁴Great Britain, Hansard: House of Commons Debates, 9th July, 1946 (London, H.M.S.O., 1946). (The Secretary of State was then making a speech during the Commons Committee Debate on Supply.)

beginning of the upsurge of Sierra Leone towards a new political awakening, certainly, the precursor of the greater political development of the country as far as interest groups are concerned. On the Colony side in 1910 Freetown Ratepayers Associations and in 1920 the Sierra Leone National Council had been founded. On the Protectorate side the Committee of Educated Elements (CEA), the Protectorate Elements Progressive Union (PEPU) and the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS) had been organized in 1925, 1929 and 1946, respectively. On each side, the new political interest groups pursued their divergent aims and objectives despite their generally abortive attempt to set up the catalytic Sierra Leone Aborigenes Society described in the next chapter. On balance, whereas the Colony interest groups found themselves gradually losing the support and sympathy of the British colonial government on which they had pinned so much hope, those groups of Protectorate origin had the better of the struggle for political influence. Chapter IV makes this point clear.

The 1951 Stevens Constitution

This is the most momentous pre-independence landmark Constitution in the history of Sierra Leone. It was, indeed one big decisive thrust to sovereignty. The Constitution provided for a large "unofficial majority" for the first time in the territory. According to the recommendations of the Select Committee and those of the Governor, Sir Hubert Stevenson, the membership of the Council was to be:

<u>President</u>	The Governor
Ex-official Members	1. Colonial Secretary
	2. Chief Commissioner (Provinces)
	3. Attorney General
	4. Colonial Treasurer
	5. Director of Medical Services
	6. Director of Education
	7. Director of Agriculture
Members elected to represent the Colony	7
Members elected by District Councils	13
Members elected by Protectorate Assembly from its nominated members	1
Members with commercial and economic experience nominated by the Governor	2 ¹⁵

The new Council totalled thirty members, with the Governor as President. The number of unofficial members was raised from ten to thirteen, and the ex-officio members was reduced from eleven to seven. The Colony was entitled to return seven members, instead of its original three. Most fundamental in all these historic constitutional developments was the fact that the Protectorate people returned elected members for the first time. The twelve District Councils and the now defunct Protectorate Assembly elected one member each to the

¹⁵Sir Hubert H. Stevenson, Dispatch No. 215, 13th October, 1947, on the Reconstitution of the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone (Freetown: Government Printing Press, 1947).

Legislative Council. The Protectorate members were elected by electoral colleges, i.e., the District Councils and the Protectorate Assembly, and not by the normal popular universal adult franchise operative in the Colony constituencies.

All this liberalism notwithstanding, the Hubert Stevenson Constitution provided for an instrument in accordance with which the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate was able to act constitutionally in opposition to the advice tendered by the Legislative Council. This was the case in spite of the presence of an unofficial majority in the Council. It is safe to conclude that the Governor's veto powers made nonsense of the so-called advanced Constitution of 1951. If the Governor could override the majority resolution of the Executive Council, just as he deemed fit, then it is debatable whether the country was being led speedily forward to self-government at all. The unofficial majority of the legislature was still practically and theoretically unimportant.

And yet, in his Sessional Paper, Governor Stevenson held that the 1924 Constitution was no longer worth much to a British territory advancing, in accordance with the approved colonial policy, towards self-government. Stevenson said this about the old constitution:

... The Legislative Council as at present constituted has served a useful purpose, but today its constitution is no longer appropriate since (a) it has an official majority, (b) it has an unduly high proportion of nominated unofficial members and (c) the representation of the Colony, which contains less than one-tenth of the total population of Sierra

Leone, is entirely disproportionate to that of the Protectorate ... The Colony members have exercised very considerable influence in the Council and have given valuable service, but the time has now come to start to redress the balance between the Colony and the Protectorate ...¹⁶

The frustrated and enraged members of the newly-formed National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NNCSL) stoutly objected to the proposals for a new Legislative Council and government in which the Creole British subjects of the Crown Colony would be a minority group in Sierra Leone, whereas Protectorate interest groups would be predominant. Accordingly, this aggrieved Colony organization sent a petition to King George VI-in-Council in September, 1950. Among the Observations of the NNCSL were the following: that the petitioners were British subjects and descendants of the Settlers (Nova Scotians, Maroons and Liberated Africans) for whom the Sierra Leone settlement was founded in 1787-1788. In paragraph 12 of its Petition the petitioners state:

The council view with grave apprehension, the intention of the Government to put into operation the recommendations contained in Sessional Paper No. 8 of 1948 as modified by Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1950... for the reconstitution of the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone, and most earnestly state that this recommendation is totally unacceptable to them.¹⁷

¹⁶Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Legislative Council: Sessional Paper No. 8, 1948, Dispatch from Sir Hubert Stevenson to the Secretary of State, No. 215 of October 13, 1947. See also Sierra Leone: Proposals for the Reconstruction of the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1948, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷Petition from the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone to His Most Gracious Majesty King George VI-in-Council, Freetown, Sierra Leone, September, 1950.

The NCCSL contested the legality of Protectorate Chiefs or other persons therefrom to qualify for membership of the Legislative Council of British subjects in Sierra Leone. The petition held further:

- (a) That the Protectorate of Sierra Leone was a foreign country outside the territorial dominions of the Crown
- (b) That a Protectorate Chief or person was an entire foreigner.¹⁸

Further, the petition refused to accept the Government's argument that its concession of an unofficial majority to the Protectorate was based on the fact that this part of the country had a population of about 1,800,000 as opposed to 200,000 for the Colony, and also that that portion of the country was the primary source of wealth. The petitioners were convinced that an apparent 95 per cent illiteracy in the Protectorate was justification enough to deny its people preponderance in the legislature. The Secretary of State rejected the petition of the NCCSL and in 1951 a new Constitution was put into operation in Sierra Leone. The high point of interest about the 1951 Constitutions is that it ushered in the competitive party system in Sierra Leone.

As may be recalled, the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone was formed in 1950 for the purpose of opposing the

¹⁸Ibid., para. 14.

proposed new Constitution and the Sierra Leone People's Party in 1951 for accepting this Constitution, inspite of the apparent flaws in it. Two statements by Dr. Herbert Bankole-Bright, the leader of the National Council (a Creole political amalgam), and one by Dr. Milton Margai, the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party, appear at this time to have drawn the battle lines between the Colony and the Protectorate more clearly than ever.

On the 29th of November, 1951, i.e., the day following the inauguration of the Legislative Council, the Governor held a private and informal meeting with the newly-elected unofficial members to discuss the choice of those who would be invited to join the government. It was at this meeting that Dr. Bankole-Bright, among other things, said that the people of the Colony and the Protectorate were like two hills opposite each other and can never meet.¹⁹ Earlier in 1950, Dr. Bankole-Bright wrote as follows:

The Protectorate came into being after the butchering and massacre of some of our fathers and grandfathers ... and their blood streamed in the streets of Mendi Land because they were described as Black English Men showing the White English Men the country. Yes, their blood streamed with the blood of English men and after only fifty years of this treacherous and villainous act, Loyal Sierra Leone is asked by the British Government to vacate her seats in their British Legislature ... for the descendants of the murderers of our ancestors.²⁰

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰H. C. Bankole-Bright's letter in the Sierra Leone Weekly News, August 26, 1950, p. 3.

In a sharp retort to the derogatory speeches of Bankole-Bright, Dr. Milton A. S. Margai, the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party, said in the Protectorate Assembly that Sierra Leone was saddled with an archaic constitution and suggested that:

The reason for this backwardness is evidently due to the fact that our forefathers, I very much regret to say, had given shelter to a handful of foreigners, who have no will to cooperate with us and imagine themselves to be our superiors because they are aping the Western mode of living and have never breathed the true spirit of independence If the 30,000 non-natives of the Colony should attempt a boycott of the proposed election for the new Legislative Council ... I make no hesitation to assure the government that all the seats on the Colony side would be occupied by our countrymen. We mean to push ahead, and we are in no way prepared to allow a handful of foreigners to impede our progress.²¹

Practically, as a last ditch fight, the National Council sent a hopeless petition to the King-in-Council and proposed that either the Protectorate be annexed, and thus make its inhabitants British subjects, or that the Colony and the Protectorate should be granted separate legislatures.²²

Despite all the problems arising from the 1951 Constitution, a great degree of progress was made under the sagacious leadership of Sir Milton Margai. Ministers with limited departmental responsibility were appointed in 1953, and Dr. Margai, as he then was, became Leader

²¹Sierra Leone, Proceedings of the Seventh Meeting of the Protectorate Assembly (September 26, 1950), pp. 28-31.

²²The Sierra Leone Weekly News, February 17, 1951, pp. 1 and 3.

of Government Business. A year later he was made Chief Minister. More importantly, this writer sees the period 1950-1957 as the flowering of political parties in Sierra Leone, the great period when interest groups were naturally transformed into contemporary political parties for the first time. It was in this period that the political ideologies and cleavages between the Colony and the Protectorate became clearcut, decisive and finally sublimated, with the advent of independence only now a few years ahead. As will be seen later, the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone, NCCSL, was formed in the Colony in 1950 as a coalition party of almost all the interest groups represented in the Colony, followed in 1951 by the birth of the Sierra Leone People's Party, also a coalition of a number of interest groups usually associated with the Protectorate. The 1951 general elections to the House of Representatives were not contested on party basis, but events described in chapter IV led later to the organization of Parliament along party lines. The 1957 general parliamentary elections were, of course, contested strictly on party basis from the very start. Finally, it may be said that the introduction of the 1951 Constitution marked the political ascendancy of the Protectorate groups and parties over those of the Colony.

The 1957 Constitution

It is true that the 1951 Constitution provided for an official majority in the legislature for the first time in Sierra Leone, but it is equally true that the country still had a colonial Legislative Council. In addition, the Governor and four officials, i.e., senior British Civil servants, were still important members of the Executive Council. Of course, the Governor still had his veto powers and control of Sierra Leone's external relations. It was intended that the new 1957 Constitution would remedy some of these anomalies and other obvious ones.

The 1957 Constitution provided for a much wider electoral franchise for the country than that of 1951. A new electoral system introduced in the Protectorate made it possible, for the first time in that part of the country, for Members of Parliament to be popularly elected. When the House of Representatives met in August, 1958, i.e., after the May, 1957 General Elections, the four ex-officio members withdrew from the Executive Council and Dr. Margai, the leader of the victorious SLPP, was elevated to the post of Prime Minister of Sierra Leone.²³

²³D. J. R. Scott, "The Sierra Leone Election, May, 1957," in W. J. M. Mackenzie and K. Robinson: Five Elections in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 177-78; Sierra Leone House of Representatives Debates Session 1958-1959. Official Report, Vol I, 19th August-September, 1958 (Freetown, 1959), pp. 4-6.

The membership of the House was raised from thirty to fifty-eight, Plus a Speaker, four ex-officio members and twelve Paramount Chiefs members. Every district was entitled to elect one literate Paramount Chief. (Paramount Chief members automatically sat with the majority party in the House.) A remarkable thing about the 1957 Constitution was that it prepared the people for universal adult suffrage and a uniform system of direct elections in both the Colony and Protectorate.

Executive Council Reforms

Executive Council reforms introduced in 1958 affected its structure and functions. The services of its four ex-officio members were dispensed with and the offices of Deputy Governor to assist the Governor, and the Ministries of Finance and Information and Broadcasting were created.

As things looked in 1957, self-government of Sierra Leone was inevitably just round the corner. Even so, there were still quite a few things to accomplish before the birth of the sovereign state of Sierra Leone. The masses of the people had to be prepared to accept full political independence and all interest and pressure groups and political groups in the country had also to be consulted and convinced about the need for national unity in asking the British Government for their country's independence. This short but critically important constitutional period saw the consolidation of the power of the

provincial groups, the formation of independence movements and the first attempt to form a united front to negotiate Sierra Leone's independence.

The 1961 Constitution and Independence

By early 1960, the political situation was generally looking so promising for Sierra Leone that its last colonial Governor could say in the House of Representatives that it was hoped Sierra Leone would join the other independent countries in the Commonwealth in the following year. He assured members that:

The Secretary of State recognizes that it is the aim of all parties in Sierra Leone to achieve independence and welcomes the opportunity of discussing the problems arising from the attainment of national sovereignty, both in the international and domestic spheres, which would require solution if the people of Sierra Leone are to be properly safeguarded.²⁴

The year 1960 can therefore be regarded as the final year of preparation for self rule, a decision which was irrevocable. To this end, the Governor had advised the Secretary of State that the delegations that will take part in the proposed London Conference should be representatives of "all parties and other opinions, both inside and outside the House."²⁵ Still further to this end, he informed members

²⁴Sierra Leone, Speech by Sir Maurice H. Dorman, K.C.M.G., at the Opening of the 1960-61 Session of the House of Representatives on Thursday, the 11th of February, 1960 published as Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1960 (Freetown: G. P. O., 1960), p.1.

²⁵Ibid.

that his Prime Minister intended to hold ad hoc discussions at the provincial level with representatives of chiefs and people from each district. Later, the Prime Minister would call a round-table conference of those chosen representatives participating in the talks to "exchange views and to seek the largest area of common ground upon which to approach Her Majesty's Government."²⁶

In April, 1960, Sir Milton led his United National Front (UNF) to London where the Constitutional Conference referred to above took place. The UNF consisted of the ruling SLPP and all the opposition parties which united with it to jointly formulate the terms of Sierra Leone's independence.

The membership of the UNF was made up of the following delegations:

The Government and Sierra Leone People's Party	12 delegates
The People's National Party, the Sierra Leone People's Independence Movement and the Radical, Democratic Party	3 delegates
The Independent Progressives and Independent Liberals	2 delegates
The United Progressive Party	2 delegates
The National Council for Sierra Leone	1 delegate
The Sierra Leone Council of Labour	1 delegate ²⁷

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

At Lancaster House, the Secretary of State, the Rt. Honourable Ian Macleod, said that it would be a waste of time for the Sierra Leone delegation to try to convert him or Her Majesty's Government to the principle of independence. That principle had since been agreed to without further ado. He felt convinced that Sierra Leone had creditably passed the various constitutional tests set for it and that the time was ripe to consider further change.²⁸

Sir Milton, who responded to Mr. Macleod's welcome address on behalf of his Government and UNF, spoke of Sierra Leone's record of cordial and peaceful relations with Her Majesty's Government. He recognized the importance to be attached to efficient public administration and the economic and financial aspects of independence. He concluded his speech by saying that:

We will need help in various ways to develop these natural resources, and for this help we would like to look first of all to our old friends. There are all too many offers from other sources which we would prefer not to encourage, (emphasis added) as long as our old and proved friends are prepared to stand by us and help us.²⁹

In Sir Milton's last two statements, this author can see the outline of Sierra Leone's future pro-British foreign policy in greater perspective.

²⁸Great Britain, Command Paper 1029/1960; Report of the Sierra Leone Constitutional Conference held in London in April and May, 1960 (London, 1960), pp. 13-15.

²⁹Ibid.

As indicated by Governor Dorman in the House in February, the subjects discussed at the Lancaster Conference were matters of far reaching importance. The matters discussed included the nature and size of the legislature, abolition of the legal distinctions between the Protectorate and the Crown Colony, universal suffrage, the inclusion of fundamental human rights, the principle of the independence of the judiciary, procedure for amending the Constitution, the introduction of Sierra Leone citizenship, defense arrangements, diplomatic representations, the future of the public service, compensation proposals and an independent executive public service commission, currency matters, the financial implications of independence, and interim constitutional changes in the executive.

Indeed the topics listed above formed the basis of the Constitutional Conference and there was unanimous agreement on all of them, except the topic on the defense agreement between Sierra Leone and Great Britain. The Honourable Siaka Stevens was the only member who objected to this unfair agreement. For far-seeing Stevens, a bilateral defense pact was not possible between unequal partners.

The Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, containing the statutory instruments for the independence of Sierra Leone, was the result of the London Constitutional Conference of 1960. The Order revoked the previous Orders in Council, Letters Patent, the Schedule to the Sierra Leone (Constitutional) Order in Council 1958 (c) and the Sierra Leone and the Gambia Court of Appeal Order in

Council, 1959. By the same token, this Order set out the Independence Constitution.

The 1961 Constitution provided for a sovereign House of Representatives, oaths of allegiance to be taken by Members of the House and public officials, the disposal of the Sierra Leone and the Gambia Court of Appeal Fund, new citizenship, fundamental human rights, the office of Governor-General, qualifications and disqualifications for membership of Parliament, an Electoral Commission, legislation and procedure in Parliament, Executive powers, the Judiciary system, Finance, the Public Service and miscellaneous matters.

In short, this means that with the handing over of the Statutory Instruments to the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone at midnight on 27th April, 1961, the British Crown made this country a constitutional monarchy, with the Queen as its head of State. The Prime Minister became the head of Government, and with his advice and consent, the Queen appointed a Governor-General as her personal representative in the new state. Sir Milton's message to the new Nation immediately after its birth includes the following inspiring words designed to set its pace in the world and make the citizenry proud to do their own stint in their own individual stations in life:

Sierra Leone today becomes a unified and independent nation to take her place as an equal partner in the Commonwealth of Nations and as an entity in the world at large ... We must also face up squarely to the problems which will confront us, and I want you all to understand clearly that the Sierra Leone Government in future will depend very greatly upon

the active support and assistance of each one of you. The aim will certainly be to make our country a land worth living in, a land worth serving; but this can only be done by wholehearted service and hard work now.³⁰

Sir Milton also said that the significant change was the knowledge that Sierra Leoneans were now in complete control of their government and for the formulation of their external as well as their internal policies.

Sierra Leone's 1961 Constitution remained in operation until 1971 when the Government adopted a new Constitution which converted this Monarchy to a Republic. The years from 1961 - 1974 represent the period when pressure groups and political parties diminished in number and the trend towards a uniparty system set in gradually. Also in this period the various independence administrations faced the problems of nation-building.

The 1971 Constitution

The first republican Constitution came into effect on 19th April 1971, thereby replacing the 1961 Constitution and its subsequent amendments. The 1971 Constitution embodies most of the subject matter of the 1961 Constitution, e.g., guarantee of fundamental human rights, and basic freedoms of the individual, the composition and powers of

³⁰Sierra Leone Daily Mail, (Freetown), 27 April, 1961, p.1.

Parliament, finance, the public service, commissions and others. However, certain important differences must be pointed out. First the new Constitution is republican and not monarchical. Second, it creates the offices of Executive President, Vice President, and Attorney General. Third, it sets up a High Court, in addition to a Supreme Court, and a Court of Appeal. Fourthly, it does not make the Prime Minister head of Government.

In addition to his being Head of State, the President is also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Fountain of Honour. Interestingly enough, unlike many other Executive Presidents, e.g., those of the United States, Argentina, Liberia and Guinea, the President of Sierra Leone is not elected but appointed. He is appointed by the Cabinet and holds office at its pleasure. Unlike the President of the United States, the President of Sierra Leone may act only in accordance with the advice of his Cabinet.

Finally, it should be noted that the present constitution, was first introduced on 24th January, 1967, by former Prime Minister Albert Margai in the form of a Bill entitled "The Constitution of Sierra Leone." The Bill duly passed the First Reading, Second Reading and Committee stages and accordingly, the then Prime Minister reported that the Bill had passed the House with certain amendments. This having been done, the Bill passed its final and third reading with the specified majority under section 51 of the 1961 Constitution. Hence,

all that Dr. Siaka Stevens, Prime Minister, had to do and did, was to introduce the said Margai Constitution, mutatis mutandis on 19th April, 1971 and pilot it through all the necessary reading and committee stages.³¹ Thus was enacted the constitution of the First Republic of Sierra Leone which finally severed all the links between it and the United Kingdom, except that they are both independent members of the Commonwealth.

Nation-building and Modernization

In the broad sweep of this chapter the author has sought to analyze the constitutional development of Sierra Leone through its various phases of colonial rule to its present sovereign republican status. At least, in capsule form, the republic's written constitutions have been evaluated, and the uneasy fusion of its two political sub-cultures, represented by the former Crown Colony and the Protectorate, has been critically examined as fully as possible. All these vital on-going processes, in particular the dynamic role and impact of the various interest groups and the long patient experimentation with different types of constitutions, have inexorably culminated in the all-inclusive process generally termed "nation-building" and its concomitant modernization. What in fact, are nation-building and modernization?

In very simple terms, nation-building is both the natural, and imperceptible, as well as the deliberate and overt process of

³¹The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1971 and the Interpretation Act, 1971.

evolving and perpetuating socio-political institutions, symbolisms, values, interests and beliefs which tend to promote a strong sense of nationhood among the nationals of any particular country. Nationhood or statehood symbolizes a communality of interests, common loyalty to the state, a sense of oneness and spontaneous readiness to demonstrate the love of the citizenry for their motherland, right or wrong. Whether one calls this chauvinism matters not a great deal. Nation-building prospers ideally on the soil of unconditional patriotism and unswerving faith in the performance and destiny of one's homeland; it admits of a high level of social engineering. The end view of nation building is to achieve a high degree of political communication in and solvency of the state.

Even if the diehards and the progressives in Sierra Leone were not unanimous on the issue of independence in a unitary state, once sovereignty had been conceded to the country its entire populace automatically became committed to the tasks of nation-building and modernization. The primary function of any government of Sierra Leone is to ensure the perpetuation of the state's political culture, and this it may do either by simply encouraging its citizens to uphold the political community or coercing them to desist from undermining its fundamental values or ethos. Sierra Leone's political culture is nothing but the synthesis of its history, symbols, myths and various inter-relationships. Indeed, the political culture of any country is a unity in diversity. A view widely held is that a two-party system

or a constituent or mass-based party, as opposed to a cadre or oligarchic party is a better guarantee of civil liberties for all concerned in the polity, as well as for the accelerated transition from a lower level of modernization to a higher one. How well the work of nation-building and modernization is done depends on the quality of the normal institutions involved in these two processes, namely, Sierra Leone's political parties, interest groups, schools, homes, mass communications media, state bureaucracy, legislature and judiciary. These institutions, without exception, need all the scope, freedom, sophistication and other critical dynamics or resources to enable them to make Sierra Leone development-oriented, in other words, to perpetually advance the republic's modernization processes.

Modernization or Development

Millikan and Blackmer make the following comment with reference to the concept of modernization:

It is one thing for a traditional society to be moved toward change by internal factors or to experience the intrusion of modern elements which in favourable circumstances, set in motion new dynamic trends. It is quite a different matter for such a society to achieve a working modern system which moves toward constructive objectives by increasingly democratic means.³²

³²Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 18. Note: For further reading on the subject of modernization and development see

This writer agrees with Millikan and Blackmer that before a modern society can be developed constructive and viable changes must occur first of all, "for any established society has deeply rooted characteristics which yield only reluctantly, with pain and passage of time, and only to strong and persistent pressure for change."³³ Spengler puts this very succinctly by saying that politico-economic viability presupposes the existence of a set of minimal conditions. In this context he refers to the change in culture of a given society and the generation and allocation of that society's "social surplus," that is its excess of goods and services over actual needs for normal consumption. In reality, Spengler observes additionally that the size

the following works: David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Development (New York: The Free Press, 1971); Clinton Rossiter, The American Quest, 1970-1860: An Emerging Nation in Search of Identity, Unity and Modernity (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1971); Stanislaw Andreski, The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization (New York: Atherton Press, 1968); J. Barry Riddell, The Spatial Dynamics of Modernization in Sierra Leone (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Peter C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967); William McCord, The Spring-time of Freedom: Evolution of Developing Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Abdul Said, The African Phenomenon (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968); Herbert J. Spiro, Patterns of African Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967); Paul Sigmund, ed., The Ideologies of Developing Nations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967); Guy Hunter, The New Societies of Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

³³Millikan, op. cit., p. 18.

of any country's social surplus depends on its political organization and economy.³⁴

One possible conclusion to be drawn from the above conceptualization is that modernization involves both economic and political development. Although both types of development are distinct analytical concepts, they can be regarded as mutually inclusive or complementary, despite Nkrumah's injunction that a colonized people must seek first the political kingdom and the economic kingdom afterwards.

The operative terms "modernization" and "development" are sometimes given different meanings by scholars. There are also other scholars who use these terms interchangeably. For some, modernization and development generally signify primary societal transformations which in one way or other are conducive to social, economic and political developments. Spengler, for instance, states that development occurs "when an index of that which is deemed desirable and relatively preferable increases in magnitude."³⁵ Lerner, on the other hand, defines modernization as a systematic process involving complementary changes in the demographic, economic, political communication and cultural sectors of society.³⁶

³⁴Joseph J. Spengler, Allocation and Development, in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Political and Administrative Development (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 91-96.

³⁵Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 8.

³⁶Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1968), p. 401.

Fred Riggs simply regards modernization as a "movement from agraria to industria." Industrialization of the economy does not necessarily mean modernization, a fact which convinces India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, not to follow blindly the Western path to industrialization. She freely acknowledges that her government and people feel "overshadowed by the dark cloud of economic backwardness and inequality" but that they cannot confine themselves entirely to the material aspect of their development. One of Mrs. Gandhi's national priorities is for India to be rid of both its ancient and contemporary superstitions.³⁷ Sierra Leone may very well reconcile its own views on modernization or development with those of India, or at least consider whether there is any need for a change of heart or emphasis on this subject.

Finer appears to miss the point almost completely when he writes that, for Sierra Leone and all other Third World States, "modernization is not an objective datum, fixed or precise; it is an image of Europe and America."³⁸ The Republic of Sierra Leone is not a slavish emulator of things typically British as Professor Finer appears to think. Certainly, there is a small but stubborn knot of

³⁷ Colleen M. Taylor, "Interview with India's First Lady," The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), Monday, January 7, 1974, F. 1-2.

³⁸ S. E. Finer, Comparative Government (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971), pp. 98-105.

Sierra Leoneans who have been too strongly acculturated over the years by their former British overlords to be able to think that they are independent enough to strike out in other directions, but their thinking is not representative of the official or majority view in Sierra Leone. The republic's foreign policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality and its domestic policy of self-help are no doubt clear enough to convince every one that the government and people of Sierra Leone are determined to get what they can from other political systems and cultures to ameliorate theirs, if possible, but not to subvert their sovereignty. Finer should, of course, appreciate and acknowledge that no state in the world has an original culture or typical civilization. Ours is a world of borrowers, lenders, blenders and adapters of on-going systems, dynamic cultures and useful analytical models.

Garcia-Zamor sees development as a continuing process of mutually related economic, social and political changes in a society. He appears, in some sections of his works, to use the terms "development" and "modernization" interchangeably and argues that the combined process is that by which there is an application of new knowledge, techniques and equipment to raise the standard of living of the members of the society concerned. Garcia-Zamor, however, sounds bewildering to this writer when he suggests in some other place that "Development is a process which paves the way for another more subtle

one, namely, modernization."³⁹ This writer finds it difficult to see the distinction Garcia-Zamor attempts to make between the concepts or processes of development and modernization.

The position taken in this dissertation is that "modernization and development are synonymous and should be used interchangeably. The major components of modernization or development may, as a matter of fact, be considered as the combined result of both the processes of economic development and socio-political development of any country. In studying the processes of modernization in about 80 new nations "created" since the end of World War II one may have to examine the six models discussed in Masannat's Reader. This Reader includes an impressive number of authorities such as Almond, Pye, Packenham, Vorys, Levy, Eisenstadt, Apter, Ward, Huntington, Weiner, Wriggins, Johnson, Hagen, Spengler, Rose, Emerson, Deutsch, Means, Hazard, Micand, Kautsky, Zolberg, Bill, Needler, Hopkins, Dube, Kearney, and Harris. These authors have developed among them six models or approaches to the study of the processes of modernization. These include (1) the legal-formal or legal-administrative, (2) functional system, (3) economic, (4) communications, (5) institutional and (6) elite models or approaches. In general terms, the legal-administrative

³⁹Jean Claude Garcia-Zamor, "Development Administration in the Commonwealth Caribbean," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, (1970), 201-214 and "Typology of Creole Bureaucracies," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, (1972), 49-60.

approach holds that development or modernization depends on a state's constitutional and administrative capacity to maintain law and order, efficiency, rationality, and neutrality. The functional system approach lays stress on the inter-dependence of all parts of the system, social stability and balance or equilibrium. The economic approach postulates that enough capital formation and viable economic infrastructures are pre-requisites for continued meaningful political development. The elite model or approach emphasizes the need, as well as the task, of the new elite groups to close the gap between them and the rest of the polity. The ruling elite must also be able to manage efficiently the crisis of values inevitable in the transition from traditional to modern life. The communication approach lays stress on political mobilization, participation, rationalization, national integration and differentiation, and democratization, not in the least. The institutional approach is concerned with the capacity of a state's social organizations to adapt themselves to all sorts of changes in the emergent states, in the ensuing economic, political and social crisis.⁴⁰ The policy makers of Sierra Leone are experimenting with all of these models.

In the Republic of Sierra Leone, political development is apparently given greater prominence at present than economic

⁴⁰George S. Masannat, The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change: A Reader (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc.), pp. 1-50, 166-181, passim.

development. This strategy appears to be a general rule in all the emerging states. But once a subject nation wins independence it soon finds enough compelling reasons to mobilize its resources of manpower and materials to ensure a well-balanced process of modernization. It has never been possible to achieve parallel development in the political and economic sectors of any colonial territory; that is, political and economic development do not go hand in hand. Considering Sierra Leone's present level of modernization or development after only a decade of independence, and comparing it with its performance before then, it will be reasonable to say that it deserves to be proud of its record as a free state. As a matter of fact, Sierra Leone has shamed Herbert Morrison, a former deputy leader of the British Labour Party, who said categorically some time during World War II that to set black African colonies free would be like giving a child of ten a latch key, a bank account and a shotgun."⁴¹ One wonders how the erstwhile and seemingly all-knowing British politician would explain the near sudden collapse of the British empire and the progress of Sierra Leone and other former colonies in a highly competitive world. Sierra Leone has made relatively rapid strides in its programs of political and economic development. Many more miles of motor roads of a higher standard, schools, hospitals, health clinics, post offices

⁴¹Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968 (New York: Conward McCann, Inc., 1969), p. 262.

and postal agencies and mass communication media have been constructed and put into use during the country's first decade of independence. New governmental institutions and processes are being introduced in replacement of purely foreign ones which have come to the people as part of their colonial inheritance. Given its limited economic and manpower resources Sierra Leone is not finding it easy to pursue its all-round national development programs. But it does appear proud and willing to accept the implications of nation-building as a sovereign state.

As would be obviously expected during the years when Sierra Leone was a colonial possession, that is up to April 26, 1961, its foreign policy was determined by Great Britain, its so-called "Motherland." The government of Great Britain up to this date chose the countries with which Sierra Leone traded, the allies with which it fought in the First and Second World Wars and the Ashanti War and the political block to which it should belong. With the achievement of independence in 1961, the new sovereign government of Sierra Leone inevitably took over full responsibility for the formulation and execution of its relations with the other nations of the international community.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION, CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Confrontation and Cooperation Politics

Politics or inter-group conflicts and the spirit of nationalism are not new preoccupations in Sierra Leone. As has already been pointed out in Chapter II, Sierra Leone pioneered the development of modern political organization, at least in West Africa, expressly for the purpose of pressuring its colonial rulers for administrative reforms, and ultimately, total independence. The issue which is highlighted in this section is the struggle for political dominance between the educated elites in the Colony and the educated elites in the Protectorate. The section which immediately follows this deals with the subject of the evolution of Sierra Leone's political parties and the mass movements for independence.

Beginning with 1896 when the British government proclaimed a Protectorate over the hinterland of Sierra Leone, an agonizing conflict ensued between the Crown Colony established in 1808 and this newly created administrative unit of the country. This conflict actually started between the educated elite groups of the two sections. The polarization of the Colony and the Protectorate was brought about by two intriguing and fundamental questions, namely, (1) the problem of

integrating into a single country two different political, administrative and legal entities; (2) the difficulty of determining the basis of representation, in the event that the two groups assemble in one legislative chamber, how should the basis of representation be decided. Should the question be decided on the basis of geopolitical considerations alone or legalism? These two issues will be clarified as the discussion proceeds.

The interest or pressure groups which engaged in the confrontation politics between the Colony and the Protectorate were the Sierra Leone branch of the National Congress of British West Africa (SLNC), representing the former and, first, the Committee for Educated Aborigines (CEA), formed in 1925, then the Protectorate Educational Progressive Union, founded in 1929, and, still later, the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS), established in 1946, representing the latter. The Colony elite did not want the people of the Protectorate to participate with them in the same legislature maintaining that it was both illegal and unconstitutional for the British government to permit this to happen. On the other hand, the Protectorate elite, represented by the CEA argued, perhaps pragmatically, or on a geopolitical basis, that the Colony could never exist as an independent and viable economic unit without the material resources of the much more endowed Protectorate. The Colony spokesmen were not very impressed with this argument; they reacted to it by holding that, if any concessions were to be made by them, they should not be so substantial that

they could balance the interests and aspirations of the Creole British subjects with those of mere British protected persons. The Creoles were unwilling to yield their dominant position to the Protectorate.

Mr. A Tuboku-Metzger, a lawyer and Vice President of the Sierra Leone branch of the National Congress of British West Africa (SLNC) affirmed that his group was prepared to endorse the demands of the Committee for Educated Aborigines (CEA) "without a dissentient voice," on condition that the educated protectorate elements identified themselves with the SLNC movement and promoted it in their own part of the country.¹ As time went by, the fears of the Creoles that they would be swamped by the more numerous Protectorate people became more chronic and, not unnaturally, their demand for a fair deal became more vociferous. They wanted to know whether they or the people of the Protectorate were strangers in Sierra Leone. They promptly answered their own question by affirming that they saw themselves in the same light as white men. "We are not indigenous to Sierra Leone. To add to this is the fact of our own Western culture This council would lead to a lowering of our citizenship. And this is what staggers us and causes us anxiety for dear old England."² (Emphasis added.) The reference to the council is the proposed reconstituted Legislative Council

¹Sierra Leone Weekly News, Freetown, March 14, 1925, pp. 1-2 and 5.

²Sierra Leone Weekly News, Freetown, August 14, 1948, p. 1.

of Sierra Leone under what came to be the 1951 (Stevenson) Constitution which provided for greater representation for the protectorate than the Colony. A creole economics professor at Fourah Bay College depicted the horror of conceding majority seats in the proposed Legislative Council to leaders of the Protectorate in a pamphlet titled Crucifixion of Sierra Leone in which he suggested the allocation of seats and exercise of the electoral franchise on the basis of literacy, a sure guarantee for the preponderance of the Creole elite.³ Not to jump ahead of the story of confrontation politics proper in the 1950's, attention should be called to at least one serious attempt made in the 1920's to develop a working relationship between the Colony and the Protectorate.

In 1925, a liberal subgroup of the CEA decided to join a number of the Creole "intelligentsia" in founding the Sierra Leone Aborigines Society (SLAS). The chief aim of this organization was the establishment of intercourse among all classes of Africans in Sierra Leone and to promote their general welfare, politically and otherwise.⁴

The SLAS neither developed into a strong political or social organization nor did it last for long because of the mounting

³N. A. Cox-George, Crucifixion of Sierra Leone (Freetown: New Era Press, n.d. (1948), p. 15. See Sierra Leone, Proposals for the Reconstruction of the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone, Sessional Paper No. 2, 1948.

⁴Sierra Leone Weekly News, March 14, 1925, pp. 1-3.

opposition of the SLNC to the nomination of Paramount Chiefs to the Legislative Council. On the other hand, the CEA, also, continued to protest eloquently the uneven development between the two sections of the country. Apart from the fact that the Chiefs were seen to be too closely connected with the colonial regime to be able to exercise enough independent political judgment, the Creoles saw them also as a threat to their long established political and social ascendancy. As Cartwright notes:

As long as all Africans were confined to minor advisory roles in the government of Sierra Leone, it did not matter much that the Creoles had more representation in the Legislative Council than the Protectorate people, or that the Protectorate's representatives were all chiefs. But once it became clear that more power was to be handed over to Africans, the question of which Sierra Leoneans would take places on the decision-making bodies aroused considerable concern.⁵

When the Committee of Educated Aborigines and the Sierra Leone Aborigines Society became passive, a number of influential Protectorate people formed a new interest group known as the Protectorate Educational Progressive Union (PEPU) in 1929. The declared objective of this organization was to narrow the educational gap between the more enlightened Colony and the backward Protectorate, as far as Western standards were concerned. Apart from this ostensible objective of PEPU it is not difficult to see that it was the long term aim of this

⁵John R. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone 1947-67 (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 43.

organization to develop political awareness first among the leaders and, ultimately, the body politic. PEPU did not achieve much success during the period of almost two decades; it managed to exist but at least it can proudly claim to have educated a young man, Albert Margai, who trained in England as a barrister-at-law and went on to be Sierra Leone's second Prime Minister (1964-67). A new, more dynamic Protectorate organization which emerged after the lapse of PEPU was the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS). The leadership of this body included such wellknown men as Sir (then Dr.) Milton Margai, Siaka Stevens, Dr. John Karefa-Smart, Sir Albert Margai, Doyle M. Sumner, Chief Kande Bureh, Frank Anthony and Alex B. Cotay. In 1947, these leaders complained to the British Colonial Secretary about the unjust monopoly of political power granted to Protectorate Chiefs under the Hubert Stevenson constitutional proposals. For the first time in the long history of confrontation politics between the Colony and the Protectorate the latter now engaged in confrontation with the Chiefly sector of its elite structure.

According to the memorandum of the Sierra Leone Organization addressed to the Secretary of States for Colonies, the leaders argued that the "common people ... who are taxpayers ... are entitled to even more representation ... than the natural rulers of the century."⁶

⁶"Memorandum of the Sierra Leone Organization Society," September 29, 1947, in The Sierra Leone Weekly News, October 18, 1947, pp. 1-3.

The SOS objected to the election of Paramount Chiefs to the Legislative Council indirectly through such non-popularly elected electoral colleges as the District Councils and the Protectorate Assembly. It is interesting to note that this organization was an elite group immediately interested in obtaining political power just for the few of its literate leaders. It did not think in egalitarian terms.

In contrast to the other colony Creole established political organizations the Sierra Leone Youth League (SLYL), founded in 1938 by Isaac T. A. Wallace-Johnson, was a populist movement. The SLYL was a political pressure group founded on the principle of collective security for the oppressed peasantry and urban labor class in Sierra Leone. This organization operated as a catalyst in the country and became the first political body with a national program and a mass following of some sort. In the course of a single year, the membership of the League rose up to about 7,000 men and women who were mainly illiterate or semi-literate wage labourers, peasant farmers and non-workers.⁷

Wallace Johnson, surprisingly, joined the conservative National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone after his release from

⁷Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 224. See also, The Sierra Leone Weekly News, Freetown, August 13, 1938, pp. 8-9.

detention due to his apparently anti-British political activities during World War II, it is true also that he did move from one new political party to another, but contrary to Kilson's belief, he never abandoned his penchant for radicalism and populism.⁸ Instead of engaging in confrontation politics Wallace Johnson aimed at bridging the gap between the Colony and the Protectorate. In any case confrontation and not accommodation or cooperation remained to be the hallmark of the relationship between the two political units of Sierra Leone until fairly recently. The discussion of the manner in which this country's political parties evolved will clearly bear out this view expressed in the topic.

Evolution of Political Parties

The party system of Sierra Leone was born in the face of a grave constitutional crisis, between 1947 and 1951. This was a period marked by chaos and disagreement between the various political factions in the territory and the apparent irresolution of the colonial governor and the British Secretary of State for Colonies. The 1952 general elections were not contested at all on any formal national party basis. It seems true, however, to say that by the time of these elections the battle lines between the colony and the protectorate political organizations had been clearly drawn and that the issue had become truly joined, apparently irrevocably so. This view is articulated by Kilson

⁸Kilson, op. cit., p. 225.

who remarks that:

The colony-protectorate division and its sociological consequences have substantially influenced the postwar development of party politics in Sierra Leone. The long-standing predominance of the Creoles, combined with their condescending attitude toward protectorate Africans, stimulated a deep-seated antagonism among educated protectorate groups. In the postwar period the protectorate African encountered the Creole as his major political opponent, and with the broadening of the franchise to include protectorate Africans in 1951, the protectorate elite effectively exploited anti-Creole feelings among the masses to the advantage of their political party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).⁹

The National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone was founded in 1950 and the Sierra Leone People's Party in 1951, so one would naturally want to ask why the Governor, Sir George Beresford-Stooke, still had serious reservations about the status of the party system in Sierra Leone in 1951. Why did he seek to work out a rapprochement between the SLPP and NCCSL before the inauguration of the newly reconstituted Legislative Council of 28th November, 1951, even though the former party had fifteen seats and the latter five? And why would the leaders of the SLPP be even prepared, in the face of their overwhelming numerical strength in the Council to suggest that the National Council may form the new government, if its leaders so desired?

⁹Martin Kilson, "Sierra Leone," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1970), p. 90. See also Cartwright, op. cit., p. 53.

Among the statements the Governor made in his speech at the opening of the Legislative Council was the following instructive comment:

Where there is a well-developed party system it is the practice for His Majesty the King or his representative to send for the leader of the party which commands a majority and invite him to form a government. Here in Sierra Leone today, I am not sure that the party system is quite sufficiently developed for me to introduce a procedure modelled mutatis mutandis, on that which I have described.¹⁰

Sir Beresford-Stooke sought a solution to his dilemma, as well as that of Sierra Leone, by consulting with the unofficial members of the Council at a private and informal meeting for the purpose of having them suggest those who were to be invited to join the Executive Council or Cabinet. The outcome of this meeting was the Governor's invitation to Sir Milton Margai to form the new government. But even Sir Milton Margai was not sure whether he was leading a "group" or a party; hence, in the January Council Debates he refers to his SLPP as "the group I was dealing with--call it a party, a small community, or merely a number of people."¹¹ The Governor's hesitation could not be said to have been unfounded, the Sierra Leone party system was in 1952 nothing but a microcosm or shy unsure infant not to be overburdened too soon.

¹⁰Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1951/52 (November 28, 1951), pp. 8-9.

¹¹Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1951/52 (January 31, 1952), p. 271.

If one defines the term "political party" as a formal organized group of persons that seeks to control the decision-making apparatus of government in accordance with its unanimous or majority approved party programs and principles, then one can not in 1951 call the SLPP a political party. Even in 1953 when the first group of Ministers were sworn in and assigned responsibility for particular public departments, one would still not designate the SLPP as a full fledged party.¹² The 1952 general elections had not been contested on a party basis and no candidate was elected because he presented a choice of platforms to the electorate at large.

There are no available records of the private and informal meeting Governor Stooke held with the unofficial members of the 1951 legislature, but it seems to be a highly perceptive guess that he inexorably promoted the fortunes of the SLPP by refusing the plea of the National Council that it was his responsibility to take the

¹²Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 1952. Note: The following were appointed Ministers by the Governor: Hon. Dr. Margai, Chief Minister with responsibility for Health, Agriculture and Forests; Hon. M. S. Mustapha, Works and Transport; Hon. A. G. Randle, Trade and Commerce; Hon. Siaka P. Stevens, Lands, Mines and Labour; Hon. Albert Margai, Local Government, Education and Social Welfare, and Paramount Chief Bai Farima Tass, III, Minister without Portfolio.

Foreign Relations, Defence and Finance were still fully under the control of the Governor assisted by the Colonial Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate who continued their membership in the Executive Council of the territory.

the initiative to nominate all the members of the Executive Council. The Governor apparently insisted that the unofficial members of the Executive Council were to be people who had the confidence of the majority of the Legislative Council members. It was at this time that Dr. Bankole Bright likened the Colony and the Protectorate to two hills that would never meet. Dr. Bankole Bright, the leader of the National Council, never carried out his threat to order his party to stage a walk-out protest in the Legislative Council. Dr. Margai's SLPP would certainly have changed history to a remarkable degree if its classic political naivete had been allowed to hold sway when its leaders said that they did not mind if the Governor gave all the Executive Council seats to the minority National Council party. The SLPP refused to take the Governor's advice for the formation of a coalition government. This writer concludes that the SLPP came to power in 1952 by sheer accident of history, as well as by the gentle prodding of a willing and cooperative colonial administrator, that is, His Excellency Governor George Beresford-Stooke and his British administrative machinery. This is not altogether surprising since disenchantment with Creole politicians by British officialdom had set in since 1924 when a new constitution, providing for the participation of the Protectorate in the Legislative Council for the first time, was put into effect in the face of stiff opposition from the Creoles in the Colony.

The expansion of the party system in Sierra Leone was remarkable between 1951 and 1956. Among the plethora of political parties which evolved during this period are the British Koya Party, Positive Action Party, Labor Party, United People's Party (UPP) and the People's National Party (PNP). Of these splinter parties only the UPP and PNP were transnational parties, even so only on a limited basis. A further expansion of the party system resulted from the emergence of a number of mass independence movements between 1957 and 1961. By 1971 political parties in Sierra Leone numbered fifteen. The UPP and the PNP will be dealt with more fully when the writer presents a comparative profile of the major parties. At this point it is in order to discuss the mass movements for independence and explain how the All People's Congress Party came into being as a direct result of these movements and its effect on the fortunes of its major rival, the Sierra Leone People's Party.

Mass Independence Movements

Almost exactly half a century ago, Lord Lugard, a British Colonial administrator in Northern Nigeria, and chief author of the doctrine of "Indirect Rule," made a very telling observation on African nationalism between the two world wars. He observed that African nationalism tended to be "the esoteric passtime of a tiny

educated elite in Lagos, Accra, Freetown and Dakar."¹³ Markovitz notes that the inevitable small Westernized elitist urban educated group of Africans later had an overspill in several urban centers throughout the hinterland of each of Britain's four West African colonies. This new expanded elite is reportedly given credit for its positive effort in popularizing and energizing the African nationalist "crusade." The so-called crusade involved the enlightening of, for example, Sierra Leoneans, about formal school education, welfare, general progress--socially and economically, and the concept of national self-determination.¹⁴

The new post-World Wars I and II African elite used such media for communicating their political values as the nationalist press, traditional and modern Westernized voluntary associations, and independent native schools and churches. Other media used in socializing and politicizing the rural and urban masses were Sierra Leone's existing national party and parapolitical institutions. The new expanded elite groups endeavored to get all the possible advantages from local religious estrangement tendencies and economic grievances among the country's tradition-bound masses.

¹³Sir Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: Blackwood Publishers, 1922), pp. 83-88.

¹⁴Irving Leonard Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 155.

A new complex of militant political organizations evolved soon after the Lancaster Constitutional talks to highlight the new direction in which Sierra Leone was fatefully moving with unbelievable momentum. The paralysis and eventual complete impotence of the National Council and the "traditio-modern" Sierra Leone People's Party underscored the difference between the old conservatism and uncompromising attitude of the then ruling SLPP and the populist-radical APC. Three pioneer movements evolved and operated as the precursor of the All People's Congress. These three pioneer structures: the Elections Before Independence Movement (EBIM), the Sierra Leone Independent Movement (SLIM) and the Kono Progressive Independence Movement (KPIM) substantially gave scope, substance and direction to the APC, at least, during the period of its gestation.

The Elections Before Independence Movement (EBIM)

It was known to many observers even in the 1950's in Sierra Leone that Sir Milton and Dr. Stevens were not always on the same political wave-length. While Stevens, in his capacity as the Minister of Lands, Mines and Labour, was in England, with Albert Margai in 1954/5 to renegotiate the diamond lease, rumor reached Sierra Leone that Sir Milton, who was also in England at that time, had allegedly interfered with the negotiations without Steven's knowledge. Sir Milton was not a member of the delegation, hence Stevens was

disturbed because of his behind-the-scenes maneuvers.¹⁵ Relationships between the two leaders worsened in the succeeding years. The formation of the PNP in 1958 bears testimony to the bitterness and sharp political and ideological differences between the two men.

A new and final breach in the relationship between Sir Milton and Stevens occurred in 1960. This came about when Steven unexpectedly refused to sign the report of the Constitutional Conference convened in London and when he launched his Elections-Before-Independence Movement which soon culminated in the All People's Conference.

The EBIM was a motley crowd of colors or a catch-all movement, but certainly not a disposable clique of discredited rebel politicians. This hodge-podge movement consisted of the frustrated and dissident ex-members of the PNP, UPP, NCCSL, SLPP and other factious political organizations. The speeches of the leaders of the EBIM at two mass meetings held in Freetown on 17th and 31st August, 1960, reflected the motivation, mood and politics of this new pressure group. The audience was told that Sir Milton's so called United National Front Government was lopsided and unrepresentative. The organization demanded elections before independence as a way of conceding to the people their rights to pass on the government's proposal for

¹⁵ Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1954-55, For details of the Agreement reached between the Sierra Leone Government and The Sierra Leone Selection Trust, see Vol. IV (September, 1955), pp. 49-69 and 77-146.

independence in the following year.¹⁶ Other items talked about at the meetings referred to Stevens' reason for refusing to sign the report of the Constitutional Conference, the government's failure to permit the Chiefs to discuss the future of their office independently and the deportation of "strangers" (alien African illicit diamond miners) from the Kono District.

All the themes and programs propounded at the EBIM mass meetings were popular rallying points. The new leaders of the commoners who spoke to the masses were most impressive, and spoke to an anxious and expectant audience ready to settle old scores with those older leaders who had betrayed them.

The Sierra Leone Independence Movement (SLIM)

SLIM was conceived as a national movement by its founder, Dr. Edward Wilmot Blyden, III, a graduate of Harvard University (1959) and former Director of the Department of Extramural Studies at Fourah Bay College. Dr. Blyden is at present Sierra Leone's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. There is very little validity in the claim that this party was completely nationalistic, in the sense that its organizational structure was representative of even the major ethnic and tribal groups

¹⁶Daily Mail, July 18, pp. 1 and 3; August 1, pp. 1-3; and September 8, 1960, pp. 1-5. Note: Daily Mail issues for July 18 and August 1 contain reports of the two mass meetings and that for September 8 the texts of the EBIM Resolutions and Governments response thereto.

of Sierra Leone. It was a Creole-led organization based in Freetown and was without any significant strength in the Provinces. But its intentions and sentiments were truly nationalistic. It is, however, not altogether surprising that it won no seat in the 1957 general elections after which it was absorbed by the more enterprising Kono Progressive Movement (KPM).¹⁷ The two movements actually merged in September, 1958, and became known as the Sierra Leone Independence Progressive Movement (SLPIM).

The Kono Progressive Movement (KPM)

The Kono Progressive Movement may be described as the out-growth of the power struggle between the natives of Konoland and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (a London-based diamond mining company). In reality, the quarrel for a better share of the profits accruing to the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) was between the Konos and the Government of Sierra Leone, which was always seen to favor the company. Kono leaders, who saw their wealth being steadily exported to the United Kingdom and other Western states since the early 1930's when mining concessions were granted to the SLST for a period of 99 years, began seriously to organize protests in the 1950's in order to have a

¹⁷D. J. R. Scott, "The Sierra Leone Election of May, 1957" in Five Elections in Africa, ed., W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 168-280. See also Christopher Allen, "Sierra Leone Politics Since Independence," in African Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, (October 1968), 305-329.

fair deal in the diamond industry. They blamed the Government for not pressing the SLST to relinquish its claims over some of the areas within the alluvial diamond perimeter. The 1954/55 agreement between government and the SLST was unsatisfactory to the people of Kono.¹⁸

In order to obtain much better benefits from the diamond wealth of the land, the late Paramount Chief Tamba S. Mbrwa, an opposition Kono leader, founded the Kono Progressive Movement in 1957. The main platform of the KPM was, in a nutshell, to exploit the wealth of Kono for the development of Kono. This new radical political party detested the seeming connivance of Kono Chiefs and SLPP parliamentary members, hence, one might classify the KPM as a populist organization, although some of its leaders like Mbrwa and Aiah Mani belonged to chiefly houses. These two men, as a matter of fact, subsequently became Paramount Chiefs in their respective chiefdoms. On this point, Cartwright comments that "The behavior of the chiefs in the diamond

¹⁸ Note: in 1953, the government negotiated a new agreement with the SLST by which the company's tax rate was raised from 45% to 60% of its profits in return for government's more effective protection from illicit miners and traders. (See Legislative Council Debates, Session, 1953/54, Vol.1 (December 17, 1953), pp. 155-57.) Government again renegotiated its agreement with the SLST whereby "licensed mining of diamonds which shall allow substantial participation by the people of this country." (See Government Statement on agreement in Daily Mail, April 29, 1955.) The 1953/54 agreement broke the SLST's 99 years monopoly lease down to 40 years and its confinement to only 450 square miles. Government also agreed to pay the company £1,570,000 as compensation. (See details of agreement in Legislative Council Debates, Session 1954-55, Vol. IV (September 30, 1955), pp. 49-57.)

areas attracted to the KPM most of the young men and the more discontented of the ordinary farmers, and helped give it a distinctive class attitude which co-existed with its regional particularism throughout the 1950's."¹⁹

In the general elections of 1957, the KPM and the SLPP were the only two opposition parties that contested seats outside the Crown Colony and also the only ones that scored any success at all. It won one out of two seats allocated to Kono. The SLPP won 25 of the 29 popularly contested parliamentary seats, and independents, the remaining 8. The independent members almost immediately declared for the SLPP. However, in the 1960 district council elections in Kono, the KPM-SLIM alliance, i.e. SLPIM, easily won 24 seats. The SLPP won only 6 seats in this district.

It is interesting to note that SLPIM had a strong interest in developing relationships with political parties outside Sierra Leone. For example, this party took action in 1960 in requesting the British Labour Party to protest in the House of Commons the imprisonment of its leader, Tamba S. Mbriwa. Mbriwa was allegedly jailed for political activities.²⁰

¹⁹Cartwright, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3.

²⁰*Ibid.*

In early 1960, this combined party structure (SLPIM) received a new infusion of political blood when it converted to the PNP Alliance. By the middle of this year, this alliance crystallized into a new, even more dynamic alliance, that is, the APC Alliance.

The All People's Congress (APC), 1960

The Elections Before Independence Movement existed for only a two-month period when it gave way to the All People's Congress. Siaka Stevens was declared the first leader of the new organization.²¹

There is no need to reiterate the fact that the APC was founded to wrest power from the SLPP which it charged with bad faith in signing a one-sided defense agreement with the British government. This agreement, the APC contended, suppressed the rights of the Chiefs to decide the destiny of their chieftaincies, and denied the electorate the right to decide the important issue of general elections before independence. It should be noted at this juncture that Stevens was out of Parliament from 1957-1962, having strangely lost his seat as a result of an election petition. His rival in the 1957 election in the Port Loko West constituency was Banja Tejan-Sie, Sierra Leone's third and last Governor-General. Tejar-Sie was Sir Milton's favored candidate for the seat in both the 1957 and 1962 general elections, each of which he lost.

²¹Daily Mail, September 13, 1960, p. 1.

Although the APC had a national outlook and soon became the first party to challenge vigorously the then ruling SLPP, its organizational base was primarily rooted in the Northern province and Western area. One might even say that it had more of a Timni flavor than anything else. As its first and even later Central Executive Committees show, Timni leaders preponderated, and still do, in the decision-making and administrative processes of the party. This is understandable, especially during the early years of its struggles against the seemingly impregnable SLPP with its "principalities and powers" all over the place. In fact, one of the *raison d'etre* of the APC was the need to redress the balance of power between the Mendes and Timnis. The SLPP government was seen to have always favored the Mendes rather than the Timnis who cited, among other charges, the fact that when the United National Front government was formed after the London Constitutional Conference, they were not given what to them was their own fair share of public offices. As stated earlier, the three new ministers appointed after the conference included no Timni member of Parliament. The new ministers were Albert Margai (Mende), Rogers Wright and Dickson Thomas (Creoles).

The Timnis did not consider that the inclusion of some of their leaders in the original SLPP government like Kande Bureh, Dr. Karefa Smart, I. B. Taylor-Kamara and P. C. Bai Koblo was impressive enough. In fact, they felt angered by Sir Milton's failure to appoint

a Timni House Member Deputy Prime Minister. They felt humiliated too by the act of Sir Milton in carving two new Ministries out of existing Timni ministries. M. S. Mustapha, a Freetown resident of Aku (Nigerian) descent, was appointed Deputy Minister, and this raised eyebrows among the Timnis who expected one of their own tribesmen to be elevated to the number two position in the land. Kilson reports on this reaction by noting that "... there have been signs of hostility to the new dispensation --- Kande Burch, on a tour of the Port Loko District was recalled by the Prime Minister, and a meeting of the Timni in the East side was unexpectedly visited by the Premier himself.²²

At this time, too, no Kono Member of Parliament was brought into the government, not even after the United National Front government had been set up. This is also true despite the fact that Tamba Mbriwa was a member of one of the Sierra Leone delegations that attended the Constitutional or Lancaster Conference in 1960.

If Kilson is correct in observing that "the UNF can be viewed as a convenient arrangement for perpetuating Mende predominance in Sierra Leone politics," then it could also be validly argued that the APC was founded to insure Timni or Northern Province predominance in the political system of Sierra Leone At least, this is what the APC powerful "inner circle" in the Central Committee seems to suggest.

²²Martin Kilson, "Sierra Leone Politics," in West Africa, No. 2249 (July 9, 1960), 774.

The following leaders were very powerful voices in the early executive committee, and some of them are even more powerful today, with second terms as Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament, and the current absence of opposition parties in the House:

Siaka Stevens, Limba tribe, Northerner, Leader

S. I. Koroma, Timni tribe, Northerner, Organizing Secretary

C. A. Camara-Taylor, Limba tribe, Northerner, Secretary-General

S. A. T. Koroma, Timni tribe, Northerner, Treasurer

M. O. Bash-Taqi, Timni tribe, Northerner

S. A. Fofana, Timni tribe, Northerner

Otole Kamara, Timni tribe, Northerner

Abu Lako, Timni tribe, Northerner

Borboh Kamara, Timni tribe, Northerner, resident in Freetown,

Prince Koh, Limba tribe, Northerner, Deputy Secretary-General.

However, it seems that both arguments are not quite true. It appears to be all a matter of coincidence and a display of ingenuity on the part of party leaders. The Mendes were more predominant in the legislature and the ministries, 1952-1967, chiefly because of all the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, Creoles excepted, they had far more developed interest or pressure groups than any other tribal group. Attention is directed here to such Mende oriented interest groups as the CEA, PEPU and SOS already discussed. During the crucial years of 1947-1951, it was seen that the Mendes and other southerners

had more potential political and nationally known leaders, with a high degree of educational sophistication. Reference may be made here to the Margais, Momohs, Massallys, Gulamas, Sambas, Kallons, Summers, Manleys, Caulkers, Solokus, Randles, Gorvies, Hanciles, Kajues, Brewahs, Tuckers, Mahois and others. It was essentially the Mende caucus which came up with the idea in 1952 that a "countryman's party, the SLPP," can be organized and used to challenge the hegemony of the Creoles. And they did succeed in that objective. The role of the Albert Academy and the Bo Government Secondary Schools in training the future leaders of Sierra Leone was more effective among the southerners, particularly the Mendes. Up to the early 1960's, Northerners had very few university graduates, professional men and senior civil servants. The Timnis were not politically ready as the Mendes were in the immediate post-war years.

The predominance of the Northerners, especially Timnis, in the original APC power structure was due to the fact that it was they who had the greatest need to fend for themselves. It was they who among the "out groups" had the most feasible political strategies and the desired amount of resources of spirit, courage and daring to challenge effectively the SLPP hegemony in Sierra Leone. In a series of interviews the writer held with visiting APC Timni leaders, his suspicion of a Northern oligarchy in the Central Committee, as well as the Cabinet, was confirmed. However, the leaders interviewed quickly

added that it was a form of benevolent oligarchy they operated in order to consolidate further the position of their party in the entire country and also to keep national matters under strict control until it became safer or necessary to experiment with a Western type of liberal democracy with a greater degree of diffusion of power. The base of the Northern or Timni hegemony is becoming tolerably and reasonably wider and wider as more and more nationalists from the Western Area and the Eastern and Southwestern provinces enroll voluntarily in the APC. The twelve-year old alliance of the SLPIM and the APC had long ago demonstrated the importance of political unity among the various ethnic groups of Sierra Leone. This alliance was able to beat the SLPP in the 1962 general elections in four of the five districts of the Northern Province, that is in the Bombali, Kambia, Port Loko and Tondolili Districts, and in the Kono District, Eastern Province. The analysis of the entire 1962 elections by the Electoral Commission indicates that the SLPP actually won 35 percent of the total of 671,995 votes cast, the APC-SLPIM 23 percent and independents 42 percent.²³

An important point to note about the impact of the mass political movements for independence is not that they forced the British government to grant sovereignty to Sierra Leone any sooner than it

²³Sierra Leone, General Election 1962, Score Sheet.

did, but that it ushered in the All People's Congress and its foreign policy of strict non-alignment and grassroots politics and socialism in its domestic domain. In the analysis of comparative profiles of the political parties which now follows, some reasons are suggested for the fate of the Sierra Leone People's Party, the National Council, the United People's Party, the People's National Party and the All People's Congress.

Comparative Profiles and Characteristics

The major political parties of Sierra Leone evolved through the process of synthesis, that is the amalgamation of sub-interest or pressure groups, mass movements or minor parties. As will be shown in this analysis the major parties examined are either sectarian, cadre, constituent, elitist or populist in character. The former Colony parties tend to be elitist or sectarian whereas those founded in the provinces tend to be constituent or populist.

The political system of Sierra Leone may be analytically defined as a traditional-modern fragmented society arising from the extent of the impact of its "Europeanization" or Westernization and the continued almost, uncritical reception of this by the populace, in particular, its Western educated and oriented intellectuals and political leaders. In Sierra Leone politics, one generally finds that chiefly influence upon the masses is still substantial, but gradually waning. First, the SLPP and now, the APC, regard and use the Chiefs

and their traditional socio-political institutions as instruments for propaganda, stabilization and modernization. One finds, also, in general terms, that the whole country is a system of interlocking kinship ties, and this applies to both the Western Area and the provinces. Most of Sierra Leone's politicians have chiefly ties as well as school, cultural society or occupational ties. This is understandable due to the small size of the educated and/or political elite in Sierra Leone and their ever constant interminglings. Nearly everybody knows who is who in the country. Most people in this group know each other in one institution of learning or another, say, at the Albert Academy, Bo, Saint Edwards, or Magburaka Secondary Schools, the Sierra Leone Grammar School, the Milton Margai or Bunumbu Teacher Training College or the University of Sierra Leone. Some politicians may even be fellow initiates of one secret or open cultural society or another. This explains the lack of extreme antagonism among Sierra Leone politicians of this or that party. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the political system of Sierra Leone has never been associated or activated by a strong national ideology. Perhaps arising directly or indirectly from this fact is the phenomenon of fewer grass roots demands upon the system or its political authorities, and blurred perception of the state and its constituent institutions. Most people seem to be too wary about even changing the European name of their state to a more meaningful African sounding one. Talk about socialism is low key and rather simplistic.

With respect to ethnic or communal instability, Cartwright notes that, despite the violent clashes which broke out between the Mende and Timini mine workers at the Marampa iron mines, the Mokanji Hills bauxite mines and the rutile mines in the Bonthe district in 1968, ethnic violence was by no means extensive or endemic in the political system of Sierra Leone. It may be concluded that the Mende-Timni ethnic violence referred to merely temporarily reflected SLPP Mende tribal displeasure with the post-coup administration of the APC under Siaka Stevens.²⁴

Finally, the political system of the Republic is seen as being retarded in its attempt at modernization due to its general traditional outlook and because the country's bureaucracy, i.e., the Sierra Leone Civil Service, is not yet a modernizing instrumentality. Its elitism is not in any way conducive to significant all-round development. But it must be noted too that the odds against the relatively few people in the Republic's educated group, and for that matter, those in the rest of the continent of Africa, are really tremendous. In recognition of this disturbing fact or dilemma Bretton makes the following telling comment:

Africa's educated are in a precarious position.
Behind them a tidal wave of illiteracy gathers,
expanding inexorably, threatening to obliterate

²⁴ John Cartwright, "Shifting Forces in Sierra Leone," in Africa Report, 13 (December, 1968), 26-30.

eventually the most modest achievements of Africa's renaissance. Ahead of them, and probably appreciated by them more keenly than by the rest, yawns the ever widening gap that separates most of Africa from the developed world. In such conditions ability to perceive the future can be disconcerting²⁵

All political parties, whatever their typology may be, function as power brokers between the citizenry and their government. Every party seeks at one time or another to be the allocators of societal resources, which is why political parties struggle to administer their governments. Whatever the case, parties normally engage in interest aggregation, integration and transmission of the social demands of the people for whom they speak. But all this must not lead one to conclude that all political parties are universally the same.

All parties in the world have a tight inner circle that acts as the real power broker and behaves as an oligarchy. And not all political parties are coalitions or alliance parties. In the U.S., strictly speaking, neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party is a party alliance. The same principle applies to the United Kingdom where the Labour and the Conservative parties operate as non-alliance parties. Naturally, in most countries, in the Western so-called developed liberal democracies, various interest and/or pressure groups do associate with political parties but do not compete for

²⁵ Henry L. Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1973), p. 272.

public offices with them although they try to influence relevant public policies through the good offices of some political party. In most, indeed if not all, Third World States, political parties are generally traditionally oriented. The great majority of the people who are members of these parties are often very conservative and ignorant in so far as the application of modern technology to world problems is concerned, hence the steps towards the modernization of these states are usually difficult, slow and even hazardous. On the other hand, in the Western industrialized democracies political parties are expressly committed to modernization and find it relatively easier to understand the meaning and implications of this process both in its political, economic and social manifestations.

In the Western world parties create and perpetuate a system of values, interests and beliefs and expectations generally peculiar to each of its member states. But in Sierra Leone, when one speaks of political values, interests, beliefs and expectations, one is actually talking also about a mix or complex of all that country's traditional and borrowed values, interests, beliefs, symbols and orientations.

Europe, more specifically, Britain, is the chief source from which Sierra Leone generally uncritically borrowed ideas about parliamentary democracy, complete with its electoral process, methods of rule making, rule execution and rule adjudication. It is not being

suggested here that a liberal democracy per se, involving such concepts as trial by jury, egalitarianism, prior consultation, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly and other basic democratic human rights are foreign ideas in Sierra Leone. A few questions touching on these matters are as follows: How do Sierra Leone's major parties reflect the values of their society? What are the essential characteristics of each of these parties? In what ways are the parties similar and in what ways do they differ from each other?

The National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (The National Council)

The National Council was essentially a protest movement. It was frustrated by the fact that its leaders struggled in vain to alter substantially the 1947 constitutional proposals which doubtlessly passed the torch of political leadership of the future Sierra Leone from the Westernized Creoles to the new leaders of the "less developed" Protectorate. D. H. C. Bankole-Bright, the former leader of the SLNC, was again the cofounder and President of the National Council, and C.D. Hotobah During, then a popular Freetown Barrister at law and Solicitor, was his Vice President. Both of these men have since passed on.

Although the National Council was a numerically small, selective and conservative group, it was actually an alliance of almost a dozen political and quasi-political associations, all in Freetown and

established at various periods before 1950. Some of these associations include the Freetown Ratepayers Associations, the Nova Scotian-Maroon Descendants' Association, the Artisan and General Workers Union, the Sierra Leone Women's Movement and the Settlers Descendant Union.²⁶

Without doubt the issue then contested by the National Council warranted the move toward the amalgamation of Creole-based interest groups, if only for demonstration of solidarity and for reasons of survival. The following quotation contained in the National Council's 1951 manifesto is given to illustrate its negative attitude or extreme divisiveness. "We object to the foreigners prepondering in our Legislative Council."²⁷ By foreigners the National Council meant the inhabitants of the then Protectorate.

On 29th July, 1952, Dr. Bankole-Bright, who had become a member of the newly reconstituted Legislative Council as a result of

²⁶Martin Kilson, "Sierra Leone," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 96-97. Note: According to the African Standard issue of August 25, 1950, pp. 1-2, the organizations which constituted the National Council were the Sierra Leone Democratic Party, the West African Youth League (Sierra Leone Branch), the Sierra Leone Socialist Party, the Sierra Leone Political Group, the Rural Areas Council, the Fourah Bay and Foulah Town Communities and the party's members in the Executive and Legislative Councils.

²⁷Manifesto of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (Freetown, 1951), p. 10.

the 1951 General election, moved a resolution in the Chamber, distinguished solely by its lack of imagination and realism. This is the text of his resolution:

That this Sierra Leone Government stands impeached by the Creole elements of this Colony through their representatives in the Legislative Council who are members of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone in that it has by its action brought into existence a cleavage between the people of this Colony and Protectorate. That in consequence of the present existing relationship, this Colony through its National Council's representatives ask for its independence to control its own affairs.²⁸

Not surprisingly, Dr. Bankole-Bright's motion was ignominiously defeated by the votes of the majority SLPP and the ex-officio members of the legislature. As if to make themselves even more offensive or obnoxious, the representatives of the National Council blindly opposed every measure proposed by the Government in the Legislative Council without due regard to its merits or demerits.²⁹

Without any doubt, the words and actions of the National Council party were generally puerile, irresponsible, vexatious and unreasonable. One has the impression that the policy statements and behavior of the leaders of this party were nothing more than the equivocation and emotional outbursts of a rapidly diminishing minority

²⁸Sierra Leone, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1951-52, (Freetown, 1953), H. 121-128, and Sierra Leone, Collected Statements of Constitutional Proposals, September 1955 (Freetown: Government Printing Department, 1955), pp. 1-2.

²⁹Kilson, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

ethnic group who became suddenly aware that they were now a spent force, just when independence for Sierra Leone was almost in sight. This group was seemingly devoid of the wisdom of compromise which is the essence of the game of politics. For the National Council, conceding power or leadership to the leaders of the Protectorate amounted to the enthronement of an immature country folk who knew nothing supposedly about the mechanics of sophisticated politics and the art of modern government. On the other hand, the people of the Protectorate were unwilling to resign their fate to an apparently backward looking and condescending Creole aristocracy. Certainly, the National Council did not seem to reckon with the high price it had to pay very soon for its extreme obstructionist and dysfunctional political strategy.

The near-demise of the uncompromising and inflexible National Council became more than apparent in 1957 when it contested the general elections for the House of Representatives in that year and failed to win even a single seat. It has not participated in any other elections since then.

The Sierra Leone People's Party

The standard classification of Almond, Coleman and Rosberg is that the SLPP was in its heyday a mass party or a dominant party in a competitive political system. These scholars maintain this point because the SLPP seemed to them, between 1951 and 1967, to be

predominant in most parts of Sierra Leone. But in reality, the SLPP is an elitist political organization with a provincial orientation and tribal polarization, and its membership is chiefly ascriptive. The SLPP is a conservative, hegemonic, incohesive, practically regional organization, more or less based on Mendeland. The leaders of this party have always demonstrated a low level of commitment to the political mobilization of the masses, rapid modernization of the state and the realization of true nationhood.

Other characteristics of the SLPP include its small formally registered membership, lack of an effective administrative machinery, negligible financial resources, absence of links with any foreign political organization, dependence on chiefly connections and deference to elderly leaders. The SLPP was a fusion of a number of interest and/or pressure groups and minor political parties. Not unlike other elitist parties with a large loose following, the SLPP was highly authoritarian and its inter-party communication was very low; it depended on the chiefs to mobilize the masses on its behalf.

One evidence of the non-radicalism of the SLPP is the fact that its leadership had been mellowed by years of training in law and order which tended to make it conservative. Nowhere in its constitution or in its 1951 documents can any body find the words "colonialism" and "imperialism". It is true that these two words used frequently by such militant African nationalist leaders like Nkrumah, Patrice

Lumumba and Sekou Toure do appear twice in the party's 1957 election manifesto. It is clear, however, that these terms are only more distinguished in this document for their near obscurity and the diffidence with which they are used. In fact, it is widely held by many SLPP executive members interviewed by the author that the terms colonialism and imperialism were used only sparingly by one man, Albert Margai, in whose message, as party chairman, they appear merely as an appendix or an afterthought. Deference to the elderly is a given value in all African communities, hence the leaders of the SLPP, who were generally senior citizens, age-wise, commanded or expected the appropriate response from their much younger followers, and often got it, at least for over a decade.

The United People's Party (UPP)

A relatively small, but vigorous opposition populist party which emerged in the post-war era, was the Sierra Leone United People's Party (UPP). This party was founded and led by an eminent Colony Creole lawyer-politician named Cyril B. Rogers-Wright. It is interesting to note that the formation of the UPP was announced in Freetown just before the commencement of the inquiry into the 1955-56 tax riots by the Keith-Lucas commission. Remarkably enough, this political party's aim was to effect unity between the colony and protectorate

of Sierra Leone.³⁰ This platform or declared objection of the UPP stands in sharp contrast to that of the National Council of Bankole-Bright just discussed.

It is noted in parenthesis that I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson joined the UPP soon after its foundation. This versatile and erst-while politician had withdrawn from the National Council in 1952 and sat in the House of Representatives as an independent member. But Wallace-Johnson was expelled from the UPP immediately after the 1957 general election to the House.³¹

It can be concluded that the vigor of the UPP stemmed from its popular appeal to the peasants' uprising against their local government authorities. The principal issue contested by the rioters in 1955/56 was the heavy burden of per capita taxation and its consequent economic powerlessness. The UPP's main thrust was in the Northern Province where the peasant rioters were more articulate active and rebellious. Ribbi and Bompeh Chiefdoms in the Moyamba District, Southwestern Province, were also overrun by the burning and looting antitax mobsters.

Judging from the UPP testimony before the Keith-Lucas Commission and its constitutional proposals, one is tempted to see this

³⁰Daily Mail, July 14, 1954, pp. 1-2.

³¹Daily Mail, May 29, 1957, p. 1. See also D. J. R. Scott, "The Sierra Leone Election of May 1957" in W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson, eds., Five Elections in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

party vying with the SLPP for the national spotlight and the votes of the masses of the country.³² The UPP advocated two proposals for (a) a new legislature with a greater majority for the Protectorate and (b) a second chamber made up of Paramount Chiefs and other distinguished Sierra Leoneans.³³ Unlike the National Council, the UPP, although led by a Creole politician, was more compromising and nationalistic. For example, it conceded that the Protectorate with more people should have a majority in the House of Representatives and Cabinet. In its constitutional proposals, it suggested that the Colony be represented by just 14 seats in an Assembly of 43 members. However, it was only prepared to support a proposal which restricted the number of Paramount Chiefs in the Assembly to 7. This party and the National Council were in agreement to retain British administrative official members in the Executive Council.³⁴

As a result of its attractive espousal of the case of the 1955/56 tax rioters and their brilliant legal defense by Rogers-Wright

³²Note: In 1954, the Government appointed Bryan Keith-Lucas of Nuffield College, Oxford, Chairman of the Reform Commission to make recommendations on electoral reforms. The other members of the commission were the Honourable Dr. H. C. Bankole-Bright (Leader of the Opposition), Mr. A. T. A. Beckley, Mr. Y. D. Sesay (Vice-Principal, Bo Government School), Mr. Banja Tejan-Sie and Paramount Chief Bockari Kai-Samba of Kenema.

³³Sierra Leone, Collected Statements of Constitutional Proposals, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

³⁴*Ibid.* See also Cartwright, op. cit., p. 94.

who argued the police charged against their leaders, the UPP was able to win 7 seats in the 1957 elections to the House. Thus this party became the first Creole-led political party to win seats in some constituencies in the Provinces, actually six in the Northern and one in the Southwestern provinces.³⁵ The party won no seat in the Eastern province at all.

Evidence of the national political outlook of the UPP is reflected by its general organizational structure, public platforms and constitutional proposals. For instance, the party's Central Executive Committee was fairly representative of most of the principal tribes of Sierra Leone. It was as fragile and incohesive as any truly oligarchic party organization could be.

By 1958, the majority of the UPP following had transferred their loyalty to the ruling SLPP where it was originally thought to belong. The voters who had only a short time ago enthusiastically joined the UPP soon demonstrated the fact that their membership had been merely transient and that all they had wanted to achieve was to expose the gross corruption of their Chiefs and, that done, they were ready to join forces once more with the SLPP which they had apparently all along regarded as the countryman's party.

The PNP was formed on 2nd September, 1958.³⁶ In reality, this party was a development of the radical branch of the SLPP which

³⁵A.G. Simpson, Report on the Sierra Leone Election, 1957 (Freetown, 1957), pp. 1-6.

³⁶Sierra Leone Daily Mail, September 3, 1958, p. 1.

finally broke off from the parent body and transformed itself into an opposition party. This split came about because of the disillusionment of the young radicals with Dr. Margai's soft pedalling on such issues as Africanization of the Civil Service and timing of the granting of independence to Sierra Leone by the British government.

Although the PNP spoke heatedly against sectionalism and tribalism, it is to be noted that its top leadership consisted mainly of men of Protectorate origin. The Mende made up the largest tribal unit in the executive committee. As a matter of fact, 6 of the 13 PNP members in parliament were Mende.

The following members made up the first PNP Executive Committee: Albert Margai, leader (Mende), Siaka Stevens, deputy leader (Limba), Maigore Kallon, organizing secretary (Mende), Dr. Y. Yilla, secretary general (Timni), Sam T. Navo, treasurer (Mende), H. I. Kamara, (Timni), M. S. Turay (Mende), T. J. Ganda (Mende), Berthan Macauley, Ken During, Claude Nelson-Williams and Gershon B. Collier (Creoles), Abu Koroma (Kono) and Arthur J. Massally (Mende). Lawyers in the Executive Committee included Margai, Navo, Macauley, Collier, Koroma and Massally.

A few years after the foundation of the PNP, Sir Albert reverted to the SLPP, together with his large Mende following, while most of the baffled young people in the Colony and the Northern province staked their fortunes with Dr. Stevens who practically

single-handedly founded and led the All People's Congress, the present party in power in Sierra Leone. With the withdrawal of its co-founders, it is not surprising that the promising young PNP collapsed almost instantaneously.

The factors which account for the collapse of the PNP may be listed as (a) the lack of national leadership and mass following, (b) the elusiveness of the leader, Albert Margai, (c) the inability to pre-empt the institution of chieftaincy, as had been done by the SLPP, (d) the insufficiency of financial resources and (e) the unpreparedness of the majority of the electorate to endorse a radical political party, as the PNP held itself out to be. By the elusiveness and perfidy of the leader of this party, reference is made to his switch over to the SLPP and doing so by hoodwinking, in particular, the non-Mendes in the organization. This writer, who was a founding member of the PNP formed this opinion of Albert Margai after an interview he had with him shortly after the return home of the delegation which attended the London Constitutional Talks in 1960. The interviewer, that is the writer, was assured by the leader that he had not yet decided to merge the PNP with the SLPP when events proved shortly afterwards that a decision had been reached long before the interview. It was as a result of this breach of faith that a number of people followed the leadership of Siaka Stevens to form the All People's Congress.

The All People's Congress (APC)

The All People's Congress is appropriately classified as a radical populist party, which like the UPP, efficiently aggregated, articulated and communicated the demands of the masses of Sierra Leone. This party, it should be noted, recruited nearly all its leaders from the lower strata of the political system. The party deliberately chose to deal directly with the masses rather than with chiefly institutions and secret societies. As a matter of fact, Chiefs were so apprehensive of this party that they dissociated themselves from any known members of it. The SLPP did just the opposite. As is noted by Cartwright, the policy of the APC was to operate as a populist party. "It ... drew a great number of people from parochial to participant roles in the political culture"³⁷

Unlike the National Council, the Positive Action Party, the Radical Democratic Party, KPM and the SLPP, the APC made a great effort to enlarge its base of support by concentrating its mobilization machinery on all the outgroups, and the ordinary or non-elite electors in the country. Each of these avoided dependence on chiefs to mobilize votes on its behalf.

The People's National Party never developed into a tribal political organization, but its leaders were all recruited from the

³⁷Cartwright, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-2.

intellectual elite of the country, mostly lawyers, medical doctors and graduate teachers. Unlike the SLPP, however, the PNP did try to incorporate non-elites in its organization and offered them an opportunity to assume leadership roles on a limited basis. When the PNP broke up in 1960, its militant non-elite leaders regrouped to form the APC, while their more conservative colleagues reverted to the SLPP from whence they had come.

The leaders of the APC are generally much younger men than those of the National Council and the SLPP. These new leaders advantageously exploited the differences between the people and their chiefs, and between the Timms and Creoles, as the UPP leaders did before them. But even though the APC, is regarded as a populist political party it is important to note that it does have tribal cleavages as the SLPP and KPM. Today, these original cleavages have largely disappeared and it can be reasonably held that the APC has taken on a true national outlook. With its overwhelming victory in the 1973 general elections, it is now senseless to associate this party with a strictly tribal orientation.³⁸

³⁸See Robert S. Jordan, Government and Power in West Africa (New York: African Publishing Company, 1969), especially Part II, for a treatment of the origin, characteristics and functions of the political parties and interest groups of Sierra Leone.

Why the All People's Congress Survived

No opposition party in Sierra Leone politics was more harrassed by the governing SLPP, under both Sir Milton and his brother and successor, Sir Albert Margai, than the APC. These two family administrations frequently imprisoned Siaka Stevens, S. I. Koroma, C. A. Kamara-Taylor, M. O. Bash Taqi, Tamba Mbriwah and so many other opposition leaders. This writer, like most other Sierra Leoneans, lost count of the number of times Imbrahim Taqi, the former accomplished columnist of the APC party newspaper, We Yone, and his colleague S. G. Hollist, the editor, were arraigned for trial for alleged charges of libel and sedition. To the best of one's recollection, these two men were found innocent each time they were tried for various alleged offenses.

Sir Milton's concern about "...the threats, intimidating words and malicious and false rumors which are being uttered by certain irresponsible members of the Community" forced him to the conclusion that his government could no longer tolerate such subversive conduct and accordingly ordered the arrest of several APC leaders and supporters.³⁹ M. O. Bash Taqi, the suspected ringleader of the saboteurs, and two other APC leaders (all three of them of the Timni tribe, were found guilty of assault on SLPP Ministers, stopping car and train

³⁹Daily Mail, February 20, 1961, p. 1. See also issues of Daily Mail for February 21 and February 24, 1961, pp. 1-4.

traffic, sinking launches, and breaking up a tribal meeting of Mendes. As for Stevens and his companion-in-distress, Kamara-Taylor, they were each charged with the publication of a seditious pamphlet. These two men were found guilty and sentenced to a six-month jail term.⁴⁰

Stevens was later acquitted on appeal to a superior court.⁴¹ The story of the harrassment of the leaders of the APC can go on and on.

Again, on April 18, 1961, i.e., just over a week before the date of Sierra Leone's independence (April 27, 1961), Sir Milton's government declared a state of emergency and apprehended eighteen APC top leaders, including Siaka Stevens, Kamara-Taylor, M. O. Bash Taqi, Wallace-Johnson, and other members of the Executive Committee. The SLPP government's pretext at that time was that these men were plotting to sabotage the impending inauguration of the country's independence.

In his pledge to accept the existing political situation, Stevens made the following affirmation:

Independence having become an accomplished fact and the government having given the assurance of General Elections in 1962, the APC calls upon all its members to maintain the Party policy line of (a) full respect for law and order (b) constitutional and lawful procedure in all matters. The APC never stood, and will never stand, for violence, sabotage or unconstitutional action⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid., March 28, and May 24, 1961, p. 1-6.

⁴¹Ibid., July 24, 1961, pp. 1-4.

⁴²Ibid., May 29, 1961, p. 1. According to the Parliamentary Debates, 1961, I, April 28, 1961 (Mimeo) all the Members of Parliament present concurred in the decision to detain the apprehended APC members.

Siaka Stevens has never really been a fanatical or a completely unorthodox politician; hence his above statement does not depart in any way from his normal tenor. Most people who know him were not suprised by this statement. Indeed, as an ex-police officer, law and order were articles of faith for him, and one hopes that that continues to be so for the rest of his political career.

The factors responsible for the survival of the APC may be summarized in a simple manner as follows: (a) correct or auspicious timing, (b) the need for the various independence movements to find a new synthesis, (c) Sir Milton's "hasten-slowly" philosophy and tolerance, (d) Sir Albert's alarming excesses, (e) the unqualified loyalty and stoic endurance of S. I. Koroma and other APC lieutenants as Kamara-Taylor, D. F. Shears, and the Taqi brothers, (f) the dynamism and resourcefulness of the party errant traders, (g) Stevens' liberal progressiveness, non-fanaticism and abiding faith in the rightness of his course, (h) the hegemonic and incohesive structure of the SLPP and the incoherence and dearth of critical resources which plagued the other parties.

On the question of correct timing one notes that at the time the APC was founded in 1960, a large, vocal young progressive people, particularly in the five districts of the Northern Province, and, many in the Kono and Kenema Districts in the Eastern Province, had become very disenchanted with the conservative rule of the SLPP oligarchy.

The PNP, which preceded the APC in 1958, was born out of this same frustration and disenchantment, but this party had proved to be a great disappointment. Regarding the new synthesis, it is now clear that the leaders of the three independence movement parties, viz, the Elections Before Independence Movement of Stevens, the Kono Progressive Movement of Mbriwah, and the Sierra Leone Independence Movement of Blyden, recognized the need to come together. The leaders worked hard to create a more dynamic and resourceful alliance, and a single dominant party for the more adequate realization of their political ideologies and objectives. The general elections results of 1962 show that the APC amalgam won 20 out of 44 contested seats and thus established itself as a force to be reckoned with in the politics of Sierra Leone. In the 1967 general elections this party constitutionally defeated the ruling SLPP and took over the government of the country in 1968, after the overthrow of the military-police which had usurped its powers for a whole year.

General Characteristics and Typologies

Like the political parties and interest or pressure groups of other countries, those of Sierra Leone have both universal and unique characteristics. As far as general functions and objectives go, however, a geographical frame of reference or local factors seem to make little or no difference.

In the pages of this chapter political groups have been shown to be nothing more than mechanisms or objects of voter identification or psychological reference groups.⁴³ As Key points out, political parties make up the basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus of the state. In this light, he saw these formal organizations as the managers of the race for the succession to power, as well as the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy.⁴⁴ Interests of various sorts have also been shown to be the necessary raw materials or the dynamic forces in the political process in any country, whether or not any given country be dependent or independent, traditional or pre-literate, or modern.

A political party is, technically speaking, an association that "activates and mobilizes the people, represents interests, provides for compromise among competing points of view, and becomes the proving ground for political leadership."⁴⁵ The National Council, the Sierra Leone People's Party, the United People's Party, the People's National Party and the All People's Congress, and other parties, were certainly instruments used by each party's leaders and supporters to

⁴³Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System, 2d. ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), p. 43.

⁴⁴V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th. ed., (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), pp. 9-16.

⁴⁵Roy C. Macridis, "Introduction: the History, Functions and Typology of Parties," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Political Parties (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 9.

acquire power and to govern, or attempt to govern the country before 1961 and thereafter. Hence, political parties are essentially the product of the emergence of representative government or competitive political systems and every party is organized around a certain ideology or the outlook of its leaders, that is, their image of the State and its political processes and social institutions.

Among the universal characteristics usually associated with political parties a number may be readily identified. In terms of universal typologies and characteristics, reference is generally made to comprehensive, sectarian, authoritarian, democratic, national, regional, secular, religious, revolutionary, constituent or mass-based and elitist or cadre political parties. Political systems may on the other hand be regarded as one-party, two-party, multy-party, competitive and totalitarian states. Parties are classified on the basis of the following criteria: springs or sources of party support, internal organization, and role. Political systems may also be categorized according to Kousoulas' concept of the temperate or intemperate diffusion of power referred to earlier in this dissertation.⁴⁶ In other words, a political system is labelled democratic, oligarchic or

⁴⁶Kousoulas, On Government, op. cit., pp. 41-46, 53, 82; S. E. Finer, Comparative Government, op. cit., p. 40; Giuseppe Di Palmer, Apathy and Participation (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 4-15. See also, Carl J. Friedrich, Man and his Government (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 40; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1965); Richard E. Dawson & Kenneth Prewett, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1969), pp. 17-24.

authoritarian in accordance with the prevailing level of political participation in such political activities as (a) communication (petition, complaint or opinion), campaigning and voting, (b) information and (c) holding and expressing political opinions. Finer refers to this concept in his discussion of the (a) participation-exclusion, (b) coercion-persuasion and (c) order-representation dimensions. Di Palmer covers the same ground in his study of apathy and participation.

As indicated above, many party functions are universal, or, almost without exception, similar in all political systems. One can say the same thing about techniques used by parties and pressure groups to realize their common objectives, viz, to compete for and control public offices in the state, to influence policy-making, and so on. Parties perform the functions of mobilization, education, modernization, integration, and stabilization of the citizenry and the state.

Macridis uses more inclusive rubrics such as "representation" and "brokerage". These rubrics, or processes, include expression and articulation of interests, through the party and within its framework, conversion, and aggregation of interests, i. e., the processes of transforming interests and demands into policy decisions, integration (participation, socialization and mobilization), persuasion, repression, recruitment and choice of prospective leaders, deliberation, policy

and control of the government of the state.⁴⁷

As Macridis emphasized, it makes no difference whether it be in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Greece, the U.S. or Canada, the party "establishes both affective and rational ties between the individual and the political system and transforms the former into a citizen and the latter into a responsive government."⁴⁸ How effectively any political party performs its universal and local functions depends on whether or not its articulation (vertical or horizontal), communication of demands and support, and internal organization are strong or weak. Or to put it in another way, the functionality of parties depends on their organization, concepts of membership, the nature and degree of their participation in the political processes of the state, the method of the selection of leaders, and the authority of these leaders, and the typology of the political system in which they operate.

In regard to universal techniques used by political pressure groups in Sierra Leone as well as elsewhere, these include the manipulation of public opinion, and influencing or otherwise pressuring

⁴⁷Macridis, op. cit., P. 17. See also Lucian W. Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969).

⁴⁸Macridis, op. cit., p. 18. For a very authoritative treatment of the topics mentioned in the last paragraph above the reader is referred to Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Books I and II (London: Lowe and Brydone Ltd., 1964).

of legislators, and administrators, and influencing of the judiciary process. It can be said at once that pressure on the courts in Sierra Leone is very minimal, that is, if perceptible or visible at all. In the U.S., the reverse is the rule. American pressure groups, (lobbies) could force the hands of the Senate to refuse confirmation of a presidential nominee to the judiciary, if, for example, such a nominee had in the past been opposed to civil rights cases. President Nixon's ill-fated and unsuccessful nomination of Carswell and Haynesworth to the Supreme Court are two cases in point. In addition, certain pressure groups may find themselves called upon to test the constitutionality of proposed or even enacted legislation. In Sierra Leone, three interest or pressure groups, namely, the Bar Association, the United Christian Council and the Trade Union Congress pressured the Albert Margai government to reconsider its proposal for the incorporation of a one-party system in the state.

It has already been suggested in this study that the All People's Congress (APC) vigorously fought Margai's Sierra Leone People's Party over the ill-digested manner in which the latter wanted to convert the country to a one-party state. The other opposition political parties had all become passive, or even non-existent after the formation of Sir Milton's United National Front government in 1960/61. The reward for making the compromise was no doubt attractive enough to go through the exercise painlessly and with no qualms, a

process made more easily so in the absence of a pretended multi-party system with serious ingrained national or local ideological differences.

Both the extant and the passive or dormant political parties of the Republic of Sierra Leone may be described as modernizing instruments, elite-mass or cadre-constituent structures, by-products of the colonial experience and amalgamations. All the parties emerged only just before the close of the colonial era, with the exception of the National Democratic Party, or the United Democratic Party to which it converted later in 1970, ten years after independence. It may convincingly be said that all the parties of Sierra Leone reflect an unclear national ideology, a weak internal cohesion, a lack of firm loyalties through the rank and file, tenuous memberships, in other words, a fragile central and constituency organizational structure, and a dearth of vital resources, for example, professional management staff at all levels, a central research unit, money to fund party programs and pay recurrent operational costs of services and consumable commodities.

Whereas one may classify the National Council (NCCSL) led by the late Honourable Dr. Bankole-Bright, the eminent and veteran Creole political leader, a sectarian-conservative political party, the SLPP may be generally classified as an elite-mass association. And whereas the United People's Party (UPP), led by the late Honourable C. B.

Rogers-Wright and his provincial cohorts, mainly former political activists, may be categorized as a cadre or policy-making party, the now governing All People's Congress, led by His Excellency President Dr. Siaka P. Stevens and the Honourable S. I. Koroma, the present Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Sierra Leone, may be properly styled a mass or constituent party. It may also be observed that the APC has in recent times swung from one end of the political continuum to the other, that is, from being a solid mass structured to that of a cadre or policy-making party. Some definitions may bring out the distinctions the writer desires to make.

A sectarian party, as the NCCSL, is one which appeals to a particular elitist social class or caste, a region or ideology. The NC was almost entirely Creole and restricted to the Crown Colony. A comprehensive or mass or constituent party is, on the other hand, a typical phenomenon of a populist organization and a product of the industrialized 19th century world. It provides for all comers. According to Lowi, Ladd, Schattschneider, Chambers and Burnham, a constituent party cannot afford to be highly selective about its membership; it relies on a tradition-laden automatic voting support, charismatic party leaders and candidates for public political office,

the spoils of politics and the ever shifting positions on issues and answers to them.⁴⁹

A cadre party or policy-making party (e. g. the UPP) is often one that is run fairly strictly by a cluster of professional political leaders, its elected public officials, if any, and volunteer political activists or radicals chiefly recruited for the purpose of organizing the party's electioneering campaign. A cadre party normally draws its power from a behind-the-scenes strong interest group or a number of such kindred groups.

The SLPP is sometimes considered to be an elite-mass party because it is a combination of a traditional elite and the peasantry. The elite depends on the mass for its power to rule. Duverger sheds light on the subject of cadre and mass or constituent parties when he makes the following comment. "The distinction between cadre and mass parties is not based upon their dimensions or upon the number of their members. The difference involved is not one of size but of structure."⁵⁰ As one sees it, from Duverger's perspective, the category that political scientists assign to a party depends on the concept of "membership."

⁴⁹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); Everett C. Ladd, Jr. American Political Parties (New York: Norton, 1960); Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy and Constitution" in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 239-276.

⁵⁰Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 63-70.

One party may, more often than not, speak of "members" whereas another emphasized the term "supporters." Some parties regard membership as a formal affiliation and others as a merely informal association. In Sierra Leone, constituent party or cadre party matters not: membership is generally informal and tenuous or shifty. As a matter of fact, after the 1962 general elections there was hardly any difference between one party and the other; there was a marked absence of a distinguishable crusading national ideology.

Leadership is virtually the single decisive factor in the party system of Sierra Leone; it determines the party following; it is the critical factor that influences the choice of the electors. This phenomenon was characteristic of the 1962, 1967, and 1973 general elections.

Generally speaking, there are no serious doctrinal or ideological differences between the political parties in Sierra Leone. More often than not the differences are merely a question of which party is in power and which is in the opposition or who the leader is. Most of the leaders of the various parties generally belong to the same social class; they belong either to the intellectual or the business elite, except Dr. Stevens of the APC who is a labor union leader. The SLPP and APC, the only parties which have formed governments in Sierra Leone, have depended on chiefs for much of their support. All the parties have the same foreign policy of non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. (See Appendixes, A, B and C.)

Pros and Cons of a One-Party State

Neumann would have his readers believe that a one-party system (le parti unique) is a contradiction in terms by itself; but this is not a question of a straight "yes" or "no" for many people. According to Neumann, if "Every party in its very essence signifies partnership in a particular organization and separation from others by a specific program ... identification with one group and differentiation from another ..." then a one-party structure is the very antithesis of democracy.⁵¹

If one accepts Apter's position, then the primary function of parties is to organize public opinion and test attitudes and to transmit these to government officials and leaders so that the ruled and rulers, the public and government, are in reasonably close accord, or that their significant characteristic is that "their form is determined by the entire sociopolitical framework of society."⁵² This being so, then, the number of political parties in any one state is not the crucial point that decides whether a state is democratic, competitive or authoritarian non-competitive political system. The decisive

⁵¹Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 395. See also, Ruth Schachter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa," American Political Science Review, LV, 2 (June 1961), 294-307; C. H. Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party, a Structure for Democracy?" World Politics, XIV (April, 1962), 461-482; J. G. Liebnow, "The One-Party State in West Africa: Its Strengths and Weaknesses in the Nation-Building Process," in W. H. Lewis, ed., French Speaking West Africa: The Search for Identity (New

factor is doubtlessly the degree of political choices open to the electorate and in what light the political authorities perceive their power relationships with their electors in any given state.

Dr. Magona, a political scientist in his own rights, and currently the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of External Affairs, has convincingly explained that the fact that the All People's Congress (APC) is at the moment the only party in Parliament is expressly so by the free and unfettered sovereign will of the overwhelming majority of every one of the constituencies of the Republic of Sierra Leone. He has equally affirmed that the 1973 general elections were competitive, in the sense that all political parties and politicians of different persuasions had a fair opportunity to test their popularity at the polls. As the election results show, the people themselves chose to give the APC an unprecedented landslide victory, neutralizing, at least for the time being, partisan politics in the House of Representatives. As Dr. Magona further explained in an interview which this writer had with him, the APC conducted the 1973 electioneering campaign on the basis of Sierra Leone's new-found, rather its rediscovered political doctrine of "selection by consultation." By this doctrine it is meant that all the party candidates in each constituency

York: Walker and Co., 1965), pp. 45-57.

⁵²David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 181-82.

present themselves to an ad hoc assembly of chiefs, tribal authorities and people where each prospective contestant's claim for selection is heard. The process ends up with a declaration of popular support for one of the party candidates who is thereafter presented to the National Executive Committee for official adoption in the name of the entire party. After this democratic selection, no other party candidate is permitted to run against the person chosen by the majority of the constituency selection forum.⁵³

No one can be certain at this moment that the system of selection by consultation is not open to abuse, especially by the party in power; but it may also be said without fear of contradiction that it is comparatively less open to corruption, unfair competition and the risk of ethnic or national divisiveness. This system is after all the one by which African empires and kingdoms chose their cabinets, rulers and state officials long before the European Metropolitan powers introduced their particular westernized party and electoral systems, complete with the secret ballot box, to their various colonies, protectorates and trust territories in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Selection by consultation has to be constantly guarded, however, from the manipulation of over-zealous influence peddlers in high

⁵³Interview with Dr. S. S. Magona, Deputy Minister, Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of Sierra Leone, held in Washington, D. C. on Friday, 14 December, 1973.

places or lovers of power for its own sake. Candidate selection should be faithfully supervised and controlled for the sole purpose of ensuring the recruitment of the best possible candidates, the maintenance of a truly modernizing party structure and the promotion of a sense of nationhood in a state replete with so many tribes known for their divergent ideological stances and orientations.

Reflection upon the only party in the present Parliament of Sierra Leone logically leads to a critical interpretation of the single party state and to a fuller consideration of the correct categorization of the APC in the congeries of political parties which mushroomed in that state between 1950 and 1971.

Sierra Leone cannot at present be classified as a one-party state, although there is now only one party in Parliament. Without doubt, the government and the public still officially recognize that there is at least another political party in the country, namely the SLPP. Perhaps, more importantly, there is as yet no express intention on the part of the present Sierra Leone Parliament to enact a one-party constitution of any typology. The public laws of Sierra Leone do not forbid the organization and functioning of any new opposition party; to do so rashly or by one subterfuge or another will be abusing and undermining the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of the citizens of the state.

To begin with, the single party system is neither an African creation nor a new phenomenon in the world. There have been one party governments in Portugal, Spain, parts of the United States, a number of Latin American republics and other countries on both sides of the so-called "Iron Curtain" for many decades. In Turkey and Portugal, for example and very recently in Sierra Leone, there is no constitutional or official provision for a single party system. In other words, the situation appears to have just come about as a natural working out of the political process in each of these states, in the same way as the price mechanism operates in a competitive free market system. The USSR itself did not give its one-party system a constitutional cloak until 1936 when the constitution enacted in that year provided in Article 126 that:

That most active and politically conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the toilers unite in the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks which is the advance detachment of the toilers in their struggle for the strengthening and development of Socialist order, and the directing nucleus of all the workers' organizations, both social and state.⁵⁴

With reference to whether this country or that country has either a multi-party or single-party system depends on its own deliberate choice. It also has the option to choose any particular doctrine or ideology it finds most plausible, appropriate and rewarding.

⁵⁴Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., p. 257.

Proponents of the single party theory recognize that with the demise of the traditional elite, it is now necessary to have a single party which is to "form elites, to create a new ruling class, to unite and to shape the political leaders capable of organizing the country, for the masses cannot themselves govern."⁵⁵ Theorists who are in favor of a one-party system, argue that it is capable of, and does in fact, create a sieve which holds and uses the elites in its structures or meshes. The new ruling class provides the needed chief administrative, political, and other leaders who serve the masses from whom they are never isolated. In pure authoritarian states, the leaders of the state lose contact with the people, hence the probability of unexpected revolutions. As Duverger further comments, "Police reports are insufficient to break through this iron curtain which separates the government from the governed For contact is established not only upwards, in the direction people-leaders, but also downwards, in the direction leaders-people."⁵⁶ In public administration parlance, it may be said that in a one-party system, communication is not a one-way street affair but that it takes on both a vertical and horizontal or a top-to-bottom and a bottom-up flow pattern. Of course, in an authoritarian one-party system the communication flow pattern could very well be in the reverse or obverse.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 258.

⁵⁶Ibid.

The views of the natural critics of the single party system are very impressive, too. They see the single party state, especially in the Third World, as the new unmistakable replica of the old sociological type: "the Praetorian guard which strengthens the tyrant's dictatorship. It is less a question of the selection of an elite than the creation of a privileged class, bound to the regime by the particular favors it enjoys: material advantages, monopoly of administrative posts, more freedom and power than other citizens ..."⁵⁷ The critics further argue that under the one-party system loyalty to the ruling elite, or the dictator, is commanded and yielded not on the basis of merit but out of fear for instant reprisal. They hold that the state in these circumstances of coercion and exclusion becomes nothing but the machinery of the political authorities, or an instrument of merciless exploitation and relentless repression, as the Marxist socialists might put it. Finally, in a single-party state it is feared that political communication is usually operated in a top-bottom direction only, since the essential thing in such a state is to spread government propaganda among the people as effectively as possible. The state is deified and becomes more important than the people of which it is composed, or the people who created it in the first instance. Speaking figuratively, one may note that the new Praetorian guard draws its strength less from "pike and lance" in the best tradition of the tyrants of yesteryears, than from its barrage of

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 259.

incessant propaganda. As a police, or potential police system, the one-party state depends more on spying and constant repression and far less on persuasion. The single party is so organized as to make the dissemination of propaganda and the practice of spying, and being spied upon and informing, fairly easy matters.

Apparently, the arguments adduced by the proponents and the critics of the one party system can be held in a very delicate balance and there can be no absolutism on any one side. Be it as it may, an analysis of the structure, strategies and functions of the APC suggests that it is neither a communist nor a fascist party. It is none of these even if some people, erroneously for that matter, conceptualize a communist party to be the tool of the working class, that is the proletariat or lumpenproletariat, established to demolish the power and influence of the bourgeoisie. The APC is not a fascist party, often defined as the weapon of the middle class to impose its will on the general public. As in the USSR, the early U. S. republic, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Guinea and many others, a single party in Sierra Leone may be an instrumentality of political and economic development or modernization in a pluralist political system. Just as a totalitarian party can be found in a pluralist state, as was the case in France and Italy, so it is that a single party can function normally in Sierra Leone and in other democratic party states. The general rule, here, is that one party rule is a sound proposition or experiment, if such an organization does not, in Duverger's words "deduce

its right to govern from its character as the political elite, or as the spearhead of the working class, or from the providential nature of its leader, but from the majority that it won at elections,"⁵⁸ presumably at fair, open and unrigged elections.

Given the long tradition of democracy that has existed in Sierra Leone in the three periodic phases studied in this work, one may conclude that everything augurs well for that state, and for the ruling APC no less, if the latter perceives itself as a steward accountable to the people at all times for the consolidation of their independence and their general welfare. It is reasonable to assume that the APC government welcomes other political parties, old and new, and interest groups, which are ready, willing and able to make the Republic of Sierra Leone a safe place for democracy. The fact that the leaders of the APC have publicly pledged a number of times over not to make Sierra Leone a one-party state by revolutionary but by an evolutionary process must be very reassuring to all who prefer democratic rule to dictatorship.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 277.

CHAPTER V

INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES THAT INFLUENCE THE DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The primary purpose of this chapter is to study the institutions and structures involved in the determination of the foreign policy of the Republic of Sierra Leone. Included in this discussion are considerations of the role played in this political process by public opinion, the Creole as an enlightened ethnic group, the civil service, trade unions, the Chamber of Commerce, the United Christian Council, political parties and interest groups.

Public Opinion

In political terms, public opinion may be defined as the political view held by a large vocal number of citizens on an important social issue. In any state, the number of people who consistently articulate political opinions about domestic and or foreign policy constitutes a relatively small percentage of the total populace. Hence, what is termed as an "operational public", for want of a better name, consists of those members of the general public who feel stimulated enough to organize lobbies, interest or pressure groups or even political parties to pursue their common objectives. An operational group or interest group may march in protest or support of a common

cause; it may allow itself to be addressed by a speaker or implored for both financial and moral support to realize a recognized or approved objective. It may be the general purpose of a group to keep its political culture in equilibrium or seek to change it substantially.

Political culture refers to a people's system of values. As Dawson and Prewitt state: "... a nation's political culture includes political traditions and folk heroes, the spirit of public institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology and both formal and informal rules of the political game."¹ Almond and Verba conceptualize political culture as the pattern of distribution of orientations (cognitions, feelings and evaluations) which members of a political community have toward politics or political objects.² Indeed, the freedom with which public opinion is expressed and the impact it makes on both domestic and foreign policy depends on the type of political culture in which interest groups or operational publics operate. Like most other developing countries, Sierra Leone unfortunately, has not yet developed reliable

¹Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 26.

²Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 5-15. See also Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

institutions or mechanisms for scientifically assessing public opinion on national issues as is the case in certain developed countries as the United States, England and France. Therefore in Sierra Leone public opinion on international relations is assumed rather than scientifically ascertained. Cohen puts it very effectively when he states that "In the absence of precise mechanisms or procedures, one is left with the impression that opinion is absorbed, by osmosis, into the political bloodstream."³

Applied to Sierra Leone what Cohen and other scholars of public opinion are in fact saying is that foreign policy interests are only indirectly articulated, aggregated and communicated to the decision-makers by certain operational publics or interest groups in the polity. In Sierra Leone where operational groups in the sphere of international politics are currently much fewer and less organized or

³Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 11. See also James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 11-50; Milton J. Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969); William O. Chittick, The State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970); Andrew Berding, Foreign Affairs and You (Garden City: Doubleday Press, 1962); Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Elinor Katz, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955); James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961); Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, 1st. ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961); Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

articulate the osmosis hypothesis is even more real or apparent. One would therefore need to find out the kinds of foreign policy opinions held by what interest groups and political parties. One would like also to ascertain how career and elected officials perceive such opinions, the connection between causes and effects of opinions held, or imagined, on the one hand, and the nation's power potential on the other.

If foreign policy opinions are not directly or strongly articulated, aggregated and communicated to the government by the general public or ad hoc interest groups then it is valid to argue that in the Sierra Leone context one would have to conclude that procedures and mechanisms used to formulate that country's foreign policy are premised on the osmosis hypothesis to which the writer has just referred. According to this hypothesis Sierra Leone's foreign policy makers develop their decisions on the basis of their impression or perception of the attitudes of both the general public, political and interest or pressure groups, the traditions of the nation and the limitations imposed on them by the dynamics of international politics.

The opportunities to make mutually beneficial bilateral or multilateral concords also count for much. In a way, one can say that the foreign policy of the republic is guided in part by what its decision makers objectively or subjectively conceive and interpret international affairs to be from time to time. There is merit in

agreeing with Cohen when he observes that "public opinion is not a clearly defined autonomous political actor, and is not seen as one by policy makers."⁴

Kolko is even more explicit on the status or impact of public opinion on decision making in the area of international relations.

Thus he says:

The theory of public attitudes as the fount of the decision-making process reinforces a democratic theory of legitimacy, which for reasons of sentimental tradition at home and ideological warfare abroad, is a useful social myth (emphasis added). But the close and serious student of modern foreign relations will rarely, if ever, find an instance of an important decision made with reference to the alleged general public desires or opinions. What is more significant is the fact that ignorance and lack of interest among the vast majority of the population during a period of crisis as to the nature of essential facts, a condition that neutralizes their role in the decision-making process even more and cultivates an elitist contempt for the inchoate role of 'the people' as nothing more than the instrument or objective, rather than the source of policy.⁵

The influence of public opinion on foreign policy although often unscientifically proven is recognized by such eminent scholars as Lippmann who refers to this variable as the "latent veto."⁶ Harwood

⁴Bernard C. Cohen, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵Gabriel Kolko, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

⁶Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Atlantic--Little, Brown and Co., 1955), p. 18.

L. Childs posits that "In the final analysis, a state of public opinion, known or assumed, seems to set the outer limits of governmental action, within which public officials exercise much discretion."⁷

Creole Influence

In Sierra Leone the sector of the population interested in foreign affairs and able to bring its influence to bear on foreign policy making is indeed very small. This is largely due to the following facts: (a) the lack of foreign policy oriented "attentive" or operational publics, lobbies, pressure or interest groups, (b) the high incidence of illiteracy or the presence of too many inattentive publics in the state and, (c) a carry-over of the effect of the colonial policy of keeping the dependent populace ignorant of processes in international relations. As would be expected in the colonial era, foreign policy was purely in the hands of the British Colonial Office and its appointed officials in the Colony and Protectorate. As was the case during the colonial days, so it is still, but to a lesser extent, it is the Creoles as an ethnic group who are more interested in and able to play a role in foreign policy making, even if it only means exercising influence osmotically. The overwhelming majority of the people of Sierra Leone is of provincial origin but its influence has

⁷Harwood L. Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role (Princeton; New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 315.

never been pervasive or effective enough in the process of modern foreign policy determination. This traditional inward-looking attitude is, however, changing.

Creole educated men and women are by far more preponderant in the upper levels of the civil service, the church, the Chamber of Commerce, the commercial houses and such professional organizations as the Bar and the Medical Associations. Creole educated, business and public service elites are by training and nature pro-Western, and particularly pro-British oriented. This being so, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the influence of this ethnic group is more highly significant than that of the people of the provinces. A Creole employee will prefer to spend his vacation in Great Britain rather than elsewhere, buy British goods, acquire a British oriented education and imbibe and propagate British culture more than anything else, including his own. In their high and privileged positions in the various institutions of the state it is not surprising that the more articulate and westernized Creole elite do influence Sierra Leone's foreign policy development, directly or indirectly. For this group it is a matter of history, attitude, opportunity and training. A parallel in American history is the reluctance shown by a considerable number of colonists to sever ties with their mother-country, Britain, or to favor any other European nation over the British. This is what political socialization or acculturation for a long period does to a

group of people, even a nation state. The history of Afro-Americans is also a good case in point.

The Chamber of Commerce

The Republic of Sierra Leone became the birthplace of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce (FWACC) in November 1972. Attempts to develop this regional amalgam started in 1967. The aim of FWACC is "to promote industry, trade and commerce and to facilitate the mobility of all levels of skilled personnel and the free flow of goods and services within West Africa."⁸ In accordance with its constitution the FWACC is designed to be a permanent link between the National Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Mines in West Africa. The Honourable S. I. Koroma, the Vice President and Prime Minister, who presided over the ceremonial opening of the Conference attended by delegates from member states thought that the formation of the Federation was a momentous stride forward towards the probably or projected creation of a West African Economic Community.⁹

As Minister of Agriculture, the Honourable S. I. Koroma stated at the formal opening of the second ordinary session of the Executive Committee of the International African Migratory Locust Organization

⁸Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Trade Journal, 13:1 (January-March, 1973), 18-20.

⁹Ibid.

held in Freetown, that he felt the need for international cooperation in the areas of research and plant protection. He affirmed that Sierra Leone was committed to all types of international and regional cooperation so vital for his country's all round economic development.¹⁰

The present Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone started in the days of British colonial rule as two separate organizations, namely, the European Chamber of Commerce and the African Chamber of Commerce. Then, as now, the Chamber of Commerce was a voluntary commercial interest group or voluntary association. The organization is open to all business people of all nationalities doing business in Sierra Leone. The Chamber has no role in fixing the prices of commodities on the market but its individual members are just as opposed to violent price fluctuations and inflationary tendencies as all other people.

In a nutshell the aims and objectives of the Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone are as follows:

- (1) to protect the trade and commerce of the country
- (2) to collect and disseminate statistical and other information relating to trade, commerce, shipping, industry and manufacture
- (3) to promote, support, or oppose, legislation or other measures uncondusive to trade and commerce

¹⁰Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Trade Journal, 10:1 (January-March, 1970), 20.

- (4) to act as arbitrator in the settlement of disputes arising out of business transactions
- (5) to do all such other lawful things as are incidental to the aims and objectives outlined above.¹¹

The membership of the Chamber is comprised of merchants, bankers, manufacturers, trading associations, and others being principals or agents with vested interest in trade, commerce, agriculture, shipping, mines, industry and in the overall development and welfare of the Republic of Sierra Leone.

So much for history! The question now is: in what way does the Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone affect the Republic's foreign policy? The answer, of course is that this voluntary group does not only play a role in foreign policy determination, directly and indirectly by osmotic action, but that it does so very effectively. First of all, the majority of the present 136 members are foreigners. Secondly, the Chamber of Commerce is a member of the Federation of (British) Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce and has a commitment to promote pro-Western interests. Thirdly, by force of habit, arising from its long association with European business houses, the Chamber has a natural bias toward Europe. The recently demised European Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone was for many decades a great

¹¹Sierra Leone, Trade and Industry Bulletin (Republican Anniversary Issue, 1972), pp. 6-7.

supporter of the preferential tariff system which favored British Commonwealth trade and Commerce over those from other areas of the world.

The Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone exercises an effective role in influencing the Government of the Republic in the formulation of its foreign trade and general economic policies. Following below is a trade statistical table showing imports and exports by principal countries in support of this thesis.¹² The Chamber of Mines, which is not a part of the Chamber of Commerce of Sierra Leone, is an exclusively European interest group and exercises a lot of influence on foreign policy, as may be expected.

¹²Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Trade Journal, 13:4 (October/December, 1973), 112. A study of Sierra Leone's trade directional pattern indicates that for many years the country had a chronic adverse balance of payments every fiscal year by spending more on imports than it earned from its exports. The table above mentioned points up a turn around, a healthy trend to be desired and hopefully maintained through a sensible scientific fiscal policy.

Trade StatisticsIMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES

Country	Imports		Exports	
	January to March		January to March	
	1973	1972	1973	1972
Sterling Area:	(Le)	(Le)	(Le)	(Le)
United Kingdom	6,715,128	5,476,409	19,060,648	18,927,418
Hong Kong	373,629	589,870	-	-
India	692,675	518,897	-	-
Malawi	-	509,561	-	-
Trinidad	572	123	-	-
Other Countries	66,469	352,915	160,597	-
Total Sterling Area	7,847,473	7,447,775	19,221,245	18,827,418
Non-Sterling Area:				
Belgium	268,652	277,567	1,500	21,746
Canada	41,676	26,288	-	125
China	825,509	980,832	-	-
Czechoslovakia	325,522	371,546	-	-
Denmark	407,511	280,215	870	9,603
Eire	-	-	-	-
France	1,840,187	2,141,284	2,600	7,800
German Federal Republic	1,949,957	2,147,348	1,093,082	958,443
Germany, East	662,798	335,630	-	-
Italy	541,304	443,380	12	500,337
Japan	2,518,782	2,097,809	85,106	1,481,766
Netherlands	1,226,983	130,939	1,026,483	1,888,597
Netherlands West Indies	-	1,199,296	-	-
Sweden	114,794	58,729	18,714	5,400
Switzerland	369,709	185,412	733,025	693,956
U. S. A.	1,546,896	1,482,251	1,992,844	1,382,905
Venezuela	-	-	-	-
Other Countries	428,047	-	160,597	-
Total Non-Sterling Area	13,068,327	12,158,976	5,114,833	6,950,678
Ships' Stores	99, 354	176,412	156,590	-
Total Domestic Exports	-	-	24,336,078	25,878,096
Re-Exports	-	-	-	-
Total Imports/Exports	21,015,154	19,783,163	24,492,668	25,878,096

Source: Central Statistics Office, Freetown.

Note: One Leone (Le.1) is currently equivalent to 80 American cents.

Trade Unions

Trade Unions in Sierra Leone have come a long way to where they are today. One thing that is clear is that these organizations were for years mechanisms used by the British Government to control the country's foreign policy on labor and other matters. The history of Sierra Leone's trade union development underscores this observation.

Beginning with one organization in 1884, that is, the Mechanics Alliance, with a membership of 120 Artisans, Masons, Carpenters, Printers, Coopers, Painters and others,¹³ the trade union movement today embraces 31 registered unions with 31,000 paid up members (1972).¹⁴ In the pursuit of such objectives as the relief of sick or bereaved members, regulations in the training of apprentices and improving the moral and social conditions of members the trade unions soon concerned themselves more with bargaining for fair wages, and humane and decent treatment of African workers. As a matter of fact, there were union strikes in Sierra Leone in 1892 by laborers at military barracks, 1911, 1919 and 1926 by railway workers, and in 1932, 1935, 1937 and 1939 by mine workers. The last and most disastrous strike occurred in 1955. This was more or less a general strike fomented by the Artisans and Allied Workers Union and the Transport Workers Union.

¹³J. Emerson Davies, "Trade Union Development in Sierra Leone," Sierra Leone Year Book 1972, p. 27. In 1961 there were nine trade unions with a paid up membership of 17,400 workers.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 32.

The active participation of I.T.A. Wallace Johnson, in the development of trade unionism in Sierra Leone effective from 1938 and the outbreak of World War II gave the British Government two good excuses for not only infiltrating the trade union organization but for controlling it also. British administrators regarded Wallace Johnson, a Creole politician and trade unionist, as a leftish socialist. British colonial policy was strongly opposed to the politicization of the people of the colony and the protectorate.

As was the case in nearly all British African colonies, an Act was passed legalizing trade unions. Sierra Leone enacted an arbitration ordinance which established procedural rules for settlement of trade disputes. With characteristic foresight, the British Colonial Office in London posted a Labour Secretary to Sierra Leone for the purpose of advising the government on labor conditions and to provide conciliation in trade disputes. By 1940 the government was able to register seven trade unions, in addition to exercising a great deal of control over the working class. For example, in 1940, the colonial government passed the Employer and Employee Ordinance which empowered the Labour Secretary to compel all employers of at least ten workers to submit returns of their labor force.

The ordinance required the re-registration of all males 18-55 years of age. It was this law which gave power to the government to conscript men for the army. The Essential Works order gave the

government power to control essential services in which strikes were prohibited.

Before the return of the Labour Advisor to Britain he was able to bring about the reorganization of the labor movement in Sierra Leone. Wallace Johnson was earlier kept in detention without trial, essentially because he was seen as a threat to the effort of the British Government to control the behavior of the trade unions. Thus, the Colonial Office forced the trade unions to support its foreign policy, especially in the promotion of Britain's war effort.

The Sierra Leone Trade Union Congress (TUC), which was a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), perforce followed Britain and the United States in withdrawing from this body and joining the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICTU). The Sierra Leone Congress is also a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Britain, and to a lesser extent, the U.S., have been able to indoctrinate the labor unions of Sierra Leone through their ingenious leadership training programs. As in the case of the Chamber of Commerce and most of the other interest groups and institutions of the republic, the developmental history of its unions has always been patterned along British or western or western socio-economic and political lines. As noted by Davies in his study of the structure of the trade unions of Sierra Leone:

The structure and manner of organization of the Trade Unions ... follow closely the British pattern. The reason for this is obvious. Sierra Leone was until 1961 ruled by the British. And the British simply for their convenience imposed their system of trade unionism without taking into consideration the cultural, social or economic background.¹⁵

This is a very revealing thing for a respectable outstanding civil servant and established trade union expert to state in such an emphatic manner. No doubt, the views of labor unions and, perhaps to an even greater extent, those of the Sierra Leone Employers Federation (SLEF) established in 1961, have had a great impact, and will continued to have a strong influence on the determination of the republic's foreign policy. If SLEF consists of far more Europeans, or western-oriented people than indigenous African members, then it is fairly easy to argue that Sierra Leone's foreign policy is substantially influenced by its foreign elements. Even the FWACC may take a long time to reverse this long established state of affairs.

The Civil Service

The Sierra Leone Colonial Civil Service is held by some historians to have started its long career in about 1802. As rightly

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 33-34. In his opening address to the Fourth National Delegates Conference of the All People's Congress held at Kenema, Sierra Leone, on March 29-31, 1974, Dr. Siaka Stevens, the National Leader of the Party and President of the republic, recalled his trade union days and decried the manipulation of labor organizations by the British government and so-called advisers. He deplored the manner in which colonial administrators sought to separate trade unionism from politics.

claimed by the Clarke Commission, the Sierra Leone Civil Service was established on Lord Lugard's political and administrative principle of indirect rule for the greater portion of the country, that is, the then protectorate, and direct rule for the far smaller portion of the country, that is, the former Crown Colony.¹⁶

In accordance with the Lugardian Principle, the British Government conducted its rule indirectly through the inexpensive system termed the NA, that is, Native Administration. The NA system was comprised of Chiefdoms in each administrative district. As described earlier, a British administrative officer who performed the combined functions of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, presided over each district. Each district was made up of a number of Chiefdoms headed by Paramount Chiefs and Section Chiefs, who were the direct agents of the British government. This basic structure still exists, *mutatis mutandis*. Instead of British District Commissioners (D.C.'s) the country now has indigenous District Officers (D.O.'s), who perform much the same functions as their white predecessors, namely, supervising the work of chiefdom and district councils, interpreting public policies and promoting the general welfare of the populace in their respective administrative units.

¹⁶Sierra Leone, Report of the Commission into the Civil Service of Sierra Leone, and the Government White Paper thereon, 1970, p.1.

The British colonial system was well known for its racism. In Sierra Leone, India and elsewhere a rigid line of demarcation was drawn between European expatriate officers and native officers. For instance, in Sierra Leone, there were such distinguishing designations as African Assistant Colonial Secretary, African Medical Officer, African Assistant Director of Education, and so on, for African civil servants. A Departmental Committee set up by the then British Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the West African Medical Service strongly recommended that it would be inadvisable to employ natives of West Africa as Medical Officers in the Government Service. The Committee reminded the British Government that it was its duty to provide the best medical assistance in its power for its European employees It did not believe that "in professional capabilities West African native doctors are on a par, except in very rare instances, with European doctors or that they possess the confidence of European patients on the Coast."¹⁷ Concluding this portion of its report, the Departmental Committee wrote as follows:

In any case the Committee are certainly of opinion that if natives of either West Africa or India are employed, they should be put into a separate roster, that they should not be employed on military expeditions, and that European Officers should in no circumstances be placed under their orders.¹⁸

¹⁷Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1909, Vol. XI, 721-738.

¹⁸Ibid.

After reading the report of the Departmental Committee, one hardly needs any other example to be convinced of Britain's racial discrimination in Sierra Leone and its deliberate and callous policy to keep the people in perpetual ignorance or in a state of political unawareness. Indeed, the Sierra Leone Civil Service has come a long way to where it is today. As a British colonial strategy, emphasis was laid on subordinate roles for Sierra Leonean personnel who were subjected to surveillance, rigorous discipline and humiliating treatment. As times went by, the British introduced Senior and Junior Whitley Councils in the civil service to serve as consultative mechanisms through which loyal and mildly worded petitions were communicated to their departmental heads. The two Councils corresponded with the two divisions of the Civil Service, namely, the Senior Service and the Junior Service. Upward mobility was a near impossibility for most of the civil servants in the junior service.

General dissatisfaction with conditions of service in the country gave rise to the appointment of a number of Civil Service Commissions of Enquiry from time to time. Reference is made to the Harragin Commission, 1946, the Sinker-Momoh Commission, 1952-53, the Gorsuch Commission, 1957 and the Clarke Commission 1970. The frequency with which commissions of enquiry were set up is in itself an admission of the inequities and dysfunctions inherent in the colonial civil service of Sierra Leone and the breaking point to which the

traditionally patient and industrious African civil servants had been pushed by their white task masters.

The Sierra Leone Civil Service, like any bureaucracy in any other part of the world may be considered to be "a complex system of men, offices, methods and authority which large organizations employ in order to achieve their goals."¹⁹

Our modern theory about the nature and scope of bureaucracy is usually seen to be a creation of German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). The Weberian model embodies four elements, viz, men, offices, methods, and authority. Pfiffner and Sherwood suggest that Weber delineated three major power centers in any community. These three power centers include (a) the legal structures and traditional social taboos, (b) charisma or influential individual leadership and (c) bureaucracy or the combined body of the administrators of government policies and laws.²⁰

Bureaucracy, as a rule, aims at rationalizing the enormous complexities of the problems of the modern state and its constituent private or public organizations. Besides rationality, administrators are also highly interested in the human and scientific or professional management dimensions of bureaucracy. By 1956 Peter Blau was able to

¹⁹Charles E. Jacob, Policy and Bureaucracy (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966), p. 34.

²⁰John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 55.

identify the following basic characteristics of bureaucratic organization: a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules, specialization and impersonality.²¹

Professor Kousoulas' appraisal of these characteristics is summed up neatly by him. In this connection he states that "To make sure that the specifications will be observed by all members of the team, there must be a control mechanism, and hierarchy of authority, armed with sanctions and rewards (italics mine) which will assure a disciplined performance by all." Structurally, the ideal bureaucracy as conceived by Weber and other scholars in this discipline, would consist of a definite hierarchy of office-holders employed on the basis of a specialization of tasks, a specified sphere of competence, established forms of behavior, within the limits of law and the ethos of the political community, and the maintenance of pertinent records to provide for continuity and predictability of performance inside bureaucracy.²²

The Importance and Role of the Bureaucracy

The term bureaucracy conveys quite a few pleasant and not so pleasant connotations for different people. For some people, bureaucracy means a government made up of a hierarchy of bureaux or offices,

²¹Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Societies (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 19.

²²George D. Kousoulas, On Government and Politics, 2d. ed., (Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing Col, Inc., 1971), p. 270.

and top administrators or petty officials. For some others, bureaucracy represents an administration best defined by excessive red tape and routine work. For yet other people, bureaucracy is synonymous with modern large scale organization and generally refers to that complex of offices or specialized functions which implement policies of both public and private organization. There are many members of the public in any country who regard a bureaucrat as nothing but "an entrenched paper-pusher, barricaded behind his desk, with an inflated ego and tendency to augment his illusion of importance by being unnecessarily difficult."²³ One major criticism against civil servants the world over is their unswerving reliance on rules, regulations and strict procedural niceties and their disregard for their real masters--the tax-payers. Another reason for complaint against bureaucrats stems from their inordinate and choking volume of paper work for every little business transaction which obviously inhibits quick action, all in the name of law and efficiency. The seeming stand-offishness and irresponsiveness of petty civil servants make matters even worse.

But whether people like it or not bureaucracy in Sierra Leone is, at least, a necessary evil. Its role in domestic and foreign policy is undoubtedly the result of its derived legitimacy and special qualifications to do what neither the legislators nor the members of

²³Ibid., pp. 235-36.

the general public can do efficiently in the area of the organization and allocation of societal resources, the reordering of national priorities and the day to day execution of public policy and laws. Admittedly, the Sierra Leone civil service personifies the state in many respects and enjoys a great amount of authority due to its vast technical expertise on which the government of the republic increasingly depends as the scope of its responsibility widens day by day. There is little wonder then that the civil servants of the republic are fast becoming the real power structure and not the legislative branch of the government. In recognition of this fact, Adu has made the following instructive observation:

The Civil Service is part of the machinery of the executive branch of Government and exists to put into effect Government policies. The effectiveness of Government, therefore depends on the efficiency of the Civil Service and its ability to respond in practical terms to its decisions. It has been said therefore that the Civil Service is the custodian of the Government's reputation since if it is unable to carry out the Government's policies faithfully and efficiently, it not only frustrates these policies, but it might seriously undermine Government's position and stability ...²⁴

As in every other administrative state the civil servant in the Republic of Sierra Leone is powerful, influential and authoritative because he possesses the following assets: (1) resources,

²⁴A. L. Adu, The Civil Service in New African States (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), p. 25. This work is also cited in Report of the (Clarke Commission) Inquiry into the Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1970, Ch. 2, p. 8, para. 19.

(2) expertise, (3) legitimate monopoly of the means of coercive power or mandatory sanctions, (4) high social standing in the elite structure of the community, and abroad too, (5) discretionary judgment or power, (6) possession and use of confidential secret information, and (7) occupation of the middle position between the political leaders and the general public. One might even term civil servants as power brokers in the state.

From all that has been said so far about bureaucracy in general, and the Sierra Leone Civil Service in particular, it is now more than obvious why the influence of this section of the executive branch of Government is so pervasive and persuasive in making both domestic and foreign policy. Top civil servants and advisors to the Government are the basic source of expertise, the possessors of open and top state secrets and the legitimate monopoly of official state sanctions, it may therefore be held that they have both the opportunity and technical ability to influence the direction of foreign policy. Nearly all the Ministers of Government and the members of the legislature have neither the professional training nor the time to formulate a rational and rewarding foreign policy without an overly strong dependence on their senior civil servants who are fully aware of this need or inadequacy.

Indeed, contrary to what some people think or even desire, the civil service is a more political force in the state than all the

other interest or pressure groups studied in this dissertation. This is a valid comment to make considering that it is the senior civil servants of Sierra Leone who act as expert advisers or consultants to their Ministers, write their speeches, and cabinet papers, collect or collate pertinent data required for answers to parliamentary questions and manage their departmental or ministerial budget appropriations. There is no doubt that senior civil servants do actively and meaningfully participate in the public decision process of the republic.

The United Christian Council (UCC)

This is a unique amalgamation of all protestant church denominations in Sierra Leone which came into being over two decades ago as a response to the ever-pressing need for better understanding and greater cooperation among the clergy and laity of the various foreign established churches in the country. This seemingly non-political interest group does, as a matter of fact, at least, indirectly but effectively, influence the making of foreign and domestic policies. The UCC influences the development of foreign policy through the osmotic process described earlier in this chapter.

The position consistently taken in this study is that religious organizations, like several other so-called voluntary organizations introduced to Sierra Leone in the colonial era, had one express purpose, namely, to redeem Africans from the throes of paganism, to educate, evangelize and civilize them as only European and North

Americans know how. This is, in fact, the meaning of the colonial doctrine called "the white man's burden." Such constituent UCC members as the Anglican, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist (English and American) were founded and superintended by the representatives of their white founding benefactors who undertook to train a corps of African clergy, first, as assistant clerks in holy orders, and recently, as their successors. Each denomination founded a number of primary and secondary schools as instruments or institutions for perpetuating their founders' system of interests, values and norms. Thus, the Anglican Church founded the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Grammar School for Boys in 1845 and the Annie Walshe Memorial School for girls in 1849. The Methodist Church founded the Methodist Boys High School (MBHS) in 1874 and the Methodist Girls High School (MGHS) in 1899. The writer's alma mater, the Albert Academy, named in memory of Ira D. Albert, an American Missionary who died by drowning in Sierra Leone, was founded as a high school mainly for up-country boys in 1904. A counterpart institution, that is the Harford School for Girls, was also established by the United Methodist Church (UMC), formerly the United Brethren Church (UBC) and, later, the Evangelical United Brethren Church (EUBC). The Seventh-day Adventists founded the Peninsular and the Yele Secondary Schools (mixed--boys and girls) and the American Wesleyan Methodist Church founded the Kamakwiye and Kamabai Secondary Schools. The Centenary Secondary School for Boys at

Matru Jong and the Minnie Mull School for Girls at Bonthe were founded by the United Brethren in America (UBA), now the United Brethren in Christ.

The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, (not a member Church of the UCC), founded the St. Edwards, St. Joseph's Convent, Christ the King College, St. Francis, Holy Rosary (Pujehun), St. Pauls Queen of the Rosary (QRS), Holy Trinity (Kenema), the Kolente Secondary Boys School, St. Joseph's at N'jala, Komboya (mixed), Kabala Secondary (Boys), the R.C. Vocational Moyamba, the Bonthe Secondary School, the Sumbuya Secondary School (Boys) and the Holy Ghost Secondary School, Segbwema, etc. The Scarcies Secondary (mixed) at Mambolo was founded by the Baptist Mission. The UCC as a body founded the Bunumbu Teacher Training College, and St. Andrew's Secondary School at Bo.

Some of the church missions listed above also established teacher training and bible training colleges. The UCC also sponsors certain programs at Fourah Bay College, the University of Sierra Leone.

It can be logically concluded that all the locally based foreign church missions which operated in Sierra Leone, were an extension of the colonial machinery of imperialism, that is the domination and control of the minds of the people of Africa and also their economic exploitation with the greatest possible facility. The withdrawal of the western clerics and educators in recent years has been

generally superficially graceful; it has tended to give the appearance also that these foreign overlords have been on notice for some time before their withdrawal. On this point Bretton comments as follows:

It should surprise no one if organized, western-spawned and supported religion encounters difficulties in independent Africa and is, in fact, under increasing pressure to abandon the more visible pressure and influence vantage points acquired originally with the active support of colonial governments. Eventually it may have to retreat from all direct participation in public affairs, for from the more critical perspective of rejuvenated Africa the conduct of the western churches and missions in the past has been strange indeed. It is still difficult to reconcile such conduct with avowed Christian objectives in many parts today.²⁵

Bretton appears to be correct in observing that "with notable and on occasion heroic exceptions, the record of Christian churches and missions on the continent (Africa) in such matters of social justice as race relations and economic exploitation is a stain only time can remove."²⁶ It was, and still is clearly racist for foreign churches to represent the "Son of God" and by implication God and his Angels and Archangels as white. It is a sad commentary on the history of Sierra Leone, that this overt racism still remains to be the essence of the teaching of its churches. Africanization of the clergy has generally made no difference between the mythical orthodox

²⁵Henry L. Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co, 1973), p. 277.

²⁶Ibid.

teaching of its churches. Africanization of the clergy has generally made no difference between the mythical orthodox teaching of the white missionaries of yesteryear and that of today. Perhaps it may be said that the native Mau Mau inspired the church of Kenya and the Lumpa Church revolt in Zambia have pointed the direction toward which all Africa should move, if there must be an effective African social protest movement on the continent.

What all this adds to is support for the proposition that the churches in Sierra Leone emphatically influence the making of foreign policy, at least indirectly. It can be readily confirmed that early in 1968 the sympathy shown for the cause of the Biafran peoples in Nigeria, as opposed to that of the Nigerian Federation, was in part motivated by both the United Christian Council and the Roman Catholic Church in Sierra Leone. The then new All People's Congress Government was clearly and understandably seen to come out in support of Biafra, at least on compassionate grounds. No doubt, the support of the U.S., USSR, and U.K. for the federal republic of Nigeria under a military government was suspect to Sierra Leone which had just overthrown its own military rule. The high yield oil wells of the former Eastern Region, principally Biafran property, seemed to have influenced the foreign policy of the U.S., USSR and U.K. The heads of the churches of the Republic of Sierra Leone have always shown their utter abhorrence for military rule and, accordingly, contributed to the national effort

to bring it to an unexpectedly hasty end in their country. It is also generally recognized that the UCC indirectly holds some sway over the government, a power which it uses to influence the determination of foreign policy, albeit in a subtle manner. Both Dr. Milton Margai, Sierra Leone's first head of government, and Dr. Siaka Stevens, the republic's present head of state, have had strong associations with the church.

Finally, it should be noted that the Anglican affiliates of the UCC are closely associated with the Lambeth Conference, headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the United Kingdom and, the entire body, of the UCC is part of the World Council of Churches, which is pro-western. On the basis of this fact, the conclusion is forced upon one that the UCC plays not only a decisive part in influencing the determination of the foreign policy of Sierra Leone but that it does so naturally in favor of the West.

The Role of Political Parties and Interest Groups

As illustrated in chapters II, III and IV, interest groups, political parties and the army play a significant role in the development and administration of the foreign policy of the Republic of Sierra Leone. Taken as a unit, interest groups and political parties may be said to perform four common basic functions in the decision-making process of the state. These functions or roles include:

1. the crystallization, verbalization and aggregation of opinions
2. the provision of group representation
3. the articulation of group goals and the provision of channels of communication between members and the political authorities and
4. the provision of a system of checks and balances applied to other groups and the government.²⁷

The function of public opinion, as Key explains, is either supportive or directive or permissive. In many cases once a program is inaugurated or a law is passed or a constitution is promulgated public opinion begins to build support for it. In any one such instance one may recognize the supportive function of public opinion. Of course, public opinion may also develop against a bill or declared policy or constitution. This was the case in Sierra Leone in 1945 when the colonial government published the infamous Land Acquisition Bill. Public opinion is directive when the public is solidly united in its opinion about an important policy issue. Mass support for the demand for independence which culminated in the formation of the United Front delegation in the 1960 London talks is an example of the directive function of public opinion. Finally, public opinion is permissive when it allows decision makers wide latitude in the formulation and adoption of public policy. Where inattentive publics far

²⁷V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), pp. 29-37.

outnumber attentive public decision makers may not even bother to sound public opinion, which is apparently non-existent any way. Lack of public opinion may be due to the low intensity of views of many citizens, or even outsiders, a stifled information flow, disregard for feedback by the government or just outright apathy among a large segment of the community.

Group representation is provided by political organizations in order to insure the election or nomination of decision makers. Apart from their organization public opinion, political parties in particular also perform the functions of providing personnel for organizing and administering the government, educating or informing the electorate, counterchecking each other, and generally holding the nation or political system together. The function of influencing the determination of foreign policy is very important, for in the contemporary world of inevitable interdependence, Sierra Leone's political and economic well-being depends on the type of foreign policy it formulates and executes, that is, how pragmatically it conducts its relationship with the other members of the world community.

In addition to the legitimacy and orientation of the makers of foreign policy and the operating world situation, the pattern of communication flow between members of various political groups and their policy makers is of cardinal importance. The public learns a great deal from official government releases, and so does the government.

through the mass media. Therefore, the freer the mass media, the better it is for both the rulers and the ruled to conduct a healthy exchange of ideas or information on relevant matters of mutual interest. The channel of communication in Sierra Leone must be given wide scope in order to fulfill this essential purpose, provided it is understood that "scope", "responsibility" and "responsiveness" go hand in hand. The mass media, political rallies, parliamentary debates and campaigning for the election of candidates for public office may be useful forms for each party or group applying checks and balances on the behavior of other groups.

APC Determination of Foreign Policy

The All People's Congress which became the governing party in 1968 now represents more than 90% of the people of Sierra Leone and may therefore be presumed to have developed a more popular foreign policy. Whatever one may logically presume, a study of the foreign policy of the APC shows that the party has been responsible, responsive, consistent and progressive in conducting the external relations of the republic.

The APC is seen to be a responsible and responsive party by ascertaining the popular wishes of the entire citizenry and developing its foreign policy accordingly. The party is seen to be both consistent and progressive by responsibly pursuing its original

principle and strategy of positive nonalignment and also by adjusting these according to the ever-changing pattern of international relations. For the APC, nonalignment is, as defined by Burton, "a system designed to widen and not to confine transactions."²⁸ Non-alignment as a principle or system is concerned with interactions and interdependence, with each state retaining its right to determine its own cluster of values and provided it does not impose its values, beliefs and myths on others. Burton puts this succinctly when he states that:

...As foreign policy, non-alignment seeks to allow the community to be open to the influence of all foreign systems. Provided the indigenous values and interests of the authorities and the community are secure, and provided there is a wide-spread adjustment capability, non-alignment policies could lead to the integration of the domestic community with world systems.²⁹

Dr. Stevens, in his role as both President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the national leader of the All People's Congress Party, has always perceived non-alignment not as an impediment to international transactions but as a gateway, indeed, as a filter of them, to the end that nations coexist and do business with each other without undermining each other's social or political system of values.

²⁸ J.W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 32.

²⁹ Ibid.

Dr. Stevens echoed his old thoughts on this subject very recently when he addressed his party's Fourth National Delegates' Conference. In addressing himself to the current world situation, Dr. Stevens made the following statement:

If there is one lesson which the world needs to learn today, it is the lesson that no nation, no government can live in isolation; it is the lesson that nations are all dependent one upon the other. In sum, that we are our brothers' keepers. The governments of the world are so tied up with one another that every ripple in one area is reflected on the whole globe.³⁰

As the public records show quite clearly, the APC has now gone beyond just articulating general ideological considerations and foreign policy issues to translating these into positive action programs. Reference is made to the Sierra Leone-Guinea accord on Commerce (FWACC) discussed earlier and the recent Great Mano River Declaration (GMRD). The latter accord, that is the GMRD, signed by President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone and President William Tolbert of Liberia at Malema, Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District in October 1973, is an attempt to promote closer political and economical ties between the two neighboring states by accelerating their national

³⁰Dr. Siaka Stevens, "Opening Address to the Fourth National Delegates' Conference of the Party" held at Kenema, Sierra Leone, 29th-31st March, 1974, p. 1.

economic growth, social progress and cultural advancement. In short, GMRD seeks to eliminate existing trade barriers between the two sister republics. Incidentally, the new economic union has been made "open for participation to all states in the West-African sub-region, which subscribe to the aims and objectives of the union."³¹

GMRD is conceived in two major phases. Phase one, which is scheduled to be concluded by January 1, 1977, provides for:

1. the liberalisation of mutual trade in goods of local origin
2. the harmonization of rates of import duties and other fiscal incentives applicable to goods of local origin
3. the support of measures for developing cooperation in the production of agricultural and manufactured products of local origin.³²

The Secretariat of the new Union has been established in Freetown, and the Sierra Leone and Customs Training School in Monrovia, Liberia, for the purpose of achieving the aims and objectives of the GMRD.

³¹Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Trade Journal, 14:1(January/March, 1974):10.

³²Ibid.

The GMRD and the Sierra Leone-Guinea accord are still short of the goal of a United States of Africa (USAF). However, it appears that the present governments of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria are moving in the right direction, a little slowly, but surely, and realistically. After all, the havoc of European imperialism or colonialism, with its underpinning political socialization for a century discussed passim in this study should not and cannot, be expected to be obliterated and replaced by a feasible African attitude of mind and program in a mere decade or two. For a few years to come, students of African foreign policy determination and administration can not avoid such dichotomies involved in their scholarly exercises as neutrality and global participation or Steven's "being-our-brothers'-keepers" and the need "to mend our own fences at home before we play our part in any world union."³³ It is obvious that the President of Sierra Leone is not saying that his government and people will accomplish their fence-mending program first before making their contribution to the important task of developing world unity in all its phases. In many instances international cooperation and peace have a direct or indirect bearing on domestic tranquility

³³ Ibid.

and prosperity. Indeed, steps toward a world union may be taken simultaneously with those toward domestic unity and regional cooperation for the common good.

CHAPTER VI

PERSONNEL AND CHANNELS FOR THE EXECUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Where the previous chapter concentrated its attention on the analysis of the institutions and structures which influence the determination of the foreign policy of Sierra Leone, the main thrust of this chapter is the study of the officials who are responsible for the execution of that policy in the field, that is, foreign missions and consulates, and the channels they use in discharging their functions. This chapter is therefore designed to examine the meaning of diplomacy, the details of diplomatic and consular hierarchies and the roles they play, the setting up and termination of foreign missions and the strategies and problems of negotiation.

The Meaning of Diplomacy

Joseph Stalin is reputed to have held that there was nothing like sincere diplomacy. Dallin quotes him as saying that:

A diplomat's words must have no relation to actions, otherwise, what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing and actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.¹

¹David Dallin, The Real Soviet Russia (Yale: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 71. See also Sir Ernest Mason Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 2 vols. (London, 1922) and Sir Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

Stalin is not the only person who has had such a distorted perception of the art and science of diplomacy. As is widely known, diplomats throughout the ages have used deception or subterfuge of one type or another whenever they felt so inclined; but their functions, privileges and immunities make fraudulent behavior quite irrelevant. It might be well to begin the discussion of this section of the chapter by looking at one or two definitions of diplomacy by other thinkers besides Stalin.

The Honourable Sir Ernest Satow has defined diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states."² Satow's study of diplomacy brings one to the conclusion that diplomacy is the process which provides both the machinery and the personnel for the purpose of making and executing the foreign policy of any given state.

Sir Harold Nicolson, on his part, points out in his work that diplomacy is a means not an end, a method not a purpose. It is, however, unfortunate that this great intellectual diplomat appears to confuse the relationship between foreign policy and diplomacy. He does this by holding that "... when agreement becomes impossible, diplomacy, which is the instrument of peace, becomes inoperative; and foreign policy, the final sanction of which is war, alone becomes

²Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, Vol I, re-edited by Sir Neville Bland (London: Longmans and Co, 1957), p. 1.

operative."³ In contradistinction to Nicolson's thesis, one may hold the belief that, even in the event of war, diplomacy, like foreign policy, still remains operative, however invisible or subdued its profile may be in form, to the end that the status quo ante bellum may be restored as soon as possible. True diplomacy may change profile or strategy, but it does not cease to exist in one form or the other. Even when states formally sever diplomatic relations with each other diplomacy does not become passive completely between them. In cases of official breaking off of diplomatic relations, diplomacy is often conducted indirectly through the good offices of another country or an international instrumentality, e.g., the UN, OAU and EEC.

In the Oxford English Dictionary diplomacy is defined as the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist. This of course is the definition of diplomacy used by Nicholson. The weakness of this definition is that it appears to overlook the importance or relevance of the decision-making process to the entire exercise of diplomacy.

Wood and Serres who define diplomacy as the art of resolving international difficulties in a peaceful manner have called attention

³Sir Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-22 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1946), p. 164.

to the fact that this profession is both an art and technique. They equally emphasize the importance of protocol in the diplomatic world. Protocol is described in modern times as the body of rules in accordance with which the principles of ceremonial procedures in each country are applied by certain specially trained officials.⁴

Morgenthau regards diplomacy as an instrument of power-politics or an element of a nation's power. He sees diplomacy performing four functions as follows:

1. Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually or potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.
2. Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.
3. Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives must mesh with each other.
4. Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.⁵

Morgenthau's four-fold tasks of diplomacy suggest his preoccupation, perhaps one might say his obsession, with the concept of power. Whatever the case may be, in traditional diplomacy the assumption was that "conflict of vital interests between states could be contained

⁴John R. Wood and Jean Serres, Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 1-21.

⁵Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed., (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960), p. 539.

only within a threat system, and if not contained, could be resolved only by violence."⁶ In traditional diplomacy, man was considered to be aggressive by nature, especially in his international behavior. The quest for power was considered to be universal and a basic drive in man; hence, every state was expected to build up its defenses against its real or imagined enemies. No wonder world leaders were so preoccupied with the concept of balance of power until it was displaced by the concept of collective security generated by the advent of nuclear armaments about thirty years ago.

Having examined the meaning of diplomacy thus far, attention will now be given to the hierarchy of diplomats, their functions, the establishing and terminating of diplomatic missions, the objects and methods of negotiation and the administration of Sierra Leone's Ministry of External Affairs.

Functions of Diplomats

In days of pre-mass communications, diplomacy, the training and functions of diplomats and their staffs were more circumscribed than is the case in the nuclear age. In the pre-communications or classical period, ambassadors merely needed special training in languages and the histories of the countries to which they were accredited. With the development of specialized international

⁶J. W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 201.

agencies such as UNESCO, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, etc., institutions, coupled with the growing interdependence among the states of the world, it may be validly held that the requirements of diplomacy have been fundamentally altered or expanded in a new direction. As Burton aptly puts it, "Practitioners now require, in addition to the traditional skills, some basic propositions and theories to ensure that nuclear age decision-making is at least as efficient in the field of peace and war as it is in the field of factory management and production."⁷ In other words, diplomacy has become interdisciplinary, since, in addition to the study of language and history, diplomats must now also extend the area of their attention to such social science disciplines as economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and geography. The modern diplomat also needs a thorough knowledge of all the behavior of states or systems theories in order to make a realistic impact on the decision-making process of his country.

Modern diplomacy is not only an art, but also an applied science; hence, scholars now talk of scientific diplomacy. In terms of university curricula, scientific diplomacy embraces a study of the theory of institutions and functionalism, the decision-making processes of the state, the problems of peace and security, the interplay of economics and politics and that of domestic and international politics. So vital is the importance of a mastery of

⁷Ibid., p. 209.

these aspects of modern scientific diplomacy that it is not overstating the case to stress it repeatedly. It is for this reason that Burton warns that "False perception and false images, failure to assimilate available information, inflexible procedures, committed view points and even breakdowns in simple administrative processes, can lead to aggressive policies in a state that otherwise has no aggressive intent."⁸

The function of the diplomatic profession may be classified under four categories, viz, representation, negotiation, information, and protection. The diplomat's primary function is representation, which may be performed both formally and informally. It is because of these roles that he is clothed with the necessary power so that he can, in fact, speak in the name of his government. He is the permanent intermediary between his government and that of the country to which he is accredited, in so far as international relations are concerned. The diplomat is the image of his country in the receiving state and is also expected to mirror and reflect all that is best and noble in and about it.

To reveal information is an essential function of the diplomatic profession, and its nature requires that it be bilateral, direct, unadulterated and continuous. It is the ambassador's duty for example

⁸Ibid., p. 210.

to make his government's policy known in the receiving state, and, to this end, he should be free to circulate and receive information, subject to the requirements of national security. Diplomats normally obtain information by reading the press, visiting various parts of the country of residence and interviewing their colleagues, foreign office officials and eminent private citizens. Espionage is, of course, a high crime. The less a diplomat talks and the more keenly he observes movements, trends and occurrences as he goes about his duties, the more useful he is likely to be to his government. Every state needs regular reports in the form of telegrams, despatches, and summary analyses from its diplomats on trade and financial matters, the attitude of leading political leaders and scientific developments in their host countries. Indeed, skill is needed in writing useful analytic diplomatic reports.

Negotiation presupposes a reciprocal desire to establish or restore and maintain peaceful and friendly relations on a bilateral or multilateral level. Obviously, also, there has to be a subject for negotiation and a willingness to produce a consensus. Negotiation is by its very nature highly individual and subjective; it is no doubt one of the most impressive tasks of a diplomat, but it can also be his most frustrating one.

The art of negotiation actually involves one or more of the instruments of mediation, arbitration and conciliation at any one

given time. In order to perform well in any one of these areas of bargaining, a diplomat should demonstrate intelligent flexibility, a sense of situation, and opportunity, awareness of all the dimensions of the problem in hand, cost-benefit analysis and experience. A detailed knowledge of protocol is an indispensable qualification in every bargaining process, as are friendliness and truthfulness. A negotiator found guilty of flagrant de'lit de mensonge, that is, telling a flagrant untruth, deserves to be discredited by the other side. Apart from his personal standing and capacity to negotiate, he also needs a competent and experienced staff with whom he can have a frank and objective exchange of studied views of the subject of any negotiation.

Another function of the ambassador is to protect; the function of protection refers to the safeguarding of the well-being of his nationals and the protection of the commerce and shipping of his country. No doubt this is also a very important role in his repertoire of official duties. In detail, this function includes his insuring that his compatriots under his jurisdiction are not made the victims of discriminatory treatment; that the ships flying his country's flag and his government's commercial relations are being respected in accordance with whatever treaties or accords are still in force and

that the bonds of common intellectual and cultural interests are tightened.⁹

The job description of American diplomats appears to encompass all the basic functions of diplomats in all other countries of the world. American diplomats are specifically required to:

... observe, analyze, and report on political, social and economic conditions and trends of significance in the country to which they are assigned. Some major subjects of these reports are legislative programs, public opinion, market conditions, trade statistics, finance, production, labor, agriculture, forestry, mining, natural resources, shipping, freights, charters, legislation, tariffs, and laws.¹⁰

The diplomatic and consular functions of negotiation and protection respectively, will be further examined after identifying the categories of diplomats according to their visas status and the entire diplomatic hierarchy.

⁹For further authoritative exposition of topics briefly discussed see J. Rives Childs, American Foreign Service (New York: Rinehart & Holt, 1948); M. de Calliers, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans. by A. F. Whyte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919); Louis L. Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Kansas City: University of Kansas Press, 1964); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961); Susanne Keller, "Diplomacy and Communication," in Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XX (Spring, 1956); Walter Lippman, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: N.p., 1943); William Barnes and John H. Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States (Department of State, 1961); Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1939); Harold Nicholson, Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London: Constable, 1954).

¹⁰The Foreign Service of the United States (Department of State Production 3612, Foreign Service Series 6, August 11, 1946).

Categories of Diplomats

Strictly speaking, there are only two main categories of diplomats, namely, diplomatic officers or heads of missions and consular officers. Whereas diplomatic officers are chiefly concerned with representation, consular officers are mainly concerned with interest protection and welfare. Both categories of officers, diplomatic and consular, perform the function of informing or reporting.

Not all holders of diplomatic visas are necessarily diplomats in the full sense of the word. For instance, in the Embassy of Sierra Leone, holders of A2 and A3 visas, that is the children, wards, close relatives, servants and local employees of the head of mission are not diplomats and are not empowered to perform the functions of representation, negotiation, reporting and information. Locally employed personnel, who may be Sierra Leoneans, or the nationals of other countries, are normally not diplomats.

Diplomatic Hierarchies

Heads of missions are classified under various categories. First there are agents assigned to permanent missions and those assigned to temporary missions or sent to attend an exceptional protocol ceremony. It should be noted that the traditional nomenclature of "diplomatic agents" has now been replaced by "Heads of Mission" according to the 1961 Vienna Convention (art. 1). The term diplomatic agents now covers both the head of mission and his diplomatic staff.

Article 14 of the Vienna Convention sets down a threefold diplomatic hierarchy as follows:

1. Ambassadors, papal nuncios and other heads of mission with equivalent rank accredited to heads of state
2. Envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to heads of state, and
3. Chargés d'affaires received by Ministers for Foreign Affairs or Secretary of State (USA).¹¹

The missions of Sierra Leone in the United States, Europe, Asia and the Caribbean appear to be established more or less in accordance with the guidelines of the Congress of Vienna, 1815. The 1815 convention established a fourfold hierarchy, viz:

1. The Chiefs of Mission, e.g. Ambassadors, Ministers Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary
2. Consuls of Embassies or Legations
3. Secretaries (usually First, Second and Third Secretaries), and
4. Attachés.¹²

Attachés are usually relatively junior career officers, or even non-career personnel serving in a diplomatic position on a temporary basis in such areas as the military, navy, air force, agriculture, information, press, education, finance, culture and the like.

¹¹See the 1815 and 1961 Vienna Conventions. (These Conventions are supplemented from time to time as the need arises.)

¹²Ibid.

According to a U.S. Act of 1946, the American foreign service is divided into four main categories. These categories are (1) Chiefs of Mission, who are subdivided into four classes for the purpose of remuneration, (2) Foreign Service Reserve Officers (six classes), (3) Foreign Service Staff Officers and Employees (22 classes) responsible for administrative, technical, fiscal, clerical and custodial duties in their mission, and (iv) Alien Clerks and Employees.¹³

In Commonwealth countries, Sierra Leone's heads of mission are designated High Commissioners and not Ambassadors. In the Court of St. James', High Commissioners do not as a rule become Deans or Doyen of the diplomatic corps in the United Kingdom. High Commissioners can, however, become Deans or Doyen of the diplomatic corps in the Commonwealth states of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India and Pakistan.

It should be noted that High Commissioners, their career staff, families and servants enjoy the same privileges and immunities as ambassadors, but whereas the latter derive these from the law of nations, the former do so only from special laws enacted by the respective parliaments of the members of the Commonwealth. The same principle applies in the case of Hauts Representants, i.e., special representatives exchanged between the French Republic and members of the Communaute.¹⁴

¹³Norman D. Palmer & Howard C. Perkins, International Relations 2d. ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 101.

¹⁴Wood and Serres, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

The diplomatic corps is a collection or unity made up of all the heads of missions accredited to the same government. This corps usually ensures the protection of its members' privileges and immunities. The highest-ranking head of mission who presented his credentials to the head of state of the receiving country on the earliest date normally becomes the Dean or Doyen of the corps. In his capacity as Dean, this head of mission becomes the intermediary between the diplomatic corps and the receiving country to which he is accredited. The State Department or Ministry of Foreign Affairs may elect to send communications of a collective nature intended for the chiefs of mission through the Dean of the diplomatic corps. It is the duty of the Dean to ensure the unity of the corps and the maintenance of cordiality between its members.

Hierarchy and Functions of Consuls

A consul's functions are essentially protective and not representative as a rule. Whereas a head of mission alone is qualified to conduct the political relations between his state and the one to which he is accredited, a consul on the other hand is commissioned by his state to exercise specific functions with respect to the protection of his nationals resident, or in transit, through his consular jurisdiction. As stated before, he is empowered to protect his nationals in every way, and to ensure the general protection of his country's cultural, economic, commercial and shipping interests. A consul's

authority is far more restricted, and it can be exercised only within prescribed limits agreed to by the state of residence.

It must be pointed out that the scope of authority of consuls has been widened with the rapid increase in the diplomatic community since the early 1960's. This widened scope has been confirmed by recent bilateral conventions of interested states culminating in the Vienna Convention of 24th April, 1963, held under the auspices of the Commission on International Law of the United Nations. According to Woods and Serres, this convention has been signed by 51 states and ratified by 21 of them. The convention came into force on 19 March, 1967.¹⁵

The 1963 Vienna Convention (art.9) recognized four categories of consuls, namely, Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul and Consular Agent. Consulates-general are traditionally established in more important centers than Consulates. On the other hand, Vice-consulates are consular posts within the jurisdiction of a consulate-general or a consulate, whose head is normally a career officer, who operates under the authority of the Consul. Consular agencies are generally offices in ports and normally put under the control of nationals or foreigners. Consular agents are usually highly competent people in commercial and shipping affairs.¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 64-65.

¹⁶See the Vienna Convention 1963; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 264-76, passim.

Article 5 of the Vienna Convention 1963, contains a general summary of consular functions. These functions may be stated as follows:

1. To protect the interests, physical or normal, of the sending state, e.g. the right to issue passports and visas, to act as notary or civil registrar, to safeguard the interests of nationals in case of succession, mortis causa, or the protection of minors and compatriots lacking full capacity, to have their nationals represented in courts of law, to transmit judicial or extrajudicial documents, to control and to assist national vessels and aircraft and their crews. The consul may also perform these functions on behalf of the nationals of other states, if not forbidden by the receiving state;
2. to make all lawful investigations into the economic state of affairs of the country;
3. to promote the development of economic, commercial cultural and scientific relations; and,
4. to exercise all functions ascribed to consuls by the sending state which are not prohibited by the host country.

Appointment of Consuls

Articles 10 to 15 of the Vienna Convention, 1963, regulate the appointment of consuls based on the specific agreement reached between the sending and receiving states. The sending state gives the nominated consul a document known as the Consular Commission or patent, which not only confirms his appointment but also specifies his status and briefly delimits the area of his jurisdiction. When this is done the receiving state in turn confers upon him, by means of the

exequatur, the free exercise of his powers, privileges and immunities. The offices and property of consuls, as those of diplomats, are considered to be the property of the sending state, and are therefore presumed inviolable on this account.

Recognition of New Governments

As soon as a sovereign government is set up anywhere, it becomes ordinarily eligible for recognition by other sovereign governments, and also the United Nations. Recognition once afforded a new government remains valid, despite any later changes in its character or composition. It should be noted also that the sovereignty of a new government or state is not conditional on its recognition by other governments. As a matter of fact, the practice of recognizing a state or government is more a matter of expediency and mutual advantage than a legal or constitutional requirement.

In the matter of recognition by friendly governments, it seems that all they wish to know is that the new government exercises uncontested jurisdiction in most of its territory and that it came to power through the conventional political processes, which make it either de jure and de facto, or at least de facto or de jure. When Sierra Leone was granted independence in 1961, its so-called "mother country," i.e. the United Kingdom, took the initiative to accord it diplomatic recognition and the other governments followed suit automatically. By the same token, when the National Reconstruction Council (NRC) military

police junta seized power from the popularly elected civilian government of Dr. Siaka Stevens in April 1967 the question of recognition or non-recognition by foreign governments was considered to be irrelevant. The NRC was far from being de jure, but it was de facto in general terms.¹⁷

As soon as any two states mutually recognize each other their governments usually enter into diplomatic relationship also, either through the establishment of missions or through the United Nations Organization. Diplomatic missions are liable to be terminated unilaterally or mutually. The formal procedure in setting up a diplomatic mission, which is the same thing as the appointment and reception of diplomats, will now be followed.

Step 1. The sending state appoints its ambassador.

Step 2. The receiving country gives its agrément, i.e. approval. (The procedure followed in coming to this determination is known as agrément.)

¹⁷J. L. Brierley, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 137-143; Vernon V. Dyke, International Politics, 2d ed., (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1966), pp. 247-250; Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951); Kurt London, How Foreign Policy is Made (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 202-206; D. Palmer & Howard C. Perkins, International Relations, 2d ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1957), pp. 103-104; L. Oppenheim, International Law, 3d ed., Vol. I, Sect. 72, p. 135 in Kurt London, op. cit., p. 204; Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (Geneva: Droz, 1954); Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947).

- Step 3. The appointed diplomat takes the opportunity, while in his home capital, to get all the briefing he can from his Head of State, Ministry of External Affairs and the diplomatic representation of the receiving country in his own capital.
- Step 4. The new Ambassador obtains sealed "letters of credence" from his Head of State and presents these ceremonially to the Head of State of the country to which he has been accredited.
- Step 5. The new Ambassador confers with the host Foreign Minister or Secretary of State to whom he delivers a "true copy" of his letters of credence (copie d'usage). He confers also with other top leaders of the receiving country and finally pays courtesy calls on his colleagues of the diplomatic corps. Prior to this, the Ambassador stays incognito. Chargés d'affaires receive lettres de cabinet addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to his opposite number.

It should be noted that consuls also require approval by the governments to which they have been accredited, but the procedure followed in their case is less elaborate and formal.¹⁸

¹⁸J.B. Moore, Digest of International Law, IV (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 536-548; also see Wood & Serres, op. cit., ch. 3.

Non-recognition

At least as may have been inferred above, the significance of the recognition of a new state or government is a controversial issue at international law. One view by international jurists is that recognition of a new state is not a constitutive act but a declaratory one.¹⁹ Another point already made is that there are two types of recognition, namely, de jure recognition, which signifies that a new state or government has been expressly recognized by the formal diplomatic action of an older state, and de facto recognition, meaning that an official recognition may or may not be forthcoming but that the essential fact of the existence of the new state has been accepted with good grace, or misgiving notwithstanding.²⁰ There is simply no specific diplomatic method of recognition or non-recognition of new states and governments.

If recognition is voluntary rather than mandatory, so is non-recognition as an instrument of foreign policy. Suppose country "A" does not like the methods used by new country "B" or new government "C" for coming into being then it may choose to withhold recognition. For example, the Government of Sierra Leone does not recognize the state and government of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The United States has, especially in the past, tended to withhold recognition of a number of

¹⁹J. L. Brierly, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-39.

²⁰K. London, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

Latin American regimes on the pretext that they came into power unconstitutionally. Before its belated recognition of China the U.S. also was opposed to granting Communist governments its recognition on the ground that such revolutionary governments were unwilling to fulfill international commitments to world peace. History has proved that the withholding of recognition of new states and or new governments is generally an effective instrument of neither foreign policy nor diplomacy.

Non-recognition carries a low or high price tag, depending on the individual as well as the relative positions of the states concerned. In other words, how effective non-recognition may be depends on the impact made on both sides by such byproducts of the foreign policy of non-recognition as the abrogation of treaties, suspension of aid, denial of credit facilities, freezing of assets, expulsion or detention of foreigners, economic embargoes and the cessation, or suspension of both political and social intercourse. Both sides have everything to gain by heeding the words of London who notes as follows:

The rigors of ideological disputes have, unfortunately, left moral principles in a weakened state. Thus political demonstrations such as non-recognition or the break of diplomatic relations are no longer effective, per se. They must be backed by strength, determination, and domestic unity of purpose.²¹

²¹K. London, op. cit., p. 205.

Termination of Missions

An ambassador's badge of office is virtually his letter of accreditation or agrément, which confirms that he is persona grata in the host country. If for one reason or another he later becomes persona non grata then he would no longer enjoy official standing in the host country and must be withdrawn forthwith by his government.

Missions may be terminated in several ways, among which are the dismissal or recall of a diplomat or chief of mission and the severance of diplomatic relations. An ambassador or envoy may be recalled by his own government, acting at its own discretion or at the pleasure of the host country which had earlier given him accreditation. The host country may declare an envoy persona non grata if the relations between it and the envoy's government have become so strained that this is the most likely option to either or both sides. In some cases, such a recall is about the last step just before actual armed conflict ensues. In contemporary times, the recall of an envoy is not necessarily preliminary to real hostilities; the countries concerned may just wish to go their separate ways or engage in a "cold war." Not too long ago, Tanzania broke off its diplomatic links with the United Kingdom without going to war.

As a rule, it is rare for one government to request another government to recall its envoy, conscious that such an act forces the hand of the other side to retaliate in appropriate terms. But, what

will happen if a foreign government flatly refuses to recall its diplomat who has been declared persona non grata? In the event of such non-compliance the host country may feel free to dismiss the offending diplomat, hand him his passport and physically force him to return to his home country at once. A few years ago an American envoy was declared persona non grata by the Government of Sierra Leone. The U.S. Government, of course, gracefully honored the request for that envoy's recall by the government of Sierra Leone and there was no need "to draw swords" that is, by recalling or expelling each other's missions, or for the U.S. to retaliate, as it was entitled to do under the written rules of diplomacy. Indeed, the U.S. could have invoked the sanction of "Moses' law," a blow for a blow and a tooth for a tooth.

Naturally, the recall of an offending ambassador, consul, or any other diplomat, does not automatically mean the closure of the missions of both the sending and the receiving governments, or either of them. The recall, or even the dismissal of a diplomatic agent is doubtlessly a less severe sanction than the total severance of diplomatic relations.

Severance of diplomatic relations actually arises only in the event of bitter ideological disputes or war between states. A state may break off relations with another once friendly state as a demonstration of its deep resentment of its foreign policy or a deliberate

desire to force it to make a change in consonance with its own national interest. In 1950, for example, the United States government terminated its relations with Bulgaria as a retaliatory measure, arising from restrictions imposed on American diplomats accredited at that time to Sofia.²² In 1951, Iran broke off relations with the United Kingdom over the wellknown Anglo-Iranian dispute.²³ After World War II the United Nations was so displeased with Franco's dictatorial rule that it recommended that its members consider the withdrawal of their ambassadors from Spain and assigning their functions to junior diplomats. The aim of the U.N. was to systematically erode Franco's power base and ultimately bring about his downfall.²⁴

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) on 31st January, 1962, passed a resolution by a two-thirds majority to expel the Republic of Cuba from the Organization. The expulsion of and consequent severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba were based on the ground that Fidel Castro's revolutionary principles were incompatible with the principles and objectives of the OAS. Cuba was declared guilty of aggression and intervention in Venezuela.²⁵

²²Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1957), p. 250.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid

²⁵D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (London: Methnen and Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 184-85; Vernon Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 250.

Four classic cases involving the expulsion of two diplomatic agents and two consuls can be cited for illustrative purposes. In 1888, President Cleveland of the United States dismissed the British diplomat, Lord Sackville-West. On the refusal of the British Government to recall Sackville-West as requested by the U.S. Government, Cleveland handed him his passport and demanded his return home at once.²⁶

A second classic example is the declaration of United States Ambassador George F. Kennan as persona non grata by the USSR in 1952. The government of the Soviet Union took this action on the ground that he made a derogatory speech against the USSR in Berlin on 19th September, 1952. Kennan is alleged to have remarked in that speech that the life of an American in Moscow was not essentially different from that of an American diplomat held in internment in Germany in the post-Pearl Harbor disaster. Ambassador Kennan was ordered to leave the Soviet Union precisely for engaging in "slandorous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union." The U.S. government, on the other hand, defended its envoy by holding that "Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and in moderate language described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Government." This defense, as is known, did

²⁶Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., p. 104; Foreign Relations of the United States (Government Printing Office, 1888), II, 1667-1718; J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, IV, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 536-548.

not stop Kennan's ultimate recall home.²⁷ What is learned from this episode is the fact that every diplomat who is no longer acceptable to a host government, even though the sending country may choose to reject the charges brought against its diplomat, is removable at the pleasure of the receiving country.

The two cases of consuls are those of Kosenkia Lomakin and Angus Ward. One Anna Kosenkina, a Russian school teacher, jumped from a third floor window of the New York General Consulate of the Soviet Union in 1948 in order to avoid being sent back home. In order to save her life by taking her to the hospital, the New York Police entered the Consulate General to the chagrin of Peter Lomakin, the Consul General of the USSR. In the end, Mr. Lomakin was dismissed by the U.S. government, arguing that he had abused his immunities and privileges as a consul general. Lomakin, in turn, charged that the U.S. New York Police had violated the property rights of the Soviet Union by entering unlawfully. The State Department and New York police brushed the charge aside and saw to it that he was recalled.²⁸

In the second case, that of Angus Ward, the U.S. Consul General in Mukden, Manchuria, was placed under arrest, together with his staff, by the Chinese Communists troops who had put the city under

²⁷Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations, 2d ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 104.

²⁸Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, op. cit., p. 106.

siege in November 1948. Despite the protests of the U.S., Ward, his vice-consul, and staff were tried and given suspended sentences as operators of the alleged "American spy ring" and deported.²⁹ Unfortunately, the U.S. had not yet recognized the People's Republic of China, which was proclaimed as such on 1st October, 1949. The U.S. only did so belatedly in 1972 when its original supporters in the United Nations decided to change sides.

Privileges and Immunities

Diplomats enjoy certain privileges and immunities which are not granted to ordinary citizens of both sending and receiving states. Why are diplomats as a rule the whole world over given preferential treatment by receiving governments? For example, why are fines for traffic violations committed by foreign diplomats normally waived by the courts? Why are they not apprehended and detained by law enforcement officers? Why the freedom to collect and transmit information about developments in the receiving state?

Diplomats are granted privileges and immunities by receiving countries mainly for two reasons: They enjoy certain privileges and immunities, first, because they are considered to be the personal representatives of their heads of states, and second, because it is intended to make it possible for them to perform their diplomatic

²⁹Ibid., pp. 106-107.

functions with facility. It is essential for the chief of mission to always be in a position to perform his duties freely. Although he cannot be equipped with coercive powers it has been the practice in diplomatic history to accord him such privileges and immunities as would guarantee his personal independence, the security of his property and the enhancement of his dignity and that of his country.

As a matter of fact, the privileges and immunities of diplomats are recognized not only by reciprocal practice but also by the law of nations that was codified in full by the Vienna Convention of 18 April, 1961. This Convention gives legal force and a contractual character to the reciprocal obligations of states, and also of diplomats.

Diplomatic privileges and immunities include personal inviolability, that is freedom from arrest or detention, inviolability of communications, archives and premises, including the right of asylum for political refugees and such courtesy prerogatives. Courtesy prerogatives cover exemptions from compliance with the normal regulations on immigration and exit for members of diplomatic missions, their families and accompanying servants, the right to private worship, tax exemptions, exemption from customs duties, the right to carry distinctive types of passports and guaranteed facilities of departure in the event of war. ³⁰

³⁰See Vienna Convention of 1961, Articles 29-39 for a detailed listing and discussion of diplomatic privileges and immunities.

A point of clarification should be made at once with respect to the concept of "extraterritoriality," which embraces all privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomats, including consuls. As a popular notion used by many jurists in the 17th and 18th centuries, extraterritoriality was interpreted to mean that a foreign ambassador, his official residence (embassy), and offices (chancery) and staff were an extension of the sending state, and thus outside the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving state. In other words, a diplomatic mission was and still is, considered by many people to be outside the territory of the receiving state. This is, of course, a popular myth or bad reading of international law.

The privileges and immunities accorded diplomats are first of all on a reciprocal bases and second, the main reason for granting them is to enable diplomatic agents to perform their functions of representation, negotiation, information and protection freely and without impediment while they are persona grata in the receiving state. For example, the right of asylum is to protect political refugees and is not expected to be used to help criminals to escape apprehension and prosecution for which they are sought. As Wood and Serres put it eloquently, "The diplomatic premises should not serve as a place of refuge for offenders against common law because no diplomat has a legitimate reason for shielding from the action of justice a

person over whom he has not himself the least jurisdiction."³¹ Diplomatic premises can be surrounded, or even forcibly entered into to prevent a criminal's escape or effect his removal, if an ambassador refuses to surrender him. It will be very unusual for an ambassador not to demonstrate his expected respect for the laws of the country to which he has been accredited.

The Vienna Convention of 1961 appears to be silent on the all-important question of right of asylum, except that in paragraph 3 of Article 41 it provides that "the premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present convention or by other rules of general international law or by special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving states." The Montevideo Convention, 1889, the Bolivian Accord, 1911, the Havana Convention, 1928 and the Montevideo Accords of 1933 and 1939 are examples of special agreements made by some states in Latin America to lay down certain principles governing the practice of granting asylum to political refugees or fugitive political leaders. Sierra Leone has concluded no such agreement with any other state, but it does recognize the institution of asylum and will use it in appropriate cases, chiefly for humanitarian reasons.

³¹Wood and Serres, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Objects, Methods and Problems of Negotiation

Of the four principal diplomatic functions referred to above, the special attention is given to that of negotiation, its object, methods and problem. For most people, this function is apparently the best known and most prestigious of the various roles played by diplomats. It should be known at the outset that in all states the direction of international affairs or the conduct of negotiations between, or among states is the prerogative of the head of state who normally delegates some of his responsibilities in this area to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or in Sierra Leone, the Ministry of External Affairs.

The officially presumed purpose of negotiations is to search for solutions to international problems in a pacific manner. Ostensibly, diplomats negotiate agreements involving vital questions. Their negotiation may seem to involve an exploratory investigation of the chances of reaching an agreement in an amicable manner. But the declared or ostensible purpose of negotiation may not be the actual purpose for the understanding. In any case, every negotiation is pursued on the presumption that the two sides have a common interest in peaceful coexistence and in the search for a mutually acceptable solution to a problem bothering them.³²

³²Some representative works on the subject of negotiation are: Francois de Callieres, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes,

It seems that the real purposes of international negotiation are the maintenance of normal contacts between nations or the smooth flow of communication through the usual diplomatic channels established between them. A state's purposes of negotiation may be to ensure the easy procurement of intelligence, the peddling of its national ideology through technological exports, cultural exchange programs, foreign aid, and selective broadcasts and literature. Another purpose may be to induce adroitly the other party to enter into an agreement favorable to the party offering the olive branch (it could be a Trojan horse, also) or to join forces with it to pressure a third party through military leverages, foreign aid and the like.

transl. A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); Sir William Hayfer, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers (New York: McMillan, 1961); Thomas Bailey, The Art of Diplomacy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968); Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1963); Sir Harold Nicolson, "The Old Diplomacy and the New," in The Davies Memorial Lectures (London: Institute of International Lectures, 1961); Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); K. G. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1967), esp. pp. 211-244; Dean Acheson, Meetings at the Summit: Study in Diplomatic Method (Durham, New Hampshire: University of New Hampshire Press, 1958); Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Dialects and Duplicity in Soviet Diplomacy," Journal of International Affairs, 17, 1963, 42-60; John C. Campbell, "Negotiating with the Soviets: Some Lessons of the War Period," Foreign Affairs, 34 (1956), 305-319; O. Harris, "Faith in the Summit: Some British Attitudes," Foreign Affairs, 40 (1961, 58-70; Thomas Howet, Jr., "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of International Affairs, 17 (1963), 29-41; Arthur S. Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Seymour J. Rubin, "American Diplomacy: The Case for Amateurism," The Yale Review, 16 (1946), 321-335.

Negotiations: Nonamicable Methods

Negotiations between or among states may be carried out on the basis of persuasion or coercion. Methods of negotiation may be chiefly political or judicial--resort to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. For example, the recent Sierra Leone-Liberia Mano River project negotiation referred to earlier is of a purely political nature, whereas the Anglo-Iranian Oil Issue also referred to above provides an example for negotiation through judicial process. It should, however, be noted that coercion is the decisive factor in most international negotiations, since every negotiator may ultimately fall back on his reserve of coercive powers to force the other side, directly or indirectly, to acquiesce in its proposal.

In general terms, the four nonamicable methods of negotiations are retorsion, reprisal, intervention, and war. Some political scientists consider that the best known nonviolent, but coercive techniques of negotiation or settling disputes, are recall of diplomats "for consideration," dismissal of diplomatic agents by the receiving country, breaking off of diplomatic relations, the freezing of assets and the cancellation or suspension of treaty obligations.

Brierly described retorsion, reprisals, intervention and self-defense or war as "Measures of self-help under the classical system." For him, though retorsion is an unfriendly act, it is nevertheless within the legal powers of the state and it makes no difference even

if it takes the form of force in its application. State "A" is quite at liberty to exclude state "B" from the use of its (state "A's") harbor facilities or from fishing in its territorial waters as it used to do before.³³ For Lerche and Said, retorsion is a technically complex kind of retaliation.³⁴ Van Dyke lists the severance of diplomatic relations or the imposition of an embargo on the exploration of essential commodities or strategic materials on a particular country as examples of deliberate hostile acts referred to as retorsion. On the other hand, reprisal is considered to be a deliberate, unlawful and unfriendly act carried out as a foreign policy for a coercive or retaliatory purpose. Reprisal is rationalized on the pretext that the other has violated a treaty obligation or some type of binding international law. As in the U.S. case in Vietnam, North Vietnamese P.T. boats allegedly attacked American destroyers patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964. American aeroplanes bombed the Vietnamese P.T. boat bases and oil storage facilities within the territory of North Vietnam in reprisal. Reprisal may also take the form of seizing persons or property and imposing a pacific blockade.

More often than not, intervention in the external or internal affairs of one state by another is considered to be a serious

³³J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 398-408.

³⁴Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics, 2d ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), p. 156.

dictatorial act. Intervention may assume the character of occupation of part of another state's territory. One example of this kind of intervention is the occupation of Veracruz by American troops under the orders of President Wilson who justified his action by claiming that the Mexican government refused to make amends for violation of American rights in Mexico. Another example is the landing of British forces in Jordan. The U.S. blockade of Cuba during the historic missile crisis of that country in 1963 and the Bay of Pigs episode are recent classic examples of intervention.³⁵

War, as the most hideous instrument of any country's foreign policy, is the ultimate means of resolving international controversies. It is also seen as the final weapon which a powerful state uses to impose its will on a weak state. Lerche and Said refer to war as "the ultima ratio of international politics, the final and unanswerable device for producing solutions to conflicts ..."³⁶ Recent international law and conventions have ruled out the traditional hegemonic-objective total war type and replaced it by the balancing-objective or limited war variety to make warfare more humane.

War is not always a useless instrument of foreign policy, but for the Republic of Sierra Leone, or for that matter, any other Third World State, this extremely nonamicable form of settling international

³⁵Vernon Van Dyke, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-265.

³⁶Lerche and Said, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

disputes is intolerable. Given a choice among diplomacy, renunciation, and war, as foreign policy alternatives, the government and people of Sierra Leone would no doubt choose the first two alternatives since they are committed to non-intervention and support for all peace-loving international organizations and their specialized agencies. The foreign policy makers of Sierra Leone fully appreciate the point made by Morgenthau when he comments that "A nation which under present conditions is either unwilling or unable to take full advantage of the traditional methods of diplomacy condemns itself either to slow death of attrition or the sudden death of atomic destruction."³⁷ Certainly, Sierra Leone's foreign policy has no flavor or touch of jingoism in it.

What types of diplomacy are practiced in Sierra Leone, and other parts of the world today? What are the problems of negotiating? These questions are examined briefly in the following section.

Personal Diplomacy and Diplomacy by Conference

Personal diplomacy and diplomacy by conference, otherwise termed democratic or parliamentary diplomacy, are both used by the government of the Republic of Sierra Leone. Personal diplomacy refers to the direct participation of heads of state or heads of government and/or their ministers of external affairs in international negotiations. Parliamentary diplomacy is generally the open practice of negotiation.

³⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Art of Diplomatic Negotiation," in L. D. White, ed., The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 410.

Personal diplomacy is not completely new, but its increasing use during World War II and post war years is a definite innovation. It would appear that this practice has been necessitated by the need for top political leaders to personally handle certain matters at meetings between them.

Decidedly, Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, and President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, were the two leaders of the Second World War era who raised the practice of personal diplomacy to a new height. Reference is made to a number of personal meetings between these two leaders, as well as those held with Stalin of the USSR and Chiang Kai Shek of China. Indeed one may describe the Churchill-Roosevelt August 1941 Conference as the moment in history when modern personal diplomacy all began, for the personal meetings between these two men and later, others, eventually gave birth to the Atlantic Charter, the Yalta Conference of February 1945, the Potsdam Conference six months later, and the United Nations Organization. At Potsdam, Churchill was replaced by Clement Atlee, whose Labour Party had defeated the latter's Conservative Party at the general elections held in the United Kingdom in 1945.³⁸

³⁸Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., pp. 118-121; Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, International Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), pp. 315-16; 555-56; Lord Maurice Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference (London: Putnam Press, 1946), pp. 38-39; Lord Vansittart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, 28 (January 1950), 186; Max Sorensen, ed., Manual of Public International (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), Ch. 7, 7.01-7.41.

One must also add the names of the Marshall Stalin of the USSR, President Harry S. Truman of the U.S.A., who replaced Franklin Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai Shek of the Republic of China to the list of the innovators of the modern art of personal diplomacy. The foreign ministers and personal agents of the Big Three, i.e., the U.K., U.S. and U.S.S.R., made names for themselves, too. Such names as Anthony Eden of Britain, Molotov of the U.S.S.R. and Harry Hopkins of the U.S.A. come readily to mind.

As observed above, personal diplomacy became common and was developed into an excellent art by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. This was possible because of the vast modern development in transportation and communication, especially the airplane, trans-Atlantic telephone, television, radio and the use of highly trained personal confidants and emissaries. Direct correspondence between world leaders was made possible in a matter of hours, even minutes, through these various media of communication. The need for Sierra Leone to join forces with its sister African states to develop a continental communication and transportation network, with external global linkups, is now even greater than ever before, for very obvious reasons. Without direct lines of communication and adequate means of transportation, it will be difficult to contemplate or talk of national security in the context of both municipal and international affairs. Even such next door neighbors as Guinea, Liberia and Banjul

will continue to be technically beyond easy contact until they are all closely linked up together by modern highways and effective communications systems. Sierra Leone and Liberia are now busy working out solutions to these problems.

On the subject of diplomacy by the conference method, one must first of all make a distinction between the Ministry of External Affairs and the office of either the head of government or that of the head of state. Whereas the Ministry of External Affairs makes up what are usually defined as the "normal channels of diplomacy " with its diplomatic and consular machineries, the office of the head of state takes precedence when special delicate issues of highly technical matters have to be negotiated. The office of the Chief Executive is the pivot of power in Sierra Leone.

Diplomacy by conference or parliamentary diplomacy, is like personal diplomacy, not a modern phenomenon, but in terms of scale it is. Even one's casual reading of the world press tells that since World War I this technique has become popular. The League of Nations gave it great impetus in its search for collective security, and today, the UN has resorted to it with even greater zest, and for the same reason. And so do the Organization for African Unity and the OAS. Students of the UN know that the chief function of the Department of Conferences and General Services in the Secretariat of this world body is to sponsor international conferences, which now number over five

thousand a year, are attended by both foreign ministers, diplomats and experts.³⁹

Some conferences are attended chiefly by diplomats and foreign ministers when the matters to be dealt with are essentially political in nature. Other conferences are attended mainly by experts, if the agenda consists of highly technical matters. When one considers that there are at present several thousands of sessions of international conferences every year, one would readily understand the enormous strain on both the UN Secretariat and, not the least, on the diplomats and foreign ministers concerned. One cannot escape the temptation of reemphasizing the recommendation that, in so far as Sierra Leone's Ministry of External Affairs is concerned, everything must be done to ensure that only competent officers are employed in it and that delegates to conferences comprise only those who can make a meaningful contribution. Local standards should not always be the only ingredient in coming to a decision about who our diplomats should be. Fools in high places are a veritable nuisance and an unbearable burden to suffer gladly. Not on the international scene, of all places!⁴⁰

³⁹Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966) pp. 265-271; Palmer & Perkins, op. cit., pp.117-8.

⁴⁰A State's Conference Delegation normally includes a Chief Delegate, Secretary, an Alternate Delegate, Experts, Observers, Press, Officers, and Secretariat. Heads of Delegations are usually classified as follows: Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors, Ministers plenipotentiary and other delegates. All foreign delegations proceeding to Conference temporarily enjoy the conventional immunities and privileges accorded to diplomatic missions in the host country, as well as the countries through which they pass.

The Case For and Against Personal Diplomacy

Personal diplomacy has the great merit of making policy-makers negotiate delicate agreements more directly, candidly, and expeditiously, with minimum security risks. However, this type of diplomacy also has some serious drawbacks. First, it undermines the usefulness of professional diplomats by transferring their normal functions to amateur negotiators. The apparent failure of President Woodrow Wilson, who chose against professional advice and personally attended the Paris Peace Conference, is offered in support of the objection to personal diplomacy.⁴¹ About 400 years ago, Philip de Commynes, described as the father of modern history, commented that:

It is the highest act of imprudence for two great princes, provided there is any equality in their power, to admit of an interview, unless it be in their youth, when their minds are wholly engaged and taken up with entertainments of mirth and pleasure.⁴²

Secondly, trained diplomats are of the view that most political leaders, or their personal friends and favorites, often bungle delicate negotiations due to incompetence or lack of objectivity. Sir Harold Nicholson is particularly critical of the participation of political amateurs or decision-makers in international negotiations. His

⁴¹Palmer & Perkins, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴²Quoted by Lindsay Rogers in "Of Summits," Foreign Affairs, 34 (October 1955), 143.

dictum is that foreign ministers should concentrate on decision-making and diplomats on negotiations. Nicholson is supported by Sisley Huddleston, but not by Lord Hanky who thinks that there may be certain difficult issues which require political authorities, with more resources than professional diplomats would ever have.⁴³ The question is, who has ultimate public responsibility and who can make real concessions? One might take the middle ground in this conflict of expert opinions, believing that there are merits and demerits in the position taken by the two eminent schools of thought. The composition of each bilateral or multilateral conference depends mainly on the nature of the issue to be negotiated and the attitude of the other delegations to the conference.

Problems of Negotiating

Conducting the foreign relations of a country is without doubt a hazardous, although sometimes a very rewarding enterprise. The problems inherent in negotiation are both many and thorny. The diplomat has to first of all strike the "golden mean" between the strengths and weaknesses of the old diplomacy and the new diplomacy, or between "secret treaties" and "confidential negotiation" or between "personal diplomacy" and "diplomacy by conference" discussed above. Like many other students of diplomacy, Ikle is aware of the hazards and

⁴³Palmer and Perkins, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

frustrations involved in the profession. The four problems which he considers are involved in the process of negotiation are: (1) the extension of existing arrangements, (2) the normalization of previous relationships, (3) the redistribution of conflicting interests and (4) the innovation or change of interest or the direction of any such new interest.⁴⁴

As may be seen, each of the problems identified by Ikle suggests the character of the subject-matter of the particular negotiation between, or among, the states concerned. Each problem practically dictates the method of diplomacy required, that is, whether it is merely ceremonial or routine, or whether it should be by personal diplomacy or by conference negotiation. Normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations is usually carried on by personal diplomacy between the two heads of states or their foreign offices. On the other hand, a convention on the privileges and immunities of diplomats or the making of a peace pact is ordinarily the subject for conference negotiation.

The inevitable problems of negotiation are, however, not insurmountable. Negotiators could do their countries proud if they make positive use of their professional training and experience, and also if they play the game of negotiation according to the ground rules.

⁴⁴Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 26-42.

To conclude this portion of the discussion it might serve a useful purpose to reflect on the instructive words of two distinguished scholars in the discipline, namely Karl Deutsch and Harold Nicolson.

For Deutsch, negotiating or bargaining

... resembles a game of diplomacy according to the rules of which the perceptions and interests of both parties are treated as given. The diplomats on both sides first have to figure out the most promising strategy for their own side, in the light of their estimate of the probable strategy of the other side. They then play the negotiating game from move to move, from proposal to counter-proposal as best as they can, until either an outcome that is acceptable to both sides is achieved, or the negotiations fail and are adjourned or terminated.⁴⁵

Nicolson, on his own part, strongly advises against "... diplomacy by insult, diplomacy as a means of propaganda, and diplomacy by microphone and television," which appear to him to be negative methods of conducting negotiations between Sovereign States.⁴⁶ Continuing in this strain he states further that these types of postures

... provoke controversy, competition, publicity, and sensationalism ... that arouse animosity between the negotiators and feelings of anger or wounded pride in the public of several nations; we are aware that they give to international conferences or conventions a sense of unreality, and that attention becomes concentrated, not so much upon issues involved, as upon the dramatic but irrelevant problem as to who scores off whom, or who displays the greater mastery in abuse and dialectic.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 134.

⁴⁶Harold Nicolson, "The Old Diplomacy and the New, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴⁷Ibid.

It is easy to concur with Nicholson that diplomacy is not really the art of argument; it is the art of persuasion and the art of creating mutual confidence between negotiators and states. To be successful, Sierra Leone negotiators should be professionally trained, unhurried in their negotiation and removed from the glare of at least early publicity, so foolishly, hungrily desired by amateur diplomats. Further, they should be discouraged from relying on improvisation, which inevitably leads to both error, imprecision and a blistering mutual distrust. Best of all, they should learn to reckon studiously with the hard realities of international politics and thus relate the posture of their country according to what it can and cannot do.

CHAPTER VII

THE DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: FACTORS, MODELS, TECHNIQUES AND THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The purpose of this chapter is to study the theoretical basis of the foreign policy making process in the Republic of Sierra Leone. It does not aim to offer a critique of either the foreign policy of the republic or the techniques used in its formulation and execution. Since the content and character of the foreign policy of Sierra Leone have already been discussed in chapters II, IV, V and VI the study will now concern itself with an examination of the meaning, objectives and strategies, of foreign policy, the techniques used in formulating it and the factors which determine it. The type of foreign policy a country makes depends on its capabilities which are made up of both tangible and intangible factors. The chapter will also study the following approaches and models used in the decision-making process: the systemic or input-output, rational, elite-mass, group, incremental, organizational and institutional models.

The specific thesis of this chapter is that Sierra Leone's foreign policy is dictated by its tangible and intangible resources, the variable nature of international politics and the skill of its policy makers to maximize their opportunities or advantages. This is a general principle applicable to all states in the world. There is

no doubt at all that geographic, economic, demographic, technological, political, ideological and psychological factors have a pervasive influence in the determination of Sierra Leone's foreign policy. Together these factors, call them constants and variables, if you will, constitute the power potential of a country.

Meaning and Typology

In the sense that every sovereign country has a social code or an ideology which constitutes its particular identification mark, so does it also have a foreign policy. All states constitute the international system and therefore have some relationships with each other. All states interact with each other and carry on a ceaseless number of transactions. The relationships are generally political, economic and cultural. Because every sovereign state seeks to promote its national interest in a highly competitive, and often hostile, environment, it is bound to formulate a foreign policy for the express purpose of maximizing its national objectives, values, interests and power potential. What then is foreign policy?

According to Sorensen, "Foreign policy is the aggregate of decisions made by a government regarding its state's position vis-a-vis other states and its posture in international institutions and conferences."¹

¹Max Sorensen, ed., Manual of Public International Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 394.

In almost similar terms, London defines foreign policy as that policy which expresses the sum total of those principles under which a nation's relations with other nations are to be conducted.² It is often difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between domestic and foreign policies, for in actuality, the latter is practically nothing but an extension of the former. Foreign policy may be construed as domestic or national policy as it affects other members of the international political system.

The principal policy objectives of Sierra Leone, as well as all other sovereign states, are to preserve its political independence, territorial integrity, prestige, national myths and ideologies, and to enhance the general welfare of its people. In the words of Lerche and Said, "the task of the statesman ... is to reconcile the desirability of the possible with the possibility of the desirable."³ This is, of course, a cliché, but it says quite a lot about the aspirations of both policy makers and those who execute it, the end view being always to get what can be gotten in as peaceful and inexpensive a manner as may be possible. It is for this reason that negotiation is sometimes defined as the art of the possible, implying thereby that negotiators

²Kurt London, How Foreign Policy Is Made (London: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1949), pp. 12-13.

³Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul Said, Concepts of International Politics, 2d. ed., (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 33.

on both sides are normally always prepared to make compromises within given limits.

Is war an element of foreign policy? Some scholars like London answer this question in the negative holding that it is the business of the Ministry of Defense or War Office, and not the Ministry of External Affairs (the State Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which should rightly be styled as the "Ministry of Peace", for obvious reasons. The threat of war and the diplomatic effort to avert hostilities are however within the sphere and jurisdiction of the Ministry of External Affairs. War, by the way, may be the result of the conflict between either the economic or ideological interests of two or more nations. Nations are generally at each other's throat over foreign markets, strategic military positions and national ideologies, for example, racial superiority, or Western type democracy versus communism. In any case, most international disputes take on a political rather than a legal character. Whereas legal disputes, like the abrogation of treaty obligations, are justiciable, political disputes are generally non-justiciable.

The Kellog-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris, 1928, did get 61 nations to sign it symbolizing their renunciation of war as an instrument of foreign policy, but that was all, for it did not provide for sanctions against offending nations. The pact did not stop the

Second World War or any other wars fought since 1928.⁴ It is no doubt true that because no nation ever completely rules out the event of war that its foreign policy should not be divorced from strategy. War is an ultimate political reality.

Strategy is important in formulating and executing foreign policy because the stakes in international politics are very high, for every nation. The consequences of failure may be very disastrous. It is usually the mass of people who pay the heavy price of a ruinous foreign policy while the politicians who made such a policy get off relatively lightly.

The type of foreign policy any state formulates is characterized in part by the political philosophy of the decision-makers, that is whether they are realists or idealists or middle-grounders. Idealists or moralists believe that a nation must endeavor to meet its moral obligations to the rest of the world, even if doing so was not in its direct interest. Realists on the other hand, hold that a nation must not apply ethical principles to the issues of foreign policy. For them, ethical restraints are at best only optional and not legally binding. They take Machiavelli's prescription too seriously when he states that "A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in

⁴Norman D. Palmer & Howard C. Perkins, International Relations 2d ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 231-33.

everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good."⁵

When duplicity, intrigue and lying were common features of Renaissance diplomacy a Machiavellian or amoral approach to foreign policy was perhaps tolerable and understandable, but in today's world of interdependence, ethics can not be ruled out from foreign policy and diplomacy. Realists often forget that ethics is after all a mixture of psychological, cultural and ideological value orientations which predetermine the framework within which the statesmen of every nation-state operate. Lerche and Said who appear to acknowledge this fact of international politics make the following comment:

This selection of a generalized category of purpose is a pure value judgment. There are no objective criteria by which an observer can anticipate what evaluation of the environment a people will make. The elements that produce the eventual conclusion are embodied in their social dynamics and assume unpredictable and often eccentric forms.⁶

Woodrow Wilson is even more positive and firm in his support of the position of idealists on the issue of ethics, morality and values as psychological and cultural restraints or factors in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In one of his presidential campaign speeches he made the following statement.

⁵Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince cited in K. J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 424.

⁶Lerche and Said, op. cit., p. 35.

It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest ... We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us, and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so.⁷

Sierra Leone's statements of general foreign policy objectives, its declared general political philosophy and day to day policy pronouncements, like those of the United States and Great Britain, for example, have deep moral overtones. When President Stevens recently commented on the imminent dangers of the arrogance of power on the part of the super world powers and also warned the Middle East nations about the judicious use of their oil power, he was actually underlining the value of moral restraints in international affairs. And so does every statesman when he advocates the cause of world peace, peaceful coexistence, the rule of law, national security, free trade, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, the observance of treaty obligations, the right of self-determination, justice, civilization, democracy and world government.

President Woodrow Wilson was pleading the cause of international morality when he asked all statesmen to "make the world safe for democracy." Lord Wolsey did no less when he affirmed that he had

⁷Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950), p. 24.

...but one great object in this world, and that is to maintain the greatness of the British Empire. But apart from my John Bull sentiment on this point, I firmly believe that I am doing so in the cause of Christianity, of peace, of civilization, and the happiness of the human race generally.⁸

Lord Wolsey apparently struck a happy medium between realism and idealism or between the primary need to pursue the national interest and the importance of universal ethics in foreign policy. In these days of global interdependence nothing is more pragmatic and sensible than a foreign policy which represents a judicious mixture of national interest or realism and international considerations or idealism.

In order to attempt to accomplish a nation's domestic and external objectives and commitments to the other members of the international community, it has to develop a pragmatic foreign policy to reflect these. The three possible varieties of foreign policy are usually isolation, alliance or non-alignment. Sierra Leone's foreign policy is an amalgam of alliance or non-alignment, whereas that of the U.S. is one of isolation (George Washington's prescription) and alliance. Geographic or spatial advantages made isolationism tenable for the United States in its early days but this is no longer the case in these days of fast high altitude espionage airplanes, fast military transport planes, the Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABMS) and other

⁸Cited in Kenneth W. Thomson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 151.

modern weaponry. Even neutrality as a foreign policy sometimes makes no sense in this nuclear age. Diplomatic coalitions and/or military alliances are means whereby a nation seeks to pursue its policy objectives, ward off threats perceived or imagined by it and defend its national interests through cooperation with other likeminded nations. The strategy of non-alignment on the other hand represents a nation's deliberate desire not to commit its military and other resources and diplomatic support to satisfy the ambition or interest of another nation. Foreign policy is chiefly an instrument for the pursuit of the national interest.

By and large, all foreign policies may be divided into two categories, namely, the policy of the status quo and the policy of revisionism. A policy of status quo is conservative and defensive in nature because it seeks to preserve a nation's existing status vis-a-vis that of the rest of the international political system. A status quo policy does not presuppose the total absence of situational flexibility, for all decision-makers are aware that foreign policy is no less dynamic or non-static than the international system of which it is a part. On the other hand, a policy of revisionism is progressive, creative, flexible, exploitative, and offensive and critical of the organization of international politics. Lerche and Said describe the posture of a revisionist state very aptly in the following words:

A revisionist policy is characterized by relative daring in making optimistic calculation of factors

of cost, and willingness to carry a relatively large burden of risk. Its operational advantage lies in its capacity to bring about situational change or capitalize quickly upon it.⁹

It is a fact that Sierra Leone lends diplomatic support to the Afro-Asian and African blocs in the United Nations General Assembly and its specialized agencies, but it does so in regard to matters of general interest only. It can not afford to support any bloc on all issues. This is not a strange posture. Finland, Ireland and Sweden, although naturally pro-Western, have chosen to be non-aligned. The policy of non-alignment is designed as a protective shield for the developing politics, economics and sovereignty of Sierra Leone, as much as for other Third World countries in the world.

Determining Factors

It would appear that in the final analysis, the type of foreign policy that Sierra Leone, or any other country, would develop and implement will be decided by its capability to do so. By capability is meant the state's capacity to influence international politics in its own interest. The factor of capability decides what can be done as distinguished from what it would like, or even ought to do. Capability is the synthesis of realism. The factors of capability may be

⁹Lerche and Said, *op. cit.*, p. 38; see also Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951).

broken down into two classes, namely, tangible factors and intangible factors. Tangible factors may include the nation's (a) geographical position, (b) population and effective manpower, (c) natural resources endowment, (d) industrial and agricultural productive capacity and (e) armed might (military, navy, air force and paramilitary delivery power). The intangible factors of a nation on the other hand are usually its (a) socio-economic and political structure, (b) educational and technical ability (c) national morale and mind and (d) world strategic position. The classification of tangible and intangible factors is not to be rigidly presumed. Each category has an element of the other. Capability analysis is generally concerned with what factors are available, convertible, excellent and relevant. It is a matter of empirically measuring tangibles and normatively evaluating intangibles. These two categories will now be dealt with to reinforce what has already been said about them.

Geographical Factors

Under this sub-topic reference is made to the physical and economic geography of Sierra Leone in particular, and the world in general. Geography, as a tangible factor, refers to Sierra Leone's physical size, world position, accessibility of its frontiers, climate, natural resources, productive industrial capacity, population, transportation facilities and population in terms of both its quality, quantity and density. Attention should be called to the fact that

the importance of these factors is relative to conditions in other parts of the world. Nations with the advantages of accessibility to the sea, intracontinental transport facilities, critical military resources, communications networks, abundant food supplies and a pleasant climate are considered to be in possession of an influential endowment which enhances both their domestic and international postures. What is being claimed here is that physical and economic geography go a great way to determine the political potentialities of any country as well as accentuate its political problems. Shape, location, topography, terrain, internal penetrability, population density, a littoral or land-locked situation, and neighboring states are as important as the economic determinants of a country's domestic and foreign policy. The geographic base of power relates to all these elements just enumerated. As a matter of fact, these elements and their influence on foreign and domestic policies comprise the substance of geopolitics.

Sierra Leone is small in size, covering a land area of only about 28,000 square miles, stretching from the Atlantic seaboard and the estuary of the Rokel River. The Republic of Guinea borders Sierra Leone on the north, north-east and north-west and Liberia borders it on the east and south-west. Sierra Leone is a well-watered tropical country, but its river system is considerably unnavigable by ocean-going crafts, and even launches and barges. Except for the east,

much of the land is either savannah or low bushland. The republic is essentially an agricultural economy with a sprinkling of small industrial enterprises intended for undercutting its more expensive imports. The country's population is currently estimated at three and a half million.

Sierra Leone's handicap in the world is due to its small size in land area, population, and its undeveloped economy and public administration. There is no doubt that the world powers became powerful because their geographical position gave them a strategic position, a highly developed technology and, thus the power to control intra-continental trade routes, and control over vast essential natural resources for both domestic consumption and export manufactures. A rich nation is an influential one, in a world of power politics. Mere size is, of course, not vital in itself; what counts is the natural resource endowments of the land.

The government of Sierra Leone fully recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of its currency and appears to be doing what can be done to ameliorate the lives of its people and to establish its place among the nations of the world. For example, in a recent address delivered by President Stevens at the Kenema Agricultural Show he assured his large audience that it was the policy of his government "to promote agricultural development through farmers and rural people who account for about 80% of the population. Government's role in

agricultural development ... is one of giving assistance, guidance and encouragement to farmers to ensure self-sufficiency in the country's staple food, as well as to increase foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports.¹⁰ The President further told his audience that agriculture, which offered earning opportunity to the majority of the citizens of the republic should be given the highest priority.

The Economic Factor

The economic factor in making and administering foreign policy is an essential and crucial one, indeed. The factor embraces both the natural resources of a country and its agricultural and industrial productive capacity. Sierra Leone's natural resources include its natural endowment, agricultural and mineral. The nation's industrial and agricultural productive capacity to influence its international transactions and politics is obviously dependent to a great degree on its quality and quantity and the ability of its manpower to transform available raw resources to needed manufactured products for both local consumption and export.

Policy determiners must always make a distinction between national resources, that is, such gifts of nature already found to have a utility value, such as rich soil, flora and fauna, minerals and forests, and raw materials, that is, those resources which are

¹⁰Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Trade Journal, 14:1 (January/March, 1974), 14.

produceable, such as hides, cotton, rubber, fur and timber. A "resource" is an asset and a raw material possesses potential utility, and not necessarily actual utility value, hence every state which has raw materials needs to apply capital resources, labor and technology in order to convert potential utility into actual utility. This is what potentially rich Sierra Leone is trying to do as indicated especially in the preceding chapter and this one, namely, boosting its agricultural and industrial economy through the offer of various kinds of incentives to foreign and local investors.

The principal agricultural products of the Republic of Sierra Leone consist of rice, palm oil, and palm kernels, ginger, bananas, beniseed, citrus fruits, piassava, cocoa, coffee, various species of corn and pineapples. Characteristically, however, none of these products is produced in sufficient quantities to meet local demands, much less for the country's export trade. The country is rich in such minerals as diamonds, iron ore, rutile, and possibly, bauxite. These mineral deposits are, however, not being generally tapped to the significant benefit of the country's citizens; for one reason, the mines are owned by foreign companies and Sierra Leone at present has neither the knowhow nor the required capital to exploit these potentially rich mineral deposits profitably. As if to accentuate the economic problems of the republic, there are as yet no known coal or oil fields in the country.

For some time to come, the Republic of Sierra Leone would need a realistic foreign policy that will ensure the supply of much needed manufactured products for its building industry, road construction, mass communication and transportation requirements, fuel supplies to keep its agricultural and industrial enterprises going, as well as to satisfy domestic consumer needs. A nation's life-lines or critical needs dictate its foreign policy objectives and strategies.

Sierra Leone's Gross National Product has not yet been accurately computed and the per capita income which is generally estimated at about \$200 per annum is low by many standards, but it does not give a true picture of the wealth of the country. This is a fact because the greater part of Sierra Leone's economy is in the non-money sector. A great deal of services and commodities in Sierra Leone are unpaid for, hence they do not enter into the financial transactions conducted in the economy. Unpaid for labor by members of a family household and non-payment of house rent by majority of the people of Sierra Leone are two examples. It is also impracticable, or at least inaccurate, to translate prices from one national economy to another. Twenty-five American dollars will purchase more goods and services in Sierra Leone than would be possible in the United States.

To stress the importance of the economic factor in foreign policy formulation and execution once more the instructive words of two scholars are quoted below.

A government's ability to back up its demands on other nations, to attract and support allies, to bring pressure to bear on adversaries--these international operations involve the manipulation of goods and services of many kinds, quantities, and qualities. Even the intangible called national prestige may depend to some extent on the properties of a nation's economic system.¹¹

Of all the four elements of Sierra Leone's economy, that is personal consumption, net foreign investment, domestic investment and government consumption, the first two are the lowest but the position is likely to improve significantly by the end of this decade.

The Population Factor

If all things were equal, then the greater a state's population is the greater will be its capacity to perform its function effectively. But the capacity and effectiveness of the manpower of a state critically depend on such factors as their scientific and industrial level of development, their age and sex distribution and what is referred to as the population's "land - man" ratio, that is, its density or number of people in a square mile. A heavily populated industrialized country soon finds out that it needs more land space to provide for its development, hence it may resort to imperialism as an instrument of its foreign policy. An imperialist foreign policy

¹¹Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 426.

may very well lead to aggressive or interventionist behavior which may culminate in war, unless the invaded country submits to colonialism without a fight. Japan, Italy, and Germany, for example, have all at one time or another developed aggressive foreign policies in order to expand their territories or develop their economies at the expense of the countries they invaded. This is why some scholars are convinced that economic imperialism is the chief cause of war.

Those who make foreign policy take cognizance of the relative size and characteristics of their nation's population in terms of what they can accomplish vis-a-vis other states. With regard to the question of national capability, they are more interested in manpower than population per se, because the former is what represents that element of the latter which is available for the purposes of foreign policy. Those people in the population who are politically and physically "useless," or those who exist merely to perform support services or housekeeping functions, do not account immediately for much, if at all, with foreign decision-makers. They only need that portion of the population which serves as a reservoir for the recruitment of the nation's civil servants, politicians, scientists, engineers, factory managers and personnel, farmers and other essential workers. This is why keen attention is paid to such demographic factors as total population, age and sex distribution, fertility and mortality (rates for these per 1,000 per annum), increase and decrease, emigration and

immigration, net change in size of population, proportion of aggregate fit and unfit for military service, proportion of total partially and completely disabled for any type of work, proportion of total who are literate and illiterate and the distribution of technical and other skills.

The population of Sierra Leone is growing fairly steadily with a decreasing mortality rate. The population density is still low at any rate. With the gradual improvement in medical and sanitary and educational facilities the nation's reservoir of manpower is increasing correspondingly. But for some time to come, its military potential for large scale modern warfare will remain low.

The Role of Technology

Technology as the result of applied science, has significantly transformed the international environment. By technology is meant the use of scientific knowledge or the application of techniques to accomplish national objectives. The technological level of a country is determined by its standard of education, tool skill and available resources. There is no doubt that science and technology have throughout history constantly shaped and reshaped the economic, geographic and military elements of the foreign policies of states, tended to make them powerful and often dangerous. The possession and use of the first atom bomb by the United States support this observation. In 1945, the United States dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

and completely wrecked those two beautiful Japanese cities, much to the consternation and horror of the non-nuclear world. Notwithstanding the indignation of the rest of the world, the U.S. and the USSR, which joined the so-called nuclear club later, have manufactured far more destructive hydrogen bombs and ballistic missiles since 1945.

According to Sprout and Sprout, the four basic characteristics of scientific and technological advance are their tendencies to be cumulative, accelerative, irreversible and pervasive, that is becoming widely and rapidly diffuse from the country of origin.¹² Security-oriented statesmen and military strategists have not quite succeeded in limiting the size of the nuclear club. India surprised the world recently by becoming the sixth member of this seemingly exclusive league. Sierra Leone has no potential capacity to join this prestigious club.

A primary interest of this study is in the technology which builds the economic base of the state for the purpose of, not only feeding, clothing and sheltering its population, but for increasing its foreign investments and foreign exchange earnings. Weapons technology is a secondary interest in Sierra Leone. Modern technology can make and, indeed, has made a great deal of contributions to the general welfare and happiness of man. But with reference to foreign policy, one has to examine the level of technology of a country in terms of its all round national power in relation to other states.

¹²Sprout & Sprout, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

A high level of agricultural technology normally leads to a high level of food production and the manufacture and mass distribution of other agricultural products. A high level of technology in transport and communication guarantees, or at least promises, a greater mobility of travellers and goods and rapid exchange of information. Modern transportation and communication facilities have a great impact on public opinion and the dissemination of national propaganda. It is modern technology that has brought about rapid and cheap printing of literature, and thus raised the standard of literacy of the populace and international communications. Medical technology on its part has improved the health of the mass of people in all modern states. A physically and mentally healthy citizenry has a higher standard of national morale and military fitness than a generally sickly one.

Sierra Leone is not a technological state in the modern sense of the word. Its level of literacy is still very low, and so is the tool-skill of its own. This country can not overlook the strong effect technology has on foreign policy, for as Turner notes:

Today, mere numbers of men, or the possession of raw materials, or the holding of strategic positions is not the essential source of power. Only those nations having scientists, engineers, and skilled workers who are masters of knowledge and skills required for devising and operating intricate machines and chemical processes can adequately equip armed forces.¹³

¹³R. Turner, Technology and Geopolitics, cited in Kurt London, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

Turner's comment is an overstatement, especially in the context of Sierra Leone which is not immediately interested in equipping an army, but much of what he says is sobering and sensible. One may observe that Turner has provided a guideline for the decision-makers of Sierra Leone.

The Function of Ideology and National Morale

Ideological considerations are a problem in the determination of foreign policy, having regard to the fact that, as London observes, "Between the two nation groups (totalitarian and non-totalitarian) there is an abyss of suspicion, which has led to many rapid changes of policies and of the men who made them."¹⁴ But why a nagging suspicion? What is ideology, anyway? What is the national mind, or national morale?

A national ideology is a people's system of beliefs, values and their perception of the world. As Lerche and Said put it, "An ideology may be defined as a self-contained and self-justifying belief system that incorporates an over-all world view and provides a basis for explaining all of reality." Lerche and Said describe the characteristics of ideology in the following terms.

- (i) Ideology leads inescapably to the formulations of problems in moral terms. An international dispute thus becomes a clash between good and evil, with the stakes never less than absolute vindication or total defeat.

¹⁴Kurt London, op. cit., p. 32.

- (2) Ideological controversy (which is inevitable in any contact between states embodying total belief systems) is not susceptible to compromise or accommodation. No ideology permits bargaining with evil.
- (3) Ideologically-oriented policy can never "succeed" in the sense that strategic calculations can be crowned with success. States can not kill ideas, only people; wiping out a population in no way destroys their unpopular beliefs.¹⁵

The national mind is nothing but stereotypes of a nation's behavior and attitudes which are transmitted from one generation to the other. It is made up of the people's likes and dislikes, their idees fixes or prejudices. There is no doubt that the national mind colors a state's foreign policy in one way or another.

These characteristics tie in fairly well with what Snyder and Wilson say of ideology viz, "... a cluster of ideas, about life, society, or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political or religious slogans or battle cries and which through continuous usage and preaching gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party or nationality."¹⁶ Such political and social systems as democracy, communism, fascism, nazism, Marxism, totalitarianism, socialism, liberalism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Arabism, and

¹⁵Lerche and Said, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁶Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, The Roots of Political Behavior (New York: American Book Company, 1949), p. 511.

Pan Africanism are nothing but ideologies. Morgenthau has put all typical ideologies of foreign policies under three groups, viz, (1) ideologies of the status quo, for example, peace and international law, (2) ideologies of imperialism, or colonialism, and (3) ambiguous ideologies, for example, the principle of national self-determination.¹⁷

Sierra Leone, like every nation in the world has its own ideologies, myths and symbols. It believes in constitutional democracy, nationalism and internationalism. Some of the nationals of Sierra Leone believe in Islam, others in Christianity, and yet others in animism. Sierra Leoneans have a national morale which has been tested from time to time by national emergencies, industrial strikes and other stresses and has been found to be remarkably high. There is strong belief in peace at home and abroad.

A careful study of the foreign policy objectives and strategies of Sierra Leone is certain to reflect its ideological orientations. The policy strategy of nationalism, internationalism, nonalignment, and peaceful coexistence with other nations of the world indicates what these ideological orientations are. These purely normative considerations are verified in the concluding section of this study where there is a discussion of the techniques of foreign policy formulation.

¹⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2d. ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 83-88.

The Power Determinant

Power is seen as the hard currency, the raw material or essence of international politics. Contributions to the study of power and its various images and phases include those of Machiavelli, Hobbes, the church fathers—Gregory, Ambrose and Augustine, Catlin, Merriam, Russell, Lasswell, Brady, de Jouvenel, Hunter, Friedrich, Morgenthau, Weber, Berle, Modelski and many other scholars.

For some of these scholars, power is a thing one can possess and use as desired to obtain acquiescence or obedience. For some others, power is a relationship of one person or one state to another. Power is what is meant when people talk about the strategy a state uses to pursue its objectives at home and abroad. In other words, politics is chiefly concerned with the use and limits of power in either the distribution of values or conducting the nation's diplomacy. A few definitions of power will now be examined, with a view to assessing the relevance of this variable factor to the making and carrying out of any country's foreign policy.

Modelski defines power as "the community's present means to obtain the future desirable behavior of other states."¹⁸ This definition is very close to that made by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan which states that power is the present means to secure some future

¹⁸G. Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, p. 39, cited in J. W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 63.

apparent good." Lasswell and Kaplan, on the other hand, regard power as a deference value and that its various forms can be distinguished according to the value upon which they are based. For Lasswell, a nation has power if it can authoritatively decide as to who gets what, and how. Morgenthau points out clearly that power consists of anything that establishes and maintains control over man. In elaboration of his point, he makes the following comment:

Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandisement.¹⁹

Power may be coercive or consensual, hence it is important to show the difference between naked power, authority and influence. Whereas naked power is brutish or coercive and is exercised without reliance on persuasion, authority rests on morality and legitimacy. Influence on the other hand is essentially a personal attribute and may be seen as a special exercise of power and the value position of a person or group."²⁰

¹⁹Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁰Jules Karlen, Man's Behavior (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 68. See also, James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1968); Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); Milovan Djilas, The Imperfect Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969); Robert M. MacIver, The Modern State (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Adolf A. Berle, Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969).

There is no superior sovereign power in the international community of nations. This is to say that the little Republic of Sierra Leone has the same sovereign status in the international political system as the great republics of the United States and the USSR. How does Sierra Leone, for example, manage to maintain its sovereignty among the great powers of the world? Kousoulas explains how this works out, at least in theory.

In the absence of such a higher entity, the executives of these independent states find that to promote or protect the international interests of their states they must seek ways to augment their ability to influence the decisions of other state executives through bargaining, persuasion, or even force, that is they must exercise power with authority.²¹

Spykman's thesis is so close to that of Kousoulas that this writer feels compelled to quote it for what it is worth. In connection with the Japanese blitz on Pearl Harbor in 1941 Spykman writes instructively as follows:

International as well as national affairs are influenced by love, hate, charity, by moral obligation and the hope of material gain, by the moods and psychological abnormalities of rulers, and by the emotional affiliations of peoples. International society is, however a society without a central authority to preserve law and order, and without an official agency to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights. The result is that individual states must make the preservation and improvement of their power position a primary objective of their foreign policy.²²

²¹D. George Kousoulas, On Government and Politics, 2d.ed., (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 312-313.

²²Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1942), p. 7.

The creation of the United Nations Organization has made a part of Spykman's thesis incorrect, but his main argument still holds good. Almost without exception, the essential ingredients of the foreign policy of the nations comprising the international political system include barter, purchase, persuasion, and ultimately, coercion. This must be so since society is really built on the basis of cooperation, accommodation and conflict, and its decision-makers and masses have no choice but to operate within the political economic and social limits of the states as power organizations.

Sierra Leone's primary interest in power is to modify the prevailing relationship between it and other governments or to prevent an undesirable change in the international status quo by trying to push for a policy of positive nonalignment and internationalism. This is the essence of the republic's foreign policy. Its foreign policy also includes regional economic and military cooperation, which is why it went to the aid of the Republic of Guinea during its naval invasion by Portugal in 1971.

For the present leaders of Sierra Leone, power is conceived both as a means to achieve certain national objectives as well as an end in itself, and must be used with moral restraint. Power, here, is a means-end spectrum.

The sources of power comprise of naked or coercive brute force (a primordial source), wealth, position, the possession of critical

information, knowledge, expertise, special technological skills and organization, or the setting for the establishment of power relationships. A good administrative organization is needed to promote the mobilization of resources and the implementation of decisions, national ideologies, myths and, not unnaturally, the personal qualities of power holders. National power also may be assumed to be both the military and non-military means by which a government is able to control opposition in desirable ways, both internally and externally. This is state-craft, by the way. It is concerned with either national self-preservation, or national self-extension, or national self-abnegation. Self-preservation as a foreign policy objective and strategy refers to a state's attempt to preserve or protect the state's existing cluster of values. Self-extension refers to the strategy used to modify or change the status quo. Self abnegation, on the other hand is concerned with all policies that go beyond the ordinary national interest in international matters.

Has Sierra Leone power? Without doubt it does. It is certainly not a world or major power, but it can be classified as a small power in the sense that it has the means to defend its limited interests. National power must always be assessed in relative terms. Relativity of national power refers to such elements as geographic factors, population and manpower, natural resources, technology, ideologies, leadership and morale. These tangible and intangible

power factors have just been discussed above. An examination of the foreign policy of Sierra Leone suggests that the decision-makers in that state are attempting to pattern their roles according to their cloth, without surrendering or even lowering the sovereignty of the republic. Change in power at one end of the spectrum corresponds with changes in the availability of that power. But even in the face of constant changes certain objectives in the foreign policy of all states remain fixed. These constants include the pursuit of national security through defense alliances and negotiated collective security systems, the organization of greater power than is possessed by other nations, reliance on conventional diplomacy, the maintenance of ideological conflicts, the resort to world forums for debate, e.c. the UN, reference to international law and the formation of regional groupings or voting blocs in international organizations. How much any state does in these matters depends on the domain, range and scope of its power.

Adolf Berle, Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia University, a former U.S. diplomat and author of many authoritative books, seems to sum up quite comprehensively the discussion of the theory and use of national power. In his Power, Berle discusses the postulates and five laws of power which run briefly as follows:

1. Power invariably fills any vacuum in human organization
2. Power is invariably personal.

3. Power is invariably based on a system of ideas or philosophy.
4. Power is exercised through, and depends on institutions.
5. Power is invariably confronted with, and acts in the presence of, a field of responsibility.²³

It is a fact of history that power nearly always prevails over chaos and that its underpinnings are the prevailing national philosophy or perceptions and geopolitical factors. It is a practical fact that every nation has established institutions as media for the exercise of power and that it has both range, scope, domain and weight as limiting factors. Berle's law that power is invariably personal is, however, most troublesome and questionable. Certainly, says Bertrand Russell, "Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory,"²⁴ but the potential danger inherent in this kind of postulate, which has not been stressed by the proponents of personal power is that quite a number of world leaders have taken it too far and led both their supporters and their adversaries to utter ruin.

Hitler is a good example of a world leader who was obsessed with power as a personal attribute. On a relatively modest scale, Nkrumah of Ghana and Albert Margai of Sierra Leone were also of this persuasion. Who knows what these two political leaders would have

²³Adolf A. Berle, Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), pp. 38-134.

²⁴Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1938), p. 11.

done if they had a really expansive domain and remained in power for two decades? The position taken in this dissertation is that power works better for its wielders and their following if they regard this central phenomenon of politics as a relationship and a means to serve national ends rather than a personal commodity in the hands of one man, who might even blossom into a popular dictator at first, and perhaps, before long, a disgusting fellow, hunted and disavowed by many foes and old admirers. A critic of shared or impersonal power may call personal power an abstraction, but even so, the former produces better results in terms of domestic and international equilibrium, at least in the long run.

Techniques of Foreign Policy Formulation

Diplomacy, which has been broadly defined in this work as the art of negotiation is, as a matter of fact, the channel for the implementation of foreign policy. The determinants of foreign policy include public opinion, geographic, demographic, economic, technological and ideological factors and not the least, the intangible factor described as the national mind or general morale.

The concluding section will deal with the techniques used in developing foreign policy. The discussion will be focused on a number of decision-making models and approaches. In other words, the importance of intelligence and communication will be highlighted.

Karl Deutsch has built a decision-making model which mirrors the world as a communication and action system, or a cascade of five levels. Each level he says is formed by a distinct reservoir of public or elite opinion, linked to a specific complex of social institutions and status groups. This communication-action system deals with the intake of message and experiences from the domestic and international environment, the national memory bank or recall. Decision is arrived at through the processing of data received and ideas recalled from memory, and, finally, the determination of alternative measures.²⁵

The first level of the cascade or communication-action system is formed by the social and economic elite. This unit is small in every country. In Sierra Leone it is even much smaller. As already pointed out, in Sierra Leone the foreign business community has a preponderant influence in the formulation of foreign policy over the natives of the country, but this situation is fast reversing itself. The second level consists of the political and governmental elite. By far, this is the most influential factor in the decision-making process in Sierra Leone. The third level, which embodies the media of mass communication, including the nation's newspapers, journals, magazines, radio, television, films and books, is at present weak due to restrictive government measures. As with the third level, the

²⁵Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 101-102.

fourth level, which is the communications system, is desirable but is currently less important in the decision-making process for the same reason.

In normal circumstances, this will be unideal. In a fully developed democracy the fifth level in the schemata, that is, the politically active or effective people, is the largest. By politically effective people, or operational or attentive publics discussed in the preceding chapter, one refers to interest or pressure groups, lobbies and the like, which possess political power and are determined to use it to influence the formulation and execution of foreign policy.²⁶ Again in the Republic of Sierra Leone, active expressive groups are extant, but not active or politically aware of the dynamics and implications of foreign policy. It is for this reason that it is held in chapter VII that the government of Sierra Leone develops its foreign policy largely through the indirect process of osmosis.

Professor R. C. Snyder and his associates, who are regarded by some scholars as the pioneers of the decision-making approach and the analysis of foreign policy, basically assume that international action may be described as sets of decisions made by recognizable units, that states behave as participants in a situation and finally, that within them, one can possibly identify the makers of decisions

²⁶Ibid, pp. 102-104.

"whose authoritative acts are to all intents and purposes the acts of the state."²⁷ Snyder and his colleagues have broken down the decision-making process into three categories, viz (1) spheres of competence made up of the activities of the decision-makers regarded as necessary for the achievement of state objectives, (2) communication and information concerned with prevailing meanings, values and choices of the nation and (3) motivation, that is psychological, personality and value factors that influence the participants and the process of decision-making.²⁸

Information and Intelligence

Intelligence may be simply defined as processed information. It is indeed a synthesis, an evaluation of a whole mass of information gathered about the state of affairs in foreign states. To underline the crucial importance of information and intelligence this discussion will start off with three relevant questions.

In 1946, Gen. William J. Donovan, United States, wartime intelligence director, stated that "no foreign policy can ever be stronger than the information upon which it is based."²⁹ He also

²⁷R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck & Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, (1962), cited in Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the Behavior of States (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 64.

²⁸Ibid, pp. 64-65.

²⁹General William Donovan, "Intelligence: Key to Defense," Life Magazine, September 30, 1946, p. 108

summed up his article in Life Magazine by commenting that: "Our hope for peace depends upon our foreign policy, and to determine that policy we must test the facts which bear upon the economic, spiritual and political factors involved ... we must know at all times what is going on in the world ..."30 The third quotation is the old Roman proverb which states that: si vis pacem para bellum, that is, "if you want peace, prepare for war." To prepare for war or not, Sierra Leone's diplomatic and secret agencies must collect and analyse all types of information that is likely to enable policy makers to formulate the best possible type of defensive or offensive war decision, or to avoid the outbreak of war. No sound policy can be made in a vacuum, or on the basis of wrong information. The price of miscalculation based on inaccurate information or distorted perception of the external world can be heavy, indeed.

Information gatherers and processors and decision-makers and diplomats who execute foreign policy have to be very responsible and qualified people. The price of quackery in the conduct of every nation's foreign policy is so heavy that it is clear that government should do everything it can to at least seriously minimize the incidence of miscalculation and quackery. The following comment by Earys is sobering:

A physician whose patient dies through malpractice or neglect faces an inquest or a suit for damages;

30 Ibid.

an engineer whose bridge collapses through faulty mathematics or through too much sand and too little cement faces a Royal Commission or a penitentiary sentence. But the statesman whose politics bring ruin to a nation does not even ask forgiveness. There is, he says, nothing to forgive.³¹

At both the micro or internal level, and the macro or external level, decision-makers in Sierra Leone have no easy and instant solutions to the complex political problems they face. Old allies may be a little more wary to fulfill their treaty obligations to the letter. New friends may not be forthcoming, depending on what they recognize to be in their best interest, and the choices available to them at the material time, and none the least, the nation's prevailing geopolitical and ideological posture. All these factors can make an impact on a state's ability to formulate and implement its foreign policy. No doubt, it is recognized that expertise, intelligence, and opportunity for the consideration of policy development therefore consists of the collection of information pertinent, to the analysis and/or evaluation of such information and, finally, the communication of intelligence to policy-makers as soon as possible.

The methods used in collecting information have been previously discussed under the topic of the art and functions of diplomacy. So important is information gathering in the world of diplomacy that

³¹J. Earys, Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 38.

espionage has long been elevated to the status of a profession of sorts. The informing function of diplomats does not however, have anything to do with spying. Informing is a legitimate diplomatic function, as are representation, negotiation and protection.

Approaches and Models

Foreign policy is made subjectively by evaluating information, perceptions and imagery, or objectively by the impersonal method of systems analysis which makes possible a micro analysis of the world. The foreign policy of Sierra Leone is largely subjectively formulated in the absence of trained policy analysts, expressive publics and mass communication media of some magnitude.

The systems analysis approach which is mainly a contemporary American creation, can be best explained by using the Eastonian or Karl Deutsch dynamic response model of any political system in the world. Every political system has properties such as the environment, inputs of demand and inputs of support, a processing complex of institutions, outputs and a feedback loop which holds the entire system together by operating as a prediction mechanism. All political systems operate on this model.

The total environment of any system is subdivided into (a) the intra-societal environment with its ecological, biological, personality, social subsystems, and (b) the extra-social environment with its own international political, international ecological and

international social sub-systems. A constant flow of effects or messages enter the system from its environments in the form of both inputs of demand and inputs of support. The former inputs are demands addressed to decision-makers by interest groups and parties requiring them to make or not to make certain desired decisions. The latter inputs of support comprise the acquiescence or moral support of these groups in whatever public policy is arrived at by the legitimate political authorities. The two types of inputs are converted into outputs or decisions. The feedback indicates the reaction of the public to the policy executed. Every output invariably bears the imprint of the internalized interests of those who make it, subject to the limitations of the built-in cultural and other mechanisms of every particular political system. This process is applicable to Sierra Leone in the same way that it is to the U.S., the USSR, France, Nigeria, Liberia and the U.K., for example. The only differences between any two countries are the amount and quality of inputs the political authorities permit into the system and the way they handle stress conditions or the way in which they formulate and execute policies.

Although decision-making is an unending process, for analytical purposes specific stages in the activity can be recognized and studied. These stages in Sierra Leone, as well as in any other country, include the identification of an international problem, a clarification of goals, values and objectives, and the ranking of these, listing various ways of achieving policy objectives, the investigation of all the

important consequences likely to follow the application of each alternative policy. The comparison of consequences of each policy with goals and, finally, choosing decision with consequences that match policy objectives as closely as possible.³² It is still possible to break down the process of decision-making into just four basic steps, viz, recommendation of alternatives, modification, crystallization and final decision. Into whatever number of steps one divides the decision-making process, one is likely to come to the conclusion that policy is largely made on a cost-risk or cost-benefit basis, meaning that the rational choice is that which is expected to achieve maximum results, or the most desirable consequences, at a minimum cost to the nation.

Cost-risk calculation influences the making of foreign policy to a great extent, since it sets a sharp limit on the actual range of choices faced by the decision-maker. As a rule, that is, if he knows his business, he will always assume the worst possible consequences of the recommendation that he makes on the basis of pertinent available information. He should always presume the eventuality of war, hence the decision-makers of Sierra Leone can not unconditionally renounce war as the final sanction of foreign policy. Of course, this is not

³²Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 13. See also H. A. Simon & J.G. March, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), and D. W. Miller & M. K. Starr, *The Structure of Human Decisions* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).

to say that every policy decision poses the threat of war as an ultimate sanction.

What decision-making model do the decision-makers of Sierra Leone use in formulating their foreign policy? How effective are the post-war systems analysis approach and the other contemporary approaches to the decision-making process? Is there, in fact, an ideal approach or model?

Traditionalists contend that the contribution of international theory to the workings of the state have not changed anything at all, in political science. Traditionalists use the normative approach to decision-making and dismiss the "scientism" of the behaviorists who comprise the other school of thought. The behaviorists hold that scientific methodology can be usefully applied to the formulation of foreign, as well as, domestic policy and that by doing so guesswork, often involved in value judgment, is cut down to the barest minimum, if not altogether eliminated. They claim that at least, many areas of the decision-making process can be reduced to a theory and used to explain, and not subjectively evaluate the manner in which the decision-making processes work out. Scientific methodology means data-collection, simulation, quantification, testing, modification, crystalization and prediction. This is made possible because it is granted that there is an international political system with its own dynamics and not just a family of nations or world community as perceived by traditionalists. Behaviorists seek an empirical explanation of decision-making. However,

it is important to note that no perfect functional decision-making model has as yet been developed. On the other hand, it is important to note that systems theory helps policy-makers to conceptualize the linkages between the properties of political systems (environment, inputs, outputs and feedback) and public policy.

Scholars have developed quite a few decision-making models or approaches. Some of these include the systems, rational, elite-mass, organizational process, group, incremental, bureaucratic, and institutional policy models. The model or models apparently used by the foreign policy makers of Sierra Leone will be identified after a brief definition of each of the models just listed. Each model is to be looked upon as an attempt to understand political behavior. A model is intended to help by simplifying and clarifying men's thinking about government and politics, identifying vital political forces in the community, communicating essential knowledge about political life generally, directing inquiry into political process and offering explanations for occurrences and outcomes. The models listed are non-competitive, i. e., none of them could be presented as the better or best of the lot.

The systems model assesses the pressures of the environment on decision-makers. Environmental pressures, or messages, take the form of inputs which are converted into negative or positive outputs. The rational model postulates that government is one important actor in the political system responsible for the identification of societal

objectives and alternative strategies which will achieve them. The elite-mass model assesses the impact of the perceptions and values of various elite and mass structures on public policy. The organizational process model presents government as an incohesive group that merely uses the standardized procedures for making foreign policy. The political leader in this kind of situation does not exercise a pervasive or commanding influence. The group model assumes that public policy is effectively influenced by interest or pressure groups in the political system. The incremental model postulates that decision-making is a cumulative process. The decision-maker merely builds on old foundations. The bureaucratic model, on the other hand, presents the behavior of government as the result of political manipulation. Finally, the institutional model seeks to explain the impact made by governmental structures and processes on the content of foreign policy, which consists of cognitive, evaluative and affective orientations.³³

It is too early in the history of Sierra Leone as an independent state to expect policy-makers to acquire a mastery in cost-risk calculations, distinguishing between ends and means and the development of models for the formulation of various types of foreign policy, at short and long notice. The determination of the elusive phenomenon

³³Thomas D. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 17-36. See also, Thomas R. Dye & Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1970); David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring 1957), 79-88.

called "national interest" is not as easy as some people may suppose, hence the need for objective capability analysis. One wonders whether the foreign policy of Sierra Leone can at this moment, and even a few years to come, be explained through the use of contemporary decision-making models contrived more or less to suit the much older western mass communication oriented industrialized democracies. The student of decision-making can do so, provided he accepts the peculiar problems of small developing Third World nation-states. The student should be inspired by the fact that no one has yet developed a perfect model for foreign policy making, even in the largest, well endowed and older states of the world. The chief problem appears to be insufficient direct political communication between the government and the people. The relatively low level of participation of the people in the political process is another problem.

The makers of Sierra Leone's foreign policy seem to pursue their national interest more so on the three levels identified by Frankel, namely, the aspirational, operational and polemical levels. On the aspirational levels, the decision-makers are concerned with the pursuit of the good life, or some ideal set of goals. On the operational level, they seek the sum total of the nation's interests and policy actually pursued. Whereas aspirational objectives are generally long-term pursuits in nature, operational interests are short-term pursuits. On the polemical level policy-makers essay to evaluate or

rationalize their value system and strategies, criticize international behavior.³⁴

The decision-makers in Sierra Leone are seen to use, in some combination, the organizational, elite rational and input output models, and far less so, the other models described above, that is, the mass, group, incremental and institutional models. In using the organizational process model, decision-makers are concerned with the results of the interactions of government officials and agencies. The rational model is used because it is designed to maximize all relevant values of the state and suggest an alternative policy which yields, or is likely to yield maximum results at a low risk. The elite model interprets policy as an elite preference. This model is constructed on the theory that society is polarized into the masses, who are apathetic or disadvantaged in terms of economic and political power, and a small number who, in reality, decide who gets what, when, where and how. Further, the model assumes that public policy does not after all reflect popular demands but rather it is concerned with the values of the elite as a homogenous unit. The input-output model is used only in a limited way in measuring Sierra Leone's response to inputs from its environments. The negative reaction of many Sierra Leoneans to the use of Guinean troops in that country by the Stevens government led to their subsequent withdrawal.

³⁴Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-83.

The group model, which presents policy as group equilibrium, is not quite useful in Sierra Leone at this time because there are presently no expressive or alternative publics or pressure groups in sufficient number and with relative influence to make their presence felt by the political authorities. This is a great political drawback.

When the government of Sierra Leone concluded a bilateral defense agreement with the government of neighboring Guinea in 1972 it was not only seeking to insure better domestic control, but to safeguard its territorial integrity and secure its borders against possible Portuguese aggression. The conceptualization of the decision-making process used in this particular case by the government of Sierra Leone suggests that it used the input-output and the elite models which responded to the threatening messages which entered the political system of the state from its intro-societal and extra-societal environments during the turbulent period from 1970-1972. By the same token, it could be said that the rational and organizational models were used recently in formulating the foreign policy of regional politico-economic cooperation between the Republic of Sierra Leone and Liberia in the form of the Mano River Declaration (MRD), 1973. So far for capability or cost-risk analysis and approaches to foreign policy formulation, the writer concludes this chapter with a description of the role of the Sierra Leone Ministry of External Affairs in this process.

The Ministry of External Affairs

In functional terms, whereas foreign policy embodies or seeks to regulate the inter-relationships of nations, diplomacy is the vehicle and method by which such a policy is put into effect. In a way, one can say that the foreign policy of Sierra Leone is in consonance with international law or that it is the essence of the state's political credo and international posture. In order to fulfill its function, diplomacy must provide both the machinery and the personnel that should operate Sierra Leone's foreign policy. Put in this way, one should find no problem in identifying diplomacy as technique and foreign policy as substance. The Ministry of External Affairs is in very simple language the mechanism which executes the foreign policy of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It combines both substance and process.

One of the chief functions of the political wing of the Ministry of External Affairs is the regulation of protocol. As stated earlier, protocol refers to diplomatic etiquette, honors, official precedence, ceremonies, the nature of official and semi-official receptions, ceremonial dress and decorations. It may also include the techniques of diplomatic correspondence, exchange of notes, forms of address, procedure for the presentation of credentials, the ambassador's visits to foreign countries, immunities and privileges, clearance of custom, entry of personal effects, tax exemptions, conferences,

treaty making and ratification, accession, arbitration, mediation, good offices, and major terms of diplomatic language.

Protocol

As may be recalled from the previous chapter, protocol is generally defined as the rules of ceremonial according to which certain diplomatic principles in every country are put into practice by specially appointed authorities. As Wood and Serres put it, "It governs both negotiation and settlement and activates international contracts, enhancing by a display of pomp and splendor, the value attached to them and the respect due their special provisions."³⁵ The rules of protocol are designed to maintain the civilities between states and their statesmen.

No foreign office or ministry of external affairs is ever entirely closed to the world, but that of Sierra Leone appears to be too open and unspecialized. This ministry can never be self-contained; it cannot be completely autonomous in view of the influence of the outside world, the press, the parliament, the cabinet, the authority and discretion of the head of state, and other interests. But the nature of some of its functions dictates that only specially trained people should ever be appointed to the Ministry of External Affairs, routine clerical personnel excepted. This underlines the need for a school of

³⁵John R. Wood & Jean Serres, Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 19.

diplomacy to be established in Sierra Leone. It is not in the interest of the state to democratize all the operations of its ministry of external affairs by letting the public in on everything done in all its departments. Sensitive departments or divisions, must be closed to the general public. Doing this does not mean that the ministry does not operate as a national and international agency that is subject to constitutional as well as international law. Its primary objective will always remain to be the adjustment of national aspirations to the realities of international politics. This is in fact, the common property of all foreign offices. They all have political, economic, protocol, and administrative departments, which together develop intelligence, formulate expert opinion, recommend policy to the decision-makers, supervise, the foreign service and conduct international relations.

The existing organizational structure of the Ministry of External Affairs is made up of four divisions: (1) Political, (2) Administrative, (3) Economic, Trade and Cultural, and (4) Consular. The ministry's organizational chart shows that it is headed by a Minister of Cabinet rank, who is assisted by a Deputy Minister, a Permanent Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, and a number of Principal, Senior Assistant and Assistant Secretaries. Under these senior officers there are Executive Officers and Accountants, and finally, a graded clerical unit for carrying out routine functions. By every standard

it cannot be said that the departments of the Ministry of External Affairs are well developed, sufficiently, equipped and professionally staffed. But according to undocumented information just received by the writer, it is government's intention not only to reinforce the existing divisions of the Ministry of External Affairs but to add a few more divisions and sub-divisions to the organizational structure in the future. Directorates are likely to be established also. There is an immediate need to expand this ministry by adding a few more divisions including a Research and Intelligence Division. Further, the political-geographical division may be given such subdivisions as English-Speaking Africa, French, Portuguese and Spanish Speaking Africa, African Dependencies (or Non-Independent Africa), Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States of America and Territories, Asia and the Commonwealth. The Administrative Division, which is the mirror of the entire ministry, requires such sub-units as Conventions, Accords and Treaties, Conferences, Parliamentary and Financial Matters, Legal Counsel, and Information and Liaison and Public Relations. A revitalized and a functional contemporary foreign office should encompass all these units to every one's advantage.

There is no one way of organizing or reorganizing a ministry of external affairs. Everywhere in the world external ministries are subject to constant changes in organizational structure, generally as a response to shifts of political stress arising from the ever changing

conditions of international relations. The aim of the Minister of External Affairs is always to make his ministry alert, responsive, responsible, efficient and effective. Another thing to note is that a ministry of external affairs may not always be directly in charge of foreign policy. This is true whether or not one were dealing with a democracy or a dictatorship. It is the prerogative of the executive head of state to act as the principal spokesman for his foreign ministry, whenever he chose to do so, or appoint himself Minister of External Affairs. In the United States, the President can by-pass the State Department, or even Congress, in concluding executive agreements with friendly nations. No State ever gives exclusive powers to its foreign minister who is, by the nature of his appointment, subordinate to the head of state who, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces also, is ultimately responsible for the conduct of his administration's foreign policy. The Minister of External Affairs is not the next in succession to the Presidency in Sierra Leone as was the case in the United States until 1947, or, as seems to still prevail in Great Britain. He is, however, very close to the chief of state in matters of international relations and the chief diplomat both in and outside of his country, taking precedence only after the President and Prime Minister.

As the major foreign policy originating and executive organ, the Ministry of External Affairs is responsible for the development and execution of the international relations of the Republic of Sierra Leone. The latter function is essentially executed by the diplomatic agents of the ministry. In other words, diplomats carry out the field work of the ministry. The quality of work done by the ministry of External Affairs depends, among other things, on the sharpness of its research tools, the flexibility of its organs, the resourcefulness of its personnel, the capabilities of the state, and, of course, the temper of the world from time to time. The republic, no doubt, also needs both dedicated and qualified top-notch and middle management personnel, competent, experienced and trained diplomats, as opposed to "instant" non-professional diplomatic agents, and adequate financial resources to make the ministry highly functional and efficient.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

It is believed that this is the first time that research of this type has been undertaken by a Sierra Leonean to satisfy the need for a source for the study of the constitutional development of Sierra Leone, its foreign policy and the manner in which it is determined, and its nation-building and modernization programs and problems. There is included here a three-dimensional study of institutions, interest groups, and political parties and their roles in constitutional development and foreign policy determination in Sierra Leone.

The three dimensions in point of time highlighted are the pre-colonial or traditional, the colonial and the post-colonial or independence periods. With reference to interest or pressure groups, political parties and administrative institutions and processes, the three dimensions of each of these tally with the three constitutional periods studied. Reference has been made to traditional interest or pressure groups in their forms described as "Secret" Societies. These groups, in the absence of our contemporary western-type political party and pressure group organizations, constituted the core interest groups in both the political, economic and cultural life of Sierra Leone long before the British Crown took control of the government of this land, 1787-1961. Indeed, the leaders in government, the men and

women who decided such foreign policy matters as war and peace, international trade and boundaries, were the same leaders in the secret societies of Sierra Leone. As it might have been noted, a secret society is a comprehensive tribal or traditional organization set up to socialize, acculturate and politicize the youth of each tribe as well as to recruit the country's decision-makers, administrators and judicial arbitrators.

Secret societies progressively lost their political importance and influence during the colonial period in the constitutional development of Sierra Leone. In that highly repressive period there was a deliberate British foreign policy to rule Sierra Leone through a dual mandate, as eloquently described by Lord Lugard, and adroitly, to play down, or relegate traditional political and cultural values to a secondary level. This is what explains the factor of detribalization so well known today among the western-educated elite of Sierra Leone and other former European colonies. One must hasten, however, to note that in Sierra Leone there has never been a complete wall of separation between socio-economic cultural matters and political matters. Secret societies are still important social organizations in Sierra Leone, but with the rapid detribalization of young educated tribesmen they are no longer as perennially influential as they were in the colonial era. Politicians, however, still periodically use these organizations, in addition to the modern political party structures, to

maximize their influence at elections, and in times of political disasters and tranquility. It is in these ways that secret societies have always influenced the constitutional development and general governmental process of Sierra Leone. This surely is the link between our modern western-oriented interest groups and political parties and our secret societies and other traditional organizations.

As was indicated in the first chapter, the thesis is held that the interest or pressure groups and political parties of Sierra Leone have played, and continue to play a significant part, indirectly or directly, in the constitutional development of Sierra Leone and the determination of its foreign policy. Further, it was noted that the central purpose of this study was the setting up of a much needed in-depth study of the evolution and characteristics of the political groups which play leading roles in these processes.

The questions posed at the beginning of this study sought to find out why political parties were non-existent in Sierra Leone before 1950, the degree to which political ideas from the West influenced the traditional political organizations, in Sierra Leone, the timorous but progressive strides towards sovereignty, the evolution and essential characteristics of the political party system and the development and execution of foreign policy in the country. The answers to these and other questions dealt with in this work have been provided, it is hoped, in the process of the interviews and analysis

of Sierra Leone's Company rule records, the six constitutions, statutory instruments, Bills, Acts and parliamentary debates, reports of commissions of inquiry and the declared domestic and foreign policies of the various administrations of Sierra Leone and the organizational structures of the political parties and interest groups in the country.

The importance of studying group theories is that they lead the scholar or practitioner to an understanding of his or her political system and the hows and whys of its operation. Political groups can be regarded as the underpinnings, the fundamental units, or raw materials of the political process. One can break down any society into the essential groups of which it is composed. People live not only in nuclear or primary groups but also in such secondary homogenous groups as interest or pressure groups and heterogeneous groups as political parties. In each case studied, there was an examination of the organizational structures, resources, access to the political authorities who make decisions, and strategies used to influence decision-making. This study has used the terms "interest" and "pressure" groups interchangeably, in other words, it recognized no fundamental or functional difference between them, at least, for the purpose of this dissertation. Interest or pressure groups may be regarded as those political groupings of people, other than political parties, which operate on the basis of shared attitudes and seek to influence the making of public policy in their favor, but not in running for public offices through the electoral process. The point

was made that political parties perform a more highly integrative and aggregative function and display a far less ideological orientation or posture than most interest groups. Political parties, unlike most interest or pressure groups, basically cut across social, economic, religious and ethnic lines. With reference to methodology the study takes the structural-functional approach, that is, (a) analyzing the political structures and institutions of Sierra Leone and the functions each of them performs in the political process, (b) an analysis of Sierra Leone's constitutional development and the role of interest groups and political parties in policy-making and (c) an evaluation of pertinent documentary evidence and interviews.

On the basis of the analysis of the data collected on each of the three phases of this study, a number of conclusions have been reached. These conclusions include the following:

1. Sierra Leone's pre-colonial traditional interest groups are largely classified as multi-purpose socio-economic political structures which operated as secret societies, organized fairly strictly on lines of sex. Traditional male secret interest groups made and executed foreign policy on war and peace, international trade, and similar matters. The decision-makers were in fact, leaders of the secret male societies organized on a highly

sophisticated hierarchical basis. Ritual, discipline and loyalty distinguished these interest groups.

2. Contemporary modern western-type interest or pressure groups were first organized in the former Crown Colony (now the Western Area) by the western oriented Creole settler elite in that part of the country. Interest groups founded by Creole leaders played a direct role in the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the colony, especially as it referred to international trade and the internecine feuds between the Crown Colony and the Protectorate before and after its proclamation as such by the British government in 1896. The interest groups of this category ultimately flowered into para-political and para-political national pressure groups, and finally, into full-fledged political parties as conventionally defined.
3. Interest groups, other than secret societies, organized on western lines were founded by the educated elite in the former Protectorate (now the three Provinces) to press their demands on the

colonial government for political reforms as described earlier in this study. These groups are of more recent origin than those in the former colony.

4. Interest or pressure groups in the former Colony and the Protectorate engaged in confrontation politics for many years, with experiments in compromise politics intervening spasmodically for short periods.
5. There were no formally organized Western-type political parties in any part of Sierra Leone before 1950 when the first political party, that is, the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone, was founded, followed by the second party based largely on the Protectorate, that is, the Sierra Leone People's Party, in 1951. The writer's finding is that it was a deliberate colonial policy to discourage the organization of strong pressure groups and political parties by British subjects and so-called protected people. Such parties were considered to be subversive of good government or law and order.

6. The nature of the first four constitutions of the colonial period studied was deliberately contrived by the British government to stifle the ultimate sovereignty, or restoration of the original sovereignty of Sierra Leone until Britain's political and economic paralysis, as a result of World War II, forced it to concede the right of self-determination to the people of Sierra Leone without further footdragging and much ado.
7. The influence of Protectorate oriented interest groups was imperceptible, if existent at all, during the colonial era, in so far as foreign trade and foreign wars were concerned. The bulk of the armed forces who fought in the colonialist World Wars I and II, the 1898 Hut Tax and Ashanti Wars on the side of the British government were, in fact, men of Protectorate origin, recruited with the approval and help of their own political leaders.
8. The Republic of Sierra Leone is a fragmented political system by reason of the fact that it is presently a combination of traditional and Western

type political structures and processes which often fail to mesh with each other. The acute problems of modernization and political development faced by Sierra Leone are underscored by the dichotomy of its political nature and no less by its scarcity of economic resources. These growing pains are not, however, insurmountable, given the right type of political acumen and perceptiveness of the state's leaders in their formulation and application of viable domestic and foreign policies.

9. The civil service, jealously guards its professionalism and objectivity and employs the normal strategies and channels of bargaining to promote its interest.
10. The basic weaknesses of the interest groups and the political parties of Sierra Leone lack of a strong viable organizational structure, insufficient financial resources and a dearth, if not total lack of professional organizers and lobbyists. Because of these inherent weaknesses the interest groups, and even the opposition

parties, are not able to play a direct role in foreign policy determination.

11. There are no foreign policy lobbies, of any type on any permanent basis in Sierra Leone. The determination of foreign policy in this state operates indirectly, as far as interest groups are concerned, on the principle of osmotic action described earlier in chapter V. For lack of both inclination and opportunity to intervene directly in the development and administration of foreign policy, it is generally left to the party in power to sense the feelings of groups outside the government and to regulate the nation's international affairs. Sierra Leone is a member of the Commonwealth and basically remains pro Western in its international posture. The UCC exercises its influence, mainly indirectly in the determination of any foreign policy it considers conducive or inimical to its corporate interest. And so will the Sierra Leone Bar, and Medical Associations, and other organized interests.

12. Organized political interest groups and parties are diminishing from the political system of Sierra Leone at an astoundingly rapid rate. It is suggested that the present ruling, All People's Congress party now increasingly proceeds to develop the country's foreign policy on the basis of the theory of osmosis. The potential danger inherent in such a political climate is presently minimized by the pervasive influence and sobering realism of international politics and the people's belief in the incumbent President, Dr. Stevens, and some of his close friends and colleagues. The cohesion of the political system of Sierra Leone is for the moment being held in very delicate balance for the reasons just suggested and that any attempts to force a one-party state system on the populace by passing a revolutionary enabling Act of Parliament prematurely will resort in, at least, a temporary breakdown of the political system and a resurgence of pluralism therein at some future date, near or distant.

One may venture to stress that the fragility of Sierra Leone will be perilously aggravated if the normal channels of political communication are further depressed or overlooked with demands to

bridge the present gaping elite-mass social distance in the country. Persistent resort by the government to the enactment and rigorous administration of punitive or draconian laws, designed to stifle the free organization and expression of public opinion or the formation and operation of legitimate interest groups and opposition political parties, augur ill for Sierra Leone. This is usually the unmistakable path to revolution, for no government can permanently contain the opposition of organized interest groups or bottle up the emotions, ambitions, jealousies and the national desire of the masses to press the decision makers for change in either an evolutionary or revolutionary manner.

The present foreign policy of the government of Sierra Leone takes on a low but realistic profile. The government can, however, do better by encouraging the emergence and unfettered operation of genuine interest groups that can participate more directly in the determination of the nation's foreign policy.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF POLITICAL PROFILES AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Party	Typology	Founder-Leader	Profession
1. National Council (1950)	Elitist-Sectarian (C)	H.C. Bankole-Bright	Medical Doctor
2. People's Party	Elitist (C)	Rev. E.N. Jones (Lamina Sankoh)	Clergyman
3. Sierra Leone People's Party	Cadre-Constituent (P)	Sir Milton Margai	Medical Doctor
4. British Koya Political Party (1951)	Elitist (C)	J.C.O. Crowther	Businessman
5. Positive Action Party	Elitist (C)	I.E. Otto-During	Lawyer
6. United People's Party (1954)	Constituent-Cadre	C.B. Rogers-Wright	Lawyer
7. Labor Party (1955)	Elitist-Sectarian	Ronald Beoku-Betts	Lawyer
8. Sierra Leone Independence Movement (1957)	Populist (G)	E.W. Blyden III	College Lecturer
9. Kono Progressive Movement (1957)	Populist (P)	Tamba S. Mbrwa	Druggist
10. Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (1959)	Populist (G)	- do -	- do -
11. People's National Party (1958)	Populist (C)	Albert M. Margai	Lawyer
12. Radical Democratic Party (1958)	Elitist (C)	I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson	Journalist/ Trade Unionist

Appendix A - Continued

Party	Typology	Founder-Leader	Profession
13. Independent Progressive Party (1960)	Elitist (C)	Valecius Neal Caulker	Trade Unionist
14. All People's Congress (1960)	Constituent-Populist (G)	Siaka P. Stevens	Trade Unionist
15. Democratic People's Congress (1965)	Populist (G)	John Karefa-Smart	Medical Doctor

Note: Letter in parenthesis indicates each party's geographical orientation

C = Former Colony, P = Former Protectorate, G = General, i.e. refers to no spatial bias.

A Constituent Party is a loose, non-selective tradition-based conglomeration organized around charismatic leaders.

A Cadre Party is a top-heavy political organization, i.e., one run by a penumbra of professional political leaders, elected officials and volunteer party activists.

The typologies used in the diagram are mere approximations, since Sierra Leone parties defy strict definition or categorization. Thus, it is better to classify the SLPP, UPP and APC as cadre-constituent political parties since they appear to have manifestations of both typologies generally. But the APC is apparently more populist or egalitarian, whereas the SLPP is more elitist in its management structure. It seems to be rather a question of degree than of typology in most cases.

APPENDIX B

TABLE OF LEGISLATORS' TRIBAL AFFILIATIONS (1960)*

Tribe and Population	Per Cent of Population					Nominated Members	Total	Per Cent Of Legislators
		SLPP	PNP	IPP	UPP			
Mende (815,000)	36.2	15	3	0	0	0	18	35
Temni (62,000)	27.5	12	0	0	0	0	12	23
Creole (25,000)	1.1	5	1	3	1	1	11	22
Kono (164,000)	7.2	1	2	0	0	0	3	6
Kuranko (80,000)	3.5	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
Loko (80,000)	3.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
Sherbro (90,000)	4.0	1	0	1	0	0	2	4
Madingo (10,000)	0.4	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
Aku (500) 0	0.2	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
TOTAL	83.6	39	6	4	1	1	51	100


*Devised by Martin Kilson in Coleman and Rosberg op. cit., to accentuate Mende Dominance, pp. 98-100.

- Note: 1. Population percentages are based on Sierra Leone's population estimated at 2,250,000 in 1960.
2. In 1960 there were 2 nominated members in the House, but the table shows only 1 since the other was a European, who has no tribal affiliation.

APPENDIX C

DIAGRAM: PATTERN OF POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEREST/PRESSURE GROUP COLONIZATION

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE COLONY OF SIERRA LEONE (1950)



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