

Franco-Ottoman diplomacy during the French Wars of Religion, 1559-1610


by

Nathan Michalewicz
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
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of
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




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DEDICATION

To Rebecca, Edwin, and Preston, who kept me sane throughout this process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are indeed many people who supported me throughout the process. My B.A. and M.A. advisor, Charles Lipp, introduced me to the Franco-Ottoman alliance, and I will be forever grateful to him for it. Little did I know during one fateful conversation that his research suggestion would dominate my intellectual interest for the next ten years of my life. Of course, my committee Mack Holt, Huseyin Yilmaz, and Jim Collins have shaped my historical approach to the topic and this dissertation fundamentally. Mack continually pressed me to question the assumptions I made about my sources and the questions I asked of them. This dissertation emphasizes the actions of France's diplomats and the crown, rather than their perceptions, because of his encouragement, and I think I produced a superior product because of it. Moreover, the frequent dinners and lunches with him and his wife, Meg, helped introduce my wife and me to the new area. Huseyin Yilmaz patiently directed this Europeanist through the Ottoman historiography and to the available Ottoman sources. His support has been invaluable. And Jim Collins adopted me into his cohort of early modern French students since I was one of two early modern European doctoral students at George Mason University. I took a class with Jim before I even had a chance to take one with Mack, and I will be forever grateful for the acceptance I received in those classes. Indeed, SukHwan Khan, Ashleigh Corwin, Jakob Burnham, Leigh Stevens, and Natalie Donnell not only read different variations of this dissertation throughout the years, but our regular lunches and dinners formed one of the constant aspects of my doctoral education that I always looked forward to during this grueling process. I also want to thank Brian Sandberg, Megan Armstrong, and Junko Takeda for their constant support of my research. They read various parts of this dissertation as conference papers, providing critical feedback. But more importantly, they helped me feel at home in academia. Of course, I also must thank the George Mason University history department for its generous support for my research trip and for the dissertation writing grant that allowed me to finish this project in a reasonable time. Finally, my family made all this possible. My parents, Marla and Bill Michalewicz, provided constant emotional and financial support, so my small family could survive a move to a new and more expensive area on the small funding graduate students receive. And my two sons, Preston and Edwin, without them this dissertation might have been finished more quickly but I might not have been sane at the end of it. They provided a bright light in the middle of many dark days, writing what seemed to be a never-ending document. And most importantly, my wife and partner in all things, Rebecca. She has been constantly supportive from the moment I told her I wanted to pursue a doctoral degree in history until now. Her constant emotional support has made this process not only possible but enjoyable. All factual and interpretive errors are my own.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| List of Tables | vii |
| List of Figures..... | viii |
| Note on Names, places, and languages..... | ix |
| List of Abbreviations | x |
| Abstract | xi |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Part I..... | 18 |
| Chapter One—Logistics of Franco-Ottoman Diplomacy | 19 |
| Early Modern French Diplomacy and the Ottoman Empire | 21 |
| Appointing Ambassadors | 27 |
| The Distance Variable and Logistics | 36 |
| Frenchmen in the Ottoman Empire | 44 |
| The Costs of Diplomacy | 54 |
| Conclusion | 71 |
| Chapter Two—The French Diplomatic Experience in Constantinople | 73 |
| French Goals..... | 77 |
| Formal Diplomatic Channels | 84 |
| Informal Diplomatic Channels..... | 94 |
| Leisure Time and Festivals as Diplomacy | 109 |
| Conclusion | 116 |
| Chapter Three—Ottoman Diplomats in France..... | 119 |
| Ottomans in France, quantifying the issue | 122 |
| The Ottoman Envoys | 128 |
| Traveling from the Ottoman Empire to France | 131 |
| Traveling the French Countryside and Social Interactions | 135 |
| The Envoys at Court | 144 |
| The Issue of French Embarrassment | 149 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Conclusion | 156 |
| Part II | 158 |
| Chapter Four: From Military Cooperation to Mediation (1559-1569) | 159 |
| The Franco-Ottoman Alliance before Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) | 161 |
| From Military Coordination to Mediation in Constantinople | 168 |
| Ambassadorial Advocacy for the Ottoman Alliance..... | 174 |
| Ottoman Reaction to French Foreign policy..... | 177 |
| Ambassadorial Rivalry and the Unexpected Capitulations of 1569..... | 182 |
| Conclusion | 188 |
| Chapter Five: From Abandoned Campaigns to the Polish Throne (1570-1578) | 190 |
| Charles IX's Anti-Spanish Plans..... | 192 |
| The Mediterranean Theater | 197 |
| The Veneto-Ottoman Peace..... | 206 |
| The Polish Throne and Miscalculation in Its Aftermath..... | 210 |
| Conclusion | 223 |
| Chapter Six: From Diplomatic Promise to Diplomatic Chaos (1578-1592) | 225 |
| The Netherlands, Spain, and the Safavids: A Bevy of Problems..... | 226 |
| Pushing for Ottoman-Spanish Conflict | 232 |
| France's Declining Position in Constantinople | 248 |
| An Ottoman Fleet Undermined by Chaos in Constantinople | 256 |
| Conclusion | 265 |
| Chapter Seven: From a Military Ally to an Economic Partner (1592-1610)..... | 267 |
| From Civil War to a Spanish War..... | 268 |
| The Ottomans and the Bourbon Versus the Habsburgs | 271 |
| Greater Ottoman Support for France? | 274 |
| The Franco-English Rivalry..... | 285 |
| The Corsair Problem..... | 297 |
| Conclusion | 300 |
| Conclusion..... | 303 |
| References | 312 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | Page |
|---|------|
| Table 1. List of French Ambassadors and Agents in Constantinople | 29 |
| Table 2. Ambassadorial Accounts of Expenses and Receipts..... | 61 |
| Table 3. Payments to French Ambassadors in Various States by Year. | 63 |
| Table 4. List of Recorded Ottoman Envoys to France..... | 125 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure | Page |
|---|------|
| Figure 1. Map of Years Ambassador(s) Present in Countries (1517-1559) | 23 |
| Figure 2. Map of Years Ambassador(s) Present in Countries (1559-1600)..... | 24 |
| Figure 3. Map of Recorded Overnight Stays by Ottoman Envoys in France. Original image, François de Belleforest, <i>Description generale de toute la France</i> , (1575), modified by Nathan Michalewicz. Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France, GE D-14776. | 139 |

NOTE ON NAMES, PLACES, AND LANGUAGES

Throughout this dissertation, I try to keep the original spelling of names in French and transliterate Ottoman names following the style of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. For titles, I translate French titles to English, so Charles de Guise duc de Mayenne becomes Charles de Guise, duke of Mayenne. For Ottoman titles, I generally keep the original Ottoman terms unless it is common in English: so, *kapudan* and *ağa* of the janissaries, but pasha.

Place names are provided in the form provided by the agents but with modern English spelling. So, throughout the dissertation, Istanbul is referred to as Constantinople since that is how Frenchmen thought of the city. This decision is not particularly problematic because Constantinople continued in use at the Ottoman court and in Ottoman documents throughout the period. For other lesser known Eastern Mediterranean places, I maintain the style of the individual agents, but place the modern place name in parentheses. Thus, Edirne is referred in the Dissertation almost exclusively as Adrianople (Edirne).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Bibliothèque Nationale de France | BNF |
| <i>Calendar of State Papers of Venice</i> | <i>CSPVenice</i> |
| Her Majesty's Stationery Office | HMSO |
| Nouvelle Acquisition Française | NAF |
| Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes | SHD |

ABSTRACT

FRANCO-OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION,
1559-1610

Nathan Michalewicz, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2020

Dissertation Director: Dr. Mack P. Holt

This dissertation investigates the French military alliance with the Ottoman Empire during a series of religious civil wars between Catholics and Protestants in France. It asks why the French court and its diplomats continued to pursue France's Ottoman alliance during a period of such intense internecine conflict, and how those diplomatic endeavors were achieved. Based on extensive manuscripts research, this dissertation argues that the French court pursued an alliance with an Islamic Empire while the country was in the throes of Catholic-Protestant warfare because the Ottoman Empire was a central part of how the French conceived of their foreign policy. To prevent Spanish intervention into their domestic turmoil, the French court and its diplomats turned to their Ottoman ally to counter Spain in the Mediterranean. Historians have long known about the alliance between King François I^{er} (r. 1515-1547) and Sultan Suleiman I (r. 1520-1566), but the historiography has believed there were no further political ties until the reign of

Louis XIV. This dissertation shows that the Franco-Ottoman alliance continued unabated throughout the sixteenth century despite the outbreak of religious civil war. France's cross-confessional foreign policy was institutionalized long before the 1630s. This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part one provides an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of early modern and specifically Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. It demonstrates how the French court and its diplomats in the Ottoman Empire established a structure of communication and interaction with their Muslim allies to facilitate Franco-Ottoman diplomatic and military cooperation. Part two provides a narrative of the waxing and waning of the Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. It shows that the French crown included the Ottomans in all its foreign policy endeavors during the second half of the sixteenth century until the end of Henri IV's reign (r. 1589-1610). Frustration with the Ottoman Empire's inability to provide substantive military support to France caused Henri IV and his court to abandon the military aspects of the alliance, leaving only an economic agreement. Historians have traditionally defined the European geopolitical community within the restrictive parameters of western Christian Europe, treating the Ottoman Empire as a peripheral actor on the margins of Europe at best and as a foil against which the European community defined itself at worst. This dissertation demonstrates that the French court and its diplomats treated their geopolitical community as a much broader region that included the Ottoman Empire.

INTRODUCTION

In 1571, church bells rang throughout France, celebrating the victory of the Holy League of Venice, the Vatican, and Spain over the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Lepanto (1571). This public proclamation of Christian solidarity, however, stood in stark contrast with the French court's private expressions of Ottoman solidarity. Charles IX (r. 1562-1574) of France had continually rejected invitations from Venice and the Pope to join the Holy League, explicitly citing his alliance with the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Charles IX explained the two factors that prevented France from joining the Holy League to the papal nuncio in France: the French Wars of Religion (1562-1629) between Protestant Huguenots and Catholics prevented his involvement in foreign wars, and Charles IX "had always thought he could bring more profit to Christendom by maintaining the good relations that he [Charles IX] had with the Turks than if he broke with them and enters the war against them."¹

Charles IX's explanation to the papal nuncio encapsulates the central concerns of this dissertation. From 1562 until 1629, a series of religious civil wars engulfed France, crippling the country. Yet, the French alliance with the Ottoman Empire, established in the 1530s as a counterbalance against the power of the Habsburg dynasty, remained a central part of France's foreign policy calculus until

¹ Instructions to Schomberg, 15 February 1573, in *Henri de Valois et la Pologne en 1572*, ed. Emmanuel Henri Victurnien Noailles, 3 vols. (Paris M. Lévy, 1867), 3:306. Charles IX recounts his conversation with the papal nuncio in these instructions.

the end of the reign of Henri IV (r. 1589-1610). Why, and indeed how, did the French court and its diplomats continue to pursue France's Ottoman alliance during a period of such intense internecine conflict? How did it fit within what one historian has termed France's "diplomacy of survival?"²

Historians have long known about the alliance François I^{er} (r. 1515-1547) made with Sultan Suleiman I (r. 1520-1566) in the 1530s. Faced with the growing power of the Habsburg dynasty under Charles V—who became the ruler of the various states of the Netherlands (r. 1509-1556), Spain (r. 1516-1556), Naples (r. 1516-1556), Sicily (r. 1516-1556), and the Holy Roman Empire (r. 1519-1556)—France and the Ottoman Empire negotiated an alliance against their mutual enemy.³ This alliance has been understood in a variety of ways, but until recently, it has primarily been treated as an aberration from normal diplomatic protocol and an embarrassment.⁴ In this view, the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis that ended France's sixty-five-year conflict with the Habsburgs in 1559 acted as a turning point for the Ottoman alliance. After Henri II's death in 1559, the alliance became a concern of the past until commercial interests with the Ottomans were re-invigorated in the seventeenth century and continued to expand throughout the rest of the early modern period.⁵ For instance, Pascale Barthe has argued that French opinion was

² De Lamar Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (1985): 451–70.

³ Ernest Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860); Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Édith Garnier, *L'Alliance impie: François Ier et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles Quint (1529-1547)* (Paris: le félin, 2008); Ion Ursu, *La politique orientale de François Ier, (1515-1547)* (Paris: H. Champion, 1908).

⁴ For instance, Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955; reprint, New York: Cosimo Classics, 2008), 172-180, argues that the alliance precipitated the break-up of Christendom.

⁵ See, for instance, Megan Armstrong and Gillian Weiss, eds., "France and the Early Modern Mediterranean," special issue, *French History* 29, no. 1 (2015): 1-108.

hardened to the Ottomans by the 1570s, seeing them as tyrants and outside the bounds of acceptable political partners.⁶ The one article that has focused on the alliance during the second half of the sixteenth century has argued that France's diplomacy represented an "incoherent policy" that worked against the immediate currents of Ottoman foreign policy.⁷

In this dissertation, I argue that the Franco-Ottoman alliance continued throughout the Wars of Religion unabated. The Ottoman Empire was not only a core member of France's foreign policy and diplomacy during the Italian Wars, it continued in that position as a fundamental part of France's diplomatic strategy in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 was hardly a watershed moment for the Franco-Ottoman alliance or the Franco-Spanish rivalry. French foreign policy, and precisely its alliance with the Ottoman Empire, centered on combatting Spain's growing power in the Mediterranean and Europe throughout the second half of the sixteenth century after only a short cooling of the relationship from 1559 to 1566.

⁶ Pascale Barthe, *French encounters with the Ottomans, 1510-1560* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 3-4. Indeed, Barthe's representation extends the alliance beyond its traditional parameters. Most histories of the Franco-Ottoman alliance do not expand their investigations beyond François I^{er}. Despite continued military cooperation under Henri II, it has received little attention beyond the short snippets that appear in Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), and a short section in a chapter of Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 41-48. on the alliance ending with François I^{er}, see Jon Ursu, *La politique orientale de François I^{er} (1515-1547)* (Paris: H. Champion, 1908); Édith Garnier, *L'Alliance impie: François I^{er} et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles Quint (1529-1547)* (Paris: le félin, 2008); A notable exception is Géraud Poumarède, "Les envoyés ottomans à la cour de France: d'une présence controversée à l'exaltation d'une alliance (XV^e-XVIII^e siècles)," in *Turcs et turqueries, XVI-XVIII^e siècles*, ed. Lucien Bély (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2009), 63-95.

⁷ Michel Lesure, "Les relations Franco-Ottomanes à l'épreuve des guerres de religion (1560-1594)," in *L'Empire Ottoman, La République de Turquie et La France*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1986), 37-57. Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth-Century French Diplomacy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1, 1985): 451-470, discusses the second half of the sixteenth century, but argues that the imperative of the alliance was primarily economic; One primary exception is Jean-François Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole: diplomatie et guerres civiles (1563-1574)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013), 56-59, 281-284, 294-319, 571-588, which includes the Ottomans as a part of Charles IX's larger diplomatic strategy, but the Ottomans remain only a small portion of the larger study.

This dissertation sheds light on France's foreign policy in the second half of the sixteenth century, which has been largely ignored under the assumption that the religious turmoil in France forced the country to focus inward. During this period, we are told that France's foreign policy, when it existed at all, focused on acquiring financial support for the civil wars or managing the Duke of Anjou's forays into the Netherlands: an *ad hoc* series of policies primarily focused on the civil wars.⁸ De Lamar Jensen and Jean-François Labourdette have provided a correction to this narrative. Jensen showed that French residential embassies only increased during the period, and Labourdette has shown how French foreign policy centered around countering Spain during the reign of Charles IX.⁹ Expanding on their work, I suggest that the rivalry that characterized the Valois-Habsburg conflict before 1559 similarly characterized France's policy calculus throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. Certainly, French foreign policy emphasized gaining financial support and Anjou's activities, but they were two parts of a larger policy primarily focused on countering Spain's growing power. In this way, Henri IV's declaration of war with Spain in 1595 simply turned a cold war that had existed since 1566 into a hot war. When we include France's Ottoman diplomacy with their activities in northern Europe, the continuity of this foreign policy comes into focus.

⁸ Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom: 1576-1585* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Arlette Jouanna, *The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State*, trans. Joseph Bergin (New York: Manchester University Press, 2013); C.f., N.M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), which argues that French foreign policy in the early 1570s was centered on the question of whether to turn their civil war into a foreign war with Spain.

⁹ De Lamar Jensen, "French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 5, no. 2 (October 1, 1974): 23-46; Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*; Jean-Michel Ribera, *Les ambassadeurs du roi de France auprès de Philip II du traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (1589): diplomatie et espionnage* (Paris: Garnier, 2007).

This argument has significant implications for how we understand European politico-diplomatic history, which has not adequately accounted for the Ottoman Empire within the Christian-European geopolitical framework. Despite ruling a sixth of the European peninsula of Eurasia, the Ottoman Empire most frequently appears as a peripheral actor on the margins of Europe at best and as a foil against which the European community defined itself at worst. Although Ernest Charrière provided a prominent depiction of the extensive Franco-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth century a century-and-a-half ago, historians have been unwilling to treat the Ottomans as anything other than a violent intruder excluded from the European story other than in their role as an invader.¹⁰ This exclusionary interpretation is the product of focusing on rhetoric over practice.

For instance, Franklin Baumer, in a very influential article, argued that despite the “diplomatic revolution,” Christian Europeans maintained a view of the “common corps of Christendom” that treated the Ottomans as “a political pariah, excluded by its very nature from membership in the family of European states” until the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699.¹¹ Baumer’s argument has had a dramatic impact on historical investigations. M.S. Anderson used it to argue that the Ottomans were never embraced within the European state system because they were “different in *kind*.”¹² Nabil Matar has recently argued similarly as Baumer that “the Muslim [including the Ottomans] was all that the Englishman and the Christian was not: he

¹⁰ Ernest Charrière, ed., *Négociations de la France dans le levant*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860) 1:xvi-xvii.

¹¹ Franklin L. Baumer, “England, the Turk, and the Common Cops of Christendom,” *American Historical Review* 50 (October, 1944): 26-48.

¹² M.S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494-1618* (New York: Longman, 1998), 228-31.

was the Other with whom there could only be holy war.”¹³ In Jeremy Black’s recent book on diplomacy, he excluded the Ottoman Empire from the European diplomatic tradition, treating it as a part of the Middle Eastern tradition of diplomacy.¹⁴ Even Daniel Goffman, who provides an explicitly connected history of the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe, describes the Treaty of Carlowitz as the moment of Ottoman integration into the European community of states, “before which it was too much a belligerent outsider” to be considered otherwise.¹⁵

The arguments of Anderson, Baumer, and others have been adopted by general European historians, who define the European geopolitical community as synonymous with Christendom or a replacement for it. Indeed, the Christian European community defined itself in opposition to, or in comparison to, the Ottoman Empire and the Levant.¹⁶ For instance, in Mark Greengrass’s *Christendom Destroyed*, “Europe emerged, as in a mirror, reflected geographically and culturally in comparison not just with America, but also the Levant.”¹⁷ In Diarmaid MacCulloch’s *The Reformation*, the Ottomans are a periphery power invading

¹³ Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 13.

¹⁴ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), which treats Ottoman diplomacy as wholly separate from European diplomatic endeavors, but instead operating within the Middle Eastern context only. J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” *Middle East Journal* 15, no. 2 (1961): 141–52, makes a similar argument. Cf. John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” 1–14, provides a substantive criticism of the historiography of this sort of argument; see also A. Nuri Yurdusev, ed., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004);

¹⁵ Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18, 225; Géraud Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade: Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles* (2004; reprint, Paris: Quadrige, 2009), similarly argues for the desacralization of the conflict with the Ottomans, yet nevertheless follows this same timeline. Others have failed to include the Ottomans at all in European diplomatic history even beyond this point. Perhaps most notably is Lucien Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), which excludes the Ottomans from the process of creating a common culture in Christian Europe through diplomacy.

¹⁶ John Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995), 38–43.

¹⁷ Mark Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517–1648* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 12.

Europe, “inspiring deep anxiety” and millennial fears of God’s anger and justice.¹⁸ Of course, this depiction is not wrong; it is just incomplete. The average Christian European certainly maintained hostile perceptions of binary opposition toward the Ottomans. But such binary depictions leave little room for those exercising the powers of the state who operated in a much more nuanced and complicated world—in other words the actual practice of foreign policy and diplomacy. For them, the Ottomans frequently represented a potential political partner, hardly separate from European geo-political community despite the public myths of a confessionalized geo-political world.

This dissertation complicates that rhetorical division by emphasizing the actual diplomatic practice and foreign policy decisions that drove France’s alliance with the Ottoman Empire. By focusing on diplomatic letters, royal correspondence, Franco-Ottoman correspondence, I am able to strip away the myth of Christian solidarity and the binary opposition of Christian and Muslim politics to reveal a world of intensive Christian-Muslim cooperation in practice. The French court and its diplomats turned to their Ottoman ally to redirect Spanish military activities away from France’s borders and into the Mediterranean in an attempt to prevent Spanish intervention into the Wars of Religion. Central to this process was an effort to maintain France’s privileged position in Constantinople as the Ottoman Empire’s most prominent Christian ally. This position was written into the 1581 Capitulations—a set of trade agreements between the Ottoman Empire and foreign states that set the conditions for trade and the presence of non-Muslim foreigners in

¹⁸ Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The Reformation: A History* (New York: Penguin 2005), 57.

Ottoman lands, and that doubled as a mechanism of maintaining alliances—explicitly extending diplomatic precedence to the French.¹⁹ The French used this privileged position as a form of influence over Christian Europeans, extending (or refusing) their mediatory efforts to those situations that benefited French interests. When breaks in the French Wars of Religion permitted, these diplomatic activities became militant as the French negotiated joint military campaigns with the Ottomans against Spain. Unfortunately, each time the two states made significant agreements, changing circumstances drew one or the other’s interests away. This process, fluctuating between diplomatic and militant cooperation, continued unabated until the end of Henri IV’s reign (1589-1610) when frustration with the Ottomans’ inability to provide substantive support to France due to the Ottoman-Safavid conflict led the court to reduce the alliance to primarily an economic relationship.

In my approach, I have been inspired by intellectual, social, and economic historians who have demonstrated how the practices of early modern subjects complicate the notion of separate social and economic development between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Long before the sixteenth century, proximity and economic necessity compelled many to breach the Christian-Muslim divide. The commercial relationship between Genoa and the early Ottoman state was integral to the expansions of the Ottomans in Anatolia and the Balkans as far back as the

¹⁹ See *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Imtiyazat”; Edhem Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 293-296. Capitulations have often been misunderstood because of their ambiguous title in European languages, Capitulations as opposed to the Ottoman *Ahdname*, which does not refer to any capitulation but the Latin term *capitula*, meaning an article or paragraph. They literally are the articles between France and the Ottoman Empire, which is much more consistent with the Ottoman title as *Ahdname*, or document of imperial decrees or agreements.

fourteenth century.²⁰ Genoese economic integration later turned political when Genoese ships ferried Ottoman forces across the Bosphorus to support them in a war against Venice.²¹ The Poles engaged regularly with the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars since the fifteenth century.²²

Historians of the sixteenth century have gone further to show the social and economic integration between Muslims and Christians across the Mediterranean.²³ These revisionists have sought out the cultural connections between these groups in non-state actors such as trans-imperial subjects, merchants, and renegades (Christians who converted to Islam and joined the Ottoman society).²⁴ Far from the Mediterranean dividing Christians and Muslims, it remained very porous, and Christian and Muslim subjects moved back and forth between their realms and made a place for themselves while staying comfortable in both cultures. Individuals such as Gazanfer Ağa and Hasan Pasha both began their careers as Venetian renegades.

²⁰ Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman Empire: The Merchants of Geoa and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 140-141; F. Özden Mercan, "The Genoese of Pera in the Fifteenth Century: Draperio and Spinola Families," in *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 42-54.

²¹ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 16.

²² Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century): an Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents* (Boston: Brill, 2000), especially part II; Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th-18th Century): A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Boston: Brill, 2011).

²³ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1996), 1:14.

²⁴ Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Eric Dursteler, *Renegade Women: Gender, Identity, and Boundaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); Daniel Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000); Gerald MacLean and Nabil Mattar, *Britain and the Islamic World, 1558-1713* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry" (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2012); Noel Malcolm, *Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Peter N. Miller, *Peiresc's Mediterranean World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

Gazanfer rose to become an influential Ottoman courtier, and Hasan, the *kapudan* pasha (Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet). Neither cut themselves off from their old Venetian identity.²⁵ Trans-imperial subjects, straddling the divide between the Christian and Ottoman Mediterranean, played essential roles as brokers in economic and political matters. They facilitated entry into markets and established a place for themselves by emphasizing their trans-imperial identity as Levantines.²⁶

Cultural and material historians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have extended these characterizations beyond the Mediterranean and into Northern Europe. The period, once associated with exclusively Christian European cultural and intellectual progress toward modernity, is increasingly being understood as a product of intensive cultural interactions with other Mediterranean peoples, not the least of which was the Ottoman Empire.²⁷ Material and artistic exchange between Christian Europeans and Ottomans was widespread.²⁸ Ottoman sultans participated in the same cultural patronage as Christian European princes, indeed, as part of the same princely competition. For instance, Suleiman the Magnificent's sponsorship of a helmet-crown from Venetian goldsmiths in the 1530s represented a symbolic challenge to Charles V's imperial crowning.²⁹ Similarly, Francesco Berlinghieri dedicated his *Septe Giornate della Geographia di Francesco Berlinghieri* to the

²⁵ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 120-25; Stephen Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural Relations in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Ottoman-Venetian Encounters* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014).

²⁶ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, especially chs. 2 and 7.

²⁷ On the Renaissance as a product of isolated European genius, see Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (1878; reprint, New York: Penguin, 2004).

²⁸ Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton, *Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West*, (New York: Reaktion Books, 2000), chap. 1; Lisa Jardine, *Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996); Jerry Brotton, *The Renaissance Bazaar: From the Silk Road to Michelangelo* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); .

²⁹ Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *The Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (1989): 401-427.

Ottoman sultan Mehmed II.³⁰ Multiple collected volumes have been published demonstrating the connections between Christian Europe and the Muslim Levant and North Africa. They show how “the course of the Renaissance was molded in a very fundamental way by these close linkages, connections, and mutual commercial intellectual and cultural influences.”³¹ In addition, Cemal Kafadar has demonstrated how many of the characteristics we thought as isolated to Renaissance Europe were also experienced in the Ottoman realm. For instance, in the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire—Anatolia and Rumelia (the Balkans)—Ottoman elites imagined themselves as the inheritors of the Roman tradition, and indeed referred to themselves as Romans—the *Rumi*—not that very different from the “Trojan” origins the French nobility claimed.³²

Indeed, the experiences historians once considered unique to Christian Europe have manifested themselves in various forms throughout western Eurasia. The Ottomans equally participated in the Military Revolution, producing cannon of similar character and effectiveness as the rest of Europe. While they should not be exaggerated, foreign military experts from Christian Europe played an important role in spreading technical know-how to the Ottomans. But Ottoman military know-how also influenced Christian Europe, forcing the Austrian Habsburgs to modernize their frontier defenses in the seventeenth century, albeit in more antagonistic ways.

³⁰ Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 87-91.

³¹ William Dalrymple, “The Porous Frontiers of Islam and Christendom: A Clash or Fusion of Civilizations?” in *Re-Orienting the Renaissance: Cultural Exchanges with the East*, ed. Gerald MacLean (New York: Palgrave, 2005), xv; see also Anna Contadini and Claire Norton, eds., *The Renaissance and the Ottoman World* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013).

³² Cemal Kafadar, “A Rome of One’s Own: A Reflection on Cultural Geography and Identity in the Lands of Rum,” *Muqarnas* 24 (2007): 7-25.

Christian and Muslim military innovation was thus intertwined.³³ Similarly, the same processes that accompanied the European Reformation—a hardening of confessional boundaries between states in direct competition with alternative religious expression, whether through top-down directive or cooperative negotiation at all social levels—has characterized Ottoman imperial confessionalization and ideology through rivalries with both the Habsburgs and Safavids.³⁴

Focusing on sources that describe experiences or the movement of goods, ideas, and people between Christian and Muslim societies rather than prescriptive sources about one another has allowed these historians to break down the binary opposition between Christians and Muslims. Diplomatic sources along with royal correspondence provide the opportunity to apply this historical tool kit to the politico-diplomatic history of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. In doing so, I am proposing here that the continuity of the Ottoman alliance as a fundamental part of French foreign policy, which was structurally opposed to Habsburg power, reflects the mutual expansion of the Christian European and Ottoman geopolitical

³³ Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gábor Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800,” *Journal of World History* 25, no. 1 (2014): 85–124; Günhan Börekçi, “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire during the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problems of Origins,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 59, no. 4 (2006): 407-438.

³⁴ Tijana Krstic, *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). The differing interpretations of the process of confessionalization are particularly prominent within English historiography of the Reformation. Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), depicts the enforcement of Protestant belief in England as a top-down process coerced upon society; Ethan H. Shagan, *Popular Politics and the English Reformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), has re-imagined this process as a negotiation between society and state whereby lay-people made the new policies work for themselves, confessionalizing themselves. On Confessionalization in Europe broadly, see Bodo Nischan, *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555-1700* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), and Marc R. Forster, *Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque: Religious Identity in Southwest Germany, 1550-1750* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

community to encompass one another. The French and Ottomans were cooperating in a common competition over the balance of power that encompassed Europe, the Levant, and North Africa. The Ottomans were not an outsider of the region's state system, but an active participant in it. The diplomacy between France and the Ottoman Empire from 1559 to 1610 reflects this common geopolitical region.³⁵

To tell this story, this dissertation is organized into two parts. Part I is organized thematically and provides the foundational information of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy that contextualizes the narrative chapters of Part II. Part I contains three thematic chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the logistics of French diplomacy generally and Franco-Ottoman diplomacy specifically. Issues such as how ambassadors and consuls were chosen, how (much) they were paid, how letters were delivered, etc., are the topic of this chapter. It provides an introductory understanding of basic sixteenth-century diplomacy that will inform later chapters. It argues that the French court established an infrastructure that demanded extensive human and financial capital, drawing the Ottomans into the French diplomatic network, to effectively coordinate diplomatically and militarily with them.

Chapter two discusses the French experience in Constantinople. How did the work of diplomacy get done? Where did it happen? Who were France's allies and

³⁵ I am not the first to propose broader geographic parameters for understanding early modern political history. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), xiv, has argued for a common Eurasian political culture: "courtly encounters were the crucial site for the forging of mutual perception and representations in Eurasia." And Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2010), 25, suggested that Christian Europeans and the Ottomans were "less remote" from one another than they would have accepted. But I do think I am the first to suggest that the states comprising the European and Mediterranean regions were part of a common balance of power and competitive alliance system.

enemies in Constantinople? Supporting the findings of much of the new diplomatic history, this chapter argues that the diplomatic functions of French ambassadors and envoys expanded well beyond formal audiences and petitions. Diplomatic success entailed playing the Ottoman political game through successfully integrating oneself into the Ottoman political culture and making friends with various viziers, pashas, or other ambassadors whose interests aligned with their own and who could advocate on their behalf. While much in Constantinople produced an unfamiliar environment for French diplomats, the commonalities of Ottoman and Christian European political cultures ensured that playing the political game was not one of them.

The third chapter discusses Ottoman envoys to France, an understudied subject before the eighteenth century. This chapter provides a social history of Ottoman envoys in France during the later sixteenth century. It argues that their missions were numerous and that their presence was conspicuous both at court and across the countryside. The court mustered every level of the French society, from courtiers to local actors, to receive and transport the Ottomans to their audience with the king. These interactions helped to condition the French to the Ottoman alliance and helped to normalize it. In addition, the envoys did not provide an embarrassment, as they are frequently described in the historiography, but the French embraced them and defended their presence on the international stage.

The four chapters comprising Part II provide a chronological overview of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy from the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) to the end of Henri IV's reign in 1610. They ask such questions such as what the diplomatic missions of the ambassadors and agents were and how did the Ottoman Empire fit

within French foreign policy calculus. Part II demonstrates the significance and continuity of the alliance to French foreign policy during this trying time of France's history. The central argument of these chapters is that the French court envisioned the alliance as central to, rather than separate from, its primary foreign policy goals, which increasingly focused on combating Spain's growing power after 1566. Chapter four discusses the period directly following the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis until the reinvigoration of France's anti-Spanish diplomatic activities in 1569. During this period, the alliance did not end as much as it evolved to peace-time conditions. The French court emphasized France's role as a mediator that could be used to benefit other Christian princes in their relationship with the Ottomans. This policy, which during the time frequently benefited Spain, set a precedent for France's future endeavors as they became increasingly belligerent toward the Habsburgs.

Chapter five describes the first dramatic increase in diplomatic and military coordination with the Ottoman Empire against Spain from 1569 to 1577. France's foreign policy became increasingly hostile to Spain out of fear of its intervention in France's Wars of Religion, and the Ottoman Empire was at the center of France's endeavors to counter Spain. France mediated peace between Venice and the Ottomans to isolate Spain in war with the Ottomans, negotiated a pact with the Ottomans for joint attacks on Spanish lands, and negotiated Ottoman support for Henri of Anjou's election to the Polish throne. Only the Venetian-Ottoman peace provided any real benefit. Intervening circumstances undermined the pact, and Henri's time on the Polish throne challenged the Franco-Ottoman alliance more than it supported it.

Chapter six describes the precipitous collapse of France's diplomatic position in Constantinople from 1577 to 1592. In the early 1580s, a moment of Franco-Ottoman cooperation nearly materialized in the form of a joint campaign against Spain. But the French ambassadors' actions to combat perceived diplomatic slights in Constantinople increasingly alienated the Frenchmen from Ottoman powerbrokers. French attempts at preserving their privileges in Constantinople ultimately undermined their foreign policy interests. The absolute nadir came when the French ambassador joined a rebellion against the Protestant Henri IV, causing a split in the French embassy that mirrored the division in France, and forced the Ottomans to abandon a second attempt to provide military support to France in the early 1590s.

Chapter seven depicts the recovery of the French diplomatic position in Constantinople under the eminently capable ambassador François Savary de Brèves (ambassador, 1592-1604), who protected French precedence in Constantinople against an increasingly prominent English presence from 1592 to 1604. While the French court continued to seek Ottoman support against its Habsburg foes, welcoming the outbreak of the long war between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs (1593-1606), the Ottomans were incapable of producing the sort of support France sought. This perceived failure caused the French court to abandon the military aspects of the alliance.

This story cannot be understood within the traditional parameters of European history, which has been artificially restricted both by the myth of Christendom and the superimposition of Europe onto that myth in a way that

excludes non-Christian actors in the same historical processes. The continuity of the Franco-Ottoman alliance as a structural part of France's foreign policy and diplomatic strategy throughout Wars of Religion—indeed the alliance might have been the most constant aspect of French policy until the end of Henri IV's reign—indicates that we must expand our analysis of the European geo-political community beyond the restrictive parameters of Christendom in order to adequately understand the politico-diplomatic history of the period.

PART I

CHAPTER ONE—LOGISTICS OF FRANCO-OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY

When Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron of Salignac (ambassador, 1604-1610) was appointed as the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1604, it took him and his retinue of thirty-three men three months to travel from Paris to Constantinople. The dispatches between the ambassador and his king took an average of two months to arrive at their destination.¹ Regular diplomacy between France and the Ottomans was a logistical nightmare that demanded a significant investment in both human and financial capital to maintain. Unfortunately, we understand little of the logistics that made this diplomacy possible. Although the “new diplomatic history” has recently reinvigorated a once-neglected area of history by emphasizing the roles of non-traditional intermediaries and the multiple venues at which the theater of diplomacy played itself out, we still know little about the process that supported the formal channels of diplomacy and thus the government’s investment in it.² Historians such as Catherine Fletcher and Jean-Michel Ribera have

¹ Julien Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron de Salignac: 1605 à 1610*, ed. Gontaut-Biron Théodore de, vol. 1 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1888), 2-50.

² For instance, see John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 1–14; Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstic, eds., “Cross Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean” special issue, *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 93-259; Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), especially 47; Timothy Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy: Literature and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). Tijana Krstic, “The Elusive Intermediaries: Moriscos in Ottoman and Western European Diplomatic Sources from Constantinople, 1560s-1630s,” in “Cross Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” eds., Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstic, special edition, *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 129-151. On multiple venues of diplomacy, see Ellen R. Welch, *A Theater of*

begun addressing these questions for France's diplomats in Spain and the diplomatic culture in Rome.³ This chapter seeks to extend this analysis to France's diplomacy in Constantinople.

This chapter provides an overview of the logistics employed to perpetuate the Franco-Ottoman alliance. It addresses such questions as who was appointed as ambassador? What criteria impacted those decisions? How did ambassadors and their letters travel between France and the Ottoman Empire? How much specie did the crown invest in the alliance? These issues are fundamental to understanding France's relationship with the Ottomans and its significance to their foreign policy. I argue that the crown invested heavily both in material and personnel to support its alliance with the Ottoman Empire. This investment reflected the importance of the Ottomans to France's foreign-policy calculus. Far from the peripheral actor of the state-system, the Ottoman Empire was a fundamental part of the geo-political community in which the French court perceived itself operating, and they invested in their alliance accordingly.⁴

Diplomacy: International Relations and the Performing Arts in Early Modern France (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

³ Jean-Michel Ribera, *Les ambassadeurs du roi de France auprès de Philip II du traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (1589): diplomatie et espionnage* (Paris: Garnier, 2007) which provides an incredibly detailed account France's diplomacy with Spain during the Wars of Religion; Catherine Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome: The Rise of the Resident Ambassador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); see also John B. Allen, *Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

⁴ The state system closed to non-Christian non-European countries has become so fundamental to assumptions of early modern Europe in the sixteenth century that it often is only referenced and not investigated. But for investigations into it, see M. S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494-1618* (Longman Group, 1998); J. C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System," *Middle East Journal* 15, no. 2 (1961): 141-52; this argument comes through implicitly in Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), which treats Ottoman diplomacy as wholly separate from European diplomatic endeavors, but instead operating within the Middle Eastern context only. C.f. John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe," 1-14, provides a substantive criticism of the historiography of this sort of argument; see also A. Nuri Yurdusev, ed.,

Early Modern French Diplomacy and the Ottoman Empire

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a new type of diplomacy based on the resident ambassador, as opposed to a temporary single-mission envoy, began to spread to France. Historians usually credit the rise of the resident ambassador to the Italian states in the second half of the fifteenth century. Fifteenth-century Italian politics was especially chaotic, and temporary envoys between principalities could not keep up with the fluctuating circumstances, necessitating permanent residencies.⁵ But these same circumstances characterized Italian and principally Venetian contacts with the Byzantine Empire and then later the Ottoman Empire. The *bailo* was sent to Constantinople in the eleventh century as an economic position meant to maintain regular trade, but it quickly developed into a permanent *de facto* ambassador. It was also during the fifteenth century that other Italian states such as the Genoese began negotiating diplomatically with and establishing permanent residents in Ottoman Empire. As Daniel Goffman has argued, these contacts between Italian states and the Ottoman Empire due to economic opportunity as well as the political threat the Ottomans posed to these Italian states—rather than the particular Italian environment—lay at the heart of the new diplomatic system that developed and spread to the rest of Europe. From the very beginning, the Ottoman Empire was

Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁵ Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955; reprint, New York: Cosimo, 2008), 55-100; Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome*, chaps. 3 and 4.

central to the very infrastructure that has been assumed to be the fabric of the European state system.⁶

In the sixteenth century, France adopted the Italian approach to diplomacy, and the Ottomans were similarly central to the development of their diplomatic network from the beginning. The first permanent French embassy was sent to the Holy Roman Empire in 1509. By the accession of François I^{er} to the throne in 1515, France still only had the one resident ambassador abroad. At the end of the reign of François I^{er}, there were ten resident French ambassadors abroad. These countries included the Holy Roman Empire, Venice (1517), England (1525), the Swiss Cantons (1522), Portugal (1522), Rome (1530), the Ottoman Empire (1535), the Grisons (1537), Denmark (1541), and the Netherlands (intermittently after 1538).⁷ This number did not grow much throughout the rest of the sixteenth century.

Using Fleury Vindry's collection of ambassadors abroad, we can see the distribution of French ambassadors and thus a representation of French diplomatic priorities. Figure 1 shows the cumulative years of ambassadorial representation (including multiple ambassadors present concurrently) at foreign courts from 1517 to 1559.⁸ Figure 2 provides the same map for the period from 1559 to 1600. From 1517 through the 1530s, France established an axis of embassies stretching from England

⁶ Daniel Goffman, "Negotiating with the Renaissance state: the Ottoman Empire and the new diplomacy," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61-74.

⁷ Fleury Vindry, *Les ambassadeurs français permanents au XVI^e siècle* (Paris: H. Champion, 1903), 12-17; De Lamar Jensen, "French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 5, no. 2 (October 1, 1974): 23-46; c.f. Anderson, *Origins of the Modern European State System*, 54, lists the number at ten, but there was only an ambassador in the Netherlands intermittently after 1538.

⁸ The information from these maps come from Vindry, *Les ambassadeurss français*, and organized into a map using Stanford's Palladio interface. De Lamar Jensen, "French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion," has criticized Vindry's tables and incomplete, and this is a fair criticism, but Vindry nevertheless fairly represents the larger picture even if an ambassador is left out here or there.

through the Swiss Cantons and Venice to the Ottoman Empire, in direct response to the ongoing conflict with the Habsburgs centered in Italy. This axis of embassies was diplomatically predominant throughout the entire sixteenth century despite the changing circumstances around 1559 from conflict in Italy to civil war in France. It represents the nucleus of French diplomacy (see figures 1 and 2).



Figure 1. Map of Years Ambassador(s) Present in Countries (1517-1559)



Figure 2. Map of Years Ambassador(s) Present in Countries (1559-1600)

These maps, however, are not perfect. They fail to consider the disparities in social capital attached to embassies. For instance, Rome is underrepresented in the map. The papacy held certain powers inside of France such as papal control of Avignon as well as those conferred by the Concordat of Bologna, so French ambassadorial retinues were especially extensive. As early as 1462, the retinue of the temporary French embassy in Rome included two cardinals, two bishops, and a number of abbots and noblemen, and France's representation in Rome only grew from there as the representation became permanent in the sixteenth century.⁹ While no state compared to Rome for these reasons, the example demonstrates a limitation of the maps: it only tracks ambassadorial presence, not the investment in them.¹⁰

Nevertheless, these maps show how the Ottomans compared favorably with other

⁹ Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome*, 81.

¹⁰ For more on French investment in its Ottoman embassy relative to others, see the section below on Costs of Diplomacy.

members of France's diplomatic nucleus of states in terms of diplomatic representation. For instance, France maintained comparable ambassadorial representation in Constantinople as in England, the Holy Roman Empire, and Venice.

For most countries, intermittent temporary ambassadors with short-term missions remained the rule.¹¹ This was also the case for France outside of its diplomatic nucleus. A patchwork of hundreds or even thousands of small states punctuated by a few large states comprised early modern Europe.¹² Temporary diplomatic agents were central to maintaining connections with all these principalities. Even relatively large Principalities like Genoa, Ferrara, Tuscany, and Savoy never housed a permanent resident ambassador from France beyond intermittent appointments. The same can be said of Poland-Lithuania—one of the largest territorial states of the region—until the 1570s when the kingdom became important to French interests because the French crown sought to place Charles IX's brother Henri, duke of Anjou, on its throne.¹³ The majority of European principalities never received a resident ambassador from France. Moreover, it was not unprecedented for France to receive ambassadors without reciprocating. Florence, for instance, sent an ambassador to France in the 1550s that was not reciprocated except with short temporary agents tasked with acquiring loans for

¹¹ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 47-48.

¹² Charles T. Lipp, *Noble Strategies in an Early Modern Small State: The Mahuet of Lorraine* (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2011), 12.

¹³ For more on this topic, see chap. 5, pp. 206-213.

France.¹⁴ Scotland also maintained an ambassador in France in the second half of the sixteenth century that was not reciprocated.¹⁵

The Ottoman Empire similarly based their diplomatic interactions on intermittent and temporary ambassadors. The Ottomans did not send a permanent ambassador to France, or to any other country, until the eighteenth century. M.S. Anderson has argued that this asymmetry prevented the Ottomans from membership in the European state system.¹⁶ But the Ottomans sent multiple diplomatic agents and temporary ambassadors to France throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. The Ottoman court, for instance, dispatched diplomatic envoys to France in three out of the four years between 1562 and 1565.¹⁷ The Ottomans thus behaved in the same diplomatic fashion with France as France did with Ferrara, Florence, or Genoa. The Ottomans and France did not behave in two fundamentally different ways diplomatically.¹⁸

The Ottoman Empire has been a part of Christian European and specifically French diplomatic developments from the beginning with the Venetian *bailo* to the blossoming of French embassies under François I^{er}. It remained one of the few countries with which France maintained continual diplomatic residence from its embassy's establishment until the end of the sixteenth century and beyond. The

¹⁴ De Lamar Jensen, "Catherine de Medici and Her Florentine Friends," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 9, no. 2 (1978): 60-63.

¹⁵ Jensen, "French Diplomacy," 41.

¹⁶ Anderson, *Origins of the European State System*, chap. 9; c.f. Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*

¹⁷ See chaps. 3 and chap. 4, pp. 173-175.

¹⁸ This approach was not particular to Christian Europe. The Ottomans similarly sent only temporary ambassadors to Safavid Iran. See Sine Arcaç, "Gifts in Motion: Ottoman-Safavid Cultural Exchange, 1501-1618" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2012); Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*

Ottoman Empire along with the six or so other countries with which France maintained almost continual residential diplomacy represent the core of French diplomatic activities. They were the most significant countries to French foreign policy, and the Ottomans were a part of this exceptionally significant group.

Appointing Ambassadors

So, who was appointed to this critical Ottoman embassy, and how were they chosen? The process of ambassadorial appointment is an area in which there exists little in the way of systematic analysis. Long ago, Fleury Vindry compiled a list of sixteenth-century French ambassadors and their posts, but the process of their appointment still largely remains a mystery beyond the case of Spain for which Jean-Michel Ribera has provided extensive biographies of the ambassadors to Spain.¹⁹ Beyond Spain, Lucien Bély provided something of the sort in his *Espions et ambassadeurs du temps de Louis XIV*, but as historians of the development of the state indicate, the French government operated much differently under Louis XIV than it did in the sixteenth century.²⁰ The case of the Ottomans was different from Spain. It was farther away, and their diplomacy operated under a different paradigm.

Active diplomacy with Spain was integral to preventing another outbreak of the

¹⁹ Fleury Vindry, *Les ambassadeurs français*; Ribera, *Les ambassadeurs du roi de France*, 57-108.

²⁰ Lucien Bély, *Espions et Ambassadeurs Au Temps de Louis XIV* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).55-84, 292-340; the historiography on the French state is voluminous, but a great starting point is David Potter, *A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); James B. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James B. Collins, *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). On the changing state and its relationship to the Mediterranean, see Junko Thérèse Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce: Marseille and the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2011); and Gillian Weiss, *Captives and Corsaires: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Franco-Spanish wars that dominated the first half of the century, and it was important to prevent undue Spanish influence during the Wars of Religion. France predicated its Ottoman diplomacy on countering Spanish power, so its significance to the French court waxed and waned with its relationship to Spain. These differences explain the variety of individuals the court appointed to the embassy in Constantinople as opposed to the series of ancient nobles from powerful houses that held the post in Madrid.²¹

The French court tended to choose their ambassadors in Constantinople from one of two social backgrounds: the prominent diplomatic families in France or the experienced diplomatic residents in Constantinople working as couriers or secretaries. Of the eight French ambassadors sent to Constantinople between 1559 and 1610, five either had ambassadorial experience or spent significant amounts of time in Constantinople attached to previous embassies. Jacques de Germigny (ambassador, 1579-1584) was something of a special courier that attached himself to the embassy of François de Noailles, bishop of Dax (ambassador, 1571-1574), and was considered a significant part of the embassy.²² François Savary de Brèves (ambassador, 1592-1604) was the cousin of Jacques Savary de Lancosme (ambassador, 1584-1589) and was a member of Lancosme's retinue for seven years before being named as his cousin's successor. Guillaume de Grantrie, *seigneur* of Grandchamp (ambassador, 1566-1570), spent fifteen years in Constantinople attached to various embassies, including Gabriel de Luetz d'Aramon (ambassador,

²¹ See Ribera, *Les ambassadeurs du roi de France*, 57-108.

²² BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fols. 2, 11, 15, 23, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 6 January 1573, 17 January 1573, 24 January 1573.

1546-1553).²³ Both of the Noailles brothers—François, bishop of Dax, and Gilles, abbot of L’Isle (ambassador, 1574-1581)—were experienced diplomats who had held critical ambassadorial appointments in England, Venice, Rome, and Poland.²⁴

| French Ambassador/Agent | Tenure |
|---|---------------|
| Jean Cavena, seigneur of La Vigne | 1556-1559 |
| Jean Dolu | 1560-1561 |
| Antoine Pétrezol, seigneur of Norroy (agent) | 1561-1566 |
| Guillaume de Grandchamp, seigneur of Grantrie | 1566-1569 |
| Claude du Bourg (agent) | 1569-1570 |
| Pierre de Maisniel, seigneur de La Tricquerie | 1569-1571 |
| François de Noailles, Bishop of Dax | 1571-1574 |
| Gilles de Noailles, Abbot of L’Isle | 1574-1578 |
| Sebastien de Juyé (agent) | 1578-1579 |
| Jacques de Germigny, baron of Germolles | 1579-1584 |
| Sébastien Berthier (agent) | 1584-1586 |
| Jacques Savary de Lancosme | 1586-1589 |
| François Savary de Brèves | 1592-1604 |
| Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron of Salignac | 1604-1610 |

Table 1. List of French Ambassadors and Agents in Constantinople

While diplomatic experience was significant, patronage and social status were equally as important. Henri IV seemed to be especially susceptible to this approach. Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron of Salignac (ambassador, 1604-1610), came from the powerful Gontaut-Biron family that associated itself with Henri IV throughout the wars of religion. His brother, the Marshal of France Charles de Gontaut, duke of Biron, was famously executed for conspiring against Henri IV in 1602 after being an

²³ Trandafir G. Djuvara and Louis Renault, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913)* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1914), 80-82.

²⁴ Vindry, *Les ambassadeurs français*, 12-18; Jensen, “French Diplomacy,” 32.

early supporter of the king.²⁵ Salignac himself was one of the earliest supporters of Henri IV and was present with the future king at the conquest of Cahors in 1580 opposite Salignac's father, one of Henri III's marshals. He was a member of the privy council of Henri of Navarre before he was king of France, and present at the siege of Rouen in 1592.²⁶ Salignac's extended service made it easy for Henri IV not to blame him for his brother's crime, and it is likely why the king permitted Charles's family to inherit his property, the majority of which went to Salignac.²⁷

Perhaps Salignac's appointment to the post in Constantinople indicates that the king honored his promises that the dishonor would only apply to Charles, but the Ottoman embassy was not on the same level as the office of the Marshal of France.²⁸ Regardless, we should not assume that the position was a sort of punishment. The ambassador in Constantinople, and association with it, could be a jumping-off point for a future career. Philippe de Fresne-Canaye, who attached himself to the embassy of the bishop of Dax, later became the ambassador to Venice from 1602 to 1607.²⁹ François Savary de Brèves became the French ambassador to Rome from 1608 to 1614 after his embassy in Constantinople.³⁰ And the appointment of the Noailles brothers with their plethora of diplomatic experience in important embassies would also indicate otherwise.

²⁵ See Vincent J. Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 275-276.

²⁶ Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Henri IV* (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 274-277, 298; Julien Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron de Salignac: 1605 à 1610*, ed. Théodore de Gontaut-Biron, vol. 1 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1888), x-xvii.

²⁷ Pitts, *Henri IV*, 276.

²⁸ Pitts, *Henri IV*, 276.

²⁹ See his letters in BNF, Français 16081 and Français 16082.

³⁰ See his letters in BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 351, fols 352 and 353.

Similarly, Jacques de La Fin—whom Henri IV intended for the Ottoman embassy instead of de Brèves—was an early supporter of Henri IV. He joined the service of then Henri of Navarre through his service to Marguerite de Valois shortly after his master François, duke of Anjou, died in 1584.³¹ But he had little if any diplomatic experience. Jacques's brother Jean de La Fin, who was the ambassador in England, advocated for Jacques's appointment in some embassy, which Henri IV planned to be the embassy in Constantinople, but Henri IV had to change his plans. The resident ambassador, Lancosme, joined the Catholic League in rebellion against the Protestant Henri IV in 1589, refusing to accept a Protestant on the throne, and began acting as the League's ambassador in Constantinople. Henri IV was forced to act quickly to appoint a new ambassador, which could not be La Fin since he was recovering from an injury. The situation led the appointment of Lancosme's cousin de Brèves to the position. He supported Henri IV throughout Lancosme's betrayal and was already present in the Ottoman capital.³² The situation demonstrates how the patronage La Fin enjoyed would have superseded the experience of de Brèves were it not for the circumstance.

To observe the appointment process, and the importance of court patronage, looking at the appointment circumstances surrounding Jacques de Germigny is informative. His embassy has often been criticized due to his social and political

³¹ Maurice Dumoulin, *Jacques de La Fin: études et documents sur la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1896), 8-64

³² Henri IV to Murad III, 6 April 1591, *Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV*, ed. Berger de Xivrey, 9 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-1876), 3:363; Henri IV to Beauvoire, 30 September 1592, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 3:846; Dumoulin, *Jacques de La Fin*, 60, incorrectly relates Henri IV's intention to send La Fin to Portugal rather than the Ottoman Empire in the letter to Beauvoire; for La Fin and his brother, see also Olivier Poncet, *Pomponne de Bellièvre (1529-1607): un homme d'Etat au temps des guerres de religion* (Paris: École nationale des chartes, 1998), 98-101, 214; for Lancosme's betrayal, see chap. 6, pp. 252-261.

position. For instance, Güneş Işıksel uses Germigny's appointment after being only an "*ancien chargé d'affaires*," as exemplary of the decreasing relevance of the alliance.³³ Judging Germigny's embassy based on his previous positions was not new to modern historians. Germigny's contemporary Jacques-Auguste de Thou described the ambassador as a "man of obscure birth, and who had little merit for such an appointment." De Thou goes on to explain that it was rare for someone of the quality of the Noailles brothers to be willing to accept the position because such "appointments demand considerable expense and that there would not be any aid to expect from the court," because the treasury was so depleted: "*voilà* this is why a man of such little dignity was named to this embassy to succeed the great men who preceded him."³⁴

It is true; the limitations that the Wars of Religion placed on the French treasury were part of the story. Despite de Thou's condescension for Germigny, his explanation was not inaccurate. France's depleted treasury tied Henri III's hands. In a letter to Marshall Damville, the king explained that he was stretching his treasury to fund the voyages of Germigny and his counterpart in Portugal.³⁵ As we will see later in this chapter, funding an embassy in Constantinople was an expensive endeavor, and supporting the household of the ambassador abroad was one of the expenses of the crown. Moreover, diplomats in the Ottoman Empire had yet to receive funding from duties on Levantine trade imposed on French ships.

³³ Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 208.

³⁴ Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou: depuis 1543. jusqu'en 1607*, vol. 9 (London: s.n., 1734), 9:3

³⁵ Henri III to Damville, 15 February 1579, in *Lettres de Henri III*, ed. Pierre Champion et al., 8 vols (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1959-2018), 4:147.

Nevertheless, we cannot place the entirety of his appointment on his status and the treasury, the powerful patrons supporting him and his extensive experience in Constantinople were integral to his appointment. As early as 1576, Henri III planned to replace the abbot of L'isle in Constantinople, and the Cardinals of Bourbon and of Armagnac advocated for their client Germigny. The Cardinal of Armagnac wrote to Henri III after the appointment of Germigny. The Cardinal promised the king that he made the correct choice: "I rejoice from the resolution your majesty took to send him [Germigny] to the Levant, for the assurance that I make, not only the satisfaction you will take from it, but that he will bring great advantage to all Christianity."³⁶ The Cardinal also wrote to Catherine de Medici, the secretary of state Nicolas de Villeroy, and the Cardinal of Bourbon to the same effect.³⁷ Germigny was also a client of the Cardinal de Bourbon. It is not clear if the Cardinal and prince of the blood advocated on the future ambassador's behalf, but their relationships certainly could not have hurt. Along with the two Cardinals, Germigny was a part of the clientele network of the lieutenant-general of Burgundy, Henri III's hand-picked Guillaume de Saulx, *sieur* of Tavannes, as well as his father-in-law and predecessor Léonor Chabot.³⁸ In addition, as we will see below, Arnauld de Ferrier wrote glowingly of Germigny during the future ambassador's earlier missions to Constantinople.

³⁶ Cardinal of Armagnac to Henri III, 22 August 1576, in *L'illustre orbandale*, vol. 2, 74.

³⁷ See *L'illustre Orbandale*, vol. 2, 74-76.

³⁸ On Henri III's hand-picked governor, see Mack P. Holt, *The Politics of Wine in Early Modern France: Religion and Popular culture in Burgundy, 1477-1630* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 171; on Germigny's clientage to Guillaume de Saulx and Léonor Chabot, see BNF, Français 4125, fols. 17r, 90r-92r, 101r.

Germigny had extensive experience in Constantinople. He made his career as a sort of minor diplomat in the Ottoman Empire, and he had a knack for finding his way into the upper circles of the Ottoman hierarchy. He was a member of Michel de Codignac's (ambassador, 1553 to 1556) retinue and remained in Constantinople during the embassy of Jean Cavenac, seigneur of La Vigne (ambassador, 1556 to 1559), where Germigny made waves by undermining the ambassador through multiple meetings with the grand vizier.³⁹ Germigny shows up again in the 1570s attached to the embassy of François de Noailles in Constantinople for at least a year. During this trip, Germigny attended important events such as the ritualistic kissing of the sultan's hand and dining with Noailles, the grand vizier, and the *kapudan* pasha.⁴⁰ As we saw earlier, he was again dispatched by Henri III to send presents for the embassy of Gilles de Noailles, but he fell ill in Venice and could not continue his journey.⁴¹ He was not an anonymous diplomat during these endeavors, either. His name found itself in the letters of the bishop of Dax, Charles IX, Henri III, and thus also the secretaries of state that continued their service from Charles IX to Henri III's reign. For instance, Germigny brought information from the bishop of Dax both verbally and by letter that he relayed to Charles IX personally, and on his return journey Charles IX and Du Ferrier frequently discussed the significance of him meeting up with Dax before he left from Ragusa to Constantinople.⁴²

³⁹ La Vigne to Henri II, 14 April 1558, in *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, ed. Ernest Charrière, 4 vols (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860) 2:460-61n.

⁴⁰ Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, ed. Henri Hauser (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897), 65-67.

⁴¹ See chap. 4, p. 214-217, for more on this issue.

⁴² See BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 13-15, 29-30, 35-37, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 24 January 1573, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 18 January 1573, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 3 and 8 February 1573.

In addition, Germigny had a good reputation at home and abroad. In 1573, when Germigny was sent to negotiate a matter with the Ragusans before joining the bishop of Dax in Constantinople, Du Ferrier noted that “I assure myself that he will do well and dexterously since he is experienced in the country having been nourished there from his youth, and for his desire that I know to do some good service in the charge.”⁴³ Germigny’s mission was significant enough that Du Ferrier was concerned that the ambassador, the bishop of Dax, would depart Ragusa for Constantinople before Germigny arrived.⁴⁴ Later after Germigny was appointed as ambassador and arrived in Venice, Du Ferrier wrote to the king that he “can assure Your Majesty, that he [Germigny] has been seen and honored as much as is possible, even from those, who saw him in the Levant, and know the friendship that the first pasha [the grand vizier] has for him.”⁴⁵ Indeed, rumors of the “extraordinary honors that were prepared for him [Germigny] on the routes and even more on his arrival” indicated to Du Ferrier that “these Berbers prefer him to all other ambassadors.”⁴⁶

Despite Germigny’s lower status compared to some of the other diplomats such as the Noailles brothers, his appointment indicates the importance of experience and powerful patrons to overcome it. When we evaluate the appointments of all the ambassadors, we see a balance between these three qualifications of status, experience, and patronage. The Noailles brothers had all three. Jacques de La Fin and the baron of Salignac lacked diplomatic experience but had the most powerful of patrons in Marguerite de Valois and Henri IV. By contrast, the appointment of

⁴³ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 3, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 6 January 1573.

⁴⁴ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 2, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 6 January 1573.

⁴⁵ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fol. 666, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 26 June 1579.

⁴⁶ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fol. 736, Ferrier to Henri III, 17 October 1579.

François Savary de Brèves was much like Germigny's. He had extensive experience in Constantinople, and his advocacy for Henri IV when Lancosme rebelled could do nothing but ingratiate him into Henri IV's good graces. A variety of paths could lead to the embassy in Constantinople, but almost all of them involved some variety of status, experience, and patronage.

The Distance Variable and Logistics

After the ambassador was chosen and appointed, he and his retinue began the trip from France to Constantinople. This trip could be very long, and the Wars of Religion only exacerbated the problem. But when we consider the distance between France and Constantinople, the number of letters exchanged between the crown and its ambassadors is much more substantial than one would otherwise assume. To help attenuate this problem, the French ambassador in Venice played an essential function as an intermediary between the crown and Constantinople. He was thus a valuable player in France's Ottoman diplomacy. Nevertheless, distance was a substantial hindrance to effective Franco-Ottoman diplomacy.

The route to Constantinople was predictable by the later sixteenth century. Ambassadors and couriers alike usually took the overland route from France to Venice. From Venice, the trip to Constantinople took roughly two months. The ambassador and his retinue would catch a boat, either Venetian or Ragusan, to the Ottoman vassal state of Ragusa (modern-day Dubrovnik). This trip usually made many port-calls along the shores of the Adriatic Sea. When Philip du Fresne-Canaye made the voyage with the secretary of the ambassador François de Noailles, the trip

took nineteen days with no less than seven stops.⁴⁷ From there they would travel overland through the Balkans. This leg of the trip took much longer. The same delegation as above left Ragusa on January 14 and arrived in Constantinople on March 2.⁴⁸ This duration was not the case for all trips. Couriers took a quicker pace. Generally, about two months for the entire trip from France to Constantinople.⁴⁹ To a lesser extent, envoys would travel overland the entire way, passing through Vienna. For instance, after Venice and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace agreement in March 1573, François de Noailles sent Monsieur de Marillac back to France through the Vienna route to share the news with the French court.⁵⁰

The Wars of Religion could equally cause further—sometimes significant—delays in ambassadors' arrival in Constantinople. The embassies of Jacques de Germigny and François Savary de Brèves are great examples of this. Germigny received his appointment in 1576, but he did not depart France until 1579 because of the Wars of Religion.⁵¹ France experienced a series of civil wars from 1575 until 1577, and the south erupted in a series of peasant revolts delaying the ambassador's travels. Germigny was a part of the Marshall de Damville's army, which operated where much of the violence was located in 1577.⁵² The Wars of Religion could have graver consequences for ambassadorial travels. After the Lancosme joined the

⁴⁷ See Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage de Levant*, 4-14.

⁴⁸ See Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage de Levant*, 20-53.

⁴⁹ See for instance, BNF, Français 4125, fols. 85r-85v, De Retz to Germigny, 10 October 1581, which was written the same day he received a letter from Germigny, dated 5 August 1581.

⁵⁰ Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage du Levant*, 82-83.

⁵¹ Henri III to Du Ferrier, 16 February 1577, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 3:162; Henri III to the abbot of L'Isle, 7 April 1576, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 2:401.

⁵² On Germigny's service with the Marshall de Damville, see "Lettre de Cardinal d'Armagnac en faveur de Monsieur de Germigny au Roy, 22 August 1576" in *L'illustre Orandale* 2 vols. (Lyon: Pierre Cusset, 1662), 1:74; on the conflicts in France from 1575 to 1579, see Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 112-114; on the peasant revolts, see Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Carnival in Romans*, trans. Mary Feeney (New York: George Baziller, 1979).

Catholic League against King Henri IV in 1589, the king sent a new ambassador to Constantinople during a civil war.⁵³ The named ambassador Jacques de La Fin was “beaten badly during a battle” in the king’s service.⁵⁴ His expected recovery that never fully came caused Henri IV to wait until 1592 to name Lancosme’s nephew de Brèves—who supported the king against Lancosme—as the new ambassador.⁵⁵

Death *en route* to Constantinople, even by violent means, was not an altogether unimaginable event. Antonio de Rincon was captured and assassinated by the imperial governor of Milan in 1541 *en route* to Constantinople while passing through Northern Italy toward Venice after he played an influential role in mediating a peace agreement between Venice and the Ottoman Empire the year before. The French held Emperor Charles V responsible. He had the most to lose from Rincon’s activities, and the Imperial Milanese took Rincon.⁵⁶ When François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, went to Venice *en route* to Constantinople in 1571 with the mission to mediate peace once again between the two countries, he traveled in disguise and without an escort. Dax feared a similar outcome as Rincon.⁵⁷

The threat did not only come from enemies of the alliance but could also arise in Ottoman lands. When François de Salviati traveled to Constantinople to help negotiate the release of some Spanish prisoners in 1561, he was attacked while

⁵³ For more on De Lancosme’s rejection of Henri IV and support for the Catholic League, see chap. 6, pp. 252-261.

⁵⁴ Henri IV to Murad III, 6 April 1591, and Henri IV to Beauvoire, 30 September 1592, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 3:363, 846..

⁵⁵ Henri IV to Beauvoire, 30 September 1592, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 3:844.

⁵⁶ Pellicier to François I^{er}, 7, 9, 26, 29 July 1541, in *Négociations*, 1:501-507; also Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), 456-459.

⁵⁷ See Işiksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 182-183; see also Charrière, ed., *Négociations*, 3:172 for the assassination of Antonio de Rincon. BNF, Français 15870, fol. 245r, Instructions sent to Sr de Triquerie, also references the “great pains Dax took to conduct himself safely to Venice.”

passing through Adrianople (Edirne) by the peasants of a village for some slight. His head and arms sustained injuries, but his life was never in danger. The French agent in Constantinople, Antoine de Pétremol (agent, 1561-1566), complained to the grand vizier, who ordered the governor of the region to punish the peasants and tend to Salviati and ensure his good treatment.⁵⁸ When a member of the bishop of Dax's retinue Philippe du Fresne-Canaye was returning to France, a Greek tax farmer tried to extort him for the *jizya* (head tax on non-Muslims), but Du Fresne-Canaye was able to appeal to the *Kadi* (judge), who ruled in his favor.⁵⁹ The trip from France to Constantinople posed many challenges to ambassadors on such a long journey.

Letters generally traveled more quickly than ambassadors, but it was still a long and unpredictable trip. The trip from the French court—wherever it might be at the time—to Venice could take just five or six days, but it was always the fastest part of the trip. Letters between France and Constantinople usually took two months, but they could take as long as three months. Moreover, couriers were not always available to transport letters immediately after they were written. For instance, letters from Henri III to Gilles de Noailles written on 26 October, 25 November, and 22 December 1574 were all delivered together on 22 March 1575.⁶⁰ There was not an established direct courier service between France and Constantinople, but one might dispatch a special courier with especially important letters from the French court to its ambassador at the Ottoman capital. Jacques de Germigny served in this capacity

⁵⁸ BNF, Français 7092, 79r, 86r. Pétremol to Charles IX, 12 February 1562; Pétremol to Boistaillé, 12 February 1562.

⁵⁹ Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage du Levant*, 160-161.

⁶⁰ BNF, Français 3165, fol. 190; John B. Allen, *Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 85-87.

frequently before his appointment as ambassador, but he always had another mission attached to the trip, and he frequently resided with the ambassador in Constantinople for extended durations before his return.⁶¹ One might also task a courier with purchasing gifts in Venice and transporting them to the ambassador in Constantinople. Germigny also filled this function.⁶² A certain *Sieur de Guitard* performed this service along with other functions as an envoy between France and Constantinople during the embassy of François Savary de Brèves in the 1590s.⁶³ These couriers often came from the ambassador's retinue. Léonard de Massiot was part of the bishop of Dax's retinue, and the ambassador entrusted him with the delivery of a letter from the grand vizier to Charles IX in 1573.⁶⁴

Often, letters traveled in stages from Constantinople to Ragusa or Venice; then, the French representative would relay the letter(s) to France. If they went *via* Ragusa, the letter usually passed through Venice as well. The addition of a French representative in Ragusa in 1564 aided in this endeavor.⁶⁵ In this process, the French often used the Venetian and Ragusan posts. The ordinary Venetian post departed roughly every fortnight, and the French took great advantage of it. The French agent in Constantinople Antoine de Pétremol sent most of his letters *via* the ordinary Venetian post.⁶⁶ This dependence on Venice had its drawbacks. Pétremol noticed in

⁶¹ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 115r, bishop of Dax to Charles IX, 8 July 1572 and 21 July 1572; BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol. 29 and 35-36, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 18 January 1573; Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 3 and 7 February 1573.

⁶² Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, and Henri III to Dax, 28 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:568, 576-77; for more on Germigny's failure to continue his trip, see chap. 5, pp. 214-217.

⁶³ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 November 1594, 20 March 1595, 21 September 1595, 5 February 1596, 9 March 1596, 17 June 1596, all in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:252-253, 321, 408, 497, 523-524, 602.

⁶⁴ BNF, Français 20343, fol. 106r, Sokollu Mehmed to Charles IX, 15 July 1573.

⁶⁵ Allen, *Post and Courier Service*, 86.

⁶⁶ See his correspondence in BNF, Français 7092; also Allen, *Post and Courier Service*, 66.

1562 that the Venetian *bailo* had received three or four packets of letters, and he received none. He concluded the Venetians were withholding his packets from the French ambassador in Venice, Jean Hurault de Boistaillé.⁶⁷ In the 1580s, Henri III wrote to his ambassador Germigny explaining that he had not sent letters in a while because the ambassador in Venice, Hurault de Maisse, did not currently have the funds to relay the letters to Constantinople.⁶⁸ The courier relay between France and Constantinople, if regular, posed distinct complications to the diplomacy.

Venice played a vital role in Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. French letters to Constantinople and *vice versa* almost invariably passed through Venice even when they traveled with a dedicated courier. Venice was also a gathering place for information from the Levant. The Venetians and their *bailo* maintained a robust correspondence that could provide a fount of information to the French ambassador in Venice.⁶⁹ One such ambassador, Arnaud du Ferrier, would frequently recount news arriving in Venice from the Levant. Such important events as the departure to the Ottoman capital of a Spanish envoy trying to negotiate peace in the Mediterranean could quickly come from Du Ferrier before the ambassador in Constantinople confirmed it. Even information of the Spanish envoy's provisions for gifts to Ottoman notables and his eventual arrest in Ragusa, if temporary, would make its way to the king from Du Ferrier.⁷⁰ Nor was it a rare occurrence for the

⁶⁷ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 148r, Pétre mol to Boistaillé, 13 September 1562.

⁶⁸ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 159r, Henri III to Germigny, 11 November 1583.

⁶⁹ For more on the Venetian *bailo*, see Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

⁷⁰ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fols. 565, 589, 630, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 3 January 1579; Du Ferrier to Henri III, 7 February 1579; Du Ferrier to Henri III, 17 April 1579.

French king to write his ambassador in Venice with a message for his Ottoman ambassador.⁷¹

The French ambassador in Venice himself frequently sent orders to the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire directly. Hurault de Maisse was especially active in this respect. In the late 1580s, the French crown hoped that the Ottomans would send out their fleet against Spain. De Maisse gave directives for the ambassador Lancosme to suppress a rivalry he had with the English ambassador in Constantinople, which developed years before over diplomatic prestige, and work with him to further French interests: “It would be expedient and useful,” De Maisse explained, “if the Grand Seigneur [Murad III] sent out his fleet this year as you have notified me and as the ... the Queen of England has made similar efforts.... Since our interests are common here, it would not be a bad idea to pursue this command with the English ambassador.”⁷² Later, when Lancosme rebelled against Henri IV, De Maisse played an integral role in recognizing the ambassador’s treason and notifying the Ottomans of it. De Maisse first wrote Henri IV, but when he had not received a response, he wrote directly to the grand vizier and promised the king would send a new ambassador soon. He then ordered the consuls in Chios, Tripoly, and Alexandria to disregard Lancosme and serve the legitimate King Henri IV.⁷³

⁷¹ See BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 103, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 18 March 1573; BNF Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fols. 663, 695-696, Henri III to Du Ferrier, 14 April 1579, Henri III to Du Ferrier, 20 July 1579; BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol 86. Du Ferrier to Henri III, 6 June 1580.

⁷² BNF, Français 16091, fols. 625v-626r, De Maisse to Lancosme, 3 January 1588; for more on the Franco-English rivalry see chaps. 6 and 7, pp. 242-252 and 280-293.

⁷³ BNF, NAF 6982, fols. 23, 34, 170-172, De Maisse to Henri IV, 24 June 1589, 30 July 1589, 16 May 1590; see also Michel Lesure, “Les Relations Franco-Ottomanes à L’Épreuve Des Guerres de Religion (1560-1594),” in *L’Empire Ottoman, La République de Turquie et La France*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1986), 52–57.

The ambassadors in Venice and Constantinople often maintained a regular correspondence, but it has unfortunately survived only in fragments. We usually only get hints of it from their letters to the king. Jean Dolu (agent, 1560-1561) and Antoine de Pétremol both frequently communicated with François de Noailles and Jean Hurault de Boistaillé when they were ambassadors in Venice. Dolu sought advice from the bishop of Dax on navigating the troubled waters that were the Franco-Ottoman alliance after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559).⁷⁴ The response from Noailles was less than optimistic: “gifts will do miracles there,” but the advisers in charge were not interested in that route.⁷⁵ Pétremol’s correspondence with Boistaillé was extensive. Pétremol frequently used Boistaillé as an intermediary with the French court on such vital matters as remediating the debts of his predecessor Dolu.⁷⁶ They had a rather cordial relationship. Boistaillé asked Pétremol to find a series of Greek books for him, to which the agent agreed.⁷⁷

The distance variable played a significant role in shaping French diplomacy with the Ottomans. It could cause significant delays in the arrival of ambassadors in Constantinople that were only exacerbated by the Wars of Religion, and it caused a significant delay in communication. There were always months of delay before receiving a response to a letter. The ambassador in Venice was an essential facet in trying to overcome these obstacles, and he generally did an excellent job of facilitating communication, especially when the ambassador embraced the role and acted when necessary.

⁷⁴ Dolu to Dax, 5 February 1561, in *Négociations*, 2:648.

⁷⁵ Dax to Dolu, 9 February 1561, in *Négociations*, 2:648-49n1

⁷⁶ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 40r, Pétremol to Boistaillé, 19 September 1561.

⁷⁷ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 100v, Pétremol to Boistaillé, 4 April 1562.

Frenchmen in the Ottoman Empire

As the ambassador and his entourage arrived in Constantinople, they contributed to a substantial French presence in the Ottoman Empire. The embassy itself in Constantinople was a place of significant French interaction. The French ambassadors' entourage could be numerous, but these were not the only Frenchmen in Constantinople. When French ambassadors arrived, they found a group of diplomats at the embassy that had become a sort of professional group residing there over multiple ambassadorial tenures. In addition, a series of temporary envoys, important messengers, and regular couriers traveled between France and the Ottoman Empire, residing in Constantinople for various durations. Beyond Constantinople, French consuls held offices around the Ottoman Empire to support French merchants and others sailing under the French flag, but they were only loosely connected to the French crown.

When French ambassadors left France, they brought with them a retinue of followers that were part of their clientele network and supported the ambassador in Constantinople. These entourages varied in size based on the ambassador. For instance, the retinue of Jacques Savary de Lancosme included twelve nobles and an unknown number of non-nobles.⁷⁸ The ambassador in Venice reported that Jacques de Germigny "is leaving very well and honorably accompanied by many French gentlemen from good houses."⁷⁹ The best list of a retinue comes from the account of the embassy of Salignac. Salignac brought thirty-three men with him. Many of these were simply members of his retinue. Others had official capacities. He brought three

⁷⁸ BNF, Français 15870, fol. 252r.

⁷⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fol. 666, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 26 June 1579.

secretaries, two *valets* of the wardrobe, two cooks, three servants, a chaplain, *maistre d'hôtel*, falconer, *valet de chambre*, treasurer, surgeon, cook, pastry cook, *sommelier*, and a *dragoman* (translator). Four more attendants joined the retinue in Venice.⁸⁰ His entourage was extensive and demanded significant coin to maintain it in Constantinople.

It is not clear how representative Salignac's retinue is of other embassies. Records relating to ambassadorial retinues are difficult to find. For instance, in the list of Lancosme's entourage, only the nobles are listed, all other commoners that comprised the rest of the retinue likely fulfilling important positions are left out. We do not have any documentation on the extent of the retinue of François de Noailles, bishop of Dax. But from a collection of letters and the book left by one of its members *Le Voyage de Levant*, we can piece together some of his entourage while understanding that many remain invisible. The bishop of Dax brought his secretary Monsieur Massiot, his cousin Monsieur de Montagnac, Monsieur de Marillac, Monsieur de Presault, the author of the book Philippe du Fresne-Canaye along with his cousin Monsieur Perrot, who were unimportant hangers-on.⁸¹ We should assume that the retinue was much larger than these names listed. For instance, there must have been others like Du Fresne-Canaye and his cousin who attached themselves to the embassy unofficially, but they only enter the record because one of them was the author of it. For instance, in addition to these two members of the entourage, the bishop also took two young men with him to learn the Turkish language at the

⁸⁰ Julien Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron de Salignac: 1605 à 1610*, ed. Théodore de Gontaut-Biron, 2 vols. (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1888-1889), 1:18-19.

⁸¹ See Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 2-4, 7, 19, 50-51, 82.

embassy.⁸² These embassies could also include—although infrequently—the direct family members of the ambassadors and agents. Jean Dolu brought his family with him to Constantinople for his short tenure as ambassador. After the ambassador's death, their return to France became an important part of settling Dolu's affairs.⁸³ Members of the ambassadors' extended family were a more common presence in the entourage. Of the twelve nobles in Lancosme's retinue, five were either his cousins or nephews.⁸⁴ Two of the attendants of Salignac were family members.⁸⁵

When the ambassadorial retinue arrived, they were greeted with an already present household. Ambassadorial secretaries and a variety of other agents maintained a constant presence at the embassy. The more significant actors of this menagerie were the secretaries and copyists. When Jean Dolu died, his secretary Antoine de Pétre mol became the new *chargé d'affaires*, and he then appointed his secretary from within the household of the embassy, a certain *Sieur* Devetz.⁸⁶ When François de Noailles returned to Constantinople in 1573, the secretary he left in charge of the embassy's affairs M. de Preseault along "with his troupe" greeted the bishop of Dax and his entourage outside the walls of Pera (Gelata), the suburb of Constantinople where the Christian European embassies resided.⁸⁷ These individuals maintained much of the diplomatic paper associated with the embassies. In the early 1590s, the copying clerk of the Catholic Leaguer Jacques Savary de Lancosme

⁸² SHD Vincennes, A⁴, fol. 2r, Règlement fait aux Finances du Roy pour mondit s^{er} d'Acqs en ladite charge et ambassade.

⁸³ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 38v, 60v-61r, Pétre mol to Boistaillé, 18 September 1561; Pétre mol to Catherine de Medici, 25 November 1561.

⁸⁴ BNF, Français 15870, fol. 252r.

⁸⁵ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 18-19.

⁸⁶ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 3r, Pétre mol to Catherine de Medici, 15 July 1561.

⁸⁷ Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage du Levant*, 50-51.

abandoned him, taking many incriminating papers to the ambassador's nephew and rival François Savary de Brèves who supported Henri IV during their rivalry.⁸⁸

Included in the household were the *dragomans* (translators), perhaps some of the most integral members in mediating Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. The number of *dragomans* maintained regularly is hard to tell. It was certainly more than one because the ambassadors always refer to them in the plural, and there was a certain hierarchy of the position whereby they referred to the “premier *dragoman*.”⁸⁹ During the affairs of Pétremol, he maintained two *dragomans*.⁹⁰ This pattern appears to be an accurate picture for much of the period under study, but it is apparent that the French crown was investing in their *dragomans*, which is clear from the two young men sent to Constantinople attached to the bishop of Dax's embassy “to learn the Turkish language.”⁹¹ The embassy certainly had to maintain more than one because they periodically accompanied Ottoman envoys to France. Such was the case of Gabriel de Bourgoigne, who was previously a page in the house of the Duchess of Castelheuraux.⁹² The court even wrote directly to the *dragomans* at times, but these letters do not exist except through reference in diplomatic correspondence.⁹³

Along with these official members of the ambassador's household were the servant staff. We only rarely learn about them. For instance, the servants of Lancosme appear in correspondence only when his behavior precipitated their arrest

⁸⁸ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 4 May 1591, in *CSPVenice*, ed. Horatio Brown et al., 38 vols. (London: HMSO, 1864-1947), 8:545.

⁸⁹ See for instance SHD Vincennes, A14, fol. 4r, Reglement fait aux Finances du Roy pour mondiet Sgr d'Acqs en ladite charge et ambassade.

⁹⁰ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 128r, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 16 June 1562.

⁹¹ SHD Vincennes, A14, fol. 4r, Reglement fait aux Finances du Roy pour mondiet Sgr d'Acqs en ladite chare et ambassade.

⁹² BNF, Français 16143, fol. 125r, Germigny to Henri III, 10 June 1581.

⁹³ See for instance BNF, Français 3954, fol. 54r, Juyé to Simon Fizes, 13 August 1578.

in Constantinople while he hid in an abandoned house after concerns about his espionage for Spain were substantiated.⁹⁴ The Venetian *bailo's* household, after which the French ambassadors modeled their own, fluctuated between twenty-five and thirty-five attendants. For example, the *bailo* employed a barber, doctor, chaplain, as well as various servants, squires, pages, and couriers.⁹⁵ The embassy of Salignac, which maintained an entourage of thirty-three men, indicates that the French employed similar positions and that the French embassy could reach the same numbers as the *bailo's* household. He employed a chaplain, several servants, multiple cooks, a *sommelier*, and others.⁹⁶

We should imagine the French embassy similarly as Kristen Neuschel has depicted noble households in sixteenth-century France. She describes the regular household as having “five or eight noble associates, one or two secretaries, an almoner, and finally an array of skilled and unskilled workers.” This characterization aligns with the documentation we have on the ambassadors’ households. The noble households were also a place of extensive coming and going that left them at times woefully empty, and other times dramatically full depending on the natural coming and going of attendants and noble visitations.⁹⁷ While the embassy was never empty, its numbers could dramatically increase through the coming and going of short-term agents from France.

⁹⁴ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 11 May 1592, in *CSPVenice*, 9:28-29.

⁹⁵ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 32.

⁹⁶ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron de Salignac*, 18-19.

⁹⁷ Kristen B. Neuschel, “Noble Households in the Sixteenth Century: Material Settings and Human Communities,” *French Historical Studies* 15, no. 4 (1988): 604-610, quotation on 604.

A variety of short-term temporary agents, either with business with the French or under the crown's patronage, stayed at the French embassy. These could include special envoys sent with short-term missions. For instance, in 1561 and 1562, the French crown sent François de Salviati to Constantinople as a special envoy to negotiate the release of some Spanish prisoners as a favor to Philip II, whose friendship the crown was courting. Salviati's mission never gained traction in Constantinople, and he left after residing at the embassy for three months in 1562.⁹⁸ After Salviati's mission, Sampietro Corso arrived in Constantinople with letters from the crown supporting him. His mission was ambiguous, nevertheless. Pétremol originally thought he came to Constantinople to help negotiate the release of the prisoners, but he quickly realized that Sampietro Corso sought material aid for the Corsican revolt against Genoa with the support of France.⁹⁹ During his mission, he resided at the French embassy and was permitted the use of the French dragomans.¹⁰⁰ His retinue provides insight into the size of the entourages that attended these temporary missions that we only gain access to because Pétremol was frustrated by Sampietro and complained about the expense his presence produced. Sampietro maintained a household of fourteen at the French embassy that Pétremol had to support for six months.¹⁰¹

Others traveled to the Ottoman Empire on their own business that acquired the support of the crown. A certain Conte Prosper d'Atheine traveled to

⁹⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 90r-99r, 118r-124v. A series of letters from De Pétremol to Boistailé and Catherine de Medici from March to June 1562. Pétremol first learned about Salviati's dispatch in November 1561, see BNF, Français 7092, fols. 54v-55r, 20 November 1561.

⁹⁹ See Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 4:835-836.

¹⁰⁰ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 177r, Pétremol to Boistailé, 5 February 1563; he arrived in November 1562, see BNF, Français 7092, fol. 158v-159r, Pétremol to Boistailé, 13 November 1562.

¹⁰¹ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 198r, Pétremol to Boistailé; 15 May 1563.

Constantinople in 1574 with letters from the king supporting his mission as well as letters from Charles duke of Mayenne asking the French ambassador to let him reside at the embassy during his business. The duke of Mayenne also asked that the ambassador support D'Atheine's mission as if it were Mayenne's.¹⁰² Some of these agents were personal representatives. The French ambassador in Venice, Jean Hureault de Boistaillé, sought certain Greek books and a portrait of the famed Ottoman *kapudan* pasha Heyreddin Barbarossa from Pétremol, so he sent a certain Monsieur de Longueil to reside at the French embassy and return with the items Pétremol was able to acquire.¹⁰³

We could add to this number the proliferating French trade during the Wars of Religion that counter-intuitively grew during the chaotic period. Since this is a study of diplomacy, we do not need to go into detail about the merchant presence in the Ottoman Empire. It is sufficient to indicate that French trade was growing during the period. The Ottoman-Venetian war between 1570 and 1573 provided a void for French trade to fill immediately after the confirmation of the French Capitulations in 1569. In the 1540s and 1550s, Franco-Ottoman trade had increased dramatically, with imports valued around 8.5 million *écus*. The growth in trade only grew during the 1570s. Customs taxes in Marseille increased from 7,000 to 8,000 *livres* in 1570 to 13,000, 15,000, and 19,000 *livres* in 1571, 1572, and 1573 respectively. France's Mediterranean merchant fleet grew from around twenty vessels in 1535 to between

¹⁰² SHD Vincennes, A¹8, fol. 15r, Charles duke of Mayenne to the abbot of L'Isle, 9 May 1574. This letter references the letters from the king to the sultan and the grand vizier.

¹⁰³ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 132r, De Pétremol to Boistaillé, 16 June 1562.

one and two hundred ships by 1583.¹⁰⁴ This proliferation of French trade placed copious merchants in the Levant and North Africa, and not the least of all in Constantinople.

To accommodate this growing merchant presence in the Ottoman lands, the French court in collaboration in the Marseille chamber of commerce and the French ambassador in Constantinople appointed consuls throughout the critical trade cities in the Levant and North Africa. The first French consul was established in Alexandria in the 1530s, and others were established in Tripoli in 1548, Algiers in 1565, Tunis in 1577, Chios no later than 1579, and Aleppo in 1583, but the appointment of these positions filled only erratically until after 1585.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, we do not have much information on the Consuls during this period.

The appointment process was the product of cooperation between the French king, his ambassador in Constantinople, and the Marseillaise chamber of commerce. As Viorel Panaite has demonstrated, this was an elaborate process whereby the proposed consul was nominated by Marseille and confirmed by the king of France then proposed by the ambassador to the sultan who formally recognized the new consul by granting him an imperial diploma (*berat-i hümayun*) that “stipulated the consul’s functions, rights, and privileges.”¹⁰⁶ A vice-consul was also appointed in

¹⁰⁴ See Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks,” 460-464; also Raymond Collier and Joseph Billioud, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, 7 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1949-1966), 3:198-199, 333, 439-449.

¹⁰⁵ Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks,” 460-464; Viorel Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction in Egypt and Aleppo in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, eds. Pascal Firges et. al. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 74-75; Paul Masson, *Histoire des établissements et du commerce français dans l’Afrique barbaresque, 1560-1793 (Algérie, Tunisie, Tripolitaine, Maroc)* (Paris: Hachette, 1903); see also BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 5r-6r, Henri III to Germigny, 17 July 1579, on the appointment of the consul of Chios after the death of his predecessor Thomas Randy.

¹⁰⁶ See Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction,” 76.

many cases. For instance, a certain Sieur Bionneau was the vice-consul in Algiers.¹⁰⁷ The appointment process of the vice-consul is not clear, but the position was formal enough that Henri III complained about his vice-consul's treatment to the pasha of Algiers directly as well as to the sultan through his ambassador.¹⁰⁸

What we can say for sure is that the consuls were frequently farmed out to industrious individuals who were not necessarily Frenchmen, who did not necessarily represent France uniquely, who did not permanently reside at their post, and who often maintained the position for long periods until exceptional events precipitated their dismissal. Paulo Mariani encapsulated all these characteristics. He was a Venetian who held the position of consul in Egypt from 1591 to 1596. He was also the taxing master and consul for England in Egypt. Indeed, one would better describe Mariani as an English representative than a French one. At one point, the Venetian *bailo* referred to Mariani as "a member of the English ambassador's household."¹⁰⁹ Another *bailo* referred to Mariani as one of the English ambassador's "chief councillors."¹¹⁰ As these two statements would indicate, Mariani was never present in Egypt around this time. He spent much of his time in Constantinople. The double-dipping by Mariani was not enough to get the consul removed from his position. The French ambassador de Brèves frequently complained about Mariani's activities, and they clashed frequently.¹¹¹ These clashes produced a dramatic flurry of

¹⁰⁷ See Henri III to Germigny, 12 October 1583, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 6:128.

¹⁰⁸ See Henri III to Germigny, 12 October 1583, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 6:128.

¹⁰⁹ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 4 May 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:129.

¹¹⁰ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, in *CSPVenice*, 9:59.

¹¹¹ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 236r, de Brèves to Henri IV, 10 July 1594.

letters whereby both men decried the other's activities.¹¹² Despite these troubles, Mariani was only discredited when de Brèves learned of Mariani's espionage for Spain while performing his duties for both England and France. From the information de Brèves provided, the Ottoman authorities executed him.¹¹³ How Mariani acquired his position is unclear from the sources, but it is apparent that he was not a French bureaucrat. He was a self-interested entrepreneur holding multiple offices with competing interests.

While Mariani was an extreme case, he was not the only consul that represented these characteristics. Christophe Vento came from a prominent Genoese family that immigrated to Marseille. He acquired the Consulate of Alexandria from 1570 until at least 1583. Nevertheless, he frequently acted as a courier between France and Constantinople despite his consulship.¹¹⁴ Some of the consulates became the virtual property of families. Viorel Panaite indicates that this was the case with Aleppo. The consulate there remained the possession of the Rénier family from 1548 until the early seventeenth century.¹¹⁵ Some members of the Rénier family also held the office of the consulate of Tripoli in the 1560s.¹¹⁶ These long tenures were the norm for the consulates in the sixteenth century. Viorel Panaite describes three reasons that consuls changed: they were forcefully removed due to extreme

¹¹² BNF, Français 16144, sol. 216r-226v, Mariani to De Maisse, 4 May 1594; *Memoriale delle particolar ationi del sr de Brèves verso il console Mariani*, 10 May 1594, *Memoires de Paul Mariani consul d'escripte contre le sr de Brèves*, 10 May 1594.

¹¹³ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 24 December 1596, in *CSPVenice*, 9:247; see also Panaite, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction," 76-77.

¹¹⁴ See Henri III to Germigny, 1 February 1583 and 5 December 1583, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 6 :14, 161; also Artefeuil, *Histoire heroique et universelle de la noblesse de Provence, Marseille*, vol. 2 (Avignon: François Saguin, 1776), 484-488.

¹¹⁵ Panaite, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction," 77.

¹¹⁶ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 179r, Pétremol to De Boistaillé, 11 February 1563 refers to the Consul Rénier in Tripoly being useful to him.

situations such as espionage as in the example of Mariani; they arbitrarily abandoned the position; or they died.¹¹⁷

The French diplomatic presence throughout the Ottoman Empire, especially in Constantinople, was extensive and continuous. The retinue of the ambassador himself could easily have included up to thirty people, and this does not count the semi-permanent staff that had to perform all the non-diplomatic duties that kept the embassy running. In addition, Frenchmen were coming and going, and they could place a significant strain on the resources of the French embassy. With letters from the king, they could stay in the embassy sometimes with their own extensive retinues that the ambassador had to feed. The French embassy in Constantinople was a conduit for French activity in the Ottoman Empire.

The Costs of Diplomacy

Supporting all these people at the French embassy was an expensive endeavor. So, how were the ambassadors' activities financially supported? Unfortunately, we do not have much information on this issue, and the records of the *trésorier d'épargne* were not well preserved during the Wars of Religion. Luckily, we have a few account books preserved from the embassy of Jacques de Germigny—including one that is abnormally detailed—and one from the embassy of Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle. Combined with some orders from the king to the bishop of Dax and various other miscellaneous letters with references to their finances, we can piece together the financial costs associated with France's Ottoman diplomacy. What

¹¹⁷ Panaite, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction," 76-77.

comes through clearly is that the Franco-Ottoman alliance demanded a capital-intensive investment from the French treasury for its maintenance.

One of the challenges of understanding this topic results from the inherent complexity of the French monetary system, the variety of coins used in regular exchange, and their fluctuating relationship to one another due to increasing inflation during the second half of the sixteenth century. The three monetary units of account in France were the *livre*, the *sol*, and the *denier* denominated in the following way: 20 *sols* to 1 *livre tournois*, and 12 *deniers* to 1 *sol*. But the primary coin used in these endeavors was the gold *écu*, which fluctuated wildly relative to these units of account from 1 *écu* to 50 *sols* in 1561 to 1 *écu* to 60 *sols* in 1577. The money of account did not reflect a physical coin until the *écu* was made the official money of account in 1577 and set the value at 3 *livres tournois* (60 *sols*).¹¹⁸ So, the royal treasury might owe one of its ambassadors 5,000 *livres tournois* and pay them in 2,000 *écus* in 1561, but 1,666.66 *écus* in 1578. These are, however, at best guidelines because real exchange of currency was always fluctuating, especially internationally.

The exchange was made more complicated by the use of multiple coins from multiple countries. For instance, the account books of Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle, for the period of 1574 to 1577 referenced the traditional French coin of the *écu*, alongside the Florentine *florin* and *gros* (infrequently), the Imperial *thaler*, and the Ottoman *asper*. All of which were then converted into *livres tournois* and *sols* in

¹¹⁸ On the conversions, see Jotham Parsons, *Making Money in Sixteenth-Century France: Currency, Culture, and the State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 6 and especially chap. 3. This calculation remains rough because as Parsons indicates later in the book France experienced inflation and readjustment throughout the Wars of Religion. The inflation primarily influenced the *écu-sol* conversion. See pp. 134-145.

their final summaries of accounts. The default coinage by far was the Imperial *thaler* denominated into forty Ottoman *aspers*, but no single money of account had a monopoly on exchange. For instance, one account noted the receipt of 5,615 *thalers* 7 *aspers* in addition to 100 *écus* to total 5,819 *thalers* 39 *aspers*.¹¹⁹ From my calculations from the abbot of L'Isle's conversions in his accounts, one *thaler* converted to two *livres*, and one *asper* converted roughly to one *sol*.¹²⁰ Both Eric Dursteler and Emrah Gürkan have referred to the international nature of Constantinople in terms of intelligence gathering and social interactions.¹²¹ To this characterization, we must add that it was a place of tremendous financial inter-mixing.

As one might imagine, balancing these books between various coins was immensely complicated, and indeed they were not always balanced accurately. Perhaps, this complication could have been intentional if he planned to send these accounts back to the French court for reimbursement, but this was not the case. This account book was a summary left to the *chargé d'affaires* Sébastien de Juyé (agent, 1579), who remained in the abbot of L'Isle's place at his departure. Accuracy was tantamount for maintaining an ongoing balance of expenditures and remittance from the French treasury. The balance of debts to remittance for each year equates, but the summaries of total annual receipts from the treasury—which were delivered in *thalers* and *aspers* and then converted into *livres tournois*—do not match any

¹¹⁹ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁸, fol. 1r-3r, the referenced account can be found on 2r.

¹²⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁸, fol. 1v-2r.

¹²¹ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, chap. 6; Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry" (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2012)ç

account.¹²² Keeping account of the costs of Ottoman diplomacy was thus a complicated affair, especially when one considers the inflation France experienced throughout the Wars of Religion.¹²³ To avoid this complication, Jacques de Germigny kept track of his expenses exclusively in *aspers* presumably to avoid the multiple conversions associated with the use of thalers and aspers. Most of Germigny's books balanced.¹²⁴

What becomes clear from these accounts is that embassies operated perpetually on credit and were almost always indebted. While the crown sent their ambassadors money and indeed provided them with a regular stipend, which we will discuss later, the money was usually earmarked to pay off accumulated debts established by the ambassador. The arrangement followed a regular pattern. The ambassador took out debts in Constantinople from local creditors based on his expected stipend from the treasury. These debts were then paid down periodically as the treasury remitted payments to the ambassador in Constantinople. Since the money from the treasury was spent paying back accumulated debts, the ambassador then took out another round of debt from local creditors to support their endeavors, and the cycle continued. For instance, Henri IV promised to “reimburse [François Savary de Brèves for] the other advances you have taken to sustain your charge and my affairs”¹²⁵ When Jean Dolu died in 1560, one of the common refrains of his replacement Antoine de Pétremol was the need to resolve the late agent's debts. Indeed, the debts had accumulated since the time of Michel de Codignac, the

¹²² SHD Vincennes, A¹8, fol. 1r-3r.

¹²³ See Parsons, *Making Money in Sixteenth-Century France*, chap. 3.

¹²⁴ See BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 255r-266r.

¹²⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 September 1595, in *Receueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, vol. 4, 405.

ambassador in the early 1550s. Pétremol reported that the debts left by Dolu were no less than 5,000 *écus* (roughly 12,500 *livres tournois*).¹²⁶ This debt was massive for an individual. For comparison, it was the same as the salary of a provincial governor, a position generally held by one of the highest members of the nobility.¹²⁷ The accounts of Gilles de Noailles continually referred to the amount still owed after remittance from the royal treasury, although these debts never reached the level of Dolu.¹²⁸

Rarely did these amounts grow too great after the 1560s when France's outstanding debt led to a standoff with a prominent Jewish banker in Constantinople, Joseph Nasi. The sultan granted Nasi a *firman* (imperial order) to confiscate French shipping in and out of Alexandria to repay a debt owed to him by France. It is not fully clear if the debt came from his time in France or the debts ambassadors accumulated from him in Constantinople.¹²⁹ Regardless, the debts to Nasi were hardly the only ones that existed. The debts from Dolu and his predecessors grew so great that Pétremol had to sell one of the houses a previous ambassador Michel de Codignac purchased for the French embassy.¹³⁰ Pétremol complained that the gages of his dragomans had been in arrears for the past two years. To appease them, François Salviati paid them 120 *écus* (300 *livres tournois*) each in order to make use of them during his attempted negotiation for some prisoners held by the Ottomans.¹³¹ Comparatively, the French embassy was on a

¹²⁶ BNF, Français 7092, 61r, De Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 25 November 1561. In 1561, the *sol* converted to 50 *écus*.

¹²⁷ See Parsons, *Making Money*, 21.

¹²⁸ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁸, fol. 2v-3r.

¹²⁹ For more on the Nasi affair, see chap. 4, pp. 175-178.

¹³⁰ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 64v, Pétremol to d'Alluye, 25 November 1561.

¹³¹ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 81v, 82a, 128r, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 12 February 1562, Pétremol to d'Alluye, 12 February 1562, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 16 June 1562.

much better footing after those problems were resolved by the French treasurer Claude du Bourg, who also negotiated the French Capitulations in 1569.¹³² For instance, Gilles de Noailles left the embassy indebted only 56 *thalers* 6.5 *aspers* (or 112 *livres* 6.5 *sols*) at the end of his embassy in 1577, which became the concerns of the agent he left in his place Sebastian de Juyé until the next ambassador arrived.¹³³

So how much were these ambassadors spending if they were perpetually indebted? The answer to this question depends. Table 2 provides insight into the received funds from the royal treasury, the expenses of ambassadors, and the available total French spending on all ambassadors abroad. The abbot of L'Isle appears as a particularly frugal ambassador. He typically spent between 10,000 and 12,000 *livres tournois* per year during his four-year tenure.¹³⁴ It is not entirely clear if these accounts are complete, however. In an account book of his yearly payments to maintain his household, L'Isle spent 4,122 *livres* per annum on his household alone, or 37 percent of his total spending. Jacques de Germigny, by comparison, spent 14,279 *écus* 17 *sols* 6 *deniers* (or roughly over 42,837 *livres*) in his final year in Constantinople in 1584. This amounted to Germigny's highest level of spending. In his first year, which included spending on initial gifts, Germigny spent 29,004 *livres*.¹³⁵ The only the other years of expense accounts are substantially lower, but they were incomplete. The 1582 accounts only include spending on gifts (4,758

¹³² For more on Claude du Bourg, see chap. 4, pp. 178-184.

¹³³ SHD Vincennes, A¹8, fol. 3v.

¹³⁴ SHD Vincennes, A¹8, fol. 1r.

¹³⁵ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 255r-266r lists his expenses as 14,493 *livres* 30 *sols* (not including gifts); fols 211r-212r lists his initial presents costing a total of 14,511 *livres* (totaling 29004 lt 30 s).

livres), and the 1583 accounts only include spending on provisions, letters, and special couriers (9,594 *livres*).¹³⁶

The embassy of L'Isle's predecessor and brother François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, provides us with the expectations the French court had for the expenses of the ambassador. In a declaration of the ambassador's stipend from the crown, Dax received 25,000 *livres* per year for his regular expenses as well as an extra 5,000 *livres* remitted immediately and repeated every half year to pay for the maintenance of the ambassadorial residence and to purchase gifts.¹³⁷ Compared with Germigny's accounts, Dax's 35,000 *livres* a year appears to be closer to the typical amount an ambassador in Constantinople would spend despite being more than double L'Isle's accounts. This estimation appears accurate when one considers the individual accounts of the household of L'Isle (4,122 *livres*) combined with Germigny's accounts for gifts in the middle of his tenure (4,758 *livres*), and accounts for provisions and couriers (9,594 *livres*), totaling 18,747 *livres*. None of these accounts seem to include the 2-8 *écus per diem* (depending on the ambassador) that the Ottoman sultan granted ambassadors, which works out to 730-2,929 *écus* per year (or 1,825-7,300 *livres tournois*).¹³⁸ So, French spending in Constantinople was substantial.

¹³⁶ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 210r, 240r-v.

¹³⁷ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 4r. Reglement fait aux Finances du Roy pour mondict Sg^r d'Acqs en ladite charge et ambassade.

¹³⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 70v, reports Dolu's *per diem* as 100 sols, or 2 *écus* exchanging at 50 sols per *écu* in 1561; Français 7091, fol. 115r, bishop of Dax to Charles IX, 8 July 1572, referenced his expected *per diem* from the Sultan as 8 *écus*; Du Fresne-Canaye, *La Voyage du Levant*, 58-59, reported the *per diem* Dax received as 4 *écus*.

| Ambassador | Year | Funds Received | Expenses | French Spending on all embassies ¹³⁹ |
|--|------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| François de Noailles, bishop of Dax ¹⁴⁰ | 1570 | ---- | ---- | 89,000 lt. |
| | 1571 | 35,000 lt. | ---- | ---- |
| | 1572 | 35,000 lt. | ---- | ---- |
| | 1573 | 37,500 lt. ¹⁴¹ | ---- | ---- |
| Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle ¹⁴² | 1574 | 12,596 lt. 4 s. | 11,638 lt. 39 s. | ---- |
| | 1575 | 10,030 lt. 11 s. | 11,490 lt. 36 s. | ---- |
| | 1576 | 10,796 lt. 15 s. | 9,972 lt. 13 s. | 95,800 lt. |
| | 1577 | 11,348 lt. 19 s. | 11,360 lt. 32.5 s. | ---- |
| Jacques de Germigny | 1580 | ---- | 29,004 lt. 30s. ¹⁴³ | ---- |
| | 1581 | ---- | ---- | 227,700 lt. |
| | 1582 | ---- | 4,758 lt. (gifts only) ¹⁴⁴ | ---- |
| | 1583 | ---- | 9,594 lt. 32 s. ¹⁴⁵ | ---- |
| | 1584 | ---- | 42,837 lt. 17 s. ¹⁴⁶ | ---- |

Table 2. Ambassadorial Accounts of Expenses and Receipts

When we compare the French investment in its Ottoman embassy to other embassies, it becomes clear that the Ottomans were not only a core member of France's diplomatic calculus but it was also one of the most important—at least if investment is indicative of significance. For instance, a list of accounts sent to ambassadors provided in Table 3 indicate the significance of the Ottoman embassy in

¹³⁹ BNF, Dupuy 848, fols. 60r-85r. I would like to thank James B. Collins for sharing this data with me.

¹⁴⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁴, fol. 4r.

¹⁴¹ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁷, fols. 167r-v.

¹⁴² SHD Vincennes, A¹⁸, fols. 1r-3v.

¹⁴³ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 255r-266r lists his expenses as 14,493 *livres* 30 *sols* (not including gifts); fols 211r-212r lists his initial presents costing a total of 14,511 *livres* (totaling 29004 lt 30 s).

¹⁴⁴ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 210r. The actual value of these gifts were not provided, but in 1580, one robe was valued at 26 *écus*. Applying this value to the 61 total robes Germigny doled out give a value of 1,586 *écus*. This can only be an estimate, however, because it is unlikely that the cost of these robes was stagnant over two years.

¹⁴⁵ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 240r-v. This account is surely incomplete. It only accounts for purchases on provisions, costs of letters, and special couriers.

¹⁴⁶ BNF, NAF 22048, fols 214v-215r.

French spending. The French crown spent 200,000 *livres* on embassies in 1611. The Baron of Sancy, the new ambassador in Constantinople, was the recipient of 45,000 *livres* sent in late March. This sum amounted to 25 percent of French spending on ambassadors that year. By comparison, the embassy in Rome received 14,525 *livres* in late February. The ambassador in England received a quarterly payment of 4,500 *livres* to comprise his annual receipts of 18,000 *livres* from the crown. The ambassador in Spain received 4,200 *livres* in May. And the ambassador to the Swiss received 6,000 *livres* in November and 1,220 *livres* again in December. Much money is missing from these accounts. The sums available only amount to 100,000 *livres*, or 50 percent of the total spending for the year. But the fact that 25 percent of the crown's ambassadorial spending was dedicated to the embassy in Constantinople is telling of its significance.¹⁴⁷

More complete records exist for 1609 (provided in Table 3) that confirm those of 1611. In 1609, the crown once again almost spent 200,000 *livres*. Once again, the Ottomans were at the top of the list. Rome received the greatest investment (42,000 *livres*), but as indicated above, the Papacy held significant power *within* France, so Rome was always an exceptional case. The ambassador in Constantinople received 25,000 *livres*, the second largest investment by the crown. The ambassador in England received 21,600 *livres* (the normal 18,000 *livres* along with an additional installment of 3,600 *livres*). The ambassador to the Swiss received 18,000 *livres*,

¹⁴⁷ BNF, Dupuy 824, fol. 3r. I thank James B. Collins for providing this source to me.

followed by lesser amounts in descending order to the embassies in the Dutch Provinces, Spain, Venice, the Grisons, and the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁴⁸

| | 1609 ¹⁴⁹ | 1611 ¹⁵⁰ |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Total Ambassadorial Spending | 192,000 lt. | 200,000 lt. |
| Rome | 42,000 lt. | 14,525.5 lt. |
| Ottoman Empire | 25,000 lt. | 45,000 lt. |
| England | 18,000 lt. | 18,000 lt. |
| The Swiss | 18,000 lt. | 6,000 lt. |
| Dutch Provinces | 12,000 lt. | ---- |
| Spain | 9,000 lt. | 4,200 lt. |
| Venice | 9,000 lt. | ---- |
| Grisons | 8,000 lt. | ---- |
| Holy Roman Empire | 6,000 lt. | ---- |
| Brussels | 6,000 lt. | ---- |

Table 3. Payments to French Ambassadors in Various States by Year.

Moreover, these comparisons come from a period when French interest in the military aspects of its Ottoman alliance was waning at the end of Henri IV's reign.¹⁵¹ We might look at the ambassadorial spending around the 1570s and 1580s in Table 2 to see how significant France's investment in its Ottoman diplomacy was. In 1570, the crown spent 89,000 *livres* on ambassadors. Dax's 35,000 *livres* in 1571

¹⁴⁸ BNF, Dupuy 848, fols. 60r-85r.

¹⁴⁹ BNF, Dupuy 824, fol. 3r-6r.

¹⁵⁰ BNF, Dupuy 848, fols. 60r-85r.

¹⁵¹ For more on France's waning interest in the military nature of the Franco-Ottoman alliance, see chap. 7.

amounted to 35 percent of the previous year's total spending on all ambassadors (89,000 *livres*).¹⁵² In 1576, the crown spent 10 percent of its ambassadorial budget on L'Isle, if his accounts are accurate. In the 1580s, French diplomatic spending increased dramatically to 227,700 *livres* in 1581. We do not have figures for Germigny's spending that same year, but if we assume similar spending in 1580 and 1584, the Ottoman embassy received 13 percent of the 1581 diplomatic budget in 1580 and 19 percent of the 1581 budget in 1584. While this comparison is far from perfect, it indicates the extensive investment France made in its Ottoman diplomacy. The Franco-Ottoman alliance received a substantial share of resources France dedicated to its diplomatic endeavors. French budgetary priorities indicate that the Ottoman Empire was central to French foreign policy throughout the second half of the sixteenth century.

Yet, these *livres* were almost always spent before they arrived, so how did ambassadors pay their bills? Authors such as Pierre de Bourdeille, *Seigneur* of Brantôme, would lead us to believe that a stipend from the sultan saved the crown expenses spent on the ambassador, but most of this section indicates that this story was nowhere close to the case.¹⁵³ The ambassadors regularly took out debts in Constantinople from people like Joseph Nasi, and they also found loans from Muslim Ottomans such as Mehmed Çelebi, who shows up frequently as a creditor in Jacques de Germigny's account ledgers in the 1580s.¹⁵⁴ Finding such loans was not always an easy task. Sometimes the interest was higher than they were willing to pay. For

¹⁵² BNF, Dupuy 848, fols. 60r-85r.

¹⁵³ Pierre de Bourdeille de Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes de Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantome*, ed. Ludovic Lalanne and Eduard Galy, 11 vols. (Paris: Mme Ve Jules Renouard, 1865-1882), 9:56.

¹⁵⁴ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 255v-257v.

instance, Pétremol complained to his counterpart in Venice about his trouble finding money at a reasonable rate in the 1560s.¹⁵⁵ The ambassadors might also seek out loans from other places such as the Venetian *bailo*, which was the case for de Brèves, who was ultimately rebuffed in 1594.¹⁵⁶ The ambassadors thus sought loans from a motley crew of agents in Constantinople.

Another source of income came from ambassadors' interactions with merchants. Brantôme reported that the ambassadors were able to expand their income from the gifts they received from merchants for their mediation or other services on merchants' behalf.¹⁵⁷ The unusually detailed account book of Germigny in 1580 shows that Brantôme's statement is accurate but deserves qualification. While Brantôme might be correct—and there seems to be some evidence he was—more often, the money came from deceased French merchants, perhaps from a shipwreck, who had no inheritors in the Ottoman Empire. In such a circumstance, the merchandise went to the ambassador or consul. If they could not find an appropriate beneficiary, they then determined how to distribute the products or their proceeds.¹⁵⁸ For instance, the merchandise from the *Barque St. Mary*, which shipwrecked off Gallipoli, brought in a total of 111,647 *aspers* (or around 5,582 *livres*) in goods from which 26,050 *aspers* (or around 1,302 *livres*) went to pay the various fees and costs of its recovery, and the debts against the goods. Germigny used the rest of the provisional income to fund the embassy. For instance, after one of Germigny's

¹⁵⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 110v, De Pétremol to De Boistailé, 15 April 1562.

¹⁵⁶ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 10 December 1594, in *CSP Venice*, vol. 9, 148-149.

¹⁵⁷ Brantôme, *Œuvres complètes*, 9:68-69.

¹⁵⁸ See article V of the 1569 Capitulations in François-Emmanuel Guignard de Saint-Priest, *Mémoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le commerce des Français dans le Levant* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1877), 369-370

attendants, Jehan Aleman, died, and portions of the proceeds from the shipwreck went to pay off his debts at multiple intervals.¹⁵⁹

To diminish the amount of effort the ambassador had to take to maintain his embassy, Henri IV permitted him to take a 2% duty on the merchandise of French merchants trading in Constantinople beginning in 1592.¹⁶⁰ This duty provided a windfall of money to de Brèves, especially after he received permission from the sultan to extract duties from non-Frenchmen trading under the French flag.¹⁶¹ The revenues from this duty grew so great that Henri IV received many complaints. It caused him to seek a report on how much money de Brèves had extracted from the duties.¹⁶² Despite the revenues from the duties, it was not enough to forgo stipends from the Royal treasury. Just one month after Henri IV requested the report, he sent de Brèves another 3,000 *écus* (or 9,000 *livres*).¹⁶³

So, where did this money go? How did these ambassadors spend so much coin? The ruling on the bishop of Dax's stipend provides insight into the standard expenditures of the embassy. Some of the most important expenditures came from paying the embassy's dragomans, the janissaries that protected the embassy, the costs for sending letters and packets, as well as "all other fees that the ambassador might contract doing the services of His Majesty in his Charge and the embassy's

¹⁵⁹ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 255v-257r.

¹⁶⁰ "Lettre de Henri IV accordant aux ambassadeurs de France près de la Porte un droit de 2 % sur les marchandises naviguant sous pavillon," in *La France en Tunisie*, ed. Pierre Grandchamp (Tunis Impr. rapide, 1920), 143-145, quote on 145. See also Panaite, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction," 85-87.

¹⁶¹ See Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:497; Viorel Panaite, "Being a Western Merchant in the Ottoman Mediterranean," in *İsam Konuşmaları: Osmanlı Düşüncesio Ahlakö Hukukö Felsefe-Kalam / İsam Papers: Ottoman Thought, Ethics, Law, Philosophy-Kalam*, ed. Seyfi Kenan (Istanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2013), 102; and Panaite, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction," 86.

¹⁶² Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:497.

¹⁶³ Henri IV to de Brèves, March 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:524.

membership and dependents.” Further funds were provided for Dax’s travel to Constantinople, along with the furnishings of his embassy and the regular “gifts and presents that he should make at his arrival and during his charge.”¹⁶⁴

This description leaves much discretion to the ambassadors, but certain expenditures were predictable and important. For instance, *dragomans* were an integral part of the French embassy, as we have already seen. Their salaries, while not fully clear, were at least 60 *écus* (or 180 *livres*) a year, and likely more if we take François Salviati’s payment of 240 *écus* to placate Pétremol’s two dragomans, whose pay was two years in arrears, as an indicator.¹⁶⁵ The cost of letters and presenting them to the Grand Seigneur was another high cost. In the accounts of Germigny, he listed the cost of sending a packet to his wife at the cost of 1 *écu* 40 *sols* (or roughly 5 *livres*).¹⁶⁶ Perhaps this might not seem to be a large amount, but when one scales it to the volume of letters and packets dispatched in a year, the number grows significantly. Considering Germigny sent at least thirty letters between January and August 1580, and likely more that have not survived, the cost of seven months of letters was 150 *livres*.¹⁶⁷

The more discretionary charges from “the embassy’s membership and dependents” demanded much more substantial funds. As the previous section indicates, the embassy had a significant household and a range of visitors and temporary residents who had to be fed at least and likely receive regular pay. These expenses could quickly add up. Pétremol complained about the presence of

¹⁶⁴ SHD Vincenne, A¹4, fol. 4r.

¹⁶⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 128r, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 16 June 1562.

¹⁶⁶ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 240r.

¹⁶⁷ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 14r-112r.

Sampietro, who resided in the French embassy with his fourteen attendants, and Pétremol only had 500 to 600 écus (1,250 to 1,500 *livres*) to feed them.¹⁶⁸ The pay for other members of the embassy, such as doctors, apothecaries, cooks, and others, could add up as well. For instance, Gilles de Noailles employed an apothecary that he paid 10 *thalers* per quarter, which converted to 80 *livres* a year.¹⁶⁹

The largest expense by far came from gift exchanges at the Ottoman court. Gift-giving was an important aspect of both French and Ottoman diplomacy. It was a formality that represented respect for the Ottoman rulers, and it greased the wheels of diplomacy.¹⁷⁰ Gift-giving played a similar role in official interactions in French society. Cities and towns presented French kings with presents upon his first entry. As Natalie Davis states, the municipal gift was a way to “to make him a friend of the town’ ... ‘to recommend the town and its affairs to him.’”¹⁷¹ This portrayal is an accurate characterization of the gift-ritual at initial audiences with the sultan and his viziers. To this we might add Hedda Reindl-Kiel’s assertion that gifts were part of a diplomatic etiquette that “established not only real value but also what we might call symbolic capital in kind,” it was a representation of the social worth of the recipient.¹⁷²

Some historians have suggested that gift-exchange between Latin Christian countries and the Ottomans were asymmetrically understood. They argue that

¹⁶⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 198r, De Pétremol to De Boistailé, 15 May 1563.

¹⁶⁹ SHD Vincennes, A18, fol. 3v. This conversion is listed in the ledger.

¹⁷⁰ Elias Muhanna, “The Sultan’s New Clothes: Ottoman-Mamluk Gift Exchange in the Fifteenth Century,” *Muqarnas* 27 (2010): 189-207.

¹⁷¹ Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 85.

¹⁷² Hedda Reindl-Kiel, “East is East and West is West, and Sometimes the Twain Did Meet: Diplomatic Gift Exchange in the Ottoman Empire,” in Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki and Rhoads Murphy, *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, 2 vols. (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 2:114.

Ottomans understood gifts as purely status symbols and not reflective of the relationship between the two parties.¹⁷³ They, however, make a mistake in assuming that Europeans imagined interpersonal gift-giving in the same way they imagined diplomatic gift-giving. The French imagined diplomatic gift-giving in much the same way as the Ottomans did. While Reindl-Kiel treats this as a distinguishing mark in how Latin Christendom and the Ottoman world understood gifts—exemplifying how “cultural misunderstanding” frequently accompanied meetings between East and West—one can find many examples of Frenchmen treating gifts similarly as a representation of the recipient’s status.¹⁷⁴ For instance, Jacques de Germigny pressured the Ottomans to hold a departure banquet for him before he returned to France, which had since become *passé*. He declared that he would depart Constantinople without kissing the sultan’s hand if the Ottomans refused him this honor, to which the Ottomans acquiesced.¹⁷⁵ Germigny fully understood that gifts represented the position of the recipient rather than the relationship between the giver and recipient. In his gift list of 1582, the proportion of gifts reflected their station rather than his relationships. For instance, despite the strong relationship between the *kapudan* pasha Uluç Ali and Germigny, Uluç Ali received fewer robes—textiles were the primary gift other than the more precious gifts dedicated to the

¹⁷³ Reindl-Kiel, “East is East and West is West”; Peter Burschel, “A Clock for the Sultan: Diplomatic Gift-Giving from an Intercultural Perspective,” ed. Thomas Ertl, *The Medieval History Journal* 16, no. 2 (2013): 547–63.

¹⁷⁴ Reindl-Kiel, “East is East and West is West,” 121.

¹⁷⁵ Giovanni Francesco Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 3 September 1584, in *CSP Venice*, 8:101.

sultan—than Siyavuş Pasha and the grand vizier Sinan Pasha with whom Germigny had a more complicated relationship.¹⁷⁶

The expenses from this process were extensive. Indeed, when the bishop of Dax negotiated a new treaty between France and the Ottomans in 1572—that was never ratified because of the redirection of French foreign policy from the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre—he introduced a clause that ended the need for perpetual gift giving.¹⁷⁷ In the accounts of Germigny for his initial gifts, the gifts dedicated to the sultan alone cost 1,909 *écus* (5,727 *livres*). The total value of the gifts given to all the recipients was 4,837 *écus* (14,511 *livres*).¹⁷⁸ The initial presents could thus cost the equivalent of the entirety of a year’s budget for the ambassador, and these initial investments in presents do not show up in the account ledgers of Germigny. Gift-giving was not simply a singular experience when one arrived in Constantinople; it was a continuous process, and while the value of these gifts rarely reached the level of initial gifts, they were still substantial. In 1582, Germigny presented a series of gifts to the officials in Constantinople that were valued at around 1,586 *écus* (4,758 *livres*).¹⁷⁹ Henri IV sent de Brèves 3,000 *écus* (9,000 *livres*) dedicated solely to gifts in the middle of his tenure.¹⁸⁰ Even the costs of the

¹⁷⁶ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 210r.

¹⁷⁷ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol. 202, Dax to Charles IX, 2 November 1572, but it is not sent until 29 November 1572 because of a delay in the dispatch of the courier. For more on this issue, see chap. 5, pp. 196-202.

¹⁷⁸ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 211r-212r. The *livre* was officially abolished at this point but continuing to convert.

¹⁷⁹ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 210r. The actual value of these gifts were not provided, but in 1580, one robe was valued at 26 *écus*. Applying this value to the 61 total robes Germigny doled out give a value of 1,586 *écus*. This can only be an estimate, however, because it is unlikely that the cost of these robes was stagnant over two years.

¹⁸⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, March 1596, in *Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV*, 4:524.

presents appropriate for the presentation of a simple letter to the sultan could reach high levels. Pétremol placed the cost for such a ritual at 400 *ducats*.¹⁸¹

Conclusion

The French crown established an entire system to overcome the challenges preventing effective diplomacy with an ally as far away as the Ottoman Empire. The French court did not treat the Ottoman Empire as a peripheral power but an integral part of their foreign policy, investing heavily in an infrastructure to support their alliance. Many of the ambassadors had experience with the Ottoman Empire or as ambassadors elsewhere. At least three ambassadors were resident in the embassy before taking the post, and the bishop of Dax was an ambassador to Venice, which played an important role in mediating between the court and the ambassador in Constantinople. Despite the extensive distance separating the two countries, Frenchmen interacted with the Levant in various ways. Ambassadors brought with them a large entourage; short-term diplomats, and couriers traveled back and forth between France and Constantinople filling the beds of the embassy. This characterization does not even consider the vast numbers of French merchants that increasingly filled the waterways between Marseille and the Ottoman lands.

Supporting this sort of interaction over such long distances demanded, most importantly, intensive capital investment. Besides appropriating the ambassador in Venice as an integral mediator between the Levant and court, the French court set up an agent in Ragusa to further support formal exchange. Most importantly, the court

¹⁸¹ BNF, François 7092, fol. 70v, Pétremol to Boistailé, 25 December 1561.

invested cash into the process. The ambassadors spent large sums of money that could rise far beyond the levels of provincial governor stipends, or half the total annual revenues of a prince of the blood. The gifts alone could reach such sums. These mediations, however, could only go so far. The distance provided not only challenges but also dangers—that only increased with the troubles associated with the Wars of Religion—for the men tasked with the maintenance of the Franco-Ottoman alliance. *En route* to Constantinople, letters were interrupted, and agents were threatened. Antagonists ran the gamut from enemies of the alliance to all the dangers associated with long-distance travel in the sixteenth century. Regardless, the court continued to funnel human and financial capital into their diplomacy with such a powerful international partner. The next chapter will explore how French diplomats overcame these logistical complications in Constantinople, exploiting both the formal and informal channels of diplomacy, to successfully fulfill their mission.

CHAPTER TWO—THE FRENCH DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Having established an extensive network of communication within the Ottoman Empire and across the Mediterranean to support the French embassy, how did the French court leverage the extensive capital used to maintain their presence in Constantinople? How did they make such an investment worthwhile? What did ambassadors do? With whom did they interact? What did diplomacy look like between the French and Ottomans? How did these diplomats support French interests in Constantinople?

Historians of European diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire have traditionally focused on the formulaic audiences grand viziers and sultans granted to ambassadors or the official petitions ambassadors submitted to them. Until recently, historians have ignored the more interactive relations beyond these formal channels either because the old diplomatic historians did not consider them relevant or because they considered the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe operating within separate social-political paradigms, preventing such interactions. Their political cultures were simply incompatible or incommensurable.¹ Recently historians

¹ Bernard Lewis, *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); M. S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494-1618* (Longman Group, 1998), especially chap. 9; A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), focuses on the formal patterns of diplomacy to demonstrate greater integration, but the introduction provides a productive summary of prevailing argument of asymmetrical political and diplomatic cultures between the Ottomans and Christian Europe.

studying Italy and the Ottoman Empire have begun to question this sharp division by emphasizing the informal diplomatic channels that characterized early modern diplomacy. Eric Dursteler, Emrah Gürkan, and Natalie Rothman have shown the various ways Venetians' social relationships with Ottomans supplemented diplomacy, the extensive espionage networks that overlapped the Mediterranean between the Ottomans and Habsburgs, and how *dragomans* (translators) established a place for themselves in the Venetian and Ottoman worlds by emphasizing their trans-imperial identity. Yet, beyond Viorel Panaite's illuminating work on French consuls, the diplomatic experience of the countrymen with the closest alliance with the Ottomans during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remains a noticeable gap in our knowledge of Christian European and Ottoman socio-political interactions.²

We see this argument of asymmetrical political cultures in gift-giving. See Hedda Reindl-Kiel, "East is East and West is West, and Sometimes the Twain Did Meet: Diplomatic Gift Exchange in the Ottoman Empire," in Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki and Rhoads Murphy, *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, vol. 2 (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005). On incommensurability, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 3-9.

² Viorel Panaite, "Being a Western Merchant in the Ottoman Mediterranean," in *İsam Konuşmaları: Osmanlı Düşüncesine Ahlakî Hukukî Felsefe-Kalam / İsam Papers: Ottoman Thought, Ethics, Law Philosophy-Kalam*, ed. Seyfi Kenan (Istanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2013), 91-135; Viorel Panaite, "French Commercial Navigation and Ottoman Law in the Mediterranean According to the Manuscript Turc 130 (Bibliothèque Nationale de France)," *Revue des études Sud-Est Europe* XLVI 1-4 (2008): 253-268; Viorel Panaite, "Western Diplomacy, Capitulations, and Ottoman Law in the Mediterranean. 16th and 17th Centuries: The Diplomatic Section of the Manuscript Turc 130 from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris" in *Erken Klasik Dönemden XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonuna Kadar Osmanlılar ve Avrupa: Seyahat, Karşılıklı ve Etkileşim / The Ottomans and Europe: Travel, Encounter and Interaction from the Early Classical Period until the End of the 18th Century*, ed. Seyfi Kenan (Istanbul: ISAM Publications, 2010), 357-387; Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2012); also Michael Talbot, *British-Ottoman Relations, 1661-1807: Commerce and Diplomatic Practice in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul* (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2017); and Pascal Firges, *French Revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire: Diplomacy, Political Culture, and the Limiting of Universal Revolution, 1792-1798* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

This chapter builds on the work of recent historians to indicate how French ambassadors, and by extension, other Christian diplomats, integrated themselves into the Ottoman political culture in Constantinople. Informal diplomatic channels characterized by factional alliances and back-room meetings with Ottoman notables, as well as the ubiquitous networking during leisure activities and festivals, were fundamental parts of standard diplomacy, just as important as the formal diplomatic channels we are so familiar with such as audiences and Capitulations negotiations. Indeed, the socio-political integration represented in these informal channels was a precondition to have their message heard since the formal conduits of communication were so limited by the grand vizier.

One of the leading approaches in demonstrating the interconnection of the European and Ottoman diplomatic worlds has come from the new diplomatic history's focus on non-traditional actors such as spies, non-accredited envoys, renegades, and even slaves as conduits breaching the formulaic atmosphere of early modern diplomacy.³ This chapter emphasizes that accredited ambassadors participated in these same sorts of informal channels of diplomacy, integrating themselves into the factional politics of Constantinople. There were multiple avenues of diplomatic interaction that ambassadors used to benefit their mission. When circumstances arose limiting the effectiveness of formal diplomatic channels, either because of a bad relationship with the grand vizier or incongruity in French and

³ See for instance, Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstic, eds., "Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean," special issue, *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 93-159; Pascal Firges et al., eds., *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

Ottoman foreign policy—both of which were frequent during this period—it became especially vital for ambassadors to play the Ottoman political game.

After describing the inherent goals driving French diplomacy in Constantinople, this chapter discusses the means of bringing those goals to fruition. French goals in the Ottoman Empire focused first on defending French precedence over other Christian states to act as a mediator between the Ottomans and the rest of Christian Europe, which during this period meant bringing the Ottomans into war with Spain, and second on defending Frenchmen in Ottoman lands by ensuring the maintenance of the Capitulations (formal trade agreements). French diplomats pursued these goals through the formal channels of audiences with the sultan and the grand vizier, who acted as the primary mediator between ambassadors and the sultan, organizing audiences and frequently delivering formal petitions (*arz*). When the grand vizier was either not partial to the French ambassador or his political plans, diplomats had to find other informal avenues of influence that were more open-minded to them and their mission. Ambassadors had recourse to the friends they established in Constantinople in these circumstances. One of the most regular friends of France was the *kapudan* pasha (Grand Admiral), whose political incentives frequently aligned with those of France since the Mediterranean theater of war became a key to his further glory.⁴ The ambassadors sought out other allies as well in the Grand Mufti (head legal jurisconsult), the sultan's secretaries, other viziers, and even contacts connected to the harem who could advocate for policies that aligned with French goals. Establishing these friendships and alliances in

⁴ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the 'Mediterranean Faction' (1585-1587)," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLV (2015): 57–96.

Constantinople—which came to include other Christian diplomats as well—permeated all the ambassador’s activities in the Ottoman capital, from informal gatherings and hunting trips to Christian and Muslim festivals. Because all the diplomats’ activities were imbued with diplomatic significance, these leisure activities became competitive atmospheres between Christian diplomats, rife with precedence disputes. While Eric Dursteler has rightly indicated that Christian diplomats developed sincere relationships with their Muslim counterparts in Constantinople, they were also driven by diplomatic incentives to integrate themselves into the political culture of the Ottoman elite.⁵

French Goals

What was these ambassadors’ strategic mission in Constantinople? Since Part II will depict the changing relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire and the specific missions for their diplomacy, it is necessary here only to provide the general impetus that drove those goals. Ambassadors had two interrelated functions. The more important function was the protection of the French relationship with the Ottomans that provided France with a privileged position in Constantinople relative to other Christian principalities. This precedence in Constantinople was considered a precondition to pursuing all other foreign-policy initiatives related to the Ottomans. Ambassadors’ second function was to protect the merchants and other Frenchmen in Ottoman lands, ensuring that the terms of the Capitulations were maintained. Whether the French court wanted to mediate between Spain and the Ottomans in the

⁵ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 173-180.

1560s, support the Ottoman war effort against Spain in the 1570s, or prevent peace between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs in the 1590s, these overarching concerns formed a continuous foundation on which such goals were formulated.

Diplomatic precedence became an essential aspect of all the ambassadors' activities. They had it declared in the Capitulations of 1581; they enforced it in the diplomatic protocol; they expressed it even among other ambassadors outside the presence of Ottomans. Diplomatic privilege in Constantinople permitted the French court and its ambassadors to act as mediators between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire. This position permitted the French to justify their alliance with the Ottomans as benefiting Christendom by protecting Christian princes and their subjects from the Ottoman war machine.⁶ For instance, when France sought to mediate a peace agreement between Venice and the Ottomans a year after the Battle of Lepanto (1571), both Charles IX and his ambassador in Venice argued that it benefited not just Venice but all Christendom, which "will be greatly obliged" to the French king because it was the wrong time for Christendom to make war against the Ottomans since all of Christendom was so divided.⁷ This refrain was not merely propaganda from the lips of ambassadors. Many of the diplomats believed it. After François de Noailles left the embassy in Constantinople, he reflected on his career in the service to the king in a letter to the secretary of state Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de Villeroy. Noailles dedicated most of the letter to his embassy in the Ottoman Empire, where he "gave peace to the Venetians,...aided the truce with the

⁶ Géraud Poumarède, "Justifier l'injustifiable: L'alliance Turque au miroir de la Chrétienté (XVIe-XVIIe Siècles)," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* 111 (1997): 217–246.

⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 68, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 6 March 1573.

emperor,...guaranteed and protected the lands of our Holy-Pope from attacks by three powerful [Ottoman] armies that were never put to sea... [and] delivered more than 200 Christian slaves.”⁸ The bishop of Dax viewed his service in Constantinople as a benefit to Christendom.

The privileged place of the French also granted the crown soft power over other Christian European states. They extended their protection and influence in the Ottoman Empire to Christian merchants in the Levant who flew the French banner. Even before the confirmation of the 1569 Capitulations, other Christian states customarily traded in the Levant under the French flag.⁹ Philip II sought French support to free his subjects enslaved after the battle of Djerba (1560), and Charles IX extended his support to Venice to mediate peace with the Ottomans during the Cypriot war (1571-1573).¹⁰ Yet, as France reignited its rivalry with Spain, the crown consistently undermined any treaty negotiations between Sultan Selim II and Philip II after mediating peace between the Ottomans and the Venetians.¹¹ When war broke out between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs in 1593, Henri IV sought to prevent any peace negotiations between the two. As long as the war continued, the king’s enemies were less likely to raise German auxiliaries to intervene in the French Wars of Religion.¹² At the same time, the English ambassador tried to mediate

⁸ Dax to Villeroy, 22 April 1578, in *Lettres inédites de François de Noailles, évêque de Dax*, ed. Philippe Tamizey de Laroque (Paris: A. Aubry, 1865), 29-30.

⁹ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 166r-168r. De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (1985): 43, has conflated this clause in the Capitulations of 1569 as a directive rather than the legitimation of a custom already in practice.

¹⁰ For more on these issues, see chaps. 4 and 5, pp. 164-170 and 202-205.

¹¹ The point of mediating peace between Venice and the Ottomans was to isolate Spain in the Mediterranean with the Ottomans. See below, chap. 5, pp. 202-205.

¹² Henri IV to Brèves, 21 December 1592, in *Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, ed. Berger de Xivrey, 9 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-1876), 3:711.

between the Austrians and the Ottomans. The English thought the war in the Balkans an impediment to Ottoman intervention against Spain.¹³ The competitive situation that resulted between the French and English ambassadors was the exact experience France tried to prevent when they so passionately complained to the Ottomans for granting the English an ambassador. As more Christian states gained representation in Constantinople, the French lost influence, and they increasingly had to emphasize their diplomatic precedence. As Lancosme eloquently stated, such a position “places two bridles in their hands: one of Christendom against this [Ottoman] empire, the other of this empire against Christendom.”¹⁴ The French sought such a position, and they tried to leverage the ancient friendship between the French kings and the Ottoman sultans as currency to achieve it.

The French insistence on their precedence over other Christian European states in the Ottoman Empire was not a one-sided affair. The position was cultivated by the Ottomans as well. Even before 1581, when the Sultan Murad III first articulated French diplomatic precedence in French Capitulations, the Austrian ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq was able to write about the prestigious “locum tenens” of the French ambassador in Constantinople.¹⁵ The Ottomans referred to the French king as *padishah* (emperor) rather than *kral* (king), and the French king was the only Christian monarch to receive such a title in Ottoman letters. The Ottomans even constructed a narrative of the ancient marriage between a

¹³ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 1 May 1593, 24 July 1593, 22 November 1593, in *CSPVenice*, ed. Horatio Brown et al., 38 vols. (London: HMSO, 1864-1947), 9:70, 85, 114-115.

¹⁴ Lancosme to Henri III, 20 August 1586, in *Négociations*, 4:542.

¹⁵ Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, trans. Edward Seymour Forster (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 219.

sultan and a French princess, mythologizing an intimate connection between the two crowns to reflect their close relationship.¹⁶

By continually emphasizing their current and ancient place in Constantinople along with their relationship to the Ottoman sultan, the French were not imposing foreign concepts onto their amity; they were integrating themselves into the Ottoman diplomatic system and using its assumptions to their advantage. Güneş Işıksel has provided a fascinating description of the Ottoman diplomatic system and how it reflected the Ottoman worldview. The Ottoman diplomatic protocol organized itself to construct a vision of the sultan as a “supra-sovereign,” whose supreme position other monarchs and people should accept. The sultan thus “placed [himself] at the summit of a complex hierarchy of states, in which the prestige and qualities of other monarchies or political entities [were] measured according to their proximity and fidelity.”¹⁷ While the French crown would never accept its subordination to the sultan, French letters and the ambassadors’ rhetoric continually emphasized the fidelity of the French crown toward the sultan. This confluence can be attributed to the common foundation of early modern political practice, which was fundamentally based on relationships and clientele networks.¹⁸ Defining one’s relationship based on proximity and fidelity was thus natural to both parties.

¹⁶ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 47.

¹⁷ Güneş Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selim II: paramètres et périmètres de l'Empire ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVIe siècle* (Paris: Peeters, 2016). 16.

¹⁸ On Ottoman clienteles, see Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean”; Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Tobias P. Graf, *The Sultan’s Renegades* (Oxford University Press, 2017); Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors” (Ph.D. Diss., Ohio State University, 2010); Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). On French clienteles, see Sharon Kettering, “Patronage and Kinship in Early Modern France,” *French Historical Studies* 16, no. 2 (1989):

The other primary role of the French ambassador was protecting Frenchmen and those sailing under the French flag in the Ottoman lands. The central concern of this process was ensuring the Capitulations between France and the Ottoman Empire were followed and renewed. The Capitulations (or *Ahdname* in Ottoman Turkish) dictated the terms of the French presence in Ottoman lands, providing accommodations for free travel to French merchants, terms for trade, and the processes to resolve conflicts that might arise between French and Ottoman subjects.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Capitulations provided privileges to the Christian subjects of kingdoms allied to the Ottomans in the form of normalized treatment. Islamic law did not accommodate non-Muslim, long-term foreign residents such as merchants and diplomats. Christian subjects visiting the Ottoman lands could not remain in the Empire longer than a year without being charged the *jizya* (the head tax on non-Muslims) and other taxes that were applied to Ottoman subjects because they acquired *dhimmi* (non-Muslim, head-tax paying Ottoman subject) status after that point.¹⁹ The Capitulations provided the parameters for their long-term presence in the Islamic lands of the Ottoman Empire, and they generally only extended to subjects of the kingdom that received them.

The Ottomans extended these trade and jurisdictional rights to shore up their alliance with the French and others and granted them rights to maintain their

408–35; Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Mack P. Holt, “Patterns of Clientèle and Economic Opportunity at Court during the Wars of Religion: The Household of François, Duke of Anjou,” *French Historical Studies* 13, no. 3 (1984): 305–22; Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

¹⁹ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Aman”; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Imtiyazat.”

orderly presence within the Empire.²⁰ Beyond France, the Ottomans expended such agreements only to Venice and Poland until the 1580s when England acquired their Capitulations. While most other Christian European countries understood the Capitulations as primarily trade agreements that also established a political relationship, the French similarly viewed their Capitulations as the Ottomans, establishing a political alliance solidified *via* friendly trade. From the 1530s until 1569, the French operated in the Ottoman Empire without proper Capitulations. When the Ottomans conquered the Egyptian Mamluks in 1517, the sultan confirmed the Capitulations France established with the Mamluk Empire.²¹ Later between 1535 and 1536, France's first ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Jean de la Forest negotiated a new set of Capitulations, but they were never officially confirmed. Regardless, as Gilles Veinstein has argued, they acquired the force of tradition as the alliance between France and the Ottomans caused both parties to treat them as a reality. For instance, French ambassadors and Ottoman statesmen looked through the Ottoman chancellery records for the 1536 Capitulations in vain, hoping to reconfirm these agreements.²² Even in the absence of formally confirmed Capitulations, the alliance gave the agreement force and demonstrated that the political relationship took priority.

²⁰ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 144-145.

²¹ Ernest Charrière, ed., *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860), 1:123; BNF, Français 16141, fols. 1-8.

²² Gilles Veinstein, "Les Capitulations Franco-Ottomanes de 1536 sont-elles encore controversables?" in *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, eds. Vera Constantini and Markus Koller (Boston: Brill, 2008), 71-88; Frenchmen searched the archives for the 1536 copy, see BNF, Français 16143, fol. 125v, Germigny to Henri III, 10 June 1581.

When France and the Ottoman Empire confirmed the first set of Capitulations in 1569, they mirrored the Venetian agreements.²³ These agreements provided the entire structure for the freedoms and responsibilities that Frenchmen in Ottoman lands enjoyed. Such guarantees prescribed in the agreement were as follows: the freedom to travel and trade in Ottoman seas and lands without molestation, Ottoman support for the return of goods from French shipwrecks and dead merchants, the freedom of French slaves, the individual rather than communal responsibility for debts in the Levant, and the conditions for consular and Ottoman jurisdiction.²⁴

The French goals for the alliance fit within a common construction of the international field and political culture held by both Ottomans and Frenchmen. Differences in the political culture and challenges to overcome them did exist, as we will see in later chapters, but they were far from insurmountable because they were differences in degrees rather than fundamentals. As challenges arose, the French and Ottomans could mitigate them by inserting a negotiated resolution into the Capitulations.

Formal Diplomatic Channels

France's diplomatic goals were accomplished through the formal channels of audiences with the sultan and grand vizier, at least theoretically. The most apparent function of French ambassadors and diplomats was the participation in these more formal channels of diplomacy. These channels of diplomacy are what we think about

²³ Du Bourg to Charles IX, 12 January 1570, in *Négociations*, 3:91n.

²⁴ BNF, Français 16141, 47v-59r.

when we discuss old diplomatic history: the audiences with heads of state and government, the organized negotiations related to treaties and Capitulations, and other formulaic processes. These diplomatic processes were highly ritualized and largely dependent on courtship and the ability of foreign diplomats to act according to protocol.²⁵

When the French ambassador arrived in Constantinople, there was an interim between his arrival and the first audience with the sultan. During this time, the ambassador met only with the grand vizier, during which time they discussed the protocol for his audience with the sultan. Only after the first sultanic audience could the new ambassador meet with other Ottoman statesmen or the other ambassadors in Constantinople. When Jean de Gontaut, baron of Salignac, arrived in the Ottoman capital, the current ambassador François Savary de Brèves advised him of the proper way to go about this process. For his first meeting was with the grand vizier in 1604, Salignac, accompanied by his household, four janissaries, and four *dragomans*, marched to the abode of the grand vizier. These meetings could last a variety of time, depending on the importance of the embassy. Salignac's meeting lasted half an hour.²⁶ The preliminary meeting between François de Noailles and Sokollu Mehmed lasted three hours, discussing the Ottoman-Venetian peace negotiations in 1573.²⁷

This first meeting was also the time when the embassy discussed the first audience with the Grand Seigneur, learning when it would take place and receiving

²⁵ Talbot, *British-Ottoman Relations, 1661-1807*; Michael Talbot, "Accessing the Shadow of God: Spatial and Performative Ceremonial at the Ottoman Court," in *The Key to Power? The Culture of Access in Princely Courts, 1400-1750*, ed. Dries Raeymaekers and Sebastiaan Derks (Boston, MA: Brill, 2016), 103-123; Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 46-49.

²⁶ Julien Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron de Salignac: 1605 à 1610*, ed. Gontaut-Biron Théodore de, vol. 1 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1888), 63-64.

²⁷ SHD Vincennes A¹⁷, fol. 175v, Dax to Ferrals, 8 March 1573.

the necessary clothing. When Salignac met the grand vizier, Sokolluzade Mehmed Pasha (the son of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha), had robes and bonnets available. The twelve servants dressed in “long red robes of good scarlet cloth...the gentlemen of the suite each chose a robe and bonnet at his discretion.”²⁸ Re-clothing ambassadors was a part of admitting the ambassadors to the Ottoman court.²⁹

The first audience with the sultan was a dramatic production of rigorous protocol. For the Ottomans, it was a moment to reinforce the Ottoman vision of the political world and to reaffirm their superiority in it.³⁰ The members of the French embassy donned the Turkish clothing and received an escort to the Ottoman palace. Du Fresne-Canaye recounted that a *müteferrika*—a member of the Ottoman palace guard—was sent in the 1570s to the French embassy to lead the ambassador with his retinue to the Ottoman *Serail*. In 1604, a gaggle of *çavuşes* and *müteferrikas* two by two on horseback, followed by twenty-four lesser Ottoman representatives from the palace on foot and finally eight janissaries and four dragomans on horseback arrived to escort the French entourage to the sultan’s palace. The ambassador followed this impressive display on horseback with his retinue following behind similarly two-by-two through the streets of Constantinople.³¹ As they traversed the cityscape to the imperial palace, French vessels at port customarily saluted their promenade, hoisting the *fleur de lis* and discharging their cannons.³² It was a spectacular display.

²⁸ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie*, 64.

²⁹ Talbot, “Accessing the Shadow of God,” 118-122.

³⁰ Güneş Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selim II*, 26.

³¹ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie*, 64-65.

³² Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, ed. Henri Hauser (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897), 59.

When the retinue arrived at the imperial palace, they made their way from the outer palace to the inner palace where the entourage was presented with a cadre of janissaries dressed in majestic clothing, whom the ambassador saluted. Over time, the number of these janissaries increased and became an entire parade of power. Nevertheless, the presentation was imposing enough in the late sixteenth century.³³ The ambassador was then ushered into the *divan* where the grand vizier and the senior ministers of the Ottoman Empire met to discuss the affairs of state. In 1604, Salignac alone presented his harangue to the *divan* at this time, but this was not always the case.³⁴ The rest of the retinue was directed to the banquet hall for a festive dining experience with rice, legumes, hens, sherbet (no wine), and pastries of all sorts. The meal left differing impressions on observers. While Du Fresne-Canaye was impressed by the display and the sherbet, Bordier found the manners of the Ottomans and the lack of wine intolerable. After the banquet, the entourage was directed to the private palace. There, they received the sultan's gifts before being ushered to his throne to kiss his hand in order of status. After some short pleasantries, during which the sultan said little, if anything, the bishop of Dax gave his harangue and presented his letters patent in 1573. In 1604, the baron of Salignac did not even do this much in front of the sultan. He was ferried away to another room where he presented his letters patent from the king, having already given his harangue in the *divan*.³⁵

³³ Talbot, "Accessing the Shadow of God," 116.

³⁴ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie*, 66.

³⁵ Du Fresne-Canaye, *Voyage du Levant*, 59-71; Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie*, 66-70; Talbot, "Accessing the Shadow of God," 116-121; Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 25-28.

These audiences were rigorously formulaic, but they established the metaphorical dynamics of the relationship. As Michael Talbot and Güneş Işıkşel have argued, both groups could grasp onto various aspects of these events to reinforce their self-perceptions. For the Ottomans, it reinforced their worldview of the sultan as the universal monarch from whom the kings of the world sought favor and to whom they paid homage as their superior. For the French and other Christian representatives, the level of expenditure on the banquet, quality of gifts received, and time allotted with the sultan all represented the grandeur of their monarch and respect owed to their king by the Ottomans.³⁶

Having concluded these formulaic audiences, the majority of the diplomats' formal efforts in Constantinople came in regular meetings with the grand vizier, who acted as the primary conduit to the sultan. The grand vizier managed how ambassadors' messages reached the sultan. He was the primary channel by which ambassador's verbal and written petitions (*arz*) reached the *divan* and the man who arranged for an audience with the sultan.³⁷ It is no surprise, then, that the French ambassadors met the grand vizier regularly. He was the primary topic of ambassadorial correspondence to such an extent that ambassadors simply referred to him as "the pasha." Any specification was unnecessary despite references to other pashas and viziers whose names or formal titles were always supplied. Good relations and common political goals with the grand vizier facilitated diplomatic relations. For instance, the bishop of Dax negotiated a productive treaty between France and the Ottomans in the 1570s, promising recurring naval support against

³⁶ Talbot, "Accessing the Shadow of God," 110-122; Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 26-27.

³⁷ Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 34.

Spain that was only undone by the unforeseen circumstances of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572) and renewed civil war. Even after this shift in French foreign policy, the bishop was able to work together with the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to put pressure on the Polish nobility to elect the French king's brother Henri, duke of Anjou, to the Polish throne.³⁸

The *arz* (or an official petition to the sultan) provided another formal channel of communication, whose delivery to the sultan was generally facilitated by the grand vizier, either directly or by arranging for an audience. The presentation of the *arz* through the grand vizier was the easiest, but also the least reliable, method. The grand vizier had ready access to the sultan and could present the *arz* in a timely manner. When the bishop of Dax presented his *arz* to the sultan at the tail end of the negotiations between Venice and the Ottomans in 1573, it was delivered to Selim II through the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, and it was delivered the day after it was translated.³⁹ This was not always the safest policy especially if the ambassador's relationship with the grand vizier was rocky. For instance, de Brèves petitioned the sultan *via* an *arz* to consult the Grand Mufti in a dispute with the English ambassador, which he handed to the grand vizier for delivery. The *arz* never made it to the sultan.⁴⁰

When a bad relationship with the grand vizier arose, ambassadors would use other means to deliver their *arz* to the sultan. De Brèves at times, had his *arz* delivered to the sultan through his intermediaries connected to the harem (the

³⁸ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fols. 179-236; see also chap. 5, pp. 206-216.

³⁹ SHD Vincennes A¹7, fol. 175v, Dax to Ferrals, 8 March 1573.

⁴⁰ Augustino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 17 April 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:452-454.

parallel Ottoman female court in the *divan*).⁴¹ Others would entrust the *arz* to the sultan's secretary for delivery to the Grand Seigneur. Lancosme had a terrible relationship with the grand vizier. He depended on the sultan's secretary and the master of the sultan's household (likely the *kapicilar-kayasi*, or grand chamberlain) for the delivery of his petitions.⁴²

Delivering the *arz* in person at an audience or through other opportunities ensured its delivery, but they were less readily available opportunities. One problem with an audience is that it was unlikely to be granted if the ambassador had a poor relationship with the grand vizier. There were, however, other opportunities. Lancosme would wait for the sultan to go riding and would use it as an opportunity to deliver the *arz* in person.⁴³ This approach of delivering the *arz* was not an uncommon affair. Even the humblest of subjects were permitted to present their *arz* to the sultan in such manner.⁴⁴ It is not surprising then that ambassadors would do the same.

Another important formal channel of diplomacy was the appropriation of the negotiations of Capitulations toward resolving political conflicts. As well as providing the terms of the French presence and trade in Ottoman lands, the Capitulations were practical political instruments. They established political protocol among Christian European representatives in Constantinople, and they resolved diplomatic conflicts that arose in Constantinople.

⁴¹ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 24 May 1593, in *CSPVenice*, 9:75-76; for more on the harem, see Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁴² Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 1 April 1587, in *CSPVenice*, 8:261-262.

⁴³ Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 1 April 1587, in *CSPVenice*, 8:261-262.

⁴⁴ Susan Skilliter, "Catherine de Medici's Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting: A Dilemma in Franco-Ottoman Diplomatic Relations," *Turcica* 7 (1975): 204.

The Capitulations provided the most permanent way to explicitly resolve political conflicts in Constantinople that set a precedent for future interactions, and these conflicts often precipitated the negotiations themselves. While theoretically the Capitulations needed to be confirmed with the ascension of each new sultan, a long period frequently preceded their confirmation after the ascension of a sultan. For instance, despite the 1536 Capitulations not being confirmed, Frenchmen continued to trade throughout the Levant, and multiple countries traded in Ottoman lands under the protection of the French banner well into the reign of Selim II (r. 1566-1574), yet negotiations to formally establish the Capitulations did not begin in earnest until 1569. That year, the French crown sent a treasurer Claude du Bourg to Constantinople to resolve the debts the French crown supposedly owed to Joseph Nasi, a Jewish merchant and favorite of Selim II, in the amount of 150,000 *écus*. The controversy had become a significant distraction for Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. Nasi was able to acquire a *firman* (imperial order) granting him permission to confiscate the goods from ships flying the French flag in Egyptian ports. After Claude du Bourg resolved the affair in principle, he then took the opportunity to negotiate the Capitulations and write the resolution of the affair in the agreement.⁴⁵ The extensive description of the the Nasi affair in the preamble—which recounts the reasons the Ottomans granted the *firman* and why they ultimately withdrew it—is evidence of its significance in precipitating the agreement. As the preamble explains, the Ottomans were misled by the French ambassador Guillaume de Grandchamp, who told the Ottomans that Charles IX had agreed to the endeavor and to reimburse

⁴⁵ For more on this affair, see chap. 4, pp. 178-184.

the merchants for their lost goods in France, which was definitively not the case.⁴⁶ These Capitulations were as much a product of the diplomatic problem Nasi created as the need to “renew” (as the contemporaries termed it) the Capitulations under a new sultan. Beyond this preamble, the text of the Capitulation is generic. One clause explicitly provided all benefits the Venetians enjoyed to those trading under the French flag—indeed, a generic clause.⁴⁷

Other Capitulations similarly adjudicated conflicts in which the French ambassadors found themselves. The arrival of an English ambassador attempting to negotiate an English set of Capitulations and a Spanish envoy looking to establish a treaty with the Ottomans, both of which the French vehemently challenged, led to precedential challenges between the lot. The English ambassador was successful in 1580, negotiating a set of Capitulations, but the French ambassador Jacques de Germigny helped undermine them. A conflict between the Englishman William Harborne and the *kapudan* pasha (Grand Admiral) Uluç Ali, which was no doubt exasperated by Germigny’s rivalry with Harborne, caused the Englishman to fall from favor and return to England, leaving the Capitulations unconfirmed.⁴⁸ To add

⁴⁶ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-v. The preamble in this copy of the Capitulation is much longer than the others in BNF, Français 16141, fols. 46r-56r, or the copy printed in 1570, Domenico Oliveri, (trans.), *Articles accordez par le Grand Seigneur [Selim] en faveur du roy & de ses sujets, à messire Claude du Bourg, Chevalier, Sieur de Guerine, Conseillier du Roy & Tresorier de France: pour la liberté & seurté du traffiq, commerce & passage és pays & mers de Levant*. (Lyon: François Didier, 1570), provide a shortened version that elides the blame placed on Grandchamp for the entire affair.

⁴⁷ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-168r. Güneş Işıkşel, *La diplomatie ottomane, 178-18*, and De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1, 1985): 461-62, have claimed that these agreements provided more advantageous benefits to the French—for instance that all other Christian merchants beside Venetians were compelled to trade under the French flag and that French customs were half the rate of the Venetians—but these clauses simply are not listed in the French copies of the agreements. The agreements did recognize the “custom” that many countries such as the Genoese and Sicilians traded under the protection of the French banner, but it was in no way a prescription. Instead, the recognition of this reality simply explained why those merchants were caught up in conflict with Joseph Nasi.

⁴⁸ BNF, Français 16141, fols. 61r-62v; for more on this issue, see chap. 6, pp. 231-233.

insult to injury, Germigny had his victory and diplomatic precedence written into French Capitulations of 1581. They forced all other Christian merchants to trade in the Levant under the French banner. They also declared the “Emperor of France” as the “most supreme,” “renowned,” “oldest,” and “chief of all [Christian] kings,” whose ambassadors and diplomats enjoyed precedence above all other Christian princes, explicitly naming the English and Spanish in the clause.⁴⁹ The French jealously sought to protect this position since it was the foundation upon which they tried to position themselves as the arbiter between Christian European states and the Ottomans.

In the 1590s and early 1600s, the French and English—who confirmed their Capitulations, ignoring the clause of the 1581 Capitulations—again played out their rivalry in the Capitulations. This time the focus was the jurisdiction over the Dutch traders in the Levant. Because the Dutch did not have a set of Capitulations, their merchants should have traded under French protection, paying any fees the French demanded and dependant on the French ambassador for legal protections. The English, however, claimed the Dutch fell under English jurisdiction per the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585) in which Elizabeth of England guaranteed her protection to the Dutch. In the subsequent years, the Dutch found themselves referenced in both English and French Capitulations, forcing the issuance of *firman*s (imperial decrees) and *fetvas* (religious decrees from an Ottoman jurist consult, or *mufti*, usually the *şeyhülislam*) to inform the relevant Ottoman governors of the new situation.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁹ BNF, Français 16141, 61r-62v.

⁵⁰ BNF, Turc 130, fols. 28v, 161v, 240r, 124r-123v; see also Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction,” 85-87; Panaite, “Being a Western Merchant in the Ottoman Mediterranean,” 111. On the use of

Dutch thus fluctuated between French and English jurisdiction until the Dutch themselves negotiated a set of Capitulations in 1612.⁵¹ Throughout this process, the Capitulations became the preferred avenue to establish precedential arrangements in Constantinople, even if they revealed themselves not to be the permanent solution for which ambassadors hoped.

Thus, formulaic diplomacy in Constantinople comprised attending audiences with the sultan and grand vizier, attempting to acquire their support, submitting an *arz* petitioning the sultan on one's behalf, and appropriating the Capitulations into a way to resolve conflicts with competing parties. These media left little means of navigation for the ambassadors. Their ability to be heard was dependent on two equally important criteria: a good relationship with the grand vizier, and alignment between the grand vizier's foreign policy and that pursued by the ambassador. Throughout the period under study, both characteristics rarely existed concurrently, primarily because the Ottoman Empire's eastern frontiers drew them from the Mediterranean in the 1580s and beyond. When these two criteria did coexist, French ambassadors could be very productive through these formal diplomatic channels.

Informal Diplomatic Channels

When ambassadors' relationships with the grand vizier were strained or their foreign policy interests did not align, French diplomats sought out informal networks, alliances, and back-room meetings whereby ambassadors and diplomats

fetvas in Ottoman diplomatic matters, see Joshua Michael White, "Fetva Diplomacy: The Ottoman Şeyhülislam as Trans-Imperial Intermediary," *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 199-221.

⁵¹ See chap. 7, pp. 291-292.

conspired and coordinated with other Ottoman statesmen to further their mutual goals. Until recently, we did not know that this sort of diplomatic activity even existed, but recent work by historians on diplomatic go-betweens and mediators has demonstrated the variety of agents who engaged in diplomatic activities.⁵²

Ambassadors similarly engaged in these sorts of informal channels of diplomacy. Successfully inserting themselves into the factional politics in Constantinople and establishing alliances with Ottoman notables whose interests aligned with their own was integral to successful diplomatic outcomes. Yet, successful integration into the Ottoman political culture was not always enough. While this sort of integration was a precondition for success, it did not guarantee it. Sometimes the embassy's allies were ultimately the political losers of the policy debates in Constantinople.

Time with the grand vizier and sultan was always limited, and the grand vizier was not always able to direct foreign policy decisions in Constantinople. He frequently had to compete with factions at court and often the sultan's favorite. For instance, even the powerful and long-tenured grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha found himself outmaneuvered and his stranglehold on power crippled by Sultan Selim II's favorite Şemsi Ahmed Pasha. A powerful faction surrounding Şemsi persuaded Murad III to attack the Safavids in 1579 against the vehement opposition of Sokollu Mehmed. Moreover, Şemsi and his collaborators had many members of Sokollu's faction removed from power.⁵³

⁵² Gurkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean"; Gelder and Krstic (eds.), "Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries"; Firges, et al. (eds.), *Well-Connected Domains*.

⁵³ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), ch. 3; Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I," 20, 159-172.

Gaining support for French foreign policy goals in Constantinople thus necessitated a broader network of allies among the Ottoman notables, which was especially true when the grand vizier or the *kapudan* pasha did not support the French alliance. These networks became even more critical after Sokollu Mehmed died, and the position of the grand vizier changed hands rapidly.⁵⁴ Such networks extended beyond the Ottoman statesmen and included other Christian European ambassadors and agents. Their function was to align the message for a specific policy to come from multiple mouthpieces, increasing its persuasive power within the *divan*.

The network of France's friends was indeed broad. Ambassadors found friends in the expected areas among various viziers, *kapudan* pashas, and janissary *Ağas*, but it also included other members of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Some found friends among Constantinople's religious class (especially the Grand Mufti, or *Şeyhülislam*), the eunuchs, and other members of the harem. Some found a friend in the secretary of the sultan, the grand vizier's secretary, or the sultan's *dragomans* (as opposed to those employed by the French embassy). The ambassadors from Venice and England also frequently acted as friends to France. All these individuals and groups, however, could also become enemies for political or personal reasons.

The networks could become extensive because several French ambassadors learned to speak Turkish, enabling communications without the presence of a dragoman and more flexibly move about Ottoman political factions. We know at least Gilles de Noailles, the abbot of L'Isle, learned to speak the language during his

⁵⁴ Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I," chaps. 3 and 4, esp. p. 171.

tenure in the 1570s: he acted as a translator for an Ottoman envoy who came to France in 1581.⁵⁵ François Savary de Brèves was exceptionally fluent in Turkish. He spoke and wrote the language, sending his own translations of Ottoman letters back to France.⁵⁶ The extended tenures of French embassies provided them with ample time and incentive to learn the language. Before he became ambassador in his own right from 1592 to 1604, de Brèves traveled as a member of his uncle Jacques Savary de Lancosme's embassy in 1585. De Brèves thus remained in the Ottoman capital continuously for nineteen years. The abbot of L'Isle did not reside in the Ottoman lands as long but only spent five years in Constantinople from 1574 to 1579. Likely, other ambassadors knew the language as well. It is hard to imagine that Jacques de Germigny did not know the language. He spent almost his entire career in the Ottoman Empire. He was a member of the embassy in the 1550s, 1570s, and finally five years as ambassador in the 1580s. In fact, Germigny frustrated the ambassador Jean de La Vigne with his frequent meetings with the grand vizier behind the ambassador's back in the 1550s, which would indicate he did not have access to the embassy's *dragoman*.⁵⁷

This sort of linguistic malleability was not limited to the French; the court of the Ottoman Empire was the most multilingual of all Europe. Most erudite Ottomans spoke at least Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Moreover, the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman elite—generated from the *devşirme* (or levy of Christian youths to the

⁵⁵ Cobham to Walsingham, 11 Dec 1581, "Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20," in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, ed. Arthur John Butler (London: HMSO, 1907), under Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol15>.

⁵⁶ BNF, Français 16144, fols. 238r-242r.

⁵⁷ M. de la Vigne to Henri II, 14 April 1558, in *Negociations*, 2:460-61n1.

Ottoman state) in the Caucuses as well as converted Christian slaves who entered the Ottoman bureaucracy—led to communication in a variety of languages. Slavonic, Hungarian, Armenian, Italian, and many other languages could be heard throughout Constantinople.⁵⁸ Besides Slavonic, Hungarian, and German, Italian was an especially prominent language among many Ottoman statesmen (and French diplomats) since many members of the Ottoman bureaucracy came from Italian backgrounds, converting to Islam after being enslaved by the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. For instance, an entire clientele network of Italian-born converts in Constantinople developed around the Venetian-born head of the white eunuchs under Selim II, Gazanfer Ağa.⁵⁹

Grand viziers were some of the most important friends that French diplomats could foster in Constantinople. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha controlled the position from 1565 until 1578. France found a frequent friend in the Sokollu primarily because their interests frequently aligned during his tenure. François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, and Sokollu Mehmed's political positions had much in common. Dax's primary mission, as we will see in chapter five, was to help negotiate a peace agreement between Venice and the Ottomans following the outbreak of war between Venice and the Ottomans in 1570 when the Ottoman Empire attacked Famagusta on the island of Cyprus. This mission was part of a larger goal to isolate Spain in a Mediterranean conflict with the Ottomans. While he was trying to negotiate peace for Venice, Dax

⁵⁸ Eric Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues: Language and Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Past & Present* 217 (2012): 53.

⁵⁹ Tobias P. Graf, "Of Half-Lives and Double-Lives: 'Renegades' in the Ottoman Empire and Their Pre-Conversion Ties, ca. 1580-1610," in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, eds. Pascal Firges et al., (Boston: Brill, 2014), 140-43; Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues," 52-57.

also emphasized the importance of Ottoman peace with the Austrian Habsburgs and actively tried to rupture any negotiations between Spain and the sultan.⁶⁰ Besides the bit about Spain, Sokollu had similar political inclinations. He was one of the prime instigators for the Habsburg-Ottoman truce of 1568, and he never wanted war with Venice.

One meeting between the bishop of Dax and Sokollu in 1573 demonstrates the nature of the informal behind-the-scenes diplomacy that permeated diplomatic interactions during the period. During the Venetian-Ottoman peace talks that had begun in earnest in 1573, Dax and Sokollu Mehmed met in private to discuss the issues, which Dax claimed were being held up by the sultan's refusal to heed the advice of the grand vizier. Sokollu's solution was for Dax to write an *arz* (formal petition) to Selim II, advocating for the peace and supporting the grand vizier.⁶¹ As Dax reported, peace was concluded days later. The bishop likely exaggerated the significance of his *arz* in the process, but the bishop and the grand vizier's back-room coordination was representative of this sort of informal diplomacy. Dax and Sokollu Mehmed met privately at night, where they conspired to resolve a diplomatic problem in a way that benefited them both. The solution was to persuade the sultan by coordinating Dax's message with the grand vizier's through the formal channels of the *arz*. While a formal meeting with the grand vizier was hardly an informal matter, the underhanded coordination of the process was highly informal. This sort of back-

⁶⁰ BNF, Français 7091, fols. 81r, Dax to Charles IX, 25 April 1572.

⁶¹ SHD Vincennes A¹⁷, fol. 175v, Dax to Ferrals, 8 March 1573. For more on this situations, see chapter 5, pages xxx-xxx.

room coordination characterized much of diplomatic activities in Constantinople as well as Christian Europe.⁶²

This event was not the only time an ambassador worked behind the scenes with the grand vizier. When the English Capitulations were confirmed in 1583, Jacques de Germigny did all he could to prevent them from being placed in force. He looked to the new grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha, with whom Germigny had been friendly since his arrival. While complaining about the confirmation of the English Capitulations, Siyavuş suggested that the ambassador make his protest during an audience with the sultan, Murad III, and complain about Siyavuş himself to prevent the sultan from suspecting their collaboration. At the same time, Siyavuş wrote a formal petition to the sultan favoring the French alliance over the English.⁶³ The coordinated effort, however, did not sway the sultan.

Germigny was especially active in establishing alliances. In part, the king appointed him to the embassy because of his extensive familiarity with the Ottomans and his excellent relationship with Sokollu Mehmed.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, soon after Germigny's arrival, Sokollu Mehmed died. The French ambassador quickly established new allies in the capital, most significantly the *kapudan* pasha Uluç Ali. Uluç Ali was the leader of the Mediterranean faction, which had many mutual interests with the French. The Mediterranean faction, as Emrah Gürkan explains it, was a group of primarily North African Ottoman statesmen whose material well-

⁶² On this sort of diplomatic activity in other countries, De Lamar Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

⁶³ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 197v-198r, 203r, Germigny to Henri III, 29 November 1583, 13 December 1583; Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 29 November 1583, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 8, 73-75.

⁶⁴ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 1-2, Du Ferrier to Henri III, February 1580.

being was dependent on Mediterranean conflict with Spain. Uluç and his followers had much to lose while the sultan continued his war in the east. Peace in the Mediterranean relegated them to operating a small fleet in the Dardanelles, carrying victuals and troops to the Black Sea.⁶⁵ Germigny similarly hoped to disrupt the Ottoman-Spanish truce and redirect hostilities from Safavid Persia to Spain in the Mediterranean, so Germigny and the Mediterranean faction made natural allies.⁶⁶

Germigny and Uluç Ali conspired together frequently. Uluç Ali and a certain Semisi Pasha—whom Germigny called the admiral’s uncle—helped the French ambassador temporarily derail the Spanish truce in late 1579 and early 1580. These two also advocated on Germigny’s behalf to the grand vizier praising the French alliance.⁶⁷ The *kapudan* pasha also intervened in the early rivalry between Germigny and England’s first ambassador, William Harborne, over the English trading under their own flag in the Ottoman Empire. Uluç Ali promised to support the French against the English in the ordeal, and he proved himself a man of his word. The *kapudan* pasha ordered the arrest of two English ships and demanded they recognize the authority of the French king in Ottoman waters (i.e., trade under the French flag).⁶⁸ The two also coordinated their message of Spanish plans against North Africa. In a fly-by-night meeting at which Uluç Ali introduced Germigny to the *ağa* of

⁶⁵ Gürkan, “Fooling the Sultan,” 64-74.

⁶⁶ Germigny to Henri III, 26 January 1580, in *Négociations*, 3:854-55; BNF, Français 16143, fol. 10r, Germigny to Henri III, 24 December 1579; “Instruction a Monsieur de Germigny,” in *Recueil Des Pièces Choieses, extraites sur les originaux de la Negociation de Mr. de Germigny, de Chalon sur Saône, baron de Germales, Conseiller du Roy, et son Ambassadeur à la Porte du grand Seigneur* (Chalon sur Saone: Pierre Cusset, 1661), n.p.

⁶⁷ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 10r, 26r, 28r, Germigny to Henri III, 24 December 1579, Germigny to Cathrine de Medici, 26 January 1580, Germigny to Catherine Medici, 6 February 1580; Germigny to Henri III, 26 January 1580, in *Négociations*, 3:854-55; see also Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2:1158.

⁶⁸ BNF, Français 16143, fol. 57r, Germigny to Henri III, 17 March 1580.

the janissaries Damad Ibrahim Pasha in May 1580, Germigny proclaimed that the Ottoman-Spanish truce was only permitting Philip II to plan an attack on North Africa.⁶⁹ Henri III had been warning Germigny of these intentions of Spain already.⁷⁰ Two months after Germigny began spreading these fears of Spanish ambitions for North Africa, Uluç Ali produced a Neapolitan captive and an intercepted letter of questionable legitimacy to the grand vizier Mustafa Pasha that attested to Philip II's purported plan to attack North Africa. The machinations of Germigny and Uluç Ali were successful. After the testimony, Murad III granted the admiral permission to sail west with his Ottoman fleet.⁷¹

Damad Ibrahim Pasha and Uluç Ali remained friends of France for some time, which became important as Damad Ibrahim rose through the Ottoman hierarchy. Jacques Savary de Lancosme had significant trouble gaining any support in Constantinople when Siyavuş Pasha became the grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha in 1586. The relationship grew so caustic that Lancosme and Siyavuş rarely spoke. Lancosme had to use Damad Ibrahim as a conduit to the rest of the *divan* and the sultan.⁷² Damad Ibrahim was indeed a useful ally in this affair. His influence in the *divan* was growing. That year he married Ayşe Sultan, the daughter of Murad III.⁷³ But against such intense opposition from the grand vizier, Lancosme had little recourse even with the support from Damad Ibrahim.

⁶⁹ Germigny to Henri III, 24 May 1580, in *Recueil des Pièces, extraites sur les originaux de la Negotiation de Mr. De Germigny, de Chalon sur Saone, Baron de Germales, Conseiller du Roy, et son ambassadeur à la Porte du Grand Seigneur* (Lyon: Pierre Cusset, 1671), 21-23.

⁷⁰ Henri III to Germigny, 25 March 1580, in *Lettres de Henri III*, ed. Pierre Champion et al., 8 vols (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1959-2018), 4:361.

⁷¹ See Gurkan, "Fooling the Sultan," 85.

⁷² Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 24 December 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:228.

⁷³ Damad Ibrahim Paşa, sv *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

Lancosme's successor and nephew François Savary de Brèves was one of the most active manipulators of these informal diplomatic channels. His extensive tenure in Constantinople—nineteen consecutive years from 1585 to 1604—certainly gave him much time to develop numerous friendships. He was especially liked among the Ottomans and acquired the reputation as an Ottoman benefactor when he acted on their behalf to free Ottoman slaves from Malta.⁷⁴ De Brèves's friendships penetrated deep into the *divan*. He frequently met with the sultan's secretary in the garden of the *divan*. These meetings could include such issues as trying to manipulate the appointments of the Ottoman bureaucracy. For instance, he worked heartily to damage the reputation of the *kapudan* Cigalazade Sinan Pasha, one of his rivals, in a meeting with Murad III's secretary. There was no shortage of animosity between de Brèves and Cigalazade, and the rivalry between the two only increased when Cigalazade's brother Carlo Cicala, who was in the service of Philip II, came to Constantinople on a visit. Carlo's anti-French—and anti-Henri IV—bias influenced the *kapudan* pasha. At one point, Carlo refused to engage socially with de Brèves and, at times, refused social invitations where de Brèves would be present as well.⁷⁵ Cigalazade appropriated this sort of approach and even refused to recognize de Brèves as an ambassador and questioned if France had a king at the time in 1594.⁷⁶ Suffering from such animosity, de Brèves hoped the sultan might replace Cigalazade with the Sancak Bey of Tripoli, Frenk Cafer.⁷⁷ Frenk Cafer would benefit France greatly. He rose through the hierarchy under the tutelage of Uluç Ali, and French

⁷⁴ Matheo Zane to the Dage and Senate, 23 July 1593, in CSPVenice, vol. 9, 81-82.

⁷⁵ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 2 August 1593, in CSPVenice, vol. 9, 96-97.

⁷⁶ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 3 May 1594, in CSPVenice, vol. 9, 127.

⁷⁷ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 16 August 1593, in CSPVenice, vol. 9, 100.

ambassadors had known and worked with him since at least as far back as Germigny's embassy in the early 1580s.

Navigating the harem—with its power brokers, the *valide* sultan (the sultan's mother) and the *haseki* sultan (the sultan's favorite wife)—was an important conduit for this sort of informal diplomacy. The ability to draw their support was always important in Ottoman affairs. As Leslie Peirce has argued, the harem increasingly acquired influence in government affairs during this period, largely due to its proximity to the sultan.⁷⁸ While access to the women themselves was hardly infrequent, ambassadors could meet with their clients to communicate.⁷⁹ Jacques de Germigny peppered his letters to the French court with references to the *Valide*, and recommendations to acquire her favor.⁸⁰ Jacques Savary de Lancosme recommended that the crown send little dogs and *turquets* (a type of small dog) as prized gifts for the *valide* sultan “who governs all their [Ottoman] will.”⁸¹ François Savary de Brèves navigated the harem most expertly, using the women of the harem as a conduit to get his message to the sultan's ears so successfully that the *bailo* complained about his effectiveness.⁸² This sort of activity was not unique to the French ambassadors; the English also took advantage of the harem as a medium of influence.⁸³

⁷⁸ Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁷⁹ Leslie P. Peirce, “Beyond Harem Walls: Ottoman Royal Women and the Exercise of Power,” in *Servants of the Dynasty*, ed. Anne Walthall, 1st ed., *Palace Women in World History* (University of California Press, 2008), 90-94.

⁸⁰ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 8r, 118r, 127r, Germigny to Catherine de Medici, 8 December 1579, Germigny to Henri III, 10 June 1581, Germigny to Henri III, 22 June 1581.

⁸¹ BNF, Français 7094, fol. 51v-52r, Lancosme to Henri III, 30 April 1586.

⁸² Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 24 May 1593, in *CSPVenice*, 9:75-76.

⁸³ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 22 November 1593 and 4 December 1593, in *CSPVenice*, 9:114-116.

Along with the sultan's secretaries and the harem, de Brèves also sought the *Şeyhülislam*—or Grand Mufti, whose *fetvas* did not have the force of law but came close—to support his affairs.⁸⁴ He acquired the favor of the *Şeyhülislam* and much of the Ottoman religious class after securing the freedom of some Ottoman prisoners in Malta. One of the prisoners he saved from a Maltese prison was a family member of the *Mullah* (prayer leader) of the Mosque of Suleiman. When the French ambassador sought a fleet to attack Spain, he always made sure to acquire the support of the Grand Mufti.⁸⁵ He also acquired the support of the Grand *Mufti* in his rivalry against the English over jurisdiction of Dutch merchants in 1601. Cigalazade—the long-time rival of de Brèves—naturally supported the English, forcing de Brèves to seek support from others.⁸⁶ The Grand Mufti took up his cause. He recommended the ambassador petition the sultan to consult the Grand Mufti, promising to provide a favorable ruling, but the *arz* de Brèves delivered to the grand vizier never made it to the sultan.⁸⁷

Sometimes ambassadors sought to foster the advancement of their friends in Constantinople to bolster their allies in the *divan*. We already saw this sort of activity when de Brèves unsuccessfully sought the advancement of Frenk Cafer to *kapudan* pasha, but he was not the only one. Lancosme became friends with a certain Soliman who was previously Sieur de Semur, a French knight of Malta who was taken by Uluç Ali and “forced” to convert. Soliman then entered the Grand Admiral Uluç Ali's

⁸⁴ On the power of *fetvas*, see Colin Imber, *Ebu's Su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

⁸⁵ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 30 May 1592, 9 May 1593, and 17 May 1593, in *CSPVenice*, 9:36, 72-74.

⁸⁶ For more on this issue, see chap. 7, pp. 286-289.

⁸⁷ Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 17 April 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:453-454.

service and thus that of the sultan. He became a gatekeeper for the Grand Admiral and hoped to enter the palace service. Soliman hoped Henri III would write to Sultan Murad III on his behalf. As Lancosme indicated, “he maintains all the markings of a French gentleman besides the turban” and would be of service to the king.⁸⁸

Supporting the advancement of someone with direct ties to France could only benefit the ambassador’s network. This request was not the only of its sort. Lancosme’s nephew de Brèves maintained the relationship with Soliman, who made the successful transition to the palace service becoming a *Kapucu* (or gatekeeper). Later in 1595, Henri IV advocated once again for Soliman’s advancement most assuredly at the prompting of de Brèves. This time the king asked that Soliman be appointed a “*chechier*,” or what I assume is a *chéquier* (or bookkeeper), the equivalent of an Ottoman *defterdar* (treasurer).⁸⁹

This sort of support for French allies should not be surprising. Research on spies in the Mediterranean in the last decade has demonstrated how competing powers fostered relationships with Ottoman statesmen through bribes, gifts, or other means to acquire information in the Ottoman capital. The *dragoman* Hürrem, for instance, was on the Spanish payroll, feeding information and advice to the Spaniards and supporting the Spanish envoy Margliani, who was trying to negotiate a truce with the Ottomans. Hürrem, however, was also working for the Ottoman spymaster and grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed, who supported these negotiations

⁸⁸ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 121r, Lancosme to Henri III, 30 April 1586.

⁸⁹ Henri IV to Murad III, before 20 March 1595, *Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, vol. 4, 324.

against powerful factions in Constantinople, using the *dragoman's* loose lips to further the negotiations.⁹⁰

These sorts of alliances and coordination also existed among the Christian ambassadors. The French ambassador was almost always allied with the Venetian *bailo*. When Paul Cantarini arrived as the *bailo* in 1580, he told Germigny that he received orders “to honor and respect the French ambassador above all others.”⁹¹ Similarly, Henri III expected his ambassadors to maintain friendly relations with the *bailo*.⁹² Henri IV, for instance, thought de Brèves acted judiciously when he supported the *bailo* in his conflict with Cigalazade.⁹³ This relationship was strong enough that Germigny asked the *bailo* to provide support and advice for his secretary, whom he was leaving in his place at the ambassador's departure until the arrival of his replacement.⁹⁴

Other relationships were not so amicable. Since the English ambassador arrived in Constantinople in the 1580s, the French continually undermined them, challenging the legitimacy of the English ambassador and then competing with them about jurisdiction over the Dutch in the late 1590s and early 1600s.⁹⁵ During the 1580s, Germigny and the *bailo* were both ordered to coordinate their efforts against the English.⁹⁶ These contests grew increasingly intense. The opposition Germigny

⁹⁰ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-Betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560-1600," in "Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean" eds. Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstic, special issue, *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015), 112.

⁹¹ BNF, Français 16143, fol. 98v, Germigny to Henri III, 17 June 1580.

⁹² Henri III to Gilles de Noailles, 16 March 1575, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 3:526-7.

⁹³ Henri IV to de Brèves, 7 March 1600, *Lettres missives de Henri IV*, 5:212-213.

⁹⁴ Giovanni Francesco Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 20 March 1585, in *CSPVenice*, 8:111-112

⁹⁵ For more on these issues see chaps. 6 and 7, pp. 244-252 and 280-293.

⁹⁶ Henri III to de Maisse, 3 February 1584, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 6:194; Minutes of the deliberations of the Senate, 14 January 1581, in *CSPVenice*, 8:1-2.

made to the arrival of English ships in Constantinople was so great that it caused resentment from the grand vizier.⁹⁷ Germigny's successor Lancosme referred to the English ambassador as the "so-called (*pretendu*) ambassador," implying his illegitimacy. Even after Du Ferrier recommended that Lancosme find a way to work with the Englishman, William Harborne, to persuade the Ottomans to put their navy to sea against the Spaniards, Lancosme could not overcome the animosity that existed between the two—but such was always the case with Lancosme, who seemingly could not find a relationship worth preserving.⁹⁸ The competition over the jurisdiction of the Dutch caused such bad blood between de Brèves and the English ambassador that they stopped communicating.⁹⁹

Circumstances, however, could change this paradigm. When Lancosme joined the Catholic League rebellion against Henri IV, the abnormal circumstances created odd bedfellows. Lancosme quickly went from being a rival of Spain and Austria to their allies. Lancosme conspired with the Imperial ambassador to prevent the departure of the Ottoman fleet into the Mediterranean and to ensure the renewal of the Spanish-Ottoman truce.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the French crown had recourse to Edward Barton, the English ambassador, who became the official representative of the French from 1589 until 1592. During that period, de Brèves, Lancosme's nephew who traveled with the ambassador to Constantinople but remained loyal to Henri IV,

⁹⁷ Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 5 April 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:50.

⁹⁸ Lancosme to Henri III, 30 April 1586, in *Négociations*, 4:501.

⁹⁹ Girolamo Capello and Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 29 January 1597, in *CSPVenice*, 9:254

¹⁰⁰ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 19 April 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:539.

worked hand-in-hand with Barton, especially as they managed the newfound rivalry with Lancosme.¹⁰¹

Just as the new diplomatic history has emphasized informal actors as significant channels of effective influence, formal ambassadors and agents similarly utilized these back-room channels. Indeed, this sort of diplomacy and coordination was a pre-condition for effective diplomacy. Diplomats found willing participants in mutually beneficial policies, coordinated messaging and strategy, and enacted plans to persuade the rest of the divan and the sultan toward their goals. This sort of coordination was only possible due to the great linguistic malleability of Constantinople and the extensive commensurability of the two political cultures. French, and other Christian European, diplomats were at home in a political environment predicated on factionalism and clientele networks.¹⁰²

Leisure Time and Festivals as Diplomacy

When ambassadors and diplomats were not participating in dedicated diplomatic activities, these diplomats filled their time with a variety of leisure activities that often doubled as moments to network and play the political game. Some of these activities, such as meals, relaxed soirees, and Christian festivals, provided the diplomats with a more relaxed atmosphere to unwind and confirm friendships. Others, such as Ottoman festivals, provided a more formal atmosphere with dedicated procedures. The strict adherence to custom and honor that

¹⁰¹ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 11 May 1592, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 9, 27.

¹⁰² On factionalism and clientele networks in the Ottoman Empire, see Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites"; Graf, *Sultan's Renegades*; Graf, "Of Half-Lives and Double Lives"; Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean"; Metin Kunt, "Royal and Other Households," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (New York: Routledge, 2012), 103-114.

predominated early modern societies made all these events a minefield of possible precedence disputes for the aloof or especially sensitive participant. In short, these activities were simultaneously leisure activities as well as alternative diplomatic media.

Informal gatherings for meals and other such engagements were the most frequent leisure activities. The *bailo* played an especially prominent role in organizing these affairs. For instance, on the eve of St. Mark's day, the *bailo* customarily held a banquet for all the Venetians in the city, and he frequently invited the other ambassadors to attend, excluding the English who of course did not celebrate the Saints' days.¹⁰³ Other events were impromptu. The *bailo* frequently had the French representative over to dine with him. These opportunities became increasingly important during the interim between ambassadors. Germigny left his secretary Sébastien Berthier as an agent in Constantinople until the new ambassador arrived, and Berthier frequently sought advice from the *bailo* over dinner.¹⁰⁴

The arrival of new ambassadors or diplomats in the Ottoman capital was frequently an impetus for such a gathering. When the Venetian *bailo* Francesco Contarini arrived in Constantinople in 1602, the "customary banquet" was provided. De Brèves and many Ottomans, including "some of quality" attended.¹⁰⁵ When the new English ambassador Henry Lello arrived in Constantinople in 1599, he organized a gathering aboard his ship for some notables in Constantinople, including the Venetian *bailo*, the *Nishanji Bashi* (Grand Chancellor) among other Ottomans,

¹⁰³ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 3 May 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:127.

¹⁰⁴ Giovanni Francesco Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 20 March 1585, in *CSPVenice*, 8:111-112.

¹⁰⁵ Francesco Contarini and Agostino Nani to the Doge and the Senate, 2 December 1602, in *CSPVenice*, 9:510.

and some Ragusan merchants. De Brèves, however, did not attend this gathering since he and the Englishman were in the middle of a burgeoning rivalry. The Englishman Lello took the opportunity to seek advice from the *bailo* on how to resolve his differences with de Brèves during the soiree.¹⁰⁶ Christian holidays, such as Easter, were other moments calling for celebration. In 1580, Germigny related assisting with all the events during the holy week preceding Easter. He also had a gathering of his own for the vice-*bailo* (the *bailo* had died), the Ragusan provosts, and various Venetian merchants. While this might appear a simple gathering, Germigny intentionally made plans with this group throughout the week, accompanying one another to various events to isolate the Spanish representative Margliani—who was trying to negotiate a truce with the Ottomans—from prospective allies. Germigny delighted in his success that Margliani had to “attend the St. Pierre church alone...not finding any provosts or others and least of all ambassadors or *bailos* there.”¹⁰⁷

Hunting provided another pastime that brought ambassadors and Ottoman notables together. The baron of Salignac was an especially avid hunter—indeed, he took time out of his voyage to Constantinople to go hunting in Munich with Prince Albert and the Cardinal d’Este—and he frequently used it to get closer with Ottoman statesmen. He became especially friendly with the *Chakirji-Bashi* (head falconer) Halil Pasha due to their mutual appreciation for hunting. Halil Pasha would frequent the French embassy talking and drinking with Salignac all night and into the morning. Despite the costs of food and drink to the ambassador for these

¹⁰⁶ Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate, 16 October 1599, in *CSPVenice*, 9:379-380.

¹⁰⁷ BNF, Français 16143, fol. 74r, Germigny to Henri III, 16 April 1580.

entertainments, they were worth it because he loved the hunt, and he received “great favors and courtesies from the viziers, *kapudan* pashas, janissary *Ağas* and other principal officers of the Porte that knew how he carried his business and entertained the Turks (*caressoit les Turcs*).” When Salignac met Halil on the hunt, the Ottoman frequently brought his friends. Some of these hunts would last days: “two or three days in one place and as many days in another.” This impetuous method was a source of enjoyment—the diversity of the game—but it also introduced him to different *Ağas* and *Çavuşes* “who favored us and accompanied us to the new game.” Frequently, Salignac and Halil would receive invitations to reside in their houses during the hunt and participate in banquets from their hosts. Salignac took such opportunities to give his host, hostess, or their child a coat made from Parisian cloth or some other valued textile to improve the reputation of the French among the Ottomans.¹⁰⁸

Ottoman festivals also provided moments for convivial gathering, but they took on a much more formal atmosphere. Various weddings of important Ottoman notables would bring the Christian ambassadors together in attendance. Antoine Pétremol attended four of these weddings between Ahmed, *ağa* of the janissaries, and the daughter of Rustem Pasha in October 1561, as well as three other weddings in August 1562.¹⁰⁹ For Ibrahim Pasha’s wedding in 1586, the pasha’s majordomo approached the English, French, and Venetian ambassadors seeking pheasants, hares, and other game since he understood they like to eat such foods. Both the French and Venetians declined, not wanting to set a precedent for the future, but the

¹⁰⁸ Bordier, *Ambassade en Turquie*, 94, 97-98, 116; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 178.

¹⁰⁹ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 41r-v, 146v, Pétremol to Boistaillé, 19 September 1561, 30 August 1562.

English ambassador was happy to provide the requested game.¹¹⁰ While the Venetian *bailo* thought the request an inconvenience, one could equally interpret it as a good-faith gesture to cater to the preferences of the Christian ambassadors during the festivities. Christian ambassadors also attended other celebrations, such as the circumcision festival for the sultan's son.¹¹¹

Despite the joyous attitude of these gatherings, precedence was always important, especially to French diplomats who tried to impose their *de facto* privileged place in Constantinople. Jacques Savary de Lancosme was especially sensitive to these matters, and his brusque personality made everyone aware of it. The French and Venetian representatives traditionally held privileged social positions in Constantinople—the Venetian *bailo*, from his ancient long-standing in the city, and the French ambassador from to the Franco-Ottoman alliance. One of the places where these positions were on display was at mass on holidays and saints' days when they participated in the celebration. Traditionally, the *bailo* and ambassador sat side-by-side prominently next to the choir, but Lancosme thought such an arrangement unsuitable for the most prestigious ambassador in Constantinople. He would sit alone as he claimed the bishop of Dax had done since he was the “the only real ambassador at the Porte, for [Venice] only kept a *bailo*, whose rank was that of [an] agent,” a pedantic claim that no longer represented reality. To avoid the issue—neither deferring precedence on the matter to Lancosme and future French ambassadors nor antagonizing Lancosme's sensitive attitude on

¹¹⁰ Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 15 May 1586, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 8, 164.

¹¹¹ Derin Terzioğlu, “The Imperial Circumcision Festival of 1582: An Interpretation,” *Muqarnas* 12 (January 1995): 84–100.

the issue—Bernardo attended mass at a different church until the matter could be settled.¹¹²

It is easy to understand why Lancosme would blunder the typically amicable relationship with the *bailo* in this way. His abrasive personality over zealously clung to the position of the French ambassador, who frequently maintained a position of social prestige. At the gatherings at the *bailo*'s residence, the French ambassador sat at "his usual place at the head of the table." The seating precedence of the French ambassador disturbed Carlo Cicala—a Spanish representative in Constantinople theoretically only on personal business to visit his brother the *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade—so much that he chose to stay home rather than attend the gathering at the *bailo*'s residence. Despite his presence in the capital on private business, he did not want to attend the gathering in a subordinate position to a representative of France.¹¹³

These precedence disputes could become so enraged that the Ottomans intervened. When the *bailo* died in Constantinople in 1579, the Ottomans helped organize his funeral. During the process, the rivalry between the French ambassador and the Spanish agent grew so intense that the grand vizier refused to let either Germigny or the Spaniard Margliani attend the funeral out of fear that their bickering would disrupt the somber event.¹¹⁴

Skillfully navigating these interactions could be a significant difficulty, especially when they occurred during Ottoman festivals. During the circumcision

¹¹² Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 7 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 8, 152.

¹¹³ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 3 May 1594, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 9, 127.

¹¹⁴ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fols. 766-767, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 12 December 1579.

festival in 1582, a precedence dispute led Jacques de Germigny to abstain from the festivities. The exact reason is not completely clear, but many of the explanations for the abstention included some variation of a precedence dispute. Jacques-Auguste de Thou claimed that Germigny refused to be present while the Polish ambassador was there because it diminished Henri III's claim to the Polish throne. Henri III was elected king of Poland before he inherited the French kingdom in 1574, but after he claimed the French throne, Poland elected a new king, which Germigny was protesting according to De Thou.¹¹⁵ There were other more likely claims. For instance, the seating arrangements supposedly left Germigny in a less prestigious position than the Austrian ambassador led to Germigny's absence rather than him capitulating to a subordinate position in the festivities.¹¹⁶ While this would have met protocol in other European states, it was not the case in the Ottoman Empire where the tribute the Austrian Habsburgs paid to maintain peace placed them in an inferior position relative to France in Constantinople. No matter the reason, Germigny made a serious mistake, and his detractors pointed back to his actions during the festival as further examples of his imprudence as his reputation declined in Constantinople.¹¹⁷

Ambassadors' social calendars were full of various activities, from informal social gatherings and hunts to more formal occasions for both Christian and Muslim religious events. While these gatherings and festivals operated as moments of jovial conversation among often sincere friends, they also doubled as extensions of

¹¹⁵ Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou: depuis 1543. jusqu'en 1607*, 15 volumes, trans. Nicolas Rigault (London: s.n., 1734), 9:3.

¹¹⁶ Prochazka-Eisl, "Die Wiener Handschrift des Surname-i-Hiimayun," pp. 10-1 quoted in Terzioglu, "The Imperial Circumcision Festival," 98n22.

¹¹⁷ On this issue, see chap. 6, pp. 246-248.

diplomatic maneuvering. They could seek advice from allies in more intimate and less formal environments and develop friendships with prospective allies or intelligence assets. These events also acted as moments to publicly reinforce the prestige of the French monarch internationally and the diplomatic precedence of his agents in Constantinople. But this precedence card could be overplayed as both Germigny and Lancosme found out.

Conclusion

While the main push for French diplomacy with the Ottomans was to counter Spain's ever-growing power and prevent Spanish intervention in the French Wars of Religion, the French court viewed preserving French precedence and prestige (and thus the preservation of the Capitulations) in Constantinople as an essential precondition for that goal. As Lancosme explained, such a position held the reins of both Christendom and the Ottoman Empire as they faced off against one another, able to manipulate the conflict.¹¹⁸ To accomplish this goal in the best of times, French diplomats had to lean on informal channels of influence in Constantinople as much as the more formal diplomatic protocols. In a period of increasing competition from other Christian states in Constantinople, these sorts of interactions with various Ottoman statesmen became even more critical.

Informal avenues of diplomacy consumed the abundance of ambassadors' time in Constantinople. Even when they were engaging in leisure activities, navigating and fostering diplomatic relationships and preserving precedence were

¹¹⁸ Lancosme to Henri III, 2 and 20 August 1586, in *Négociations*, 4:542.

central factors of their participation. Simple, joyful activities like hunting, the mass, and banquets were moments to attract new friends or discuss diplomatic strategy as well as reinforce the position of the French ambassador relative to others—sometimes with negative consequences if too overzealous. These relationships permitted the French and others to have their position heard from different mouths in the divan. Policy positions were never homogeneously held, and factional disputes could frequently play out in the realm of foreign policy. Ambassadors and diplomats had to find allies and friends whose interests corresponded with their mission and work with them toward their common goals.

French diplomats, and others, were able to integrate themselves within the Ottoman political culture because of structural similarities within the two that were predicated on clientele networks that were both vertical and horizontal. Ottoman historians such as Emrah Gürkan, Giancarlo Casale, Tobias Graf, and Günhan Börekçi have demonstrated the significance of factionalism—another term for horizontal clientele networks—in Ottoman politics to further foreign policy interests.¹¹⁹ The similarity of these groups to the French clientele networks and factions that pervaded France during the time is significant.¹²⁰ For instance, the rivalry between the Bourbon and Guise families pervaded the French Wars of

¹¹⁹ Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean”; Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Tobias P. Graf, *The Sultan’s Renegades* (Oxford University Press, 2017); Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603–17)”; Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire*.

¹²⁰ Sharon Kettering, “Patronage and Kinship in Early Modern France,” *French Historical Studies* 16, no. 2 (1989): 408–35; Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Mack P. Holt, “Patterns of Clientèle and Economic Opportunity at Court during the Wars of Religion: The Household of François, Duke of Anjou,” *French Historical Studies* 13, no. 3 (1984): 305–22; Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

Religion. The clientele networks attached to these families consistently competed with one another to influence the policies of the crown and ultimately helped shape the Wars of Religion.¹²¹ Indeed, the actions of French ambassadors in Constantinople, integrating themselves in the factional politics of the Ottoman Empire, appear similar to those of the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza in Paris becoming a vital partner to the Catholic League rebelling against the Protestant French king Henri IV during the Wars of Religion. French ambassadors in Constantinople, however, supported much less rebellious agents.¹²² The French were well conditioned to play the political game in Constantinople.

At the same time French diplomats were integrating themselves into Ottoman political culture, the Ottoman Empire sent its own series of envoys to France. How did their experience in France influence the larger diplomatic relationship between the two states? We will turn to this question in chapter three.

¹²¹ Stuart Carroll, *Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the Making of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially chap. 4; Stuart Carroll, *Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹²² De Lamar Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*.

CHAPTER THREE—OTTOMAN DIPLOMATS IN FRANCE

Despite novel research questioning the degree to which Ottoman diplomacy differed from European patterns, our understanding of Ottoman envoys in Europe remains unfortunately very limited. Even the historiography on Ottomans in Venice remains sparse.¹ The case of Ottoman diplomats to France before the eighteenth century is even less well understood. When we do learn about Ottoman envoys in France, they almost invariably produce embarrassment to the French.² Géraud Poumarède's article, which describes the steady integration of the Ottomans into French diplomatic protocol by the eighteenth century, characterized the sixteenth-century French approach to Ottoman diplomats as "marked by discretion and prudence."³ Mathieu Grenet has written the most comprehensive social history of the Ottoman diplomatic presence in France before Mehmed Efendi in the eighteenth century. Grenet has focused on the social interactions of Muslim envoys in the seventeenth century beyond their presence at the French court, suggesting that focus on the courtly interactions, the spectacle, and the role of the interpreter has

¹ Cemal Kafadar, "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 10 (1986): 191-218; E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), chap. 6; Stephen Ortega, "Across Religious and Ethnic Boundaries: Ottoman Networks and Spaces in Early Modern Venice," *Mediterranean Studies* 18 (2009): 66-89.

² R. J. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France 1483-1610*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 181-182; De Lamar Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1985): 451-70.

³ Géraud Poumarède, "Les envoyés ottomans à la cour de France: d'une présence controversé à l'exaltation d'une alliance (XVe-XVIIIe siècles)," in *Turcs et turqueries, XVI-XVIIIe siècles*, ed. Lucien Bély (Paris: Presses universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne, 2009), 73.

inaccurately emphasized the exotic nature of these envoys and the “communication crisis” between the two cultures.⁴

This chapter pushes Grenet’s analysis into the sixteenth century and the French court. It argues that a culture of accommodation, rather than a culture of exoticism or difference, characterized the interactions of these Ottoman diplomats at the French court. The regular presence of Ottoman diplomats in France normalized the Ottoman alliance to the French elite. These envoys were not irregular, and their presence in France had a long history dating to the inception of the Franco-Ottoman alliance. The French court leveraged every level of the French government to accommodate and honor the Ottoman delegations appropriately. Local governments, provincial governors, elite courtiers, and nobles all participated. The Ottomans traveled through France as a conspicuous entourage with a royal escort, and the towns *en route* to court prepared to entertain them until the Ottomans moved on. Remaining at court frequently for a month or longer, they conditioned the French to the Ottoman alliance and helped to normalize it.

A note on sources is warranted. One of the frustrations of these studies is the limitation of sources describing sixteenth-century Ottoman diplomats. Sometimes, the only records of the existence of an Ottoman diplomat in France exist in the diplomatic correspondence of French ambassadors in Constantinople, notifying the court that the Ottomans sent a diplomat to France. Until the seventeenth century,

⁴ Mathieu Grenet, “Muslim Missions to Early Modern France, c. 1610-c.1780: Notes for a Social History of Cross-Cultural Diplomacy,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 223-244; Also see Géraud Poumarède, “Les envoyés ottomans à la cour de France,” 63-95; Susan Skilliter, “The Sultan’s Messenger, Gabriel Defrens: An Ottoman Master-Spy of the Sixteenth Century,” *Wiener Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Des Morgenlandes* 68 (January 1976): 47–59.; Fatma Muge Göcek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1987).

the Ottoman envoys did not leave accounts of their own experiences.⁵ Moreover, the Ottoman *Mühimme Defteri* (register of imperial orders) from the Ottoman Empire, which is the essential source of imperial activities available in the sixteenth century, might only indicate the existence of such a diplomat to France if anything at all. This absence results from the nature of the genre of the *Mühimme* and Ottoman diplomatic procedures. The *Mühimme Defteri* were summaries of imperial orders (or *hukum*) registered by the Ottoman chancellery as they went in and out of the *divan*. They were not in-depth descriptions of diplomatic endeavors. Generally, the *Mühimme Defteri* might only discuss the letter sent to the French king, and not always that much. For instance, the only reference to the Ottoman delegation sent to France in 1565 was a letter from the sultan.⁶ In the letter, no reference of the diplomat sent to deliver the letter exists nor other matters that the diplomat discussed during the mission. The Ottomans emphasized oral communication for sensitive information over ciphers.⁷ Often, the nature of oral communications were even withheld from other members of the Ottoman delegations. For instance, Ali Ağa, the Ottoman delegate sent in 1581, waited until his colleague Assan Ağa, who was sent on other matters, had departed before discussing the focus of his mission. The English ambassador, Henry Cobham, learned the reasons for this delay from the French court in an incredible moment of irony: Ali Ağa “understands that matters in France are treated with little secrecy; ... [and] if Assanaga (sic) had discovered his

⁵ Nabil Matar, *Europe Through Arab Eyes, 1578-1727* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

⁶ *6 Numarali Mühimme Defteri (972 / 1564-1565)*, (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995), no. 942.

⁷ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 187-188.

affairs, he [would] lose his head on his return.”⁸ So, we must depend on Christian-European sources.⁹

Ottomans in France, quantifying the issue

The emphasis of diplomatic history on permanent ambassadors has led many to question the degree to which the Ottomans participated in the same diplomatic activities as Christian Europe.¹⁰ The Ottomans did not practice residential diplomacy. To do so would undermine their self-representation as the pinnacle of the universal sovereign to whom all others sent residential ambassadors.¹¹ But these pretensions did not prevent them from sending embassies and envoys to Christian European and Muslim principalities. As we discussed in chapter one, the Ottoman Empire approached their diplomacy with France in much the same way France approached its diplomacy with a state like Florence or some other small state: through temporary embassies. Recent research has begun to recognize the similarities of Ottoman and Christian European diplomatic practices, but we still lack much information on almost all aspects of Ottoman diplomats sent to Christian

⁸ Cobham to Walsingham, 11 Dec 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, ed. Arthur John Butler, vol. 15 (London: HMSO, 1907), under Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol15>.

⁹ Both Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Fonds for the Sultan: How to Use Venetian Sources for Studying Ottoman History,” *News on the Rialto* 32 (2013): 23-28; and Tobias P. Graf, *The Sultan’s Renegades: Christian-European Converts to Islam and the Making of the Ottoman Elite, 1575-1610* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5-6, have defended the use of Christian sources for Ottoman history. Graf’s approach most similarly mirrors the one taken in this chapter.

¹⁰ M. S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494-1618* (New York: Longman Group, 1998); c.f. A. Nuri Yurdusev, éd., *Ottoman diplomacy: conventional or unconventional?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

¹¹ See Güneş İşiksel, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selîm II: paramètres et périmètres de l’Empire ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Peeters, 2016), 26-30; Michael Talbot, “Accessing the Shadow of God: spatial and Performative Ceremonial at the Ottoman Court,” in *The Key to Power? The Culture of Access in Princely Courts, 1400-1750*, ed. Dries Raeymaekers and Sebastiaan Derks (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 103-123; also see chap. 2, pp. 83-84.

states in the sixteenth century. Yet, at least in the case of France, the Ottoman Empire regularly sent *çavuşes* (messengers/envoys at the Ottoman court) and temporary ambassadors to the French court throughout the sixteenth century. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), the Ottomans sent a series of envoys to France to attend to their alliance and resolve any problems impeding effective cooperation, and the recourse to temporary envoys did not end there.

By the 1560s, the French court had extensive experience with Ottoman diplomats in France. **Error! Reference source not found.** provides a list of the Ottoman envoys to France for which we have records. The first significant interactions came through the Ottoman prince (*şehzade*) Cem, who found his way to France in 1483, more or less as a prisoner under the “protection” of the Knights of Rhodes as a competitor to the Ottoman throne. By 1488, the Ottomans sent an envoy to France to discuss the prince’s return. Bayezid II offered many gifts and his friendship if the French returned Cem.¹² This interaction began a long series of diplomatic agents sent from the Ottoman Empire to France, for which Table 4**Error! Reference source not found.** provides a list of Ottoman diplomats whose presence exists in the records. More friendly and cooperative Ottoman envoys began in the 1530s when Heyreddin Barbarossa, the *kapudan* pasha (Grand Admiral) and beylerbey (governor) of Algiers, met the French court in Puy-en-Velay in 1533. Barbarossa first met with a retinue of Marseillaise merchants when he

¹² Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2011), chap. 3; Louis Thuasne, *Djem Sultan: Fils de Mohammed II, Frère de Bayezid II (1459-1495)* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1892), chaps. 3 and 4.

disembarked his ship and was then escorted by them and the king's representative Antonio de Rincon to Puy-en-Velay. When François I^{er} arrived, Barbarossa broke the chains of some Christian prisoners he brought to symbolize the new friendly relations between the Ottomans and the French. Then the king gave the envoy an audience, the details of which have not survived.¹³ Two years later, the Ottomans sent a group of emissaries to Paris to await the dispatch of a French ambassador to Constantinople and to accompany him on his voyage.¹⁴ In 1537, an Ottoman envoy resided at court for four months.¹⁵ In the winter 1542-1543, the Ottoman Navy wintered in the French port of Toulon after besieging Savoyard Nice, an ally of Charles V.¹⁶ These sorts of diplomatic interactions continued—though never again like the wintering in Toulon—through the rest of the century, so the French were conditioned to the Ottoman diplomatic presence by 1560. Unfortunately, little research exists on Franco-Ottoman diplomacy under Henri II's reign, so data on the years between 1547 and 1559 does not exist. Yet, it is difficult to imagine that diplomatic envoys ceased since Franco-Ottoman military cooperation continued unabated under Henri II.¹⁷

¹³ Édith Garnier, *L'Alliance Impie: François Ier et Soliman Le Magnifique Contre Charles Quint (1529-1547)* (Paris: le félin, 2008), 73-74.

¹⁴ Garnier, *L'Alliance impie*, 91.

¹⁵ Géraud Poumarède, "Les envoyés ottomans à la cour de France," 63-95.

¹⁶ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, "Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us': Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543-1544," *French Historical Studies* 30, no. 3 (2007): 395-425.

¹⁷ See chap. 4.

| Ottoman Envoy | Year |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| Prince Cem | 1483 |
| Anonymous Envoy | 1488 |
| Heyreddin Barbarossa | 1533 |
| Anonymous Envoy | 1535 |
| Anonymous Envoy | 1537 |
| Ottoman Wintering in Toulon | 1542-1543 |
| Laffer <i>Ağa</i> | 1561 |
| Anonymous Envoy | 1562 |
| Anonymous Envoy | 1563 |
| Haci Murad | 1565 |
| Haci Murad | 1567 |
| Mahmud Bey (arrested in Venice) | 1570 |
| Haci Murad | 1571 |
| Algerian Delegation | 1572 |
| Assan <i>Ağa</i> | 1581 |
| Ali <i>Ağa</i> | 1581 |
| Mustafa <i>Ağa</i> | 1598 |
| Barthelemy de Coeurs | 1601 |
| Mustafa <i>Ağa</i> | 1607 |

Table 4. List of Recorded Ottoman Envoys to France

The second half of the sixteenth century saw a continuous string of Ottoman envoys to the French court almost immediately after the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 despite the theoretical damage the Treaty did to the alliance. Laffer *Ağa* was sent by the Algerian beylerbey in 1561, promising friendship, freeing French slaves, and seeking munitions for the Algerian navy.¹⁸ The Ottomans sent three envoys to France in 1562, 1563, and 1565. We do not have much information about these embassies except the one in 1565 led by Haci Murad. They were all related in some way to the economic standoff between the French crown and a Jewish merchant in

¹⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 13r-v. Pétremol to the Count of Taude, 14 July 1561.

Constantinople Joseph Nasi—who happened to be one of the favorites of Suleiman’s son and the future Sultan Selim II (r. 1566-1574)—to whom the crown owed money. In 1567, Hacı Murad was sent again to France, but the nature of his embassy is not clear. In 1570, an Ottoman diplomat delivering the newly confirmed Capitulations (trade agreements that also confirmed the alliance) to France was taken prisoner in Venice. Later in 1571, Hacı Murad returned once again with a twelve-man retinue to France to share information on their projects against the Holy League in the Mediterranean. His mission also included lodging a formal complaint about the demeanor and actions of the French ambassador in Constantinople at the time, Guillaume de Grandchamp, for his actions against his fellow compatriot sent to help resolve the Nasi affair.¹⁹ In 1572, an Algerian delegation was sent to Charles IX, seeking French support against Spain, which they thought was planning an attack against them.²⁰

The reign of Henri III saw only two Ottoman delegations both in 1581. The first ambassador, Assan *Ağa*, was meant to invite Henri III to send a representative to attend the elaborate fifty-day festival for the circumcision—religious ritual to mark his entrance into the “people of the *fitra*,” who followed the “conduct of Abraham”—of the sultan’s son.²¹ Many foreign envoys attended from the Safavid Empire, Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, and others.²² The second envoy, Ali *Ağa*, had much more important business to discuss. While he was nominally charged with the delivery of

¹⁹ SHD Vincennes, A¹4 fol. 34r, 34r-35r ter, Dax to Charles IX, 25 July 1571, Charles IX to Dax, 25 July 1571; Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 182.

²⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol 179-180, Charles IX to the bishop of Dax, 11 May 1572.

²¹ D. Terzioğlu, ‘The Imperial Circumcision Festival of 1582: An Interpretation’, *Muqarnas* 12 (1995), 84-85; M. J. Kister, “...and He Was Born Circumcised...’: Some Notes on Circumcision in Hadith,” *Oriens* 34 (1994), 20-22.

²² Terzioğlu, “Imperial Circumcision,” 84-85.

the confirmed Capitulations of 1581, his real mission was to discuss Franco-Ottoman military coordination against Spain.²³

Henri IV's reign received three separate Ottoman delegations of which we are aware. The ambassadorial correspondence from 1589 to 1604 is especially spotty with large chunks of time missing from the record, so there might have been more. A certain Mustafa Ağa arrived in France in 1598.²⁴ Three years later, the Ottomans sent another diplomat, this time the French renegade Barthelmy de Coeurs hoping to combine France's forces to those of the Ottoman Empire against the Austrian Habsburgs.²⁵ In 1607, Mustafa Ağa visited France as part of a combined mission traveling to both France and then England. This delegation delivered some letters to the king along with a gift of some sort of a big cat that the king displayed on the *rue de la Harpe*.²⁶ Mustafa also sought the release of Ottoman galley slaves in Marseille. This envoy was one of the few, if not the only one, for whom we have records of complaints about his treatment in France.²⁷

These are only the notable Ottoman embassies sent to France that turned up in the records. There were likely numerous others pursuing less significant activities such as Mustafa Ağa in 1607, who was delivering letters to Henri IV from the sultan before continuing his journey to England. We only hear of his mission because the

²³ Responce du Roy a la Creance de l'Ambassadeur Ali Aga, 15 June 1582, in *L'illustre Orbandale*, 2 vols. (Lyon, Pierre Cusset, 1662), 1:59; Cobham to Walsingham, 22 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30.

²⁴ Henri IV to de Brèves, 4 May 1598, in *Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV*, ed. Jules Berger de Xivrey, 9 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-1876), 4:979.

²⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 25 June 1601, in *Lettres missives de Henri IV*, 5:430-432.

²⁶ Pierre de L'Estoile, *Memoires-Journaux de Pierre de L'Estoile*, eds. G. Brunet et al., 12 vols. (Paris: Librairie des Bibliophiles, 1875-1896), 8:297.

²⁷ Salignac to Henri IV, 17 August 1607, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, Baron de Salignac: 1605 à 1610: correspondance diplomatique et documents inédits*, ed. Theodore de Gontaut-Biron, 2 vols. (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1889), 2:162.

French ambassador, the baron of Salignac, wanted Henri IV to prevent him from continuing to England as part of the ongoing Franco-English rivalry in Constantinople and because the envoy thought himself poorly treated in Marseille. Sometimes, letters from the sultans traveled to France *via* French channels. This option was especially used when the French embassy translated the letters. François Savary de Brèves had a habit of translating the letters himself.²⁸ But more frequently, the Ottomans sent a *çavuş* (messenger or a generic court official) to deliver the letters directly to France. So, these Ottoman envoys that left records of their presence in France are only the tip of the iceberg. There was a much more significant proportion of Ottomans traveling to the French court that simply left no surviving records. Even without taking into consideration this unreported mass of Ottomans traveling to France, Frenchmen experienced a steady stream of Ottoman statesmen traveling to court. It should not be surprising, then, that Mathieu Grenet recognized a mundane *quotidian* nature of French interactions with these Ottomans statesmen by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁹ By then, there was a long history of Ottomans in France that normalized the Ottoman alliance as well as the Ottoman presence.

The Ottoman Envoys

So, what do we know about these Ottoman diplomats? Unfortunately, not very much. To establish a general understanding of the type of individual the Ottomans sent to France, we must piece together the scattered evidence relating to

²⁸ BNF, Français 16144, fols. 238r-241v.

²⁹ Grenet, "Muslim Missions."

the position and background of some of the Ottoman diplomats. As the introduction to this chapter explained, the Ottoman sources are unfortunately very silent on these matters. So, we must lean on Christian-European sources, which are themselves limited, to learn anything about these Ottoman diplomats.

The Ottomans took care to send envoys who would be well received during these visits. Usually, someone in the Ottoman retinue—either the diplomat himself or a *dragoman* (translator) sent with it—would have experience in France or other Christian European countries. Renegades (those Christian Europeans who converted to Islam and entered the sultan’s service) played frequently functioned in this capacity. Barthelemy de Coeurs, the Ottoman envoy sent to France in 1601, was a French renegade who defected to the service of the Ottomans. He was from Marseille, France, and entered the service of the Ottomans along with a large group of Frenchmen who joined the Austrian war effort during the Long War between Austria and the Ottomans (1593-1606) only to defect to the Ottomans during the siege of Papa in 1600. He, along with other deserters, then entered the service of Ibrahim Pasha before he became a doctor for the sultan.³⁰ Gabriel de Bourgoigne, another French renegade, was a perfect example of the flexible identities that permeated the early modern Mediterranean.³¹ He was captured at sea by the Ottoman navy before taking the turban, as his contemporaries would say, and converting to Islam. He then entered French service at their embassy while

³⁰ Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 4 May 1601, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 9, 38 vols. (London: HMSO, 1864-1947) 458; Henri IV to de Brèves, 23 September 1600, *Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, 5:308-310; Henri IV to de Brèves, 25 June 1601, *Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, 5:430; C. F. Finkel, “French Mercenaries in the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606: The Desertion of the Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 55, no. 3 (1992): 451–71.

³¹ Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), chap. 4.

maintaining a position in the Imperial palace as an *Odabaşı* (or head of the chamber).³² In 1581, He functioned as the *dragoman* sent along with the Ottoman diplomats, Assan *Ağa* and Ali *Ağa*, and he played an essential role in organizing their travel from Venice to Paris. He took multiple trips between the two cities, and he played a role in negotiating the honorable reception the Ottoman diplomats were to receive in Lyon.³³ His French background was undoubtedly crucial in leaving a good impression on his hosts.

Most of the envoys were, however, not French renegades, but they were frequently renegades from other Christian European states or had connections in some fashion to France. Hacı Murad was a Polish renegade. He was sent as a diplomat to France at least three separate times in 1565, 1567, and 1571.³⁴ Ali *Ağa* was an Anatolian, but he had previous experience with the French in Constantinople. Henri III wrote in his favor to the sultan.³⁵ According to the Henry Corbham, he was frequently “used by the Turk in matters touching the dispatch of French affairs and those of other parts of Christendom.”³⁶ But this was not always the case. Assan *Ağa*, who was sent on a separate mission simultaneously with Ali *Ağa*, had no connections to France. Indeed, he brought his son along with him so they could see France together.³⁷

³² Skilliter, “Sultan’s Messenger,” 52-54.

³³ BNF, Français 2704, fols. 252r-v, Henri III to Mandelot, 19 September 1581.

³⁴ “Journal of Affairs in France, June and July 1565,” in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, Vol. 7, ed. Joseph Stevenson (London: HMSO, 1870), under Elizabeth: June 1565, 16-30, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol7>; Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, ed. Henri Hauser (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897), 182.

³⁵ See Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), 4:841.

³⁶ Cobham to Burghley, 20 Nov 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 16-20.

³⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 302-303, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 31 August and 2 September 1581.

These connections with France helped facilitate smooth communications and interactions with the French. Many of Ottoman diplomats did not have any problem communicating with Europeans. Indeed, they traveled with *dragomans* (translators), and the French court sent a translator to accompany the Ottoman delegates *en route*, but capabilities in spontaneous communication only improved the experience.³⁸ When the English ambassador Henry Cobham met with Ali Ağa in Paris in 1581, he primarily communicated through his *dragoman*, but he also talked to the envoy directly in Italian³⁹ Haci Murad, who often acted as an Ottoman envoy, had no problem communicating in Modon with some Frenchmen returning from Constantinople in 1572. Haci Murad shared much about his time in France and even shared his perspective on France's Huguenot problem.⁴⁰ The Ottomans skillfully chose diplomats familiar with France and Christian Europe.

Traveling from the Ottoman Empire to France

Ottoman travel to France could be a logistical nightmare for the French to resolve. Generally, the Ottomans traveled by sea from Constantinople to Venice without much trouble, but they might also travel to Algiers and then sail to Marseille from there. The latter prevented the envoys from traveling through northern Italy's various principalities allied to Spain, but it also meant sailing through the dangerous waters of the northwestern Mediterranean on a Muslim vessel. While the French committed themselves to reciprocate the freedom of travel Frenchmen received from

³⁸ Cobham to Burghley, 20 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 16-20.

³⁹ Cobham to Walsingham, 29 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30.

⁴⁰ Du Frense-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 182-183.

the Ottomans, Ottoman vessels would have to travel through dangerous waters where one could expect interaction with ships from Naples, Sicily, Genoa, and other lands allied to, or under, Habsburg rule. These lands were always either actively at war or operating under a tenuous truce with the Ottomans. The French could not guarantee, nor even be optimistic about, the safety of Ottomans traveling through the northwestern region of the Mediterranean in the same way that the Ottomans could at least feign to guarantee the safety to French vessels traveling in the eastern Mediterranean.⁴¹

These threats to the Ottomans were real. French ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire were famously caught and murdered by Habsburg clients in 1541. The threat caused François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, to travel to Venice *incognito* to avoid a similar fate.⁴² In 1581, Henri III encouraged the Ottomans not to send an envoy to France when he expected the message was not significant enough to overcome the risk of traveling through the Italian territories of Philip II. The English ambassador in Paris recounted that the Ottoman diplomats “were persuaded to leave their rich apparel, jewels, and horses at Ragusa, being put in doubt lest...they might be spoiled” while traveling through Italy.⁴³

There was a real concern for the repercussions of such an event. A decade earlier, Mahmud Bey was imprisoned in Venice on his way to France to deliver the

⁴¹ This was a low bar since French ships were frequently attacked at sea, and the Ottomans constantly writing *hukums* (imperial orders) to North African corsairs ordering them to stop attacking French vessels, see chap. 7 pp. 293-295.

⁴² See Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 182-183; see also Charrière (ed), *Négociations*, 3:172, for the assassination of Antonio Rincon. BNF, Français 15870, fol. 245r, Instructions sent to Sr de Triquerie, also references the “great pains Dax took to conduct himself safely to Venice.”

⁴³ Cobham to Burghley, 20 Nov 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 16-20.

recently concluded Capitulations to France in 1570 while traveling with his French counterpart Claude du Bourg.⁴⁴ Du Bourg and Mahmud Bey arrived in Venice, but the Frenchman left Mahmud there while he traveled to France to organize their journey to the French court.⁴⁵ The timing could not have been worse. While Mahmud was still in Venice residing at the French embassy, an Ottoman envoy to Venice arrived demanding Venice cede Cyprus; Venice declared war instead, beginning the Cypriot War (1570-1573). Mahmud's continued presence in Venice drew suspicion, and the Venetians arrested him while he awaited permission to travel to Paris.⁴⁶ The fallout was significant for Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. France spent the next three years seeking Mahmud's release on behalf of the Ottomans. Part of François de Noailles's mission as the new ambassador in Constantinople was to stop in Venice *en route* and secure the Ottoman's freedom.⁴⁷ He was unsuccessful, and his failure was evident when he arrived in Constantinople. He gained little traction in his diplomatic maneuvers, and as he stated, it was directly related to his failure to release Mahmud, who was arrested while under French protection.⁴⁸

The French Wars of Religion further complicated the trip to the French court. The French kings could not maintain order in their own kingdom; guaranteeing the safety of a group of Muslims traveling through the countryside was even more problematic. This concern was particularly important in 1581. It was part of the

⁴⁴ Mahmud Bey was traveling with Claude du Bourg, the French envoy who negotiated the Capitulations. See chap. 5, pp. 193-194.

⁴⁵ Du Bourg also had to explain himself to Charles IX considering the envoy's rivalry with the ambassador in Constantinople Guillaume de Grandchamp. More on this in chap. 4, pp. 178-184.

⁴⁶ Niccolò Capponi, *Victory of the West: The Great Christian-Muslim Clash at the Battle of Lepanto* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2007), 127.

⁴⁷ BNF, Français 3164, fols. 1r-2r, Instructions données aud. Sieur d'Acqs en ladicte charge et ambassade.

⁴⁸ BNF, Français 7091, fols. 8r-v, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 24 April 1572.

reason Henri III hoped the Ottomans would not send their envoys until he learned of the important matters Ali Ağa had to discuss. The French ambassador in Constantinople, the French ambassador in Venice, and Henri III were all concerned by the violence that permeated France at the time.⁴⁹

When Venice was safe for Ottomans, which was most of the time, the Venetian ambassador played an integral role in organizing the envoys' route to the French court. In 1573, he played an important role in mediating how to handle Mahmud Bey's travel after he was finally freed from captivity by the Venetians.⁵⁰ In 1581, Du Ferrier had to navigate the difficult process of determining the safest routes through enemy territories and acquiring passports for the diplomats. The French ambassador sent the Ottomans through Spanish Milan *en route* to France, conceivably also passing through Turin, Savoy, an ally of Spain. As Du Ferrier explained, the route through Grisons, Switzerland, would be frustratingly slow in the winter as well as dangerous since the plague broke out in Grisons that year. The French ambassador had to seek passports from Venice and Milan. For Milan, he had to persuade Spanish representatives in Venice to write the governor in Milan on his behalf for the passport. Du Ferrier also sent his nephew to Milan to speak to the Governor to ensure the passports were given and to receive a promise of safety. After Du Ferrier's nephew returned with the passports, he received orders to escort the Ottoman delegates to the French court, and if he could not receive an understanding

⁴⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 273-275, 289-90, 293-294, 326, 338-341, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 8 July 1581; Du Ferrier to Henri III, 4 August 1581; Henri III to Du Ferrier, 26 July 1581; Henri III to Du Ferrier, 5 September 1581; Du Ferrier to Henri III, 13 October 1581; BNF, Français 16143, fol. 125r, Germigny to Henri III, 10 June 1581.

⁵⁰ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 133-134, Du Ferrier to Catherine de Medici, 17 April 1573.

with the Governor of Milan, he would take the Ottoman delegation through Grisons.⁵¹ This process was loud and conspicuous, and we should expect this sort of affair characterized all the journeys of Ottoman diplomats traveling to France *via* Venice.

Traveling the French Countryside and Social Interactions

After the arrival of Ottoman envoys in France, they were received by a royal representative—reciprocating the Ottoman gesture—and escorted through the French countryside to the French court.⁵² These trips involved multiple stops in different cities in France, where they experienced elaborate receptions and entertainment in the lodgings of various Frenchmen. The process provided ample opportunities for Franco-Ottoman social interactions throughout southern and middle France that were almost always positive. The sixteenth-century experience demonstrates that Frenchmen were interested in meeting their Ottoman allies. The Ottomans almost invariably left their French hosts impressed, and the numerous visits from Ottoman diplomats conditioned Frenchmen to the Ottoman alliance. At the end of Henri IV's reign, however, increasing attacks from the Barbary corsairs on French vessels could produce a caustic environment for Ottoman diplomats in the early seventeenth century.

The court expected its local governors and elites to entertain and honor the Ottoman diplomats on their voyage through France, providing numerous moments

⁵¹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 339-341, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 13 October 1581.

⁵² See Grenet, "Muslim Missions," 229; On the Ottomans receiving French ambassadors at the border and escorting them to Constantinople, see and Işiksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 21-26.

for social interaction and cultural exchange. Ellen Welch has discussed the significance of pageantry and theatrical entertainments to construct and convey the relationship between the two powers in early modern French diplomacy. While the French never produced anything as elaborate as the Bayonne entertainments for their Ottoman guests, they still sought to produce an ornate welcome that both demonstrated the importance of the Ottomans to the French and the continued relevance of the French monarchy to the Ottomans. As Catherine de Medici poignantly stated, she hoped that the Ottoman envoys in 1581 would “notice that France is not as abased and poor as many foreigners consider it.”⁵³ The Ottoman envoys’ experience in France, thus, entailed a significant amount of social interactions with Frenchmen.

These interactions generally began in Venice with the French ambassador and his retinue at the French embassy. In 1570, as we already saw, Mahmud Bey’s stay in Venice became a much longer affair. Before the envoy’s arrest, he took up residence in the French embassy while waiting for the return of Du Bourg with instructions for his voyage to the French court.⁵⁴ When Mahmud Bey was freed, he immediately went to the quarters of Du Ferrier. After three years in captivity, he was ready to return to the Ottoman Empire, which was only reasonable. Du Ferrier met with Mahmud “frequently,” and gave him 1,200 *écus*, which was provided by the crown as his *per diem* during his voyage to France, along with the promise of more gifts. Du Ferrier

⁵³ Catherine de Medici to Ferrier, 28 September 1581, in *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, ed. Hector de La Ferrière, 11 vols. (Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1880-1943), 7:404; on the pageantry of the Bayonne entertainments, see Ellen R. Welch, *A Theater of Diplomacy: International Relations and the Performing Arts in Early Modern France*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), ch. 1.

⁵⁴ Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 127.

thought the gifts and *per diem* made up for the misfortune Mahmud suffered and would further French diplomatic goals in Constantinople.⁵⁵

The Ottoman envoys also spent an extended time in Venice after arriving in early September 1581. The first ambassador, Assan *Ağa*, sent to invite a representative from France to the circumcision festival of the sultan's son, was lodged in the French embassy. This decision was not uncommon.⁵⁶ The more prestigious diplomat, Ali *Ağa*, sent to discuss military coordination with France, was lodged in a dedicated house by himself. The Venetians thought it only appropriate due to Ali *Ağa*'s standing in Constantinople.⁵⁷ They did not depart for the voyage from the Serene Republic until 14 October.⁵⁸ During this time, Du Ferrier met with them both frequently to organize their voyage. Du Ferrier was impressed with Assan *Ağa* for his enthusiasm to see France. He brought his son, who was excited to see the country. Du Ferrier enjoyed working with them on the details since Assan *Ağa* was "so good-natured."⁵⁹ He met Ali *Ağa* twice while he was held in quarantine (a normal process for all coming from the Levant to prevent plague) before entering Venice. After these conversations, Du Ferrier was persuaded to encourage Charles IX to take the risks associated with their travel through Northern Italy and France to hear Ali *Ağa*'s important mission to coordinate their military forces against Spain.⁶⁰

As the Ottomans arrived in France, the opportunities for social interactions were everywhere. The envoys did not make direct trips straight to the French court.

⁵⁵ BNF, Cinq Cents du Colbert 366, fols. 132-134, Du Ferrier to Catherine de Medici, 17 April 1573.

⁵⁶ Henri III to Du Ferrier, 26 July 1581, in *Négociations*, 4:72n.

⁵⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 301-305, 321-323, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 31 August and 2 September 1581, 15 September 1581.

⁵⁸ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fols. 345-346, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 14 October 1581.


⁵⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol. 322, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 15 September 1581.

⁶⁰ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 315-317, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 8 September 1581.

They often meandered their way throughout the countryside, stopping along the way, primarily in major cities. Haci Murad visited many villages during his route to a monastery outside Bayonne to meet Charles IX in 1565. He traveled from Marseille to Narbonne to Toulouse, then up the Garonne river to Bordeaux, then making his way south to Dax, before meeting the French court outside Bayonne. On his return journey to Marseille, Haci Murad stopped at Condom, La Romieu, Lectoure, Lavit, and Lemargne.⁶¹ Two Ottoman diplomats stayed in Lyon, another in Orléans. Another took a detour to visit the hometown of the French ambassador in Constantinople in 1581.⁶² Figure 3 below marks the different places Ottoman envoys stayed. The documentation of these visits is limited. We only have references to seven different missions, and most of those are only one or two stopping points. Using the 1565 envoy of Haci Murad as a guide, we should assume that the other envoys similarly scattered the countryside with short visits intermixed with more extended layovers on their path to the French court and back that provided ample opportunities for interactions.

⁶¹ See Paul Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Naci duc de Naxos* (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 113-116.

⁶² BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fols. 388-389, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 20 January 1582.



Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France

Figure 3. Map of Recorded Overnight Stays by Ottoman Envoys in France. Original image, François de Belleforest, *Description generale de toute la France*, (1575), modified by Nathan Michalewicz. Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France, GE D-14776.

As the envoys visited the different towns in France, their presence was conspicuous and generated interest and cultural exchange. When Haci Murad’s delegation in 1565 arrived in Marseille with eight or nine attendants in addition to the French consul of Algiers as an escort, the city’s governor Pierre Bon, baron of Meillon, treated them well and “with courtesy” and provided them with all they would need on their voyage. The duke of Joyeuse then joined the Ottoman delegation

en route to Narbonne to act as the royal escort.⁶³ The governor of Narbonne, Raimond Beccarie de Pavie, *seigneur* of Fourquevaux, received the delegation with honors when they arrived. Similarly, the governor of Languedoc, the Cardinal of Armagnac, received the Ottoman envoys when they arrived in Toulouse.⁶⁴ In Toulouse, Haci Murad and his entourage found ready hosts. The *capitouls* (the elected leaders) of the city prepared the same lodging for the Ottoman delegation that they provided to Louis, cardinal of Guise, when he traveled to Toulouse.⁶⁵

Henri III's treatment of the 1581 delegation provides some insight into what these honors might look like. The king ordered the remittance of 200 *écus* to the delegation as a *per diem* and ordered the governor of Lyon, François de Mandelot, to prepare a variety of "fruits and wines" along with other preparations "that is accustomed to honorable guests."⁶⁶ One might expect similar treatment in Narbonne and Toulouse. Accommodating the diplomats in the same lodgings in Toulouse that the *capitouls* reserved for distinguished nobles such as the cardinal of Guise would indicate as much. Granting these honors to the Ottoman delegates was not rare. One town in Gascony forced an ambassador from Denmark traveling to his post in Spain in 1565 to depart the inn to make room for the Ottoman envoys.⁶⁷ Ottoman diplomats could thus expect to be treated similarly as distinguished nobles visiting the city and better than other some diplomats from other Christian states.

⁶³ BNF, Français 15881, fol. 148r, Mouillon to Charles IX, 23 May 1565.

⁶⁴ Guillaume-Ballin, *Joseph Naci duc de Naxos*, 111-113.

⁶⁵ BNF, Français 15881, fol. 166r, The Capitouls of Toulouse to Catherine de Medici, 14 June 1565.

⁶⁶ BNF, Français 2704, fols. 252r-v, Henri III to Mandelot, 19 September 1581.

⁶⁷ Guillaume-Ballin, *Joseph Naci duc de Naxos*, 116.

These opportunities led to significant interactions. In 1565, the Cardinal of Armagnac had extended conversations with Hacı Murad and came away with a great impression of the envoy: he was “from the province of Anatolia, he spent a long time in Jerusalem where, he told me, he made great contributions and foundations in the honor of God.”⁶⁸ Despite their different religious traditions, the cardinal of Armagnac found common ground in their mutual honors to the same God. Others similarly wanted to visit the Ottoman envoy. All the notables of the city as well as students, regular Toulousains, and surrounding nobles sought to meet Hacı Murad and his retinue. Florimond de Rémond reported a conversation the Ottoman diplomat had with them about the religious situation in France, inquiring about the Huguenots.⁶⁹ When François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, passed through Lyon while traveling to Constantinople as the new ambassador, he learned of the presence of an Ottoman diplomat there and sought him out to dine together. He learned much about the current status of the French embassy in the Ottoman Empire because the envoy had nothing but complaints about the behavior of the current resident ambassador, who the Ottoman envoy claimed sullied the position. Yet, the Ottoman diplomat was nevertheless pleased with his reception in France.⁷⁰ In 1581, Du Ferrier reported that the Ottoman delegations of Ali Ağa and Assan Ağa were both treated very well in France. Along with the gifts they received from the court, they also received many gifts from the inhabitants throughout France. In particular, Assan Ağa made a detour on his return from the court in Paris to Germolles near Chalons-

⁶⁸ Cardinal d’Armagnac to Fourquevaux, 3 and 7 June 1565, quoted in *Joseph Naci duc de Naxos*, 112.

⁶⁹ Florimond de Rémond, *Histoire de l’hérésie* (Rouen: Ernest Vereul, 1622), book 4, p. 462.

⁷⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 7, fol 32v-32r bis, Dax to Sauve, 16 August 1571.

sur-Saône to see the wife of the current ambassador in Constantinople, Jacques de Germigny. The meeting went well, and Madame de Germigny left Assa Ağa a token of her appreciation.⁷¹

There were only a very few negative experiences, and they chiefly were a product of devolving relations between France and the Ottoman Empire at the end of Henri IV's reign over the increasing attacks on French shipping from the Barbary corsairs. In 1607, one envoy complained that he was treated poorly in Marseille. The exact nature of this treatment is unclear.⁷² The most extreme moment of negative interactions came in 1620. A frenzied uproar of violence between the French and the Algerian corsairs had been growing since 1604 when François de Brèves was sent from Constantinople to Algiers to negotiate a treaty with the Algerians to stop the piracy against France. Despite the agreement, it did little to help.⁷³ The Marseillais began taking the situation into their own hands, arming ships to attack the Barbary corsairs and defending the coasts in the 1610s. When news of another Barbary attack circulated in Marseille in 1620, the inhabitants surrounded and attacked a mansion that housed an Algerian delegation as well as other Ottoman merchants. Many Ottomans tried to escape but were tracked down and beaten to death. The mob then entered the mansion and killed the rest. In the end, the Marseillaise killed forty-eight men.⁷⁴ The number of the dead gives some indication of the level of the Ottoman

⁷¹ Du Ferrier to Henri III, 20 January 1582, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 388-389.

⁷² Salignac to Henri IV, 17 August 1607, Henri IV to Mustafa Ağa, April 1607, Henri IV to Salignac, April 1607, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 2:162, 404.

⁷³ Salignac to Henri IV, 12 December 1605, 14 March 1606, and de Brèves to Villeroy, 27 August 1606, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 2:10, 24-25, 74-75.

⁷⁴ Gillian Weiss, *Captives and Corsaires: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 16; "Histoire du massacre des Turcs a Marseille en 1620," in *Documents de l'histoire de Provence*, ed. Edouard Baratier (Toulouse: Privat, 1971), 191-193.

presence in France. But this tragic account should not shade how we understand earlier interactions in France during the sixteenth century. Instead, it indicates changing dynamics in Franco-Ottoman relations at the end of Henri IV's reign and beyond that will be discussed more fully in chapter seven.

The outbreak of violence appears very similar to the type of religious violence Natalie Davis has described. Regular French citizens acted out their religious grievances against the Huguenots when they imagined the crown was not upholding its duty to maintain the sanctity of the kingdom. When they violently attacked their Huguenot compatriots, they were doing the work the king failed to do.⁷⁵ A similar appraisal can be applied here while de-emphasizing sanctity. Although religious concerns likely played some role, we should understand the events of 1620 as the Marseillais acting out the justice of the king in an environment of increasingly unrestrained Barbary attacks against the French. For almost the entirety of the sixteenth century, the Franco-Ottoman alliance had tenuously protected the French coast from corsair attacks. But things changed after the 1580s. As the Ottoman war with Spain declined after 1580, Ottoman control over their North African provinces declined as well. Since the North Africans lost a significant source of revenue from the war in the Western Mediterranean, they began acting outside the confines of Ottoman constraints to recoup their losses.⁷⁶ The loss of control was borne out by France's direct negotiations with the North African territories after 1604. As Barbary attacks increased and royal inaction continued, the Marseillais took the king's

⁷⁵ Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays by Natalie Zemon Davis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 161-163.

⁷⁶ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the 'Mediterranean Faction' (1585-1587)," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLV, (2015): 66-69; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 14-18.

vengeance in their own hands after news of a Barbary attack circulated throughout the city. This reaction would have been unnecessary just thirty years earlier.

Despite the violence in 1620, the examples noted here indicate that positive interactions surrounding these delegations were ubiquitous until the final years of Henri IV's reign. By the time that they arrived at the French court, French men and women from Marseille to Paris, especially the local elites, had already been entertaining them and growing accustomed to the Ottoman alliance. For instance, the cardinal of Armagnac became increasingly active in Franco-Ottoman affairs after his meeting with Hacı Murad in 1565. He played a prominent role in appointing Jacques de Germigny to the embassy in Constantinople in 1581, and he maintained frequent correspondence with the ambassador during his tenure there.⁷⁷ This characterization was especially apparent in places, such as Lyon and Marseille, that received frequent visits.

The Envoys at Court

When the Ottoman envoys arrived at the French court, they were announced with pomp and honor and were entertained for a month or longer. Unfortunately, we have little evidence from the Ottomans at court, and the details relating to these audiences are even more scarce. Nevertheless, what comes through the sources is a continuation of the conspicuous presence of the Ottoman diplomats at the French court. In addition, the diplomats spent longer at court than any other place in France, providing numerous possibilities for social interactions. The diplomats never

⁷⁷ BNF, Français 4125, fols. 58-64.

developed the same relationships French ambassadors fostered in Constantinople because the Ottomans never remained in France long enough. Thus, the formal channels of diplomacy focused on the audiences with the king remained the predominant diplomatic experience. Regardless, the Ottomans' presence at the court, and the frequent interactions they produced, normalized the Ottoman alliance.

When the Ottoman envoys arrived near the French court, the king sent out a large entourage to escort the Ottomans the rest of the way. In 1581, Henri III sent sixty of his best horses from the royal stables led by Albert de Gondi, duke of Retz. Forty of them carried French knights. The rest were outfitted in the Turkish manner to carry the Ottoman entourage. This procession marched through the streets of the Parisian *faubourgs* and the city itself until it reached the Louvre in Paris. At the gates, the procession encountered two escorts, who presented the envoys to the king. As they walked through the gates, they were greeted with French guards lining the way to the king's presence. When Assan Ağa met Henri III, he kissed the king's hand, delivering only a very few words, and presented his letters.⁷⁸ If this ornate display were not enough, the two envoys Ali Ağa and Assan Ağa received separate entrances into the city, most likely because Ali Ağa was particularly adamant that his higher status than his colleague be respected.⁷⁹ So any Parisians who missed Assan Ağa's entrance the first day were able to experience Ali Ağa's on the second.

⁷⁸ Cobham to Walsingham, November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30; "Rélacion des Ambassadeurs Envoyez par le Grand-Seigneur, Empereur des Turcs, vers le Roy Henry III," in *Archives Curieuse de l'Histoire de France*, eds. M.L. Cimber and F. Danjou, series 1, vol. 10 (Paris: Beauvais, 1836), 172-74.

⁷⁹ Cobham to Burghley, 20 Nov 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 16-20; The insistence on respect to Ali Ağa's elevated rank particularly frustrated to Du Ferrier as he organized their voyage from Venice to the French border. See BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 333-334, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 29 September 1581.

During the audiences, much like those in Constantinople, the king and the Ottoman envoys exchanged gifts. In 1581, Ali *Ağa* brought two scimitars with Damascus blades, “a little cap of ‘porsellyne,’ full of the Grand Signior’s” balsam and some treacle. The envoy also brought gifts for other members of the French court: Turkish needles and pins, some sweet powders, and some examples of Ottoman needlework for Catherine de Medici and some embroideries for the princess of Lorraine. Henri III gave one of his scimitars to the duke of Guise. In return, the king gifted Ali *Ağa* a basin and ewer gilded with silver and filled with 2,000 *écus* along with two pieces of gold cloth. To Assan *Ağa*, he gave pieces of scarlet and Parisian cloth. A “fair clock” was sent with the envoys as a gift to the Grand Seigneur.⁸⁰

Similarly as in Constantinople, these preliminary meetings represented formulaic processes, but they were just the beginning of the diplomatic activities. The ambassadors remained in Paris, usually around a month, and received multiple audiences with the king. During Ali *Ağa*’s month-long visit in Paris, the English ambassador Henry Cobham related that he had some “long discourses with the king.”⁸¹ Henri III gave Ali *Ağa* at least another audience in early December, this time in private. According to the English ambassador, only Gilles de Noailles, a previous ambassador in Constantinople, was present as a translator for the private audience, where they discussed plans to combine French and Ottoman forces to attack Spanish

⁸⁰ Cobham to Walsingham, November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30.

⁸¹ Cobham to Walsingham, 29 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30.

garrisons in North Africa.⁸² Multiple audiences were likely typical for Ottoman envoys in France.

One of the fascinating aspects of these Ottoman envoys is how quickly knowledge of them spread. We already discussed their conspicuous nature wherever they traveled, regaled in their ornamental display along with that of their royal escort. Intricate information about the envoys also circulated through the court. For instance, the English ambassador to France, Henry Cobham, provided much of the information we have on the Ottoman envoys' activities in France in 1581. While it was his job to acquire such information, the accuracy of it indicates a loose familiarity of the French court with the nature of Ottoman delegations. Cobham, for instance, was familiar with the ages and birthplaces of the envoys as well as the relative positions of the two—Ali *Ağa*, the more distinguished—but also that Ali *Ağa* was “in quality more than a chause” (*çavuş*, or messenger/envoy). This information was obtained through a conversation with French courtiers rather than direct interaction with the delegation: “it was given me to understand,” he explained in the letter. While such off-hand phrases might seem trivial, the colloquial usage among the French court of the official term for an Ottoman messenger or envoy with a foreign diplomat implies familiarity with the Ottoman hierarchy.⁸³

While the ambassadors were at the French court for their audiences—Paris was a particularly frequent destination—there was ample time to interact with local Frenchmen and notables. Both Ali *Ağa* and Assan *Ağa* remained in Paris from 8

⁸² Cobham to Walsingham, 11 Dec 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20; BNF, Français 3954, fols. 194r-195r.

⁸³ Cobham to Burghley, 20 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 16-20.

November until around 10 December 1581. Ali Ağa stayed in the *Hôtel de Ventadour* with his nine attendants, and Assan Ağa stayed in the *Corne du Cerf* in the same neighborhood with his four attendants.⁸⁴ With such splendid entrances to the city, their presence was as conspicuous in Paris, if not more so, than it was throughout the countryside. The famous diarist Pierre de L'Estoile noted their arrival, where they resided along the Seine in St-Germain, and when they departed.⁸⁵ Indeed the diary of Pierre de L'Estoile indicates the conspicuous nature of many of the Ottoman diplomats arriving in Paris. He described another Ottoman delegation, including a description of the envoy, Bathelemy de Coeurs, that brought particularly lavish gifts of diamonds in 1601.⁸⁶ The Ottoman presence could even outlast their departure. For instance, the large cat presented to the king in 1607, discussed earlier, was available for all to see and admire in Paris, prominently displaying a symbol of the Franco-Ottoman alliance.⁸⁷

During Ottoman diplomats' stay in Paris as elsewhere, the wider public had access to the Ottoman delegation. Henry Cobham visited Ali Ağa at the Hotel de Ventadour in late November, and the Ottoman envoy made a good impression on him.⁸⁸ It strains the imagination to think that Parisians did not do the same. Just a few years earlier, in 1567, Haci Murad had returned to Paris to meet with the king when the battle of Saint-Denis was on the horizon. Some Parisian gentlemen invited

⁸⁴ L'Estoile, *Memoires-Journaux de Pierre de L'Estoile*, 2:35; Cobham to Walsingham, 11 Dec 1581, "Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20," in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20.

⁸⁵ L'Estoile, *Mémoires-Journaux de Pierre de L'Estoile*, 2:35.

⁸⁶ L'Estoile, *Memoires-Journaux de Pierre de L'Estoile*, 7:298-99.

⁸⁷ L'Estoile, *Memoires-Journaux de Pierre de L'Estoile*, 8:297.

⁸⁸ Cobham to Walsingham, 29 November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30.

the Ottoman envoy to join them at Montmartre to watch the battle from afar.⁸⁹ Such an experience indicates that the Parisians were familiar enough with Haci Murad, and liked him enough to invite him on such an excursion with them.

The Ottoman presence at court provided them with ample opportunities to interact socially with French courtiers, but the formal channels of diplomacy played a much more critical role for Ottoman envoys in France than for French ambassadors in Constantinople. The temporary nature of the delegations prevented the establishment of the sort of networks Frenchmen fostered in the Ottoman capital. Nevertheless, the extended Ottoman presence at the French court and the rate at which familiarity with them spread throughout the court indicates the French ruling elite became accustomed to the Ottoman alliance and Ottoman diplomats.

The Issue of French Embarrassment

By this point, it is clear that the French were not embarrassed or ashamed of their Ottoman alliance or the Ottoman diplomats that traveled to France, but it is necessary to approach the issue head on since historians have frequently emphasized the embarrassment the French court experienced from the Ottoman presence in France.⁹⁰ Recently, Christine Isom-Verhaaren has demonstrated how this perception has been driven by Habsburg propaganda. For instance, the history by Paolo Giovio had a significant impact on modern histories of the Ottoman wintering in Toulon

⁸⁹ Agrippa d'Aubigné, *Histoire universelle*, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1887), 248-249.

⁹⁰ Knecht, *Rise and Fall of Renaissance France*, 181-182; Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks," 466-467, argues this was the case for the 1581 Ottoman envoy; and multiple authors have indicated the same for the 1565 embassy of Haci Murad. See, Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi, duc de Naxos*, 113; For instance, Arlette Jouanna, *The Saint Barholomew's Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State*, trans. Joseph Bergin (New York: Manchester University Press, 2013), 50-57 has mustered French embarrassment from their alliance during the Holy League against the Ottomans in 1571-73 to help explain Charles IX's unwillingness to intervene openly against Spain in the Netherlands.

between 1542 and 1543.⁹¹ While nobody would argue that explaining and defending the French alliance did not produce some diplomatic obstacles in France's dealings with other countries and specifically the Vatican and Spain, we should not over-emphasize it. French treatment of these ambassadors indicates that the French court embraced their ally and even actively defended the alliance and Ottoman envoys on the international stage.

The issue of French embarrassment has characterized primarily two Ottoman envoys: the 1565 envoys that coincided with the Franco-Spanish meeting at Bayonne; and the 1581 envoys.⁹² While there were moments when the presence of an Ottoman envoy challenged the French diplomatic prerogatives, French actions during these meetings indicate that embarrassment was not one of the considerations. In the case of Bayonne, the French and Spanish governments organized a meeting between the French court and Spanish representatives, including the sister of Charles IX and Queen of Spain, Elisabeth of Valois, to celebrate an enduring alliance between the two that turned out to last only a little longer than the celebration itself. The presence of an Ottoman envoy—an example of French antagonism against the Habsburgs—at court at the same moment that the Ottomans besieged Malta undermined the very message of amity the French were trying to construct with the elaborate entertainments prepared for the meeting at Bayonne.⁹³ Nevertheless, Catherine de Medici sought to navigate the two meetings concurrently, while trying to prevent their interaction, which she thought “would not be proper.” Initially, the

⁹¹ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 15-18, chap. 4.

⁹² Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks,” 466-467; Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi, duc de Naxos*, 113.

⁹³ Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, chap. 1.

court hoped to meet with the Ottoman envoy Haci Murad in Bordeaux before arriving at Bayonne, but the two entourages missed one another.⁹⁴ Even so, Charles IX took time from the entertainments in Bayonne to dine with the Ottoman delegation at a nearby monastery, and Haci Murad remained there for two weeks. Moreover, this process was no secretive endeavor. The English ambassador wrote about Charles IX's dinner with Haci Murad, and the Spanish delegation used the presence of the Ottomans in France as a reason that Philip II refused to enter the country himself with his wife and the duke of Alva.⁹⁵ It was hardly a secretive affair.

In 1581, as Henri III learned about the Ottoman plan to send a couple of diplomats to France, he sought to dissuade their departure. De Lamar Jensen has explained this decision as a product of the king's fear of Papal and Spanish reactions.⁹⁶ This possibility would only be the case if Henri III were concerned that the Spanish would attempt to assassinate or imprison the Ottomans. When the king learned about the delegation, he tried to deter it "because of the danger that exists on the routes and [because his] kingdom is not yet delivered from all the civil wars."⁹⁷ Concerns over dangerous routes between France and Constantinople was indeed real since it happened in the past. Envoys conducting Franco-Ottoman business had been taken prisoner or worse along the regular routes before. A French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire was captured and killed by Habsburg clients *en route* to Constantinople in 1541, and an Ottoman envoy was imprisoned in Venice for

⁹⁴ Catherine de Medici to M. de Meuillon, 27 March 1565, in *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, 2:278-279.

⁹⁵ "Journal of Affairs in France," June and July 1565; Phayre to Cecil, 22 June 1565; and Robert Hogan to the Earl of Leicester, 30 June 1565, all in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 7, under Elizabeth: June 1565, 16-30.

⁹⁶ Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks," 467.

⁹⁷ Henri III to Ferrier, 26 July 1581, in *Négociations*, ed. Charrière, 4:72n.

two years in 1571.⁹⁸ In a letter from Du Ferrier to Henri III, the ambassador made the same claim that the continued voyage of the ambassadors through northern Italy “would only invite the evident danger of death, where they will be without a doubt recognized as Turkish outside the state of these seigneurs [Venice].”⁹⁹ Nor was peace guaranteed in the French kingdom despite a treaty between the Catholics and Huguenots in 1580. The edict of peace was concluded only eight months before these events, and peasant revolts were rife throughout the south of France.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the participation by the king’s brother, the duke of Anjou, in the Dutch Revolt against Spain made crossing Spanish Milan particularly dangerous for an Ottoman envoy on its way to France.¹⁰¹ When the king decided to accept the envoy after hearing of the mission of Ali Ağa, which included more pressing matters than the confirmation of the Capitulations, he remained concerned for their safety. He ordered Du Ferrier to counsel them on the safest route by which to enter his kingdom.¹⁰² We thus have no direct evidence of French expressing embarrassment in either of these events. On the contrary, after the French court agreed to see the envoys in 1581, Henri III and Catherine de Medici both lamented that the Ottomans would not arrive soon enough

⁹⁸ On the assassination of Antonio Rincon, see Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 3:457-458; BNF, Français 15870, fol. 245r.

⁹⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents du Colbert 368, fols. 273-274, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 8 July 1581.

¹⁰⁰ See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Carnival in Romans*, trans. Mary Feeney (New York: George Braziller, 1979); also J.H.M. Salmon, “Peasant Revolt in Vivarais, 1575-1580,” in *Renaissance and Revolt: Essays in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 211-34.

¹⁰¹ On the Duke of Anjou’s participation in the Dutch revolt, see Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Political Struggle during the Wars of Religion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 7.

¹⁰² Henri III to Ferrier, 5 September 1581, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 5:215.

to attend the wedding of the duke of Joyeuse, where the alliance would have been put on public display.¹⁰³

To indicate the degree to which the French court associated itself with the Ottoman alliance, we might look at the case of the 1570 Ottoman delegation to provide a corrective to this narrative. In 1570, Mahmud Bey traveled to Venice with Claude du Bourg *en route* to France to deliver the newly negotiated Capitulations, but as discussed above, he was arrested after the Venetian-Ottoman war broke out, leading to extended imprisonment. This same war led to the creation of the Holy League allying Venice, Spain, and the Vatican against the Ottomans. France found itself in an awkward position. The crown hoped to negotiate peace between Venice and the Ottomans, to isolate Spain in the Mediterranean with the Ottomans, but the imprisonment of Mahmud Bey made such a possibility unlikely.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, Venice and the Papacy pressured France to join the Holy League.

The French court's response placed their Ottoman alliance in stark relief. They not only refused these gestures from Venice and the Papacy, explicitly on the grounds of the alliance with the Ottoman Empire, but they also expressed outrage over the Venetians' actions toward Mahmud Bey. In his letters to his ambassador in Venice and the Venetian senate and doge, Charles IX made it no secret that Mahmud Bey was traveling to the French court under its protection as a representative of the sultan, and that the actions of Venice were an affront to both France, its alliance with Venice, and international law (or *les droits de gens trouvent par tous*). Mahmud was

¹⁰³ Catherine de Medici to Du Ferrier, 28 September 1581, in *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, 7:404; Henri III to Ferrier, 28 September 1581, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 5:223.

¹⁰⁴ For more on this issue, see chap. 5, pp. 193-194.

“sent to [France] as an ambassador,” the king wrote, “he cannot and must not be arrested and imprisoned as you have done [while he is] passing through the Lands of those who are friends and confederates to us, without violating the confederation and doing us extreme damage.” Charles IX demanded that Mahmud be freed with his papers and have other confiscated materials returned to him, so he could return to Constantinople with the French ambassador, François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, as part of a negotiating tool to mediate peace between the Ottomans and Venice.¹⁰⁵

As the imprisonment of the Ottoman delegation continued, Charles IX increasingly emphasized the failure to observe either the Franco-Venetian alliance or the international respect owed to diplomats. The French king explained that Mahmud traveled to France “under the public faith that is always inviolably kept and observed” and that his continued imprisonment “offends our honor and reputation.” His arrest was all the more concerning because the French court had “always understood [Venice] to be exact observers of the alliance that has always existed between us [and] that you would not infringe and violate it for such a small and slight occasion.” The refusal to grant Mahmud Bey his freedom “can cause nothing but our grand displeasure and dissatisfaction, and [would be] against the opinion we have always had and expected of your good and gracious offices.”¹⁰⁶ By December 1571, Charles IX’s exasperation with the situation was at a high point. The failure of the Venetians to follow the “laws of men followed by everyone” had directly damaged the French king’s honor: “I cannot express the wrong that has been done to me by his

¹⁰⁵ BNF, Français 7091, fols. 8r-v, Charles IX to the Seigneurie of Venice, 29 July 1571.

¹⁰⁶ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 40v, Charles IX to the seigneurie of Venice, 7 October 1571.

[Mahmud's] detention, having been arrested coming to me on the part of his Master under the benefice of the laws of man followed by everyone."¹⁰⁷

This response was not restricted to a single letter; it was part of an entire campaign to win Mahmud's freedom. The bishop of Dax was sent to Venice to stump for the Ottoman's release as part of his diplomatic mission *en route* to Constantinople as the new ambassador.¹⁰⁸ The French king also ordered his ambassador in Venice to do the same. As he explained to the Venetians, he charged his ambassador "to tell you [Venetians] and make you understand more amply" the need to release Mahmud.¹⁰⁹ This issue became an important matter. The Venetians invited the bishop of Dax to the senate to discuss Mahmud's imprisonment. As the bishop summarized his harangue on the senate floor,

in the four years that I was an ambassador [in Venice], I had not negotiated an affair of such importance as this one...and there had not been an affair between princes over the observation of the laws of men, which had greater consequences than this one in the past fifty years. Seeing that it is a question of violating the franchise of ambassadors, and even among friends, that is a fact which appertains directly to the dignity and grandeur of a prince.¹¹⁰

In the end, French protests did little, and Mahmud Bey was released only at the conclusion of the war in 1573, but the resounding tenor of the court's complaints makes it clear that they showed no embarrassment from their relationship with the Ottomans nor the presence of Ottoman embassies. To the contrary, they embraced the alliance with the Ottomans. The court took up the call to defend the Ottoman delegation with vigor, sending multiple letters and a dedicated ambassador to

¹⁰⁷ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 68v, Charles XI to Ferrier, 31 December 1571.

¹⁰⁸ BNF, Français 3164, fols. 1r-2r, Instructions données aud. Sieur d'Acqs en ladite charge et ambassade

¹⁰⁹ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 41r, Charles IX to the seigneurie of Venice, 7 October 1571.

¹¹⁰ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 49v-50r, Dax to Charles IX, 24 September 1571.

demand the freedom of Mahmud. Moreover, they mustered the closest rhetoric of international law available to them (*les droites de gens*) to condemn the Venetians' actions. Perhaps most notably, the French were extending the protections afforded international law to the Ottomans and their ambassadors. Perhaps, one might argue, the French were utilizing a rhetorical argument most likely to benefit their immediate interests. Indeed, the likelihood of a Venetian-Ottoman peace without the freedom of Mahmud Bey in 1571 was very low. Nevertheless, even if this were the case, the necessity to defend the alliance, and the rhetoric the French utilized, effectively normalized the alliance and institutionalized its significance to French foreign policy on the international stage.

Conclusion

While in today's world, diplomatic travel is inconspicuous and invisible to the public, it was the exact opposite in the sixteenth century. Ottoman envoys and their entourages received royal escorts throughout the countryside, stayed in local towns and cities, resided in civilian housing, and interacted with the general public. It is no surprise Mathieu Grenet emphasized the unremarkable reaction of the French population to Muslim envoys in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; they had been making these voyages conspicuously through France since the 1530s. The entire state machinery at each level of government was mustered to coordinate the process and pageantry of the reception of the diplomats from Marseille to the French court appropriately wherever it resided. This process was a conspicuous reminder of the relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire; indeed, its repetition familiarized the French to the Ottoman hierarchical system to the point

that they could comment on the particularities of the diplomats' station. Other than some mishaps at the end of Henri IV's reign and beyond, the Ottoman delegations appear from the evidence available to have left positive impressions among the French, receiving gifts not only from the court but also from the various stops they made along their travels. Far from a source of embarrassment, the Ottoman envoys were celebrated, honored, and at times defended most conspicuously. Now that we have established the essential parameters of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy, the next four chapters will explore how political circumstances in France and the Ottoman Empire shaped their diplomatic goals and activities in the second half of the sixteenth century, beginning with the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559.

PART II

CHAPTER FOUR: FROM MILITARY COOPERATION TO MEDIATION (1559-1569)

In the 1530s, France and the Ottoman Empire established an alliance, primarily to facilitate military cooperation between the two countries against their mutual adversary in the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, which established peace between France and Spain, did not, however, mark the end of Franco-Ottoman cooperation. While no combined Franco-Ottoman fleet sailed the seas again as it did in the 1540s and 1550s, neither France nor the Ottomans turned their backs on the alliance. Instead, the alliance evolved in the 1560s to survive peace-time circumstances.

After presenting an overview of the alliance from 1535 until 1559, this chapter looks at the years directly following Cateau-Cambrésis, demonstrating how the French and Ottoman approaches to the alliance evolved in the years preceding the 1569 Capitulations. France redirected its foreign policy around a pro-Spanish position, and France's diplomacy with the Ottomans was no different. No longer needing Ottoman military cooperation, the French court leaned on their self-proclaimed role as the mediator between Christian Europe and the Ottomans to the benefit of Spain, attempting to negotiate the release of various Spanish prisoners. Mediating these sorts of exchanges was a standard affair for French ambassadors, and it was one of the ways the French justified their alliance, and it was an important

form of soft power they could leverage in international affairs.¹ The new international situation following the Treaty of Cateau-Cambésis (1559), however, did not benefit the Ottomans, and they were not willing to accommodate France's new foreign policy at their own detriment. When grievances of two individuals at the Ottoman court challenged French interests, there was little reason for the Ottomans to ignore them. These two affairs effectively foiled the French mediation on Spain's behalf.

But the Ottomans were also not willing to turn their back on such an important potential ally. While the Ottomans took these grievances by their subjects seriously, they did not sacrifice their relationship with France to placate them. While the complaints at the Ottoman court undermined French mediation for Spain, they simultaneously kept their diplomatic channels with France active, precipitating the dispatch of multiple Ottoman envoys to France to resolve them. When France began showing greater interest in the alliance—hoping to establish a buffer state between the Ottomans and Habsburgs as a place to resettle French Huguenots and thus resolve France's religious problems—it set off a series of events, including a significant rivalry among French diplomats, that unexpectedly led to the first Franco-Ottoman Capitulations in 1569. The timing was perfect. The Ottomans began considering war against Venice in 1568 and needed to shore up its relationship with the French to ensure their ally did not enter the looming conflict on the Venetian side. The Ottomans frequently used the Capitulations to solidify political

¹ Géraud Poumarède, "Justifier l'injustifiable: L'alliance Turque au miroir de la Chrétienté (XVIeXVIIe siècles)," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 111 (1997): 217–46. François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, negotiated the release of numerous Christian prisoners; see BNF, Français 7161, fol. 74, Discours du Monsieur de Noailles to Charles IX, April 1572; Dax to Villeroy, 22 April 1578, in *Lettres inédites de François de Noailles, évêque de Dax*, ed. Philippe Tamizey de Laroque, (Paris: A. Aubry, 1865), 29-30; François de Brèves mediated the release of Ottoman prisoners from the Knights of Malta; on mediation and soft power, see chap. 2, pp. 75-77.

relationships, and this moment was no different. The Ottoman concerns for their subjects' grievances disappeared to make room for the establishment of The Capitulations.

The 1560s thus established a precedent for Franco-Ottoman cooperation that transcended military coordination. France's mediation, though unsuccessful, created a new pattern whereby the French court tried to influence foreign affairs by manipulating the Habsburg-Ottoman relationship when military intervention was impossible due to the French Wars of Religion. Similarly, the Ottomans would continue to return to their Catholic ally whenever conflict in Europe arose.

The Franco-Ottoman Alliance before Cateau-Cambrésis (1559)

The cooperative relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire began in the 1520s to counter-balance Habsburg power in Europe. Charles duke of Burgundy, prince of the Dutch provinces, inherited the united crowns of Aragon and Castile, becoming the first king of Spain (1516)—which included Naples and Sicily—and was later elected as Charles V, Holy Roman emperor (1519), thus, encircling France with his domains. Through the acquisition of these various domains, he also became the most powerful rival to the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. In Eastern Europe, the Ottomans and Habsburgs competed over control of Hungary, especially after the kingdom collapsed following the death of their king at the Battle of Mohacs (1526), causing the two rivals to support competing

claimants to the throne.² The Mediterranean also became a major front of the conflict after Charles V sought “to rid the North African coasts” of the Ottoman corsairs.³ Charles V sent a fleet to deny the Ottoman conquest of Tunis and restored the Hafsid dynasty in 1535, an enemy to the Ottomans in Tunis.⁴ The French rivalry with Charles V originated in France’s ongoing conflict with Spain over Italy. The Italian conflict between France and the united crowns of Spain had continued off and on since the 1490s, and the situation worsened after Charles V’s various inheritances. At the Battle of Pavia in 1525, King François I^{er} himself was taken prisoner. This experience caused the Queen Regent, Louise of Savoy, to seek out all possible allies against the Habsburgs, including the Ottomans seeking “aid” and “succor.” After the king’s release, he and Suleiman exchanged letters between 1526 and 1528, and the two countries renewed Capitulations for French commerce in Alexandria in 1528.⁵ Later, François I^{er} and Suleiman concluded their alliance in 1535 to coordinate a joint Franco-Ottoman military campaign against Charles V.⁶ The two countries also negotiated formal Capitulations for trade in all Ottoman lands in 1536, but they were never officially concluded. Nevertheless, both countries maintained an ongoing military alliance that caused them to act as if the 1536 Capitulations were in force.⁷

² Kenneth Setton, *Papacy and the Levant 1204-1571*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), 3:249-53; Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 122-25.

³ Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 68.

⁴ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 71-98; Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 126-27.

⁵ Ernest Charrière, ed., *Négociations de la France dans le levant*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860), 1:117; see also Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 3:237; Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 24-40; Ion Ursu, *La politique orientale de François Ier, (1515-1547)* (Paris: H. Champion, 1908), 37-54.

⁶ Charrière, ed., *Négociations*, 1:253-66.

⁷ Gilles Veinstein, “Les Capitulations Franco-Ottomanes de 1536 sont-elles encore controversables?” in *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, eds. Vera

This sort of cross-confessional diplomacy was not unprecedented. Chapter Three already discussed the Franco-Ottoman contacts surrounding prince Cem in the 1490s. Those interactions were an early indicator of the potential of diplomatic exchange with the Ottomans.⁸ In the first decades of the sixteenth century, Frenchmen began to consider cross-confessional cooperation with Islamic powers actively. Pascale Barthe has demonstrated how writers such as Jean Lemaire de Belges, Jean Thenaud, and Jacques de Bourbon discussed Muslim leaders in a positive light and, at times, even described the Ottomans as a model to emulate. They presented the economic opportunities available in the Islamic kingdoms and de-emphasized Crusade—or at least questioned its utility in an increasingly globalized world.⁹

The alliance led to a series of coordinated Franco-Ottoman naval campaigns against the Habsburgs. Ottoman naval support was a necessity if the French were to be competitive in the Mediterranean. The French navy was a tiny institution at the time, and the situation only worsened after the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria defected from French service to the Habsburgs, taking his galleys with him.¹⁰ After Doria's defection, the largest fleet the French put to sea in the sixteenth century comprised sixty total ships in an attack against the Spanish Azores in the 1580s.¹¹ By

Constantini and Markus Koller (Boston: Brill, 2008), 71-88 has put an end to all debate on the topic; see also Gaston Zeller, "Une Légende qui a la vie dure: les Capitulations de 1535," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 2 (1955): 127-32; c.f. De Lemar Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (1985): 451-470.

⁸ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, ch. 3.

⁹ See Pascale Barthe, *French Encounters with the Ottomans, 1510-1560*, (New York: Routledge, 2016), chaps. 2 and 3.

¹⁰ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 3:275-277; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 38;

¹¹ Alan James, "A French Armada? The Azores Campaigns, 1580-1583," *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 1 (2012): 1-20.

comparison, just three years after the colossal defeat of the Ottoman navy at Lepanto, the Ottomans put 250 to 300 ships to sea in 1574 to attack Spanish La Goletta in Tunis.¹² The Ottoman alliance and their large and well-funded fleet helped subsidize France's weak navy in the Mediterranean against their common enemies, establishing a pattern the French tried to replicate for the rest of the sixteenth century.

In 1537, the French sent thirteen galleys to meet Hayreddin Barbarossa in Tunis, then accompany him to Constantinople, and finally aid him in the siege of Corfu.¹³ A few years later, the French combined their fleet with the Ottomans' 153 ships (including 110 galleys) again in 1543—this time in Marseille—to prepare to besiege Nice, which was then a part of the Duchy of Savoy and an ally of Charles V. The siege lasted two weeks, but the citadel of the city held out against the Franco-Ottoman attackers until the armies abandoned Nice and the French burned the city as they departed. After the failed siege, the Ottomans spent the 1543-1544 winter camped in Toulon, so a coordinated naval expedition could be undertaken once again during the 1544 campaign season against the Habsburgs' ally Genoa.¹⁴

This extraordinary moment was the most famous of what would become a long history of Franco-Ottoman cooperation. A sizeable Ottoman army came into

¹² Noel Malcolm, *Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 188-192; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2:1134-1140. For more on Ottoman naval power, see Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), chap. 4.

¹³ BNF, Fr 6091, fols 7r-7v. Jehan de Vega, *Le Voyage du Baron de Saint-Blancard en Turquie redigé*, 15 Août 1537-19 juin 1538.

¹⁴ Isom-Verhaaren, "Barbarossa and His Army," 411-16; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 123-138; Ursu, *La Politique Orientale*, 143-45.

peaceful contact with the French in Marseille and even resided among them in Toulon after the siege for the winter.¹⁵ The experience provided a moment of intense Franco-Ottoman interaction. Christine Isom-Verhaaren has demonstrated that Barbarossa's relationship with the local populations and the French king during the winter of 1543 were much more civil and more positively perceived by the French than has often been presented. Barbarossa's army also boosted the local economy, providing a new, though temporary, market for goods from the surrounding areas.¹⁶ Yet, all was for naught since François I^{er} and Charles V concluded the Peace of Crépy in 1544.

Franco-Ottoman campaigns after 1544 continued to be a source of aid for France in its struggles against the Habsburgs. Under Henri II's reign, the royal court regularly discussed coordinated French and Ottoman campaigns. As Henri was looking toward war in 1547, Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, advised him "to reinforce his fleet and attempt to rent galleys from the Grand Seigneur or from the king of Algiers" to take possession of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily.¹⁷ This plan never came to fruition, but a few years later, after France captured the town of Siena, Henri II sent Captain Polin to Constantinople in 1553 to negotiate a joint attack by the French and Ottoman fleets. By June of that year, the Ottoman fleet arrived along the

¹⁵ Originally all the residents in Toulon were going to be evacuated, but the council of the city of Toulon concluded that the heads of household and the artisans of the city would remain in the city during the Ottoman sojourn. See *Extraits des registres des délibérations du conseil de la ville de Toulon*, 25 Septembre 1543, in *Négociations*, 1:568-69.

¹⁶ Isom-Verhaaren, "Barbarossa and His Army" 414-18; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 123-138; c.f. R. J. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France 1483-1610*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 181-82; and McCabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France*, 40-43, both treat the Ottoman sojourn in Toulon as an "occupation" that François I^{er} was coerced into and that Toulon was dominated by Barbarossa.

¹⁷ Cardinal of Lorraine to Henri II, Rome, 31 October 1547, in *Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine (1525-1574)*, ed. Daniel Cuisiat (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1998), 81.

coast of southern Italy, forcing the retreat of the Italian forces sent to retake Siena. In July, the two fleets combined their forces to attack Corsica. The French conquest of the island was made easy with the Ottoman support, and control of the island inhibited shipping between Spain and Italy—a major strategic victory.¹⁸ The last major attempt at a coordinated attack came the year before Cateau-Cambrésis. Henri II once again asked for Ottoman support in 1557, and Suleiman agreed, assuring the king “that he provided the greatest assistance that he had ever made.”¹⁹ But the two fleets failed to meet at the arranged place in 1558, and the Ottomans continued on to sack Sorrento near Naples. The French tried to persuade the Ottomans to return to Toulon, so they could combine forces to attack Bastia, a Corsican town, but the Ottoman commander Piali Pasha refused, and the Ottomans returned to the Levant.²⁰

Many among the French, and the cardinal of Lorraine in particular, saw Piali Pasha’s failure to join the French fleet as a traitorous act that had significant impacts on French strategy. Prior to learning the news, the cardinal of Lorraine seemed confident in the prospects of continuing military collaboration with the Ottomans. He wrote to the ambassador in Constantinople, Jean de La Vigne, that his sojourn in the Levant would be very useful to France and that he should undermine Genoese attempts at making peace with the Suleiman.²¹ The cardinal also hoped to maintain the sultan’s confidence in French military capabilities, imparting the ambassador to explain that the French defeat by the Spanish at the Battle of Gravelines in 1558

¹⁸ Knecht, *Rise and Fall of Renaissance France*, 230-31; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 42.

¹⁹ Cardinal of Lorraine to Duke of Guise, 5 February 1558, in *Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine*, 306.

²⁰ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 45.

²¹ Cardinal of Lorraine to Jean de La Vigne, 7 April 1558, in *Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine*, 313.

(primarily considered the defeat that forced France to the negotiating table) was nothing to worry about. The French fought valiantly, killing “more captains and soldiers” than the Spanish did, even though the French were outnumbered three to one.²² Following the news of Piali Pasha’s actions, the cardinal of Lorraine wrote the ambassador expressing his anger at the actions of the Ottoman fleet and demanded retribution:

[Piali Pasha] has only given the King occasion to complain about him. The King asks that the Grand Seigneur [Suleiman] instantly punish him as a minister caring little about the reputation of his master and disobeying his commands. It is necessary to make an example of him for all his peers (semblables) to repair these faults and errors. Otherwise, we would believe that we could not trust the friendship the Grand Seigneur has always assured to the King.²³

The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was not only precipitated by the defeats at St. Quentin (1557) and Gravelines (1558), but it was also a product of the failure of Franco-Ottoman coordination the same year. Spain, England (an ally of Spain), and France all wanted peace. French prospects were particularly grim, despite retaking Calais from the English, after the defeats to Spain. Peace would permit the French king, Henri II, to turn his focus to the rising problem of Calvinism, as the Catholic kingdom increasingly associated Calvinists (referred to as Huguenots) with rebellion.²⁴ What has been lost in this depiction was the role of the Ottomans in this crucial year before the treaty. Even after the defeat at Gravelines, letters from the cardinal of Lorraine tried to characterize the losses in the best possible light,

²² Cardinal of Lorraine to Jean de La Vigne, 13 August 1558, in *Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine*, 330.

²³ Cardinal of Lorraine to Jean de La Vigne, 25 August 1558, in *Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine*, 333.

²⁴ Knecht, *Rise and Fall of Renaissance France*, 235-244. Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40-43. Hugues Daussy, *Le Parti Huguenot: Chronique d'une disillusion (1557-1572)* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2014), 36-43.

indicating the push for peace was not yet guaranteed. Continued coordination demanded continued faith in the utility of the alliance by both parties, and the cardinal was trying to instill that in the Ottomans. The failure to coordinate the French and Ottoman navies, and the loss of faith in the immediate utility of the Ottoman alliance due to Piali Pasha's actions, however, made the French position even worse than it already was. To the plethora of reasons driving Henri II to negotiate the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis with Spain and England in 1559—religious divisions in France, a devastated treasury, and defeats on land—we should add the perceived isolation from their Ottoman ally.

From Military Coordination to Mediation in Constantinople

The post-Cateau-Cambrésis environment forced a re-orientation of French foreign policy. Along with a new peaceful relationship with Spain—against which all of France's previous endeavors were arranged to combat—the French court also had to navigate this novel situation with a new young king in Charles IX (r. 1560-1574). Henri II died in a jousting accident celebrating the new peace in 1559. The next year, François II (r. 1559-1560) died in 1560, leaving his ten-year-old brother Charles IX on the throne as a minor under the governorship of his mother Catherine de Medici until he reached 13, the age of majority, in 1563. To make matters worse, the religious troubles in France came to a head when soldiers led by the Catholic militant, the duke of Guise, massacred a group of unarmed Huguenots worshipping in Vassy in 1562. The event set off the first in a series of religious civil wars in France. Under these circumstances, France went to great lengths to maintain peace with its neighbors, and especially Spain. This pro-Spanish foreign policy is best characterized

at the Bayonne meeting between the French court and Spanish representatives, including the Spanish Queen and sister of Charles IX, Elizabeth of Valois. The meeting was organized as a multi-day diplomatic summit with elaborate entertainment to represent an enduring Franco-Spanish alliance.²⁵

France's diplomatic approach toward the Ottomans adjusted to reflect the new paradigm of peaceful relations with Spain. While the French were not willing to abandon their ally, neither did they need to invest significant human or financial capital in the embassy either. Jean Dolu, one of François II's *valets de chambre*, replaced the late ambassador La Vigne. Dolu held an ambiguous place in Constantinople. He was often referred to as an agent in French letters and the secondary literature, but he was treated as an ambassador in Constantinople, receiving the customary ambassadorial per diem of 100 *sols*.²⁶ What is clear is that he was not a man of prominent status, a factor that the Ottomans did not overlook. Dolu was a "merchant" and a member of a wealthy bourgeois family in Paris before entering the service of the king.²⁷ Dolu spent the duration of his sojourn in Constantinople from 1560-61 with very little correspondence from France. Moreover, the French court was both unwilling and unable to invest in the alliance with the traditional gifts to ingratiate themselves into the Ottoman good graces. As the ambassador in Venice at the time, François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, indicated,

²⁵ Ellen R. Welch, *A Theater of Diplomacy: International Relations and Performing Arts in Early Modern France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), chap. 1.

²⁶ For instance, his successor Antoine de Pétre mol did not receive this honor. BNF, Français 7092, fol. 70r, Pétre mol to Boistaillé, 25 December 1561.

²⁷ See *Catalogue des Actes de François I^{er}*, vol. 8 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1905), 116; also "Traité des Princes, Conseillers et Autre Ministres de l'Etat de France," in *Foreign Intelligence and Information in Elizabethan England: Two English Treatises on the State of France, 1580-1584*, ed. David Potter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 56, 57n10.

“gifts would do beautiful miracles [in Constantinople], but we are in a time when those who govern no longer want to take that route.”²⁸

Yet, the French court recognized the benefit their position in Constantinople could render to their new policy. They emphasized their traditionally favorable position in Constantinople to mediate between Spain and the Ottomans. Mediating between Christian powers and the Ottomans provided two significant advantages to France. First, advocating for the protection of Christians individually as prisoners or collectively as states helped justify the Franco-Ottoman alliance. It permitted French proponents of the alliance to defend it against claims that it was un-Christian.²⁹ Second, mediation provided France with a sort of soft power. Other Christian powers looked to France to acquire the release of their subjects. It was a favor they asked of the French king, one he could graciously accept or reject. Years later, one French ambassador referred to the position as holding the bridle of Christendom against the Ottomans in one hand and the bridle of the Ottomans against Christendom in the other.³⁰

French mediation became centered on two Spanish captains and their associates taken prisoner by the Ottomans at the Battle of Djerba (1560): Don Alvaro de Sande (the son of the Viscount of Cicily) and later the viscount of Cicala. The

²⁸ Dax to Dolu, 9 February 1561, in *Négociations*, 2:648-49n1.

²⁹ See for instance, Poumarède, “Justifier l’Injustifiable,” 217–46; BNF, Français 7161, fol. 74, Discours du Monsieur de Noailles to Charles IX, April 1572; bishop of Dax to Villeroy, 22 April 1578, in *Lettres inédites de François de Noailles, évêque de Dax*, ed. Philippe Tamizey de Laroque, (Paris: A. Aubry, 1865), 29-30; Henri Lancelot-Voisin, seigneur de la Popelinière, *L’histoire de France, enrichie des plus notables occurrences survenues ez provinces de l’Europe et pays voisins, soit en paix, soit en guerre, tant pour le fait séculier qu’eclésiastique, depuis l’an 1550 jusques à ces temps* (La Rochelle: Abraham H., 1581), 167r.

³⁰ Lancosme to Henri III, 6 and 20 August 1586, in *Négociations*, 4:542.

French crown sent two envoys specifically for these endeavors, which indicates the importance of this sort of activity toward French policy.

The challenges French representatives faced in these endeavors indicate how the Ottomans were unwilling to participate in France's newfound strategy. Both French envoys sent to Constantinople failed in their mission. Don Alvero de Sande and his compatriots were freed by the Habsburg agent Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq, which caused great frustration for the French agent Antoine Pétremol, *seigneur* of Norroy. The viscount of Cicala was never freed. He died in prison in 1564. In both situations, the French crown was called on to negotiate their freedom because of its special relationship with the Ottoman Empire. But the Ottomans were unwilling to accommodate France's prerogatives.

The mission to gain the freedom of Don Alvero began in 1561 as a favor to the Spanish king, who, Catherine de Medici explained, had a "great desire to recover" him.³¹ After Dolu died the same year, Antoine Pétremol, *seigneur* of Norroy, as well as François de Salviati, who was sent specifically for the mission, began negotiating the prisoner's release.³² Pétremol initially thought their prospects for success were good. Salviati was well received, and the grand vizier Semiz Ali Pasha continually led Salviati and Pétremol to believe that they should have good expectations.³³ But this was not, in fact, the case. By May 1562, it became clear that French actions would not

³¹ Catherine de Medici to Dolu, 11 March 1561, in *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, ed. Hector de la Ferrière, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1880), 172-173.

³² BNF, Français 7092, fols. 50v, 54v-55r. Pétremol to Boistaillé, 4 November 1561; Pétremol to Boistaillé, 20 November 1561.

³³ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 90r-v, 93r, 96r. Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 3 March 1562; Pétremol to Boistaillé, 3 March 1562; Pétremol to Boistaillé, 24 March 1562. Salviati was attacked *en route* to Constantinople in Ottoman lands, but the grand vizier acted swiftly to have the peasants responsible punished. See BNF, Français 7092, fols. 79r, 86r, Pétremol to Charles IX, 12 February 1562; Pétremol to Boistaillé, 12 February 1562.

produce Don Alvero's freedom.³⁴ The grand vizier Semiz Ali insisted that this was not a slight against France and freed all of the French slaves in Constantinople as a sign of goodwill.³⁵ With his mission a failure, Salviati decided to return to France in June.³⁶

To the surprise of everyone, Don Alvero's freedom came not from French intervention, but the imperial ambassador Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq. When Busbecq decided to intervene in the affair, neither he nor those whom he consulted thought he would have success since the Ottomans "refused the ambassador of a king who was an old friend of the sultan."³⁷ Even Don Alvero himself was surprised by Busbecq's success and smugly demonstrated that his freedom demanded no thanks to the French. Busbecq explained that this reaction was "because the *locum tenens* of the French ambassador," or, in other words, the privileged place of the French ambassador among Christian diplomats in Constantinople.³⁸ Pétremol complained vigorously to Suleiman that releasing Don Alvaro to an enemy rather than an ally who sent an envoy expressly to affect the prisoner's release was terrible for France.³⁹

Pétremol's attention then went directly to obtaining the release of another group of prisoners captured with Captain Cicala.⁴⁰ This was an entirely fruitless endeavor, and Pétremol knew this would be an especially tricky prospect from the

³⁴ BNF, Français 7092, fol.118r, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici 21 May 1562.

³⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 118r-118v, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 21 May 1562; Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 27 May 1562.

³⁶ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 124r, Pétremol to Boistailié, 8 June 1562.

³⁷ Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, trans. Edward Seymour Forster (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 218.

³⁸ Busbecq, *Turkish Letters*, 219.

³⁹ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 142r-143v, Pétremol to Boistailié, 30 August 1562.

⁴⁰ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 143v, Pétremol to Boistailié, 30 August 1562.

beginning. The exploits of the viscount of Cicala as a pirate based in Sicily were notorious enough that they reached the Ottoman court.⁴¹

The Cicala negotiations went similarly as those for Don Alvero. Semiz Ali Pasha promised that he would do all that he could for Cicala's release,⁴² but Pétremol gained little headway while Cicala and his retinue remained in prison. Just a month later, Semiz Ali Pasha was asserting in public the many reasons that they could not grant their freedom.⁴³ A year later, the story was the same. Semiz Ali continued that refrain: Sultan Suleiman "cannot deliver such an extraordinary and great Corsair as was Cigala who has done an infinite evil and damage not only to the Turks but also to those of Christendom who are their [Ottoman] friends." Indeed, the grand vizier went on to claim that the sultan's refusal came from a place of "paternal affection" for Charles IX, whereby he is only refusing the request because it would be "damaging not only to his highness but also to your majesty."⁴⁴ Regardless, Semiz Ali promised that he would do his best to persuade the sultan to grant Cicala his freedom.⁴⁵ But the viscount died not long after, and his son, who taken prisoner along with him, was placed into the palace school and would later become the famed *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade Sinan Pasha.⁴⁶ The issue was moot.

These negotiations, though failed, nevertheless signaled a continuity of French interests in their Ottoman alliance. Military cooperation with the Ottoman Empire was no longer desirable in the context of the early 1560s, but the French

⁴¹ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 90v, Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 3 March 1562.

⁴² BNF, Français 7092, fol. 143v, Pétremol to Boistailié, 30 August 1562.

⁴³ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 168r-v, Pétremol to Boistailié, 6 January 1563.

⁴⁴ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 348v, 349r-v, Pétremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1564.

⁴⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 353r. Pétremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1564.

⁴⁶ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3rd ed., s.v., "Cigalazade Sinan Pasha."

court saw potential benefits from the position in Constantinople that a long history of cooperation with the Ottomans created. These negotiations failed primarily because the Ottomans were not willing to support France's pro-Spanish position that provided no benefit to them. This approach established a pattern whereby France positioned itself as the *de facto* mediator between western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire to support French foreign policy when military cooperation was not an option. In the 1570s and later, France would draw on this strategy to counter Spanish aggrandizement when ongoing civil war prevented French belligerence against their neighbor. By extending their support to negotiate the freedom of Spanish prisoners, the French crown was able to simultaneously appease Spain and continue the relationship with the Ottomans, which would be crucial if France's relationship with Spain ever changed—a highly likely occurrence.

Ambassadorial Advocacy for the Ottoman Alliance

France's new policy toward the Ottomans owed much to the advocacy of French diplomats with experience in Ottoman affairs. The crown could have easily abandoned its diplomacy in Constantinople and saved a lot of money since the maintenance of the embassy was an expensive affair. French diplomats in Venice and Constantinople became staunch advocates for its continuation. These individuals had experience with the alliance and viewed it as essential to French foreign policy despite the recent peace with Spain. First, French diplomats viewed it as an insurance policy in the case that peace with Spain failed, a perfectly reasonable expectation. Second, even if peaceful relations with Spain continued, the alliance

with the Ottomans could be used to mediate between Latin Christian states, specifically Spain, and the Ottomans.

François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, the ambassador in Venice at the time, advocated for this second option immediately upon François II's ascension to the throne. He argued that if the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis rendered the military aspects of the Ottoman alliance moot, the treaty did not relieve the alliance of its strategic abilities:

the continuation of this [friendship between France and the Ottomans] would serve at the very least to procure, by the means of his [François II's] ambassador, a peace or truce with the Catholic King or some other prince with the said G[rand] S[eigneur] if they want to pursue it or if they were forced to do so by the inferiority of their forces to his.⁴⁷

Even when France was not in a place to employ the Ottomans militarily, the alliance permitted France to act as an arbiter between Christians states and the Ottomans. Indeed, this was the exact role the French crown took in the albeit failed negotiations for Don Alvero and Cicala.

Pétremol thought that if France could mediate a peace between the Ottomans and Spain, they could also impede it through their alliance. The Franco-Ottoman alliance was too valuable as a counterbalance to Spain not to jealously protect it. He recommended “above all things this true and perfect friendship” with the sultan.⁴⁸ The French relationship with the Ottomans could be used to manipulate the conflict between the two states:

If the king of Spain always remains a friend to us, I do not see that this peace could harm us in any way, being for the good and peace of Christianity. But if to the contrary, he [Philip II] desires to shuffle the

⁴⁷ Dax to the Cardinal of Lorraine, 10 November and 18 December 1559, in *Négociations*, 2:606.

⁴⁸ Pétremol to Catherine de Medici, 15 juillet 1561, in *Négociations*, 2:664.

cards and make peace with them [the Ottomans] so that henceforth we could not profit from their [Ottoman] forces, it would be necessary to stop the peace with all of our power, which I am sure that the G[rand] S[eigneur] would never accept.⁴⁹

Maintaining the alliance with the Ottomans had no downside. It posed no problem to continued peace with Spain, but to abandon it could be catastrophic for France if the rivalry with Spain returned. Spanish and French foreign policy interests were mutually exclusive in too many areas for continuing friendship to be sustainable.⁵⁰

Increasingly, French diplomats emphasized this mediating role for France in Constantinople, and Pétremol became a strong advocate for it. In 1564, he tried to persuade Charles IX and Catherine de Medici to send a formal ambassador with gifts to Constantinople. In doing so, he defended the utility of the alliance. It existed, he surmised, to draw security and benefit to France. Charles IX's predecessors "had drawn many great armies from [the alliance], and in the future when necessity requires it, [Charles IX] can do the same." Even if at present France was at peace with all its neighbors, the alliance would restrain other countries from attacking France because "the Grand Seigneur will also be ready to support and aid Your Majesty with all his power and all you require of him."⁵¹ For these reasons, Pétremol declared, Charles IX should "esteem this alliance and maintain it as your predecessors have."⁵²

⁴⁹ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 94r. Pétremol to Boistaillé, 3 March 1562.

⁵⁰ See for instance, N.M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973); Jean-François Labourdette, *Charles IX et La Puissance Espagnole: Diplomatie et Guerres Civiles (1563-1574)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013).

⁵¹ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 355v-356r. Pétremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1564.

⁵² BNF, Français 7092, fols. 356r-357r. Pétremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1564.

Ottoman Reaction to French Foreign policy

Although the French sought to continue their alliance in a way that would support their new pro-Spanish position, the Ottomans were not willing to play along. The Ottomans claimed that they supported the French alliance, but they were not fully persuaded that France held the same position. Indeed, the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis caused the Ottomans to look at the French crown suspiciously, and they remained reserved from the alliance. When Jean de La Vigne sought his return to France after Henri II's death, it was granted in a simple letter to the "Padishah of France."⁵³ As Güneş Isıksel has observed, the letter from the sultan was brief devoid of the friendly formulas frequently employed in such letters indicated a cooling of Ottoman affairs toward France.⁵⁴ Later in 1562, when the Ottomans captured a Captain of Andrea Doria's fleet, they questioned the strength of the Spanish navy. One of the premier concerns they had was whether France had contributed any ships to the naval effort. The Captain responded that they had not, but as Pétremol explained, their actions were an "evident sign that [the Ottomans] fear greatly that the king will declare himself their enemy."⁵⁵

Despite these suspicions, the Ottomans were not willing to abandon their alliance with France. The Ottoman response to France's support for the Spanish prisoners represented this conflicted position. They allowed the grievances against France of two individuals at the Ottoman court to undermine French negotiations while also keeping diplomatic channels open. The first was an Ottoman woman

⁵³ Imperial letter to François II, 9 September 1559/12 Zi'l-hicce 966, in 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri 966-968 / 1558-1560 (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993), no. 294.

⁵⁴ Isıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 179.

⁵⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 156r. Pétremol to Boistailé, 27 October 1562.

Huma whose two daughters were taken prisoner by the Knights of Malta and become ladies-in-waiting for Catherine de Medici. The second was a Jewish banker, Joseph Nasi, who claimed the French crown owed him 150,000 *écus*. Both affairs derailed French attempts to free the Spanish prisoners, but they also precipitated the dispatch of multiple diplomats from the Ottoman Empire to France.

Around 1557, two Ottoman girls were captured during the raiding missions of the Grand Prior of Malta, who was then recalled and brought the girls with him as a gift to Catherine de Medici. Apparently, this was a thoughtful gift since Catherine de Medici had a liking for Muslim ladies-in-waiting. At her wedding, she brought with her three such ladies, two Turks and a Moor. These new ladies joined the Queen's retinue took new names (the eldest became Catherine and the youngest Marguerite), learned French, converted to Catholicism, and benefitted from the Queen-Mother's largesse, including servants of their own.⁵⁶

In the subsequent years, the family of the girls led by their mother Huma demanded their return from France. In the beginning, it appeared to be little more than an inconvenience. As Susan Skilliter argues, voluntary conversions of French and Ottoman subjects were generally permitted the protection of their new monarch. Sultan Suleiman initially followed this logic, "understanding that the daughter had been a Christian for a long time and was married, [he] said that there is no longer an order to return her nor a reason to demand it."⁵⁷ But these points were disputed by a letter that has not survived from an Ottoman envoy to France. The mother claimed

⁵⁶ Susan Skilliter, "Catherine de Medici's Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting: A Dilemma in Franco-Ottoman Diplomatic Relations," *Turcica* 7 (1975): 191-194.

⁵⁷ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 273v. Pétremol to Charles IX, 22 April 1564. The ambassador was referencing a conversation from the past.

the “girl was very young [and] that it is impossible that she would be married[,] and that they know certainly by letters...that the said girl desires nothing more than to return and live under [Islamic law].” After the arrival of this letter, Huma acquired a group of influential supporters for her cause such as Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and his wife, Suleiman’s daughter. Both took an interest in the plight of the ladies’ mother.⁵⁸ Sokollu Mehmed regularly championed Huma’s cause to question France’s dedication to the alliance. It came up during the Don Alvero negotiations and again during the negotiations for Cicala.⁵⁹

While Skilliter is right that the affair demonstrated the agency of Huma as well as the “availability of the Ottoman sultan’s justice,” Huma also benefitted the strained relationship between France and the Ottomans at the time. She provided the Ottomans with a welcome diversion from France’s negotiations. As we will see, when Huma complained again in 1569 while the Ottomans were trying to strengthen their ties with France before the war with Venice, her complaints were quickly dismissed.⁶⁰ The ability of Huma to have her grievances treated seriously was inversely related to the significance of the French to Ottoman foreign policy.

At the same time that Pétremol was fending off the complaints of Huma, he had to resolve the French debts to the Jewish banker Joseph Nasi. This challenge became much more severe, and it prompted Charles IX to send a dedicated envoy for its resolution around 1568. The issue at hand was some 100,000-150,000 *écus*

⁵⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 274r-v. Pétremol to Charles IX, 22 April 1564; Skilliter, “Catherine de Medici’s Ladies-in-Waiting,” 195-197.

⁵⁹ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 293r-v, 352r-v, Pétremol to Ferrier, 27 May 1564; Pétremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1564; Skilliter, “Catherine de Medici’s Ladies-in-Waiting,” 198.

⁶⁰ Skilliter, “Catherine de Medici’s Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting, 204,

Joseph Nasi claimed the French owed him. Some have reported that the debts of 150,000 écus came from loans Henri II took out from many Ottomans, especially Joseph Nasi, in the late 1550s to fund his war against Spain.⁶¹ But Pétremol recounted that the Joseph Nasi left around 100,000 écus in a bank in Lyon that was later confiscated by the Duchess of Valentinois after Nasi emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Nasi then extended the amount to 150,000 écus to account for interest.⁶²

By the 1560s, Joseph Nasi had acquired a position of significant influence in the Ottoman Empire. Nasi came from a family of new Christians based in Portugal with extensive experience in the international banking house of Mendes. He grew his wealth in Flanders before following his aunt to Constantinople in 1554, embracing Judaism, and using his extensive contacts throughout Latin Christendom to establish a spy network that endeared him to the highest echelons of Ottoman society. By the 1560s, he became a favorite of Suleiman's son and heir apparent to the Ottoman throne.⁶³ By this time, it became clear that courting Joseph Nasi's favor was a smart decision. The Venetians were already "insinuating themselves in his good graces with gifts since the death of Bayezid," and Pétremol thought Charles IX should do the same for the continuation of the alliance.⁶⁴ But by then, Nasi had acquired the support of the Ottoman government for France's debts to him. Not only was he a

⁶¹ Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 4 (Philadelphia : American Philosophical Society, 1976), 838; Fariba Zarinebaf, *Mediterranean Encounters: Trade and Pluralism in Early Modern Galata* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018), 110-111.

⁶² BNF, Français 7092, fols. 206v-207r.

⁶³ Cecil Roth, "Joseph Nasi, Duke of Naxos, and the Counts of Savoy," *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 57 (1967): 460-72; on Nasi's spy network, see Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2012), chap. 5; for instance, the Ottomans knew of Salviati's departure from France and the nature of his mission before Pétremol informed the Ottoman court because of the spies Joseph Nasi, see BNF, Français 7092, fols. 54v-55r, 65r. Pétremol to Boistaillé, 20 November 1561; Pétremol to d'Alluye, 25 November 1561.

⁶⁴ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 151v-152r, Pétremol to Boistaillé, 13 September 1562.

favorite of Selim, Joseph Nasi also planned to purchase several *muqat'as* (tax farms) with the money the French confiscated.⁶⁵

The Nasi affair led to the dispatch of three separate diplomats to the French court to resolve these debts in 1562, 1563, and 1565, and the envoy sent in 1562 was also charged to check on Huma's daughters in the service of Catherine de Medici. These envoys accomplished little more than maintaining ongoing diplomatic contacts with the French. We know little about the 1562 envoy other than that it produced a letter that Huma's daughters wanted to convert back to Islam.⁶⁶ The 1563 diplomats deferred the situation to a more appropriate moment after realizing that the French religious wars that broke out in 1562 left the French crown unable to respond adequately.⁶⁷ Indeed, the Ottoman response indicates how these envoys were meant more to keep diplomatic channels open than truly resolve Nasi's grievances. As the grand vizier indicated, the delay was not a significant problem because the *çavuş* (envoy) was sent more due to the "annoyance of Micques (Joseph Nasi) than otherwise."⁶⁸ The letter Suleiman sent to Charles IX in January 1564 is proof of this sentiment. The sultan excused the French king of not dealing with the matter because of the turmoil in France, but he expected when the discord in the

⁶⁵ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 206v-207v, 275v-276r, Pétremol to Boistailé, 29 May 1563; Pétremol to Charles IX, 22 April 1564. See also Minna Rozen, *A History of the Jewish Community in Istanbul: The Formative Years, 1453-1566* (Boston: Brill, 2010), 240-241; Jacob Reznik, *Duc Joseph de Naxos: Contribution à l'histoire juive du XVIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Lipschutz, 1936), 87-89.

⁶⁶ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 274r-v, Pétremol to Charles IX, 22 April 1564.

⁶⁷ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 155r, Pétremol to Boistailé, 27 October 1562.

⁶⁸ BNF, Français 7092, fol. 155r. Pétremol to Boistailé, 27 October 1562.

kingdom was ameliorated, the debt would be paid.⁶⁹ Yet, even after the mission of Haci Murad in 1565, nothing was resolved.⁷⁰

The Ottomans thus sought to keep diplomatic channels open to the French, signaling a willingness to cooperate with them in the future while nevertheless stymieing France's immediate pro-Spanish interests. Neither the Nasi affair nor Huma's complaints about her daughters were significant enough to impede Ottoman interests with France. For instance, as we will see in the next section, both Huma and Nasi saw their grievances ignored as the Ottomans began preparing to attack Venetian Cyprus and needed to prevent French support for Venice.

Ambassadorial Rivalry and the Unexpected Capitulations of 1569

The road to reasserting the Franco-Ottoman alliance came from an outlandish project to resolve France's religious struggles. Since the end of the first civil war in 1563, Catherine de Medici tried to find a way to provide a long-term solution to France's Huguenot problem: the Huguenots were too numerous and powerful to be effectively repressed or defeated in battle, and the Catholic faction too militant to permit any type of long-term tolerance.⁷¹ From 1564 to 1566, she and Charles IX, then at the age of majority, toured the country, trying to strengthen his control over the provinces.⁷² Catherine de Medici also sought to find a way to resettle the Huguenots out of the country. By the 1560s, this was not a new idea. In the 1550s,

⁶⁹ See P. Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi duc de Naxos* (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 110.

⁷⁰ BNF, Français 7092, fols. 371r-372r, Pétremol to Charles IX, 28 November 1574. See also, Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi*, 111-117; chap. 3, pp. 121-122, discusses this Ottoman envoy further.

⁷¹ Holt, *French Wars of Religion*, 67-75; James B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.

⁷² Holt, *French Wars of Religion*, 51-62.

France sought to establish a Huguenot colony in Brazil that ultimately failed. Again in 1562, Catherine tried to organize another colony in Florida, but the Spanish destroyed the settlement in 1565.⁷³ By 1566, Catherine learned of the news, and the French court decided to try their hand at resettling the Huguenots in Moldova, a client state of the Ottoman Empire. For this mission, Catherine dispatched Guillaume de Grandchamp de Grantrie as the new ambassador in Constantinople to negotiate the creation of a military colony in Moldova for resettled French Huguenots and German Lutherans that would act as a buffer state between the Ottomans and Austrian Habsburgs.⁷⁴

When Grandchamp arrived in Constantinople, he immediately took his mission beyond the confines of the vision of the French court. He tried to convince the Ottomans to appoint him as the new voivode of Moldova. As part of the deal, he would marry the sister of the voivode of Wallachia and pay the usual annual tribute of 20,000 *ducats* to the Ottomans.⁷⁵ Grandchamp's shameless self-promotion did not end there. In pursuit of this Huguenot safe-haven and his own self-promotion, he negotiated support for the endeavor from Joseph Nasi in exchange for the ambassador's approval of a *firman* (imperial decree) granting Nasi permission to blockade French shipping in and out of Alexandria and confiscate their goods to

⁷³ Nate Probasco, "Catherine de Medici and Huguenot Colonization, 1560-1567" in *Colonization, Piracy, and Trade in Early Modern Europe: The Roles of Powerful Women and Queens*, eds. Estelle Paranque et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 51-57.

⁷⁴ Probasco, "Catherine de Medici and Huguenot Colonization," 59-61; Michel Lesure, "Les Relations Franco-Ottomanes a L'Épreuve Des Guerres de Religion (1560-1594)," in *L'Empire Ottoman, La République de Turquie et La France*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1986), 45; Trandafir G. Djuvara, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913)* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1914), 80-96.

⁷⁵ Michel Lesure, "Les relations Franco-Ottomanes a l'épreuve des Guerres de Religion (1560-1594)," in *L'Empire Ottoman, La République de Turquie et La France*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1986), 45; Trandafir G. Djuvara, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913)* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1914), 80-96.

satisfy France's debts.⁷⁶ As the Ottomans explained later, they only granted the *firman* to Nasi because they were led to believe by Grandchamp that Charles IX had agreed to the confiscation and that the king intended to reimburse the merchants when they returned to France.⁷⁷ The French court would never have agreed to this payment scheme.

Grandchamp's selfish mismanagement of the Nasi affair forced the French crown to send a dedicated envoy, Claude du Bourg, to Constantinople to resolve the debts when Ottoman ships began confiscating the goods of French vessels. Du Bourg's position as a treasurer for the king made him ideal for such a mission. But he was a relentlessly ambitious man who took any chance to improve his station. Grandchamp and Du Bourg's mutual ambition, as well as Grandchamp's underhanded activities in Constantinople, led to a dramatic rivalry between the two. Immediately on the arrival of Du Bourg, the Ottomans began to question the legitimacy of some of Grandchamp's supposed letters from the king. As the grand vizier, Sokollu Mehmed, explained in a letter to the Charles IX, Grandchamp's letters became known as false when Du Bourg arrived with his own letters from the king, and the Ottomans noticed that the signatures differed. Doubtless, Du Bourg took advantage of Grandchamp's misdeeds to further his own situation in Constantinople,

⁷⁶ Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 179 ; Djuvara, *Cent Projets*, 80-96; BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-v, The 1569 Capitulations provide a description of these events in the preamble. SHD, A¹ 4, 34 bis r, *Extrait des lettres que le Grand Seigneur & son premier Bassa escrivent au Roy*, refers to Grandchamp pillaging French merchants, which would seem to refer this affair.

⁷⁷ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-v. The preamble in this copy of the Capitulation is much longer than the others in BNF, Français 16141, fols. 46r-56r, or the copy printed in 1570, Domenico Oliveri, (trans.), *Articles accordez par le Grand Seigneur [Selim] en faveur du roy & de ses sujets, à messire Claude du Bourg, Chevalier, Sieur de Guerine, Conseillier du Roy & Tresorier de France: pour la liberté & seurté du traffiq, commerce & passage és pays & mers de Levant*. (Lyon: François Didier, 1570), provide a shortened version that elides the blame placed on Grandchamp for the entire affair.

and the situation developed into a significant conflict that escalated to violence. As Sokollu Mehmed described the events, Grandchamp “besieged the house of Du Bourg with harquebuses, pistols, and other armaments, and [he] shot his pistol at one of the men of Du Bourg.”⁷⁸

While Grandchamp’s position devolved, Du Bourg’s relationship with the Ottomans only improved. In one of his letters, Du Bourg told the king that the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha stopped meeting with Grandchamp and would only deal with him.⁷⁹ Even if this was self-serving praise, it rang true. After Du Bourg revealed that Charles IX had not, in fact, agreed to the confiscation of his subjects’ goods, he was able to resolve the Nasi affair quickly.⁸⁰ The sultan and grand vizier revoked the *firman* granted to Joseph Nasi and cleared the French debts from the books. The decision was simple for the Ottomans. They were misled, and even if they were not, the blockade of French trade in Alexandria caused the treasury to suffer significantly, reducing any benefit from Nasi’s tax-farm purchases.⁸¹

The resolution of the Nasi affair seamlessly led to Du Bourg’s negotiations of the 1569 Capitulations. Indeed, the preamble explicitly connects the Nasi affair to the Capitulations, explaining in detail from the Ottoman perspective the misunderstanding that precipitated the affair and its resolution.⁸² The transition moved so quickly, it is not entirely clear that the French crown ordered the

⁷⁸ SHD, A¹ 4, fol. 34r bis, Extraict des lettres que le Grand Seigneur & son premier Bassa escrivent au Roy.

⁷⁹ BNF, Français 16141, fols. 93r-v, Du Bourg to Charles IX, 30 August 1569.

⁸⁰ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-v, Preamble to the 1569 Capitulations.

⁸¹ Hukum to the Bey and Kadi of Alexandria, 4 Receb 976/23 December 1568, and Hukum to Piyali Pasha, 11 Receb 976/30 December 1568, in *7 Numerali Mühimme Defteri (975-976 / 1567-1569)*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1999), nos. 2695, 2720; Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 179; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 4:838; Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Naci*, 111-118.

⁸² BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-v, Preamble to the 1569 Capitulations.

negotiations or was even aware of Du Bourg's ongoing negotiations until Grandchamp complained that the Capitulations would damage France's reputation because they were not truly a reciprocal agreement between princes, but a unilateral agreement—a moot point since all Capitulations were unilateral decrees.⁸³

The speed with which the negotiations of the Nasi affair moved to the Capitulations demonstrates the Ottoman intent to reassert its alliance with the French. Since 1568, the Ottomans were redirecting their foreign policy back to the Mediterranean, specifically toward Venetian Cyprus, and they could not afford to have the French support the Venetians in the looming war.⁸⁴ The Ottomans had always used the Capitulations as a way of establishing political relationships, and this situation was no different.⁸⁵ As Mehmed Sokollu wrote to Charles IX, the agreement with the French would “make other princes understand that the friendship between their majesties [Selim II and Charles IX] was not diminished at all.”⁸⁶

The Capitulations were confirmed in 1569. While they were not particularly notable—indeed, they explicitly granted to the French all the benefits the Venetians enjoyed—they did increase the soft power of the French crown in the Mediterranean by legitimizing the practice of foreign merchants trading under the French flag.⁸⁷

⁸³ Grandchamp to Catherine de Medici, 16 October 1569, in *Négociations*, 3:695; Veinstein, “Les capitulations Franco-Ottomanes de 1536,” 77.

⁸⁴ Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 178-180.

⁸⁵ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 144-145.

⁸⁶ SHD, A¹ 4, fol. 34 bis r, Extraict des lettres que le Grand Seigneur & son premier Bassa escrivent au Roy.

⁸⁷ BNF, Français 3954, 167r-168r. C.f. Güneş Işıkşel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 178-18, and De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1, 1985): 461-62, have claimed that these agreements provided more advantageous benefits to the French—for instance that all other Christian merchants beside Venetians were *compelled* to trade under the French flag and that French customs were half the rate of the Venetians—but these clauses simply are not listed in the French copies of the agreements. Işıkşel, for instance, cites the copy in BNF, Turc 130, 1r-6v, but this copy was made in the first years of the seventeenth century at the behest of the ambassador François Savary de Brèves, and were thus not a superior source than the earliest available copy in BNF, Français 3954,

When merchants traded under the French flag, they were under the protection of the French crown and depended on its representatives to resolve conflicts that might arise. The influence in Constantinople went further than this. Claude du Bourg explained the strategic and commercial advantages that the new agreement with the Grand Seigneur would bring. Along with commercial gains, he made sure to point out that the agreement gave the new king a certain amount of power over Spain as well: “the ability and freedom of commerce [was] conceded in your favor to [Spain’s] subjects, always coming under your name or banner.”⁸⁸ Yet, this prospect also brought the inverse possibility. The French king could also “encourage a grand storm and upheaval that is being prepared against him [Philip II].”⁸⁹ These gains, for Du Bourg, were worth any criticisms that France might receive for its relationship. As the French agent asserted, “in this case, our eggs would be worth the cost of the hen.”⁹⁰

Du Bourg was not the only French diplomat who perceived this diplomatic influence to be particularly important. When the next ambassador François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, was in Constantinople, he learned the Ragusans had been trading in Alexandria under their own flag as opposed to the French. Dax thought this development was very troublesome. The Ragusans themselves were not the problem, but it was the precedent their actions would set if the French permitted them to continue to flout the French privileges in Ottoman lands. Dax recommended

fols. 165v-169r by Sébastien de Juyé. The agreements did recognize the “custom” that many countries, such as the Genoese and Sicilians, traded under the protection of the French banner, but it was in no way a prescription.

⁸⁸ BNF, Français 16142, fol. 39v, Du Bourg to Charles IX, 17 January et 12 February 1570.

⁸⁹ BNF, Fr 16142, fol. 39v, Du Bourg to Charles IX, 17 January et 12 February 1570.

⁹⁰ BNF, Fr 16142, fol. 39v, Du Bourg to Charles IX, 17 January et 12 February 1570.

that Charles IX should follow the lead of his father. He claimed a similar circumstance arose when Henri II was king, and the king ordered the French to chase Ragusan “ships like enemies.” This approach was valid, he argued, because

it is not only a question of the Ragusans, because if they enjoy what they obtained, make no doubt that as soon as peace is made [with Spain], the Genoese, Florentines, Sicilians, Neapolitans, and Milanais will also obtain them because there is nothing not for sale here.... voila, the Spanish are planted in this Porte [Constantinople], your alliance dissipated, your consulate in Alexandria ruined, and by consequence all the trade of your subjects in the Levant destroyed.”⁹¹

This position was not merely another example of the French monarchy overestimating their significance in the minds of others. The privileges the Capitulations legally conferred to the French crown and its subjects held a prominent place in France’s foreign policy calculus. This soft power, however, was not necessarily new. Even though the 1535 Capitulations were not confirmed, they existed in the minds of the participants; and as we saw during the Don Alvero negotiations, other Christian states deferred to France’s place as the Ottomans’ favored ally.⁹² The 1569 Capitulations, however, did reassert that relationship and placed it in writing that could be referenced.⁹³

Conclusion

After the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the French never failed to imagine a way their Ottoman alliance could benefit them. They transformed the focus of their

⁹¹ BNF, Français 7091, fol. 109r-v, Dax to Charles IX, 10 June 1572. The Ragusans traded under the French flag in the sixteenth century until 1575.

⁹² See above chap. 2, pp. 108-111; on the treatment of the 1535 Capitulations as legitimate, see Gilles Veinstein, “Les capitulations Franco-Ottomanes de 1536: sont-elles encore controversables?” in *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, eds. Suraiya Faroqhi, Constantini Vera, and Koller Markus (Boston: Brill, 2008), 78-88.

⁹³ The 1536 Capitulations could never be found despite Frenchmen and Ottomans best efforts each time that they renewed them. Gilles Veinstein, “Les Capitulations Franco-Ottomanes de 1536.”

diplomacy in Constantinople from military cooperation to mediation between Christian princes and the sultan, and they even saw in the Ottomans a possible solution to the religious problems in France. The Ottomans, however, were not willing to accommodate France's newfound pro-Spanish policy. They allowed otherwise minor challenges to the alliance from Huma and Joseph Nasi to fester and frustrate the negotiations of the French ambassadors as long as they were supporting Spain. But those grievances also allowed the Ottomans to keep diplomatic channels with the French open by sending multiple envoys to France that produced little more than facetime between the Ottoman and French allies. As the French looked more seriously toward their Ottoman alliance—no matter the unlikelihood of a Huguenot homeland in Moldova—and the Ottomans needed their old ally again, all other impediments were dismissed, making room for the Capitulations, which represented a renewal of the alliance, as Mehmed Sokollu indicated.⁹⁴ The 1569 Capitulations thus represented a new stage in Franco-Ottoman cooperation. Charles IX immediately intended to exploit the benefits of the new agreement, which will be the topic of the next chapter.

⁹⁴ SHD, A¹ 4, fol. 34 bis r, *Extrait des lettres que le Grand Seigneur & son premier Bassa escrivent au Roy.*

CHAPTER FIVE: FROM ABANDONED CAMPAIGNS TO THE POLISH THRONE (1570-1578)

The renewal of the alliance represented by the 1569 Capitulations came at an ideal moment for French foreign policy. Three events conspired to reinvigorate France's rivalry with Spain and, by extension, diplomatic cooperation with the Ottoman Empire. First, the outbreak of the Dutch revolt against Spanish dominion in 1566 placed a significant Spanish military presence along France's eastern frontier, reviving fears of Habsburg encirclement. Second, Spain joined Venice's war effort against the Ottomans after they attacked Venetian Cyprus in 1570. Third, the Peace of St. Germain pacified France's religious wars in 1570, permitting Charles IX a free hand to counter the growing power of Spain all around him. Yet, the peace was shorter than expected, limiting the ability of the crown to act militarily and forcing Charles IX to rely on French diplomatic influence in Constantinople to counter Habsburg power.

French anti-Habsburg diplomacy can be organized into two phases during this period. The first immediately followed the 1569 Capitulations until the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in France in August 1572. During this period, France increasingly sought to counter Spain's growing power militarily, and the break in the Wars of Religion permitted Charles IX the opportunity. Spain was spreading its resources thin, combatting its own rebellion in the Netherlands since the late-1560s and joining Venice and Rome's League against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean in

1570. At the same time France reached out for allies such as England and the German Protestant princes to intervene in the Dutch revolt, and the court increasingly collaborated with the Ottomans to undermine Spain in the Mediterranean. The crown began mediating peace between Venice and the Ottomans to isolate Spain and eventually negotiated a military agreement against Spain in 1572 after an Algerian delegation sought French support against Spain. France's outreach to the Ottomans demonstrates that the French crown was expanding its coalition against Spain in preparation for war rather than trying to avoid war in the year immediately preceding the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre.¹

The agreement, however, was rendered moot before it could even reach France. In August 1572, a Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny was assassinated at a wedding meant to stabilize the country by uniting the most prominent Huguenot noble Henri de Bourbon to the crown *via* the king's sister Marguerite de Valois. The event set off a wave of popular violence against Huguenots in Paris that spread throughout France. The celebration meant to bring stability to the country, thus, ripped it apart into another civil war. France's strategy in Constantinople quickly reoriented itself away from military cooperation to mediator, before ultimately deteriorated after a series of diplomatic miscalculations. War against Spain was abandoned in both Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, and France sought to improve its geopolitical position through Ottoman diplomatic intervention. France's Ottoman policy focused on two goals: the Veneto-Ottoman peace and the election of

¹ On France trying to avoid war before St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, see Arlette Jouanna, *The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State (24 August 1572)*, trans. Joseph Bergin (New York: Manchester University Press, 2013) 55-57.

Charles IX's brother Henri, duke of Anjou, as the king of Poland on the eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire. While the first proved hugely beneficial, the second backfired. After Henri became the new king of Poland, largely due to Ottoman intervention, he severely mishandled Polish-Ottoman relations, damaging Franco-Ottoman relations when he inherited the French throne in 1574. These sorts of miscalculations continued to characterize Franco-Ottoman diplomacy as it deteriorated in the first years of Henri III's reign until 1578.

Charles IX's Anti-Spanish Plans

The outbreak of the Dutch revolt was, perhaps, the most critical catalyst for renewing the French and Spanish rivalry. In 1566, an iconoclastic Calvinist movement in the Netherlands provoked a disproportionately violent response from the Spanish governor.² The subsequent revolt to the perceived infringement of Dutch rights by the Spanish crown led to a preponderance of Spanish troops posted along France's eastern frontier, demanding French concern. Continued Spanish dominance of the Dutch Provinces was not desired in any way in France, and a liberated Netherlands would do much to alleviate the Habsburg encirclement that persisted after the Treaty of Cateau-Cambésis. Not only did the French crown hope to keep Spain preoccupied, fearing Spanish intervention into France's religious troubles, but the possibility of an independent Netherlands was also much more desirable than being surrounded by Spanish dominated lands.³

² Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1985), chap. 5.

³ See N.M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), 10-15; Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 63-64.

The threat France perceived from Spain's Dutch policy is evident in the years directly following the outbreak of the revolt. Philip II sent the duke of Alva with his army to quell the Dutch revolt in 1567. The Spanish duke marched his troops along the Spanish road, a route from Italy to the Netherlands along the eastern frontier of France. While there was peace between France and Spain, it remained tenuous, and the French crown feared a Spanish invasion. For protection, Charles IX amassed his army, including 6,000 Swiss mercenaries, along the eastern border.⁴ The Huguenots in France feared that there was a conspiracy afoot between the crown and Alva. This fear was not unreasonable. Catherine de Medici and the Spanish duke had met in Bayonne in 1565, and the militant Catholic Guises held a prominent place in the king's council. War broke out after the Huguenots failed to "free" the royal family from Guise dominance by force at Meaux in September 1567. The situation was made more concerning for Catherine de Medici and the moderate faction when Charles cardinal of Lorraine invited Spanish intervention into the conflict.⁵

War with Spain provided the additional prospect of uniting the country behind a common cause. The peace of St.-Germain, which stabilized France in 1570 after two consecutive civil wars, provided Charles IX with the opportunity to pursue such a policy. The Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny, count of Condé, combined with moderate Catholics at court to persuade Charles IX that war against Spain in the Netherlands was a logical way to divert France's militaristic energies away from civil war. As a result, the king shaped an anti-Spanish foreign policy that was focused

⁴ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: the Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, paperback ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 65.

⁵ Holt, *The French Wars of Religion*, 64.

on countering Spanish hegemony in Europe by establishing a series of marriages to solidify France's foreign and domestic position, and a series of alliances in preparation for an attack on the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Italy.⁶ One of the facets of this policy that has been lost by historians was the significance of the Mediterranean theater and the Franco-Ottoman alliance to France's strategy.

The two most significant weddings were arranged to solidify France's domestic concerns. The first marriage sought to ease tensions between the Catholic Guise family and the Huguenot branch of the Montmorency family. A blood feud between the two factions had not only driven their rivalry but also contributed significantly to the religious wars.⁷ Gaspard de Coligny, the leader of the Huguenot branch of the Montmorency clan, was to marry Mary of Clèves, sister-in-law to Henri de Guise, making Coligny and de Guise brothers-in-law. To resolve the broader religious tensions, the crown negotiated the wedding between the highest-ranking Huguenot in France, Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre and a prince of the blood, and the king's sister Marguerite de Valois. These two marriages were intended to make the Peace of St. Germain a more durable agreement.⁸

The crown combined these efforts with a series of agreements to solidify its position on the international stage. Charles IX himself married the daughter of the Holy Roman emperor, strengthening his position on his eastern front. He also tried to negotiate a marriage between his brother Henri, duke of Anjou, and Elizabeth I of

⁶ Sutherland, *Massacre of St. Bartholomew*, chaps. 8 and 9; Jean-François Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole: diplomatie et guerres civiles (1563-1574)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013), 351-418; Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre*, 44-63.

⁷ On the pervasiveness of blood feuds and vendetta violence in sixteenth-century France, see Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁸ See Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre*, 44-50.

England, joining France and England together as a bulwark against Spain. While these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, the crown did establish a defensive alliance with the English in April 1572. In addition, Charles IX also sought out the German Protestant princes of the Holy Roman Empire. He sent Albert de Gondi, Count of Retz, to the German princes in Spire to gain their support. Along with Gondi, Coligny lent his support to the royal objective to conclude an agreement with the German princes.⁹

In combination with these efforts, France weaponized its diplomacy with the Ottomans to counter the Spanish threat. As Philip II combatted the Dutch revolt, he also joined a Holy League with Venice and the Vatican against the Ottomans in 1570 after an Ottoman attack against Venetian Cyprus. France immediately sought to mediate a peace agreement between Venice and the Ottomans, isolating Spain at war in the Mediterranean. Since the failed Ottoman siege of Malta in 1565, the Mediterranean theater had significantly reduced its intensity. In 1567 and 1568, for instance, the Spanish fleet was able to patrol the western Mediterranean for North African corsairs undisturbed by any Ottoman threat.¹⁰ Avoiding the awkward position of watching France's two important allies at war was an important consideration, but a Veneto-Ottoman peace would also bring the prospect of isolating Spain in the Mediterranean just as the conflict was returning to the region in earnest.

⁹ Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre*, 44-53; Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*, 237-274; Bernard Vogler, "Huguenots et Protestants Allemands Vers 1572," *Bulletin de La Société de l'Histoire Du Protestantisme Français* (1974), 181-84.

¹⁰ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2:1047-1050.

The limits that conflict in the Mediterranean placed on Philip II's ability to operate in Europe was no secret. The Dutch rebel leader Maurice of Nassau wrote to his brother in 1566, indicating as much: "The Turks are very threatening, which will mean, we believe, that the king will not come [to the Netherlands] this year."¹¹ After Spain lost their outpost La Goletta just outside Tunis in 1574, the French ambassador to the Dutch made a similar point. He thought that "the loss of La Goletta may make Philip II more anxious to seek ... [peace here] so that he will be able to turn all his forces and resources against the Turks in order to put up a better resistance to them, the war in the Mediterranean being of greater importance to him."¹² This perception reflected reality. Geoffrey Parker has demonstrated that Spain was only able to privilege one of the two fronts monetarily. Specifically, Philip II benefited from the Netherlands government being able to carry its own in 1570 and 1571, but when Spain tried to support both wars at the same time in 1573 and 1574, bankruptcy became a necessity.¹³ The Holy League helped to shoulder much of the burden in the Mediterranean. As the new ambassador in Constantinople François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, theorized the problem *en route* to his post, "the Venetians..., nevertheless, compromise their state to cover their allies, especially the Spanish lands, which at this time are the only ones to enjoy the benefits of this

¹¹ Prince of Orange to Count Louis, 3 April 1565, quoted in Geoffrey Parker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1648," *Past & Present* 49 (November 1970), 82.

¹² Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, revised ed. (New York: Penguin, 1985), 165-166.

¹³ Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, 231-233.

confederation.”¹⁴ After Venice made peace in March 1573, Spain had to fight two Mediterranean campaigns alone without Venetian support in 1573 and 1574.¹⁵

The Mediterranean Theater

France’s Mediterranean strategy began in 1570 focused on mediating the conflict in the Mediterranean to keep Spain’s focus away from Northern Europe, but it quickly shifted to cooperative military action against Spain in the Mediterranean. French historians have not considered the degree to which the Mediterranean theater fit into the crown’s foreign policy calculus. But Geoffrey Parker has made it clear that one of the most significant obstacles to Spain’s European endeavors was the Ottoman threat, to which Philip II always attended before dedicating troops to the Netherlands.¹⁶ The French were fully aware of the limitations the Ottoman navy could place on Spain’s ability to operate beyond the Mediterranean and organized their foreign policy appropriately.

Immediately after war was declared between Venice and the Ottomans, Charles IX sought to end the conflict between his two allies to isolate Spain in the Mediterranean with the Ottomans. He sent a new ambassador, François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, first to go to Venice, where he would learn their conditions for peace and free an Ottoman envoy, Mahmud, from Venetian prison, and second to continue to Constantinople to finish the negotiations for a Veneto-Ottoman peace. Such a

¹⁴ Dax to Charles IX, 26 July 1571, in *Négociations de la France dans le levant*, ed. Ernest Charrière, 4 vols., (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-1860), 3:163.

¹⁵ As Braudel has shown, Mediterranean warfare was determined by the seasons. Merchant ships, much less large fleets took to the seas during the winter, so the campaign season lasted from April or May until October. See Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 248-252; on the benefits of the Holy League to Spanish Mediterranean policy, see Niccolo Capponi, *Victory of the West: The Great Christian-Muslim Clash at the Battle of Lepanto* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2007), 155-158.

¹⁶ Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, 231-239.

simple mission on paper became anything but simple in reality. Circumstances frustrated the bishop of Dax at every turn. The direction of the war provided his most significant challenge. The victory of the Holy League at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, occurring just one month before Dax's arrival in Venice, caused Venice to dig in their heels. Mahmud, who was taken prisoner in Venice while delivering the 1569 Capitulations to France, would not see his freedom until the end of the war, and Venice thought more victories would follow the Lepanto success.¹⁷ When Dax arrived in Constantinople, the tide of the war was turning again, and he found the sultan and grand vizier had "return[ed] to their original insolence" after the failed Venetian siege of St. Maure, thinking that the "Christians do not have the means to take any place of importance."¹⁸ The bishop of Dax hardly had any contact with the *bailo* to mediate anything between the two countries while the *bailo* remained imprisoned in retaliation for Mahmud's imprisonment in Venice.

Very soon after the arrival of Dax in Constantinople, however, his energies were diverted away from simple mediation and toward greater military cooperation against Spain in the Mediterranean. Two events influenced this new approach. First, the battle of Lepanto transformed the paradigm of the Mediterranean conflict. The French began to question the degree to which the Ottomans could dominate Spanish interests since the defeat demonstrated they were not unbeatable. Arlette Jouanna

¹⁷ For more on Mahmud, see chap. 3, pp. 128-130; Dax severely misunderstood France's position. Dax originally thought the Battle of Lepanto would make the Venetians more eager for peace since they found themselves in a better bargaining position, but they found the circumstances to be no time for peace. Even if they did find peace desirable, Dax argued that Venice did not want to be indebted to France for its mediation. They feared they would leave one league only to be drawn into another. See BNF, Français 7091, fol. 52r, Dax to Charles IX, 22 October 1571; BNF, Français 7091, fols. 54r-56v, bishop of Dax to Charles IX, 4 November 1571; Güneş Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selim II: paramètres et périmètres de l'Empire ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVIe siècle* (Paris: Peeters, 2016), 182-183

¹⁸ BNF, Français 7091, fols. 8r-v, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 24 April 1572.

has argued that Lepanto caused France—now worried about the consequences of a war against Spain to France’s reputation during a period of Catholic pride—to abandon its Spanish war efforts in the years preceding the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Instead, France’s strategy devolved to focus on covertly undermining the Spanish endeavors while avoiding open war.¹⁹ But France’s negotiations with the Ottomans indicate that they never abandoned their war with Spain. Instead, the crown was opening a new front against Spain in the Mediterranean.

The Ottoman defeat caused the French to rethink the ability of the Ottomans to dominate Spain’s military resources. The French feared that the Ottomans were no longer willing to attack Spain’s forces in the western Mediterranean after suffering such a severe defeat that cost them most of their fleet. Moreover, there was reason to believe that Spain “no longer fear[ed] the navy of the Turks,” so Philip II would turn away from the Mediterranean if threatened by France.²⁰ To make matters worse, Charles IX was learning that despite the Ottomans’ plans to rebuild their fleet, they were going to keep their maritime forces in defensive a position while sending out their land forces against the emperor. This prospect would only cause the Germans to band together to fight the Ottomans, and the Holy League was already pursuing the emperor’s support. The French king recommended that Dax persuade the Ottomans to set their sights on Africa. The ideal situation in Charles IX’s mind was that Germany would remain at peace, and the French pull “this poor Republic (Venice) from the vices in which it placed itself, and to leave the others to play their

¹⁹ Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre*, 56-57.

²⁰ BNF, Français 7161, fol. 12v, Discours de Monsieur de Noailles, April 1572.

part alone” in the war with the Ottomans.²¹ The Ottoman defeat at Lepanto, thus, reduced the likelihood of the Mediterranean to hold the attention of both the Ottomans and the Spanish, a significant detriment to France’s ongoing negotiations for a coalition against Spain.

The second catalyst for greater military cooperation with the Ottomans was a delegation from Algiers that sought French support against an attack they thought to be imminent from Spain. As Güneş Işıksel has demonstrated, the Ottomans also embraced their alliance with France even more after Lepanto.²² Charles IX sought to take advantage of the alliance to further his coalition against Spain by placing his brother Henri de Valois, duke of Anjou, on the throne of Algiers. The Ottoman province would remain a tributary state of the Ottomans, and Henri would continue to pay the duties and tribute owed to the Grand Seigneur by the current viceroy of Algiers.

This idea came to the French king in May 1572 after meeting with an Algerian delegation. They came to France hoping that Charles IX would “take and receive them in protection and to defend them from all oppression and the enterprises that the Spanish want to make on those of their country.” After receiving news about problems arising between the Moors in North Africa and the Ottoman janissaries, the French king embraced the cause of the Algerians and extended his protection to them. He decided to make his brother Henri, duke of Anjou, their king. He would pay the customary tribute assuming the Grand Seigneur found it agreeable. Charles IX knew this would be an unlikely proposition to sell to the Ottomans and hoped that

²¹ BNF, Français 7091, fols. 75v-76r, quote on 76r, Charles IX to the bishop of Dax, 9 January 1572.

²² Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 187-197.

Dax would “propose it dexterously,” and assure Selim II that it would not just be in the king’s interest but also “to serve the friendship and good intelligence (alliance) that is between the Grand Seigneur and me” because it would be “very bad for both of us if we did not employ the means God gave me...[and] Spain became masters of it [Algiers].”²³ Perhaps, Charles IX thought this was a possible outcome since the Ottomans offered the island of Cyprus to France to proffer them to the Ottoman side while they were planning to attack.²⁴

This proposal was directly connected with the attempts by the French king to establish an anti-Spanish coalition.²⁵ Research on Charles IX’s coalition preceding the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre has not adequately accounted for the Ottoman alliance in France’s strategy. The brief Algerian affair demonstrates that the French crown was trying to take a much more active role in countering Spain in the Mediterranean, but it has mostly gone unnoticed in the historiography primarily because the complete letter has rarely been cited.²⁶ For instance, Arlette Jouanna has argued in her persuasive account of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre that this letter from Charles IX on 11 May 1572 is “the key to the enigma” of the crown’s strategy for Spain. She grasped on to Charles IX’s statement that the French fleet’s movements in the Mediterranean were “to keep the Catholic King [Philip II] guessing

²³ SHD, A¹⁴, fol. 178, Charles IX to bishop of Dax, 11 May 1572; see also Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 191-192.

²⁴ See Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 124.

²⁵ For more on the anti-Spanish coalition, see Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance Espagnole*, 351-418; and Sutherland, *Massacre of St Bartholomew*, 214-222; and Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre*, 43-73.

²⁶ Two notable exceptions are Işıkşel, *Diplomatie Ottomane*, 190-197; and Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2:1110-1111. But neither discusses it in the context of France’s larger foreign policy context and its relationship to the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, most likely because the letters they reference are incomplete and do not include that second half of the letter that connects the Algerian enterprise with France’s northern European policy. Işıkşel cites BNF, Français 3899, fol. 187v, and Braudel cites BNF, Français 16170, fols. 121r-123v. Both contain the same incomplete copy.

(*en cervelle*),” to argue that Charles IX had abandoned his belligerent intentions against Spain, only intending to paralyze the Spanish king in confusion.²⁷ But Jouanna did not have access to the context of this statement, citing an incomplete excerpt of the letter.²⁸

I agree with Jouanna that this letter holds “the key to the enigma” of French foreign policy strategy immediately before the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. But Charles IX did not want to keep Philip II guessing to avoid conflict; he wanted to keep Philip II guessing to provide cover for his North African endeavors, expanding his coalition to include the Ottomans. After proposing his brother as the tributary king of Algiers, the king wanted Dax to know and tell the Grand Seigneur that he raised “a good number of ships” outfitted with 12,000 to 14,000 men under the pretext to protect his harbors. In reality, though, the king explained that it was meant to embolden the Dutch against Spain as well as “to keep the Catholic King guessing (*en cervelle*).” Indeed, Charles IX claimed, his efforts inspired the Dutch to conquer Zeeland and to revolt in Holland. But the letter did not end there. Charles IX explained that the Dutch efforts would divert Spanish resources away from North Africa, providing an opportunity for France.²⁹ To further persuade the sultan of his anti-Spanish pretensions, Charles IX shared the news of his new alliances with the Queen of England that would “put the Spanish in marvelous jealousy” as well as the

²⁷ Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre*, 55-57, quote on 55; SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol. 179-180, Charles IX to the bishop of Dax, 11 May 1572.

²⁸ Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre*, 55, cited Emmanuel Henri Victurnien de Noailles, *Henri de Valois et la Pologne en 1572* (Paris: M. Lévy Frères, 1867), 1:9n. It does not appear that Victurnien de Noailles had access to the complete letter either.

²⁹ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol. 179, Charles IX to the bishop of Dax, 11 May 1572.

agreement he made with the princes of Germany.³⁰ France was courting the Ottomans as a part of its anti-Spanish coalition.

This proposition was intended to accomplish the same results as the marriage negotiations between the duke of Anjou and Elizabeth I failed to produce. Indeed, it promised much more significant results than a marriage to Elizabeth could. Placing Anjou on the throne of Algiers as a tributary would align France to another anti-Spanish country in the Ottomans in a more durable and mutually beneficial way. Placing Anjou on the Algerian throne would expand the French dynasty, albeit in a tributary role, in a strategically important position to counter Spanish interests. It would also draw the French and the Ottomans even closer together because the Ottomans would have a natural interest in protecting Anjou's position in Algiers. Moreover, it would instantly expand the naval power available to the French from the Algerian corsairs to challenge Philip II's domination of the Dutch Provinces. Anjou on the throne of Algiers would represent an immediate threat to the maritime corridor between Spain and Italy. The security of that corridor was the reason Philip II repeatedly privileged the Mediterranean theater over the Dutch revolt in his military strategy.³¹

While the proposition might appear ridiculous on paper—indeed, even the bishop of Dax thought it was doubtful when he first read the letter—the Ottomans appear to have taken it seriously.³² Dax adeptly associated the proposal with France's maritime activities in the Mediterranean as a combined response to Spain raising

³⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol. 179-180, Charles IX to Dax, 11 May 1572.

³¹ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, 231-238.

³² Dax to Charles IX, 31 July 1572, in *Négociations*, 3:290-291.

their own fleet with the support from some Portuguese ships. Dax argued that Spain planned “to attack the *vilayet* (province) of Algiers” to support “a clan of Arabs supposedly oppressed by the men of Islam,” which caused the French king to name his brother the admiral of a fleet to intercept Spain’s navy and attack Spanish territories.³³ The Ottomans took seriously the good-will associated with Charles IX’s attempt to defend Algiers from Spain. In a conversation with the bishop of Dax, the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha indicated that Selim II originally found himself inclined “to gratify Monseigneur your brother with the kingdom of Algiers,” but after bringing the issue up with the *Şeyhülislam* and the muftis of his empire, Selim II concluded that it would not be possible. Because Ottoman law and Islam were firmly established, he could not cede Algiers to Anjou “any more than [he could] Constantinople.”³⁴

France’s strategy produced the same outcome as in England. Although Ottomans turned down Charles IX’s proposition, France nevertheless acquired an alliance from the Ottomans and a much more advantageous alliance than the defensive agreement to which England committed. Dax negotiated a beneficial agreement with the Ottomans. Selim II promised to send 200 galleys to Toulon in early June, and 200 galleys would be sent each year with “aid and assistance to conquer and subjugate the provinces of Spain and Italy” as long as the French crown

³³ Mühimme Defteri 19, no. 667 bis, Selim II to Charles IX, 4 Ra 980/10 November 1572 quoted in Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 193. As Işıksel explains, this section comes from a draft letter that never made it into the actual letter, but it indicates how Dax framed the issue in his *arz* (formal request). See also SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 185r, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 31 July 1572.

³⁴ Dax to Charles IX, 4 September 1572, in *Négociations*, 3:298.

continued to fight Spain.³⁵ In addition, the Grand Seigneur promised “to present and leave to you [Charles IX] all the conquests he might make with his fleet in either Spain or Italy.”³⁶ Selim II was also very optimistic about the alliance France established with England and the German princes. He recommended that they march together against Flanders “when the moment is favorable,” and if Charles IX is willing to accept the Grand Seigneur’s support, “we will treat your friends the same as ours, and they will be assured under our protection the same way you are.”³⁷ As Dax recounted, this development amounted to the greatest treaty between France and the Ottomans that had ever been declared. He thought that his negotiations overachieved the expectations of both the king and himself. He even managed to negotiate an end to the necessity of gifts for the Ottoman ministers.³⁸

In Dax’s zeal for his newly negotiated treaty, he left Constantinople to deliver it personally to France, but when he arrived in Ragusa in November 1572, he learned his treaty with the Ottomans was moot. Three months earlier, on 24 August 1572, one of the leaders of the Huguenot party Gaspard de Coligny was assassinated while he and many of the Huguenot nobility were in Paris to celebrate the nuptials of Henri of Navarre to the king’s sister Marguerite. As a result, the marriage meant to bring stability to the kingdom as a symbolic union between the Catholic and Huguenot

³⁵ Mühimme Defteri 19, no. 713, Selim II to Charles IX, 18 Rabi’u’l-ahir 980/8 August 1572, quoted in Işıksel, *La diplomatie Ottomane*, 195.

³⁶ Dax to Charles IX, 4 September 1572, in *Négociations*, 3:298.

³⁷ Mühimme Defteri 19, no. 713, Selim II to Charles IX, 18 Rabi’u’l-ahir 980/8 August 1572, quoted in Işıksel, *La diplomatie Ottomane*, 195.

³⁸ SHD Vincennes, A¹ 4, fol. 202, Dax to Charles IX, 2 November 1572, but it was not sent until 29 November 1572 because of a delay of the courier.

parties instead set off a terrible massacre of Huguenots in France that resonated through the countryside and engulfed the country in another civil war.³⁹

France's diplomatic strategy in Constantinople immediately returned to a position of mediator after a brief but significant attempt at military cooperation. As Charles IX explained to Dax, the French kingdom was not in a place to make war with Spain anymore.⁴⁰ But neither was France joining the Holy League, a major rumor circulating the Mediterranean. French diplomatic strategy in Constantinople became centered on two affairs: the Veneto-Ottoman peace and the acquisition of Ottoman support for the duke of Anjou's election to the Polish throne.

The Veneto-Ottoman Peace

French mediation between Venice and the Ottomans was complicated by the bishop of Dax's absence from Constantinople. Dax remained in Ragusa for the rest of 1572 for reasons that are not entirely clear. Multiple factors prevented his quick return to the Ottoman capital. He wanted clarification on his orders, confirming France would not join the League against the Ottomans. He was naturally afraid of the rumors circulating throughout the Mediterranean, and he knew the imprisonment that befell the Venetian *bailo*. He did not want the same fate.⁴¹ In addition, the Ragusans intentionally prevented his departure for Constantinople for unknown reasons.⁴²

³⁹ See Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre*, chap. 5.

⁴⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fols. 199-200, 216-217, Charles IX to Dax, 7 September 1572, 28 September 1572.

⁴¹ See SHD Vincennes, A¹ 7, fol. 148, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 29 November 1572; see also Michel Lesure, *Lepante* (1972; repr., Paris: Gallimard, 2013) 335-337.

⁴² SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 213, Dax to Henri de Valois, 13 January 1573.

During the ambassador's absence from Constantinople, both the Venetians and the Ottomans increasingly sought the ambassadors' mediation, but they were forced to get along without the bishop of Dax. The Venetians began negotiating with the French ambassador in Venice, Arnaud du Ferrier, away from the ministers from Spain and the Vatican.⁴³ The Venetians also sent an ambassador to France in September 1572 to discuss French mediation in the negotiations in Constantinople.⁴⁴ The Venetian *bailo* also demonstrated his interest in Dax's intervention in the peace negotiations. For the Ottomans, a series of peasant revolts in the Balkans, Morea, and Albania drove them to seek peace despite a successful campaign season in 1572.⁴⁵ Yet, Dax was still in Ragusa, and the Venetians and Ottomans began their negotiations for peace in January 1573. The Ottomans made the first proposal for the conditions of peace, which were far beyond what Venice was willing to accept.⁴⁶ After some time and work, they came close to their final position, but the momentum of the negotiations slowed just before the bishop's arrival.⁴⁷

Immediately when the bishop of Dax arrived, he began working with both sides for the peace. The two sides were very close to establishing peace, but the mediation from the bishop of Dax proved expeditious for the negotiations. Immediately when the ambassador arrived, Sokollu Mehmed apprised him of the situation during a long conversation, and he "held their hand...to intervene on the conclusion of this deal." Both parties were pleased with his arrival and "disposed to

⁴³ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 67, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 6 March 1573.

⁴⁴ SHD Vincennes A¹4, fol. 219, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 28 September 1572.

⁴⁵ Işıksel, *Diplomatie Ottomane*, 169-171.

⁴⁶ Işıksel, *Diplomatie Ottomane*, 169-172.

⁴⁷ SHD Vincennes A¹4, fol. 236, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 13 March 1573; Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottoman*, 169-172; Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 311-312; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 4:1091.

believe now that [his] return [was] so timely and agreeable to both parties that [he] must be an instrument to regain and extend what was undone.”⁴⁸ The grand vizier thought Dax’s interjection into the matter with the sultan through an official petition (*arz*) recounting their negotiations from a three-hour discussion and recommending the agreement would help the matter. As the ambassador told it, “the *arz* was made Tuesday; Wednesday, one of the Dragomans translated it; Thursday, it was placed in the hands of the pasha; Friday, he presented it to his master; Saturday, the peace was concluded.”⁴⁹ In a letter to the duke of Anjou, he exaggerated his role poignantly: “the pasha and the *bailo* had brooded over the peace secretly for three months, and I hatched it with God’s mercy in eight days.”⁵⁰

Perhaps the bishop of Dax exaggerated his influence, but it is clear that his arrival expedited the affair.⁵¹ He laid the groundwork for the peace treaty in 1572 through his discussions with the grand vizier and the *bailo*, who was ordered to work secretly with Dax.⁵² Even if Dax arrived too late to make any significant impact on the actual terms of the agreement—although he claimed he saved the Venetians 100,000 *ducats*—his presence was reassuring to both parties during the final moments of the negotiations.⁵³ Indeed, the *bailo* welcomed the French ambassador’s intervention because he thought that the agreement would carry greater weight if the French acted as guarantors of it.⁵⁴ In addition, Charles IX certainly thought that the bishop of Dax played an important role in the negotiations, explaining to his

⁴⁸ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 233, Dax to Catherine de Medici, 6 March 1573.

⁴⁹ SHD Vincennes A¹7, fol. 175v, Dax to Ferrals, 8 March 1573.

⁵⁰ SHD Vincennes A¹4, fol. 236, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 13 March 1573.

⁵¹ See also Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 171-173.

⁵² See Lesure, *Lepante*, 330; also, Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 310.

⁵³ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 235, Dax to Charles IX, 8 March 1573

⁵⁴ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fol. 235, Dax to Charles IX, 8 March 1573; Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 311.

ambassador in Venice how happy he was that the peace was concluded and even more so that the bishop of Dax “opportunistically arrived in Constantinople in time to serve and aid [the peace].”⁵⁵

The brokered peace between Venice and the Ottomans had the desired outcome for France. When Venice abandoned the League, Spain was isolated in the Mediterranean, and North Africa became the primary focus of the conflict. Don John quickly raised a naval force of around 200 ships at Sicily to attack Tunis. Two days after the Spanish fleet arrived in Tunis in October 1573, many of the Ottoman supporters fled the city, and the locals who remained overthrew their Ottoman overlord, handing the city over to a new one in Spain. The next year, the Ottomans responded sending 250 to 300 ships to Tunis in July 1574 to retake the city as well as the long-time Spanish outpost of La Goletta, which sat just outside the city. La Goletta fell after five assaults on its walls in August, and Tunis fell a month later in September to the Ottomans.⁵⁶ The Ottomans thus solidified their position in North Africa. Moreover, Philip II’s attempts to support his Dutch and North African frontiers simultaneously forced Spain into bankruptcy the next year.⁵⁷ It is hard to imagine Charles IX could have hoped for a much better outcome from Spain’s isolation against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean.

⁵⁵ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert, 366, fols. 155-156, Charles IX to Ferrier, 19 April 1573.

⁵⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 188-192; Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2:1134-1140.

⁵⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, 231-233.

The Polish Throne and Miscalculation in Its Aftermath

The next affair on which French diplomacy focused in the aftermath of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the subsequent reorientation of French foreign policy was the acquisition of the crown of Poland for Charles IX's brother Henri, duke of Anjou. The heirless king of Poland, Sigismund Augustus, died in July 1572 after signing the Union of Lublin (1564), which unified the Polish and Lithuanian kingdoms and established an electoral monarchy. Beginning in November 1572, the "chief goal" for France's diplomacy with the Ottomans became the acquisition of Ottoman support for the election of the duke of Anjou as the Polish king.⁵⁸ Dax was to persuade the grand vizier and sultan to send a formal ambassador to convince the Polish nobility to elect Henri de Valois.⁵⁹ As the king's secretary, Villeroy, wrote to the French ambassador, "all of our fantasies turn with Poland (*tourner du costé de Pologne*)."⁶⁰

The Polish throne was an ideal position for Anjou. He could rule Poland in his own name rather than through his Queen in England or as a tributary in Algiers. In addition, as Jean-François Labourdette has argued, acquiring the Polish crown would encircle the House of Austria with two powerful French allies in Poland and the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹ The election of Henri to the throne of Poland would be productive for both states, and the sultan previously posited the possibility of France

⁵⁸ Charles IX to Dax, 30 November 1572, in *Négociations*, 3:344. SHD Vincennes, A¹⁴, fols. 221r-227v, Charles IX to bishop of Dax, Catherine de Medici to bishop of Dax, Henri of Anjou to bishop of Dax, all 30 November 1572.

⁵⁹ Charles IX to Dax, 30 November 1572, in *Négociations*, 3:344. SHD Vincennes, A¹⁴, fols. 221r-227v, Charles IX to bishop of Dax, Catherine de Medici to bishop of Dax, Henri of Anjou to bishop of Dax, all 30 November 1572.

⁶⁰ SHD Vincennes A¹⁷, fol. 170, Villeroy to Dax, 21 February 1573.

⁶¹ Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*, 589.

and the Ottomans working together to this end to Claude du Bourg in 1569.⁶² The *Grand Seigneur* would gain a friendly dynasty on the throne of Poland, and France would be able to straddle the Holy Roman Empire's ambitions with control of Poland on its eastern Frontier. As Charles IX explained, Poland would maintain continual peace with the Ottomans if Anjou were on the throne.⁶³

Placing Anjou on the Polish throne would be no easy task. The clear favorite at the time was Archduke Ernest, son of the Habsburg emperor Maximilian II. Ernest had the support of the great lords as well as many of the Prussians and Lithuanians. He was also the preferred pick of the Papacy. The petty nobility, especially among the provinces that bordered Muscovy, supported the candidacy of Czar Ivan IV. The great nobles of Poland, however, disliked both these candidates out of fear of foreign domination, especially from powers along their frontiers. They especially feared Poland-Lithuania going the way of Bohemia or Hungary, being subsumed into the Holy Roman Empire if a Habsburg ascended to the throne.⁶⁴ Henri de Valois was the third favorite, and the French ambassadors' prospects in Poland only worsened after news from the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre arrived.⁶⁵ In early 1573, rumors were circulating Europe that the Habsburg Archduke Ernest was gaining an advantage in the affairs. In Venice, the French ambassador wrote that he

“had seen letters written in Cracow that the Lithuanians, who have favored my seigneur more than any others, were cooling toward him because of the events in France last year since it was printed by the Imperial [camp] that the massacre was against the greatest number of

⁶² Claude du Bourg to Charles IX, June 1570, in *Négociations*, 3:73-75n1.

⁶³ SHD Vincennes, A⁴, fols. 198-199, Charles IX to Dax, 6 September 1572.

⁶⁴ See Işıksel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 197-199.

⁶⁵ R. J. Knecht, *Hero or Tyrant?: Henry III, King of France, 1574-89* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 55-56.

Lutherans [rather than Calvinists], and most of the Lithuanians are Lutherans.”⁶⁶

France’s alliance with the Ottomans played a significant role in the negotiations between France and Poland to put Anjou on its throne. For instance, the French made multiple promises to the Polish nobles that took advantage of the Franco-Ottoman alliance for Poland’s benefit: Henri would maintain the alliance with the Ottomans; he would work to negotiate the return of Wallachia to the control of Poland, which would pay the duties and tributes owed to the sultan; France would support Poland in any wars even against the Ottomans; France would intervene to persuade the Ottomans not to enter the debate between Poland and the Tatars over tribute demanded by the Tatars.⁶⁷ These promises were not a one-sided affair. In the Polish requests to the French, two of the thirteen related to France’s alliance with the Ottomans and to France’s ability to act as an intermediary with the Ottomans. The second item in the list stated, “that the foreign alliances will be maintained and that [Poland] will enjoy those held by France, making peace perpetual with the Turk.” This clause was important. The only item preceding it was the declaration of perpetual peace between France and Poland. In addition, the Poles requested that the Ottoman client state Wallachia would be placed under Polish dominion, as the French promised.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fols. 16-17, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 24 January 1573; see also Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*, 599-600.

⁶⁷ “Sommaire des principaux articles contenus en l’instruction donnée par le Roi a M. de l’Isle pour déclarer par son oraison aux Polonais afin de les induire a élire pour leur roi monseigneur son frère le duc d’Anjou,” in *Henri de Valois et la Pologne en 1572*, ed Emmanuel Henri Victurnien Noailles (Paris M. Lévy, 1867), 3:19-20.

⁶⁸ “Propositions faites par les Polonais au Roy avant l’élection du duc d’Anjou son frère pour leur Roy (14 Décembre 1572),” in *Henri de Valois et la Pologne*, 3:21.

Assurances that the French could make good on these promises were reinforced by the bishop of Dax's success in Constantinople. The Ottomans wanted to coordinate with the French on Poland. Indeed, the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed dispatched "a *çavuş* (messenger) in diligence preying [Dax] to hurry up" and return to Constantinople from Ragusa to discuss the affairs of Poland.⁶⁹ Regardless, the sultan was not immediately supportive of Anjou's candidacy. Selim II originally preferred that Poland elect one of their own as the new king, and anyone else would be unacceptable. But the sultan sent another order, which must have been influenced by the bishop of Dax. It stated that if the Polish Senate could not elect one of their own, he would "not accept any candidate that was an enemy and would only consent to the election of a candidate whose family was a loyal and sincere friend of the [Ottoman] Porte for a long time"⁷⁰ So, Anjou (to whom this final remark referred) was the Ottomans second choice, but the message was clear: choosing any candidate under consideration other than Anjou was a *causus belli*. Indeed, these threats were genuine. Selim II also sent letters to the Crimean khanate, Moldova, Wallachia, and his governors in Silistra, Nicropolis, and Vidin to prepare for war against Poland if they did not follow through with his demands.⁷¹

By May 1573, Charles IX's machinations were successful. The French and Polish ambassadors had overcome the religious tensions partly with a promise of continued religious toleration that was included in a set of articles that limited the

⁶⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colber 366, fol. 77-78, Du Ferrier to Catherine de Medici, 6 March 1573.

⁷⁰ Mühimme Defteri 21, no. 406, quoted in Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 200-201. See also SHD Vincennes, A⁷, fol. 182v-183r, bishop of Dax to Monluc, 13 March 1573; and SHD Vincennes, A⁴, fol. 236, 239, bishop of Dax to Anjou, 17 March 1573; bishop of Dax to Charles IX, 28 March 1573.

⁷¹ See Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 202.

powers of the Polish king, which Robert Knecht has succinctly described as being “about as powerful as the Doge of Venice.”⁷² Nevertheless, Anjou had acquired his throne. The French alliance with the Ottomans and France’s ability to mediate the Polish and Ottoman relationship played a part in it. In fact, the Polish senate sent a letter to the sultan notifying him that they followed his recommendation in favor of Anjou as their new king.⁷³ In a letter to Anjou, Selim II affirmed that the Polish had elected Anjou unanimously because of the pressure from the Ottomans.⁷⁴ Anjou wrote back to the grand vizier and the sultan in two separate letters thanking them for their role in supporting his election to the throne of Poland, and specifically the role of the grand vizier who associated himself directly with the affair.⁷⁵ While we should not exaggerate the role of the Ottomans in this affair, it is clear that both the French king and the sultan thought their relationship was integral to placing Anjou on the Polish throne.

Selim II went to great efforts to support his new ally in Poland. He offered to facilitate the new king’s journey to Poland by way of Venice to either Ragusa or Zadar then overland to Poland. The sultan already informed the governors of the cities along both routes of Anjou’s possible journey, ordering them to assist him in any way he needed.⁷⁶ The now freed Mahmud—the Ottoman envoy imprisoned in Venice from 1569 to 1573—discussed the matter with the French ambassador in Venice, describing in even greater detail the extent to which the Ottomans would take to

⁷² Knecht, *Hero or Tyrant*, 57.

⁷³ SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fols. 472-473.

⁷⁴ Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 203-204.

⁷⁵ Henri of Anjou to the grand vizier, 24 July 1573, and Henri of Anjou to the Grand Seigneur, 2 September 1573, in *Lettres de Henri III, roi de France*, eds. Pierre Champion et al., 8 vols (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1959-2018), 3:523-524.

⁷⁶ Işıkşel, *Diplomatie ottomane*, 206.

bring the new King Henri safely to Poland. He told the ambassador that if Henri took the sea route, “the Grand Seigneur will send him all his galleys ahead and would receive him with the greatest honor that any Christian prince had received at sea.” As Du Ferrier pointed out, this approach came with its own logistical problems as well as the threat from Spain.⁷⁷ Selim II also promised to protect the borders of Poland until Anjou arrived in his new kingdom, ordering the Crimean Khanate to protect Poland in the case of an attack by Muscovy.⁷⁸ Charles IX told Du Ferrier to continue to consider the possibility of a Venetian passage whereby “one can pass in those [lands] of the Grand Seigneur and other princes without entering those [lands] of my brother-in-law [Maximilian II] nor his brothers.”⁷⁹

There were significant concerns about the overland route through the German lands for Henri to get to his new country. The Valois dynasty went from a power encircled by Habsburg states to controlling two of the three largest countries in Europe in France and Poland that now encircled the Habsburg Empire. The third was the Ottoman Empire, which helped to create this new situation. The French ambassador in Austria, Gaspard de Schomberg, was already discussing the concerns surrounding the logistics of transporting Henri de Valois across half of Europe. Despite rumors that the Elector of Saxony would prevent Anjou from traversing his lands and would persuade his brother-in-law the king of Denmark to block the northern sea route, Schomberg insisted that none of the German princes would raise any obstacle to Henri’s journey. But French fears did not relent. Du Ferrier heard

⁷⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol 186, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 22 May 1573.

⁷⁸ Işıkşel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 203-204.

⁷⁹ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert, fol. 286, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 24 July 1573.

rumors that the emperor, the duke of Saxony, the Czar of Muscovy, and the king of Sweden were all working together to prevent Henri from reaching Poland. At last, it took an imperial decree from the imperial diet in Frankfurt to allay the fears of the French crown. Henri de Valois traveled across the Empire *via* Frankfurt on his way to Poland.⁸⁰

Henri's short time as king of Poland had a significant effect on the next few years of Franco-Ottoman relations. Almost immediately after Henri took his throne in Poland, Ioan Voda, the voivode of Moldava, revolted against the sultan. The Ottomans immediately "fear[ed] ... the involvement of the king of Poland in it."⁸¹ Perhaps the root of this assumption came from the French representatives frequently promising the return of Wallachia to the Polish nobility if they elected Henri as their king.⁸² Indeed, Ioan Voda did send an emissary to Poland seeking the new king's support, but Henri and his Senate dutifully rejected the proposal. They did, however, promise to give asylum to the voivode's family and his treasurer as well as not to impede troop movements from Kyiv to support Moldova. Despite the king's command, some Poles did support the rebel voivode at the battle of Cahul, where they were defeated.⁸³

The actions of the Polish contingent and Henri's grant of asylum to Voda's family had a significant effect on the relationship between France and the Ottomans in the early years of Henri's reign. Charles IX died in May 1574, and on 16 June

⁸⁰ Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*, 633-637.

⁸¹ SHD Vincennes, A⁷, fol. 314v, Dax to Charles IX, 4 June 1574.

⁸² On the promises of Moldova by Jean Monluc, see Knecht, *Hero or Tyrant*, 55; Labourdette, *Charles IX et la puissance espagnole*, 589-602.

⁸³ See Işiksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 206-207.

1574—right when this affair was finally ending—Henri fled to France to take up his throne as Henri III. Immediately after Charles IX’s death, Catherine de Medici wrote to Selim II, expressing her hope that the sultan would “continue toward this kingdom the same affection that has always had there.”⁸⁴ This letter was not simply a generic trope, but a sincere desire. It was the first of its kind the Queen Mother sent to another prince or monarch after the king’s death. To put it into perspective, Catherine wrote to Philip II three days after her letter to the sultan, and to the Pope five days later, on 6 June 1574.⁸⁵ Regardless, the damage had been done. As an indication of Ottoman sentiment toward France during this time, the Ottomans sent multiple emissaries to persuade Poland’s nobles to relinquish Henri’s Polish crown immediately.⁸⁶

Despite Catherine de Medici’s hopes, the Moldavan affair compounded with a series of diplomatic missteps that soured the Franco-Ottoman alliance for the next few years. In addition, another series of religious wars broke out until 1577 preventing France from acting on the international stage. The first years of Henri III’s reign left the Franco-Ottoman alliance dormant with little activity other than the French ambassadors defending France’s position in Constantinople.

The most significant diplomatic blunder following the Moldavan affair came when Dax’s replacement arrived in Constantinople without the traditional gifts. The bishop of Dax’s health was failing, so the Henri III sent the ambassador’s brother

⁸⁴ BNF, Français 3165, fol. 180r, Catherine de Medici to Grand Seigneur, 1 June 1574.

⁸⁵ See Hector de La Ferrière et al. (eds.), *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, 11 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1880-1943), 5:1-9.

⁸⁶ See İşıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane*, 207-208.

Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle, to replace him.⁸⁷ As it turned out, many in Constantinople desired the recall of Dax. An Ottoman envoy to Venice spoke to the French ambassador there, Arnaud du Ferrier, about the concerns the Ottomans had with Dax. He charged Du Ferrier “expressly to make [Henri III] understand that the premier pasha [grand vizier] was very unhappy with Mr. Dax, your ambassador and that he thought him unhappy in the charge; nevertheless, it would be very agreeable to him that your majesty send someone else.”⁸⁸ The logistics of replacing Dax with his brother created more complications for the alliance than benefits. L'Isle traveled with Henri de Valois as part of the new Polish king's court.⁸⁹ After Henri inherited the French throne, L'Isle remained behind as the French ambassador to Poland, so L'Isle had to travel directly to Constantinople from Poland without a supply of gifts that were traditionally purchased in Venice on the way to Constantinople. The solution should have been simple: send Jacques de Germigny to Venice to purchase and transport the necessary gifts to Constantinople for L'Isle to present to the grand vizier and sultan when he arrived.⁹⁰ Unfortunately, however, Germigny fell ill in Venice and was unable to continue his journey.⁹¹

The arrival of L'Isle at Constantinople without the customary gifts caused significant controversy. Gift-exchange was a vital process of diplomatic etiquette that reflected the status of the recipient. So, the lack of gifts was perceived as a significant

⁸⁷ On Dax's health see BNF, Français 16142, fol. 259r, Dax to Henri III, 22 January 1575.

⁸⁸ Du Ferrier to Henri III, 31 July 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:551-552.

⁸⁹ Nicolas Le Roux, *La Faveur du roi: mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois*, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000), 137, 729.

⁹⁰ Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:568. This is the same Jacques de Germigny who acted as a courier for Dax and who would become the next French ambassador in Constantinople after L'Isle.

⁹¹ Henri III to Dax, 28 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:576-77.

insult.⁹² The perceived slight at the hands of the French led to one by the Ottomans. Their demand for presents implied a lesser status of the French crown as a tributary of the Ottomans similar to the Holy Roman emperor, whose gifts were mandatory.⁹³ If the connection were too subtle at this point, when the imperial ambassador arrived after L'Isle, he was provided with an audience before the Frenchman because he came bearing the mandatory gifts. Familiar with diplomatic protocol in Latin Christendom, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha defended his position to Dax, stating that "all the places of Christendom the king had accustomed to ceding to the [Holy Roman] emperor in all ceremonies for the respect that he shows to the Holy Empire."⁹⁴ While Sokollu Mehmed was right, this arrangement was not the case in Constantinople. The Holy Roman emperor was treated as a tributary in Constantinople through his control of west Hungary. He technically was not permitted to maintain a formal resident ambassador in Constantinople and was required to pay tribute to preserve peace.⁹⁵ The Ottomans frequently used gift exchange with European states as a means by which to cleverly establish hierarchical relationships symbolically, such as sending robes of honor to the Holy Roman emperor that denoted vassalage status with the intentional knowledge that the implications of which were unknown to the

⁹² See chap. 1, pp. 80-82.

⁹³ Gifts from the Holy Roman Empire were referred to as a "duty" in the official documents until the early seventeenth century that emphasized the Ottoman view of the Austrian Habsburgs as vassals to the Ottomans through their control of Habsburg Hungary. Hedda Reindl-Kiel, "East is East and West is West, and Sometimes the Twain Did Meet: Diplomatic Gift Exchange in the Ottoman Empire," in Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki and Rhoads Murphy, *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, vol. 2 (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 114-119;

⁹⁴ Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, in *Négociations*, ed. Charrière, vol. 3, 567.

⁹⁵ Gabor Karman, "Sovereignty and Representation: Tributary States in the Seventeenth-Century Diplomatic System of the Ottoman Empire," in Gabor Karman and Lovro Kuncevic, *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2013), 161; Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (University of Washington Press, 2012), 322-323; Peter Burschel, "A Clock for the Sultan: Diplomatic Gift-Giving from an Intercultural Perspective," *The Medieval History Journal* 16, no. 2 (October 2013): 554.

emperor, making it an acceptable gift.⁹⁶ So, these acts by the Ottomans were by no means innocent.

The French crown did not take this insult lightly and fully understood the implication. Writing about the troubles L'Isle suffered to kiss the hands of the sultan without presents, Du Ferrier complained to Henri III "that these Berbers would want to place [France] at the rank of other princes [who are Ottoman] tributaries without considering the benefits that your friendship brings them."⁹⁷ Echoing Du Ferrier's sentiments, Henri III wrote to L'Isle that although presents were "a very laudable and guarded custom" between friendly princes and that "liberality and magnificence is the custom of a great prince," he would not "receive any law or condition from them."⁹⁸ The message was clear: France would not be treated as a subordinate to the sultan in the same way the Holy Roman Imperial ambassador was.⁹⁹ L'Isle received the message clearly. In June 1575, L'Isle continued to refuse the grand vizier's invitations for an audience at his house because of the prejudice Sokollu Mehmed showed against the ambassador.¹⁰⁰

This situation was primarily a result of the logistical challenges that faced Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. It frequently took two months for letters to go from France to Constantinople. It took so long for Henri III to learn the gravity of Germigny's illness that the controversy had already erupted in Constantinople. Both the bishop of Dax's letters informing the French court of the problems produced by

⁹⁶ Burschel, "A Clock for the Sultan," 547-63.

⁹⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 366, fol. 716, Ferrier to Henri III, 1 April 1575.

⁹⁸ BNF, Français 3165, 194r-v, Henri III to L'Isle, 27 April 1575.

⁹⁹ See Reindl-Kiel, "East is East and West is West," 119-120.

¹⁰⁰ SHD Vincennes, A¹⁴, fols. 688-691, L'Isle to Henri III, 24 June 1575.

the lack of gifts and the letter from Henri III about the illness of Germigny in Venice were sent in September 1574.¹⁰¹ By the time that Henri III learned about the controversy itself, he interpreted his sovereignty to be compromised by the Ottomans' insistence on gifts as a precondition for diplomatic interactions. This challenge to the French king thus further exasperated the controversy.

While the gift dispute and the imperial ambassador challenged France, it provided an opportunity for ambassadors from Florence, Genoa, and Milan to seek their own Capitulations, permitting them to trade and negotiate with the Ottomans on a level field with the French. The weakness of the French crown in Constantinople made the threat of the Italian princes especially apparent. When Henri III learned that Italian princes attempted to negotiate trade contracts with the Ottomans to access "trade in the Levant outside of the [French] banner," he demanded his ambassador oppose this prospect.¹⁰² This demand was much easier said than done. As Sokollu Mehmed explained to Dax, the French "want[ed] to deprive them [the Ottomans] of a great increase of revenue that the said Florentines, Genoese, Milanese, and Luccenes offer[ed] to the G[rand] S[eigneur]."¹⁰³ On this issue, French and Ottoman interests were inherently opposed.

In better times, French ambassadors could lean on the significance of their alliance with the Ottomans to prevent pashas and viziers from considering new partnerships. As Dax explained to Henri III, previous ambassadors would confront the grand vizier when competing Christian envoys would arrive in Constantinople,

¹⁰¹ Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, and Henri III to Dax, 28 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:568, 576-77.

¹⁰² Henri III to Gilles de Noailles, 16 March 1575, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 3:526.

¹⁰³ Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:572.

and “say that if any of the said [ambassadors] were received they [the French ambassador] would ask for their own leave. [Dax] held this same language with [Sokollu] Mehmed Pasha in the presence of Germigny.” Conceivably, this worked because the opportunity cost to the Ottomans was minimal. The offending prince could continue to trade with the Ottomans under the French flag. The declining situation for the French, however, made such threats more hazardous. As Dax continued, “in truth, I would not counsel my brother [L’Isle] to continue in these terms in the times where we are in...for I fear that they might take him at his word” and let him leave.¹⁰⁴

The French reaction to the controversy reflected their intent to defend their privileged place in Constantinople alongside Venice among Latin Christian states. The French crown valued this position as a sign of honor bestowed upon France over other states, and Henri III sought to maintain it. As we will see in the next chapter, the French had their privileged position written into the 1581 Capitulations, partially in response to the challenge from the Italian princes. The French crown gained a sort of soft power among Latin Christian princes that it could dole out and retract at will as we saw in the Venetian negotiations. For this strategy to remain successful, the French had to preserve their good relations with the Ottomans to prevent other Christian princes from bypassing the French banner and establishing their own capitulations with the Grand Seigneur. This possibility was the exact problem the French were experiencing.

¹⁰⁴ Dax to Catherine de Medici, 18 September 1574, in *Négociations*, 3:573.

For the next three years, L'Isle's tenure in Constantinople was characterized by his poor relationship with Sokollu Mehmed Pasha that prevented any resolution in the ongoing dispute with the Italian ambassadors trying to negotiate their own Capitulations in Constantinople. The challenge from the Italian states was only resolved by happenstance in 1578. Ships from Florence and Genoa overtook some fourteen Ottoman vessels, which gave Sébastien Juyé—the secretary who replaced L'Isle until the next ambassador arrived—ammunition to undermine their negotiations.¹⁰⁵ The Italian powers were not able to gain any trade agreements. Other than the prevention of these agreements, French interests in Constantinople went dormant. From 1575 to 1577, France was stricken by another series of religious civil wars, preventing the French crown from engaging in foreign affairs.

Conclusion

From 1570 to 1574, the Ottoman Empire was as much a part of France's foreign policy calculus as any other country when France began organizing its anti-Spanish coalition before the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. What began as an attempt to mediate the Veneto-Ottoman conflict to isolate Spain in the Mediterranean quickly developed into more militant-cooperation with the Ottomans. The Battle of Lepanto and the fear of Spanish disengagement in the Mediterranean influenced Charles IX to open a second frontier in North Africa against Spain by placing Henri de Valois on the Algerian throne as a tributary to the Ottomans. Charles IX was not avoiding conflict with Spain in the year immediately before the

¹⁰⁵ BNF, Français 3954, fol. 47r, Juyé to Simon Fizes, 20 August 1578.

St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre; he was actively pursuing a new front against France's traditional enemy. Unfortunately for France, the treaty of Jassy negotiated as a result of Charles IX's proposal was moot the moment it was signed. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's day and the religious wars that followed forced France to return to its position as mediator.

French diplomacy in Constantinople became focused on the Veneto-Ottoman peace and the election of Henri de Valois to the Polish throne. While both pursuits proved successful, they had dramatically different outcomes. Spain's isolation in the Mediterranean could not have been more successful. By 1574, Philip II lost a critical North African outpost in La Goletta and was bankrupted from his attempt to navigate his Dutch and Mediterranean conflicts simultaneously. But Henri's time on the Polish throne led to a slow devolution in Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. The failure to navigate the Moldovan affair effectively and the subsequent mishandling of the gift-exchange in 1574 placed France on such bad terms in Constantinople that they could not fend off the ambassadors from various Italian states seeking their own Capitulations. Accompanied by renewed civil war in France, French diplomacy in Constantinople reverted to protecting French privileges in Ottomans lands while not pursuing much coordination. This was the situation in 1577 when Spain began seeking a treaty with the Ottomans, and Henri III sent a new ambassador Jacques de Germigny to Constantinople the next year. This new dynamic and its consequences are the subjects of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: FROM DIPLOMATIC PROMISE TO DIPLOMATIC CHAOS (1578-1592)

As the French Wars of Religion waned and domestic policy began to stabilize in the early 1580s, France faced a variety of international challenges that reignited their Ottoman diplomacy. The Dutch revolt once again spilled into France. What began as a revolt against Spanish imposition against Dutch rights turned into a genuine rebellion for independence. The Dutch sought support from the French king's brother, François, duke of Anjou, offering him a position as the figurehead of the Dutch Provinces. At the same time, Philip II's power was growing in Europe as he inherited Portugal in 1580. To make matters worse, the traditional counterbalance to Spanish aggrandizement, the Ottomans, were redirecting their foreign policy away from the Mediterranean and toward Safavid Iran in the east. Henri III found himself without many allies as he was engaged in a cold war against Spain, trying to support his brother and undermine Philip II's efforts to expand his empire.

French diplomacy in Constantinople became focused on encouraging conflict between the Ottomans and Spain to the Mediterranean. To achieve this goal, French ambassadors had to lean on the social capital established by their long-standing alliance provided. Despite two brief opportunities to combine French and Ottoman forces against Spain in North Africa, the French were fighting a losing battle in Constantinople. The French crown overestimated its own significance to the Ottomans and the influence their ambassadors carried. Indeed, their diminished

influence became readily apparent when the English established their own ambassador in Constantinople. The French attempt to enforce their position as the premier Christian partner to the Ottomans only isolated their ambassadors further, undermining their anti-Spanish diplomacy. The situation worsened still when the Huguenot Henri de Bourbon inherited the French crown as Henri IV, and the French ambassador in Constantinople joined the French Catholic League in revolt against him. The resulting situation was chaotic, ultimately undermining an Ottoman attempt to support France. The French crown and its ambassadors overplayed their position in Constantinople, harming not only the position they so jealously sought to protect but also the very policy it was intended to support.

The Netherlands, Spain, and the Safavids: A Bevy of Problems

The Dutch revolt caused significant disruption to European politics in the sixteenth century, and the blowback to surrounding countries from the conflict reached a pinnacle in the 1580s. The Dutch States-General began a process of appropriating the powers of Philip II in the Netherlands in 1576. Before the revolt, the States-General convened only by order of its prince and functioned as a medium through which taxes were levied by the government. It, however, did not have the power of legislation or, for that matter, any powers in its own right. After the Spanish bankruptcy in 1575—from the struggles of financing the conflict with the Dutch simultaneously with that of the Ottomans—left significant numbers of unpaid Spanish forces in the Dutch provinces to pillage their way through Antwerp in 1576, things changed. The experience provoked the State-General to act increasingly as its own independent body, enacting legislation, raising and funding an army, and

negotiating with foreign powers. By September 1580, the States-General engaged in the revolutionary act of rejecting Philip II as their prince and replacing him with Henri III's brother François, duke of Anjou.¹ The Dutch revolt against Spanish oppression became a proper rebellion for independence, and the brother of the French king was at the center of it all.

The Netherlands crisis provided an ideal situation to further his political position and prestige. The States-General bestowed upon him the titles of the "Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands" and then "Prince and Lord" of the Netherlands and then "Prince and Lord of the Netherlands," however, they never intended to empower the offices in any significant way. Regardless, François of Anjou was an ambitious man, perhaps beyond his abilities. The duke accepted the titles, raised an army of 3,000 men, and marched it across the Dutch border in autumn 1578. A risky act: any prince that extended support to the Dutch risked suffering the wrath of Spain. Moreover, Anjou's endeavors were fraught with troubles from the beginning. From the moment that Anjou traveled to Mons in Hainaut Province of the Dutch states in Autumn 1578, his mission was in jeopardy. He could not afford to support the soldiers that he was able to muster. As 1578 turned into 1579, Anjou's unpaid troops had been deserting for months. The towns given to Anjou to govern preferred Philip II over the French duke. His situation was in complete disarray, and Anjou was forced to return to French territory.

¹ Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, rev. ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), chap. 4; Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 93-112, 132-139.

Beleaguered and almost penniless, he only made it back to France through the largesse of his brother.²

Anjou's actions forced the French crown to prepare for the worst. Henri III was in a precarious situation. He could either, one, support his brother and risk war with Spain or, two, abandon him, placing his brother and sole heir in mortal danger without adequate resources. Anjou essentially gave Henri III no other option than to support him. By 1580, the French king promised to support his brother as long as Anjou was appointed their sovereign prince, and Henri III decided to offer material support to Anjou's enterprise to relieve the Netherlandish city of Cambrai from Spanish control by 1581.³

Ironically, the timing of Anjou's actions could hardly have been more fortuitous. Portuguese attempts to conquer Morocco led to the climactic battle of Alcazar in 1578 when three claimants to the Moroccan throne died, including King Sebastien of Portugal himself.⁴ While Philip II, a close heir to the late king of Portugal, staked a claim to the throne, Sebastien's elderly uncle Cardinal Henry was proclaimed king to prevent Portugal from falling under the crown of Philip II. In 1580, Cardinal Henry named Philip II his successor before dying.⁵ The Spanish king, however, was incapable of maintaining his new inheritance without the recourse of war. Philip II was forced to transfer much of his army in the Netherlands to Portugal, providing an opportunity for Henri III to more safely support his brother. Moreover,

² Parker, *The Dutch Revolt, 190-198*, 204-207; Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, chaps. 4 and 5, especially pp. 92 and 112, quotations on 105.

³ Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, 141-153.

⁴ Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier* (Reprint; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 97-99.

⁵ J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 268-77; Henri III to Germigny, 27 August 1579, in *Lettres de Henri III, roi de France*, eds. Pierre Champion et al., 8 vols (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1959-2018), 4:294.

Philip II's growing power reflected in the acquisition of Portugal and all its empire was hardly desirable.

Anjou and Henri III sought out a new coalition with England and the Ottoman Empire against Spain. France's diplomatic outreach to Elizabeth of England has been well studied. The French court opened marriage negotiations for Anjou to marry Elizabeth of England to secure an alliance against Philip II. Elizabeth entertained the marriage negotiations for the same reasons as Henri III. While these negotiations ultimately failed, they developed into a "charade to pour English money into Anjou's enterprise in the Netherlands."⁶ Henri III's simultaneous Levantine policy, however, has gone unnoticed by historians. For instance, neither Mack Holt's biography of the duke of Anjou nor Robert Knecht's recent biography of Henri III refers to the Ottoman Empire once, but they have entire sections dedicated to the pursuit of an English alliance.⁷ Anjou was the first to reach out to the Sultan Murad III, but Henri quickly put an end to Anjou's diplomatic intervention into the Franco-Ottoman alliance. Thereafter, Henri III became a vigorous advocate for greater Ottoman conflict with Spain in the Mediterranean to disrupt Philip II's activities both in the Netherlands and in Portugal. He was readily aware that a Mediterranean conflict would undermine Spanish efforts from his brief attempt to acquire the Algerian throne. He sought to replicate Charles IX's policy in his present circumstances.⁸

⁶ Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, 146-147, quotation on 146.

⁷ Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, chaps. 6 and 7; Knecht, *Hero or Tyrant?*, chap. 10.

⁸ The bishop of Dax kept Henri apprised of the affairs of his negotiations in the 1570s. See SHD Vincennes, A¹4, fols. 174-176, 185-186, Dax to Henri of Anjou, 8 July 1572, 31 July 1572,

Unlike the 1570s, however, the Spanish-Ottoman rivalry was cooling in the Mediterranean. Spain's numerous conflicts have already been discussed, and the inability of Philip II to finance the Dutch and Ottoman conflicts concurrently was made abundantly clear by the Spanish bankruptcy of 1575. The Ottomans also redirected their interests away from the Mediterranean. When the shah of the Ottomans' eastern rival, the Safavid Empire in Iran died in 1577, a rival faction of the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha pounced on the opportunity to disrupt the grand vizier's stranglehold on power. Led by the sultan's favorite minister Şemsi Ahmed Pasha, they pushed Murad III to take advantage of the opportunity to expand his lands in the east, ignoring the protests of Sokollu Mehmed.⁹ This decision was the beginning of a war that lasted until 1590, diverting Ottoman economic and human capital to their eastern front and leading to a less hostile stance toward Spain.

Since the Ottoman conquest of Tunis, Spain had sought peace of some kind with the Ottomans. The possibility of an end to the Ottoman-Spanish conflict became very real with the outbreak of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict in 1577. The same year, Philip II's envoy in Constantinople signed a short-term truce with the Porte from March 1577 to February 1578. But the Ottomans refused to negotiate further until Philip II sent a formal ambassador to Constantinople. Henri III learned that the

⁹ Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2010), 159-171; Ebru Boyar, "Ottoman Expansion in the East," in *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603*, eds. Suraiya Faruqi and Katherine Fleet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 135; Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 169-71; Hess, *Forgotten Frontier*, 98; Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 154-157.

Spanish king dispatched the necessary ambassador in December 1578.¹⁰ France was beset by unfavorable circumstances in Constantinople.

Henri III and his ambassadors were fully aware of the Ottoman interests in Safavid Iran and the consequences of a truce with Spain. Upon hearing of the truce in 1577, the king made the direct connection between the two: “I always expect that the principal occasion which has made [the Grand Seigneur] agree to a truce with my said brother-in-law [Philip II], was the difficulty (*empeschement*) he knew would befall him on the Persian front.”¹¹ Henri III in no way desired a truce between the two states at this time. He wrote to the bishop of Dax with instructions to disrupt the Spanish negotiations in Constantinople. It risked harming the rapport between the two countries, and he did not want to “extend the advantages of the alliance that is between the *Grand Seigneur* and [him] to the profit of his [the *Grand Seigneur’s*] enemies.”¹² The king’s letter, however, was written after the temporary truce was already concluded. As the Safavid war continued, French diplomats lamented how it benefited Spain’s conquests. Du Ferrier wrote the king in 1580 that the Venetians “received another [letter] from the Levant” with news that could only benefit Philip II. He explained that the Safavid rout of the Ottomans at Cheval destroyed the possibility of peace and forced the sultan “to continue the war, changing his designs against the Spanish”¹³

¹⁰ Henri III to Juyé, 12 December 1578, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 4:115-16.

¹¹ Henri III to Du Ferrier, 31 August 1577, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 3:365.

¹² Henri III to Dax, 31 May 1577, *Lettres de Henri III*, 3:274.

¹³ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol. 144, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 23 September 1580.

Pushing for Ottoman-Spanish Conflict

French diplomatic strategy in Constantinople became focused on breaking the Spanish-Ottoman truce and returning conflict to the Mediterranean as early as 1578. In that year, the crown received encouragement in Constantinople that increasing cooperation with their old ally might be possible. When the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha learned of Anjou's activities in the Netherlands, he was excited about prospective war between France and Spain, which he already "believe[d] to be open between [Henri III] and the Catholic King [Philip II] for Monseigneur [Anjou's] opportunity in Flanders."¹⁴ When Henri III learned of the grand vizier's encouragement, he began sending his agent Sébastien de Juyé regular updates of Anjou's activities in the Netherlands to relay to the grand vizier and sultan.¹⁵ Yet, the Spanish-Ottoman truce was still moving forward. To disrupt these negotiations, the French ambassadors would have to lean on the social capital and position their long-standing alliance provided them.

That position was almost compromised before Henri III could dispatch his ambassador. Anjou, like his brother, recognized the significance of the Ottomans to redirecting Spanish priorities away from the Netherlands. He sent his own emissary, Claude du Bourg, to Constantinople to obtain a promise from the Grand Seigneur "to send some grand army by sea against the king of Spain so that my seigneur [Anjou] will find less resistance in the conquest of the Netherlands."¹⁶ Luckily for Henri III, his ambassador Antoine du Ferrier in Venice intercepted Du Bourg, learned of his

¹⁴ BNF, Français 3954, fol. 47r, Juyé to Simon Fizes, 20 August 1578.

¹⁵ Henri III to Juyé, 29 November 1578, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 4:108-9.

¹⁶ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, 552, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 20 December 1578.

mission, delayed his travels to Constantinople, and reported Du Bourg's actions to his king. Henri III ordered Du Ferrier to negotiate Du Bourg's arrest in Venice. Du Bourg was arrested by the Venetians.¹⁷

Henri III had ample reasons to divert Du Bourg's mission. It risked undermining his own diplomacy with the Ottomans. Du Bourg showed himself both ambitious and adept at navigating Ottoman politics in the late 1560s, quarreling with the king's ambassador, and then negotiating the 1569 Capitulations. And his master, Anjou, had proved himself self-interested and unheeding of the king's wishes concerning his Dutch pursuits. The combination of the two was anything but promising for the king's diplomatic strategy. Besides, Henri III already lost his patience with Du Bourg's international activities. Du Bourg previously engaged in two separate rogue diplomatic missions to Spain, first concerning Anjou's Dutch interests, and another on behalf of Henri de Bourbon.¹⁸ Henri III already had plans to intervene in the Ottoman-Spanish negotiations. He did not need Anjou's interference, especially with such an unpredictable individual as Du Bourg.

Henri III chose Jacques de Germigny as his new ambassador to replace Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle, as early as 1576. Germigny was a smart choice, despite the criticism it received from contemporaries and historians due to Germigny's social

¹⁷ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, 574, Henri III to Ferrier, 18 January 1579; Français 3954, 115a-115b, 122r-122v, Henri III to Juyé, 18 February 1579, Juyé to Henri III, 18 June 1579.

¹⁸ Guy de Bremond d'Ars, *Le père de Madame de Rambouillet. Jean de Vivonne, sa vie et ses ambassades près de Philippe II et à la cour de Rome: d'après des documents inédits*, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1884), 81-89; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.), 1:375 ; Henri III to Saint-Gouard, 16 June 1576, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 2:446.

position.¹⁹ He spent almost his entire career in Constantinople as part of multiple embassies.²⁰ Before his appointment, he was a member of the bishop of Dax's embassy and played an essential role alongside the ambassador negotiating the 1572 military agreement with the Ottomans. Moreover, he was in direct contact with Henri III on Dax's behalf during the negotiations.²¹ He was an ideal candidate in the current climate. Indeed, his excellent relationship with the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was one of the considerations.²²

The primary emphasis of the new ambassador Jacques de Germigny's mission was straightforward: maintain warfare between the Ottoman Empire and Spain in the Mediterranean while discouraging Ottoman military engagement elsewhere. Germigny's instructions were unambiguous on this issue. He was ordered to "oppose himself with all his power against the advancement and conclusion of this [truce] because it is contrary and damaging to the *amitié* between His Highness (Murad III) and His Majesty (Henri III)." At the same time, the crown wanted peace between the Ottomans and their other traditional enemies. Germigny was directed to support the Papal states and prevent any "outgoing fleet from there [the Ottoman lands]" from "descending upon the lands of the Holy Apostolic See." Similarly, "if the [Holy Roman] Emperor negotiates a continuation of the truce that he has with the Grand

¹⁹ Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou: depuis 1543. jusqu'en 1607*, 15 vols. (London: s.n., 1734), 9:3; Güneş Işıksel, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selîm II: paramètres et périmètres de l'Empire ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Peeters, 2016), 208-209.

²⁰ La Vigne to Henri II, 14 April 1558, in *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, ed. Ernest Charrière, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1848-1860) 2:460-61n; Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, ed. Henri Houser (Paris: Leroux, 1897), 65-67; BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fols. 13-15, 29-30, 35-37, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 24 January 1573, Charles IX to Du Ferrier, 18 January 1573, Du Ferrier to Charles IX, 3 and 8 February 1573.

²¹ SHD Vincennes, A14, fols. 210-211, Dax to Henri III, 28 November 1572. For more on Germigny's appointment, see chap. 1, pp. 30-34.

²² BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 367, fol. 666, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 26 June 1579.

Seigneur [Murad III],” Henri III wanted Germigny to “support the negotiations.” Finally, he was to support Venetian affairs with the Ottomans, holding the serene republic “under the protection of His Majesty.”²³ Henri III sought to isolate Spain in war with the Ottomans, trying to torpedo their peace talks while supporting peace between the Ottomans and any other possible combatants.

Germigny’s earliest efforts to undermine Ottoman-Spanish negotiations produced a favorable outcome. He was able to temporarily derail the negotiations of the Spanish envoy Marigliani *via* help from the allies he acquired in Uluç Ali and Semisi Pasha. Uluç Ali was the *kapudan* pasha (Grand Admiral) of the Ottoman fleet and one of the most influential members of the sultan’s *divan* behind the grand vizier. He was also the leader of the Mediterranean faction at court that had much to lose from the peace negotiations with Spain since his faction’s social and economic power centered around North Africa and depended on the spoils from the Spanish conflict.²⁴ Semisi Pasha was a close confidant of Uluç Ali. Germigny referred to Semisi as the Uluç Ali’s uncle—certainly untrue since Uluç Ali was a renegade from Italy—but it demonstrates their close connection. The three had common political interests and made natural allies. As Germigny explained, it was through the actions of the admiral and Semisi that he gained an audience with the grand vizier and was able to impress upon him “the great consequences of this peace or truce,” by

²³ “Instruction à Monsieur de Germigny,” in *Recueil Des Pièces Choies, extraites sur les originaux de la Negotiation de Mr. de Germigny, de Chaolon sur Saône, Baron de Germoles, Conseiller du Roy, et son Ambassadeur à la Porte du grand Seigneur*, (Lyon: Pierre Cusset, 1661), n.p.

²⁴ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the ‘Mediterranean Faction’ (1585-1587),” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLV (2015): 57-96.

emphasizing rumors of a Spanish plan to invade Algiers.²⁵ This success, however, was ephemeral. Germigny and his allies could only hold off the truce so long, and it was confirmed for another year in 1580.

After the Ottoman-Spanish truce went forward in April 1580, Germigny set his sights on renewing the French Capitulations. As was discussed in chapter two, the Capitulations were practical instruments, and Germigny planned to weaponize them against Spain in his diplomatic rivalry with Marigliani. He planned to write into them a formal statement of French diplomatic precedence in Constantinople, providing him with a formal guarantee to receive audiences with the grand vizier and sultan ahead of other Christian diplomats, including Marigliani. With such a declaration in the Capitulations, he could undermine Marigliani's message before the Spaniard was even able to deliver it.

Under the grand vizier Şemsi Ahmed Pasha, however, little could be done due to Germigny's poor relationship with him: the ambassador even reported having problems acquiring an audience with the grand vizier.²⁶ Germigny's prospects improved after Semsi's death in 1580.²⁷ He immediately got along well with the new acting grand vizier Lala Mustafa Pasha.²⁸ Germigny's work on the Capitulations developed rapidly afterward. In three months working with Lala Mustafa, they

²⁵ Germigny to Henri III, 26 January 1580, in *Négociations*, 3:854-55; BNF, Français 16143, fol. 10r, Germigny to Henri III, 24 December 1579; Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2:1158.

²⁶ "Lettre du Sieur de Germigny au Roy, sur la premiere Audience aupres du premier Bassa du 26 Septembre 1579," in *Recueil des Pieces Choisies*, 9; BNF, Français 16143, fol. 8r, Germigny to Catherine de Medici, 8 December 1579.

²⁷ Semşi Ahmed Pasha was grand vizier for only a short time. He arose to the grand vizierate in October 1579 and died in April 1580.

²⁸ Lala Mustafa Pasha, the second vizier, expected to be the new grand vizier after the death of Semşi Ahmed, but his rival Koca Sinan Pasha effectively prevented his ascension, but remained on the Safavid front as the commander of the campaign. See Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 169-171. On the good relationship between Germigny and Lala Mustafa Pasha, see BNF, Français 16143, fol. 85r, Germigny to Henri III, 17 May 1580.

formulated a working text of the Capitulations. In June 1580, Mustafa Pasha ordered their confirmation, and Germigny dispatched his secretary Berthier back to France with the Capitulations for Henri III to review them.²⁹ Unfortunately, however, Lala Mustafa died soon thereafter, and the arrival of an English diplomat, William Harborne, in 1580 delayed the confirmation of the French Capitulations as the English negotiated their own set of Capitulations.

Although Harborne successfully negotiated a set of English Capitulations, they were undermined immediately by the efforts of Germigny and his friends: Uluç Ali, a constant ally in Constantinople who disliked Harborne from the moment of his arrival, the second vizier Siyvuş Pasha, whom Germigny befriended. What appears to have happened is that Harborne confirmed the Capitulations, but Germigny and Uluç Ali were able to make them dependent upon the arrival of a formal ambassador from England in order to be enforced.³⁰ Immediately after this stipulation was added, Germigny and Uluç Ali discredited the Englishman for offering his protection to some English merchants who later conducted acts of piracy against the Ottomans. The outrage from Uluç Ali and Siyavuş Pasha forced the English ambassador to flee the Ottoman Empire in July 1581.³¹

²⁹ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 93r- 99r, Germigny to Henri III, 2 June 1580 and 17 June 1580.

³⁰ Germigny claimed that the Capitulations were never confirmed due to widespread opposition to them including from himself; see BNF, Français 16143, 125r, Germigny to Henri III, 10 June 1581. Susan Skilliter has questioned the legitimacy of this cancellation, arguing that the Venetian Bailo was reporting groundless rumors coming directly from Germigny rather than real substance; see S. A. Skilliter, ed., *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582: A documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 138.

³¹ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 171; S. A. Skilliter, ed., *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582: A Documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 83-104; Arthur Leon Horniker, "William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations,"

After his victory, Germigny confirmed the French Capitulations in 1581. The articles in this agreement extended significant diplomatic privileges to the French in the Ottoman Empire. One particularly critical clause explicitly stated that French ambassadors had precedence over “the ambassador of Spain and other Christian princes and kings.”³² While the French often claimed this privileged position in Constantinople, it was not formally established until 1581. This accomplishment was tremendously significant, and his contemporaries praised it. As Du Ferrier, the French ambassador in Venice, explained, “the Sr de Germigny would have not only erased the past but [he] can rightly brag (*se venter a bon droite*) [that he] obtained what no other ambassador had been able to do.”³³

In addition, the 1581 Capitulations mandated that the countries trading in the Levant without their own set of Capitulations must trade under the protection of the French flag. While the 1569 agreement granted acceptance to the common practice that other countries would trade under French protection, this clause withdrew any other option. The text specifically identified the “Genoese, English, & Portuguese” as well as “Catalan, Sicilians, Anconan, & Tagusan merchants” as having to trade under French protection.³⁴ Most of the territories of the nations named, except the English, were either Spanish client states, such as Genoa, or under Philip II’s sovereignty, such as the Catalan and Sicilians. The clause thus extended Germigny further

The Journal of Modern History 14, no. 3 (1942): 297-301. BNF, Français 16143, fols. 59r, 125r-126r, Germigny to Henri III, 17 March 1580, 10 June 1581.

³² BNF, Français 16141, 62a-62b. “Confirmation faits par Sultan Amurath en l’an 1581 des Traictez & Capitulations d’entre les Roys de France treschrestiens & les Grands Seigneurs ses predicesseur,” in

³³ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, 64-65, Du Ferrier to Henri III, 29 April 1580. See also, François-Emmanuel Guignard de Saint-Priest, *Mémoires sur l’Ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le commerce des Français dans le Levant* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1877), 385.

³⁴ BNF, Français 16141, 61r-61v, “Confirmation faits par Sultan Amurath en l’an 1581 des Traictez & Capitulations.

privileges over both of his rivals, Marigliani and Harborne. This clause extended a very real form of dominance over any Spanish or English representatives in Constantinople. If a Catalan or Englishman found himself in a dispute in Constantinople, he could not seek out Marigliani or an Englishman to act on his behalf. They would have to seek support from Germigny, who would have the discretion to deny them if he was so inclined. Indeed, after Harborne was discredited in 1581, he had to seek out protection from Germigny, who granted it to him to preserve the Franco-English relationship Henri III was fostering with Elizabeth of England at the time.³⁵ So, in 1580 and 1581, French prospects in Constantinople were at a high they had not seen since 1574.

To improve matters further for Germigny, the Safavid war appeared to be ending. From 1578 to 1580, the Ottoman offensive against the Safavids and their clients in the Caucasus were dramatically successful. The Ottoman forces advanced through Georgia, capturing Tiflis (the capital of modern Georgia) and occupying much of the region of Shirvan on the western side of the Caspian Sea. Many of the Safavid clients submitted to the Ottoman forces, and the Safavids began to sue for peace in November 1580. A tenuous truce was established between 1581 and 1582.³⁶ The Ottomans were in an ideal position to return to their Mediterranean front, or so it seemed.

³⁵ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 167r-168v.

³⁶ Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 170-173; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 63-65; Derin Terzioğlu, "The Imperial Circumcision Festival of 1582: An Interpretation," *Muqarnas* 12 (January 1995): 85-86; BNF, Français 16143, fol. 130r, Germigny to Henri III, 24 June 1581.

The Ottoman court dispatched two Ottoman ambassadors to France in 1581. One diplomat, Assan Ağa, was meant to invite Henri III to send a representative to attend the elaborate fifty-day festival for the sultan's son's circumcision.³⁷ The other envoy, Ali Ağa, had much more important business to attend to. While he was nominally meant to deliver the confirmed Capitulations, his real mission was to discuss a joint Franco-Ottoman military campaign against Spain.³⁸

The Ottoman outreach aligned perfectly with the cessation of France's religious wars, but travel to the French court was still a dangerous prospect. The king was inclined to deter the departure of the Ottoman ambassadors. It was not yet clear that the Peace of Fleix between the Catholics and Protestants in late 1580 would stabilize the kingdom any more than the Peace of Bergerac, which was concluded in 1577 only to be followed by a series of peasant revolts throughout the south from 1578 to 1580 and renewed war in 1580.³⁹ But when Henri III learned the true nature of Ali Ağa's mission, he jumped at the opportunity to negotiate increased military coordination against Spain and ordered his ambassador in Venice to send the Ottomans to France *via* the safest routes available.⁴⁰ At the same time, Anjou became determined to free Cambrai from Spanish control, forcing the king to support his

³⁷ See chap. 3, pp. 141-144.

³⁸ Responce du Roy a la Creance de l'Ambassadeur Ali Aga, du 15 juin 1582, in *L'Illustre Orbandale*, ed. Léonard Bertaut, 2 vols. (Lyon, Pierre Cusset, 1662), 2:59; Cobham to Walsingham, November 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, ed. Arthur John Butler et al., 23 vols, vol. 15 (London: HMSO, 1863-1950), under Elizabeth: November 1581, 21-30, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol15>.

³⁹ Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks," 467-68; Henri III to Ferrier, 26 July 1581, in *Négociations*, 4:72n; on the peace of Bergerac, the peasant revolts in the south, and the Peace of Fleix, see Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 109-118; Ladurie, *Carnival in Romans*; also Salmon, 'Peasant Revolt', 211-34.

⁴⁰ BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol. 326, Henri III to Du Ferrier, 5 September 1581.

brother.⁴¹ It was not a coincidence that Henri III ordered the Ottoman diplomats to continue their journey to the court less than a month after he agreed to support Anjou in August 1581.⁴²

At the envoys' reception in Paris, Henri III gave multiple audiences to the ambassadors in the company of his many princes and servants. But the most important audience was granted to Ali in private after Assan *Ağa* had returned. Both Henri III and Ali were careful to keep prying eyes from their discussion. Ali was particularly worried about how quickly information and rumors spread throughout the French court. Only Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L'Isle, was present to act as a translator.⁴³ During this audience, the king and Ali focused their discussion on combining the French and Ottoman militaries to attack Spanish interests and its clients in North Africa. After Ali offered France the Ottoman "forces and army and even of the [fleet] that sailed to Africa under the good leadership of the captain pasha [Uluç Ali]. His Majesty [Henri III] made the same offer of forces from his kingdom." Specifically, Henri III hoped to target Cape Negro and Fiumara Salada near Bizerte in Tunisia, which were recently usurped by the Genoese (a Spanish client state). He promised his army in Marseille was prepared to sail to join the Ottoman forces on the Barbary coast to accomplish this goal. Moreover, Henri III "wished that the peace

⁴¹ Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, 153-158.

⁴² Henri III sent Anjou material support in mid-August 1581; see, Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, 155. He ordered the envoys continue their journey to court on 5 September 1581; see BNF, Cinq Cents de Colbert 368, fol. 326, Henri III to Du Ferrier, 5 September 1581.

⁴³ Cobham to Walsingham, 11 Dec 1581, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 15, under Elizabeth: December 1581, 11-20; BNF, Français 3954, fols. 194r-195r.

will soon be concluded with Persia, so that his highness [the sultan] ...could employ his plans and forces against their common and ancient enemy [Spain] more easily.”⁴⁴

The military cooperation Ali *Ağa* offered to Henri III was a direct result of the relationships Germigny fostered with Uluç Ali, the second vizier Siyavuş Pasha, and others. Germigny and Henri III had repeatedly warned that Spain planned to attack the Ottomans in North Africa. Germigny argued that the Spanish truce was only a ploy to permit Philip II to grow his forces and attack the Ottomans again.⁴⁵ These efforts were combined with backroom coordination with Ottoman notables. For instance, Uluç Ali introduced Germigny to Ibrahim, *ağa* of the janissaries, when the French ambassador snuck into the Admiral’s *divan* under cover of darkness. During the meeting, the three discussed the need to prevent Spain’s further expansion and the need for greater Ottoman intervention to accomplish such a goal. In the end, Ibrahim promised the Ottomans would raise a fleet to “ravage all of Spain.”⁴⁶ The French position acquired greater significance as Uluç Ali began a parallel—and hardly unrelated—misinformation campaign. He produced a Neapolitan captive and an intercepted letter of questionable legitimacy to the grand vizier Mustafa Pasha that attested to the Spanish conquest of Portugal and Philip II’s purported plan to attack North Africa. After this testimony, the admiral gained permission to sail west with his Ottoman fleet.⁴⁷ Reflecting these relationships, Henri III made sure to

⁴⁴ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 194v-195r,

⁴⁵ Henri III to Germigny, 25 March 1580, Paris, *Lettres de Henri III*, vol. 4, 361; BNF, Français 16143, 57r, 83r, 89r, 140r-140v, Germigny to Henri III, 17 March 1580, 1 May 1580, 17 May 1580, 30 September 1581.

⁴⁶ Germigny to Henri III, 24 May 1580, in *Recueil des Pièces Choiesies*, 23.

⁴⁷ See Gurkan, “Fooling the Sultan,” 85.

promise his support for the sultan as well as Uluç Ali, Siyavuş Pasha, and the *ağa* of the janissaries during his meeting with the Ottoman envoy, Ali *Ağa*.⁴⁸

The second vizier Siyavuş Pasha, who supported Germigny throughout the Harborne affair and negotiated the Capitulations, helped organize all these activities. He played a significant role alongside Uluç Ali in the assembly of the two hundred ships for the Ottoman fleet sent to North Africa to support France in the upcoming campaign season.⁴⁹ Siyavuş coordinated with Germigny to prepare the envoys going to France, meeting at the French embassy and negotiating matters such as the appropriate dragomans to send with the envoys.⁵⁰

These plans were immediately dismantled. In 1581, any attempt to sail West against Spain by the Ottomans was scuttled by a janissary rebellion in North Africa.⁵¹ There appeared to be promising news that Uluç Ali was preparing to sail to Africa with eighty to a hundred galleys. The king's ambassador in Venice recognized the possibilities of the fleet, and was hopeful of its ability "to consume the Spanish and bother their Flemish and Portuguese affairs."⁵² Such expectations, however, were dashed when the Safavid armies broke the short-lived truce between the two countries in 1582, returning the Ottoman Empire's interests to the Persian front.⁵³

To make matters worse, Germigny's position in Constantinople was declining. The process began at the circumcision ceremony for which Sultan Murad III had

⁴⁸ BNF, Français 3954, fols. 195r.

⁴⁹ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 136r-136v, Germigny to Henri III, 19 August 1581.

⁵⁰ BNF, Français 16143, fol. 127r, Germigny to Henri III, 22 June 1581. See also, Susan Skilliter, "The Sultan's Messenger, Gabriel Defrens: An Ottoman Master-Spy of the Sixteenth Century," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 68 (January 1979): 47-59.

⁵¹ Gurkan, "Fooling the Sultan," 88.

⁵² Du Maisse to Henri III, 20 and 22 June 1583, in *Negotiations de la France dans le Levant*, vol. 4, (reprint; New York: Burt Franklin, 1966), 4:198.

⁵³ Terzioğlu, "The Imperial Circumcision Festival," 86.

invited a delegate of Henri III. The circumcision festival was an elaborate gala lasting over fifty days for male heir's circumcision, a rite of passage in Islam that marked him as a follower of the "conduct of Abraham." Numerous foreign envoys attended the event.⁵⁴ Not only did Henri III fail to send a delegate to attend the celebration, but Germigny himself also failed to attend. Germigny's absence was most likely the product of a precedence dispute with either the Polish delegate or the delegate from the Holy Roman Empire. Jacques Auguste de Thou claimed that Germigny abstained from the Ottoman court because the presence of a Polish envoy was an insult to Henri III, who refused to give up his claim to the Polish throne after he fled the country for France in 1574.⁵⁵ It has also been claimed that the seating order between Germigny and his Austrian counterpart led him to refuse to attend rather than be seen in a less prominent position than the Austrian envoy.⁵⁶ Regardless, his actions caused a stir in Constantinople and represented a significant insult to the Ottomans.⁵⁷ As we will see in the next section, this miscalculation was the first in a series of blunders that undermined his mission. But in the short term, if the Ottomans meant to uphold its promises of support to France after the Safavids broke their tenuous truce—already an unlikely possibility—Germigny's actions sank those prospects.

⁵⁴ On the circumcision festival, see Terzioğlu, "The Imperial Circumcision Festival," 84-100; on circumcision in Islam, see M. J. Kister, "...and He Was Born Circumcised...": Some Notes on Circumcision in Hadith," *Oriens* vol. 34 (1994): 20-22.

⁵⁵ Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou: depuis 1543. jusqu'en 1607*, 15 vols. (London: s.n., 1734), 9:3

⁵⁶ Prochazka-Eisl, "Die Wiener Handschrift des Surname-i-Hiimayun," pp. 10-1 quoted in Terzioğlu, "The Imperial Circumcision Festival," 98n22.

⁵⁷ Bernard Yvelise, ed., *D'Alexandrie à Istanbul: Jean Palerne - Pérégrinations dans l'Empire Ottoman (1581-1583)* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1991), 278-279.

French appeals for Ottoman intervention in the Mediterranean steadily became more aggressive as the Ottomans continued to ignore them. In 1582 and 1583, Henri III tried to emphasize France's ongoing efforts to prevent Philip II's growing power. The French king kept Germigny continuously apprised of the actions of the duke of Anjou in all his correspondence with the ambassador.⁵⁸ France challenged the Spanish in the Azores. The king claimed only a single ship was lost despite the defeat, which he blamed on the cowardice and treason of a few.⁵⁹ These examples intended to alert the Ottomans that the Spanish conflict was ongoing, and France was doing its part while the Ottomans watched the growing power of their common enemy. Henri III was not simply forwarding summaries of events to Murad III and his viziers but manipulating their characterizations to make it appear as if he was more strongly countering Spain than in reality. Henri III mischaracterized his depictions of events. He positioned himself as supporting Anjou's activities more than he ever did, and the debacle in the Azores was much worse than he portrayed. The letter he sent to his ambassador in Venice focused on the terrible treatment and "cruelty" that the Spaniards imposed on his fleet and soldiers.⁶⁰ The reputations of France and Germigny in Constantinople, however, were in no place to capitalize on these claims.

French insistence of their anti-Spanish efforts were followed by assertions that Philip II planned to attack North Africa. Henri III explained that the sultan should make peace with the Safavids to make a preemptive strike against Spain in North Africa where

⁵⁸ Henri III to Germigny, 16 August 1582, *Lettres*, v, 324; Henri III to Germigny, 22 September 1582, *Lettres*, v, 343; Henri III to Germigny, 19 February 1583, *Lettres*, vi, 19; Henri III to Germigny, 16 April 1583, *Lettres*, vi, 39-40.

⁵⁹ Henri III to Germigny, 22 September 1582, *Lettres*, v, 343.

⁶⁰ Henri III to Du Ferrier, 22 September 1582, *Lettres*, v, 343.

Philip II planned to conquer Larache either by diplomacy “with the king of Fez, or by force.”⁶¹ On this matter, the king also reached out to the Grand Admiral, as he noted in the letter.⁶² Later, Henri III again made the same claim, adding that the forces he was gathering were “strong enough to easily vanquish” any opposition.⁶³ French claims of Spanish aggression were expanded to assertions of direct Spanish attacks planned against the Ottoman heartlands. Henri III claimed, “the Pope and the king of Spain search greatly the seigneurie of Venice and other princes of Christendom to create a league to make war against his highness [the Grand Seigneur] now that the King has pacified Portugal... and that the Sophy occupies the principal lands of his highness.”⁶⁴ If that were not enough, the king added that Philip II was growing his army to send it either to Italy, Flanders, or “the coasts of the Levant as he is pressured ... by the [Safavid shah].”⁶⁵ In the face of the Ottomans’ eastward-facing foreign policy, the French rhetoric to reorient Ottoman military interests became increasingly desperate.

Henri III’s desperation reflected the growing threat from Spain. Anjou’s military intervention in the Netherlands from 1581 to 1583 increasingly threatened war with Spain.⁶⁶ When Anjou died in 1584, the threat increased still. Anjou was the last living Valois heir to France. With his death, the Protestant Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre and leader of the Huguenot military, became the presumptive heir to

⁶¹ BNF, NAF 22048, fols. 127r-127v, Henri III to Germigny, 21 January 1583.

⁶² Henri III to Germigny, 6 January 1583, in *Lettres de Henri III*, 6:5. Henri III refers to the letter to Uluç in the letter to Germigny, but it seems not to have survived.

⁶³ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 140, Henri III to Germigny, 16 April 1583.

⁶⁴ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 159, Henri III to Germigny, 11 November 1583.

⁶⁵ BNF, NAF 22048, fol. 159r, Henri III to Germigny, 11 November 1583.

⁶⁶ Holt, *Duke of Anjou*, chaps. 8 and 9.

the throne. The Catholicity of the French crown was one of the *de facto* fundamental laws of the land. The imperative of preventing the French crown from falling into the hands of a heretic led militant Catholics to form the Catholic League to formed in response. The civil war that followed—placing Henri III in a vise between the Catholic League and the Huguenots’ attempt to maintain the semblance of legal tolerance they acquired—lasted over a decade. Philip II immediately became a supporter of the Catholic League in the conflict, aiding its military endeavors monetarily and placing Spain in the middle of France’s civil war to a much higher degree than ever before.⁶⁷

The mission of Germigny’s replacement, Jacques Savary de Lincosme, represents a pinnacle of France’s desperate measures. During Lincosme’s embassy, correspondence between the French court and Constantinople dwindled due to the increasingly devastating civil war after the death of Anjou in 1584.⁶⁸ But the arrival of Lincosme in 1586 in Constantinople demonstrates that the court had not abandoned their earlier policy. Lincosme, Henri III ordered, should endeavor more than ever to gain [the favor of] those who are the holders of affairs like the said [Ali] Pasha, and must always have their attention to council them to make an accord in the Persian wars.”⁶⁹ The strategy to bring the Ottomans into war with Spain went beyond anything that came before. Lincosme brought with him a copy of a supposed letter from the Safavid Shah to Philip II, explaining that “those two Sovereigns intended to

⁶⁷ Holt, *French Wars of Religion*, chap. 5; De Lamar Jensen,

⁶⁸ For example, only two letters from Lincosme to Henri III, and none from Henri III to Lincosme, exist in 1587, and only four letters from Lincosme to Henri III, and one from Henri III to Lincosme, exist in 1588. See BNF, Français 16144, the only manuscript with original letters from Lincosme and the source from which all other copies derive.

⁶⁹ BNF, Français 16171, fols. 63r-64v, Henri III to Lincosme, 5 June 1586.

divide the world between them. The king of Spain was to take all of Europe, the king of Persia, all of Asia.”⁷⁰ These efforts produced little if any response from the Ottomans until 1588 when they began considering to send out a large fleet against Spain and sought out French support. Indeed, they hoped to gain access to French ports to resupply their fleet during the campaign season. But as we will see below, Lancosme’s actions caused chaos in Constantinople and prevented any such Franco-Ottoman cooperation.

France’s Declining Position in Constantinople

A significant decline in the positions of the French ambassadors in Constantinople hampered all the efforts described above after Germigny failed to attend the circumcision festival in 1582. A series of miscalculations followed the ceremony. Both Germigny and his successor Jacques Savary de Lancosme insisted on upholding France’s diplomatic precedence and mercantile privileges granted to them in the 1581 Capitulations. The disputes these ambassadors provoked dominated their concerns and alienated them from the power brokers in Constantinople. Even their friends in Constantinople grew tired of their belligerent complaints. Their actions ultimately undermined the primary mission—bringing the Ottomans into war with Spain.

The good standing Germigny earned in 1580 and 1581, preceding the dispatch of the Ottoman envoys to France, was significantly diminished almost immediately after it was acquired by his actions at the circumcision festival discussed above. But it

⁷⁰ Bernardo to Doge and Senate, 2 April 1586, in *CSP Venice*, ed. Horatio Brown et al., 38 vols. (London: HMSO, 1864-1947), 8:149-150.

was just the beginning of a series of events that successively deteriorated any chances France had at returning open conflict between the Ottomans and the Spanish in the Mediterranean. When the English ambassador William Harborne arrived in 1583, it set off a diplomatic rivalry between Germigny and Harborne that only led to more diplomatic blunders on the part of the French ambassadors.

Although the combined efforts of Germigny, Uluç Ali, and Siyavuş Pasha discredited William Harborne in 1581, forcing him to flee Constantinople, their success was short-lived. When an English ambassador returned to Constantinople, the English Capitulations would be confirmed. To prevent such a circumstance, Germigny named the English explicitly as one of the nations compelled to trade under the French flag. Any confirmation of the theoretically defunct English Capitulations would be in direct violation of the French Capitulations. Practice and theory, however, were not the same thing. When William Harborne returned to Constantinople in April 1583, fulfilling the requirement of a resident ambassador, the English Capitulations were finally confirmed, contravening the clause of the 1581 French Capitulations.⁷¹

Harborne's arrival caused a significant diplomatic distraction from the Franco-Ottoman alliance, and Germigny's response to the English challenge led to further degeneration of the relationship between the French and the Ottomans, and specifically, Germigny's standing in Constantinople. The French ambassador made a "most vigorous" opposition to the English ship's presence sailing under its own flag with an ambassador on board. Germigny's attitude created "deep resentment" from

⁷¹ Skilliter, *William Harborne*, 194.

Siyavuş, who had become the grand vizier.⁷² Regardless, of French complaints, Harborne was received by the grand vizier and Grand Seigneur in May and even received the same provision as the French ambassador.⁷³ As Harborne wrote, he “remain[ed] equal with the French [ambassador] in every way.”⁷⁴ All things seemed to be going Harborne’s way. Despite Germigny’s protests, Harborne would continue to receive the same good treatment: “the entire Porte had shown to receive and accept this new friendship.” Germigny grew resentful of the Ottoman treatment of this new ambassador that “prove[d] daily the perfidy, malice, and falsity of these men.”⁷⁵

Germigny was, however, able to persuade Siyavuş Pasha to his side with the aid of the Venetian *bailo* and the prominent Jewish doctor to the grand vizier Benveniste. After the Jewish doctor explained the significance of the negotiations to the French and the importance of their alliance to the Ottomans, the grand vizier resolved to support the French position and recommended that Germigny speak directly to Murad III. The grand vizier added that Germigny ought to complain about Siyavuş Pasha, so the sultan would not suspect that they were coordinating with one another on the issue.⁷⁶ Siyavuş then wrote a petition himself to the sultan on behalf of Germigny. As Benveniste described the petition to the *bailo*, “nothing could [have been] more favorable, as he [Siyavuş] point[ed] out the immense difference between

⁷² Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 5 April 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:50-51.

⁷³ Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 3 May 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:55-56.

⁷⁴ Harborne to Walsingham, 11 and 25 June 1583, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, vol. 17, under Addenda: Miscellaneous 1583, pages 648-705, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol17>.

⁷⁵ BNF, Français 16143, fol. 183r, Germigny to Henri III, 15 November 1583.

⁷⁶ BNF, Français 16143, fols. 197v-198r, 203r, Germigny to Henri III, 29 November 1583 and 13 December 1583; Moresini to Doge and Senate, 29 November 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:73-74.

the king of France and the Queen of England as an ally.”⁷⁷ Regardless, Siyavuş Pasha was unable to persuade Murad III. The sultan maintained his position that he would not turn away any “who came to the Porte to seek an alliance.”⁷⁸

How Germigny handled this roadblock combined with his circumcision debacle dramatically undermined his position and that of France in Constantinople. Germigny took the most extreme position possible. We do not have the letters from him at the time of Harborne’s arrival until November 1583, but we can derive Germigny’s actions from the king’s letters disparaging his approach. Germigny seems to have misunderstood the king’s claim that “if they [the Ottomans] dispense to default and terminate our treaty, I will be free to do the same,” and read into it a more direct claim than the king ever made. The ambassador tried to force the Ottomans to dismiss Harborne by leveraging France’s relationship. He argued that the English ambassador and French ambassador could not remain together at the Porte, forcing the Ottomans to choose.⁷⁹ Germigny even took his strategy a step further, spreading rumors about a prospective alliance between France and Spain against the Ottomans, perhaps to remind the sultan of the importance of France’s friendship by threatening the alternative.⁸⁰ Henri III, however, never made any such claims. On the contrary, he continually sought Ottoman aid against Spain and warned the Ottomans of a possible alliance between the Safavids and Spain.

Germigny’s activities significantly diminished the French ambassador’s reputation in Constantinople. Even his long-time ally Siyavuş Pasha complained

⁷⁷ Moresini to Doge and Senate, 29 November 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:73-74.

⁷⁸ Moresini to Doge and Senate, 13 December 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:76-77.

⁷⁹ BNF, NAF 22048, 152v, Henri III to Germigny, 6 July 1583.

⁸⁰ Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 13 December 1583 and 27 December 1583, in *CSPVenice*, 8:76-78.

about him. The *bailo* reported a conversation with the grand vizier during which Siyavuş called Germigny “a terrible man, [who] when things did not go as he wished, he too easily flew into a passion.” Siyavuş also described the disappointment with the inadequate gifts presented by the French during the circumcision festival in 1582.⁸¹ Harborne similarly claimed in 1584 that the sultan wondered if France’s underwhelming gifts during the circumcision was because Germigny appropriated them for his own use.⁸² As Germigny discredited himself with his own actions, Ottoman statesmen began to reflect on his actions in 1582 as increasingly suspicious. If he did not undermine himself at the festival, his continued miscalculations in Constantinople created a pattern that forced the Ottomans to reevaluate his activities in Constantinople.

Germigny’s growing isolation in Constantinople came when Ottoman support was essential to Henri III, so his recall was inevitable. France’s increasingly hostile relationship with Spain demanded more effective diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. In January of 1584, Henri III recalled Germigny from his post in Constantinople. In his place, the king appointed Jacques Savary de Lancosme. Hardly could the crown have thought that its position in Constantinople would deteriorate further, but Lancosme would accomplish such a task.

Lancosme arrived in Constantinople in 1586 with the same goal as Germigny: bring the Ottomans into conflict with Spain in the Mediterranean as a means of

⁸¹ Moresini to the Doge and Senate, 6 March 1584, in *CSPVenice*, 8:84-86.

⁸² Harborne to Walsingham 15 September 1584, in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas, vol. 19 (London: HMSO, 1916), under Elizabeth: September 1584, 11-20, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol19>. This is the first we hear of this claim, and it does not come up in Germigny’s papers, so the timing seems to indicate *post facto* rumors circulating in Constantinople driven by his depreciating credit there.

redirecting Spanish interests away from France's borders. A pre-condition for this mission was persuading the Ottomans to make peace with the Safavids. Henri III made this clear to Lancosme in 1586, stressing the necessity that he court the favor of the power brokers in Constantinople, such as the *kapudan* pasha, to persuade them to make peace with Safavid Persia and attack Spain.⁸³ This mission would be a difficult task in the best of climates, but Germigny had sullied many French relationships in Constantinople. Lancosme would continue the pattern.

Lancosme lacked political tact, and he managed to isolate himself from prospective allies. Lancosme met with France's ally in Constantinople, the *kapudan* pasha Uluç Ali, before any other Ottoman statesmen. As was discussed in chapter one, the first audience a new ambassador had was traditionally the grand vizier to prepare the ambassador for his audience with the sultan. Only after these preliminary audiences were any ambassador permitted to meet with the other Ottoman notables.⁸⁴ If this were not bad enough, the audience with Uluç Ali was itself a disaster because Lancosme was either unfamiliar with Ottoman political culture or simply flouted it. When the ambassador arrived at the *kapudan's divan*, he made no formal compliments, provided no gifts, and waited in silence for Uluç Ali to speak. When at last the awkward encounter ended, both parties left enraged by the other's actions, failing to respect the other.⁸⁵ Uluç Ali's actions were likely driven by a desire to meet with the new French ambassador to discuss their alliance that was established by Germigny. He was expecting a warm greeting and gifts that befitted

⁸³ BNF, Fr. 16171, fols 63r-64v. Henri III to Lancosme, 5 June 1586.

⁸⁴ See chap. 2, pp. 81-84.

⁸⁵ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 20 April 1580, in *CSPVenice*, 8:157. This was the account as it was explained to the *bailo* by Lancosme.

that relationship but was met with silence. Lancosme might have been ignorant of that relationship, but the damage was done. The French ambassador flouted Ottoman protocol to endanger an alliance that should have been easy to maintain.

Lancosme's actions with the *kapudan* pasha typified his diplomatic style; he was a zealous diplomat to his own detriment. He took his mission against Spain to the extreme. Lancosme sought out information on the individuals who worked on the ongoing negotiations to renew the truce between the Ottomans and the Spaniards. He refused to work with any Ottomans who participated in the Ottoman-Spanish diplomacy. Orem Bey, the sultan's *dragoman* (translator) and an influential powerbroker, became the focus of Lancosme's ire because of his role in Ottoman-Spanish negotiations. The ambassador refused to use Orem Bey as his *dragoman* in his audience with the sultan when that was Orem Bey's function during such audiences.⁸⁶ Instead, Lancosme chose to use the services of Ali Ağa, who acted as the Ottoman envoy to France in 1580-1581 and made no pretension to be a *dragoman*, because Ali spent time in France and knew Henri III's will.⁸⁷ This decision was less than discrete. The grand vizier cut Lancosme off prematurely before Murad III could make his customary response.⁸⁸ Lancosme did not only undermine diplomatic tradition; he also isolated himself immediately from an influential power broker. Orem Bey could be an important ally to ambassadors, and indeed a good relationship

⁸⁶ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 12 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:153-155.

⁸⁷ Lancosme to Henri III, 2 April 1586, BNF, Français 16144, 106v.

⁸⁸ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 12 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:153-155. In Lancosme's letter, he underplays the incident, referencing being stopped by the grand vizier, but otherwise claiming he received all the appropriate dignity owed to the ambassador of France. See BNF, Français 16144, fol. 114v, Lancosme to Henri III, 16 April 1586.

with him could benefit Lancosme's mission since Orem Bey held a vital role in the negotiations with Spain.

Lancosme even isolated himself from his counterparts, whose support would benefit his mission. Upon arriving in Constantinople, he manufactured a precedent dispute with the traditional ally of the French ambassadors, the Venetian *bailo*, over the seating arrangements at the Easter service in St. Francis Cathedral. Lancosme insisted that he alone would sit in the prominent position next to the choir forcing the *bailo* to attend Easter mass at another church to avoid the dispute. Although Lancosme realized his mistake and quickly began treating the *bailo* in a better manner, such a turnaround was not always the case.⁸⁹ Lancosme similarly isolated himself from the English ambassador, with whom he initially planned to collaborate against the Spanish.⁹⁰ From the moment the English ambassador sent his secretary to make the traditional greetings upon Lancosme's arrival, inviting him to the English ambassador's house, Lancosme immediately attacked the English claim as an ambassador. Lancosme flew into a rage, explaining to the secretary that his master was no ambassador: "Ambassador! Why he is a merchant, your master, Ambassador! I know only one Ambassador at the Porte, and that is myself; out of this place at once, and tell your master that he had better mind his trade and not usurp titles like these, or I'll have him drummed out of this place."⁹¹ This relationship never recovered. Even while the French ambassador in Venice pleaded with Lancosme to

⁸⁹ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 7 April 1586, 12 April 1586, and 20 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:151-157. It should not come as a surprise that these events never find their way into Lancosme's letters since Henri III consistently expected his ambassadors to treat the *bailo* as a regular ally.

⁹⁰ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 2 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:149-150.

⁹¹ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 12 April 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:154.

work with the English ambassador to counter the Spanish negotiations, Lancosme could not bring himself to do it.⁹²

In 1587, Lancosme's position hit an absolute low point. An Ottoman *çavuş* (messenger) was able to beat one of his *dragomans* in his presence without being reprimanded. Later Lancosme's wine was confiscated by the customs house and sold at auction. Lancosme, however, never received a response from the sultan or the grand vizier to his petitions seeking remonstrances against these acts. As the Venetian *bailo* explained, Lancosme "ha[d] learned at last to his cost that diplomacy here requires dexterity, and the cultivation of friendly relations..., not bragodoccio [sic] and insolence."⁹³

An Ottoman Fleet Undermined by Chaos in Constantinople

Somehow, in 1588, Lancosme acquired some diplomatic skills and managed to improve his position. He repaired some of his bad relationships, and it was beginning to pay off.⁹⁴ To his benefit, Uluç Ali—who became a rival of Lancosme's after their awkward meeting—died in 1587, making Ibrahim Pasha, one of the few friends of Lancosme, the next *kapudan* pasha. Lancosme also benefitted from the burgeoning concerns in Constantinople of Spain's growing power that began to develop as early as 1586. After Philip II acquired Portugal, he also acquired all its empire in the Indian ocean creating another prospective conflict zone between the Ottomans and Spain.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Safavid conflict was winding down in 1588.

⁹² BNF, Français 16091, 625v-626r, de Maise to Lancosme, 3 January 1588

⁹³ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 1 April 1587, in *CSPVenice*, 8:261-262.

⁹⁴ Lancosme to Henri III, 3 February 1588, in *Négociations*, 4:647 and 647n.

⁹⁵ Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 23 July 1586, in *CSPVenice*, 8:184.

When the Safavid's eastern neighbors, the Uzbeks, invaded Iran, the Safavid Shah was forced to sue for peace with the Ottomans in 1588, agreeing to a peace treaty in 1589 that expanded the sultan's lands farther to the east and north than ever before.⁹⁶

With peace in the east and a growing threat from Spain, the Ottomans began considering sending their fleet against Spain in the Mediterranean in 1588. While celebrating a victory of the French crown at the Battle of Auneau, Lancosme received promises from the Grand Admiral that the Ottoman fleet would set sail against Spain the next year. Ibrahim Pasha also wondered if France would give the Ottoman navy access to French ports to resupply during their conflict with Spain. Lancosme not only agreed to this request, but he also wrote to Henri III, recommending that the king consent to it in writing to the *kapudan* pasha and the sultan and do so as quickly as possible.⁹⁷ Indeed, the Ottomans took intervention in the French war very seriously. For instance, the *kapudan* pasha submitted a petition to Murad III in 1589, advocating for an attack on Spain whose power was growing. The grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha agreed. He proposed a dramatic increase in the size of the Ottoman fleet because "France has been overcome by utter chaos and may also be overrun by the accursed Spaniards."⁹⁸ These ideas of Franco-Ottoman cooperation were short-lived. Pal Fodor has emphasized how economic realities depleted the Ottoman will to realize the new fleet. To his analysis, we should also add that

⁹⁶ Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 172-173.

⁹⁷ Lancosme to Henri III, 2 March 1588, in *Négociations*, 4:654-655n. BNF, Français 16144, fols. 190r-196r, 202r-203r, Lancosme to Henri III, 3 February 1588, 19 February 1588, 20 April 1588.

⁹⁸ Topkapi Surraiya Museyi Kutuphanesi, Raven 1943, 3v, quoted in Pal Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars: The Ottoman Naval Preparations in 1590-1592," in *Armağan. Festschrift Für Andreas Tietze*, eds. Ingeborg Baldauf and Suraiya Faroqhi (Prague: Enigma, 1994), 97.

Lancosme's activities in Constantinople further diminished the Ottoman willpower to move forward with their Mediterranean policy.⁹⁹

In August 1589, Henri III was assassinated, making the Huguenot Henri de Bourbon the new king of France as Henri IV. The realization of a Protestant on the Catholic throne of France emboldened the Catholic League. Their fight became directly focused on the crown of France. They proclaimed Henri de Bourbon as illegitimate and named Charles, cardinal of Bourbon, as King Charles X. Philip II entered the conflict on the side of the Catholic League, sending Spanish forces into France.¹⁰⁰ To make matters worse for French diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire, Lancosme joined the Catholic League rebellion in 1589. French diplomatic representation in Constantinople split along the same lines that divided France. In the diplomatic void, Henri IV became dependent on the new English ambassador Edward Barton (England had long supported Henri of Navarre during his religious struggle in France) and Lancosme's nephew, François Savary de Brèves, who remained loyal to Henri IV. Chaos reigned in the French embassy in Constantinople between the rival French factions competing for Ottoman support. French hopes for Ottoman intervention against Spain on the crown's behalf that were stoked in 1588 were thus stifled by 1592.

Lancosme's new political orientation demonstrated itself when the Spanish agent arrived in Constantinople to negotiate an extension of the truce in November 1589. Lancosme was conspicuously quiet, making no complaints or protests of his presence. The behavior was so out of character that the *bailo* made a note of it

⁹⁹ Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 89-111.

¹⁰⁰ Holt, *French Wars of Religion*, chap. 5.

contrasted with the English ambassador's intent to suppress the negotiations.¹⁰¹

Later in April 1590, Lancosme asked Sultan Murad III to write letters to the new king of France, accepting the continuing good friendship between the two countries.

When the sultan wrote letters to Henri IV rather than Charles X, Lancosme complained to the grand vizier, declaring that Henri IV had not yet ascended to the throne.¹⁰²

French diplomats in Venice and Constantinople immediately denounced Lancosme's activities. After learning of Lancosme's support for the Catholic League, undermining Henri IV, the French ambassador in Venice immediately wrote to the sultan and sent letters from the French king withdrawing the letters of credit from Lancosme and asking for his dismissal from Constantinople. He promised France would send a new ambassador soon and left French affairs in the hands of the English ambassador until that time. Indeed, these letters were presented to the sultan by the English ambassador.¹⁰³ Lancosme's decision to defect from Henri IV split his bureaucracy as well. His nephew François Savary de Brèves quit Lancosme's service and began supporting the English ambassador on behalf of Henri IV. A year later, Lancosme's copying clerk turned against him as well, taking with him a large trove of documents from the French embassy, which included the ambassador's papers.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate, 11 November 1589, in *CSPVenice*, 8:472-473.

¹⁰² Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate, 28 April 1590 and 12 May 1590, in *CSPVenice*, 8:487-489.

¹⁰³ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 21 July 1590, in *CSPVenice*, 8:497. Michel Lesure, "Les relations Franco-Ottomanes à l'épreuve des guerres de religion (1560-1594)," in *L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1986), 52-57 discusses the role of De Maisse in the Lancosme affaire as well.

¹⁰⁴ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Venetian Senate, 4 May 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:545.

Luckily for France, Lancosme's initial defection from Henri IV's service did not undermine Murad III and the grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha's plan to raise a fleet to support France against Philip II and the Catholic League. Murad III declared he "shall make great armament of galleys, and they shall be sent out. And for next year, my Imperial order has been issued which appoints as general my vizier Sinan Pasha, who will take command of three hundred galleys and maone (a type of ship) and a suitable army."¹⁰⁵ In January, the *bailo* observed much activity in the arsenal that was "the result not of chance but of a premeditated design." They were also raising money to build galleys. The *bailo* reported that the Ottomans expected to have a fleet of 300 galleys and 18 galleasses by March 1592 from repaired and newly built ships, and the grand vizier declared that he "desire[d] to take command in person."¹⁰⁶ The grand vizier, the *kapudan* pasha, the *ağa* of the janissaries, the sultan's secretary, David Passi, and Edward Barton—also operating in the interest of Henri IV at this point—met almost daily to discuss plans for the dispatch this fleet to support England and France's war with Spain. In the *bailo*'s words, they hoped to "support England, make a diversion in favor of Navarre, cause a rising in favor of Don Antonio [in Portugal], and capture some four or five thousand slaves in Andalusia."¹⁰⁷ Since the 300-galley fleet would not be ready until 1592, they planned to combine forty or fifty already available galleys with a squadron from North Africa.¹⁰⁸ Henri IV took the pledge of Murad III seriously and included in the

¹⁰⁵ Grand Seigneur to the King of France, enclosed in Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 14 January 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:517.

¹⁰⁶ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 5 January 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:513.

¹⁰⁷ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 5 January 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:513.

¹⁰⁸ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 5 January 1591 and 2 February 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:513, 521.

figures of expected foreign support in a letter to the duke of Nevers while explaining his strategy. Along with an army from the German princes, the sultan “wisely intends to attack the king of Spain this year, and again the following year.”¹⁰⁹

But Lancosme received support from the Catholic League and its allies to persuade the Ottomans to take his assertions more seriously. The duke of Mayenne wrote to the grand vizier and the sultan in late 1590, arguing that Henri IV was not accepted as king by the estates of France, he did not control many cities nor even Paris, and he tried to take the crown against French laws. Mayenne hoped for support and that the sultan would grant free trade to all of its ports to France, and he promised to send a new ambassador to demonstrate his devotion toward the Ottomans.¹¹⁰ This support provided much-needed credibility to Lancosme’s position in Constantinople. The *bailo* told the Venetian senate that despite the grand vizier’s low esteem for Lancosme, if Mayenne sent an agent to Constantinople he would be well received. Indeed, these letters were received “with great satisfaction,” the *bailo* claimed.¹¹¹

Lancosme was not acting alone in these endeavors. Through his support for the Catholic League, he became a *de facto* partisan of the League’s most important ally, Spain, because the truce would permit Spain to continue to contribute to the League’s cause.¹¹² After presenting the letter from Mayenne to the Grand Seigneur

¹⁰⁹ Henri IV to the Duke of Nivernois and Rethelais, 29 April 1591, *Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, 3:386. I have not located the French version of the letter from Murad III, but the similarities to it in the above letter indicate that the copy provided by Lippomano most likely reflects the original.

¹¹⁰ Mayenne to the grand vizier, 28 December 1590, in *CSPVenice*, 8:540-541 Mayenne to the Grand Seigneur, 28 December 1590, in *CSPVenice*, 8:541-542.

¹¹¹ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 19 April 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:539.

¹¹² Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, 21 September 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:557.

and grand vizier, Lancosme secretly met with the Holy Roman emperor's ambassador in a monastery in Pera to exchange the orders they received from Spain and coordinated their mission to renew the Ottoman-Spanish truce, preventing the departure of the Ottoman fleet into the Mediterranean.¹¹³ The combined efforts from Lancosme, Mayenne, and the Habsburg ambassador caused the sultan to inquire further into the French Wars of Religion. Later that year, Murad III raised some poignant questions about the different sides in a conversation with the *bailo*: "he wished to know if the crown of France came to the king of Navarre by blood [and] what the relative forces of Navarre and [Mayenne] were."¹¹⁴ Lancosme's interference was beginning to pay off, undermining the sultan's confidence in Henri IV's position.

The division in the French coincided with growing divisions among the fleet's chief organizers. The divide developed around the intended target of the fleet. While the grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha continued to advocate for an attack on Spain, others began to question the utility of supporting France under the current circumstance. Ibrahim Pasha, the *kapudan* pasha, promoted a new strategy, an attack on Corfu or Crete. Since Spain was now occupied with France and England, Philip II could not send aid to Venice.¹¹⁵ The *silahdar ağa* (sword-keeper) complained to the *bailo* that such a long campaign against Spain would be impossible, especially since it necessitated wintering the fleet in France, whose current divisions were on display in Constantinople, and he thought that a campaign

¹¹³ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 19 April 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:539.

¹¹⁴ Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 21 September 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:556.

¹¹⁵ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 16 February 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:525.

against Crete or Malta was much more reasonable.¹¹⁶ The Ottoman government then went through a dramatic transformation in leadership. One of the original advocates for the fleet, David Passi, was dismissed from the *divan* in May and expelled in July.¹¹⁷ The *kapudan* pasha Ibrahim died the same month. In the next month, Murad III dismissed the greatest advocate for the attack on Spain, Koca Sinan Pasha, as his grand vizier, replacing him with Serder Ferhad Pasha.¹¹⁸

It is hard to believe that Lancosme's activities and the dramatic redirection of Ottoman policy by the primary stakeholders away from an attack on Spain in support of France were unconnected. Ottoman support for the campaign increasingly declined. For instance, a diplomatic envoy to France that was expected to depart to France and England in 1591 was never sent.¹¹⁹ Later in 1592, the Ottomans were placing new requirements on the French for the departure of the fleet. They demanded the arrival of a new ambassador before the fleet would be dispatched against Spain.¹²⁰ This request led to the appointment of de Brèves as the new ambassador but resulted in no action on the campaign from the Ottomans.

In 1592, Lancosme's depleted financial position led to his downfall. His line of credit from the Henri IV had been withdrawn, and the sultan stopped paying his traditional stipend as an ambassador, so the French representative of the Catholic League in Rome arranged for a bill of exchange of 3,200 *sequins* to be sent to

¹¹⁶ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 2 March 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:528-529.

¹¹⁷ Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 2 February 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:521-522; Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, 18 May 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:546; 15 July 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:550.

¹¹⁸ Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 10 August 1591, *CSPVenice*, 8:552.

¹¹⁹ Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 21 September 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:556; Lorenzo Bernardo to the Doge and Senate, 5 October 1591, in *CSPVenice*, 8:558.

¹²⁰ Sultan [Murad III] to Henri III (sic) King of France and Navarre, 28 January 1592, enclosed in Mattheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 22 February 1592, in *CSPVenice*, 9:12.

Lancosme. When de Brèves and the English ambassador heard of this, they told the new *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade Sinan Yusuf Pasha, claiming the funds came from the Pope and associated it with the recent capture of a Spanish spy. This news threw Cigalazade into a fury, and he demanded an audience with the Leaguer diplomat. When Lancosme refused, Cigalazade sought permission from the sultan to compel the Frenchman by force.¹²¹ His request was granted, and he sent a large group of *çavuşes* to the French embassy causing Lancosme to flee while his nephew and some of his servants were arrested. The grand vizier declared him a fugitive and confiscated all his goods including all the papers of the French embassy.¹²² He was later imprisoned and consigned to house arrest under the supervision of his royalist nephew de Brèves and the English ambassador.¹²³ For the next eight months, the central issue became negotiating the return of Lancosme to France as a prisoner of Henri IV, which never happened despite all their best efforts. Lancosme was able to manipulate his way back to Rome, where he found himself volunteering to go to Safavid Iran to negotiate an anti-Ottoman campaign.¹²⁴

Despite the Leaguer's downfall in Constantinople, the damage had been done. By 1592, support for the fleet was waning. Indeed, part of this was a product of the economic realities associated with such an endeavor. The limited treasury following the conflict with the Safavids forced Murad III to raise the galleys indirectly, compelling viziers, beylerbeys, and other elites to produce their own galleys or funds for their construction. This process significantly delayed the production of the

¹²¹ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 11 May 1592, in *CSPVenice*, 9:27.

¹²² Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 11 May 1592, in *CSPVenice*, 9:28-29.

¹²³ Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 11 May 1592, in *CSPVenice*, 9:29.

¹²⁴ Polo Paruto to the Doge and Senate, 2 October 1593, in *CSPVenice*, vol. 9, 107.

requisite 220 galleys.¹²⁵ The willpower to push beyond these preliminary complications in the face of significant division within the embassy of their ally who would be the campaign's primary beneficiary simply did not exist at the Ottoman court. A year later, in 1593, burgeoning conflict along the Hungarian-Ottoman frontier provided another outlet for the Ottomans to counter Habsburg power, and the Ottomans ceased their efforts against Spain.¹²⁶

Conclusion

All the successes Germigny and Henri III were able to garner in Constantinople in the early 1580s were squandered by the middle of the decade, and they only got worse as the years passed. In part, these successes and failures represent the significance of establishing and maintaining strong relationships with Ottoman notables. Germigny was able to acquire his improved position at the Ottoman court, negating the English Capitulations and negotiating a plan for cooperative military activities in 1581, due to his relationships with Uluç Ali and Siyavuş Pasha. Similarly, Germigny and Lancosme's declining fortunes in Constantinople reflected their inability to manage the diplomatic challenges they encountered appropriately. Germigny became so boisterously opposed to the English that he isolated himself from even his closest allies. Lancosme could not get out of his own way, repeatedly alienating prospective allies and influential power brokers. When he joined the Catholic League, he did even further damage, undermining the first real attempt by the Ottomans to support France in a decade.

¹²⁵ Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 92-106.

¹²⁶ Fodor, "Between Two Continental Wars," 110-111; Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 172-173.

On another level, the French failures that followed 1582 reflected the structural problems related to maintaining its own precedence in Constantinople. Germigny and Lancosme were not willing to accept diplomatic precedence over the English; they insisted that the presence of an English ambassador was unacceptable. In this conflict, Henri III and his diplomats overestimated France's significance to the Ottoman court and suffered the consequences. The French rivalry with England in Constantinople thus overshadowed France's primary goal, Ottoman-Spanish conflict in the Mediterranean. Lancosme's revolt against Henri IV exacerbated these problems even further. In an ironic twist, the French king became dependent on the English ambassador, who cooperated with de Brèves, for his representation against Lancosme until he could name a new ambassador. In 1592, when Henri IV appointed de Brèves to the position, he found his embassy severely diminished and the English ascendant. De Brèves had much work to do to return France to a respectable position in the eyes of the Ottomans, which we will explore in chapter seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM A MILITARY ALLY TO AN ECONOMIC PARTNER (1592-1610)

When Henri IV appointed François Savary de Brèves as his new ambassador in 1592, the decision proved transformative. He was a highly effective diplomat, especially sensitive to the Ottoman political culture and proficient at reading and writing the high Ottoman Turkish. His tenure saw France return to its privileged place in Constantinople, and he effectively fended off English assaults on French privileges in the Ottoman Empire that began during the previous embassies of Germigny and Lancosme. Yet, despite some minor attempts by the Ottomans to attack Spain in the Mediterranean, de Brèves was nevertheless beset by the structural redirection of Ottoman foreign policy away from the Mediterranean. Faced with this realization, Henri IV slowly re-evaluated France's relationship with the Ottomans from a military alliance to an economic alliance by the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century.

The first half of Henri IV's reign sought endlessly to acquire Ottoman support in his war against the Catholic League and Spain. When the Ottoman Empire's foreign policy became focused on the war with the Holy Roman Empire, Henri IV viewed the conflict as a benefit to his own struggle against the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs. But the king's enthusiasm for their common struggle waned as Ottoman promises for support continually failed to materialize. In the second half of the king's reign, Henri IV became increasingly dejected by the inability of the Ottomans to

provide substantive support to France. Moreover, Henri IV increasingly questioned the Ottomans' dedication to their alliance with France. From the French perspective, the Ottomans failed to enforce the privileges extended to France in the Capitulations during the French rivalry with the English in Constantinople, and they failed to control North African corsair attacks against French shipping that increased dramatically during Henri IV's reign. These combined frustrations caused the French king to increasingly focus his diplomacy in the Levant solely on protecting French mercantile endeavors and to increasingly negotiate with the Barbary states independently after 1604. The transition away from France's military alliance with the Ottomans was complete by 1610 when Henri IV began planning a military campaign against the Habsburgs, during which he neither tried to include the Ottomans in his coalition nor even mentioned the campaign to his ambassador in Constantinople.

From Civil War to a Spanish War

Under Henri IV, the cold war with Spain that developed under Henri III quickly turned hot. Philip II extended more considerable material and financial support to the Catholic League after Henri IV ascended to the throne than ever before. The governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the duke of Parma, provided contingents of soldiers to the League's lieutenant-general, Charles, duke of Mayenne. Later in 1590, the duke of Parma led a Spanish army from Brussels into France to break Henri IV's siege of Paris, preserving the Catholic League's stranglehold on the

city. This series of events left the League weakened and more dependent on support from Spain. Parma's presence signaled Philip II's willingness to fill that role.¹

After 1592, Spanish intervention became even more active. Philip II landed troops in Brittany and provided periodic support for the Catholic League. The Spanish king then actively sought to place the *Infanta*, the granddaughter of Henri II from Philip II's marriage to Elizabeth de Valois, on the French throne. At the Estates General of the League in 1593, Philip II sent diplomats and jurists to make the argument for the *Infanta's* accession to the throne, suggesting that the *Infanta* be elected Queen if she married a match acceptable to the Estates General. This compromise was hardly acceptable to most Frenchmen, and only the most radical Leaguers could stomach it. Many Leaguers, like Mayenne, were stuck between two choices they were unwilling to accept: a Spanish-dominated monarchy or Henri IV. The prospect, however, demonstrates how dependent on Spain the League had become.²

Henri IV's declaration that he would abjure Protestantism and convert to Catholicism weakened the League further, leading to even greater dependence on Spain. Many Leaguers saw Henri IV as the rightful king, but only questioned his religious allegiance. With his abjuration, those Leaguers holding this position no longer had a reason to rebel against the king. As the League weakened, its need for Spanish assistance grew. Mayenne tried to leverage the marriage negotiations with

¹ Vincent Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 149-157.

² Mack P. Holt, *The Politics of Wine in Early Modern France: Religion and Popular Culture in Burgundy, 1477-1630* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 184-185, 206-208; Pitts, *Henri IV of France*, 162-170; Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 150-155; Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics 1588-1603* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 140-144.

the *Infanta* for more significant support from Spain. He demanded that Philip II needed to deliver an army to France before Mayenne would consider electing a new monarch to marry the *Infanta*.³ Moreover, as the Paris League began to split over the acceptance of Henri IV, making it more susceptible to conquest by the king, Mayenne joined his forces with a Spanish army in 1594. When Mayenne, Aumale, and Mercoeur stubbornly refused to accept Henri IV after the rest of the Leaguers, they did so with Spanish money and troops.⁴

In January 1595, France declared war on Spain. In many ways, this action simply recognizing the current circumstances. But it also reflected a choice. Many of Henri IV's advisers thought peace talks were the best route since Henri IV still did not have a stronghold on his country. Their arguments could overcome neither the reality that Spain had been at war with Henri IV his entire life nor the assassination attempts that Henri IV blamed on Philip II.⁵

From the beginning of the wars of the Catholic League, the French crown thought the Ottomans could help accelerate the peace process. Henri IV and his councilors recognized that the League depended militarily on Philip II. If the Ottomans could redirect Spain's forces, the League would be left to fend for itself. As the Venetian ambassador to France reported in September 1591, the Ottoman threat would force the king of Spain to "attend to his defenses against the Turk," which would divert Spanish silver away from the League, forcing "the princes of the

³ Pitts, *Henri IV*, 168-171.

⁴ Pitts, *Henri IV*, 181, 186.

⁵ Pitts, *Henri IV*, 192-193.

[Catholic] League ... to sue for peace.”⁶ This strategy suffered from one major setback: the Ottomans were about to enter a war with the Austrian Habsburgs that monopolized Ottoman resources.

The Ottomans and the Bourbon Versus the Habsburgs

After the chaotic environment surrounding Lincosme effectively undermined the Ottomans’ anti-Spanish policy, Koca Sinan Pasha and Murad III redirected their energies against the Austrian Habsburgs and the Hungarian frontier. Skirmishes broke out between Ottoman and Habsburg forces along the frontier in western Croatia in 1591, but war was prevented as both the Ottomans and Habsburgs tried to resolve the burgeoning conflict diplomatically. In 1593, the war finally broke out when the Habsburgs defeated an Ottoman raid into the frontier that led to the death of the beylerbey of Bosnia. Koca Sinan Pasha, once again named grand vizier, took advantage of the situation to persuade the sultan to attack the Austrian Habsburgs. In July 1593, the grand vizier led an army into Habsburg lands.

Despite the demise of the Ottoman fleet, Henri IV was not dissuaded by the outbreak of the Ottoman-Habsburg war. Far from it, when Henri IV learned of the preliminary skirmishes in Hungary between the Imperialists and the Ottomans, he wrote to de Brèves that “it is very important for the security and advancement of my affairs that the [Ottoman] progress begun on the frontiers of Hungary not desist because this prevents the king of Spain from raising forces from Germany.” But the king wanted his ambassador to act discreetly in his machinations. De Brèves should

⁶ Diovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, 21 September 1591, in *CSPVenice*, ed. Horatio Brown et al., 38 vols. (London: HMSO, 1864-1947), 8:557.

stay close to the *bailo* and the English ambassador, so no blame would come to Henri IV for “the ills that might befall *Chrestienté* from the armies and the forces of the Grand Seigneur [Murad III].” The king wanted to have his cake and eat it, too; to enjoy the benefits of sustained Ottoman success against the Habsburgs without much blowback.⁷

But Henri IV could hardly contain his joy from the prospect of the Ottomans overrunning the Austrian Habsburgs. The Venetian ambassador in France reported that the French looked upon Ottoman successes in the war fondly because they expected Spain to come to the aid of the Holy Roman emperor. Moreover, he reported that the “French [were] supposed to have an understanding with the Turk for the molestation of the house of Austria.”⁸ When news arrived in France of an Ottoman victory in Hungary in 1594, the Venetian ambassador reported that the king joyfully exclaimed, “the League made me King, [and] the Turk may make me Emperor.”⁹ Henri IV then wrote to de Brèves a month later that the ambassador should “rejoice with the Grand Seigneur [Murad III] on my behalf” because of “the advantages” the sultan gained in Hungary.¹⁰

The French king identified the French and Ottoman conflicts with the Habsburg powers as part of a common struggle. After Murad III died in 1595 and the war swung against the Ottomans, Henri IV guaranteed to the new sultan Mehmed III *via* de Brèves that his “enemies [are] all the house of Austria, which,

⁷ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 December 1592, in *Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV*, ed. Jules Berger de Xivrey, 9 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-1876) 3:711.

⁸ Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, 11 January 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:118.

⁹ Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, 14 October 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:146.

¹⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 November 1594, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:253-54.

prospering on [the sultan's] frontiers, fortifies itself on mine and renders itself formidable and unbearable to both [of us].”¹¹ The king did not just identify his struggle against the Habsburgs with the Ottomans'; he sought to support the new sultan through advice from his own experience. The messages he relayed to the new sultan reflected the connection he envisioned between his affairs and those of the Mehmed III.

Make them understand how important it is for His Highness [Mehmed III] to safeguard my friendship, and not to relax the preparations drawn up and commenced by his father for the war in Hungary. If he has a good outcome [in the war], he should expect a great increase in his reputation and authority, as much against those who are revolting against me as against his enemies, who are [also] my enemies.... Tell [the Ottomans] that I led my army in person, expressly for this effect, since it seems to me that the Grand Seigneur [Mehmed III] should do [the same].¹²

Henri IV empathized with Mehmed III's position, coming to the throne at war with a Habsburg foe in need of a victory to prove himself. He provided his personal experience on how to do so: lead your army personally to victory. More significantly, Henri IV went on to claim that he and the sultan would prevail through God's providence, which looked fondly on them both. After explaining that the sultan should follow Henri IV's example and lead his army against the Habsburgs, Henri IV wrote, “doing that, I expect God will bless our arms, and we will teach our enemies at their expense that the princes who depend on lieutenants never thrive like those who save their own lives.”¹³ This instance was not the only time Henri IV invoked God's providence to Mehmed III in their mutual anti-Habsburg fight. Henri IV wrote that

¹¹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 September 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:406.

¹² Henri IV to de Brèves, 27 April 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:344.

¹³ Henri IV to de Brèves, 27 April 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:344.

when de Brèves had an audience with the new sultan, he should “explain to him that God has reserved to him alone [Mehmed III] the glory of the restoration of his Empire, and the vengeance for the outrages and infidelities that have been done to him.”¹⁴ God was blessing their mutual arms and reserving to the Muslim sultan vengeance against outrages done to him at the hands of the Catholic Habsburgs. The sultan was not merely a pragmatic ally against the Habsburgs, but a brother-in-arms against them.

Greater Ottoman Support for France?

At first, it appeared that the war in Hungary would not deter the Ottomans from following through with their promises to Henri IV, but it soon appeared as if the king’s rhetoric might pay off. After Mehmed III’s ascension, one of the viziers Halil Pasha wrote the French king in April 1595, which was translated by de Brèves himself. In it, Halil Pasha promised Henri IV that he would

promptly represent to his highness [the sultan] in person the intention and desire of your majesty that he send out a number of galleys, but it is a sure thing (*pour chose assurer*) [that] next year he will send out an imperial army of two or three hundred galleys [because] it is the design of this Porte to procure the ruin of our common malicious enemy and to cause the total ruin of this malicious [enemy] with your all powerful forces [making up] one part and ours another.¹⁵

The common malicious enemy referred to throughout the letter can be no other than Spain. This message was very promising to the French king, but one must imagine

¹⁴ Henri IV to de Brèves, 17 November 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:452.

¹⁵ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 238v, Halil Pasha to Henri IV, 17 April 1595.

that Henri IV took these promises with some skepticism. It was not the first time that Ottoman viziers had promised two or three hundred galleys to attack Spain.¹⁶

More substantive news came from Constantinople *via* de Brèves later that year. At the king's behest, the sultan wrote a letter to the city council of Marseille ordering them to return to obedience to Henri IV, or he would ruin their commerce, prompting a return letter from the city in which they remained recalcitrant.¹⁷ In September and August 1595, the French ambassador sent the king translations of orders from the sultan to his viceroy in Algiers to support the French king. The order focused on the city council of Marseille, which had committed itself to the Catholic League. The ambassador's pleas received some response earlier as well. The orders from Mehmed III to the viceroy of Algiers was the promised response by the Porte. Mehmed III explained that Marseille was supporting Spain against their "emperor," and was not returning to obedience to Henri IV in their "obstinance."¹⁸ Another letter in September provided more specific instructions. Mehmed III explained the plans established by his father and Henri IV to raise an army to attack Spain. The sultan ordered that the viceroy "will be general of the galleys of our kingdom of Algiers and of Tunis. You will inform yourself of the intention of the Emperor of France so that succeeding divine aid you will employ yourself to the conquest of the places that you will be ordered by him [Henri IV] and commanding you and rendering you above all lords to aid and server the accomplishments of his designs." The sultan also qualified

¹⁶ See chap. 6, pp. 236-239 .

¹⁷ The people of Marseille to the Sultan Murad, 8 June 1594, enclosed in Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 14 October 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:146. According to the *bailo*, Barton and de Brèves sought Ottoman support for an attack on Marseille as early as 1593. See Matheo Zane to the Doge and Senate, 22 July 1593, in *CSPVenice*, 9:81.

¹⁸ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 242v, Mehmed III to the Viceroy of Algiers, 25 August 1595.

this expansive set of powers to Henri IV. He explained that if he met “forces on shores of Spain, I advise you not to be the attacker (*offenseur*) and that the galleys of the enemy should not have the advantage, conserving the honor and reputation of my empire.”¹⁹ In other words, the viceroy should support Henri IV, permitting him to make the strategic decisions, but above all, the viceroy should protect the fleet and not place it in a compromised position.²⁰

When Henri IV received these letters, he was concerned with the sultan’s qualifications to his orders to the viceroy—specifically about them not being the attackers on Spanish shores. The king complained bitterly in 1596 about the trouble the Catholic League was giving him in Marseille and that if the fleet of the viceroy of Algiers did “not occupy the Spaniards in their country,...it will be difficult for me to break this coup, which is not less important to the Grand Seigneur [Mehmed III] than to me.” The king went on to advise de Brèves to display to the Ottomans “the gravest alarm that you can...so that they warm up to sending their fleet to the coast of Spain.”²¹ As might be clear at this point, France was hardly satisfied with the Ottomans’ support.

These promises rarely amounted to anything. The only major Ottoman attack on Spanish lands came in 1594. Cigalazade harassed Spanish vessels around Naples and Sicily before sacking Reggio di Calabria in the south of Spanish Italy with around

¹⁹ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 246r, Mehmed III to the Viceroy of Algiers, 5 September 1595.

²⁰ This qualification reads much like the orders Sultan Suleiman wrote to Barbarossa in 1542. See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2011), chap. 4, especially 119-123.

²¹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:495.

100 galleys.²² In 1596 a fleet of similar size sailed out to the edge of Greek seas. This fleet appears to be the one Henri IV was reading about in his dispatches. But Cigalazade never ventured past Modon.²³ After this feigned adventure, the French received further promises from the Ottomans. De Brèves wrote to the Secretary of State Villeroy in late 1596, indicating that the Ottomans promised to follow up this previous campaign with another. Apparently heading the French king's request, de Brèves received promises that the Ottomans would send their fleet to the coasts of Spain in the next year.²⁴ Perhaps these promises from the Ottomans were genuine, but they ultimately were up to the discretion of the *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade to put them into action, and he was in no way a supporter of France. Indeed, at the height of the wars of the Catholic League in 1594, he asserted that he did not “recognize [de Brèves] as Ambassador, and was not aware that there was a king of France.”²⁵ Cigalazade's disdain for the French prevented the likelihood of any type of Franco-Ottoman military coordination.

Henri IV was frequently frustrated by the inability of the Ottoman promises to materialize. The campaign of 1597 promised to de Brèves never came to fruition. Ottoman support was always sporadic, which should not be a surprise considering their foreign commitments in Hungary. Despite the 1594 and 1596 Ottoman campaigns in the Mediterranean, the Ottomans frequently fell short of Henri IV's unreasonably high expectations. He grew weary of news of delays of promised naval

²² Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 14 October 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:146; Philip Williams, *Empire and Holy War in the Mediterranean: The Galley and Maritime Conflict between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2014), 235-236

²³ Williams, *Empire and Holy War*, 236-237.

²⁴ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 268r, de Brèves to Villeroy, 23 November 1596.

²⁵ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 3 May 1594, in *CSPVenice*, 9:127.

campaigns from the Ottomans. In September 1595, for instance, de Brèves wrote to Henri IV that the *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade Pasha had not yet departed for Algiers in preparation for a naval campaign that year.²⁶ In response, Henri IV began to question the degree to which he could trust the messages emanating from Constantinople. He complained that he saw “such little certainty in their [Ottoman] deliberations and promises that [he] could not trust them.”²⁷

In June 1597, Henri IV consigned himself to begin building galleys to support “commerce in the Levant and Barbary” coast, but also “to hold the coast of Provence and to protect [*asseurer*] the coast against the designs of my enemies [Spain].”²⁸ Unfortunately, these ships would not be ready soon, and the king needed some vessels to protect the coast from Spanish and Tuscan ships that were menacing near the Island of Hyères off the coast of Marseille and Toulon. Henri IV knew a request for the Ottoman fleet would go unanswered again, so he asked merely for “some command to the pasha of Algiers to promptly secure for us some number of galleys to oppose the grand duke and king of Spain to make an effort to recover the place if it is necessary.”²⁹ This much more modest request did surprisingly receive the intended result. Later that year, Murad Bey arrived with four galleys off the coast of France near Marseille. It was not the largest Ottoman fleet to take the seas, but it was one of the first times the French king’s pleas were definitively answered.³⁰

²⁶ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 251v, de Brèves to Henri IV, 17 September 1595.

²⁷ Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 September 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:407.

²⁸ Henri IV to de Brèves, 8 July 1597, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:806.

²⁹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 8 July 1597, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:806.

³⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, 6 September 1597, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:840.

Despite this gesture, Henri IV's frustrations were running high, and he began to threaten peace with Spain if the Ottomans did not send more support. He warned of the consequences to the Ottomans if he did: "not only would all his [Philip II's] power fall on their [Ottoman] empire, which I alone stop and prevent, but it would also be impossible to stop the great number of men of war and captains, with which my kingdom is overflowing [and] who are accustomed to a life of war, from joining the Christian army [in Hungary] without having any other place to to employ their arms. he [Mehmed III] will avoid this if he sends his fleet to the coasts of Spain because I will not make peace [with Philip II]." ³¹ This threat was not the only place in the letter, Henri emphasized the necessity of Ottoman support against Spain. Henri IV told de Brèves that the Pope was seeking "to unite all of Christendom against the Empire of this [Grand] Seigneur..., you make him [the Grand Seigneur] understand that I will not agree to it, provided that he makes his fleet sail to the coasts of Spain that he must send out this year, demonstrating to him that if he sends it elsewhere it will be useless for them and me." ³²

Henri IV was threatening to abandon their common cause as a rhetorical attempt to indicate the significance of France to Ottoman policy, prompting material support. It was clear that France and Henri IV had no intention of aligning themselves with Spain. There were too many fundamental differences in French and Spanish interests to ever permit Henri IV from committing to any common cause with the Spaniards. ³³ Henri IV himself made this known even before he officially

³¹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4: 496.

³² Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4: 495-496.

³³ Pitts, *Henri IV of France*, 289-291.

declared war on Spain to the Ottomans. After the king converted to Catholicism, there was concern in Constantinople that it might indicate a rapprochement between France and Spain. The king commanded that de Brèves “demonstrate to them the reasons and differences of state that exist between this crown and that of Spain do not permit such a union...seeing that there have been many wars between these two kingdoms due to the other interests of this crown, which remain still entirely and decisive.”³⁴ Instead, these claims represent Henri IV’s growing frustration with the Ottomans’ inaction and his desperation for Ottoman support.

While Henri IV feigned a peace with Spain to spur the Ottomans into substantive action, he also tried to ingratiate his ambassador into the good graces of Ottoman statesmen and the sultan himself. Henri IV was judicious not to make the same mistake that his predecessor made in permitting circumstances to prevent the presentation of gifts.³⁵ The *bailo* reported that France gave the “finest presents” for the new sultan’s ascension to the throne.³⁶ He sent money for presents periodically. For instance, the French king sent 3,000 *écus* to de Brèves to please Mehmed III and his viziers.³⁷ In addition, Henri IV gave de Brèves and future ambassadors and consuls the right to collect a two percent consular duty in 1592. In the order, the king stated explicitly that “the reason for the two percent, in addition to the two taken by the said consuls, [is] to support the maintenance of the Ambassadors, attending to

³⁴ Henri IV to de Brèves, 28 January 1594, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:89.

³⁵ See chap. 5, pp. 214-217. Gilles de Noailles, abbot of L’Isle, failed to present gifts at his appointment to the ambassadorial position because Jacques de Germigny—who was expected to deliver the presents from Venice because Noailles was departing from his previous diplomatic post in Poland—fell ill in Venice and could not complete his mission. This became a significant diplomatic *faux pas* that undermined French diplomacy in Constantinople.

³⁶ Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 5 April 1595, in *CSPVenice*, 9:157.

³⁷ Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:497; Henri IV to de Brèves,

our affairs with great expense.”³⁸ This new introduction improved the French ambassador’s material well-being in Constantinople considerably. It permitted him greater ability to oil the gears of various Ottoman policy-makers in the interest of France. The system was so successful that many merchants began to complain about the consular duty and sought to be discharged from their obligation because they claimed it had “raised large sums of money,” especially since de Brèves acquired “a command to draw the same right [to consular duties] from foreign merchants trading under the protection of my banner.”³⁹

The king also sought to advance people he thought could benefit his cause into higher levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy. One of his subjects had been taken prisoner from Malta, converted to Islam, changed his name to Soliman, and became a *Kapucu* (or perhaps *kapucu başı*), a gatekeeper, which was a ranking palace functionary.⁴⁰ Henri IV asked the sultan “to honor the said Soliman with a *chechier* of the household of Your Highness so as to increase the affection he has for your service by this honor.”⁴¹ The position likely refers to “chéquier” or bookkeeper, which would be a *defterdar* (or treasurer) of some sort in the Ottoman palace. But the more important point here is that Henri IV was seeking to advance people in the Ottoman bureaucracy that might benefit him. As was Henri IV’s proclivity, he employed both

³⁸ “Lettre de Henri IV accordant aux ambassadeurs de France près de la Porte un droit de 2 % sur les marchandises naviguant sous pavillon,” in *La France en Tunisie*, ed. Pierre Grandchamp (Tunis: Impr. rapide, 1920), 143-145, quotation on 145. See also Viorel Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction in Egypt and Aleppo in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, eds. Pascal Firges et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 85-87. Also, this issue is discussed further in chap. 1, pp. 61-63.

³⁹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 February 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4: 497.

⁴⁰ Henri IV to Murad III, before 20 March 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, vol. 4, 324. Henri IV refers to his subject’s title in Constantinople as “capitaine de sa Porte” as in Captain of his [the Sultan’s] door. I can only assume that this was a French translation of the position.

⁴¹ Henri IV to Murad III, before 20 March 1595, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, vol. 4, 324.

the carrot and the stick to try to get his way: threats of peace with Spain combined with lavish gifts to gain friends in the *divan*.⁴²

Despite all these efforts, it was only after France signed the Peace of Vervins in 1598 to end the war with Spain that the Ottomans responded. News of the peace provoked the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha to write to Henri IV in 1599, claiming that they were planning on supporting France. After invoking the joint military campaigns in which France and the Ottomans had engaged against Charles V, Ibrahim Pasha explained that the sultan had already sent out emissaries to learn “where his army should go [to provide] relief for your [Henri IV’s] designs, but having learned of the accord of the said peace, he commanded them to return.”⁴³ This claim was most assuredly empty. It was easy to proclaim plans for future support when it was no longer necessary. Instead, the real emphasis of the letter sought the French king’s support to prevent Frenchmen from aiding the Habsburg war effort in Hungary. Ibrahim Pasha hoped Henri IV would write to his governors, “and particularly those on the frontiers, that they not permit passage to any of your subjects who want to aid the king of Hungary.” The grand vizier also asked that France’s representatives might act as negotiators between the Ottomans and the Austrians for peace.⁴⁴

Yet, when the French war with Spain’s ally Savoy over the lands of Saluzza, Henri IV returned to his regular outreach for Ottoman military support, and this time with success. Henri IV kept de Brèves briefed on the ongoing hostilities, and the

⁴² See, for instance, Henri IV’s agreements with the last Leaguer hold outs such as Mercoeur in Pitts, *Henri IV*, 206-212.

⁴³ BNF, NAF 7495, fol. 181r, Ibrahim Pasha to Henri IV, May 1599.

⁴⁴ BNF, NAF 7495, fol. 181r, Ibrahim Pasha to Henri IV, May 1599.

king never ceased to remind de Brèves that the war with Savoy was a *de facto* war with Spain since their common enemy openly supported Savoy.⁴⁵ De Brèves dutifully assured the Ottomans that France's war would benefit them because it would prevent the union of Christian princes against the Ottomans. Spain will be forced to support Savoy after the French invasion of Italy.⁴⁶ The Ottomans appreciated this diversion because it prevented Philip II from supporting Emperor Rudolph II in Hungary, which was a significant concern of the vizier Yemişci Hasan Pasha.⁴⁷ Henri IV urged de Brèves to secretly persuade the Ottomans to dispatch their fleet to the Calabrian coast and Sicily.⁴⁸

This effort had its intended effect. Ibrahim Pasha, the grand vizier and leader of the army in Hungary, decided to send an envoy to France.⁴⁹ For this mission, Ibrahim employed two French captains—one named Barthélémy de Coeurs—who had deserted the Habsburg army on the Hungarian front for Ibrahim's camp and who had been fighting under the grand vizier's command.⁵⁰ De Coeurs arrived at Henri IV's court *via* Marseille sometime in the middle of June 1601 with presents and a proposal. He hoped to procure an offensive alliance between the two countries

⁴⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 31 July 1600, 23 September 1600, and 29 October 1600, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:266-268, 310, 332-334.

⁴⁶ Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 20 February 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:446-447; Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 1 April 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:449-450.

⁴⁷ See Evrim Türkçelik, "El Imperio Otomano y la política de alianzas: las relaciones francootomanas en el tránsito del siglo XVI al XVII," *Hispania* 75, no. 249 (April 2015): 61-62.

⁴⁸ Henri IV to de Brèves, 10 January 1601, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:744.

⁴⁹ See Evrim Türkçelik, "El Imperio Otomano y la política de alianzas: las relaciones francootomanas en el tránsito del siglo XVI al XVII," *Hispania* 75, no. 249 (April 30, 2015): 61-2; Péter Sahin-Tóth, "La France et les français face à la 'longue guerre' de Hongrie, 1591-1606" (Dissertation, Université François Rabelais de Tours, 1997), 179.

⁵⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, 25 June 1601, *Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, vol. 5, 430-431; Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 4 May 1601, *CSPVenice*, vol. 9, 458. On French defectors fighting in the Ottoman army, see C. F. Finkel, "French Mercenaries in the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606: The Desertion of the Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London 55, no. 3 (1992): 451-71; Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*, (Wien: VWGÖ, 1988), 106-109.

against Spain. The plan was for Henri IV to support the Ottomans in Hungary and the Ottomans would support Henri IV's war effort with "all good mutual intelligence (*correspondance*) and assistance." But if circumstances prevented the French king from lending military assistance, Ibrahim sought French help to mediate peace with the Austrian Habsburgs.⁵¹

The Ottoman promise for support came too late. Henri IV was not very interested in the offer. The Treaty of Savoy (May 1601) that ended the conflict over Saluzzo was confirmed before De Coeurs arrived in June.⁵² The series of empty promises for military support that characterized Franco-Ottoman diplomacy over the past five years caused Henri IV to lose faith in the military benefits of the alliance. When the Ottoman envoy De Coeurs arrived, Henri IV focused the conversation toward the jurisdictional dispute with England over foreign merchants in Ottoman lands. For the rest of Henri IV's reign, he stopped seeking out Ottoman military or diplomatic support in any of his policies. Indeed in 1603, he told de Brèves that he no longer wanted him to discuss Ottoman naval campaigns in the Mediterranean since all the promises from the sultan are baseless.⁵³ This was a significant statement. Even when France was not at war, French kings had continuously encouraged Ottoman conflict with Spain over the past three decades. Henri IV's lack of faith in the Ottomans that produced this sentiment was influenced by ongoing controversies with the English and the North African corsairs that the Ottomans failed to resolve in a manner acceptable to Henri IV.

⁵¹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 25 June 1601, in *Recueil des Lettres de Henri IV*, 5:431.

⁵² Pitts, *Henri IV of France*, 227-228.

⁵³ Henri IV to de Brèves, 17 April 1603, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 6:77.

The Franco-English Rivalry

After 1601, France did not seek out Ottoman military support for the rest of Henri IV's reign. Instead, the overriding concern of French diplomacy in Constantinople centered around French mercantile concerns. In this arena, France faced two primary problems that lasted the duration of Henri IV's reign: the Franco-English rivalry over the jurisdiction of Dutch merchants in the Ottoman Empire and the growing threat of North African corsairs to French trade and even French shores. These two disputes only served to further alienate the Ottomans from Henri IV's foreign policy calculus.

The Franco-English rivalry has received little attention since Arthur Horniker's mid-twentieth-century articles on the matter.⁵⁴ Since then, research on the Ottoman Capitulatory regime has demonstrated how the Ottoman government used the Capitulations to tighten political relationships with their allies.⁵⁵ Placing the Franco-English rivalry in this context helps explain why the Dutch fluctuated between French and English jurisdictions so frequently and why Henri IV was increasingly frustrated by the Ottomans' inaction in the Mediterranean. The Ottomans had little interest in the rivalry. Instead, they gave in to the grievances of the party whose current foreign policy most directly benefited the Ottomans, in other words, whoever was at war with Spain. Henri IV could not acquire Ottoman support after 1595 because the Ottomans were using the French and English conflicts with

⁵⁴ Arthur Leon Horniker, "William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," *The Journal of Modern History* 14, no. 3 (1942): 289-316; Arthur Leon Horniker, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612," *The Journal of Modern History* 18, no. 4 (1946): 289-305.

⁵⁵ Ethem Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 296; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Aman"; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Imtiyazat."

Philip II in the same capacity: a way to distract Spain from their ongoing conflict with the Austrian Habsburgs.

The roots of the English rivalry developed when Edward Barton became the representative for Henri IV after Lancosme rebelled in 1589. This situation provided an opportunity for the English to expand their mercantile rights in the Ottoman Empire. The English ambassador Edward Barton acquired jurisdiction over all merchants, not from France or Venice, trading in the ports of Egypt for the English crown.⁵⁶ This development was a significant contravention of France's 1581 Capitulations, which granted France jurisdiction over all Western Christians from countries without Capitulations.⁵⁷ It meant those merchants were compelled to trade under the French flag, pay duties demanded from French ambassadors and consuls, and appeal to French protection in the case of a dispute in Ottoman lands. Under Edward Barton's agreement, those privileges were transferred to the English for all trade in and out of Egypt. The English imposition into French privileges extended further in 1594 when the *kapudan* pasha arrived in Constantinople with some Dutch captives. The English claimed responsibility for negotiating their release, clearly flouting French jurisdiction. Barton claimed that the Dutch fell under their protection since Queen Elizabeth agreed to be the protector of the Dutch in 1585 with the Treaty of Nonesuch. This claim was not mere rhetoric. Elizabeth treated the Netherlands as her dependents. She sent the Earl of Leicester there to be the

⁵⁶ Edward Barton to Robert Cecil, 20/30 January 1596/7, in *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel*, ed. K. Heeringa (Nijhoff: 's-Gravenhage, 1910), 163.

⁵⁷ BNF, Français 16141, 62r-62v.

governor-general, and she insisted that her commander in the Netherlands have an active role in all decisions.⁵⁸

So why did this become a significant affair? For the English, the Dutch merchants represented increased financial support for their consuls and ambassadors in Constantinople from their consular duties. As the Venetian *bailo* summarized the issue, “the English representatives lack ... strong support [necessary] to maintain the Ambassador in Constantinople and the Consuls elsewhere; for they cannot draw their salaries except from the dues levied, and their payments can be exacted from the English subjects only, who are few in number, and so their fees.”⁵⁹ For France, much of the issue was about soft power. As Henri IV himself explained, his ability to extend to his friends and allies the privileges that benefited his subjects, demonstrated “the care [he] has for them, and ties them more directly to [him].”⁶⁰

By 1597, the dilemma between de Brèves and Barton had grown so caustic that they were no longer speaking to one another. De Brèves had returned the jurisdictional privileges in Egypt Barton had briefly contracted to the English crown back to the French banner.⁶¹ In response, Barton continually threatened “mischief” to de Brèves, and the disagreement between the two grew to such an extent that both de Brèves and Barton were threatening to withdraw from Constantinople if their grievances—the dispute over jurisdictional rights—were not satisfied.⁶² Barton

⁵⁸ McCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics 1588-1603*, chap. 13, especially pp. 249-255.

⁵⁹ Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate, 7 February 1600, in *CSPVenice*, 9:392.

⁶⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, 28 April 1604, in *Recueil des Lettres de Henri IV*, 6:241.

⁶¹ Barton to Cecil, 20/30 January 1596/7, in *Bronnen tot*, 163; Barton to Cecil, 3 March 1597, in *Bronnen tot*, 163-164.

⁶² Girolamo Capello and Marco Venier to the Doge and Senate, 29 January 1597, in *CSPVenice*, 9:254.

himself was furious about the issue. The animosity between the two even came to impact policy. This same year, the English ambassador refused to support de Brèves's appeal to the Sultan Mehmed III for military support against Spain.⁶³

De Brèves followed up the consular jurisdiction in Egypt with a renewal of the French Capitulations later in 1597.⁶⁴ These agreements can be interpreted as a sort of compromise between the two Ottoman allies. Henri IV expected as much. Despite his hopes that all the Christian nations “reserving the Venetians must trade under the banner of France,” he recognized that the English were unlikely to be compelled to once again trade under the French flag even though they were explicitly included in the previous rendition.⁶⁵ This was in fact the case. Venice and England were not forced to trade under the French flag, but all other countries were, including the Dutch. In addition, the agreement stated explicitly that all ships trading under the French banner had to pay their consular duty as well.⁶⁶ These Capitulations thus returned the situation to the status quo. The Capitulations no longer forced English merchants to sail under French protection if only in theory—the English never respected this article of the 1581 Capitulations—but the Capitulations did guarantee that Henri IV no longer needed to fear “that the prerogatives of the French banner would be transferred to the English.”⁶⁷ In many ways, this resolution was sensible for the Ottomans. Both France and England were at war with Spain. France declared war in 1595, and news of the English sack of Cadiz on the Spanish coast reached

⁶³ Girolamo Capello and Marco Venier, 14 January 1597, in *CSPVenice*, 9:252.

⁶⁴ See François-Emmanuel Guignard de Saint-Priest, *Mémoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le commerce des Français dans le Levant* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1877), 398-410.

⁶⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 9 March 1596, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:523-524.

⁶⁶ Saint-Preist, *Mémoires sur l'ambassade de Turquie*, 404.

⁶⁷ Henri IV to de Brèves, 5 October 1597, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:861.

Constantinople in 1596.⁶⁸ So, the Ottomans did not want to displease either party.

The agreement did just that. It made nobody happy, but it also made nobody angry.

The issue remained resolved until France and Spain negotiated peace in 1598, and a new English ambassador, Henry Lello, arrived in Constantinople the following year. Immediately when Lello arrived, he was able to capitalize on the recent Franco-Spanish peace to procure once again English jurisdiction over the Dutch.⁶⁹ Any resentment de Brèves held toward Lello for re-opening the dispute was exacerbated by rumors that Lello denigrated Henri IV to further his cause. The alleged insult arose during a conversation between one of the Ottoman viziers Halil Pasha and Lello about the current state of Christian European politics. These sorts of conversations were regular between Christian ambassadors and Ottoman statesmen as an intelligence-gathering tool.⁷⁰ When Halil inquired why Henri IV made peace with Spain, Lello responded (according to Halil Pasha, who shared the story directly with de Brèves) that Henri IV left the “good” religion (read Protestant) to become an “idolater and papist,” which caused the Pope to mediate between Spain and France. Lello then went on to explain that as a result of the French king’s perfidy, “no reliance could be placed upon the amity of France, but only upon his [Lello’s] mistress [Elizabeth of England].”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Piero Duodo to the Doge and Senate, 10 August 1596, in *CSPVenice*, 9:319.

⁶⁹ Henry Lello to Robert Cecil, 21/31 October 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167.

⁷⁰ Emrah Safa Gurkan, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry” (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2012), 405-410; Gabor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77-103.

⁷¹ Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate, 16 October 1599, in *CSPVenice*, 9:379.

While Lello himself, along with his secretary, insisted he never made such claims, the truth of the matter was of little importance because de Brèves quickly weaponized the affair to discredit the Englishman.⁷² Lello complained bitterly about de Brèves's treatment of him: he "spareth nothinge to hinder all my desingies in mallice, seinge the reputation of Her Majesty so great in this port and cheefly for the consulledge of the forestiers (consular duties) [of the Dutch], which the Grand Signor little after the arrivall of the shipp graunted should come under Her Majesty's banner."⁷³ The complaints from de Brèves appear to have been successful since the consular jurisdiction of the Dutch rapidly returned to the French, leaving the English ambassador writing back to England for advice on how to proceed.⁷⁴ Sultan Mehmed III sent *hukums* (imperial decrees) to both Egypt and Aleppo in 1599, commanding them to respect the right of the French consuls to collect their duties from all of those traveling under French protection, and explained that the observance of these rights and privileges was obligatory.⁷⁵ Viorel Panaite has argued that these orders demonstrate the regular contradiction of the Capitulations by local Muslims, and that is true, but they also indicate the efforts of other Christian Europeans to undermine them as well. For instance, one of the issues at hand for this iteration of the Anglo-French jurisdictional dispute were Dutch merchants who "submytted themselves under the protecc(i)on of H[er] M[ajesty], sayinge: we are H[er]"

⁷² Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate, 16 October 1599, in *CSPVenice*, 9:379-380.

⁷³ Henry Lello to Robert Cecil, 21/31 October 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167.

⁷⁴ Henry Lello to Robert Cecil, 4/14 November 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167-168. Henri IV was very pleased with this outcome, which he considered a "victory [De Brèves] gained against the pursuits of the English for the conservation of my [French] banner." Henri IV to de Brèves, 7 January 1600, *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, vol. 5, 197.

⁷⁵ See Viorel Panaites, "French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction in Egypt and Aleppo in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," in *Well Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. Pascal Firges et. al. (Boston: Brill, 2014), 86-87.

M[ajesty]’s subjects and will be under her baner.”⁷⁶ The *hukums* from the sultan prevented the Dutch merchants from this action.

This controversy was not simply about commerce either, but power over Christian Europeans in the Eastern Mediterranean that the French could enact. Lello feared specifically for the treatment of these Dutchmen who undermined French prerogatives there. He was worried that the French “ambassador should cause them to be hanged.” Later, the principal Dutch merchant who claimed English protection was sent to the French consulate where he was “beaten and punyshed at [the consul’s] discretion.”⁷⁷ Similarly, de Brèves was able to exact the execution of the Alexandrian consul Paulo Mariani, who worked for both the English and French, after persuading the Ottomans he was a Spanish spy.⁷⁸ The jurisdiction the French acquired gave them very real influence over Christian Europeans in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹

From 1601 to 1602, Lello’s position once again improved. In 1601, Henri IV ended a war with Savoy, which he repeatedly claimed to the Ottomans was a war against Spain.⁸⁰ All the while, Elizabeth of England continued her conflict with Philip II. If that were not enough, the duke of Mercoeur led a force of Frenchmen into the

⁷⁶ Henry Lello to Robert Cecil 4/14 November 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167.

⁷⁷ Henry Lello to Robert Cecil 4/14 November 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167-168.

⁷⁸ Issues with Mariani began much earlier before his execution, see BNF, Français 16144, fols. 212r-236r, Henri IV ordered him removed from office and returned to Venice, see Henri IV to de Brèves, 21 November 1594 and 20 March 1595, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 4:252-253, 323. On his execution, see Henry Lello to Robert Cecil 4/14 November 1599, in *Bronnen tot*, 167-168; Marco Venier, 24 December 1596, in *CSPVenice*, 9:247; Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdictions,” 76-77; This news even spread around the French court, Piero Duodo to the Doge and Senate, 15 March 1597, in *CSPVenice*, 9:260.

⁷⁹ On these go-betweens, see the special issue “Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” eds. Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstic, special issue, *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015).

⁸⁰ Henri IV to de Brèves, 29 October 1600, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:332-334; Henri IV to de Brèves, 23 September 1600, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:310; Henri IV to de Brèves, 31 July 1600, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:266-268

Ottoman war in Hungary on the side of the Habsburgs, and his presence did not escape the Ottomans. As the *bailo* reported Cigalazade Pasha's unhappiness with de Brèves and France, "the most Christian King was doing as badly as possible, by making peace with Spain, the enemy of the sultan; [and] in the [Habsburg] Imperial Army, beside the duke of Mercoeur a large part of the soldiers were French,... [and] finally that if it should appear from the Capitulations that the matter stood in his [De Brèves's] favour, the notary who drew it up falsely would lose a hand."⁸¹ When Mehmed III appointed a new grand vizier, Lello took advantage of the new political situation to re-open the jurisdictional dispute, and he was easily able to return the Dutch to English jurisdiction in the English Capitulations of 1601.⁸²

Even so, the matter was hardly resolved. De Brèves knew that France's peace with Savoy damaged his position in Constantinople, so he tried to manipulate the situation to the best of his abilities. He conceded the jurisdiction of the Dutch to the English, hoping it would be declared by way of an Ottoman *hukum* (imperial decree), but the *kapudan* pasha Cigalazade, a long-time enemy of the French, saw through the ambassador's ruse. If the English conflict with Spain ended, de Brèves could more easily return the Dutch to French protection, so he ensured that the jurisdiction issue was written into the English Capitulations.⁸³ Despite Cigalazade's machinations, de Brèves was still able to persuade the grand vizier and sultan to send a *hukum* to the beylerbey of Egypt that stated exactly the opposite in unambiguous terms: "Excepting the Venetians and Englishmen, all the Franks [Europeans] may

⁸¹ Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 17 April 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:454.

⁸² Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 2 May 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:457-456

⁸³ Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate, 2 May 1601, in *CSPVenice*, 9:457-456.

refer—in all circumstances and difficult matters—to the above-mentioned *bailo* [the French consul].”⁸⁴

Thereafter, Henri IV disengaged from his outreach to the Ottomans until 1604 when Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) came to the throne, and he sought a renewal of the French Capitulations. After 1601, Henri IV’s frustration with the Ottoman continued to grow from the jurisdictional dispute along with ongoing corsair raids against the French, which will be discussed in the next section. By 1603, the French king stopped writing to de Brèves at all until Ahmed I’s ascension in December 1603. In the king’s final letter, he explicitly told the ambassador that he considered all the sultan’s promises “baseless.”⁸⁵ His renewed correspondence in 1604 was dedicated solely to renegotiating the Capitulations, and the political situation was ripe for the French to have their pleas heard. England made peace with Spain in 1603 when James I came to the throne after Queen Elizabeth’s death. In addition, English pirates attacked and burnt an Ottoman squadron the same year.⁸⁶ Lello had to seek orders for the attackers’ arrest and execution to save face.⁸⁷ By comparison, Henri IV ingratiated himself to the Ottomans by refusing to receive a Safavid ambassador who was traveling around the various Christian European countries seeking a coalition against the Ottomans.⁸⁸ In 1604, when the Safavid representative arrived in

⁸⁴ BNF, Turc 130, fols. 96r-94r, 57r-55r, quoted in Panaite, “French Capitulations and Consular Jurisdiction,” 85.

⁸⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 17 April 1603, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 6:77.

⁸⁶ Francesco Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 1 July 1604, in *CSPVenice*, 10:165; Horniker, “Anglo-French Rivalry,” 301. While the Ottomans were comfortable not getting too involved in inter-Christian piracy, they were certainly responsive when it impacted them.

⁸⁷ Francesco Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 1 July 1604, *CSPVenice*, vol. 10, 165.

⁸⁸ See Jerry Brotton, *The Sultan and the Queen: The Untold Story of Elizabeth and Islam* (New York: Viking, 2016), chap. 10; also Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Three Ways to be Alien: Travels & Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2011), 93-107. This embassy began as an attempt by the Earl of Essex and Anthony Sherley—the envoy sent to the Safavids and who became the

Provence, Henri IV sent him away because, as he claimed in his explanation to de Brèves, the Safavids made war against his friends and allies.⁸⁹

France thus appeared the predominant ally to the Ottomans, and the 1604 Capitulations de Brèves negotiated reflected it. They significantly expanded the privileges of France. All Christian European merchants could theoretically be brought under French protection. Article five declared that “all other nations alienated from our [Ottoman] Porte, who do not have an ambassador [here but] want to trade in our lands, they must come under the banner and protection of France.”⁹⁰ While this article did not compel Venice and England—both of which maintained an ambassador in Constantinople—to trade under the French banner, another article did explicitly list both Venetian and English merchants as among the nations *allowed* to trade under the French flag in Ottoman lands.⁹¹ This option would be enticing to prospective English and Venetian merchants because the French negotiated significantly reduced tariffs and customs: merchants under the French flag were exempt completely from numerous taxes and customs, and their total tax burden could not exceed three *écus* at their departure from Ottoman lands.⁹² Not only did the Dutch merchants fall under these expansive privileges, but the

representative of the Safavids to the Christian-European courts—to create an Anglo-Dutch-Safavid trading network that could bypass the Iberian and Ottoman stranglehold on the spice trade, but it morphed into this anti-Ottoman endeavor when Sherley arrived in Persia.

⁸⁹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 24 June 1604, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 6:260. Knowledge of the ambassador was widespread, and fears of successful alliance were developing as early as 1601. Henri IV made it known that he had no interest in seeing the Safavid ambassador then and it continued until 1604. See Henri IV to de Brèves, 13 July 1601, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:435.

⁹⁰ François Savary de Brèves, *Articles du Traicté fait en l'année mil six cens quatre, entre Henri le grand Roy de France, & de Nauarre, et Sultan Amat Empereur des Turcs, par l'entremise de Messire François Sauary, seigneur de Brèves, conseiller du roy en ses conseil d'estat & priuè, lors ambassadeur pour sa maiesté à la porte dudit Empereur* (Paris: Imprimerie des langues Orientales, 1615), article 5, n.p.

⁹¹ De Brèves, *Articles du Traicté*, article 4, n.p.

⁹² De Brèves, *Articles du traicté*, article 13 n.p.; See also Jensen,

Capitulations also stated that “neither the English, [n]or any other can prevent” merchants from trading under France’s protection.⁹³

The 1604 Capitulations further expanded French privileges in the Ottoman Empire by extending jurisdiction over Christian pilgrims to the French. This clause used similar language as those discussing jurisdiction over merchants: French subjects and those of France’s “friends, allies, and confederates, can under his [Henri IV’s] attestation (*aveu*) and protection, come freely to visit the holy places of Jerusalem” without any impediment. The Christian orders operating in Jerusalem, as well as the clerics serving the church of the Holy Sepulcher, fell under the protection of the French king.⁹⁴ This clause was a significant demonstration of favoritism on the part of the Ottomans. Ottoman jurisdiction over the *Hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) acquired from the conquest of the Mamluks in 1517 was an important part of Ottoman state legitimacy.⁹⁵ The significance of French jurisdiction over Christian pilgrims was not lost on them. The privilege extended to France another layer of soft power in the Levant over other Christian European princes.

The 1604 Capitulations established a political situation that lasted until 1609 when France and England finally decided to share the duties of the Dutch merchants. Of course, the new ambassadors from France and England engaged in their own rivalry over the issue, but little came of it until 1609. For instance, the English ambassador Thomas Glover was able to acquire English jurisdiction over all

⁹³ De Brèves, *Articles du traicté*, article 5, n.p.

⁹⁴ De Brèves, *Articles du traicté*, article 4 n.p.

⁹⁵ See Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 110; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (Reprint; New York: Phoenix Press, 2000), 32-34; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517-1683* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1994).

Christian merchants in the Ottoman Empire in the 1607 Capitulations. But just as fast as it was confirmed, the clause was revoked, and jurisdiction returned to the French through the actions of the French ambassador Jean de Gontaut-Biron, baron of Salignac. The revocation included letters from the sultan to his governors, correcting his order, and to Henri IV, apologizing for the confusion.⁹⁶ In 1609, the two ambassadors decided to avoid further disputes by dividing the jurisdiction of the seventeen Dutch provinces between them. Half were placed under English jurisdiction and the other half, French.⁹⁷

This approach by the Ottomans—fluctuating jurisdiction back and forth between the French and English—was pragmatic from their perspective. The sultan simply conceded to the requests of the state most closely aligned to Ottoman foreign policy. The matter was of little importance to the Ottomans, whose financial benefit from Christian trade comprised only a small percentage of the Empire’s foreign trade. Throughout the seventeenth century, Christian European trade with the Ottomans never exceeded ten percent, and likely remained less than five percent, of Ottoman commercial activity. Indeed, Ottoman domestic trade dwarfed the entirety of Christian European trade with the Ottomans throughout the century.⁹⁸ Under which flag the Dutch traded mattered little as long as it did not interfere with Ottoman foreign policy. For the Ottomans, the Capitulations represented a means by

⁹⁶ Salignac to Henri IV, 26 April 1607, in *Ambassade En Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, Baron de Salignac : 1605 à 1610 : Correspondance Diplomatique et Documents Inédits*, ed. Theodore de Gontaut Biron, 2 vols. (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1888-1889), 2:136-137; BNF, Français 16167, fols. 255r-259r. Traduction des commandemens du grand Seigneur quil a envoieez aux Gouverneurs et juges des Eschelles de son Empire; BNF, Français 16167, fols. 251r-254v.

⁹⁷ Thomas Glover to Salisbury, 7/17 October 1609, in *Bronnen tot*, 174-175; Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 3 October 1609 and 17 October 1609, in *CSPVenice*, 11:368, 370-371.

⁹⁸ Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” 301-305, especially 305.

which to draw their allies closer. This *ad hoc* approach by the Ottomans to the jurisdictional dispute privileged the politico-diplomatic relationship that the Capitulations represented. The country making war with Spain could use the conflict as leverage to receive what they wanted. Just as Henri IV thought the Ottoman conflict with the Austrian Habsburgs prevented Spain from raising troops from Germany, the Ottomans recognized that a Spanish conflict in the West prevented them from supporting the Austrian Habsburgs.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the Ottoman approach led to immense frustration by Henri IV, who increasingly interpreted the Ottoman actions as perfidious. After the 1604 Capitulations were confirmed, the French crown's diplomacy with the Ottomans became focused on preventing North African corsair attacks on French shipping.

The Corsair Problem

The 1604 Capitulations were the last major diplomatic endeavor Henri IV encouraged with the Ottomans. As soon as he acquired the most extensive privileges extended to the French, he further disengaged from the military alliance that formed the nucleus of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy since the 1530s. The rivalry over the jurisdictional rights over the Dutch combined with ongoing attacks by the Barbary corsairs in the western Mediterranean to cause Henri IV to increasingly treat the Ottomans as an economic partner rather than a military partner. As the Ottomans and Spanish mutually retreated from the Mediterranean frontier after the 1580s, the North Africans lost an essential source of revenue in the form of booty from the

⁹⁹ See Türkçelik, "El Imperio Otomano y la política de alianzas," 61-62.

conflict with Spain. This conflict provided the financial and social support that formed the basis of the Mediterranean faction.¹⁰⁰ The result was increased attacks on French shipping and the French coast, and as Henri IV came to realize, the inability of the Ottomans to prevent them.

French complaints of North African attacks became the common place from Henri IV in his letters to de Brèves and then later Salignac. These comments became a regular part of diplomatic correspondence much earlier than 1604. Henri IV complained in 1598 about the attacks on the French that appeared more as “enterprises of opportunity” than from orders originating in Constantinople.¹⁰¹ By 1602, Henri IV became increasingly irritated by the incessant attacks on his subjects “wherever they [Barbary corsairs] encounter” them. The French king threatened to join the Habsburg conflict with the Ottomans in Hungary if the sultan could not control his North African subjects.¹⁰²

A major impediment to an effective Ottoman response to French grievances was the *kapudan* pasha himself, Cigalazade Pasha. When Henri IV briefly considered replacing de Brèves in 1600, the *kapudan* spread rumors that de Brèves was actually departing Constantinople because Henri IV planned to send some galleys against Constantinople.¹⁰³ Moreover, Cigalazade protected Ottoman privateers who were attacking French and Venetian shipping. Many of these corsairs were part of the *kapudan*'s household. The attacks from corsairs connected to Cigalazade became so

¹⁰⁰ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the “Mediterranean Faction” (1585-1587),” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLV (2015): 66-74.

¹⁰¹ Henri IV to de Brèves, 4 July 1598, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:5.

¹⁰² Henri IV to de Brèves, 19 January 1602, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:533.

¹⁰³ BNF, Français 16144, fol. 279v, de Brèves to Henri IV, 23 March 1600.

intense that it drove de Brèves to make a written complaint to the sultan, which could only exacerbate tensions with Cigalazade.¹⁰⁴ The corsair attacks on the French continued unabated.

The French king began to question whether Mehmed III could control his North African territories. He no longer expected much “effect of the commandments” from the Grand Seigneur, and he did not know if Mehmed III could “henceforth dispose of them as his predecessors have up until now.”¹⁰⁵ The French complaints on this issue were so great they even found their way into Ottoman chronicles.¹⁰⁶ Henri IV’s exasperation with attacks from the Barbary coast led him to abandon Ottoman intervention in the matter and took matters into his own hands. He ordered the captain of his galleys to seek out one of the Algerian corsairs responsible for many of the attacks and cut off his head.¹⁰⁷

After 1604, resolving corsair attacks on French interests became the primary priority of Henri IV in his Levantine diplomacy. Indeed, the French king began negotiating directly with the Barbary states. In that year, the Algerians sacked and destroyed the Bastion of France, a French trading post in Algiers.¹⁰⁸ When de Brèves departed Constantinople, he was tasked with traveling to Algiers on his way to France to negotiate a treaty with the Algerians to stop the attacks on French interest. The treaty was concluded in August 1606, but other than freeing many Frenchmen

¹⁰⁴ BNF, Français 16144, fols. 282r-282v, de Brèves to Henri IV, 9 April 1600.

¹⁰⁵ Henri IV to de Brèves, 3 September 1602, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:663.

¹⁰⁶ Naima, *Annals of the Turkish Empire, from 1591 to 1569 of the Christian Era*, trans. Charles Fraser (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1832), 202.

¹⁰⁷ Henri IV to de Brèves, 11 August 1602, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 5:653-654.

¹⁰⁸ Henri IV to de Brèves, 31 August 1604, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 6:257.

currently enslaved by the Algerians, it did little to help.¹⁰⁹ Later in 1607, Henri IV was seeking orders from the sultan for the restitution of French ships taken by North African corsairs.¹¹⁰ By 1608, North African attacks on the French continued unabated, and Salignac recommended to Henri IV that it would be better for France to break its alliance with the Ottomans than suffer the insolence of Barbary corsairs. It became painfully evident that the sultan could not, or would not, do anything to prevent the attacks.¹¹¹

Conclusion

By 1610, the transition of the Ottoman alliance from a medium for military coordination against the Habsburgs to a medium for Levantine trade was complete. Immediately before Henri IV's death, the French king began pursuing a coalition against the Habsburgs in Spanish Italy and in the Holy Roman Empire. The king's desired mistress fled France with her husband against the express orders of Henri IV, and they received protection in Milan from the king of Spain, Philip III. This lover's trifle combined with a very real succession dispute over the lands of Julich that pitted the Protestant princes of the Holy Roman Empire against the emperor himself. Henri IV threw his support behind the Protestant princes and constructed a coalition that included the Protestant princes, the duke of Savoy, the Dutch Provinces, and others in preparation for war. Henri IV's exact plan remains a mystery: was it meant simply as a commitment to attack Milan and to ensure the

¹⁰⁹ Salignac to Henri IV, 12 December 1605, 14 March 1606, 22, May 1606, and de Brèves to Villeroy, 27 August 1606, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 2:10, 24-25, 47-52, 74-75.

¹¹⁰ Henri IV to Ahmed I, 1607, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 7:441

¹¹¹ Salignac to Henri IV, 26 June 1608, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 2:220-223.

installation of the Protestant princes of Julich, or was it something much more dramatic. Henri IV died before he could enact any plan.¹¹²

What is clear, however, is that the Ottomans were never included as a partner in the coalition. Despite writing letters to Salignac and Sultan Ahmed I in 1610, none of them referenced the ongoing preparations against the Habsburgs.¹¹³ Henri IV made no attempt to include Ottoman support in the coalition he was in the process of creating. Indeed, it appears that Salignac learned of the coalition from rumors circulating in Constantinople.¹¹⁴ This approach was a dramatic shift in French foreign policy. Since the 1530s, the Ottomans had been a permanent part of France's anti-Habsburg foreign policy. During the period, they were France's most dependable ally. Even if their military support did not always materialize, the Ottomans never acted as an enemy to France during the sixteenth century and always identified with France's ongoing conflict against Spain.

Henri IV's early identification with the Ottoman struggle against the Habsburgs did not last because the king no longer trusted the dependability of the Ottomans. The naval support promised by the sultan never materialized beyond a few half-hearted naval campaigns. Moreover, the Ottoman approach to the jurisdiction dispute with the English and their inability to prevent the Barbary corsairs increasingly aggressive assaults on French trade caused Henri IV to question the Ottomans' dedication to the alliance. The turning point came at the same time that French influence grew to its pinnacle in 1604. The void of French confidence in

¹¹² Pitts, *Henri IV of France*, 302-316.

¹¹³ Henri IV to Ahmed I, 2 January 1610, in *Recueil des lettres de Henri IV*, 8:970.

¹¹⁴ Salignac to Henri IV, 2 June 1610, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 362.

the promises of military support left only an economic relationship. When the Ottomans learned of Henri IV's anti-Habsburg coalition in 1610, Ahmed I and his viziers were eager to contribute, but the French court never even considered sending an invitation.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Salignac to Henri IV, 2 June 1610, in *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron*, 362.

CONCLUSION

Franco-Ottoman diplomacy continued throughout the sixteenth century despite the theoretical end of the Franco-Spanish rivalry in 1559. The rivalry continued, as did France's attempts to undermine Spain at every turn. The historiography is full of descriptions of these policies in northwestern Europe: primarily French diplomacy with England and the Netherlands to counter the proliferation of Spanish power in the Netherlands and the Iberian Peninsula.¹ The Ottoman Empire was also an integral part of this diplomacy of survival, which extended to the Mediterranean and North Africa.² Geoffrey Parker demonstrated that Spain's ability to reconquer the Netherlands was severely hampered by the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Philip II always privileged the Mediterranean theater over other matters.³ The French were aware of the precedence the Mediterranean received in Spanish strategy and acted appropriately.

The Ottoman Empire thus remained an essential part of all of France's diplomatic machinations. Whether the French court intended to draw France and Spain closer in the 1560s or sought to coordinate a coalition against Spain from the 1570s to the 1590s, the Ottomans were a central part of French international

¹ Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Geoffrey Parker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1559-1648," *Past & Present* 49 (November 1970): 72-95; N.M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973); Alan James, "A French Armada? The Azores Campaigns, 1580-1583," *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 1 (2012): 1-20.

² De Lamar Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1, 1985): 463, refers to France's diplomacy of survival, but never explains how the Ottomans fit within that strategy.

³ Parker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1648," 77-83.

strategy. Directly following the peace treaty between France and Spain, the French court sought to engender favor from Spain by negotiating on their behalf for prisoners of war in Constantinople. Later, when French pretense for friendliness waned, and the rivalry returned, so too did France's attempt to coordinate with the Ottomans against Spain. When the French were unwilling or unable to intervene against Spain themselves, they sought to arbitrate continued conflict in the Mediterranean between the Ottomans and Spanish while simultaneously mediating peace between the Ottomans and Venetians in the 1570s. This strategy followed France's parallel policy of attempting to establish a marriage alliance with England directed against Spain in the Netherlands. This process was repeated in the 1580s with a second attempt at military cooperation with the Ottomans, which was similarly navigated in parallel with negotiations with England by seeking further English support for the Netherlands' rebels. In the 1590s and early 1600s, France continued to seek Ottoman support against Spain and the Catholic League, asking the Ottomans to put pressure on Marseille to return their allegiance to Henri IV and to engage Spain in the Mediterranean once again. These pursuits continued throughout the period despite French awareness of the pressures on the Ottomans' eastern front, limiting their capabilities. The French persistence, and near successes, demonstrate the structural place of the alliance in France's foreign policy.

If the French approach to their Ottoman alliance demonstrated significant continuity throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, the prestige of the French in Constantinople fluctuated dramatically. While the 1560s were characterized by a reluctance to abandon the alliance on the part of the French and

the Ottomans, neither pursued the alliance with any exuberance while the two countries reacted to the post-Cateau-Cambrésis situation. The 1570s and early 1580s saw the high point of French prestige in Constantinople reminiscent of the 1530s and 1540s, but the inability of French ambassadors to adapt to the new situation established by the arrival and recognition of the English ambassador in the mid-1580s, led to an increasingly caustic relationship between the French ambassadors and the Ottomans. Germigny and Lancosme so passionately sought to defend French privileges and precedence in Constantinople that they isolated themselves. The situation for the French only worsened as France's domestic turmoil reached Constantinople when Lancosme joined the Catholic League against the new Protestant King Henri IV. It set up a civil war of sorts between royalists and Leaguers in the Ottoman capital that undermined Ottoman efforts to support France against Spain. Lancosme's successor de Brèves reestablished the French diplomatic and economic position in Constantinople, but after he expanded French privileges in the Ottoman Empire in 1604, Henri IV counterintuitively turned away from the military aspects of the Ottoman alliance. Increasingly intolerant of the Ottomans' inability to provide substantive support to France or prevent North African corsair attacks on French shipping, Henri IV stopped including the Ottomans in his foreign policy strategy, envisioning the alliance in solely economic terms. The Franco-Ottoman relationship was evolving toward a primarily economic relationship in which Franco-Ottoman interactions focused on supporting unabated trade between the two countries and the activities of religious orders in the Ottoman Empire.

After Henri IV was assassinated, the Franco-Ottoman alliance once again went relatively dormant. The young Louis XIII (r. 1610-1648) was but eight years old when he ascended to the throne of France upon his father's death. Thus, France was to suffer through all the uncertainties of a regency once again. This time, however, the king's mother and regent—Marie de Medici (1575-1642), who was influenced by the ongoing Catholic Counter Reformation—sought to strengthen the ties between France and the Papacy. Moreover, to the dismay to many in France, Concino Concini was one of the first to rise in the court of the regency government under Marie. An ultra-montane Catholic (or a partisan to papal authority), Concini also desired to further strengthen the relationship between the Catholic states. By 1614, the Queen regent and Concini sought an alliance with Spain through a marriage pact, wedding the French king to Philip III's daughter Anne of Austria. While the *dévo*t mentality of Marie de Medici has been questioned recently, it is certainly clear that she was trying to prevent any type of conflict with Spain—and thus the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman alliance—during Louis XIII's minority.¹⁸²

Indeed, the *dévo*t mentality that was rising in the French court reached the embassy by the 1620s. The ambassador Harlay de Césy had significant *dévo*t sympathies and remained very close to the Capuchins there. His presence facilitated the contact with Persia against the Ottomans *via* his support for the missionaries. The Capuchins were able to sneak the first French ambassador to Persia with Césy's

¹⁸² Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 89-94.

aid in 1624.¹⁸³ This development was not the only example of this sort of anti-Ottoman sentiment receiving court patronage. A rising tide of Catholic Reformation influenced the duke of Nevers and Père Joseph to establish the *Milice Chrétienne* in 1617 for the explicit purpose of raising a pan-Christian crusade against the Ottomans.¹⁸⁴ They received their funding from Marie de Medici.¹⁸⁵

Considering this evolution in the seventeenth century, one must wonder why it took so long to develop? How did France's Ottoman policy maintain such continuity throughout the sixteenth century, a period marked by an increasingly confessionalized view of politics and anything but policy continuity? Indeed, why did the French continue to pursue the Ottoman alliance despite such failure to establish effective military collaboration during the Wars of Religion? One explanation is that despite the failure of military collaboration, the alliance continued to work for the French. Their ability to advocate in Constantinople for Ottoman foreign policy measures, mediating treaties or trying to scuttle them, continued to benefit France. This position of influence was one of the primary reasons the French sought to maintain a privileged position in the Ottoman court, which led to the intense rivalry that developed with the English diplomats. The French played this part in the early 1570s with the treaty between the Ottomans and Venice. French diplomats continued to hinder Spanish treaty talks until the 1580s, and French intervention ensured that the continuation of the 1580 Ottoman-Spanish truce was never definitive even if it

¹⁸³ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France: Eurasian Trade, Exoticism, and the Ancien Regime* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 98.

¹⁸⁴ BNF, NAF 1054. Registre original de l'Ordre et milice de chevalerie chrétienne.

¹⁸⁵ Alan James, *The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661* (New York: Boydell Press, 2004), 28-29, 28n61.

continued to be extended. Later in the 1590s, the French sought to maintain the war between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs to prevent German auxiliaries from entering the French domestic conflict. The French continually played mediator to their own benefit. The faltering of the success of this strategy at the beginning of the seventeenth century can be partially blamed for the transition away from the Ottoman military alliance at the end of Henri IV's reign.

Of equal importance here was the strength of the institutional inertia surrounding the Ottoman alliance. Since the 1530s, France had established an infrastructure supporting its Ottoman alliance, which was only shored up in the latter half of the century. The French government invested significant financial and human capital into the maintenance of the alliance. Prominent nobles such as the Noailles family sat in the ambassador's seat in Constantinople, and others around the court such as the cardinals of Armagnac and Bourbon took an active interest in those who were appointed to the post. Diplomats in Venice played integral roles in directing information between Constantinople and France. And all levels of the French government were utilized to receive and entertain Ottoman diplomats in France appropriately. This infrastructure and institutional memory of consistent cooperation with the Ottomans was combined with consistent animosity toward both branches of the Habsburgs on the part of the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was not simply a partner of convenience; the French court invested in it heavily to expand its diplomatic community to accommodate it adequately. When the French court imagined possible allies against its Habsburg foes when designing strategy, the

Ottomans were one of the only European houses on which the French could depend not to seek amicable relations with the Habsburgs.

The continuity of France's cross-confessional diplomacy has two significant historiographical implications. First, in light of the alliance, the *realpolitik* of Cardinal Richelieu's willingness to partner with Protestant states against the Catholic Habsburgs was hardly novel, but instead represented a continuation of France's long-standing tradition of cross-confessional diplomacy. Second, France's, and indeed the rest of Christian Europe's, diplomatic and political history cannot be adequately represented within the traditional confines of European history. To appropriately represent the past, we must conceive of it in broader terms.

While the Franco-Ottoman relationship evolved away from direct military cooperation in the seventeenth century, Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIII simply found new cross-confessional partners in France's traditional conflict with their Habsburg foes. During the Thirty Years' War, Richelieu became a leader of the *Bon Français* movement, which advocated for placing France's interests first in foreign policy, directing foreign policy by *realpolitik* considerations, and supporting the Protestant states during the Thirty Years' War. As Lloyd Moote has indicated, Richelieu's surprise success on the Day of the Dupes, when Louis XIII unexpectedly decided to adopt Richelieu's foreign policy in November 1630, was not a transition but a continuation of the anti-Habsburg policies of Louis XIII's personal rule that preceded that fateful November day.⁴ The Ottomans, however, were not an available partner. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Ottomans became

⁴ A. Lloyd Moote, *Louis XIII, The Just* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 220.

embroiled in a series of wars with the Safavids to their East and a series of domestic *Celali* revolts that inhibited them from participating at all in the Thirty Years' War.⁵ In their stead, Richelieu partnered with the Protestant states of Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and the Protestant German princes. Richelieu simply replaced one cross-confessional alliance that was no longer available with a new one.⁶ It was hardly a novel or transformative diplomatic practice when considered alongside France's sixteenth-century diplomatic policies.

Perhaps more significantly, the installation of the Ottomans in French diplomatic strategy reflects the general expansion of France's, and the rest of Christian Europe's, geopolitical community beyond Europe. As French kings and courtiers plotted foreign policy strategy, they had to consider the Ottoman's eastern frontier and possible Spanish attacks on Ottoman North Africa as much as they did the shifting winds shaping the foreign policy of England, the German princes, and Venice. Indeed, Charles IX seriously sought to place Henri, duke of Anjou, on the throne of Algiers before securing Ottoman support to position him on the throne of Poland. The Catholic League sought Ottoman support from for their "King" Charles X through their new ambassador, the turncoat Lancosme, in Constantinople. By trying to secure this support, the League sought to prevent what actually happened, the exertion of Ottoman pressure on Marseille to return its loyalty to Henri IV. The Franco-Ottoman alliance thus demonstrates that we must account for the Ottoman

⁵ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 197-252; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 70-86; On the Celali revolts, see Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁶ Gérard Tongas, *Les relations de la France avec l'Empire ottoman durant la première moitié du xvii^e siècle et l'ambassade à Constantinople de Philippe de Harlay, comte de Césy, 1619-1640 d'après des documents manuscrits inédits* (Toulouse: Imprimerie F. Boisseau, 1942), 7.

Empire in order to represent European political and diplomatic history accurately. Sixteenth-century Frenchmen did so in the throes of the brutal internecine warfare because they considered their alliance with the Ottoman Empire as more beneficial to Christendom than conflict with it.

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