

# “Real Men” and Diplomats: Intercultural Diplomatic Negotiation and Masculinities in China and the United States

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This paper develops a social identity approach to diplomatic negotiations that links research on gender and culture in negotiations by treating gender as an analytic category. By critically interrogating literature on diplomacy, negotiation, and masculinity in China and the United States and comparing hegemonic forms of masculinity and other “ideal type” gender and negotiator models, this suggests that in each culture: (1) dominant negotiating styles (generally integrative—“win-win”—or distributive—“win-lose”) parallel dominant ideal typical males, (2) informal negotiating styles (reliance on personal relationships) parallel subordinate ideal typical females, and (3) creative negotiating tactics are possible by code-switching (changing relationship type and strategy style), or creatively reinterpreting existing models to address negotiation goals. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by linking previously separate but related subfields (“gender and negotiation” and “culture and negotiation” research), adding to existing research frameworks, and creating the opportunity for improved international diplomacy.

**Keywords:** negotiation, diplomacy, gender, identity

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How does culture and gender shape international diplomatic negotiations? Despite an explosion of interest in the areas of culture and gender in negotiation, research in these areas only minimally intersects. Culture and negotiation literature frequently treats gender as a variable (controlling for sex differences) without considering its multilevel, interactive and dynamic aspects, and gender and negotiation literature is frequently similarly limited regarding culture (promoting Western understandings of gender, footnoting culture, or controlling for geographic origin). In addition, such research has only recently begun to learn from anthropologists and feminists in taking more sophisticated views of gender (not just equaling sex) and culture (not just equaling national culture or geographic origin) (see Gelfand and Dyer 2000:62–63; Riley and Babcock 2002:3). Because neither simplification adequately captures how these concepts interact, both traditions are limited in usefully concluding how culture and gender influence negotiation processes and outcomes. This paper links these two subfields by proposing a social identity approach to understanding intercultural negotiations, which treats gender as an

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*Author's note:* A previous draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Honolulu on March 5, 2005. In addition to the participants at this occasion and four anonymous ISP referees, I would like to thank Hayward Alker, Laurie Brand, Ann Crigler, Stacie Goddard, John Odell, and especially Ann Tickner for their thoughtful comments on previous drafts.

analytic category<sup>1</sup> for understanding cases of diplomatic negotiations. By doing so, it seeks to add to existing frameworks, such as organizational culture, bureaucratic politics, and leadership models, and create opportunities for improved international diplomacy.

In discussion, terms will be used as follows: “Identity” is a socially and relationally constructed sense of self, contingent on context, social interaction, and space (Shin and Jackson 2003:204). “Gender” can be understood as the contested and variable, culturally constructed ideas of what it means to be a man (in terms of valued masculinity) or a woman (in terms of subordinated femininity), which are reproduced by institutionalized “gender regimes” (including mental constructs, individual interactions, and structural divisions among women and men) (see Connell 1987; Acker 1992; Tickner 2001). “Intercultural diplomacy” is communications between states with different social norms that are meant to resolve apparently incompatible goals and maintain relationships. Within this term, “culture” refers to traditions of meaning in social groups (e.g., Geertz 1973); “diplomacy” refers to “management of the relations between independent states by processes of negotiation” (Nicolson 1963:41); and “negotiation” describes specialized communication aimed at resolving disputes over perceived incompatible goals (Brett 2001:2). Finally, “diplomatic negotiation” refers to interstate communication to find mutually acceptable resolutions over issues of shared concern (Cohen 2002:9).

### Literature Critique

As feminists and anthropologists have long recognized, culture and gender are deep and dynamic rather than shallow and monolithic concepts. However, as negotiation researchers have recognized, both gender and culture can generate frameworks that both restrict and enable negotiation behavior. This paper draws on both insights in suggesting that understanding “ideal type” models of gender and negotiators across cultures can help academics, students and diplomats to better understand how negotiators’ behavior is shaped by cultural and gendered systems in international politics.

#### *Gender and Negotiation*

How does gender influence intercultural negotiations? Overall, negotiator sex has been the primary research focus. Negotiator sex has a small but significant influence on negotiations consistent with stereotypes, with women in aggregate behaving more cooperatively and men in aggregate behaving more competitively, and men achieving slightly greater settlements economically than women (for meta-analyses see Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer 1998; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999). However, these results are full of inconsistencies without context. Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) suggest that research on gender and negotiation has gone through two waves: First, in the 1970s and 1980s, researchers had small and inconsistent success correlating negotiator sex with stereotypically masculine (e.g., strong, dominant, assertive, and rational) or feminine (e.g., weak, submissive, accommodating, and emotional) negotiating behavior. Second, since the 1990s, researchers have gained greater success in describing conditions under which negotiator sex promotes negotiation behavior that is either consistent, neutral, or contrary to gender stereotypes.

Researchers have argued that differences among male and female negotiators arise from negotiator attributes (e.g., socialization), negotiator partner attributes (e.g., discrimination), negotiator dyad interactions (e.g., self-fulfilling prophecies), negotiation situation (e.g., status), or negotiator-situation interaction (e.g., stereo-

<sup>1</sup>This is consistent with historian Scott’s (1988) position that gender can be used as an analytic tool.

type activation or reaction) (for excellent review see Kray and Thompson 2005). Current research, such as that by Bowles et al. (2005), provides a particularly useful understanding of how gender influences negotiations because of its more nuanced approach, which considers the impact of moderating influences (e.g., structural ambiguity or gender triggers) on negotiations. However, both first and second wave research is limited by interpretations of gender as sex and ideas about gender stereotypes based in elite Western experience.

A focus on sex ignores the structural constraints individual negotiators operate in; and descriptions of “women” and “gender” by Western researchers without reference to other standpoints (e.g., culture, ethnicity, class) overly homogenize these concepts, which both limit model generalizability. Particularly important are limitations from failing to consider how different social identities intersect. For example, Landrine, Klonoff, and Brown-Collins (1992) asked women to rate themselves on a measure of gender-stereotypical personality characteristics, and found while white and nonwhite women rated themselves similarly, they interpreted terms very differently (e.g., “passive” meaning either “easygoing” or “don’t say what I think”) (see also Stewart and McDermott 2004:536). As this suggests, and as postcolonial feminists have argued, women experience gendered hierarchies differently in different global contexts (e.g., Mohanty 1988). Consequently, it is important to consider how culture and gender, as well as other bases of identification (and oppression), influence each other to better understand how gender influences negotiation setting (see also Menkel-Meadow 2000:365).

#### *Culture and Negotiation*

How does culture influence negotiations? Research on culture and negotiation seems to be on the cusp of its second wave. The first major wave was in the 1980s and 1990s. It included both a practically oriented “negotiating with . . . ” subliterature<sup>2</sup> aimed at describing and advising how to negotiate with members of that culture, and a more comparative subliterature focused on explaining the influence or interaction of culture on negotiation processes and outcomes (see Gelfand and Dyer 2000; Jönsson 2002). In international relations (IR) literature, the debate has focused on the extent culture matters, if at all (see Faure and Rubin 1993; Mingst and Warkentin 1996; Cohen 2002; Avruch 1998). However, recently researchers have begun to propose models developing the conditions under which culture influences negotiations (e.g., Gelfand and Dyer 2000; Morris and Gelfand 2004). Overall, Lewicki et al. (2001) note that while no cultural negotiation style reaps higher profits than others,<sup>3</sup> profits from cross-cultural negotiations are sometimes poorer than from intracultural negotiations (204; see also Brett and Okumura 1998). Furthermore, culture can influence the negotiation process, including who negotiates, how they understand the situation, how they negotiate, the kind of outcome negotiated, and the structural constraints they operate under (Faure and Rubin 1993:8–12; Ting-Toomey 2000:393; Brett 2001:6; Lewicki et al. 2001; Faure 2002:403–409; Cellich and Jain 2004).

Culture and negotiation research draws heavily on classic cultural studies by Hall (1959, 1966) and Hofstede (1980), which propose that cultures can be categorized in terms of general indexes of variation on cognitions and beliefs. Hall suggested that cultures vary in terms of:

- (1) high/low context (level of information explicitly included in direct language: either more allusive or more direct communication) and

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<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., the United States Institute of Peace Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project on Chinese, Russian, North Korean, Japanese, French, and German negotiating behavior.

<sup>3</sup>At least among the United States, Japan, China, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico.

- (2) polychromic/monochromic time orientation (structuring of time in terms of “one thing at a time” vs. multiple things at a time and interpersonal relations predominating)

Alternatively, Hofstede and colleagues<sup>4</sup> proposed cultures vary in terms of:

- (1) individualism/collectivism (societal organization around individuals or groups: loose interpersonal ties and valuing of individual goals vs. tight interpersonal ties and valuing of collective goals),
- (2) power distance (the extent less powerful actors accept unequal power distribution),
- (3) masculinity/femininity<sup>5</sup> (assertiveness, acquisition and not-caring vs. concern for relationships, nurturing, and quality of life),
- (4) uncertainty avoidance (ease of being in unstructured situations), and
- (5) long-term/short-term orientation (dynamic valuing of the future vs. static valuing of present or past).

Most research on culture and negotiation has focused on Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism index (Triandis 1990; Leung 1998; Lewicki et al. 2001:213; Gelfand and Brett 2004:422). Research suggests that negotiators from individualistic and collectivistic cultures tend to value different things (e.g., independence vs. interdependence), have goals with different time horizons (e.g., short term vs. long term), be differentially susceptible to fixed pie errors,<sup>6</sup> and be different in how cooperative or competitive they are (see Cohen 2002; Bazerman et al. 2000; Lewicki et al. 2001:212–215). However, correlating negotiation behavior with cultural value dimensions has been only partially successful, suggesting problems with monolithic interpretations of culture (see Bazerman et al. 2000).

Current research, such as the “dynamic constructivist” approach by Morris and Gelfand (2004), is beginning to provide a more sophisticated understanding of how culture influences negotiations because of its more nuanced approach, which investigates moderating influences (e.g., availability, accessibility, and activatedness of cultural constructs) on negotiations. However, research remains limited by monolithic conceptions of culture, and inadequate consideration of gender dynamics, which frequently only “controls” for sex rather than considering dynamic interaction between culture and gender. This is most evident in Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity index, which imposes one cultural understanding of gendered traits globally, not recognizing how descriptions of gender vary across cultures (while traits described as feminine remain subordinate to those described as masculine; Best and Williams 1997:172).

Overall, negotiation research on both culture and gender is limited in explanatory ability by a failure to adequately consider the implications of the other perspective. Because culture and gender dynamically intersect, this failure severely hinders both traditions. To address this problem and develop an overarching framework for research, this paper proposes that culture and gender be treated as social identities models that both enable and restrict negotiating behavior. The social identity approach and its relationship to IR will be briefly described before demonstrating how it can be applied in Chinese and American contexts.

<sup>4</sup>Hofstede developed the first four indexes alone (1980). The last index (long-term vs. short-term orientation) was jointly developed by Hofstede and Bond (1988) after the original IBM survey, and was based on a Chinese value survey, which captured East–West differences not apparent originally (see also Hofstede and Hofstede 2005).

<sup>5</sup>This categorization has been extensively critiqued as imposing a Western interpretation of gender to non-monolithic and culturally varying gendered international norms.

<sup>6</sup>The fixed pie bias is the (frequently inaccurate) belief that one side’s gain is another side’s loss, rather than the recognition of opportunities for joint gains (see e.g., Bazerman and Neal 1992:16–22).

*An Integrating Framework: Social Identity Theory (SIT)*

SIT provides an integrating framework for understanding how culture and gender impact negotiation. As proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), SIT argues that individuals: (1) categorize themselves and others to understand their environments, (2) identify with groups that they see themselves as part of (in-groups relative to out-groups), and (3) creatively evaluate themselves relative to similar others to maximize the positiveness of their own group. Tajfel describes identity as individual self-concept derived from knowledge of social group membership and its value and emotional significance, and argues that individuals seek identification because they desire positive, distinct views of themselves (Tajfel 1981:255). This approach has evolved to include John Turner’s self categorization theory (SCT), which argues that personal and social identity are two functionally differentiated extremes, with *either* uniqueness *or* membership in a group being primary at any given time, depending on the salience of each category.

The social identity approach has important implications for IR generally, and diplomatic negotiations in particular. Contra standard rational choice models of individual behavior, SIT research has demonstrated that self-interest may be defined at the group (rather than individual) level (Tajfel and Turner 1986); different frames of reference (e.g., individual, interpersonal, group) correspond to different motivations (e.g., self-interest, other-interest, collective welfare; Brewer and Gardner 1996); “selfish” individuals can become less selfish by increasing group membership salience (Brewer and Kramer 1986; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999); and in-group and out-group cues (e.g., race, nation, activity) signal individuals’ social identity, which consequently promote behavior in accord with in-group norms (Wilder and Shapiro 1984). More broadly, a social identity approach complements role-based models which suggest ideal typical behavior refers both to hierarchical vertical place (superior–subordinate relationships) and to horizontal place (function) within groups (Hopmann 1996:160). Social identities that individuals draw on are institutionalized at group and societal levels. Consequently, although identities change dynamically, institutions promote a level of consistency in negotiator demographics, institutions, goals, and strategies.

Within IR, a social identity approach is consistent with but moves beyond constructivist accounts, bureaucratic politics models, and role-based foreign policy analysis approaches. It provides a process model for how identities are constructed, argues multiple role models shape behavior, and suggests conflictual and cooperative negotiation processes can be better understood in terms of ideal type social identities. It suggests people draw on key identity roles as “guides to action” which shape broad patterns of behavior (Robinson 1996:318). Finally, SIT especially agrees with the classic foreign policy work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, who argued “the key to the explanation of why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision makers as actors define their situation” (1962/2002:59).

### Method

This paper critically interrogates the literature on diplomacy, negotiation, and masculinity in China and the United States, focusing on comparing “ideal types” of negotiators and masculinities, and their relationship to individual and institutional negotiator characteristics (including demographics, interests, and foreign-service institutions). Following in the general tradition of Acker (1992),<sup>7</sup> I suggest that the impact of gender and culture on negotiations can be understood by asking the following critical questions with a gender-sensitive lens:

<sup>7</sup>Acker suggests that organizations are created and maintained through four overlapping processes, including: (1) gendered “symbols, images, and forms of consciousness,” (2) structurally different spaces for women and men, (3) “internal mental work of individuals” in understanding the gendered organization, and (4) individual interactions (1992:252–253).

1. Demographics: Who are the diplomatic negotiators?
2. Strategies: How do ideal types of men and women relate to ideal types of negotiators, and what are the implications for negotiating strategies and tactics?
3. Significance: What are the implications for the case at hand?

These questions aim at contextualizing intercultural negotiations within a cultural and gendered space, and developing ideal type comparisons of ideal men, women, and negotiators across cultural contexts in order to suggest how negotiators can draw on different models of behavior to pursue their goals in intercultural negotiations. To do this, I also develop a framework to compare such ideal types, and demonstrate how it can be applied in a case of U.S.–China relations.

Because “ideal types” are inherently constructed frameworks (biased at least by authorial interpretation and abstraction), I utilize ideal typical frameworks constructed by experts in the areas of masculinities, negotiation, and diplomacy. This includes leading academics on masculinities, classical diplomats and historians on diplomacy, and academics and practitioners on negotiation. Although analysis of these other people’s ideas cannot be considered “unbiased” by any means, it does link analytical insights among multiple fields in a way that promotes a new lens to interpret diplomatic negotiations among cultures, and which can be seen as a starting point for further development of more particular ideal types (e.g., middle class black masculinities<sup>8</sup>) as generative frames.

U.S. and Chinese cases have been chosen because they are important foreign policy cases characterized in opposite terms by culture and negotiations scholarship (individualistic and low context U.S. vs. collectivist and high context China). However, other cases are also ripe for future investigation. By investigating intercultural negotiation context and strategies in terms of ideal typical gender and negotiator identities, I hope to develop a framework for how gender and culture interact to impact negotiation, and suggest how other social identities (e.g., class) might also influence this process.

### **Discussion and Analysis**

Analyzing ideal types of gender and ideal types of negotiators suggests that culturally varying ideas about ideal men and ideal women provide generative frameworks that influence the demographics, institutions, and strategies of diplomatic negotiations. Specifically, general negotiation styles correspond to ideal gender types across cultures, both on dominant and subordinate levels. However, different cultural and gendered interpretations of each ideal type are evident. To support this approach, a general investigation of key critical questions will be conducted, a framework from this evaluation proposed, and finally the framework applied.

#### *Demographics: Who Are the Diplomatic Negotiators?*

Hierarchically gendered identity models suggest that in competitive situations, choice of “the best” or “the ideal” diplomat or negotiator will be partially defined by current interpretations of gendered ideals. Gendered models that prioritize masculine over feminine characteristics have historically made it more likely that official diplomatic negotiators will be male, rather than female, official diplomatic negotiators. However, diplomatic demographics must also be considered in light of unrecognized informal diplomacy conducted by women in complementary roles, and the behavior of women who make it as formal diplomats.

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<sup>8</sup>Such particular types are evident everywhere. One way of drawing on them to understand negotiation would be to consider multi-level models of culture that can capture culture/gender interactions across levels (e.g., group, organization, nation, or global)—see Erez and Gati (2004).

In terms of U.S. demographics, assumptions of gendered identities have changed over time, but gendered institutions remain. Referring to the 1980s, one ambassador described the Foreign Service as “male, pale and Yale” (Dorman 2004:36). A U.S. commissioner in 1988 opined, “[t]he State Department wants to hire what I call the mythical American, the 5’10,” 160 pound WASP man in perfect physical and mental health” (U.S. State 1990:18). However, with changing attitudes toward gender roles the number of women in the U.S. Foreign Service has increased. In 1993, 26% of total generalists and 36% of total specialists were women (McGlen and Sarkees 1995:40). By 2001, the Foreign Service was comprised of about 34% women, and by 2004 the incoming class of State Department FSOs had more women than men (Dorman 2002:36, 2004:33). Despite this increase, anachronistic identity models continue through bureaucratic inertia, resulting in glass ceilings for women’s official diplomatic opportunities. As one male USAID officer in Egypt commented:

It often feels like we’ve walked onto a military base from the 1950s, where the wives are all expected to host tea parties or go shopping for curtains, and where spouse employment means working as a social planner for the community liaison office. Sorry, but we are well-educated, modern, smart people and don’t fit that lifestyle very well. (Dorman:39)

Such expectations contribute to statistics demonstrating that few women are in the top rankings (only 10% of generalists and 3% of specialists) with the majority clustered at the bottom (McGlen and Sarkees:40).

In China, women have also had difficulty becoming official diplomatic corps members. In general, the number of women in politics has increased over time, although this has leveled off since the 1990s. For example, women deputies in the National People’s Conference (NPC) have increased from 12% in 1954, to 21% in 1993, and 20% in 2003; and women members of the permanent body of the NPC (the Standing Committee) increased from 5% in 1954, to 12% in 1993, and 13% in 2003 (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1994, 2005). More specifically, in Liu’s (2001) review of Chinese ambassadors since 1949, the majority were men, and the first female ambassador (Ding Xuesen) was not dispatched until 1979. Furthermore, although today 70% of students at China Foreign Affairs University<sup>9</sup> are women, only 25% of Chinese Foreign Ministry (MFA) candidates are women, suggesting anachronistic social identities continue to shape diplomatic demographics through institutional structures (see Rana 2005:232).

If women overcome institutional obstacles to high ranking positions, their behavior is often modeled on gendered social identity models, frequently trying to “become like men,” using androcentric models of leadership to attain legitimacy, or less commonly sticking with “soft issues” associated with women and deriving legitimacy from maternalistic roles (Peterson and Runyan 1999:105). For example, “iron ladies” have emerged in China (e.g., Deng Yingchao, the hardliner wife of Zhou Enlai, or Wui Yi, who negotiated China’s inclusion into the World Trade Organization), the United States (e.g., Condi Rice, the current U.S. Secretary of State, or Madeline Albright, Secretary of State under the Clinton Administration), and Britain (e.g., British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, possibly the most well known by this term). A minority has also focused on “soft issues.” However, both categories demonstrate the shaping of options that gendered models create across different cultures.

<sup>9</sup>A feeder school for the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

*Strategies: How Do Ideal Types of Men and Women Relate to Ideal Types of Negotiators, and What Are the Implications for Negotiating Strategies and Tactics?*

There are many different kinds of specific types of ideal men and women (e.g., strong father, Southern belle, sports jock, princess) just as there are multiple layers and different kinds of culture. The most precise method of analysis for this paper would be to compare ideal types of gender at different cultural levels from particular to general. For example, following Erez and Gati's (2004) dynamic, multi-level model of culture, one could examine these intersections along each onion-like layer, from individual cultural interpretation through group, organization, nation, and global culture.<sup>10</sup> However, this paper focuses instead on more overarching patterns to provide general analysis, which should also pave the way for more specialized investigations. Such overarching patterns are particularly evident in generalized cultural negotiating styles, and "hegemonic" forms of masculinity.<sup>11</sup>

By critically comparing hegemonic masculinities and other "ideal type" gender and negotiator models, this paper suggests that (1) dominant negotiating styles (generally integrative—"win-win"—or distributive—"win-lose") correspond to dominant ideal typical males in each culture, (2) informal negotiating styles ("boudoir diplomacy" and "inner helpers") rely on subordinate ideal typical females in each culture, and (3) creative negotiating tactics are possible by either code-switching (changing the relationship type and strategy style), or creatively reinterpreting existing models to address negotiation goals.

### *United States*

#### *Masculinities*

In the United States, hegemonic masculinities and ideal typical understandings of negotiators have emerged within a broadly Western tradition. Charlotte Hooper (1998) suggests at least four ideal types of dominant masculinities exist in Western culture. First, the Greek Citizen-Warrior is militaristic, rational, and a citizen in the political sphere of free speech. Second, the Patriarchal Judeo-Christian is domestically responsible, a property owner, and respects the father. Third, the Honor Patronage model is aristocratic and values male bonding, military heroism, and risk taking. Finally, the Protestant Bourgeois Rationalist is competitively individualistic, rational, and self-controlled. Hooper argues these models overlap and recombine in different geographic and historical contexts to create a hegemonic masculinity that appears timeless despite its inherent instability (33). In the United States, their intersection has tended toward defining men as tough, dominant, assertive, rational, powerful, and independent, while women are described in opposite terms as weak, submissive, accommodating, emotional, and dependent (see, e.g., Tickner 1992; Kray and Thompson 2005). These ideal types also frame subordinate subtypes (e.g., workplace masculinities, sporting masculinities, heterosexual masculinities, and "black" masculinities; Mac an Ghail 1996).

#### *Diplomats*

These models of masculinity have significant parallels with Western ideal typical diplomats. In general, the image of a masculine, autonomous, dominant, rational

<sup>10</sup>Erez and Gati (2004) propose that culture can be described as a dynamic, multi-level phenomenon, in which each layer interrelates to others through top-down processes (individual internalization of various group shared meanings) and bottom up processes (individual understandings shared and aggregated into various higher-level group cultures).

<sup>11</sup>Bob Connell (1995), one of the most influential theorists in the field of masculinities, describes hegemonic masculinity as "the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordinate position of women" (77). This is constructed in opposition to subordinate masculinities as well as femininity.



actor is evident in Morgenthau’s (2006) discussion of “realist” foreign policy based on “political man” (see Tickner 1995); this is also demonstrated in his discussion of diplomats, who he suggests are “political men” who must use the best combination of persuasion, compromise and threats in order to accomplish rationally determined foreign policy goals (537–568).

However, these parallels are even more evident when considering Nicolson’s (1963) classic *Diplomacy*, in which the author describes two diplomatic ideal types: the warrior and the shopkeeper (25–27). The warrior conception of diplomacy is rooted in the feudal system and conceptualizes diplomacy as “war by other means”: it tends toward power politics, assumes that “the purpose of negotiation is victory and that the denial of complete victory means defeat,” uses military-like strategies in negotiation, and does not encourage confidence and fair dealing (25–26). Alternatively, the shopkeeper ideal is rooted in bourgeois commercial relations and conceptualizes diplomacy as “an aid to peaceful commerce”: it tends toward “profit politics” and conciliation, assumes “a compromise between rivalries is generally more profitable than the complete destruction of the rival,” and uses frank discussion and fair dealing to reconcile conflicting interests (26). The kind of diplomatic practice and theory utilized reflects its political system, and shifts in diplomatic practice are due to shifts in “the centre of power” (30).

Overall, Nicholson’s warrior diplomat parallels a combination of Greek Citizen-Warrior and Honor Patronage male, and his shopkeeper diplomat parallels the Protestant Bourgeois Rationalist. In the first case, a competitive, militaristic rational actor self-interestedly takes risks to “win” a zero-sum game. In the second case, an individualistic, self-controlled rational actor seeks to “expand the pie” to maximize benefits from negotiation. In both cases, traits valued as “ideal typical” of certain hegemonic forms also appear ideal typical of a related diplomatic style.

Nicolson also mentions a third type, without honoring it with “ideal type” status. This “boudoir diplomacy” is diplomatic efforts to “secure the confidence, and if possible the affections, of the sovereign” through such methods as flirting, seduction, and bribery in order to win their support (31–32). In describing a diplomat who, for the sake of his diplomatic mission, flirted with an aging empress and allowed an important man to take his wife out to dinner, Nicolson notes:

It is possible, and even probable, that it was irksome for Harris to be obliged to flirt with an Empress who was over fifty years of age, even as it was unpleasant for him to watch his wife being taken in to supper by Potemkin; yet the old diplomacy took a heavy toll upon personal predilections and even today an ambassador who allowed his dislike of foreign personalities or conditions to become apparent would not in fact be serving the purposes for which he had been appointed. (32)

Nicolson’s “boudoir diplomacy” is comparable with “informal” diplomacy which relies on institutionally gendered informal relationships, such as the role of “diplomatic wives” to lubricate formal diplomatic confidence and trust. In both boudoir and modern informal diplomacy, (masculine) political actors rely on (feminine) “private” or “informal” relationships to facilitate negotiating power. This demonstrates that social identities are important both in terms of their own self-models and their relational connection with others: while “formal” diplomatic negotiations may overlap with ideal typical masculine models, they are not complete without consideration of the “informal” (and gendered) relationships. Overall, substantial similarities appear between ideal Western masculine social identities and diplomatic negotiators (both formal and informal actors).

#### *Negotiating styles*

Two general negotiating strategies are broadly recognized (Walton and McKersie 1965; Lax and Sebenius 1986). First, the “distributive” or “claiming” strategy assumes negotiation is a zero-sum game (one side’s gain is the other side’s loss) and

uses aggressive tactics to claim as much value as possible. Specific tactics include shaping perceptions of alternatives, holding the other side's prime value hostage, making threats, and manipulating ignorance (Lax and Sebenius:117–153). Second, the “integrative” or “creating” strategy assumes joint gains are possible (one side's gain mean the other side also gains) and uses creative communication and information-sharing to create value for both sides. Tactics include trading on differences (e.g., in valuation, risk aversion, or time preference) to maximize joint gain (e.g., thorough contingent agreements), creating common value (through unbundling or linking separate interests), and creating value through economies of scale (88–116).

Overall, effective negotiators are broadly characterized with “male” attributes (strong, dominant, assertive, rational), while ineffective negotiators are characterized with “female” attributes (weak, submissive, accommodating, emotional) (Kolb and Williams 2000:28; Kray and Thompson, 2005:104). In particular, claiming strategies parallel warrior diplomats and a combination of Greek Citizen-Warrior and Honor Patronage masculinities; while creating strategies parallel shopkeeper diplomats and Protestant Bourgeois Rationalist masculinity.<sup>12</sup> In each case, ideal typical models of masculinity, negotiators, and diplomats significantly overlap.

### *China*

#### *Masculinities*

Discussions of Asian sexuality have focused primarily on the *yin-yang* paradigm. In this paradigm, *yin* is female and *yang* is male, but men and women embody both *yin* and *yang* because these elements constantly and dynamically interact. However, Louie (2002), whose work has been hailed as the first comprehensive analysis of Chinese masculinity, argues that this flexible gender spectrum is more dichotomously juxtaposed against another, solely male, gender construct: that of *wen-wu*, or cultural attainment-martial valor (4, 10). While *yin-yang* applies to both males and females, *wen-wu* can only be applied to females if they publicly disguise themselves as men (12, 46). This concept reflects Confucian privileging of male over female, and legitimates and naturalizes the power imbalance between the two (10).

Louie describes Guan Yu, the *wu* god (or Chinese god of war), and Confucius the *wen* god (sage or *junzi*—exemplary person) as ideal types of the *wen-wu* paradigm, both of whom are worshipped in temples around China. The *wu* hero is characterized both by physical power (e.g., size, martial skills, and brutality) and by “ability to withstand feminine charms,” and uses ideologies of “brotherhood” to contain male competition (29, 61). *Wen* on the other hand, is characterized by cultural refinement through “proper education” and competitiveness (45, 61). Both *wen* and *wu* seek *junzi*-hood—to become exemplary persons or “real men” (rather than *xiaoren*, inferior men), which for both requires strong self-control (61).

#### *Diplomats*

The *wen-wu* model of masculinity is mirrored in diplomatic history by descriptions of two emperors described as bearers of the *wen* and *wu* traditions. In Su-ma Ch'ien's classic, *The Grand Scribe's Records—Volume II: The Basic Annals of Han China*, the author catalogs the lives of two emperors who were entitled “Emperor Wen the Filial and Cultured,” and “Emperor Wu the Filial and Martial.” In this account, Emperor Wen (a *wen* icon) is described as the “ideal ruler, who was benevolent, modest, frugal, and eager to care for the well being of the commoners”—an exemplar of “virtuous rule.” On the other hand, Emperor Wu (a *wu* icon) is portrayed as lacking virtue and going to the opposite extreme “by engaging in

<sup>12</sup>For comparison of negotiating strategies and Nicholson's ideal typical diplomats, see also Zartman and Berman 1982:13.

violence, cruelty, and far-ranging military exploits" (190). Both emperors provide historical demonstrations of the importance of the *wen-wu* paradigm in diplomacy.

Chinese ambassadors in the *wen-wu* tradition had their efforts complemented by what can be seen as a Chinese form of "boudoir diplomacy." Despite communist ideals guaranteeing men and women equality, wives of early modern Chinese ambassadors were expected to be partners in diplomacy, including attending ambassadorial training courses, learning ballroom dancing, and demonstrating "appropriate" dress, hairstyles, bearing, and table manners (Liu 2001:20–28). These expectations are reminiscent of historical conceptions of women as "inner helpers" who acted as family managers, mediators and even writers to make their husband's and parents-in-law's lives easier (Ebrey 1993:115). Although formally separate, these wives remained integral to diplomatic functioning as informal social lubrication.

### *Negotiating styles*

Chinese negotiating styles parallel the *wen-wu* model of masculinities and diplomats. Faure (1998) argues there are two different kinds of activities in Chinese negotiations: "mobile warfare" and "joint quest." Mobile warfare is a conflictual repertoire assuming a zero-sum game between "civilized people" and "barbarians," and utilizing Sun-Tzu style war strategies. These include "lur[ing] the tiger down from the mountain" (cutting the other side from its base), "tak[ing] away the firewood under the cauldron" (eliminating the opponent's source of energy), "killing the chicken to warn the monkey" (coercive warnings), and "giving away a brick to earn a piece of jade" (relying on ignorance to trade low for high value) (140–141). In total, these tactics contribute to a negotiation conceived like a war or a chess game, in which the purpose is to win, or at least score more points than the other side.

The "joint quest" approach is a harmonizing approach that is possible between "civilized people" (those with "good manners" according to Chinese culture). It is based in a Taoist search for stabilizing harmony, and aims to clarify problems through ritually controlled activity using implicit and allusive discourse to promote "discussion and judgment" (144). This approach requires that negotiators not reveal their positions, as the principle of *keqi hua*, or preserving harmony requires allusive discourse to avoid loss of "face" for the other side (145). It also requires a holistic conception of negotiation that minimizes the importance of time and highlights the importance of responsibilities to broader groups.

Overall, Chinese models of masculinity (*wen-wu*) and negotiation strategies (joint quest/mobile warfare) demonstrate significant parallels. The "joint quest" strategy parallels *wen junzi*, with both focused on "civilized" or "culturally refined" people, who make it possible to work toward holistically conceived stable harmony. The "mobile warfare" strategy parallels *wu junzi* with both focused on manifestations of physical power and aggression which are possible strategies because they are directed at "barbarians" or uncivilized people. This suggests that gendered ideal types correspond to ideal negotiating styles in both China and the United States.

### *What Are the Implications?*

The previous discussion demonstrates that culturally varying ideas about ideal men (and, less explicitly, ideas about ideal women) can significantly parallel similarly culturally varying ideals about ideal diplomats and negotiators. Specifically, (1) dominant negotiating styles (generally integrative—"win-win"—or distributive—"win-lose") correspond to dominant ideal males in each culture and (2) informal negotiating styles (reliant on personal relationships with "inner helpers," or "boudoir diplomacy") correspond to reliance on assumptions of subordinate females in each culture (e.g., hostessing). Although ideal typical feminine models have not been developed in this paper, particularized models of women (e.g.,

	Negotiating Style		Masculine / Feminine Gender ideal	
	US	China	US	China
<i>Dominant</i>	Integrative (“win-win”)  Distributive (“win-lose”)	Joint quest (among civilized people)  Mobile warfare (civilized people vs. barbarians)	Rational man:  1) Shop-keeper (Protestant Bourgeois Rationalist male) 2) Warrior (Greek Citizen-Warrior / Honor Patronage male)	Yang:  1) Wen junzi (culturally refined male) 2) Wu junzi (war-like male)
<i>Subordinate</i>	“Boudoir” diplomacy	Inner helper	Emotional woman	Yin
<i>Alternative</i>	Creative reinterpretations	Creative reinterpretations	New man / woman	New man / woman

FIG. 1. Parallels between Negotiating Style and Gender Ideals in the United States and China

Madonna/whore, or red rose/white rose<sup>13</sup>) may also be related to particularized informal kinds of negotiating (e.g., sexualized “babe” or masculinized “bitch”—see Kolb and Williams 2000:129; see also Liu and Chi-Hui 2002; Hawkes 2003). These ideal types are stylized models; they provide only generative frameworks that guide and limit, but do not determine negotiating behavior. Consequently they also create the opportunity to develop creative negotiating tactics, either by code-switching (changing the relationship type and strategy style), or creatively reinterpreting existing models to address negotiating goals in nontraditional ways (see Figure 1).

As this table reviews, parallels also exist both among gendered ideal types and among negotiating styles across cultures. Both the United States and China rely on at least two kinds of diplomatic negotiation: direct (including broadly integrative and distributive approaches), and indirect (e.g., reliance on feminized lubricants to relationships). Within the direct approach, broadly integrative and distributive tactics are evident across cultures; however they are manifested differently and based on different social identity assumptions (see also Faure 1998:139). The distributive/mobile warfare are the most similar, with aggressive tactics like manipulating ignorance (giving away a brick to earn a piece of jade) common to both, but with a much more developed and circuitous repertoire of tactics on the Chinese side (Faure 1998:140–143). However, while the integrative/joint quest approaches aim toward what Americans would call “win-win” outcomes, what that means is very different for negotiators from the two countries.

For U.S. negotiators, whose dominant model is the rational male businessman, “win-win” means problem solving by exchanging information to maximize joint gains (whether through trading on differences, creating common value, or creating value through economies of scale). To some extent, solving a problem in the best way possible is a demonstration of being a fully rational businessman: the role of business-oriented utility maximizer is fulfilled in the action of maximizing joint gains. However, this is totally different in the Chinese context. For Chinese negotiators, whose dominant model is the *wen junzi* (culturally refined male), the “win-win” equivalent means discussing how to see a problem without exchanging information or positions that could risk violating harmony by making any participant lose face. Here demonstrating being a culturally refined man requires having the manners to prioritize and protect the harmony of relationships through incre-

<sup>13</sup>This dichotomy may be a general framework in which more specific elevated and denigrated ideal types are fit. For example, in China, variations on the Madonna might include servant to father, husband, and son, while in America the Madonna might include homemaker (see, e.g., Liu and Chi-Hui 2002; Hawkes 2003).

mental negotiating moves meant to maintain face for all sides and keep relational harmony (see Faure 1998:143–146).

### Case Study Application: U.S.–China Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Negotiations

Integrating the insights of culture and gender on negotiations through a social identity framework can be useful in both understanding and teaching about international negotiation. An application of the social identity approach to an existing teaching case can illustrate how culture and gender inform negotiating strategies. However, this will not be able to demonstrate how informal diplomacy influences the process and can only shallowly demonstrate how cultural and gendered norms influence the broader institutional structure of the negotiation. The best application of this model will have to wait for original application to case studies that consciously draw on cultural and gendered social identity issues, which current teaching cases fail to do. However, until then, this preliminary application to an existing teaching case can be suggestive.

One good candidate for this is Sebenius and Hulse's (2001a, 2001b) Harvard Business School case on Charlene Barshefsky and the U.S.–China negotiation over IPR in the mid-1990s. This two-part case describes Deputy United States Trade Representative (USTR) Charlene Barshefsky's use of multi-level tactics and successful negotiation of Intellectual Property (IP) agreements that effectively reduced China's creating and exporting of pirated American goods.<sup>14</sup> How then does this illustrate the social identity framework? The framework can be used by applying the same critical questions discussed above.

First, who are the (formal and formal) diplomatic negotiators? In this case, the main character is a woman, Charlene Barshefsky, who subsequently becomes only the second female full representative in USTR history (USTR 2006). Described in media accounts as "intense" and "a hawk" but also "a cool, professional negotiator," Barshefsky is given the nickname "Stonewall" because of her ability to "out-wait, out-wit and out-talk her opponents," and is described by USTR Micky Kantor as one of the "Three Iron Ladies" of global trade (Goar 1996). Although the case says little about the demographics of the others involved, federal civilian workforce statistics demonstrate that there are about two men for every woman in the professional category in the mid-1990s (see U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1997). However, media accounts suggest that USTR is becoming one of the most progressive employers, achieving a nearly 1:1 male to female ratio by 2002 (Magnusson 2002). Similarly on the Chinese side, demographics are slim. However, Wu Yi stands out as one of the few females involved, and is similarly characterized as an "iron lady" (one of the other two noted by Kantor). Overall, the demographics and institutions of this situation appear to be oriented toward masculine expectations, but at least these two women have been able to excel in the male model of their country (thus their description as "iron ladies") and consequently break the glass ceiling in this situation.

Second, how do ideal types of men and women relate to ideal types of negotiators, and what are the implications for negotiating strategies and tactics? As noted earlier, in the United States, the social identity models of the "ideal man" and the "ideal negotiator" converge as an individualistic, self-controlled, rational, male actor who seeks to solve problems using distributive or integrative strategies in order to maximize the benefits available (in terms of either individual or joint gain). In China, the "junzi" (ideal man) and "ideal negotiator" are male actors who are tightly in control of their relationships, and consequently able to use the relationship games of *guanxi* and paradigms of *wen*/"joint quest" or *wu*/"mobile warfare" to promote the achievement of their "principled" goals. In both, dominant strategies

<sup>14</sup>All case information discussed has been extracted from this case unless noted otherwise.

(distributive/mobile warfare and integrative/joint quest) are significantly parallel but play out in different ways based on different cultural understandings of masculine ideal types, and both rely implicitly on subordinate feminized diplomacy to facilitate the dominant interactions.

Third, what are the implications for the case at hand? In terms of negotiating strategies and tactics, Charlene Barshefsky creatively interpreted the models available in applying a mixed negotiating strategy: she relied primarily on distributive tactics, but creatively code-switched (utilizing culturally sensitive integrative strategies by demonstrating respect for the U.S.–China relationship) at crucial points to successfully accomplish her goals. For the most part, she stayed true to her “iron lady” image. First, she used strong defensive claiming (distributive) tactics to unify her divided U.S. constituency, using media appearances, press releases, publicized meetings with business interests, and interest-group-specific interactive meetings to convince previously fractionated groups of a broader shared interest in battling Chinese piracy. Second, she utilized moderate offensive claiming tactics in framing the issues and using persuasive arguments to mobilize domestic and international support (or at least acceptance) of credibly threatening targeted unilateral U.S. sanctions. Third, she applied strong offensive claiming tactics and risked forcing Beijing officials to “lose face” by meeting with provincial level government officials in order to gather direct information on the worst IPR piracy offenses. Finally, she articulated a precise set of U.S. demands, compliance deadlines, and review requirements, and credibly committed to a clear set of targeted sanctions should China not comply.

Despite this aggressive set of claiming tactics, Barshefsky also was sure to include a repertoire of culturally sensitive creating tactics, which demonstrated her ability to innovatively code-switch among both gendered and cultural models. This was most evident in her consistent efforts to demonstrate respect for China as a sovereign nation. First, while unifying her domestic constituency, Barshefsky framed the problem in terms of enforcement, rather than legislative change. She argued that this was not an issue of U.S. violating Chinese sovereignty by intruding in its domestic affairs, but an issue of China acting in its own best interest to enforce its own IPR laws. Second, during the Chinese negotiations she framed the issues in terms of mutual gains, emphasizing the benefits to China in increased indigenous scientific progress that would come with improved IPR enforcement. Third, she linked IPR to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and dovetailed differences (Chinese interest in WTO accession and U.S. interest in IPR enforcement) to “expand the pie” and create more opportunity for both sides to gain value.<sup>15</sup> Fourth, she publicly described the first round solution as a “win–win agreement,” contributing to maintaining “face” for the Chinese negotiators, rather than focusing on U.S. gains and Chinese concessions. Finally, her most amazing exhibition of concern for saving face for her Chinese counterparts (while also refusing to compromise her claiming position) was evident in the way that she handled an offer to have an audience with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. According to Sebenius and Hulse:

[M]uch to the complete surprise of both the Chinese *and* American sides, Barshefsky returned the following answer through her counterpart, China’s trade minister: “I would be honored and delighted to meet with President Jiang, but I am afraid that would be impossible.” When asked what she meant, Barshefsky responded, “I cannot meet with President Jiang and then impose sanctions. If all 15 factories are not closed, I will have no choice but to impose sanctions, and I do not want to put President Jiang, or you, in that embarrassing position.” (Part B: 9–10)

<sup>15</sup>As Pearson’s (2001) case on China’s accession to the WTO documents, China did gain WTO membership in 1999, partially due to Barshefsky’s involvement.

This brilliant maneuvering enabled her to continue promoting her own domestic interests but also demonstrate respect based in cultural awareness of the Chinese side's interest in maintaining “face.” As a whole, Barshefsky showed herself to be culturally refined in the integrative part of her strategy, tailoring her tactics in the direction of a “joint quest” approach that sought to reformulate the problem together with her Chinese counterparts while preserving relational harmony by maintaining “face” when possible.

Overall, Barshefsky's ability to understand the concerns of both sides of the negotiation and creatively combine negotiating tactics based in different cultural and gendered social identities allowed her to effectively “expand the pie and then divvy it up” in a way that both ensured strong U.S. gains on the IPR problem and promoted and protected Chinese gains in economic development and respect. Although drawing primarily on strategies based on her “iron lady” image, she did utilize both creating and claiming negotiating tactics and drew on both sets of cultures in doing so, and demonstrated her awareness of the different variations in meanings of these strategies across cultures through such behavior as tailoring her behavior to strategically promote both interests in both “face” and in gains. Barshefsky presented herself as a someone who demanded respect but who was also a culturally refined person practiced in multiple kinds of strategies, and as such was able to do very well in pursuing both individual (for the United States) and joint (for the United States and China) gains.

This discussion has been limited by two major issues. First, because of the “public” focus of the Sebenius and Hulse case, it is difficult to analyze the impact of informal/“boudoir” diplomacy, which is a large part of this paper's analytical contribution. (Such discussion may have to wait for a case to be developed that takes this framework into account.) Second, because this teaching case focused on the American side of the negotiation, discussion here has been limited to the U.S. (rather than the Chinese) side of the negotiation. However, the aspects of the model that have been possible to cover suggest that the use of a social identity approach to culture and gender in negotiations can be a useful organizing framework for understanding culture and gender in negotiations.

### **Conclusion**

Culture and gender influence negotiations in dynamic, interactive ways. Although a focus on any single level of culture (e.g., national, organizational) is limited in the dynamism real-life negotiations demonstrate, highlighting the interactions between culture and gender provides a more nuanced basis on which to understand intercultural negotiations. This paper has sought to address a gap in the literature on gender, culture, and negotiation research by proposing a social identity framework which treats culture and gender as intersecting social identities that provide models which both enable and restrict negotiating behavior, and demonstrating that IR research can benefit from paying more attention to these literatures. It suggests that understanding “ideal type” models of gender and negotiator diplomats across cultures can help academics, students and diplomats to better understand how negotiators' behavior is shaped by cultural and gendered systems in international politics. It facilitates further investigations into models investigating when and to what extent culture and gender influences negotiating style and outcome (e.g., Morris and Gelfand 2004; Bowles et al. 2005) within an understanding of how broader gendered and cultural systems (not just negotiator sex and geographic origin) influence the demographics, institutions (of formal and informal diplomacy), and kinds of negotiator goals. Finally, it suggests that negotiator strategy is based in cultural and gendered social identity models of dominant masculinity and subordinate femininity, but that diplomats can creatively code-switch and use mixed strategies in order to meet goals defined in terms of different institutionalized

cultural and gendered structures. The author hopes that this investigation will convince researchers of the utility of greater cross-disciplinary dialog between the traditions of gender and culture in negotiation teaching and research.

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